


THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

Hamilton, The Federalist




YEAR XXXIII, 1991, NUMBER 3

THE FEDERALIST

a political review

Editor: Mario Albertini

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



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The European Summit at Maastricht

The result of the Maastricht summit should be judged on the basis of two key issues. First is Economic and Monetary Union, on which an important agreement set the date (1999, or possibly 1997) for the creation of a central European bank with powers to issue a single currency. Second is tackling the Community's democratic deficit, concerning which real (if insufficient) steps were taken (see below). In comparison to these decisions, the agreements on European social issues, cohesion, security and internal policy (let alone the widening of Community powers) take second place, despite the intensity with which they were debated, since they do not significantly challenge the sovereignty of member states.

The monetary achievements are by themselves significant enough to justify a positive judgement of the Summit overall. The period set down for the creation of a European currency is certainly lengthy; so much so as to make many afraid that the Union will not develop strength and cohesion fast enough to deal with the economic crisis and social disintegration which are coming to light at an ever more insistent rate in East European countries. Nevertheless the Maastricht decision to set 1999 as a firm date (which can however be brought forward to 1997) for creating a single currency and central European bank can only provide the clearest of signals. Such was the case for the single market, whose creation was set out by the European Council at Luxembourg in December 1985 with an expiry period little shorter than that for the third phase of Economic and Monetary Union — seven years as opposed to eight (which moreover may be reduced to six). This cannot fail to happen for Maastricht's revolutionary decisions. Hence the perspective of 1997-99 will inevitably and immediately start to arouse expectations and so increasingly influence the behaviour of both economic factors and the states. This will create an unstoppable mix of political decisions, industrial strategies, investment programmes, and contracts which will most likely make the

anticipation of the start of the concluding phase of Economic and Monetary Union possible and even necessary.

Moreover it is important not to forget that Economic and Monetary Union is inseparable from Political Union. The independence of the future central European bank will form an essential pillar of Economic and Monetary Union. In day-to-day politics monetary mechanisms must be removed from political control, and the ever-present temptation of political power to use inflation as a way to hide difficulties (hence aggravating them) instead of tackling them. Nevertheless the prime instrument of economic policy cannot be divorced from the control of bodies which democratically express popular sovereignty. Hence, for critical decisions, the political authority must have control over the central bank — as occurred in Germany for the critical choice of reunification. Thus on the one hand, the planned creation of Economic and Monetary Union, insofar as it entails a significant cession of member states' sovereignty, represents by itself a decisive step towards a real federal Union. On the other hand it exacerbates the problem of the Community's democratic deficit, and highlights the need to tackle this issue with radical institutional changes. This can only strengthen the resolve of those struggling to carry the process to its political conclusion.

However, the Maastricht summit did give an answer to the need to democratise the Community's institutions, even if it was an insufficient one. The European Parliament's participation in the legislative process has been increased, even if to a lesser extent than the widening of the Community's competences and the allocation of competences to the nascent Union. Similarly the areas of (qualified) majority-voting in the Council have been extended, again insufficiently. The Commission's period of office has been made equal to Parliamentary terms, and the Commission will be subject to a vote of confidence by the Parliament before it can start to operate. The Commission remains an organ of an ambiguous nature and is not yet a government which exercises full executive powers. Yet in reality, the new relationship between Parliament and Commission is looking ahead to the birth of real parliamentary government. A role (not institutional, and for this reason so much more important) for interparliamentary Conferences has been recognised (the *Assizes*, that already in Rome, 1990, had given a clear demonstration of the extent to which national Parliaments were to be important allies of the European Parliament) and the development and consolidation of European parties has been encouraged. Even though the term "federal union" was suppressed so as not to break ranks with Great Britain, the evolution-

ary character of the Union was underlined; the Union should become "ever closer", and 1996 was set for taking stock of progress in this direction and promoting new ways forward. This clearly refers to declarations, and it is well known that the road to European integration is paved with declarations that have remained dead letters. It is worth noting though that these declarations will be incorporated in a treaty; that they are set down in precise and binding terms; and that they are part of a process which gains momentum from Economic and Monetary Union, for which commitments have been signed and precise expiry dates set.

Even the "opting out" clause granted to Britain and Denmark for the third phase of Economic and Monetary Union, and the agreed exclusion of Britain from future agreements on social issues should be interpreted as positive signals. European construction will only proceed in future if the process can be freed from the veto of those governments most committed to maintaining their own sovereignty. The Community will only be able to extend eastwards and take in EFTA countries if it can create institutional mechanisms which allow new states to enjoy the benefits concomitant with membership of the Union, without paralysing the decision-making process. To counter this danger it is vital that a "strong nucleus" is established inside the Union, made up of states that accept without reservations the "federal vocation" of the Union. Such a nucleus should have its own rules and its own degree of autonomy, so as to provide the freedom of decision-making needed to give itself a genuine federal constitution in a short space of time — to which other members of the Union can adhere when the conditions have been established. The Maastricht decisions undoubtedly represent a step in this direction, and it only remains to hope that the philosophy of the two circles that inspired them will be extended in the future to decisions on Political Union as well — and institutional reforms in particular.

All the same, a constituent mandate for the European Parliament was completely lacking from the draft treaty at Maastricht. However it was unlikely that an intergovernmental conference would spontaneously divest itself of its powers in favour of a Parliament that, despite a promising leap in its self-confidence in the weeks leading up to the summit, has laid claim to its constituent role only on rare occasions and then rather feebly. The Parliament has to win its constituent role on its own, by displaying unity, combativeness and determination. After Maastricht it does have greater powers at its disposal however, and hence more effective means with which to exert pressure. The Parliament needs to understand how to exploit them for the purpose of acquiring the role

(which is its due insofar as it is the expression of European democratic legitimacy) of real author of European federal unity. In this quest the Parliament will find invaluable allies in the majority of national Parliaments, which are themselves the expression of the popular will and whose role is seriously compromised, to the same extent as the European Parliament's, by the growth of the Community's democratic deficit (and the Union's, of which, following Maastricht, the Community has become a part).

As for the Federalists they have never pretended to be the sole driving force in the process of European unification. They know that many contributors are required if significant steps towards Political Union are to be achieved. The important thing is that each actor plays his part. The Federalists have played theirs to the full, and it is an acceptable claim that without the presence of a vanguard which kept the issue of European federal Union alive when it seemed definitely beyond the horizon of national politicians, and which mobilised all available forces as the decisive moment approached, the results of Maastricht would not have been obtained — as is the case for achievements at all other decisive moments in the process. Federalists should not lose sight of the fact that their objective is still remote and that the road ahead is difficult and full of obstacles. But nor should they forget that episodes such as the Maastricht summit show their work to be decisive. Moreover, if that were not the case, the federalist viewpoint (which for many years Federalists alone gave voice to) would not have entered into the political debate to the extent that it has done. It is only in this double awareness that Federalists will be able to find the strong motivation needed to continue in a task that promises to increase in difficulty as the objective is neared.

The Federalist

What is internationalism?*

LUCIO LEVI

1. Introduction.

All the great revolutionary movements, such as Liberal, Democratic, National and Socialist, since the end of the eighteenth century, in other words from the French Revolution onwards, have asserted new models of political life and have been characterized by a strong internationalist component. The word "internationalism" above all expresses the idea that it is impossible to think of the values of freedom, equality, national independence and social justice as principles valid for one country only and limited exclusively to the national area. The quality of universality is inherent in these values. As a result, their realization within the national ambit could only be seen as a necessary stage towards opening the way to their extension to Europe and the world.

2. The universal dimension of the French and Russian Revolutions.

With the French Revolution, international relations, which until then had been almost exclusively relations between kings and princes, assumed a new nature: they became relations between nations. In other words, the people became increasingly active on the international political scene.

In the fight against the dynastic principle, which was the foundation of absolute monarchies, the bourgeoisie was the standard-bearer of cosmopolitan and internationalist values.

Liberal-democratic internationalism proclaimed the universal nature of the values of freedom, equality and fraternity. The spirit of the *Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens* was that of proclaiming

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universal principles, which would overcome all national allegiances. These principles, asserted through the French Revolution, were projected at a universal level and referred to nations, which, as they gradually rid themselves of the unjust and arbitrary government of monarchs, were to become the protagonists of international political life. All this placed the problems of international order under new terms and made possible the fraternization of all those people who had won democratic rights, and universal peace, as a result of the universal affirmation of the principle of popular sovereignty.

According to this type of internationalism, the affirmation of democracy in France would have started a process of transformation of international relations. The unification and pacification of the world would have been the result of an expanding movement around a revolutionary nucleus, represented by the first democratic state.

Socialist internationalism was founded on the affirmation of the universal nature of the values of social emancipation, the standard-bearer of which was the proletariat. It had its practical justification in the need to unify the struggle of workers in all countries against the worldwide organization of capitalism. The appeal: "Working men of all countries, unite!", which ends *The Communist Manifesto*, the text which contains the first complete theoretic formulation of socialist internationalism, express this need.

According to Leninist theory, the Russian Revolution is but the first stage of a more general revolutionary process, caused by the crisis of the capitalist system and destined to spread to the whole world. It introduces into the world states system a principle of contradiction, which tends to radically transform it: by modifying the nature of the state, it also modifies the rules governing international relations.

In fact, according to the Marxist concept, wherever proletarian power replaces bourgeois rule, not only does the antagonism between classes disappear, but also that between states. Therefore the Soviet Union is the embryo of a universal socialist organization in which violence, as an instrument for solving international conflicts, would no longer have any reason to exist.

Thus, in those moments when the continuity of history has been interrupted by deep breaches of a revolutionary nature, such as the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution, together with the aspirations of emancipation from all forms of oppression within the state, the ideals of peace and universal solidarity have also appeared. However, these revolutions, as their titles reveal, took place in single countries, whereas

revolution is a worldwide and universal concept. Having realized the principles of democratic and socialist rule, they became prisoners of the state they transformed. Consequently, the principles of freedom and equality have fallen into decline, because, in a world of independent and sovereign states fighting among themselves, they must be sacrificed, every time it becomes necessary, to *raison d'Etat*. However, the values of peace and solidarity between all men, which represent an essential component of revolutionary thought, have never disappeared from the underground current of history, and today, in a world where war has become so destructive as to threaten the very existence of mankind, their realization has become the condition for all progress.

3. *The nature of internationalism.*

When speaking of liberal, democratic and socialist internationalism, what is meant is a specific concept of international relations, of the causes of war and of the means to realize peace and international order, in other words a theory and practice both devoted to realizing international solidarity between peoples, parties, classes, and so on.

Liberal thought singles out the main cause for war in the aristocratic (for the political) and mercantilist (for the economic) structure of states. The introduction of representative governments and the development of international trade are consequently supposed to have quenched the warlike inclinations of states. Concerning this, Benjamin Constant wrote: "It is clear that the more the commercial tendency dominates, the more the warlike tendency must weaken."¹

On the other hand, democratic thought ascribes wars to the authoritarian character of governments. Peace is the necessary consequence of the establishment of popular sovereignty. Thomas Paine, reflecting on the French Revolution, wrote on this subject: "Monarchic sovereignty, the enemy of mankind and the source of misery, is abolished; and the sovereignty itself is restored to its natural and original place, the Nation. Were this the case throughout Europe, the cause of wars would be taken away."²

For the founders of the national movement, too, nation and humanity are not contradictory but complementary terms. For example, the *Giovine Europa*, established by Giuseppe Mazzini in 1834, is juxtaposed to the old Europe of the Holy Alliance, of conservatism, of privilege, of division and discord. The new Europe, born of the emancipation of nations, marked the beginning of a new historical phase during which human

solidarity and the brotherhood of peoples was to develop, virtues that would allow all European peoples to collaborate in the progress of all mankind. "All collective work," wrote Mazzini, "requires a division of work. The existence of nations is the consequence of this necessity. Every nation has a mission, a special office in collective work, a special aptitude for carrying out the office: this is its mark, its christening, its legitimacy. Every nation is a worker for humanity, it works for it, so that the common end is reached for the benefit of everyone: if the office is betrayed and distorted into selfishness, it declines and inevitably undergoes expiation, longer or shorter according to the degree of guilt."³

Finally, socialist thought, developing these analyses, found in capitalism the ultimate cause for wars and linked the abolition of private ownership of the means of production to the social transformation which, by allowing the antagonism between classes to be overcome, was supposed to eliminate imperialism and wars. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels thus wrote in *The Communist Manifesto*, recalling the liberal concept: "National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto." And they continued: "The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilized countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end."⁴

In conclusion, it can be affirmed that, when the liberal, democratic, nationalist and socialist theorists thought of the future of international relations, they imagined that the peoples, after becoming masters of their own destiny, thanks to their liberation from monarchic and aristocratic rule or from bourgeois and capitalist rule, would no longer have any reasons for conflict.

After rapidly summarizing these four theories of international relations, it can be observed that they have some premises in common: they explain international policy through the same categories with which they explain domestic policy, attribute international tensions and wars exclusively to the nature of the internal structures of states and consider peace as an automatic and necessary consequence of the transformation of the

internal structures (political and/or economic) of the states.

Internationalism is therefore a political concept which, from a theoretic point of view, does not attribute any autonomy to the international political system with respect to the internal structure of the single states, and to foreign policy with respect to domestic policy. Moreover, from a practical point of view, it considers that the struggle to achieve freedom, equality, national independence and social justice in the single states has precedence over the objectives of peace and international order.

If one wishes to achieve a historical understanding of the real foundations of such a widespread point of view, it becomes necessary to consider the structure and dynamics of the productive system and of the world system of states during the XIX and XX centuries. To our ends it is enough to define the more general aspects of the historical context in which the tendency to internationalism asserted itself.

4. The material foundations of internationalism: interdependence and world politics.

As far as the first aspect is concerned, in other words the identification of the material foundations of internationalism, it must be observed that the development of the industrial mode of production, in its initial phase, determined the extension to the national collectiveness of relations of production and exchange and of all those other aspects of social life which are directly or indirectly linked to them. Subsequently, social relations progressively extended beyond state boundaries, they made the individual societies in which mankind is divided come out of their former isolation and made every society increasingly dependent on others. Thus an economic and social system of worldwide dimensions was formed, the world market, on which all men depend to satisfy their requirements. The development of means of communication and transportation has brought peoples closer together and united our planet's societies. Internationalist ideology undoubtedly reflects this process.

On the other hand, it must be considered that the real foundations of this process correspond to a phase of European history in which international political stability was not troubled by serious problems. From 1815 to 1914, in other words from the Vienna Congress to the First World War, Europe went through a period of exceptional international political stability, which Karl Polanyi has called "the hundred years' peace." He observes that, apart from the Crimean War, a more or less colonial event, England, France, Prussia, Austria, Italy and Russia were involved in wars

with each other for only eighteen months.⁵

The formation and development of the world market is unthinkable without these political conditions. Great Britain played a decisive role in creating and maintaining these conditions. It was the first industrial country and had accumulated such an advantage over other states that it had a concrete interest in maintaining and developing the freedom of international exchanges, because it could play a predominant role on the world market. The political leadership of London, with the help of two instruments, one monetary and the other military, thus ensured the functioning of the world market. The first instrument was the international monetary system, founded on the hegemony of the pound pegged to the gold standard, the second was the supremacy of the British navy on the seas (the British navy's gunboats were used to keep commercial routes to foreign countries open).

Thus it is easy to understand how the orderly development of the international political and economic system was not the result of a natural order, as the supporters of free exchange maintained, but of fortuitous circumstances that were historically transient. But it is also easily understood why the liberal, democratic, national and socialist ideologies have awarded a subordinate role to the problems of international order. They were formulated in an era in which historical movements placed the problem of transforming the internal structure of states high up on their agendas, while peace appeared to be a necessary consequence of those transformations. The prevailing political culture seemed therefore to give a satisfactory answer to the desire for peace, because international political and economic stability disguised the ideological aspects of internationalism. The outbreak of the First World War showed the complete inability of that point of view to foresee, understand and avoid that immense human catastrophe. And the European ruling class, which drew the inspiration for its actions from this point of view, proved to be unable to control the blind forces caused by the historical decadence of the European states system.

The limits of internationalism are the limits of traditional ideologies, which consider the struggle to assert themselves at a national level sufficient to achieve their political objectives. Basing their interpretation of social reality on the need to defend the interests of a nation or a class, in the end they became prisoners of schemes of national culture, which explains international politics in terms of the "pre-eminence of domestic policy."

One of the most widespread theoretic expressions of this viewpoint in

our time is the economic interpretation of war, which has found its canonical formulation in Lenin's pamphlet on imperialism, that states that "imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism."⁶ This theory is but one example of various unilateral explanations of international politics, an attempt to get to know the states system starting from the study of a single aspect of social reality, such as man (explanations of a psychological and biological nature, focusing on the decisive factor of aggressiveness) or the structure of single states (explanations of a political nature, which favour the analysis of the structure of a political régime, for example the authoritarianism of monarchies).

Concerning the economic interpretation of war, Lord Lothian has observed: "The division of the world into sovereign states long antedated modern capitalism. Capitalism does not cause war inside the state. Nor would it produce war inside a federation of nations. It is the division of humanity into sovereign states which disturbs the pacific functioning of capitalism as international force and causes war, not capitalism which is the cause of the division of the world into an anarchy of sovereign states."⁷

The point of view on which these considerations is based is that of the theory of *raison d'Etat*, which dates back to Machiavelli and inspires some of the present day scholars of international relations, such as Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron and Kenneth Waltz. The basic concept of this theory is that, because of the division of humanity into sovereign states, that do not recognize any superior power, the world is ruled by war and force. As a result, security comes first among the priorities a government has to choose from and for its sake, if necessary, the principles of morality and law should be sacrificed.

There are, however, two different interpretations of *raison d'Etat*: the nationalist which conceives of the division of humanity into sovereign states as an eternal datum, and the federalist one, which considers this reality historically transient. The latter is interesting because it tends to eliminate force from international politics, gradually overcoming the anarchy of the national sovereignties and founding the security of states not on armed forces, but on a federal government able to resolve conflicts between states on a legal basis.

As far as this is concerned, it must be pointed out that during the First World War there were some who, although they belonged to the social-communist (Leon Trotsky) or liberal-democratic (Luigi Einaudi) tradition, tried to learn from the new and unforeseen events which marked a turning-point in the course of history. A new idea, in fact, began to assert

itself, which attributed to the crisis of the nation-state, the responsibility for the War and pointed to a precise alternative: the United States of Europe, meant as a step towards the unification of the world. In other words, war is interpreted as the consequence of the contradiction between the internationalization of the productive process and the division of the world into conflicting sovereign states. Einaudi defined the world war as "the bloody struggle to elaborate a political form of a superior order" to the nation-states,⁸ and Trotsky as the revolt of the productive forces developed by capitalism against their usage by the nation-state.⁹

All this shows that there is a negative aspect of technological development: every conflict threatens to spread to the whole world. World wars are the negative expression of the historical trend towards the unification of Europe and the world. The absolute nature of war in the industrial age shows that men have acquired the power to destroy the world, but not yet the power to rule it. This depends on the fact that the world is organized in independent and sovereign states which, at the time of their formation and for prior centuries, represented a principle of order in the chaos of politics, but that now no longer corresponds to the new situation of a world that is growing more tightly interdependent.

The development of interdependence has made relations between states closer and has increased the need to regulate the problems of economic, monetary, energy, social, environmental, cultural, and other policies at an international level. On this basis the world states system was formed, which has given world politics a global dimension. The traditional method of diplomacy has proved inadequate in regulating matters which have increasingly assumed the nature of problems of government.

At this point it is appropriate to examine the norms and institutions that internationalism has elaborated so as to guarantee international peace and order: international law and international organizations, the creation of an international free-trade order and the organization of international political movements, such as the workers' Internationals.

5. International law and international organizations.

The foundation of international law lies in the fact that states, not being isolated entities, are driven to regulate both government activities and non-governmental activities which take place at the international level. However, while within the individual states, when someone resorts to force others can appeal to the public authorities to inflict sanctions, in an international political framework, in the absence of a court and police

force, every state is inclined to take the law into its own hands. In an anarchic society, such as the international one, in which states have not renounced their right to self-protection, the role played by international law is problematic. It has been defined by Hans Kelsen as "a primitive law," that can be understood only "if we distinguish — as does primitive man — between killing as a delict and killing as a sanction." Kelsen, in other words, affirms that the juridical nature of international law "depends upon whether it is possible ... to assume ... that ... war is in principle forbidden, being permitted only as a sanction, i. e. as a reaction against a delict."¹⁰

On the other hand, the supporters of the imperial concept of law object that, as international law is founded on the principle *pacta sunt servanda rebus sic stantibus*, it is the individual states that decide when a change has taken place that justifies a modification of treaties. More generally, they affirm that, in the absence of a central organ with the power to apply the rules of international law, the single states are free to conform or not, at their will, to those rules. And it is obvious that, when agreement is lacking, the road is open to a recourse to force. As Kant observed, international law "presupposes the existence of many *separate*, independent adjoining nations," which is "in itself a state of war." The battlefield is therefore the tribunal in which ultimately conflicts between states are resolved, but victory conquered with the force of arms, as Kant writes, "cannot determine the right, and although a treaty of peace can put an end to some particular war, it cannot end the state of war (the tendency always to find a new pretext for war)."¹¹

The same limitation also belongs to the international organizations which, starting with the League of Nations, have tried to force states into a peaceful solution of conflicts. When the First World War revealed that the organization of Europe was radically incompatible with the development of productive forces and with international order, the problem of giving a juridical-institutional framework to international relations had to be faced and the League of Nations was established. The latter, as the UN was to be later, was the expression of an awareness and a need which are in part connected to federalist thought: that the problem of peace cannot be solved through the transformation of the political régime or of the productive system of the individual states and that it is therefore necessary to create specific instruments of international organization.

The League of Nations arose as a kind of "World Parliament" or "International of Nations" and its establishment seemed to represent the definite triumph of democratic ideas. However, the national principle

multiplied the number of states, determining, at the time of the First World War, the collapse of multinational empires and the balkanization of Europe and, after the Second World War, the balkanization of the Third World following the disintegration of colonial empires. Historical experience has shown that democracy, choked into excessively restricted spaces, is bound to suffocate and that the generalization of the national principle tends to aggravate international anarchy, which neither the L/N nor the UN have been able to hold in check. In fact, at the basis of the pact establishing the L/N, and also of the UN charter, there is the principle of the inviolability of national sovereignties, which does not admit any limitation to the exercise of states' sovereignty. Consequently, important decisions are made unanimously and the right of veto protects the individual states from those acts that threaten their sovereignty. These are essentially diplomatic mechanisms, not constitutional instruments governing international relations. This is demonstrated by the fact that the only means available to these organizations for stopping an assailant state and enforcing international law is the threat, or the actual use, of force. In other words, in order to guarantee peace they are obliged to resort to war.

Lord Lothian, trying to give an overall evaluation of the nature and limits of the L/N (but his judgement can be extended to the UN), wrote: "The League cannot be made to perform the functions of a world state. It cannot end war altogether ... If the League is to succeed as an intermediate system it will be because its members are resolved that grievances can be remedied and treaties reformed by its collective procedure, that they can rely upon one another for security against aggression unless there has first been resort to that procedure, and that if war does break out over some dispute which will not yield to pacific methods it can be localized and prevented from leading to a world war."¹²

On the other hand, as pointed out by Stanley Hoffmann, another author who has dedicated an important part of his work to studying "intermediate systems," there also exists a close link between the "solidity and authority" of the norms of international law, on the one hand, and the "stability" of the system of international relations on the other. In terms similar to those of Lothian he remarks that "if we look at the relations between states, we see a broad gamut of situations in between the status of the mythical state-in-isolation ... and the situation of a member state in a federation." And he proposes as an example of a stable system the European concert. "In a stable system, such as the nineteenth

century's," he writes, "sovereignty is a fairly clear nexus of powers with sharp edges: the world appears as a juxtaposition of well-defined units, whose respective rights are neatly delimited, which allow few exceptions to the principle of full territorial jurisdiction, and which have few institutional links among them: co-operation is organized by diplomacy and by the market."¹³

Likewise, within international organizations a wide range of situations can be distinguished, ranging from the loosest kind of institution, such as the L/N, whose task is simply to favour the solution of conflicts between states, to those institutions governing a process of economic integration and political unification, such as the European Community in its present form.

As far as the European Community in particular is concerned, it shows that economic integration (the formation of a standardized economic space) and political unification (the creation of supranational political structures, such as the European Parliament elected by universal suffrage) are founded on two structural conditions. The first is economic and social interdependence between nations. The second is the elimination of military antagonisms between states.

It is obvious that the premise of the economic integration process is the disappearance of war as a means of solving international conflicts. It is true that, according to the federalist point of view (from Kant to Lord Lothian), peace can be guaranteed only through federation. However, a "security community" can be considered only as the fundamental condition of any integration process. This expression, coined by Richard Van Wagenen, is one of the key concepts of a comparative study of sixteen historical cases of political unification in the North Atlantic area. A "security community" is defined as an area "in which there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way."¹⁴

This concept can be usefully employed to interpret the European integration process. In actual fact, the latter has caused a complete change as far as the expectations of war are concerned. Power politics has disappeared, determining a deep alteration in the relations between states. Co-operation has replaced antagonism as the main trend in the foreign policy of European Community member states.

This phenomenon has started to reveal itself at a global level. On the one hand, interdependence reflects objective needs, which are vital for the survival of mankind: security concerning the nuclear threat, the protection of the environment and the overcoming of underdevelopment

in Third World countries. Even the superpowers have become unable to solve these global problems, which require a high level of co-operation. On the other hand, disarmament is replacing the arms race, because the United States and the Soviet Union can no longer sustain the cost of the arms race and of military confrontation. Consequently, they are forced to co-operate. "To unite or to perish," the formula used by Aristide Briand with reference to the European states during the period between the two wars, is now suitable for the two superpowers and is destined to become the guiding theme of the world unification process, in the context of the transformation of the UN into a world government. It is not by chance that those who, like Mikhail Gorbachev, have tried to formulate a "new political thinking" suitable to the new problems of our time, affirm the priority of the objective of the "survival of humanity," the re-organization of international relations on the basis of the principles of "mutual security" and of "non-offensive defense," the reinforcement of the UN and the creation of a new European-Russian-American organization, the "European Common Home."¹⁵

6. *The international free-trade order.*

According to liberal thought, the state must reduce to the bare minimum its intervention in economic relations, in order to favour individual interests and to ensure their harmonious operation in society. The same principle must stand for state intervention in international trade and the achievement of mankind's prosperity and peace between peoples. We have already pointed out the limits of this point of view, which does not take into account the political influences on international trade, for example the role of the naval and commercial hegemony of Great Britain, that ensured the unity of the world market in the XIX century or of the corresponding role of the United States in the XX century. People always forget that it was the great Liberals themselves (in the first place Lionel Robbins) who demonstrated the need for the existence of a state and of a real and true "liberal plan" for the existence of a truly competitive market, in which resources are employed and distributed in the most advantageous way. Robbins, criticized all who thought the free market is something which arises spontaneously, remarking that it is instead an institution requiring "an apparatus for maintaining law and order. But whereas *within* national areas such an apparatus, however imperfect, existed, *between* national areas there was no apparatus at all." From here he highlights the contradiction of those liberals who "within the national

areas they relied upon the coercive power of the state to provide the restraints which harmonized the interests of the different individuals. Between the areas they relied only upon demonstration of common interest and the futility of violence: their outlook here, that is to say, was implicitly not liberal but anarchist."¹⁶ In actual fact, market laws do not operate without a coercive force that offers everyone a legal guarantee and uniform juridical and administrative regulations, which direct economic activity within legal limits.

Consequently, in a world of sovereign states, political preoccupations of a defensive and offensive nature tend to prevail over those of a strictly economic nature relative to a more productive use of resources. Thus productive resources tend to be organized taking into account more the state's requirement of security than the objective of citizens' welfare. This is the interpretative framework that helps to explain the protectionism and economic nationalism, which spread infectiously to all the industrialized world at the time of the world wars. Once the historic phase of the naval and commercial hegemony of Great Britain (which had ensured the unity of the world market) was over, international anarchy worsened and the need for economic self-sufficiency, which was essential to guarantee the independence of the individual states in time of war, became increasingly urgent. Protectionism was the instrument that the nation-states used to achieve economic self-sufficiency. Thus, unlike the explanations inspired by Marxism, which attribute protectionism to the monopolistic structure of the economic system, for Robbins the ultimate cause of protectionism is international anarchy.

For example, the availability of raw materials, in conditions of peace, is merely a function of the price. But as international relations are dominated by war or the threat to resort to it, the fight to control raw materials, from which no state wants to be excluded, becomes a reason for international conflicts. The race to share out the colonies at the end of the last century clearly shows how this mechanism operated. But the political context which makes it active is the organization of the world into sovereign states. Therefore, according to Robbins, the re-organization in the federal sense of international relations would make it possible to submit it to democratic control, thereby eliminating the factor which transforms economic conflicts into military conflicts.

The fact is, that "there is world economy, [but] there is no world policy." As a result, the control of the economy, be it of a liberal or socialist nature, is possible only at the national level. Thus, Robbins observes, "international liberalism is not a plan that has been tried and

failed. It is a plan which has never been carried through.”¹⁷

Of course, the development of economic relations in the world market is conditioned by the distribution of political power within the world system of states. This means that, between international anarchy and world federation there are intermediate situations, such as that characterized by the hegemony of one state, the consequences of which on the international market have been widely illustrated. Particularly interesting is the situation characterized by the convergence of the *raisons d'Etat* of a group of states, which is favourable to the development of an integration process.

7. *The workers' Internationals.*

In contemporary society there has been a proliferation of non-governmental organizations which operate at the international level. This is one of the more striking consequences of the ever closer interdependence between states. To study these subjects, an adequate theory is required. Many experts on these organizations support a thesis according to which the development of these phenomena proves that the state is no longer the main actor in international politics.

However, as Kenneth Waltz has asserted, this theory, to be reliable, would have to prove that “the non-state actors develop to the point of rivaling or surpassing the great powers, not just a few of the minor ones. They show no sign of doing that.”¹⁸ The experience of the workers' Internationals and of multinational companies has shown that these organizations are subordinate to the power system in which they operate (the world states system), which sets up the rules the non-governmental organizations follow. And it should be emphasized that the latter have a limited degree of political autonomy at the international level.

Particularly significant from this point of view are the vicissitudes of the workers' Internationals. At the decisive moment of war, national solidarity has always prevailed on the ties which unite the working classes of the world. The Franco-Prussian war was the event that determined this prevailing tendency, spread nationalist sentiments within the conflicting nations and mortally wounded the First International. The First World War represents the factor which destroyed the alliance between the working classes within the Second International and determined the alliance of the working classes of the individual states with the bourgeoisie of their own country against the proletariat of other countries.

And once again war (the Second World War) is the element that explains the dissolution of the Third International. The Soviet Union's alliance with the most powerful countries of the Western world required the end of what presented itself as an organ of world revolution, in the name of collaboration imposed by the need to defeat Nazi Germany and its allies. The survival of the Comintern had therefore become incompatible with the objectives imposed by the *raison d'Etat* of the Soviet Union.

These vicissitudes of the workers' Internationals permit the illustration of an often unobserved relation between internationalism and international anarchy. The impotence of the Internationals in the face of war was not simply a casual episode, but the expression of a structural tendency. International relations are dominated by a mechanism which irresistibly tends to reproduce, especially in the stages of the most acute crisis in the international political system, such as war, the phenomenon of the international division of the workers' movement and the prevailing of national solidarity, even among opposing classes, over international class solidarity. “International socialism cannot stand up against international anarchy” Barbara Wootton wrote, commenting on the failure of the Second International. “The claims of national security, if not of rampant nationalism, are too strong. As long as there is no machinery other than war to deal with political gangsters, the socialist is faced with an intolerable dilemma. Either he must take up arms against his comrades, or he must lie down before aggression. He has generally chosen the former alternative. And socialism as an international movement is in ruins.” Wootton's conclusion was that, if international Socialism is obliged to bow to international anarchy, it can assert itself only within the framework of a state: “Experience has shown that it is possible to build Trade Unions that are capable of concerted action over vast geographical areas, provided that they do not extend beyond the boundaries of independent states.”¹⁹

This interpretation allows us to identify the reasons for the failure of socialist internationalism, as of any other form of internationalism, in the objective structure of the international political system. The organization of political power, of the fight between parties and social forces, of the consensus of citizens in the national framework, in other words the inertia of national institutions, has prevented opening up to the people' and workers' control the mechanisms of an international society hitherto abandoned to the diplomatic and military clash between states and not regulated by laws. The democratic procedures for the formation of political decisions and organization of the masses still halts at states'

boundaries. Individuals, either singularly or organized into parties or trade unions, do not dispose of any instrument of political action beyond the national boundaries except for the summit procedures of foreign policy. Even nowadays the institutions through which democratic participation takes place are allowed to act only within individual countries. Consequently, only if a solution is found to the problem which is neglected by internationalism, that of destroying or at least limiting exclusive national sovereignty, the ultimate cause of power politics and war, will it become possible to submit international politics to the same rules as domestic politics obey.

On the other hand, as Robert Michels has observed, it is not possible to fight against war with organizations, such as parties, which are subordinated to the state. Examining the reasons for the failure of the Second International, he wrote: "The forces of party, however well-developed, are altogether inferior and subordinate to the forces of the government, and this is especially true in such a country as Germany. Consequently one of the cardinal rules governing the policy of the Socialist Party is never to push its attacks upon the government beyond the limits imposed by the inequality between the respective forces of the combatants. In other words, the life of the party, whose preservation has gradually become the supreme objective of the parties of political action, must not be endangered. The result is that the external form of the party, its bureaucratic organization, definitively gains the upper hand over its soul, its doctrinal and theoretic content, and the latter is sacrificed whenever it tends to involve an inopportune conflict with the enemy. The outcome of this regressive evolution is that the party is no longer regarded as a means for the attainment of an end, but gradually becomes an end-in-itself, and is therefore incapable of resisting the arbitrary exercise of power by the state when this power is inspired by a vigorous will. Inevitably such a party is unable to sustain so terrible a test as that of upholding its faith in principles when the state, determined upon war, and resolved to crush anyone who gets in the way, threatens the party in case of disobedience with the dissolution of its branches, the sequestration of its funds, and the slaughter of its best men. The party gives way, hastily sells its internationalist soul, and, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, undergoes transformation into a patriotic party."²⁰

In conclusion, when the security of the state is endangered and the spring of military mobilization has been released, it is an illusion to think one can impose a different political attitude on governments, by resorting to instruments of action which are not of a military nature, such as a

general strike. Besides, both Marx and Lenin strongly criticized the strategy of a general strike against war, because they considered it ineffective. On the contrary, they thought the occasion of war should be used to develop revolutionary strategy. War, by endangering the very existence of the state, has always been conceived of by revolutionaries as an event able to determine the collapse of the power apparatus of the state and to prepare the way for a change of régime. Lenin specified this point of view with the formula of the "transformation of imperialist war into civil war," an enterprise which was successful in Russia with the October Revolution.

Another limitation of using a general strike against war consists of the fact that it would have ended up by favouring states with an authoritarian régime, like Russia, in which the right to go on strike was not acknowledged, and would only have damaged democratic states.

On the other hand, it cannot be affirmed that the causes of the failure of the Second International lie in the institutional weakness of this organization, as George Haupt seems to think. In a work in which he examined the history of the Socialist International on the eve of the Second World War, he identifies the structural limits of this organization with the complete autonomy of the member parties, which made it extremely difficult to "implement the decisions and control their application" and did not allow the deep political and ideological divisions that had emerged within it to be overcome.²¹ However, on the basis of the interpretation suggested here, it seems logical to conclude that this factor has had a marginal role. Not even a supranational structure, in fact, would have been able to operate effectively against the war and would have been obliged to submit to the logic of force, which dominates international politics. On the other hand, considering the relative autonomy possessed by the organizational structures of the parties and political movements on the international level, it must be underlined that a structure of a supranational nature is more effective the further away the prospect of war is, and the stronger the co-operation between states.

A second factor, of an internal nature, which has favoured the prevalence of nationalism over internationalism has been the national integration of the popular masses. In Western Europe between 1870 and 1914 new social classes (first the middle class, then the working class) were able to enter progressively into national political life. This took place due to two successive processes, that Edward Carr called "democratization of the nation," in other words the participation of the people in political decision-making, and "socialization of the nation," in other

words social reforms.

The second process is particularly significant to an understanding of the failure of socialist internationalism. As Carr observes, "the defence of wages and employment becomes a concern of national policy and must be asserted, if necessary, against the national policies of other countries; and this in turn gives the worker an intimate practical interest in the policy and power of his nation." And he concludes: "The socialization of the nation has as its natural corollary the nationalization of socialism."²²

It was not therefore a matter of the betrayal of the working class and of the opportunism of the workers' aristocracies, according to the interpretation Lenin tried to win acceptance of. Factors of a political and institutional nature played a predominant role in determining the failure of socialist internationalism. In other terms, the fidelity of the working class to the nation was the reward of social policy in the nation-states. This was the determinant factor of the national integration of the workers' movement and of the alliance between nationalism and socialism. These elements concur to explain the decision of socialist parties to vote war credits and to support their national governments, which was the starting point of the dissolution of the First and Second Internationals. A military defeat would in fact have threatened the living conditions and positions of power that the workers' movements had acquired in their respective nation-states. "In the 19th century," Carr wrote, "when the nation belonged to the middle class and the worker had no fatherland, socialism had been international. The crisis of 1914 showed in a flash that, except in backward Russia, this attitude was everywhere obsolete. The mass of the workers knew instinctively on which side their bread was buttered; and Lenin was a lone voice proclaiming the defeat of his own country as a socialist aim and crying treason against the 'social-chauvinists'. International socialism ignominiously collapsed. Lenin's desperate rearguard action to revive it made sense only in Russia, and there only so long as revolutionary conditions persisted. Once the workers' state was effectively established, 'socialism in one country' was the logical corollary. The subsequent history of Russia and the tragi-comedy of the Communist International are an eloquent tribute to the solidarity of the alliance between nationalism and socialism."²³

8. Federalism and overcoming the limitations of internationalism.

The analysis of the values, the historical and social conditions, and the institutions of internationalism, has already shown the limitations of this

viewpoint. It is now a matter of drawing some conclusions.

The limitation of internationalism consists in neglecting the autonomy possessed by state structures due to the division of mankind into sovereign states, and the obstacle they represent to achieving real solidarity between peoples. In fact, there is an irremediable contradiction between the aspiration to independence and equality of all peoples, and their political division. Division transforms peoples into armed and hostile groups and makes it precarious, and in the long run impossible, for them to coexist peacefully. The unequal distribution of political power between states determines hegemonic and imperialist relations on the part of the stronger states with regard to the weaker ones.

The prevalent political culture of liberal, democratic, national and socialist inspiration chose as its exclusive area of commitment the effort to change the form of régime in existing states, but considered nation-states as natural, and therefore the only possible framework, for political strife. Nationalism, in other words the priority accorded to the national level, does not often appear in its true aspect, but with the mask of internationalism, precisely to hide its contradiction with the universal principles of freedom, equality and solidarity.

As Emery Reves has written, internationalism "does not and never has opposed nationalism and the evil effects of the nation-state structure."²⁴ In other words, internationalism passively assimilates the principle of unlimited national sovereignty, with all that follows (international anarchy and relations of force between nations), but does not consider the problem of modifying this form of relation between peoples and states. It accepts the anti-democratic premises of nationalism and of the diplomatic-intergovernmental approach, which keeps the people out of international politics and is not willing to sacrifice national interests in favour of international co-operation. Basically, it represents the utopia of pacific relations between sovereign states. In conclusion, it is simply a variation of the concept of the natural harmony of interests, applied to international relations.

As long as the world is organized according to the principle of national sovereignty, international politics will be ruled by relations of force between states. As a result, to defend state security, governments will tend to sacrifice, if necessary, the principles of law and morality.

To eliminate force from international relations, it is necessary to overcome the anarchy of national sovereignties and base state security not on armies, but on a worldwide federal government, able to solve conflicts within a legal framework. Federalism, by identifying the ulti-

mate cause of war in the division of mankind into sovereign states, and the instrument for achieving peace in a worldwide government, allows two different situations in which humanity can find itself to be considered clearly: international anarchy, in which international politics is the undesired and unforeseen result of the clash between national policies, and worldwide government, which has the power to decide world politics, which thus becomes a product of human will.

The federation is the only form of power organization that allows international anarchy to be overcome and relations of force between states to be eliminated. As Immanuel Kant wrote, peace is not merely the situation in which one war is ended, but in which it becomes possible "to end all wars forever."²⁵ Within this order, he specified, "every nation, even the smallest, can expect to have security and rights, not by virtue of its own might or its own declaration regarding what is right, but from this great federation of peoples (*Foedus Amphictyonum*) alone, from a united might and from decisions made by the united will in accord with laws."²⁶

However remote this objective may seem, the actual evolution of history seems to move in this direction. The direct election of the European Parliament has started the first experiment of international democracy. Certainly, it is an incomplete experiment, which is still waiting for the European people to be acknowledged, together with the power to elect their own representatives, as well as that of deciding who governs the European Community and controls the government programme. However, the extension of democratic participation (which in the past had stopped at the boundaries of states) from the national to the international sphere, represents the prerequisite for achieving popular control of that sector of political life which had previously been the exclusive dominion of the *raison d'Etat* and therefore of the diplomatic and military clash between states. The European election has thus opened up the first breach in the bastion of the *raison d'Etat*, against which the waves of internationalism used to break. All this shows that the federal unification of Europe marks an important stage in history: the overcoming of the formula of the nation-state (expression of the deepest political division and of the strongest centralization of power modern history has ever known) in order to solve the problems of increasing interdependence between states and to allow mankind to start marching towards the organization of peace throughout the whole planet.

NOTES

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⁶ V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917), in S. T. Possony (ed.), *Lenin Reader*, Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1966, p. 295.

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¹⁵ M. Gorbachev, *Perestroika* (1987), New York, Harper & Row, 1987.

¹⁶ L. Robbins, *Economic Planning and International Order*, London, MacMillan, 1937, p. 241.

¹⁷ L. Robbins, *op. cit.*, p. 239 and p. 238.

¹⁸ K.N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979, p. 95.

¹⁹ B. Wootton, *Socialism and Federation*, in P. Ransome (ed.), *Studies in Federal Planning*, London, New York, Lothian Foundation Press, 1990, 2nd edition, pp. 277 and 289.

²⁰ R. Michels, *Political Parties*, New York, Collier Books, 1962, p. 358.

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²² E.H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (1945), London, MacMillan, 1968, p. 19.

²³ E.H. Carr, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

²⁴ E. Reves, *The Anatomy of Peace* (1945), Harmondsworth-New York, Penguin Books, 1947, pp. 154-155.

²⁵ I. Kant, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

²⁶ I. Kant, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent* (1784), in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, cit.*, pp. 34-35.

The Ventotene Manifesto in the Era of World Unification *

GUIDO MONTANI

A new era in world politics?

Until now the history of the world has coincided with that of the peoples who have dominated the world. Humanity as a pluralistic people of nations has never had the chance to act as an active and self-conscious subject. Mankind is bound by an infinite number of constraints. Thousands of millions of individuals are born, live and die without being able to exercise the slightest influence, either on their personal destiny, or on

*This is a re-working of some lectures held in the course of the summer seminars at Ventotene in 1990 and 1991. The reader is referred to the Notes for a more in-depth discussion of specific questions concerning aspects of the history of the *Movimento Federalista Europeo* and the debate under way on its future.

The English translation of *militante federalista* has caused some difficulty due to meaning which, particularly in Great Britain, the word "militant" has assumed with the passage of time. A "militant" is a person "having or expressing a readiness to fight or use force" (Longman Active Study Dictionary), yet no such connotation is attached to the term *militante federalista*. The only possible alternative appears to be the substitution of the word "activist" in its place, but there are certain points to be made regarding this: a) "activist" has the defect of being unduly restrictive in that it signifies merely the execution of directives, hence emphasising a contrast between activist and leader, while *militante federalista* means a person committed to fighting for, and who personally contributes to, the elaboration of a new way of political thinking; b) in continental European parties with democratic practices, the term "militant" is still frequently used; c) throughout the history of federalism (not only the history of the MFE), the terms *militante* and *militante federalista* appear constantly and do not possess any negative connotation. For example, in 1931 Albert Einstein, in response to a US journalist who asked him if he considered himself a pacifist, said "I am not only a pacifist but a militant pacifist. I am willing to fight for peace" (O. Nathan and H. Norden, *Einstein on peace*, Methuen & Co, London, 1963, p. 125). For these reasons it is preferable not to move away from the traditional use of the term "militant", despite the fact that it may raise some misunderstanding among our English-language readers.

that of the community they live in. Mankind can only hope to be self-governing through collective action, uniting the will of fellow-citizens. Politics is the one field of human activity in which a collective will can emerge and in which man can develop conscious action, even though the dominance of interests, of necessity and of conservatism are not easy to overcome. For this reason, those moments when freedom manifests itself in history are preceded by long periods of incubation in which conscious minorities live the spirit of the new times, tirelessly criticizing the old, decaying institutions, and fighting to establish a new order.

In contemporary history an exceptional situation is coming about, in which the entire world system of power may be radically reconsidered. In other words, the possibility is emerging that world history may at last see mankind itself become an active subject in world politics. We are at the beginning of a period of struggle whose end-result might be the self-government of the people of the world: in short, international democracy. This is an opportunity for the present-day youth who will reach maturity in the next millennium. In the last few years, in fact, there has been a rapid succession of such revolutionary events that it has seemed appropriate to speak of a new era in international politics. This is no more than an intuition. The nature, character and potential of the new era are for the most part not yet understood. And yet this is the crucial task for any political force that wants to be an active subject in building the new world. If out of these opportunities for change there does not emerge, in the near future, a strong policy supported by a growing commitment of public opinion, it is indeed not impossible that the dark forces of conservatism should impose a long period of stagnation and anarchy. Progress in history is possible, but only if it is actively sought.

Europe and the world after the Cold War.

The first change to be taken account of is the end of the Cold War, i.e. of an international balance of power which came out of the Second World War, in which the two superpowers maintained a strict leadership over their respective allies by means of the military and ideological confrontation with the opposing empire. There had been phases of detente in the past, but these had never led to more than a momentary truce in the race for world supremacy. The new detente unequivocally signals the end of the age of opposing blocs. This is not simply due to the goodwill of a politician, although the determination and courage demonstrated by the Soviet leader Gorbachev must be included among the factors which

opened the way for this new cycle in international politics. No great world power unilaterally gives up a dominant role unless it is forced to by objective constraints. Detente between the USSR and the USA has gone so far as to bring down the Iron Curtain in Europe, putting an end to CMEA and the Warsaw Pact and relaunching on a wider scale the co-operation for disarmament and economic development within the CSCE. The explanation is therefore to be sought in deep and remote causes, which have eroded the very foundations on which the great world empires were built. The Cold War was based preeminently on security, which had to be guaranteed with regard to the enemy and which only the war arsenal of a superpower could ensure. But some holes appeared within the logic of the Cold War, and it was through these that the forces of change infiltrated. The ideological contest in defence of the values of democracy and socialism, while it ensured maximum cohesion between the superpowers and their allies, allowed the beginning of the first forms of international economic integration. In fact, both in the empire of the East as in that of the West, from the fifties onwards relative socio-economic development has been apparent, even though by different means and to differing degrees. While the choice of the Common Market in Western Europe has proved crucial in promoting the European economic miracle, the choice of CMEA soon revealed its limits because of the impossibility of developing an international market among centrally-planned economies. Nevertheless the basic contradiction between the tendency towards a global dimension of the modern productive process, and the national dimension into which political life is coerced, began to make itself felt. The USA and the USSR had to acknowledge the absurdity of maintaining a rigid opposition between the two empires against a myriad of forces operating ever more vigorously to overcome every geographic, economic, cultural and political division.

It is thus paradoxically in the very success of the Cold War that the reasons for its decline can be perceived. The development of productive forces of technology and the world market imposed ever growing costs on maintaining the old imperial orders. Economic well-being spread rapidly without making distinctions between allies and ruling power, causing a relative decline of the USA and USSR. For example, the US economy, which in the period immediately following the Second World War produced around half the world's industrial production, by the end of the eighties only made 20 per cent. The leadership of the two superpowers was thus increasingly based on the military factor and on the accumulation of the greatest potential in destructive technology. The

USSR was the first to recognize the necessity of reversing the march towards the conquest of an improbable and absurd world supremacy. The diseased state of the controlled economy and the glaring failures in the Soviet policy of military domination in Europe and Asia made *perestroika* inevitable. The United States was thus faced with the opportunity of accepting a reasonable prospect of disarmament and detente, and renouncing a ruinously expensive nuclear arms race that was not only useless (because by then the capacity to destroy the opponent had been reached many times over), but was the cause of increasing breakdowns in the economic system, adding to the public deficit and reducing the competitiveness of the American economy in the world market.

International detente however is not only the fruit of the foreign policy of the two superpowers. The European Community played a decisive contributory role. The historic role of the European Community can be better understood in the light of the situation of national division and anarchy which manifested itself immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall: the countries of Eastern Europe resurrected, with few changes, the old nationalistic conflicts which the Treaty of Versailles had failed to appease. The Community on the other hand has succeeded in orienting the entire foreign policy of western countries towards peace and intergovernmental co-operation, based on a common international legislation and common institutions. This was possible because the European Community, from its foundation in 1950 on the initiative of Jean Monnet, considered "European Federation" as its final goal, to be achieved by a series of successive stages. In this way, certain institutions were created immediately, such as the High Authority of the ECSC (later the European Commission) and the European Parliament. These institutions, even though lacking real power, allowed the federalist movement to fight for their reinforcement and placed a serious obstacle in the way of nationalistic forces. In the most difficult moments, the latter, if they had won the upper hand, could have sparked a crisis in the first experiment in supranational integration.

This process of intra-community pacification had a profound effect on international political reality. The European Community's powerful economic growth acted as a catalyst, firstly on the EFTA countries (Great Britain, Austria etc.) and then on those of the Mediterranean area, on the European side (Spain, Portugal and Greece), on the African (Morocco) and on the Asian (Turkey). Moreover, the Community was able to achieve the first effective agreement on multilateral co-operation for development with the South, thanks to the Lomé Convention. Apart from

factors concerning economic and civil life, the European peace process could not but have repercussions for relations between opposing military blocs, because of its absolute incompatibility with the spirit and practice of the Cold War. With the passing years, and with the consolidation of the European presence on the international scene, it became increasingly obvious that Europeans' security, both of the East and of the West, could not be based on the continuous accumulation of atomic warheads on European soil. There was a progressive erosion of the solidarity between the European allies and their respective superpowers, which were forced at a certain point to acknowledge the impossibility of basing their alliance solely on military supremacy.

Thus, thanks to Soviet *perestroika*, the possibility opened up of launching the project of a great "European Common Home," in which the common security of all participating countries could be guaranteed without military alliances. This in fact was the end of the politics of military blocs and of the Cold War. The image of the enemy has disappeared from the scene of world politics, as disarmament and economic development have replaced the politics of the arms race and of commercial discrimination.

These are the premises of the new era of international politics. A long political cycle has closed, but there remain active forces which could equally interrupt the world's difficult progress towards democracy. There is no doubt that in the last few years, the most powerful push for change has come from the politics of *perestroika*. It allowed forces favourable to the process of democratizing the USSR, of transforming the controlled economy into a market economy and of disarmament, to prevail over the conservative forces of Stalinism and the Cold War. Following on from this there has been a wave of democratic change throughout the world, starting with the Eastern European countries. However, the forces of conservatism have skilfully exploited the nationalistic claims which threaten the unity of the Soviet empire without offering reasonable democratic alternatives to the management of common affairs: these forces organized a *coup d'état* whose obvious objective was to restore what remained of the Soviet *ancien régime* after *perestroika*. Its failure signalled the irreversible collapse of communism, which dragged down with it the last vestiges of the old Stalinist empire. The big unanswered question now remains the Union. The USSR is finished, but it is not yet possible to tell whether a new Union will succeed in taking shape — one whose nature, if the forces of democracy prevail against the nationalistic arrogance of the republics, can be none other than

federal. If the forces of disunity should prevail over those of unity, the whole of Europe could enter into a state of growing anarchy. The nationalism of these small states would end up rekindling the nationalism of larger ones, both on the eastern front, where Great Russia could once more be tempted by its centuries-old imperial mission, and on the western front, where the European Community, still hesitating between confederation and federation, might not succeed in containing the hegemonic impulses of a newly unified Germany.

With these reservations, it nevertheless seems possible to state that the direction of the new course of world politics is the following: the peace process which has been achieved in Western Europe in the postwar period is asserting itself, with difficulty, also at world level, thanks to the policy of detente started by the two superpowers. The ideological barriers which opposed communism to democracy no longer exist. Democracy can finally be asserted everywhere as a universal value. As happened in postwar Europe among the major industrialized countries,§ laborious attempts are being made to create permanent institutions to guarantee common security and economic development. However, in contrast to what took place in Europe (and is still happening, because the struggle for European unification is by no means over), on the world level no international institutions have yet been realized that are strong enough to guarantee the irreversibility of the process. Humanity is troubled by enormous problems which threaten its very survival. These include the environmental destruction caused by a productive system which was developed in an age of abundant natural resources, and the tensions caused by the underdevelopment of the South, which no longer passively accepts its conditions of extreme poverty. It is necessary to construct at world level, in a first stage at least among the countries of the Northern hemisphere, institutions capable of guaranteeing an irreversible policy of disarmament and of planning the first indispensable moves to begin a sustainable development of the world economy. In short, it is necessary to build an international order based on the rule of law, which guarantees to every people and every individual, in conditions of equality with all other peoples and all other individuals, participation in the government of common affairs. Hence, what is on the agenda of world politics is the construction of a "solid international state."

Europe has particular responsibilities, because it can influence, for good or ill, the results of this process. It could, even in the near future, become a federation, at least as regards the administration of the Economic and Monetary Union. The possibility that it could act as a subject

in world politics with greater effectiveness than the current Community is able to, will clearly strengthen all those groups favourable to the policies which the European Community has until the present pursued with tenacity, but not with sufficient vigour. These policies include disarmament, the ecological conversion of the economy, supporting *perestroika*, co-operation with the countries of the East, and the development of the countries of the South. Federal completion of European unification will thus represent an essential contribution to the consolidation of the world peace process.

In the unfortunate circumstance that the forces of disunity should prevail, for a transitory period, in the Soviet Union, the international responsibility of Europe would undoubtedly not be diminished, but rather increased considerably. The process of world peace and unification would suffer an interruption due to the vacuum of power which would be generated in the Euro-Asiatic region. But to the extent that Western Europe is able to complete its political unity with no further hesitation, Atlantic co-operation with the USA will be strengthened inevitably, keeping alive and possibly reinforcing the main international institutions that, in the postwar period, have guaranteed the immense economic development of the western region, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. History often proceeds in a zig-zag fashion. Whereas *perestroika* proposed to integrate the entire Soviet Union in the world politico-economic system as quickly as possible, the reactionary victory of nationalism could force the peoples of the ex-Union to suffer a new long period of isolation. However, it is unlikely that the western world should prepare to face a new phase of cold war. The collapse of the empire may be succeeded by a period of instability and anarchy in Eastern Europe. But it would be very unlikely for a new "nuclear bear" to present itself on the historical scene, a bear able to threaten the rest of the planet with conquest and destruction.

In this changed international context new tasks await the federalists. Europe is a model and a laboratory for the politics of world unification. But the range of operation of the new process is worldwide and the European dimension, however important it may be, is only a part of the whole. Today, for the European federalists, it is possible to act effectively only by co-ordinating their action on a worldwide level, in collaboration with all federalist movements which, in whatever continent they work, have as their aim the defeat of nationalism, the overcoming of absolute national sovereignty and the construction of a democratic world government.

It is therefore opportune to think again of the current relevance of the *Ventotene Manifesto*. It has represented the constant source of inspiration for the European federalists' policy for the entire postwar period. But the world has changed profoundly since that distant 1949. The objective of European Federation, which at that time seemed only to be a historical possibility, thanks to the tenacious commitment of the federalists and to the realization of the first supranational institutions, has progressively become a real point of reference in European politics. Federalism is no longer an ideal pursued by a small group of utopians, but an effective political force, even if atypical compared to traditional parties. European Federation has become a concrete project for some national governments, for the European Parliament and for the major democratic parties. This is a positive fact which must be considered as the first great victory of the European federalists. Precisely for this reason we must ask ourselves about the objectives and the battles which lie before us in the new era. European Federation is only the "first step" on a long journey which European federalists are determined to pursue to the very end.

Nationalism and federalism.

The historical value of the *Ventotene Manifesto* consists of three major declarations. The first identifies the dividing line between progress and reaction, i.e. it is a hypothesis about the course of contemporary history. The second identifies the concrete objective for which it is possible and right to fight, i.e. European Federation. The third declaration, finally, concerns the means, that is to say the most effective type of organization for achieving specified political objectives.

The line between progress and reaction is finely drawn in the *Ventotene Manifesto*. "The dividing line between progressive and reactionary parties no longer coincides with the formal lines of more or less democracy, or the pursuit of more or less socialism, but the division falls along a very new and substantial line: those who conceive the essential purpose and goal of the struggle as being the ancient one, the conquest of the national political power and those who see the main purpose as the creation of a solid international state." The enemy of federalists is therefore nationalism, in whatever form it manifests itself, whether in claims for new military and economic frontiers, or whether in defending, to the bitter end, existing frontiers. The nation-state is a reactionary and anti-democratic political formula in our century, because it is impossible to manage interdependence peacefully on the basis of a political principle

which exalts discrimination between peoples, denies fundamental human rights, and justifies violence to the point of sanctioning the duty to kill the foreigner. Nationalism is the ideology of the political division of mankind.

Until now, the struggle to overcome the nation-state has, however, not been able to start except in Europe, where the historical conditions are ripe for an irreversible crisis of the nation-state. This declaration is clearly made in the *Ventotene Manifesto*, but the reasons are not sufficiently explained. In fact, the *Manifesto* does not foresee — and this lacuna was openly acknowledged by Spinelli himself later on — the possible division of the world into two spheres of influence by the two superpowers at the end of the Second World War. The international system based on military balance of power was thus extended from Europe to the world, opening a new phase in the history of the great powers. Only in Europe had the crisis of the nation-state already reached its final stage and no hope of autonomous life could remain for the countries which had sparked off the homicidal fury of the Second World War. Not even the victors emerged unharmed from the conflict, and in any case their victory had been more the result of external help than the fruit of an autonomous strength. The European system of national powers was by then finished. There therefore began a period of acute crisis of power in Europe — so it was thought in the *Manifesto* — which would open the way to a bold group of federalists able to fight effectively “with propaganda and with action” for the objective of the United States of Europe.

With the globalization of the production process, the start of the international peace process and the affirmation of democracy as a universal value, the dividing line between those who fight to set up “more or less democracy, more or less socialism” within the nation-states, and hence pursue as an essential goal the conquest of national political power (playing the game of reactionary forces), and those who fight for “the creation of a solid international state,” has by now become not only an accepted principle of political action (even if partially and in exceptional circumstances) by the major traditional political forces in the European Community, but also a criterion for orienting world political action.

At the beginning of the European adventure, only the small group of federalists, whether they were organized in a movement or whether they acted in isolation like Jean Monnet, had adopted this mode of thinking and acting with coherence. But, with time, thanks to the constant pressure of the federalists on the political class, and to the progress of European integration, even traditional political forces were obliged to recognize the

necessity of overcoming national sovereignty by giving effective powers to the European Community system. This dividing line was clearly visible on the occasion of the first legislature of the European Parliament, when Altiero Spinelli succeeded in forming a majority alignment of “innovators” on the basis of their consent to the Draft Treaty for European Union, despite the fact that within each party — Liberal, Christian Democrat, Socialist etc. — there continued to exist pockets of “national conservatism.”

In the new era of international politics, the conditions can be seen for this fundamental principle of federalist action spreading far and wide beyond the European continent. As long as the logic of the Cold War prevailed, federalists could naturally foresee that sooner or later the two superpowers would have to come to terms with the contradictions generated by the progressive globalization of the production process. Until that moment, the political class, in the USA and in the USSR, would be unlikely to look beyond policies aimed at consolidating and reinforcing national sovereignty. The USA and the USSR symbolized the supreme power, which no-one dared challenge seriously, and the bipolar balance of power represented the immovable bulwark of the policy of preserving the system of national sovereignty in the world. Only in Western Europe had a breach appeared on the front of national sovereignties, through which the federalist avant-garde had been able to penetrate successfully. At the world level, in the epoch of opposing blocs, federalists were not able to do more than keep alight the flame of a symbolic alternative to the rock-like system of national power.

The beginning of a new international detente was accompanied by an inevitable and parallel weakening of the international leadership of the two superpowers. The imperial system was obliged to beat a retreat, not only by the young and exuberant forces of democracy and peace, but also by economic corporations and repressed ethnic groups, which claimed from one day to the next to become active subjects in international politics. In this way there began a period of turbulence characterized by an obvious asymmetry between East and West. In the western area the process of overcoming national sovereignties was already channelled in the direction of creating functional institutions which were potentially supranational (the EEC, the Group of Major industrialized Countries, the IMF etc.) which represent a barrier, even if not yet insuperable, to nationalistic temptations. A different situation obtains in the countries of the former communist bloc.

Let us consider the first results and the possible outcomes of *per-*

estroika. It has activated enormous democratic energy, not only in the USSR, but throughout the whole world. Thanks to the struggle for the democratization of the Bolshevik régime, the historical prejudice of communism against democracy as a "bourgeois" value has finally collapsed. This is a political victory of universal value. No Communist régime — where such régimes survive, as in China — can still base the negation of human rights, and of citizens' participation in the control of political decisions, on the pretence of a historical opposition between democracy and communism. In fact, not only have all the Eastern European communist governments that still denied fundamental democratic liberties collapsed, but also those single-party régimes of the southern hemisphere, particularly in Africa, which insist on refusing political pluralism, have come under criticism.

However, *perestroika* has not only liberated the forces favourable to the democratization of political and social life. The suffocating ideological mantle of Stalinism had also kept in check the national rivalries within the Soviet Union. Scarcely had central power started the process of liberalization, than the demands of small nationalities burst forth, not knowing how else to claim a greater degree of autonomy than through the eighteenth century idea of absolute national sovereignty. But it is clear that if the separatist demands should be met without an opposing current of public opinion being consolidated, which is favourable to international integration — impossible without a federal union which co-ordinates the republics and represents them in the major centres of world politics — there would begin a most serious and dangerous period in European politics, similar to the Balkanization which followed the dismantling of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires.

The dispute between nationalities in the USSR (and in central Europe) is however a problem whose solution is not independent of the more general peace process in international politics. The factors for cohesion of the Soviet state, which in the Stalinist period consisted of the Leninist myth and Grand Russian nationalism, must necessarily weaken to the point of disappearing completely, with the advance of the process of democratization, which is to say of political pluralism, autonomy for the republics and their opening up to the outside world. The international reasons for *perestroika* are just as important as the internal ones. The United States — as they showed in the course of all the negotiations on disarmament, during the Gulf War and during the attempted coup in Moscow — have a strong interest in the policy of detente. Moreover, Western Europe has an even greater interest than the USA in a more than

purely symbolic dismantling of the Iron Curtain and in the definitive consolidation of democracy in a new Euro-Asiatic Union. It is on the basis of these solid motives, both economic and of security, that a convergence of *raison d'Etat* is emerging among all countries of the northern hemisphere. For this reason, the democratic forces of the USSR can count on positive European and international support. Their success will increasingly depend on the possibility of building a "European Common Home" in which the development of a grand intercontinental market can be planned, and security can be guaranteed without there being any further necessity to stockpile increasing quantities of arms on national borders. The real problem of the restless nationalities, in the USSR and in Europe, will then show up in all its simplicity: it is not a question of moving frontiers or putting up new ones, but of entirely eliminating them in the context of supranational integration, as the nations of the European Community are doing.

The positive repercussions of this peace process among the industrialized countries could be extended even to the Third World. Cuts in military expenditure and the elimination of the tensions between the two superpowers will certainly contribute to diminishing, if not completely eliminating, the regional conflicts between poor countries which in the last few decades have been the major cause of violence and war in the world. In a climate of detente, it will moreover become possible to relaunch the North-South dialogue which has never been able to achieve positive results because of the enormous military outlay spent by the richer and more powerful countries. But this is only a possibility. It should not be forgotten that precisely the withdrawal of the great empires to defensive positions will also open up dangerous spaces for the most arrogant dictators that infest the poor areas of the world to step into. The overbearing acts of a bully will be easily masked under the ideological mantle of anti-imperialist crusading. The image of the enemy has gone from among the great world powers, but regional conflicts, and not only small ones, could explode between rich and poor countries or between poor countries alone, where the light of a fleeting glory may help the miseries of daily life to be forgotten.

Thus the conditions for applying the dividing line drawn by the *Ventotene Manifesto* exist, in every region and every continent where the disruptive threat of nationalism is present. As has already happened among the nations of the Community, it is essential that all peoples which intend to participate in building a new world should begin to consider seriously the federalist alternative. Until now, countries have found their

main cohesive force in the principle of nationhood, that is in common blood (stock, race) or in ethnicity. The image of the enemy thus functioned as a unifying force, in the absence of common, equally cohesive, democratic values. In the new world however, peoples have to learn to live without the fear of the enemy beyond the borders: on the contrary, they will find the progress of civilization is stimulated by cultural pluralism and the proximity of other peoples. The construction of democracy within countries must be accompanied by a parallel process of democratic unification between countries. It is of course necessary to be aware that in the Caucasus, the Baltic, the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa and so on, the degree of supranational integration is still much more limited than in Western Europe, and that therefore the possibilities for avant-garde federalist action will be correspondingly less. However, it is certain that possibilities for action will present themselves, even if the alternative between progress and reaction will not be as clearly visible as it has been within the European Parliament. On this subject, it must not be forgotten that the victorious federalist alignment in the European Parliament was prepared for by the experience of years of semi-clandestine struggles, efforts and pre-political approaching marches (first the Community had to be established, and then it was necessary to campaign for election by universal suffrage for the European Parliament). But what matters is not so much the distance or the proximity of the objective, as the direction of the march: we need a compass to orient our political action. We may lose our way even with a compass, but it is certain that without any criteria for orientation we will get lost in the forest. The nationalist-federalist alternative represents the compass for the new era.

In the difficult new international context, in which even those countries with most interest in the development of the peace process could be drawn into the trap of armed conflict, the federalist objective of world government should be a means of orienting political action in the right direction. The end of the Cold War cannot leave room for a new world order in which hegemony is exercised by some new or old superpower, or by a group of strong countries. The new world no longer wishes to be governed by a "number one," nor by some emissary of the latter, and it would be shameful for the countries of the industrialized North to arrogate to themselves the task of policing the poor of the South. For this reason, every international crisis should be tackled on the premise that every situation must be exploited to reinforce the powers of the UN, involving the greatest number of countries, rich and poor, in the search for collective solutions, until the eventual transformation of the UN into

a real democratic world government is effected. In some cases, where there are already regional groups of countries — such as the European Community, CSCE, OAU, MERCOSUR, ECOWAS, ASEAN, the Arab League, and so on — peaceful solutions must also be sought within their area, with a view to the democratic reinforcement of existing regional institutions. In any case, in the new era of international politics, it no longer seems possible to achieve stable settlements of the international order by means of gunboat diplomacy. The past is over for ever.

It is certain, to return to the fundamental principle of the *Ventotene Manifesto*, that if world problems are considered in their complexity and interdependence, one cannot but observe that human progress depends increasingly on the achievement of a "solid international state," in other words on a democratic world government capable of tackling and solving common problems with the agreement of all the peoples of the world. Democracy has by now become a cultural heritage shared by all the great currents of political thought. The area covered by democracy is progressively extending to every region of the planet. Even the world of Islam, which until recently seemed impermeable to foreign "western" influences, now seems more inclined — in some countries (such as Pakistan, Turkey, the region of the Maghreb, etc.) — to allow in the fresh wind of political freedom and human rights. But without the consolidation of the international peace process by means of solid common democratic institutions, the forces of national democracy will be increasingly obliged to subordinate their gains to the superior claims of state security. If international politics is governed by the laws of imperialism, no country, however democratic it may be, can escape the necessity of seeking the greatest power to assure its independence. And democracy, in these circumstances, becomes at the most a convenient simulacrum to cover up petty power games.

Federalism and nationalism are thus the two polarities to which the forces of progress and reaction are drawn. Whoever fights for freedom, democracy and social justice as goals to be achieved for the exclusive advantage of only that portion of the human race that by historical accident lives within sacrosanct national borders, will end up, "even if involuntarily, by playing the game of the reactionary forces." Only those who accept as their chief objective the construction of supranational democratic institutions — both regional and global — will, at the same time, work in the interests of their nation, democracy, and mankind. The only political thinking which permits concrete promotion of democratic ideals, in the era of interdependence, is federalism.

The European Federation, international democracy and the transition to world government.

The achievement of the European Federation will represent the culmination of a long historical process, in which the external forces of world politics will have contributed no less decisively than the internal driving forces. The end of the balance of power established at Yalta, the decline of the system of military alliances under the protective wing of the superpowers, and the uncontrollable movement for German unity have, in recent years, forced the Community to accelerate progress towards monetary and political union. In substance, what has to be done is to make the Community's system of government democratic, and overcome the present ineffectiveness caused by the principle of unanimity which legitimizes the power of veto of countries opposed to European unity. The Community is presently constrained to overcome the democratic deficit if it wants to exist as an active subject in international politics. If it lacks the will and determination to make this choice, Europe will be reduced to a free trade area under German-US domination. There would then be a risk that it would be not only in Western Europe that the forces of nationalism and international anarchy, the inflexible enemies of democracy, would get the upper hand.

The process of European unification will become irreversible given two conditions. The first is that the institutional reform now in progress should allow the majority group in the European Parliament to control the executive. This is the essence of the modern democratic state. In the world of interdependence, an enormous number of international institutions has already been created. But the difference between federal and confederal institutions lies in their susceptibility to democratic control. The nature of the Community has from its very foundation been that of a confederal institution with the potential for federal development (universal suffrage for the European Parliament was in fact part of the plan). The second condition concerns the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union, with the transfer of national monetary sovereignty to a central European bank responsible to the democratic organs of the Community.

It must now be observed that the federal institutions that are about to be created in Europe are quite new in kind, if compared to those already existing in the USA, Canada or Switzerland. None of these federations exists as a result of taking over from historically consolidated nation-states. The nature of the European Federation is new and different: it inaugurates the epoch of international democracy. Furthermore, and the

relevance of this fact is crucial for discussing the role of Europe in the world, the European Federation will consolidate itself *pari passu* with the advancement of the process of world unification. It is an integral part of this process, because it is inevitable that every European decision has a worldwide impact.

Let us consider the principal characteristics of the European Union which is now in the process of being built. The essential nucleus of the European Federation will lie in the democratic government of the Economic and Monetary Union. This represents an institutional minimum, but one sufficient to bring into existence a new model of international relations. National politics tends by its very nature to be exclusive. What is not national is foreign. For nationalists, every individual may belong to one, and only one, political community "by nature." It follows that, even when the necessity for interdependence is recognized, the models of the past are slavishly applied. In disputes between nationalities, such as are currently particularly acute in the USSR and Eastern Europe, the quest for autonomy is considered inseparable from the demand for absolute national sovereignty, based on a separate currency and national army. The Community, until now, because of the delays with which the process of political unification has been proceeding, has passively swallowed this negative model of cohabitation. The realization of European democracy would be of crucial innovatory significance. The transformation of the Community into a federation would affirm the possibility of a positive model of international integration, in which the nations, while keeping their own cultural and political identity, would participate democratically in the common management of common policies. It would be the first successful experiment in international democracy. Many sectors of political activity, which previously were managed by individual governments, and which in the international context generated difficulties and disagreements (often insoluble), will become an internal problem. Currency is a case in point. With a European currency and a central European bank, independent national monetary policies will finally become circumscribed, and with this the possibility of arbitrary manoeuvres on monetary value by national governments. In this way one of the principal causes of international monetary and financial instability, which was generated by the collapse of the system of fixed parity instituted at Bretton Woods, will be eliminated at the root. As an equally important corollary of monetary unification, it must be observed that budgetary policies too will have to be adapted to the new situation. Budgetary surpluses and deficits, as experience has shown, have serious

international effects in an economic system. In monetary union, individual member states will have to accept a common discipline. They must, in other words, avoid spending more than they earn, which in the current situation sparks off inflationary imbalances and financial disorder in the European market.

This decisive monetary reform will be the premise of a really new deal in the European economy. Monetary union will in fact represent an excellent platform for a radical reform of the economic system. The crisis of the welfare state, and thus of the relationship between the state and the market, is a vitally important chapter in the crisis of the nation-state. Until now the efforts of traditional political forces — from liberals to socialists — to find a solution to this have been in vain. The European Union may represent the key to a profound change. The failure of the planned economy in countries of real socialism certainly does not mean the triumph of capitalism, in which public power abandons the attempt to put the collective interest before the private when the necessity presents itself. In contrast to the USA, Europe has known a more just balance between the requirements of efficiency, which can be pursued through the competitive dynamics of the market, and those of social justice, which are only achievable through adequate legislation and public intervention aimed at correcting inequalities and injustices generated by the system of private production. The continuation of this tradition of economic policy, which is realized by means of an intelligent balance between the public economy and the capitalist market, will call for some institutional reforms in Europe, complementary to the Economic and Monetary Union, so as to make sure that the creation of the internal market does not simply mean deregulation, with consequent major social and regional inequalities. On the one hand, it will be unavoidable to attribute to local authorities — regions and municipalities — an effective fiscal and taxational autonomy in order to put them in a position to run public services as responsibly as possible. The bureaucratic centralized state has shown itself unable to provide these services with the quality and in the quantity the public wishes. A significant example of this incapacity is the delay and inadequacy with which the nation-state is dealing with the ecological predicament and producing policies to safeguard their environmental, historical and artistic heritages. On the other hand, democracy, which so far has scarcely touched the world of industrial production, will have to penetrate into the structure of the firm in order to reform it radically. It is a question of allowing each individual who wants to take on entrepreneurial responsibility to be able to do so on equal terms with

those who already possess, whether by good fortune or heredity, a source of capital. Capitalism should no longer be considered the privilege of the few. Opportune reforms of the credit market and of the system of social security should allow everyone to become entrepreneurs simply on the basis of their own capabilities. With these measures in favour of greater economic democracy, an objective of no lesser importance (apart from a more just distribution of income) would be realized: that of guaranteeing full employment, because whoever possesses the will and ability to a useful job will be able to obtain the necessary means to start a new business. Europe will thus be able to become the experimenting ground for an original model of economic democracy, capable of uniting efficiency with distributive justice, without running into the faults either of anarchic capitalism or of the collectivist system.

This economic model will only become possible, however, in the context of new political institutions. The crisis of European democracy is to a large extent the fruit of the bureaucratic centralism inherited from the last century, when the important thing was, quite rightly, to overcome the remains of feudalism still rooted in local life, by means of the centralization of functions. In the contemporary world it is absurd to keep local autonomies under the suffocating guardianship of central government. The fundamental principles of federalism do not apply only to the reorganization of international life, but also to relations between local communities. The federal state is an institution consisting of independent and democratically co-ordinated governments. On this basis the broadest participation of citizens in politics is possible. Good institutions select good governors. The decadence of European political life, signalled by public scandals, by the arrogance of power, and by diminishing electoral participation, can be conquered only by achieving profound democratic reform which completely brings down, or at least weakens, the thick screen of power which separates the ruling class from those they rule. The birth of European citizenship should also signal the beginning of a new epoch in democracy and political participation, from the local community to the European government.

If we now consider Europe's role in the world, the most significant fact lies in how European unification can speed up the international peace process. Economic and technico-scientific interdependence has by now created a society that is integrated on a world scale. The members of this nascent world-community share the values of cosmopolitanism, and feel themselves as potentially citizens of a single international political community because the costs of an armed conflict and of non-participa-

tion in the world economy are greater than the enormous benefits obtained by those countries who have chosen peaceful co-operation. The great political battles of the modern age — first the protestant reform with the conquest of religious freedom, and then of the rule of law — made the principles of religious tolerance, respect for freedom of thought and of association, basic human rights and political pluralism, triumph in Europe. These ideas, which modern politics is trying to realize through the principle of democratic government, are progressively conquering the whole world, because they are essentially constitutive of human dignity itself. People from different nations, religions and cultures aspire to become members of a cosmopolitan society, open to dialogue and to solidarity with those who share a common destiny. Cosmopolitan society is still a natural society, in the sense that the modern cosmopolitan individual — daily immersed, through a myriad of messages, in the thick web of world interdependence — perceives international events as an external fact, over which he has no control, and to which he must adapt. It is precisely this constraint which raises the need and provide the will among progressive political forces to realize democracy also at an international level. Without an ever wider diffusion of this way of thinking and acting, it would be impossible to conceive of a future for the human race. If the planet is to be saved from ecological catastrophe or from extermination through hunger and war, it is imperative that all the citizens of the world consider themselves as a single people, a single political community. Only a political community can govern itself. An anarchic world is governed by the blind conflict of interests. This crucial cultural revolution is asserting itself, to varying degrees of intensity, in almost every continent, but we are still very far from its universal acceptance. A portion of the human race, numerically not insignificant, which depending on time and place considers race, religion, or ethnicity the supreme value, still excludes itself from the sphere of modern cosmopolitan society.

Contemporary politics is thus torn by a double contradiction. In the first place, cosmopolitan society, which identifies with the fundamental values of democracy, is not yet in a position to organize international politics on the basis of democratic principles. Peaceful co-operation — where it has made progress — is thus continually threatened by the return of the old rules of power politics. In the second place, the large continental areas of the North, in which the institutions of international democracy are being laboriously constructed, must deal with countries, in particular with some countries of the South, who do not accept these rules, because

they also feel themselves unjustly excluded from the “Club of the Rich.”

In Europe these profound contradictions are concentrated with greater intensity than elsewhere. Europe, which in the past was able to let loose the bloodiest national wars and to build imposing colonial empires thanks to its exuberant energy, is attempting the birth of a multiethnic and multiracial society. The European Community is not a nation. It is a political state entity with no eternally defined borders, open to the entry of new nations and with a tendency to be sympathetic, even if with understandable difficulties, to immigration from poorer countries.

It is these first characteristics of European foreign policy which indicate what contribution the European Federation could make — once the democratic reform of the Community has been completed — to the world peace process. Europe was able to transform the old colonial relationship of domination over the South of the world into relations of co-operation for development thanks to the Lomé Conventions, which represent — even if with serious gaps — the first important attempt to achieve on a continental basis the demands of poorer countries for a new international economic order. With regard to Mediterranean countries, Europe has played the happy role of a catalyst: first undermining consent to the dictatorial régimes of Spain, Portugal and Greece; and then consolidating the new democracies by means of their entry into the Community. A similar influence is manifesting itself with regard to numerous other countries in the Mediterranean basin, such as Turkey, Malta, Cyprus, Morocco, and so on.

But with regard to the countries of Eastern Europe, the present European Community, without an effective federal government, will not be in a position to propose policies suited to the gravity of the situation. These countries, by now on the way to democracy, are insistently, and rightly, knocking on the door of the Community. The old policy of association is wholly inadequate. Western Europe, which became rich during the opulent years of the American protectorate, has a duty to do more, and it can, on condition that it becomes a true federation. In this case it could enlarge itself immediately to include the Eastern countries, offering them a transitory period to adapt their economies to that of the single market. The migratory waves which come from these countries are significant. These populations consider themselves European and aspire to political solidarity, which cannot but mean common citizenship. Only in the context of a European Federation expanded towards the East will it be possible to stabilize the political context and reduce the now desperate problem of a wealthy Europe envied by an impoverished

Europe, to an internal problem of regional imbalances. Naturally the Europe of the rich will have to set up an austerity policy, like that practised by Germany to help unification. This is the meaning of the international state. It is unthinkable that without a common feeling of citizenship, sufficient solidarity between West and East can be realized. It would be absurd to relegate the populations of the East beyond a now non-existent Iron Curtain, abandoning them to their own destiny, after having preached, for decades, the abominations of an imperial system which kept Europe divided.

The grand directives of European foreign policy thus seem defined with sufficient clarity. By means of the instruments of association and membership, the European Community has succeeded in progressively neutralizing the major causes of conflict with some countries, to the point of subjecting international relations to the juridical rules of the Treaty and specific agreements of association. The European Federation will be able to eliminate completely the aspects of power from international relations, to the point of their absolute subordination to the principles of democracy. Europe can thus bring to life in world politics a new model of international order based on law.

Equally obvious, on the other hand, are the limits of this foreign policy: it cannot hold with regard to those countries which do not yet accept the principles of peaceful co-operation and the rejection of violence in international controversies. Indeed, it is significant that Europe was unable to resolve the critical situation which blew up in the Middle East, where politics still speaks the language of arms. Where force is necessary, the European Community, lacking an army of its own, has no capacity for short term intervention, and so has to give way to whichever countries, such as the USA or the European countries themselves in military alliance, have sufficient military strength. For this reason, there are those who maintain that the European Federation, like all existing federations, must equip itself with its own defence, which would allow it to act on the global scene on an equal footing with the great nuclear powers.

This proposal, however, hides an ambiguity. The new Europe does not need to assert its identity in the context of a hostile world. It is important to avoid mechanically applying the solutions of the past to the present: security does not only depend on the power of arms. If the world's balance of power is dominated by the logic of power politics, the necessary behaviour of countries is that of arming themselves with the goal of maintaining, through their foreign policy, the existing balance of

power, or of modifying it to their own advantage. But Europe is building its unity in a world which is now on the way to disarmament, in which security depends increasingly on the intensification of international co-operation and on the reinforcement of those institutions that guarantee it. It is in this perspective that the problem of European defence must be examined. This does not concern the possibility that the European federal government should organize and co-ordinate the national military forces of member countries in case of necessity, so as to constitute a stable body of European "blue berets." The crucial question concerns the formation of a real European army — evidently equipped with a nuclear potential at least equal to that of France and Great Britain, since it is hard to imagine these two countries giving their nuclear weapons up without some counterpart on a European level. This would be sufficient for Europe to play the role of a major power, similar to that played in the past by the USA and the USSR, or in fact potentially greater, if one thinks of the enormous productive potential which a unified Europe could develop.

The nature of European foreign policy, and thus also the necessity that it be founded prevalently on military force or on other factors (such as the quest for common security), will depend on the essential characteristics of the new international order following the end of the Cold War. If the world peace process made possible by USA-USSR detente is consolidated, it is quite natural that Europe should participate in it and favour it. Despite the difficulties created by the nationalistic disorders in Balkan Europe and in the USSR, this is already happening. Europe and the United States are largely favourable to the introduction of the USSR into the world market (and hence into the IMF and GATT) and to the creation of a common security system through the strengthening of the CSCE and the UN. Thus, respective *raison d'Etat* are converging towards common objectives, and this convergence has now completely changed the state of international public opinion. Fears that Europe must still defend itself against the enemy from the East, after the events of '89 and the efforts of the USSR to reform its constitution along democratic and federal lines, are increasingly subsiding. The truth is that Europe could live in absolute security the day that co-operation for development be made irreversible among all those countries which once lined up along opposing fronts in the two military blocs which are now obsolete. The best guarantee for European security is the abolition of frontiers with its own neighbours. In the new world context, while the creation of a European currency will contribute to opening and integrating Europe even more to the rest of the world, a European defence would have quite the opposite significance.

The creation of a European nuclear defence would inevitably be seen by the world as a step towards a policy of rearmament, because it would allow Europe to fulfil the role of a superpower at the very same moment that the nuclear empires are being dismantled. Only a most serious about-turn in international politics could provoke a change in public opinion such as to justify the construction of a European nuclear power. Perhaps the breaking up of the USSR and a situation of growing anarchy in all of Central Europe could cause a reversal of public opinion like the one that, it should not be forgotten, was at the origin of German unity, which came about not against the process of European unification — as would certainly have happened in the absence of the Community — but in its favour, actually accentuating the impulse towards Monetary and Political Union. In any case, a nuclear defence can be justified only in the context of an active or potential nuclear threat. But possible ethnic conflicts in Europe, however serious, can hardly be repressed with the use of an atomic weapon, and in any circumstances could not represent a mortal threat to the Community. Finally, possible regional crises in the South of the world do not seem capable of modifying the world peace process and the state of public opinion radically. The Gulf War showed that acute conflicts can be governed and kept to regional dimensions by Northern countries, provided that a much greater role is projected for the UN, the only legitimate authority for using force in a crisis which opposes rich countries against poor ones. In the epoch of world unification, the security function is inevitably shifted from the national and regional context to that of the world. A European army would be none other than the expression of a world still in a state of flux between the old and the new international order. It would represent the atrophic function of a European Federation, whose influence can only increase via the development of policies of cooperation.

The world role of the European Federation thus seems to be defined. It represents a new model of international relations, and it is in its interests that an ever greater number of countries should agree to base their foreign policy on law and not on force. However, Europe is not the world. The European model of organization of international relations can take on universal significance only if it is taken on by the world outside Europe. Other areas of regional co-operation and other continental federations will have to emerge in Asia, in America and in Africa, in order for it to be possible to pacify populations which today are enemies, and thus progressively eliminate all the obstacles that still make a World Federation impossible. The European Federation is only an experimental and

partial model of the new cosmopolitan state in formation. The real cosmopolitan state can only be born when the UN — at present reduced to a faint shadow compared to the hegemonic politics of the great powers — becomes the democratic government of all the citizens of the world. This is the new task to which the federalists are called. Federalism is the political ideology of the cosmopolitan society. All peoples, the South included, are discovering the universal value of democracy. But without federalism it will be impossible to develop and consolidate at an international level the conquests of civilization, which all peoples will bring as their specific contribution to the building of the new era in world politics.

The World Federalist Movement.

Looking over the history of the European Community once more, one can see that every important institutional reform was instigated, directly or indirectly, by initiatives inspired by the gradualistic method of Jean Monnet or by the constituent method of Altiero Spinelli. In particular, it is worth noting the ECSC, proposed by Jean Monnet; the Common Market, which emerged after the fruitless attempt, inspired by Altiero Spinelli, to institute the European Political Community together with a European defence; and, more recently, the case of the Single Act, passed by national governments as a surrogate for the more ambitious Project of European Union, proposed by the European Parliament. In all these cases, the governments were able to overcome the narrow limits imposed by the policy of intergovernmental co-operation, adopting — even if only partially — the proposals for reform of the federalist avant-garde, which must therefore be considered the true active subject in the process of European political unification. However, the fifty years since the *Ventotene Manifesto* have shown us that federalist initiatives, while showing themselves to be necessary for the advancement of the process of political unification, have manifested very different characteristics from traditional political methods.

The ways in which the federalist struggle has developed diverge considerably from the guidelines of party politics. Parties aim to conquer power (if they are in opposition) or to keep it (if they are in government). The federalists, organized under the *Movimento Federalista Europeo*, do not aim to conquer power, for the reason that, as Mario Albertini maintains, “the power to make Europe does not exist.” No party or coalition of parties possesses this power; nor individual national governments, and nor does the European Parliament. The construction of the

European Federation consists, in effect, in the creation of a new power, the democratic European government, through a constituent process which draws in all the democratic forces, the European Parliament, the national governments and parliaments. Federalists have chosen to engage themselves in politics without using the traditional instruments of political struggle, i.e. the vote, and participation in elections; still less would they use violence, because there is no sense in fighting for democracy in democratic countries with antidemocratic instruments.

The *Movimento Federalista Europeo's* lack of participation in the European elections has been criticized at times on the basis of the consideration that Altiero Spinelli played an avant-garde role, essential in the European Parliament in the course of its first legislature. The suggestion is that his work, interrupted too soon, should be completed. But this observation conceals an insidious identification between the task of the MFE and the exceptional political adventure of Altiero Spinelli. The fundamental role of the MFE is to bring all political parties to adopt the political and institutional minimum of the federalist programme and to remove, at the national and international level, all obstacles which impede the realization of European Federation today and, taking a long view, of World Federation tomorrow. Now, the federalist struggle in the European Parliament, however important, only represents a moment and an aspect of the federalist strategy. Considered carefully, that same initiative of Spinelli's in the European Parliament became possible because the federalists, for many long years, fought to have the European Parliament elected by universal suffrage and, more recently, the problem of the reform of the Treaties remained on the agenda because in some countries the federalists succeeded in bringing parties and respective national parliaments to take sides on the constituent position. The hypothetical decision of the federalists to enter the lists, against the traditional parties, in an electoral campaign, would reduce their capacity for dialogue with every democratic political force and could even mean the disappearance of the Federalist Movement itself, if the necessary action for maintaining electoral power should end up entirely absorbing the not limitless energies of the federalist militants. In any case, electoral power limits the action of federalists to the conservation of an existing political reality, while their essential task is that of fighting against every form of discrimination. Federalism is the alternative to the world of nation-states. As long as the power to make war exists, and hence the power to kill and to have people killed, federalism will not be realized.

These short notes may perhaps suffice to show what are the real

difficulties inherent in the task which the federalists have taken on. Jean Monnet pointed out that the work of preparation for the future, unlike the politics which administers the present, is not performed "under the spotlight." In effect, not using, unlike the parties, all the financial resources and the power of traditional politics, the federalists must organize their struggle on the basis of the most rigorous financial, political and moral autonomy. The life of the Movement is thus entrusted necessarily to militants who have the ambition "to do something and not to become someone." The real power resource of the federalists lies in their thinking. For this reason, alongside the traditional organs of the Movement's organization (like those of any democratic party) there has been a progressive development of autonomous debating structures, to allow all militants, independently of their age and of the office held, to bring their contribution to the politico-cultural line of the Movement. In contrast to organizations in which the traditional power struggle manifests itself, federalist behaviour should be based increasingly on the rule of reason and morality, and less and less on the Machiavellian model of the "fox" and the "lion."

Awareness of the organizational peculiarities and innovations entailed by the federalist commitment is indispensable to overcoming the difficulties connected with the transition from the European dimension of the federalist struggle to its world dimension. It is in fact particularly urgent to match the territorial extension of the federalist force to the dimensions of the international problems. Just as in the first phase of the federalist experience it was felt to be a priority task to found a democratic organization on a European scale, today it is necessary to develop the federalist strategy on the basis of a Federalist Movement which has the ambition to become worldwide.

In this perspective, the first objective lies in overcoming the rift which developed following the Second World War between world and European federalists. The European federalists were convinced, rightly, that the historical conditions for successfully developing the federalist struggle to overcome national sovereignties only existed in Europe. The Second World War had destroyed the economic and military base of the independence of the European countries. At the world level, according to the European federalists, the two superpowers were involved in a struggle for supremacy which gave no realistic possibility of fighting with any hope of success for a World Federation. Unlike the European federalists, the world federalists maintained that with the UN — whose foundation and whose strengthening they had actively supported, particularly after the

explosion of the atomic bomb, prelude of a possible world catastrophe — the preconditions had been set up for the creation of an effective world government. The battle for the regional federations, like that in Europe, did not necessarily represent the first step towards universal peace, the single and worthy objective of the federalist struggle. The climate of the Cold War and the prospect of the birth of a “third force” Europe gave a basis of credibility to the theories of the world federalists and it was thus that, also because of a maximalist stiffening on both fronts, the different political diagnoses were transformed into an inevitable organizational division. Today, with the new prospect of world peace, this rift has no more the right to exist and, in fact, there is already a unification process in progress, promoted by the avant-garde on either side.

The objective on which it seems possible to make a federalist action converge on a world scale is the election of a World Parliament by universal suffrage (in a first stage also by means of a second degree election), as a second chamber of the UN and with a view to a radical reform of the latter. The political significance of this proposal may be summarized in the following three points.

First. Despite the fact that at world level the need is already felt to pass common policies for the safeguard and good government of the whole planet, we still proceed on the basis of the intergovernmental method, which necessarily requires the unanimity of the countries involved. The result is obviously ineffectiveness or paralysis. Moreover, in the best of cases, when an agreement is reached, the management of fragile political proposals is entrusted to sectorial agents (such as FAO, UNCTAD, UNEP, the High Authority established by the Law of the sea, etc.) which, lacking co-ordination with each other, end up by wasting scarce financial resources on inefficient projects. And yet it is not impossible to obtain resources adequate to face the challenges that threaten mankind. Collective security and international justice are two parallel and complementary processes. The arms trade is today fed by the demand of the South, which puts military spending before civil expenditure. But this trade will continue until security is guaranteed to every country, even the smallest, by an international order based on law. It is necessary, therefore, to entrust the management of the world’s resources and adequate military forces to a world government responsible to a parliament elected by universal suffrage. On this institutional basis the passing of a grand world plan of solidarity for development will then become possible and desirable. The countries of the northern hemisphere, by now on the way towards a phase of economic co-operation, cannot agree to fulfil the negative role of

armed custodians of their wealth. Just as the conviction grew between the two superpowers that detente and disarmament were a more reasonable choice, because less costly, than the arms race, so for the South the consciousness should sooner or later grow that the enormous quantities of economic and human resources which today are assigned to keep the “rapid intervention” military corps active in areas of crisis, could be more conveniently used in programmes of mutual benefit. Until the foundation of the World Federation, war will always be possible. But peace cannot consist of imposing an unjust international order on the poor using armed force. Peace must be built together in co-operation, guaranteeing a future to the damned of the earth.

Second. The consolidation of the policy of peace among the great nations of the industrialized North, the creation of the European Federation and of possible other regional or interregional federations or confederations (in Africa, in Latin America, the European Common Home enlarged to include North America and Japan, etc.) will raise the problem of establishing co-operation between these great political areas on an institutional basis. For this reason, the democratic reform of the UN will be in the common interest of all peoples who want to participate in a system of collective security, to tackle effectively the urgent problems of the ecological safeguarding of the planet, and to share the advantages of international economic co-operation, which should be based on the solid foundation of a world currency. The population of the South, which represents about two-thirds of the world’s population, is today in practice deprived of real powers in the management of great international policies, and has a particular interest in demanding and promoting world institutions that uphold the principle “one man, one vote,” on the basis of which the modern democratic state was born. Democracy is an ideal which can only advance with the support of effective interests for a more just distribution of world power.

Third. Peace among the countries of the North does not mean world peace. The democratic government of the UN will necessarily be, at the beginning, a “partial” world government, because many peoples, still dominated by dictatorial régimes, will not be able to participate in free elections for the World Parliament. It is in fact with these countries that major conflicts might arise, even necessitating possible recourse to military force. All participants in the election of the World Parliament accept, or will have to end up accepting, even if not explicitly, the renunciation of force in international controversies. But it would be absurd to impose with violence the principle of non-violence on reluctant

countries. The force of democracy resides in the will to self-government of individuals and peoples, who must first overcome all obstacles and prejudices which still keep alive the old authoritarian régimes. For this reason, the very existence of the World Parliament will represent a constant point of reference and a potential tool for universal democratization, to the extent that it helps the forces of progress to make their reasons prevail against tyrannical governments.

From this world which is torn by wars, tyranny and poverty, the hope of a new epoch is, with difficulty, emerging. The arsenals are emptying, and the barriers that seemed to defy the centuries are falling. The peoples no longer accept being closed in by their governments, like flocks of sheep in a pen. Barriers cannot be imposed on democracy, because it is not possible to suppress the freedom of every individual to participate in the destiny of the world and to struggle for its survival, threatened as it is by misuse of the prodigious conquests of science and technology, which are still subject to the blind government of interests and power politics. Nationalism, which feeds continual tensions in the international system, is the fundamental obstacle to the unfolding of all the emancipatory potential of the new epoch. Nationalism is the political culture of a closed society, of frontiers, of ethnic discrimination, and of racism. It is at the origin of every major world disaster of the past. Only with federalism is it possible to organize peacefully the integration of free and interdependent nations. The hope of a new world is in federalism.

NOTES

1. *European federalism and world federalism*

European federalism and world federalism have common origins, not only cultural but also organizational. The early years of the *Federal Union*, for example, bear witness to this. It was founded in 1939 in London in an attempt to respond in terms of federal unity to the Nazi-fascist threat hanging over Europe. In the same year, Clarence Streit's essay *Union Now*, published simultaneously in the United States and in Great Britain, achieved major success. This essay, outlining the prospect of a federation of democracies against Hitler's hegemony, came directly to the aid of the founders of the British *Federal Union*, whose invitation to Streit's readers to enter their movement received a good response. Moreover, contacts were immediately established between the UK *Federal Union* and its US namesake, founded by Streit. It was however only at the end of the Second World War, after the atom bomb attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that the various federalist movements which had emerged independently in the United States and Europe sought to co-ordinate their initiatives and to attain a common organizational structure.

In 1946, on the initiative of the British *Federal Union*, a conference was organized in Luxembourg involving all the principal world federalist movements, from both the United States and Europe, together with representatives of European Federalism. The aim of arriving, in a short period of time, at organizational unification was postponed, among other things because of the difficulty of clearly defining the relationship between the objective of European Federation and that of World Federation. In the meantime, in the same year, without its promoters knowing about the recent meeting in Luxembourg, there was a meeting at Hertenstein, in Switzerland, of representatives of the principal European federalist movements which had emerged during the Resistance. Thus in August of 1947, after the organizers of the two Conferences of Luxembourg and Hertenstein had made contact with each other, there took place at Montreux, within the space of a few days of each other, the founding Congresses of the *World Movement for World Federal Government* and the *European Union of Federalists* (UEF). Many federalist militants were members of both organizations. This was the moment in which relations and goals were closest between European federalists (at the UEF Congress of Montreux one of the slogans of the conclusive motion was *One Europe in One World*) and world federalists. But from then on events in international politics — in other words the advent of the Cold War — inevitably divided the two organizations, which in this context could no longer pursue converging policies.

In the years immediately following the explosion of the atomic bomb, the enormous emotion released by this event throughout the whole world was the basis for a prodigious development in world federalism. This was particularly true in the USA, where, under the courageous moral leadership of Albert Einstein, the first serious attempt was made to found a world government. The USA, in those years, was in the singular and privileged position of holding the monopoly of nuclear energy. Therefore, any initiative of theirs to build a democratic government, together with the USSR and Europe, would have probably carried crucial weight. With the aim of exploiting this possibility, there gathered a group of atomic scientists around Einstein, who, from the First World War onwards, had indefatigably maintained his stance in favour of world government against the rising tide of nationalism. (This group's official organ became the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*.) Later a broader movement of public opinion arose with the same aim, led by the federalist movements (in particular the *United World Federalists*).

In the meantime, in the British Parliament, some MP's connected to the *Federal Union* took the initiative of launching the proposal of a *People's World Constituent Assembly*, with the aim of achieving a Constituent Assembly by 1950. This was to represent the peoples of all the continents, and be able to demand that governments support the constitution of a world government.

The mobilization in the USA of world federalists and public opinion produced some important political results. In 1946 Massachusetts organized a referendum, in which the population expressed itself in favour of world government. In 1947 the House of Representatives presented a bipartisan motion in favour of strengthening the UN. Between 1945 and 1946 the foundations were laid for what was to become the Baruch Plan. President Truman asked his ambassador Bernard Baruch to begin UN negotiations with the USSR with the aim of putting the control of the production and exploitation of atomic energy in the hands of an international agency, under the aegis of the UN. If the initiative had been successful it would have led to a kind of World Community for Atomic Energy, along the lines of Euratom. But the proposal was increasingly pushed aside and eventually shelved because of the growing distrust between the two superpowers, which were more interested in extracting unilateral advantages from the negotiations than in pooling their strategic resources. Finally, Einstein supported the initiative of the *People's World Convention*, and in 1948 a *Foundation for World Government* was created, whose goal was

that of financing a campaign for the federalist constituent assembly. However, despite these efforts, when the Convention was convoked in Geneva in 1950, its failure had to be acknowledged. Only Tennessee had organized proper elections to elect its representatives. There were a few other delegates present from some other countries, but it certainly could not be claimed that the assembly was representative of the "peoples of all the world." From then on, the world federalists' attempts to instigate a democratic reform of the UN became increasingly sporadic and lacked the support of public opinion: in a climate of growing tension between the two superpowers (in the years immediately following, the USSR also came to possess nuclear weapons), very few thought it possible to modify the international *status quo*.

The destiny of European federalism has been very different. In 1947, only a few months after General Marshall's proposal for a massive plan of American aid for European reconstruction, Altiero Spinelli realized that this was a historic opportunity to relaunch the battle for European unification. The Marshall Plan, declared Spinelli at the 1947 Congress of Montreux, when the UEF was founded, "is an opportunity which the European democracies should seize and exploit, profiting by the chances America offers. If federal institutions are not developed in the political and economic field, the politics of American imperialism will prevail." In 1949-50, with the Campaign for a federal European pact, the federalists for the first time successfully mobilized public opinion in favour of European Federation. In those same years, Jean Monnet, in the face of reviving nationalistic rivalries between Germany and France, succeeded in having European governments accept his plan for a European Coal and Steel Community, (ECSC). Its goal was to share the administration of certain strategic resources of the European economy by means of the creation of common institutions, which Monnet considered "the first concrete foundation of a European Federation." And indeed, the ECSC represented a decisive episode in Franco-German reconciliation and the start of the process of European integration.

Shortly after the constitution of the ECSC, the critical problem of German rearmament arose. France was firmly opposed to the Anglo-American proposal to let Germany have an army again in order to contain Stalinist expansionism. As a compromise, a European Defence Community (EDC) was proposed, in other words the constitution of a pool of weapons under European control. The Italian federalists immediately realized that the initiative of the EDC could open the way to European Federation: it was in fact impossible to install a European army without a democratic European government. The federalists' proposal — thanks to De Gasperi's firm support for the *Memorandum* submitted to him by Altiero Spinelli — was finally accepted by the European governments. They appointed the Parliamentary Assembly of the ECSC, which in this period became a real constituent assembly, to work out a project for a European Political Community (EPC). The constituent undertaking failed only because of the sudden refusal of the French Parliament (in August 1954) to ratify the project, after Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg had already given their consent.

Despite this failure, the federalist initiative for the EPC indirectly gave a strong impetus to the process of European integration. The governments, having brought themselves to the threshold of political unification, could not completely ignore public expectations. Thus it was that the negotiations began which were to be concluded in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome. In the course of the decades that followed, the European Community represented the institutional framework within which the federalists were able to wage crucial battles for its democratization and strengthening: first of all, the battle for direct European Parliamentary elections, and later the battle for a European currency and the European government.

This brief historical outline may perhaps help towards an understanding of the factors which hindered the development of world federalism and those which, in contrast,

favoured the growth of European federalism. The formation of a rigid bipolar balance of power at world level, with the USA and the USSR facing each other in implacable enmity, made every effort to reform the UN end in vain, because it was impossible to break into the superstructures of a world system of power built on military and ideological confrontation. The overcoming of this obstacle would have required nothing less than the dismantlement of the system of opposing blocs, and thus a long process of detente in which the populations of both blocs ceased to see each other as the enemy. Only in the last few years has this condition been realized.

On the other hand, the prospects offered to European federalism in the post-war period were quite the opposite. None of the European countries was left with sufficient strength to guarantee its citizens autonomous defence and autonomous economic development. The policy of European integration was thus imposed on European governments as a historical necessity, not as a choice which they could take or leave. The historical and political significance of the *Ventotene Manifesto* consists precisely in having identified European Federation as a realistic strategic objective and not as an ideal which, after all, had been put forward by many utopians even in the nineteenth century. The strength and the prestige won by the MFE among the traditional political forces lay in having consistently pursued this strategy, even in the most difficult moments, until they succeeded in bringing the objective of European Federation into the programmes of all democratic parties and governments.

World federalism, naturally, could not achieve these results because of the international situation. For this reason, even today, world federalism is not immune to utopian and pre-political aspects: some world federalists, for example, think that as in the days of the Enlightenment it is enough to draw up a good constitutional project to convince national governments to cede their power to a world government. The path so successfully taken by European federalism teaches us that without a daily political struggle against those who hold national power — therefore all national political forces — it is impossible to bring the federalistic objective into the process of integration. Governments, faced with the challenge set by interdependence, content themselves by definition with an "ever closer cooperation." Federalists ask for a democratic supranational government.

2. The federalist strategy

The federalist strategy consists of identifying the most effective means for the creation of a supranational democratic power, that is for founding a "solid international state." This is a new task which no traditional political force has ever set as their chief objective. Liberals fight to institute or to reinforce the rule of law within the state. Democrats fight for universal citizen participation in the process of forming the political will, thus realizing representative government. Socialists fight to eliminate every economic and social discrimination which constitutes a real obstacle to the equality of the citizens in the state. In all these cases the point is to change an existing government, not to build a new state. The task of the federalists consists in the creation of an international state over an area in which sovereign nation-states already co-exist.

From the identification of the specific task of the federalists, certain strategic guidelines can immediately be drawn. In the first place, the Federalist Movement must be constituted by men and women whose top priority is their dedication to the struggle for the construction of the international state. Members of traditional parties may also belong to the Federalist Movement, but they are dedicating themselves in an entirely secondary way to the federalist struggle, because they give priority to the conquest of national power. In the second place, the struggle for federal government is such as to involve all the traditional forces, because the currents of liberal, democratic and socialist thought do not deny the

values of internationalism and of peace among the peoples of the world. On the contrary, they share them explicitly, but then fail to indicate the means for achieving them. The federalists are thus at the same time enemies and allies of the traditional political forces. The federalist line-up goes right through all the parties, making an internal division between the "innovators," that is those who are favourable to overcoming national sovereignties, and the "conservatives." The federalists' strategy must therefore aim to make the Federalist Movement play an essential role of linking up all the democratic forces, through the constitution of committees or cross-party groups which, by including exponents from all the democratic forces, clearly show the population that in every political force there exists potentially a standpoint favourable to the federalist objective.

If we consider the history of European federalism, we can identify three fundamental and complementary approaches to the strategic problem, which can also be considered as the problem of the transition from a system of sovereign nation-states to the European Federation.

The first of these approaches can be defined as the *gradualist method*, in the sense indicated by Jean Monnet, who was the first to apply it successfully in the case of the ECSC. From the situation of *impasse* existing in post-war Europe, according to Jean Monnet there was only one way out: "by concrete and resolute action on a limited but decisive point, which brings about a fundamental change on this point and progressively modifies the very terms of all the problems." (*Memorandum* of 3 May 1950). The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community did indeed produce the results foreseen by Monnet. With Franco-German reconciliation, all the terms of the European problem were modified. There was a change from confrontation and the threat of resurgent power politics, to a policy of cooperation; with time, it even became possible, through well-timed federal initiatives, to develop the embryos of democratic power contained initially in the ECSC. In substance, with the ECSC the European governments agreed to share the administration of significant sectors of economic policy, without for the time being making any inroads on national sovereignty. The project of the ECSC provided for the immediate constitution of a High Authority (which later became the Commission) and for a Parliamentary Assembly which only later was to be elected by universal suffrage. For this reason, Jean Monnet could justly state that the Community represented "*les premières assises de la fédération européenne*."

In this embryonic phase of the community's life, the MFE criticized the "functionalist" approach of Jean Monnet because of the confederal nature of the community's construction. For the federalists, the common management of some policies only served to hide the determination of national governments not to hand over their sovereignty, which remained intact, at least formally, in the fundamental sectors of currency and defence. In substance, however many competences were in fact transferred to the European level, when it came down to the question "Who governs Europe?", the answer had to be that there was no democratic European power, but that effective powers still remained in the hands of the national governments. Therefore, against the gradualist or functionalist method of Jean Monnet, the federalists proposed the *constituent method*, as the only democratic way to build a people's Europe by the people themselves.

The constituent method is not mentioned in the *Ventotene Manifesto*, but it is implicit in the democratic nature of the federalist battle. In fact, as the opportunities for the struggle for European Federation became more concrete, the constituent method was defined with great clarity by Spinelli, who was faithful to it right up to his last great battle in the European Parliament. "In politics," declared Spinelli at the Council of the Peoples of Europe held in Strasbourg in 1950, "as in other fields, there are inventions, methods which cannot be avoided or ignored when certain problems arise. For example, in the French Revolution, the French invented the method of the Constituent Assembly to create the fundamental

laws of the state on a democratic basis. Ever since then, no country has been able to apply substantially different methods to establish the basis of a democratic nation-state. Similarly, since the Americans invented the means for moving from a group of sovereign states wishing to unite, to a federal state without legal interruption, the very same method has to be adopted to resolve the same problem here."

By his tenacious pursuit of the constituent method, Spinelli succeeded on two crucial occasions in bringing the European countries to the threshold of federation. The first was with the European Defence Community (EDC), when it was shown to be clearly impossible to advance on the Union without a parallel project for a European Political Community. The proposal of Altiero Spinelli for a Constituent Assembly empowered to draw up a draft federal constitution, was adopted by De Gasperi, who succeeded, in turn, in imposing it on the governments of the other countries of the Community. The project failed only because of the opposition of the French Assembly, which in August 1954 did not ratify the new Treaty-Constitution.

The second occasion presented itself to Spinelli in the course of the first legislature of the European Parliament that was elected by universal suffrage (1979-84). Thanks to the initiative of an initially small group of federalist representatives, the European Parliament approved by a huge majority a new project for European Union, which was to enable the European Parliament to increase its powers, acquiring legislative power in the sectors within its competence, and subjecting the Commission to political control. Thus an effective mechanism for democratic government of the Community would have been achieved. However, the proposal of the European Parliament, despite the favourable position of France, Italy, Germany and the Benelux countries, was rejected in the Council of Ministers because of the opposition of the United Kingdom.

In this last phase of the struggle for the European Federation, the conviction grew in the MFE that Jean Monnet's gradualist method and Spinelli's constituent method should by no means be considered as alternatives. As long as the framework of international politics remains favourable to the process of European unification (in other words as long as the convergence of *raisons d'état* continues), every step forward towards European unity adds to the sum of forces which support the process of integration, adds to the body of public opinion the expectations favourable to a federal outcome, and at the same time adds to the opportunities for federalists to launch the final attack. This situation can be defined as an "inclined plane" from the nations towards Europe. The succession of events in the process of European unification confirms this point of view. The Community, thanks to its initial successes (the Common Market) reinforced the necessity for European unity in public opinion, and allowed the federalists to exploit some evident contradictions, such as the existence of a European Parliament not yet elected by universal suffrage. The 1979 European Parliamentary elections were not an arbitrary gift from heaven, but had been prepared for by an intense federalist campaign directed at the parties and national parliaments, starting from 1967. From this point of view, it can also be understood how the failures of Altiero Spinelli's constituent attempts caused, as a consequence, some important steps forward in the process of unification. After the collapse of the EDC, the European governments started the construction of the Common Market with the Treaty of Rome (1957), and, in 1985, they only succeeded in rejecting the project of Union, proposed by the European Parliament and widely supported by public opinion, on the basis of a compromise which did nothing more than postpone the institutional questions: the institution of the single market by 1992.

These are the reasons that seem to justify a third approach to the federalist strategy: *constitutional gradualism*. In other words a transfer of competences to the community level which makes the institution of a democratic supranational government necessary sooner or later must be considered a positive step towards the European Federation. A

significant application of this strategy was seen in the struggle for a European currency, started by the MFE in 1976. A single market is impossible without a single currency; and, in democracy, monetary unification is inconceivable unless accompanied by democratic governmental control of monetary policy, which is an essential part of the economic policy of a state. For this reason, the battle for a European currency represented an important phase in federalist strategy, in the sense that it favoured the transfer of monetary sovereignty from the nation-states to the European level and raised the need for a parallel reform of the Community to overcome the inevitable "democratic deficit." In fact there is a risk that the nation-states will deprive themselves of an essential competence without any democratic organ being able to take on the responsibility of administering the economy at the Community level.

Constitutional gradualism naturally only has any meaning for objectives which implicitly contain or, by increasing the contradictions, facilitate the achievement of the central objective, which is European Federation. In any case, the central concept remains that voiced by Spinelli: without a constituent assembly it is impossible to bring into being a federation of states. For this reason, according to Mario Albertini, "while the method of Jean Monnet allowed to start the process of European unification, Spinelli's constituent method is indispensable for bringing it to completion."

The gradualist method and the constituent method are not exclusive to the European experience. In the period leading up to the constitution of the United States of America, both methods can be traced. Once independence from the mother country had been won, the thirteen colonies found themselves with common administrative problems. Maryland and Virginia drew up an agreement for the common administration of Chesapeake Bay and, on the initiative of Virginia, in 1786, a Convention was convened at Annapolis which was to regulate the Confederation's trade. These examples are very similar to more recent functionalist attempts. Naturally, however, in American history the experience of the Constituent Assembly of Philadelphia in 1787 is fundamental. In the history of world federalism it is easy to trace constituent attempts — like those promoted by *Federal Union* for a *People's World Convention* — and functionalist attempts, like the Baruch Plan promoted by the United States government. But only in the history of European federalism is a logical connection clearly visible between the various approaches to the problem of transition from a system of sovereign states to federal government. This is due to two things: the manifest historical necessity to unite Europe after the irreversible crisis of the European nation-states, and a conscious avant-garde which has consistently pursued the political objective of European Federation by exploiting every contradiction generated by the process of integration.

3. The federal state

The first example in history of a federal state is that of the United States of America. The thirteen colonies which, with the *Declaration of Independence* in 1776, rebelled against the mother country, found themselves, after the victorious war, having to decide whether to keep alive the fragile unitary structures which they had created to face the British troops, and if so, how; or whether to choose the course of absolute sovereignty and of division. The evils of division were already becoming obvious: jealousies in the control of commerce, small wars for the control of river passages and above all, the tendency to seek dangerous alliances with the great European powers in the attempt to gain advantage over neighbouring states. The Confederation was by then already crumbling.

In 1787, in an attempt to overcome these difficulties, the supporters of unity among the thirteen colonies succeeded in convoking the Convention of Philadelphia which was charged with "the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of the Confederation."

However, in the course of the Convention, it became apparent that the unitary viewpoint could not be accepted without bringing into question the autonomy of the individual states and that, on the other hand, the realization of an absolute independence of the states would completely destroy the union. From this there emerged a compromise which revealed itself to be not only acceptable to both the unitary and the localist currents of thought, but also vital. In substance, a new type of state was born, the federal state, capable of reconciling unity with independence. The Constitution of 1787 respected the principle of popular sovereignty for the American people as a whole, who were directly represented in the Congress and elected the President of the federal government; but the member states remained sovereign in all spheres of competence which the Constitution did not explicitly attribute to the federal level, and they could influence the legislative process of the Union, being jointly represented in the Senate. Judiciary power, in turn, found itself in a clearly privileged position compared to the situation that existed and still exists in centralized states, where it is often obliged to bow to the executive's greater power. In the United States, judiciary power is effectively sovereign in all questions concerning the respect of the Constitution, because by means of its power to annul any unconstitutional legislative provisions, it can guarantee a balance between the various territorial centres of power, thus ensuring the unity of the federation. In short, the federal state, in juridical terms, is constituted by independent and democratically co-ordinated governments.

There are two important characteristics of the federal state which must now be observed. The first concerns the progress of democracy. It is well-known that certain social problems hinder the establishment of democracy. Major disparities in income and opportunities mean that in practice the idea of political equality remains a dream. However, there are also objective territorial difficulties. Democracy first took shape in the exceptional conditions of the Greek city-state, under the form of direct democracy. In the modern age, after the formation of the nation-states, the formula of direct democracy proved impracticable and it was only after many failed attempts that the formula of representative government was finally reached. On the great continental landmasses, however, this formula seems impracticable because of the distance separating the individual elector from his representative. It was in fact this difficulty which the constituents of Philadelphia had to tackle. According to Hamilton, the formula of the federal state allows "the enlargement of the orbit" of representative government. The federal state creates the conditions for the democratic organization of whole continents — apart from the United States, further examples can be observed in Canada and Australia — in which several member-states co-exist. The only alternative to the federal method of organizing the interdependence of states is hegemony or imperialism. And if we consider the possibility of federating grand continental federations together, the notion of the federal state makes world federation, the democratic government of humanity, perfectly conceivable.

This capacity of federal government to organize relations between different territorial communities harmoniously is not only valid in an upwards direction, in other words for ever greater geographical areas, but also in a downwards direction, for the smallest administrative units. Switzerland is an excellent example of how, through federalism, it has been possible to organize the co-existence of diverse ethnic and linguistic communities peacefully. Federalism democratically organizes society's pluralism, from the citizens' local community council right up to world government.

The second aspect concerns the relationship between federalism and the international order. Hamilton saw quite clearly that to try to keep the peace between "a number of independent unconnected sovereignties ...", would be to disregard the uniform course of human events." The situation which normally characterizes international relations between sovereignties is that of anarchy, in which the biggest fish eats the smallest. Peace — or, as Kant says more precisely, the truce until the next war, if there is no power above

the untamed freedom of states to establish justice — is no more than the fruit of the equilibrium of forces: the balance of powers. The federal state is thus the response to the problem of international anarchy. Only with federal government is it possible to guarantee an international order founded on the rule of law. Universal peace, the fundamental value of federalism, thus cannot but be the fruit of World Federation.

This second aspect of the doctrine of the federal state was not actually perceived as a historical novelty at the time of the creation of the United States of America. The American Revolution became a historical event because of its democratic significance, not for its innovative organizational proposals for international relations. After the French Revolution, the only subject recognized by international relations was the national sovereign state. The history of international politics in the nineteenth century was dominated by the principle of nationality, and the United States itself, by entering as an active subject into world politics, became a nation, with the consequence that it was obliged, in order to augment its military power, to limit increasingly the autonomy of the local governments, thus coming closer to the continental European model of the centralized state. All the federal states that have existed up till now — such as Switzerland, Germany, etc. — are nations in which the citizens recognize their exclusive national identity and respect “natural” borders which automatically exclude the external population as foreign.

It is in the negation of the nation-state that the innovative nature of European federalism must be seen. The European Federation will be the first “international state,” in the sense that for the first time in history, historically consolidated nation-states will unite in a supranational federation. Compared to national federations of the past, the European Federation will present itself as open, that is without definite natural borders marking ethnic, linguistic or territorial entities. The constitution of a democratic European government will be sufficient to define European citizenship, which will be federal, because the fact of being European citizens will be perfectly compatible with the Italian identity, the Lombard identity, and so on.

Naturally the European Federation, like the American one, will also be an imperfect example of federation, in that it will only represent a stage on the way to international democracy and peace. In Europe, we should therefore not exclude the possibility that strong tendencies to close the borders to democratic peoples aspiring to membership, and to use European unity to develop a dominant foreign policy, will come to the fore. In these circumstances, the process of international detente could undergo a sudden halt. The reverse is also true however. A nationalistic and imperialistic European policy could impose itself only with great difficulty, given the pluralistic and multinational character of European society, which has been open to international cooperation for several decades now and is conscious of the vital requirement for Europe to extend and strengthen peaceful relations with the rest of the world. The best guarantee of security in Europe resides in its capacity for dialogue and cooperation with the external world. Imperialistic politics are an inheritance of the Cold War which certainly cannot represent the basis for building constructive international relations. Unfortunately the world has not yet found the way to establish a new international order founded on the rule of law, and the threat of anarchy hangs heavily over the future of civilization. But it is no longer thinkable to rebuild a world order founded on the hegemony of one or more superpowers. The future of European foreign policy thus seems sufficiently defined. The European Federation can play a positive role, thereby increasing its influence in the international context, only if it favours the process of world unification. On this basis, European Federalism could be an important catalyst for world federalism. Europe is the embryonic model of the new international world order.

The positive role of Europe as a model of the new “international state” is evident if one takes into consideration the situation which has come about in the USSR and the countries

of Eastern Europe following the demise of communism. The conquest of democratic freedoms needs to be translated into a positive process of social and economic reconstruction, but this is hampered by the incurable ethnic and national rivalries which threaten the disintegration of states like the USSR and Yugoslavia. These states defined themselves as federations, but in reality they were empires cemented together by the single party. There can be no federation without democracy. The passage from empire to federation has become a dangerous and tortured process because the territorial communities have no other concept of how to claim their independence than on the basis of the fatal nationalistic principle of self-determination. In fact, this leads to the disintegration of the state and of society itself, because no limit can be put on the claims of each, ever smaller, ethnic unit to possess its own army and its own currency. (Yet this absurdity is very hard to oppose because nowadays international relations are based on the dogma of the self-determination of nations, which is fundamental to all major contemporary international organizations, such as the UN). This involves implicit acceptance of the view that international order is regulated by relations of force and not of law. The mistake, for those who have understood the principles on which federalism is based, is obvious. The self-government of a political community by no means implies its absolute sovereignty. Interdependence is inevitable in the modern world, and must be managed by democratic government. Every territorial community must seek to obtain independence in those sectors, such as education, certain forms of taxation, and so on, which affect its inhabitants exclusively; but must agree to share, with the other territorial authorities involved, the control of those aspects of social life which concern them jointly. Self-government is possible only in the context of the federal state, which guarantees democratic relations between democratic nations. Independence is never an exclusively juridical matter, but political. Without common democratic institutions, small states are condemned to submit to the domination of the strongest.

In the last century, nationalistic movements justified themselves by their progressive character, which aimed for the emancipation of peoples and for the unification of the great territorial areas that were indispensable to industrial development (as in the case of Italian and German unification). Today, claiming to close one's own political community off from interdependence and democratic dialogue with other communities can, in the final instance, only base itself on the demoniac principle of racism. For this reason, many disputes between nationalities, both in the USSR and in the Balkans, often end up in bloody conflicts, in which the enemies face each other with the ferocity of savages, but with the most modern and murderous instruments of war.

4. Federalism as a new political behaviour

In the *Ventotene Manifesto* the call for action ends with the exhortation: “Since it will be the moment for new action, it will also be the moment for new men, the Movement for a free and united Europe.” The “new” character of the federalist commitment compared to traditional political commitment remained, however, for a long time undefined within the MFE. Only after years of strong commitment did serious reflection begin on federalism as a new political behaviour.

Spinelli, in the course of his life, which from Ventotene onwards was entirely dedicated to the achievement of the federalist project, necessarily experienced some of the fundamental characteristics of the new federalist behaviour. According to Spinelli, politics is essentially the struggle for power. Since the European Federation is not simply an ideal to hold up for future generations, but a political objective which can and must be pursued “here and now,” the federalist commitment lies in a political struggle to achieve this new objective, and its opponents are those national politicians who are opposed to the federalist project. The novelty of the federalist commitment, for Spinelli, depended only on the

novelty of the objective, not on the means to be used. There is no doubt that Spinelli considered himself a realistic politician, and that he saw absolutely no need to tackle the problem of a "new commitment" in politics. The only concrete problem which arose at the time of the MFE's foundation was the choice between party and movement: for obvious reasons the second alternative prevailed. The MFE "does not seek to be an alternative" to the traditional political currents of thought, as is stated in the MFE's Founding Thesis (1943). On the contrary, "it is from these movements that the MFE draws its support and it works to establish those aims which represent the highest values of our civilization." The specific role of the MFE is only that of showing that "the creation of the European Federation is definitely the first task upon which the progressive European movements must concentrate all their energies."

Spinelli's political activity however is not identifiable with the life of the MFE. At the end of the Second World War, Spinelli thought that the political conditions for the federalist battle no longer existed, at least in the years immediately following the war, and he successfully entered Italian national politics, occupying some prestigious positions there. In the meantime, the MFE was kept alive by a group of young people. Only with the launch of the Marshall Plan did Spinelli realize the intrinsic potential of the new international situation for successfully relaunching the federalist project, and he then returned to involvement in the MFE. Later he frankly acknowledged his mistake. He had strayed onto the "wasteland of national politics," abandoning the only ground — the MFE — on which it was possible to maintain an autonomous capacity of thought and action with regard to the national powers. From then on, Spinelli never again allowed himself to be lured away by the flattery of national power, even though he ventured to occupy positions of prestige (like that of Community Commissioner and European Parliamentarian), but only so as to develop his constituent strategy with greater likelihood of success.

The circumstances of the federalist struggle therefore dissuaded Spinelli from concerning himself with national power (he never sided with any national political force, because even when he accepted the candidature for the European Parliament he did it as an independent and declared his primary identity as a federalist). His basic political commitment lay in the struggle for the construction of a new power — the federal European Government — not in the conquest of an established power. Spinelli knew that Italy was lost without European unity and that therefore it was not worthwhile fighting for the power to govern Italy. In this sense, Spinelli was a political innovator, working outside national institutions and venturing alone into *terra incognita* (Spinelli's entry into the European institutions depended on his personal decision alone, because at that moment the MFE was starting its politico-cultural reformation, and so Spinelli was obliged, because of the impossibility for the MFE to support his political line, to leave it once more).

The consciousness that federalism amounted to a new political behaviour made no progress in the MFE until the politico-cultural renewal promoted by Mario Albertini at the end of the fifties. The MFE freed itself completely from "followers of traditional political currents of thought" and founded its organization on militants who considered federalism their priority political commitment. Autonomy from the traditional parties became the new watchword of the federalists. For this reason, the organizational renewal was necessarily accompanied by cultural renewal.

Federalism had to be considered as a new political thinking, thus as a new political ideology which placed itself in a critical relationship with regard to traditional ideologies: liberalism, democracy and socialism. The traditional ideologies are in crisis because in the epoch of the supranational course of history, when the solution of major contemporary problems lies in the creation of supranational federations, to continue to conceive of the nation-state as the principal and exclusive context of political struggle leads to an implicit betrayal of the values professed. The liberals want freedom for the French, for the

Germans, and so on, but invoke the iron laws of *Realpolitik* if that freedom is threatened in other countries; the socialists want to achieve the solidarity of the poor of their nation, but ignore the Third World (the welfare state only looks after national, not international, solidarity), and so on. Liberalism, democracy and socialism are empty words unless they apply to the whole human race. The internationalism invoked by traditional politics in reality does nothing to question the *status quo*, in other words the balance of power and the *raison d'état*. For this reason, national political life, being unable to achieve the ideal reality which it nonetheless loudly professes, constantly impoverishes itself and degenerates into pure power struggles. Only with federalism is it possible to conceive once more of a policy which has as its concrete goal the emancipation of mankind, that is the realization of freedom and justice for all men.

Federalism, like any ideological thinking — ideology, as Albertini defines it, means "active political thought" — presents different aspects: an aspect of value (peace), an aspect of structure (the federal state), and a historical-social aspect (federal society). The identification of peace as a fundamental value of federalism allows us to identify the cultural roots of modern federalism in the political thought of Kant, and to identify the relationship between federalism and the traditional ideologies, which certainly have not ignored the value of peace, but have always subordinated it to the realization of other objectives. Furthermore, in those years of cultural renewal, there was a deeper examination of that ideology which is opposed to the realization of federalism, in other words nationalism, defined by Albertini as "the ideology of the bureaucratic and centralized state."

These theoretical acquisitions turned out to be crucial for forming the specific identity of the federalist activist. At the same time however, there developed in the MFE the awareness that in the federalist struggle, paradoxical as it may at first seem, "the power to make Europe does not exist" and, therefore, there is no power for federalists to conquer (as opposed to the revolutionaries of the past with their assaults on the Bastille or the Winter Palace). In fact careful consideration shows that no government, no party, and no politician, however important they may be, can autonomously take the decision to create European unity. The decision to found the European Federation must spring from the consensus of all the governments concerned, of the European Parliament, of the European parties and, in the last instance, from the citizens themselves. This is why the federalists are obliged to develop a political struggle in new terms and in extremely difficult conditions. They cannot avail themselves of the normal instruments of power: namely the vote, because they would become a party which struggles to govern that which already exists, instead of dedicating themselves to the foundation of the new; and violence, because a democratic battle is fought with the instruments of persuasion and reason suitable to the respective historical circumstances. For the federalists therefore the motivations of the pursuit of power or of personal interest which habitually accompany political commitment do not apply. Hamilton reminds us that the fundamental rule for the good functioning of institutions is that interest goes together with duty. In the long run, no institution survives when it requires of men that they dedicate all their energies solely to guarantee the "common good," without their being able to derive any personal advantage in terms of money, prestige, and so on. This is how parliaments, parties, bureaucracies, universities, and so on, function. The federalists on the other hand have found in these long decades of struggle that it is possible to be involved in politics without occupying positions of power and, in this specific sense, have been pioneers of a new political behaviour.

This conception of the federalist commitment was recently brought into question, with the battle fought by Spinelli within the European Parliament for a constituent role, and then after his death, because of the Parliament's evident inability to fight a vigorous battle for European democracy without an internal, relentless, federalist leadership. It was thus

proposed (explicitly in the French MFE) that the federalists should compete in the European elections in order that at least a small federalist patrol should be present in the European Parliament.

This proposal is insidious. Although suggested by a clear and legitimate intention to advance the process of European unification, it does not take account of some fundamental objections. We should not confuse the role assumed by individuals (like Altiero Spinelli) who may also renounce their role in the MFE if others take on the responsibility, with the role of the MFE itself. The battle for the federation will not only be won in the European Parliament. The federalists' struggle to bring the national parties, parliaments and governments to positions favourable to European democracy has been just as important in promoting European Federation as the federalist positions taken by the European Parliament. The MFE can only continue to fulfil the function of stimulus and connection between all the political forces if it does not enter into electoral competition with them. Moreover, for those who believe that the destiny of the federalist revolution lies in its world dimension, it is clear that the MFE will have an important role to play in giving a global orientation to the external policy of the European Federation. This would affect such important questions as enlargement to the East, relations with the USSR (now struggling in the face of enormous difficulties to achieve a federalist democracy), relations with the Middle East and the southern hemisphere, the democratic transformation of the UN, and so on. A united Europe will be a power and will try, like any other power in this world, to maintain and increase its powers, even when this conflicts with the aims of federalist policy. Nothing in the world is born perfect, and not even European federalism will be an exception. It will therefore be up to an autonomous force, external to the established European power, to intervene and fight to assert the political line of international solidarity and world unification.

Even in the new era of world politics it is thus true that for the federalists there is no power to be won and held. Nevertheless, they must be fully committed to the political struggle, because the traditional parties, until proved otherwise, are either not concerned with, or not capable of, fighting effectively for the construction of the "international state."

5. *The federalist militant and the reform of politics*

The debate of a new political commitment is certainly not exhausted with a reflection on the past experience of the MFE. It is particularly important for drawing up resolutions as to its future, in other words on the rules which federalist activists should follow to optimize the organization of their political action in this new era of world politics. The MFE is like a small boat ploughing across a menacing sea: federalist militants must cope with the traditional means of political action, with the struggle for power as it exists. Politics is like the two-faced Janus: the search for the common good can only be realized by the struggle for power. This is why the pursuit of personal interests can easily be masked under the ideological cloak of seeking the collective interest.

This realistic observation must not however justify a moralistic refusal to undertake political commitment. Relying on its forces alone, the MFE can hope to modify the world situation of power only by pursuing its institutional objectives. But in the meantime, it can try to develop internal rules of behaviour which ensure greater democracy among its members. In fact, past experience shows that to a certain extent the MFE was able to commit itself in politics preeminently on the basis of its own moral and intellectual energies without recourse, partly through necessity and partly by choice, to the traditional instruments of party politics. And if we turn our eyes beyond the small world of federalist militancy, we must also note that the forms of political struggle have undergone profound changes from ancient times to the present day, particularly in countries with a more solid

democratic tradition. In the days of Machiavelli few moral and juridical checks existed to stop the resolution of conflicts between opposing factions by means of the physical elimination of opponents. Today, in many civilized countries we have succeeded in channelling the struggle between parties into non-violent democratic rules. Democracy, in the final analysis, is the consensual respect for collective systems. For this reason its realization is progressive in time: it is inevitably associated with a process of individual self-education. "Real" democracy has not yet succeeded in eliminating the power of the great economic and political oligarchies, such that it can be maintained that the current democratic regimes are nothing more than a modern variant of aristocratic government, in other words a polyarchy. It is true, however, that the conflict between opposing factions is resolved ever more frequently by going to the polls, without bloodshed. It thus seems legitimate to state that it is possible to achieve progress even in political activity, which can therefore be further reformed to the point of guaranteeing a more effective realization of the common good.

This debate on the best form of civil government is as old as mankind. It has as its object the realization of the *polis*, a community of destiny inhabited by free and equal citizens, and every great current of political thought has tried to contribute to this ideal. Ultimately, the mobilizing force of revolutionary thought in the past — from the Enlightenment to Bolshevism — has been precisely the faith that important reforms can achieve a step forward for humanity towards emancipation from the slavery of economic need and political tyranny.

Federalism brings an original contribution to this debate. It clearly defines the final conditions for overcoming all politics governed by domination and power. This reflection necessitates reference to the political thought of Kant, who was the first to explore the relations between federalism, politics and morality. For Kant, the history of civilization begins with man's emergence from the state of nature, in which all people are enemies and in which no form of associated life based on the rule of law is possible. This state of nature is a state of war. The civil constitution consists of the institution of a government which has the power to prevent the use of force in the regulation of controversies between individuals. Rather, in a society in which relations between individuals are regulated by a civil constitution, a progressive development of man's natural dispositions can take place, as a result of the inevitable antagonism (the *unsocial sociability*) which will manifest itself among its members. "In this way," according to Kant, "all man's talent are gradually developed, his taste is cultured and through progressive enlightenment he begins to establish a way of thinking that can in time transform the crude natural capacity for moral discrimination into definite practical principles and thus transform a pathologically enforced agreement into a society and, finally, into a *moral whole*."

These fruits of the civil constitution cannot however mature while the state remains part of an international society of states living in a situation of anarchy and barbarity, which forces every state to arm itself for its own defence against the real or potential threat of other states. The state of war is the necessary consequence of international anarchy. It is thus inevitable that, in such a situation, not even the civil constitution can be in accordance with the laws of morality and justice. "Enlisting men to kill or be killed appears to use them as mere machines and tools in the hands of another (the state), which cannot be reconciled with the rights of humanity over one's own person."

No civil constitution can thus call itself perfect until a pacific world constitution is instituted. It is possible to emerge from a state of international anarchy only by federation. Just as for individuals with regard to civil government, so states will have to give up their feral freedom in order to enter a state of international law, subordinating themselves to a federal government which has the power to prevent war. The World Federation, in instituting universal peace, will allow mankind finally to be governed by reason and not

by relations of force and by the conflict of interests. In the world of sovereign states, the law of the jungle prevails, the strongest is always right. Until the World Federation is instituted, the states will have to follow the rules of power politics: to keep their own power, to increase it where possible, and to act always to diminish opponents' power (the *divide et impera* principle).

Anyone involved in politics in the world of sovereign states — which is the only political reality today — thus cannot help but encounter power and *raison d'Etat*. All people who engage in politics, whether they want to or not, find themselves having to follow Machiavelli's advice to the Prince: act like a "fox" or a "lion" according to circumstances. The alternative is only a sterile moralism. To imagine that it is possible to engage in politics on the basis of abstract moral precepts is pure hypocrisy. Kant recognizes this explicitly, precisely in relation to the realization of the federalist project. All attempts to show states the necessity of universal peace by appeal to reason, by means of naive projects for more or less perfect constitutions, have been in vain. "As for this way, all theoretical plans for the constitution of an international and cosmopolitan public law end up in vain and unattainable ideals." This does not mean that one must renounce all political activity, leaving it in the hands of those who are only concerned with its utilitarian aspects. Kant was convinced that true politics is based on morality. But in order for this connection to emerge, the politician has to be able to associate the science of politics with the laws of morality. "A practice based on empirical principles of human nature, which does not disdain to draw instruction for its own norms from the way of the world, can alone hope to find a sure foundation for its political art." Thus Kant defines the *moral politician* as he "who understands the principles of political art in such a way that they can co-exist with morality."

The teaching of Kant is of great value to federalists. Kant not only affirms that only in World Federation is it possible for politics to be fully reconcilable with morality, at least in the sense that peoples and their governments will no longer be obliged to submit to the laws of the *raison d'Etat*; but he also maintains that for the *moral politician* it is possible and necessary to act henceforth to achieve that end. Herein lies the meaning of the definition that Mario Albertini, as far back as the Fifties, gave to the federalist militant: "A militant is one who takes the contradiction between facts and values as a personal commitment."

This relationship between the ends and the means of federalist action did not however present itself as a problem within the Movement, at least in its early years. The only choice that the founders of the MFE had to make was between party and movement. From time to time this choice has been questioned, but without its suitability ever being seriously contested. Only after the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage, and as a consequence of the effective constituent action undertaken by the MFE jointly with the European Parliament, did an intense debate develop among federalist militants on the best organizational form of the MFE. The MFE, with its constant commitment, has acquired the *status* of a political force, even if an anomalous one, because its power cannot be measured in any precise institutional sense (such as the number of seats in parliament won by a party), and because it almost disappears completely when the problem of European unity is reduced or else is entirely adopted by the traditional political forces. In fact, on closer inspection, the power of the MFE lies only in an effective influence on the parties and governments, an influence which the MFE exercises in the name of the European people. All the same, the problem arose of whether or not the organizational structure of the MFE should follow that of the traditional parties, in other words if the Movement should not rather assign itself internal rules which are based on the usual ones regulating the life of parties, which are occupied primarily with the pursuit of national power.

What is currently being proposed is to base the political struggle within the MFE on rules which allow the development of the maximum democracy among its militants, while at the same time seeking to maximize the effectiveness of action for a political force which does not aim to win any institutional power. In principle, the MFE should not blindly imitate the traditional parties, if it wants to continue to pursue its role of historical avant-garde. However, in its early years the MFE gave itself a statute which essentially followed the organizational model of any democratic party. Only subsequent experience has shown that this model cannot ensure real democracy within the Movement, by which we mean an equal participation of all militants, both in identifying the strategic line to be followed, and in the decision-making process. Traditional parties, in fact, use an organizational model in which the pursuit of these objectives is not achieved. This is by no means a novelty. Since the beginning of this century, Robert Michels and Max Weber denounced the oligarchic nature of political parties, both in bourgeois parties and in more recent social-democratic variants. In practice the leadership of the parties is composed of irremovable, charismatic leaders who represent the party to the masses and who dominate internal party life unchallenged. In practice, change of leadership in parties is much rarer than in public administration, whether in national or local government. We are thus still very far from the idea of democracy as common "government of the common good," even in those political formations which claim to have as their primary goal the realization of democracy. Be that as it may, the immobility of the party leaders is matched by the immobility of party ideas. Politico-cultural debate, when it exists, is left to any willing intellectual who, lacking any internal office or duties, can speak without worrying about losing power. Those in power act on the basis of the fundamental Machiavellian rule, speaking only the truths of the "Palazzo". Truth is revolutionary, because it shakes the foundations of power. Only in exceptional circumstances are the parties prepared to question themselves.

It is obvious that an avant-garde movement, on the contrary, must exploit to the full its role as a politico-cultural force. Therefore, in order to attempt to organize its own life in a more truly democratic manner, overcoming the oligarchic contradictions of traditional parties, the MFE has, thanks to a debate promoted by Mario Albertini, started some statutory reforms whose goal is to ensure the full participation of all MFE militants in the process of defining the political line and making decisions. An initial reform consisted of separating the decision-making organs from those of debate, ensuring organizational autonomy for the new organ, the Debate Commission, whose role is to promote freely an open discussion of the most important problems for the life of the MFE. The Debate Commission works also as the permanent link between young federalists and the MFE. The power aspect of politics emerges more easily when debate is not completely transparent: transparency and openness are therefore essential for all militants, even the youngest, so that they can feel able to put across their point of view without reservations. A debating forum such as this should tend to promote a common position within the MFE, in the last resort unanimity. A common way of thinking is a prerequisite of a strong collective will. It should not come as a surprise if in politics, as in natural sciences, the most sensible opinions in the end are shared by all. The natural sciences, by means of normal procedures of scientific debate, of verification and confutation, demonstrate that the truth, once established, is shared by all, or almost all, scientists. Politics too should tend to make itself a science. In politics, when possible, it is worthwhile applying the same procedures as the sciences and attempting to reach the widest possible consensus on the general strategic line, which is after all the point of view that feeds action, and on which any division among militants would cause a serious weakening of the Movement. In this way, progressively, federalism can become the science of the pacification of the mankind.

Of course, this reform is only the first step in the direction of an ever broader participation of all the militants in leading the Movement, in fact towards the achievement of a

real collective leadership, which should therefore be founded on rules of conduct that are very different from those that favour the individual leadership of parties. To the extent that the political line emerges as a result of a common way of thinking, it is inevitable that the management of this line should be entrusted to organisms that are, as far as possible, interpreters and executors of a will which has already been broadly consolidated within the Movement. In this way it is conceivable to base the policy of the MFE increasingly on the force of reason and morality, which emerge in the search for the most effective policies to achieve federalist objectives.

For the moment, these new organizational directions are only the subject of debate, but the next few years should see them turned into reality. Here it need only be underlined that this debate is important not only for the internal life of the MFE, but for all democratic forces. Politics is in crisis everywhere, and everywhere alternatives are being sought to the forms of government that were conceived of in the centuries in which there was still an acute class struggle. Then, participation in the decision-making process was extremely limited. The division of society into classes inevitably imposed the distinction in politics between the ruling classes and those who were ruled. Today this dramatic situation is on the way to being overcome. The federalists know that power will not be really democratic, and thus will not cease to show its demonic side, until we have a World Federation, when all people — including the poorest inhabitants of a remote village in the South of the world — can participate on an equal footing in the decision-making process. Only then will reason really be able to prevail over force, because no-one will suffer the imposition of a remote and extraneous government. It is a very distant target. This is why until this battle is won we must look to a more limited, but crucially important objective: to try ways of reaching real democracy at least within the MFE, our Common Home. It is true that even the federalists cannot help but struggle for power. But it is a question of the power to make a world government, and hence the power to abolish violence from the world of politics. In this sense, it can be affirmed, then, that for the federalists, politics means fighting to conquer the power to abolish power.

Notes

THE CENTRALISATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

On the eve of the creation of the single market, Community regulations and directives are harmonising norms and standards in a wide variety of areas. As a result the Community is increasingly assuming the characteristics of an institutional monster, displaying the defects of centralisation, impotence and anti-democratic practices. Indeed, while the Community demonstrates its complete inability to deal with the frightening centrifugal tendencies being revealed in Eastern Europe which threaten the whole balance of the continent, a growing number of areas in our daily lives are being regulated (often in a pedantic and intrusive fashion) by a European authority which the people are only vaguely aware of, which they do not consider as being their government, and over which they cannot exercise any democratic control. The Community is currently claiming the right to intervene in areas that even in the United States (which has been becoming increasingly centralised for a long time now) are not competences of the Federal government. This means, among other things, that national parliaments are being dispossessed of their prerogatives and hence the substance of their legitimacy, without the European Parliament gaining a commensurate increase in its prerogatives and legitimacy.

This is a paradoxical situation, which offers easy arguments to the enemies of Europe, starting with the British government, and whose real nature is not understood — the growing harmonisation pursued on a daily basis by the Commission and the Council of Ministers with the collaboration of the European Parliament being considered by many genuine supporters of a federal Europe as being the process of European integration itself. The decision-making capacity of an institution is being confused with the extension of its competences. In fact these two issues are separate, even if it is obvious that all decision-making mechanisms can only operate within a defined sphere of competences. In reality the

ability to take and carry out decisions with speed and effectiveness (which in a democracy is heavily tied to consensus and the existence of a direct channel between governing and governed) can have a beneficial effect even in a framework of strictly limited competences. On the other hand a broad extension of competences is perfectly compatible with a slow and ineffective decision-making process. In a democratic European Union in particular, the federalist principle of "unity in diversity" will be more fully realised if the competences of the Union are restricted to controlling the currency (and, in the future, security policy) and only to such parts of other sectors for which pan-European regulation is strictly indispensable.

In fact, as regards European integration, the process of harmonisation represents an *ersatz* sort of political union, a substitute for real democratic power. The harmonising process represents a substitute for those who do not know how, or who lack the will, to unite. European Community governments are unwilling to relinquish sovereignty and grant supranational institutions the power to take necessary decisions that would be valid for all Europeans in the Community. Notwithstanding this, since Community governments are permanently confronted with issues of a pan-European nature that require pan-European solutions, they can find no other way out of the impasse than to increase the homogeneity of the legislative framework in which national institutions operate. It is in this way that in the minds of many genuine supporters of a federal Europe, the model of a European federation as a strong decentralised state with "limited but real powers" is being replaced with its complete opposite — a Community both weak and centralised.

This model should be rejected not only for its bureaucratic and inefficient characteristics, but also because it paves the way to blocking the entry of Eastern European countries to the Community. In order that the necessarily traumatic impact of the Soviet Union's ex-satellites joining the Community (which is by now a both unavoidable and urgent step) can be absorbed without causing damage to the Community itself, two prerequisites are necessary. First, the institutional structure of the Community must be both strong and democratic; second, there should be no strategy to impose a standard socio-economic order, given that Eastern European countries are destined to retain, for decades, profoundly different standards and behavioural norms compared to West European countries — a situation which Eastern European countries are not, and for a long time will not, be in a position to alter.

It is clear that in the Community of the twelve, which lacks political

union, the supplementary role of the harmonisation process is, for the moment, indispensable. It helps to make economic operators and social issues increasingly interdependent, and hence guarantees at the level of civil society that very cohesion which the political sphere is unable to provide for lack of a real democratic dialectic within the European Community. In this way, among others, the harmonisation process dramatically highlights the absurdity of the claim to govern an increasingly united economy and society with confederal institutional instruments which are structurally incapable of taking important decisions. But by now this contradiction no longer needs highlighting: interdependence within the Community has long since passed the point at which political union becomes both possible and necessary. The decision to achieve political union, then, no longer depends on achieving certain objective conditions (that moreover have largely been realised) but *simply on the will of governments and political forces*. As a result the further extension and acceleration of the harmonisation process does not bring political union closer but, in as much as it acts as a substitute, makes it more remote.

Paradoxically, the more remote unity becomes the greater the need to extend the scope of harmonisation, so as to preserve necessary cohesion within the Community (by reinforcing a false idea of unity). As a result European political union is destined to be less pluralistic the longer it is delayed. This situation is fully appreciated by the German *Länder* which raised fundamental objections along these lines to the plans of the Treaty approved by the European Parliament in 1984. With mounting concern they are now watching as the Community appropriates some of the prerogatives they currently exercise. Their disquiet should be given careful consideration since it could result in a serious loss of consensus over the aims of the European Union. But it will only be possible to keep the situation under control if it is understood that these fears have real roots, and that it is at the roots that solutions must be found.

A typical response to such disquiet is the proposal to create a sort of European Regional Chamber equipped with consultative powers or, in a similar vein, one that is given joint decision-making powers which are limited to issues that cut across the sphere of competence of regional or *Länder* administrations.

But even this solution is no more than a reflex of the confederal, or interstate, character of the Community in its present form. It is an attempt to divert general attention from the fact that the process of European integration is depriving regional and local autonomies of their substance

where they already exist, and hindering their development where they have yet to emerge. In consequence a muddled and corporatist body is being created — one that can only strain further the current complicated and inefficient decision-making structure of the Community, without the slightest guarantees safeguarding regional and local autonomies in return.

Moreover, federalists should guard against the temptation of responding to this problem by resorting to a hazy vision of a “Europe of regions”, of a federation that “skips” the national level and bases federal institutions directly on the regional level. Beyond the difficulty, in itself decisive, of democratically representing an extremely high number of territorial units of small and varying size at the European level, the implementation of this model would (as an exact consequence of the abolition of the national level) cause all issues of a larger than regional scale to be transferred directly to the European level. Hence the implementation of this vision would lead to uncontrolled growth in Community competences and bureaucratic structures. A “Europe of regions” would in reality be the centralised superstate that many fear, since small territorial units with commensurately limited powers, faced with a pan-European federal power, would not give birth to a system of checks and balances — the system which in all genuine federal arrangements constitutes the ideal institutional framework for guaranteeing liberty and the rule of law.

In reality issues should be dealt with within the framework in which they emerge: European matters in a European framework, national ones in a national framework, regional and local ones in a regional and local framework. Hence this matter concerns giving Europe, at last, real federal unity. Under this arrangement territory would be divided into various democratically self-governing units. To each of these units the constitution would grant from the outset the power to deal with issues that emerge within it.

In this model of a federal state the national level would fully regain its legitimacy and completely lose its negative connotations; not simply by being divested of its sovereign aspects, but also because it would itself be a *federation of regions*. This model also resolves (albeit indirectly) the problem of defending regional and local interests against interference by the central European power — since the Senate, representing the national level, would by its very nature be a more effective support of regional and local interests, and a guarantee that these interests would be effectively negotiated at the European level.

This would represent the only effective implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. Many European politicians have recently discovered the subsidiarity principle and it is currently being used to justify even the least admissible plans, in particular that of retaining real power under state control — in other words continuing the substance of the current institutional structure of the Community. This concerns once again the (often purposely encouraged) confusion of two issues — widening competences and the sharing out of real power.

In practice the principle of subsidiarity (under which all government decisions must be taken in the smallest territorial framework in which the issue to be dealt with can be resolved,) only makes sense within a federal state, and should not be used as a pretext with which to hinder the creation of a federal state itself. Nor should it be adapted to defend the prerogatives of nation states that, as is the case for France and Great Britain, refuse any form of decentralisation in favour of their regions or local bodies whatsoever. Conversely, it should not be used as a pretext for justifying claims to regional autonomy within a framework that does not take into account the priority of the aim of European political union — because until the principle of the connection between sovereign state and nation (however it may be defined) is not fundamentally questioned, movements for regional autonomy are destined to degenerate into separatism and hence reproduce with greater virulence the ills of centralisation within smaller territorial units which will prove to be both weaker and more oppressive.

Federalism is a simultaneous affirmation of both autonomy and solidarity. It is based on the independence of local and regional communities — an independence which is to be exercised by each within its own sphere — but it must guarantee this situation by establishing peace and the rule of law, first in a European framework, subsequently in a global one. That the European Community is heading in this direction is far from certain.

Francesco Rossolillo

ON THE QUESTION OF A STRATEGY FOR THE ECU: A COMMENT

The publication,¹ of a summary of the results of a recent investigation promoted by the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe and conducted both by Ernst & Young and the National Institute of Economic and Social Research of London, formulates an operational programme which has the aim of making the Ecu the single currency of a finally and completely united Europe, by 1997.

It is a highly detailed report (indeed it resembles, not incidentally, in this historic phase which is still to a great extent "constituent" for the European unification process, one of those monumental specialized monographs produced by the Economic Commission of the Ministry for the Constituent, since it is similarly organized in its investigations and hearings) and therefore it is difficult not only to outline, albeit briefly, its complex architecture (and even more so its specific contents) but also to stress its many original conclusions. One of the preeminent and most basic of these issues seems to be the systematic and precise, even meticulous, analysis of the *microeconomic* aspects of the issue and the related project. This analysis identifies the *obstacles* which hinder a more widespread private use of the Ecu, as they seem to be perceived by its users (incidentally, with regard to Italy, the report actually states that "The use of the Ecu was perceived as an unnecessary burden which obliges the commercial partner and oneself to deal in an extra financial currency which will eventually have to be exchanged for another currency."² The elimination of these obstacles is identified as an undoubtedly necessary (but by no means sufficient) condition for the "self-sustained" development of this use, at this delicate moment when, although the satisfactory performance of the European Monetary System makes the Ecu progressively less "attractive" as store of value with respect to a past period of much higher monetary instability, this same performance increases the Ecu's relevance as a unit of account (at present extremely limited) and also as a true means of payment.

Referring to the statement of the European Council during the establishment of the EMS in 1978, in which "a European Currency Unit (ECU) will be at the centre of the EMS," the Delors Report on the other hand acknowledges the "considerable popularity"³ of the Ecu in private markets as a denomination unit for financial operations (the market share in international issues of bonds was 6 per cent at the time of the Report) in view of its advantageous characteristics as an instrument for diversi-

fying portfolios and as insurance against exchange rate risks. Yet at the same time it stresses both the progressive reduction of the use of the Ecu in international banking activity, especially in the field of direct transactions with non-banking counterparts, and the negligible share (1 per cent of the foreign trade of EEC countries) of the Ecu for the invoicing and payment of commercial operations.⁴ On the other hand, experience in the "official" use of the Ecu also seems to be orientated in a reductive sense with respect to the extensive range of cases contemplated by the Brussels Resolution, which envisaged the use of the Ecu as the denominator of the exchange rate mechanism, as the basis for determining the divergences among Community currencies, as the denominator of operations contemplated in the intervention and credit mechanism, and finally as the regulatory means between the Community's monetary authorities. In fact, the operative scope of the Ecu was found to be limited to the still-significant functions of official reserves and of means for financing and regulation in the very short term; which however is also limited due to the predominance of interventions made in dollars (2/3 of the total) and of the *marginal* role of *marginal* interventions (indeed those which produce debit and credit balances in Ecu) in favour of *inframarginal* ones (approximately 90 per cent of the total) which are preferred (since the March 1983 realignment) in order to avoid the tensions deriving from the attainment of bilateral intervention margins. These interventions, performed in eurocurrencies or in activities denominated in foreign currency, are characterized by the existence (according to the terminology used by Rainer S. Masera in the monograph on *Monetary unification and the EMS*) of "asymmetrical effects in terms of monetary base."⁵ In other words, their repercussions in terms of monetary base only affect the central bank which carries out the intervention and are therefore preferred by the monetary authorities of strong-currency countries, which have a marked inclination toward keeping the tightest possible control over domestic monetary policy.

Despite the re-sizing operations *in itinere* in the private and public sectors, the Delors Report nonetheless stresses "... the role of the ECU in connection with an eventual move to a single currency," the latter being considered a "desirable feature," but not an indispensable requirement for monetary union. The Ecu in fact has "the potential to be developed into ... a *common currency*"⁶; thus, it is no longer a currency basket, but a true currency in its own right. The Report also considers the so-called "parallel currency strategy" not advisable (as a potential cause of inflationary tensions, as well as jeopardizing any efforts to co-ordinate na-

tional monetary policies). According to this strategy, the new currency which would arise from the transformation of the Ecu and which would maintain its denomination, would operate alongside the other currencies in an *additional* and *competitive* manner.

Thus, if the various types of public and private Ecu use are ranked, in both cases this would produce two markedly decreasing curves, with a peak in the public sector in relation to the functions of official reserves and of very short term financing instruments and with a peak in the private sector in relation to the function of denominators of financial operations, which are in any case (at least initially) to the advantage of payees who also belong to the public sector of the various economic systems. The motivation for the use of the Ecu is thus concentrated in the latter sector and in its choices. It is not surprising, therefore, that the target of the investigation, and therefore the research in question, refer to the sphere of *political* decisions seeking the conditions for a more extensive, systematic and "institutional" use of the Ecu, especially as the solution of problems such as the legal standing of the Ecu and those arising from the current lack of *end* uses, indicated as second- and third-ranking (after "inertia") in the list of obstacles reported by operators,⁷ is necessarily dependent on the above-mentioned sphere. In similar fashion, *A strategy for the Ecu* states that "... the private sector is unlikely to act as an initiator in increasing or encouraging greatly increased use of the Ecu"⁸ and that "The degree of permanence which the Ecu will enjoy within the European Community is a political question and requires a political solution."⁹ Consequently, we can conclude that "Official stimulus is needed," without which no removal of administrative obstacles would achieve the desired effect: the recommendation that "... *there should be a credible announcement that the Ecu will be the single currency of Europe*"¹⁰ is based on these grounds.

Without underestimating in any way the importance of such a statement, which would be simultaneously the cause and effect of a further contribution to the unification process in the form of the additional administration of "converging thrusts," it should be stressed that some important *operative* proposals can be found in recent literature, which aim at reinforcing the role of the Ecu precisely through the promotion of communication channels between the official and the private market and thus overcoming (or starting to overcome) the separation which has so far characterized their operation, even though there are no conceptual incompatibilities between the two fields of use.

A particularly clear statement on this synergy can be found in the

above mentioned essay by Masera: "Market interventions in Ecu, invoicing and price setting in Ecu and the keeping of reserves in Ecu are three aspects of a single process which would lead to the assertion of the Ecu as a fully-fledged *currency* in the private and official sector, enhancing its properties as means of payment, as unit of account and store of value."¹¹ The principle of linkage between the private and public circuit indeed inspires the proposal (similar to the one made some time ago regarding Special drawing rights) to link, by interposing a clearing house (specifically, the BIS) acknowledged as a "third holder" of official Ecu, central banks which purchase currencies for inframarginal interventions and official Ecu sellers and commercial banks which sell currencies in exchange for the acquisition of instruments of deposit activated by giving the received Ecu to the "third holder." This mechanism for mobilizing the official Ecu would be essential in reinforcing, by the very use of the Ecu, a *European monetary dimension* without making this development conflict with the already mentioned inclination of strong-currency countries toward interventions characterized by asymmetrical effects in terms of monetary base.

This same range of objectives also includes the proposal¹² to link the promotion of the Ecu and the co-ordination of monetary policies, specifying in more detail the operative content of the second phase outlined in the Delors Report. Paragraph 57 of this Report in fact states that "*In the monetary field*, the most important feature of this stage [indeed the second one] would be that the European System of Central Banks would be set up and would absorb the previously existing monetary arrangements ..."¹³ and subsequently that "The key task for the European System of Central Banks during this stage would be to begin the transition from the co-ordination of independent national monetary policies by the Committee of Central Bank Governors in stage one to the formulation and implementation of a common monetary policy by the ESCB itself scheduled to take place in the final stage."¹⁴ Thus, in phase two the ESCB would already be operating, but intra-community exchange rates would not yet be irrevocably fixed: this would lead to an unusual distribution of powers between national levels and the community level, concerning which the Report provides no specific indications as to the *quid commune* of monetary policy or rather of the *monetary policies*.

It is in this context that the proposal to authorize the ESCB to establish a compulsory reserve constraint denominated in Ecu for the commercial banks of the Community is put forth. The mandated banks would acquire these resources by purchasing activities which can be likened to federal

funds, provided exclusively by the ESCB. The allocation of these activities among countries and banks would be assigned to a "federal fund market" in which the commercial banks would exchange funds in order to meet the Community's reserve obligation. This obligation should initially be *additional* and *independent* with respect to national ones (as well as small and non-remunerated), but with the prospect of gradually replacing them as monetary integration progresses. This instrument would in turn accelerate and strengthen integration and would commensurately enhance the role of the Ecu.

As a conclusion to these notes, we can return to the hope for a political announcement, formulated by this report, of the intention to make the Ecu the single currency of a united Europe at a fixed date. This hope not only does not seem to conflict with the financial engineering projects to which reference has been made, but is fully in tune with the most recent developments of that powerful analytical tool for the strategic approach to the theory of economic policy in conditions of international interdependence represented by the dynamic theory of international co-operation games.¹⁵ One of the results obtained in this analytical frame work is indeed the acknowledgement of the crucial impact of the behaviour of private operators who "rationally" define their expectations regarding the choices of *policy makers* and thus also regarding *credible* statements concerning these choices. Although the presence of rational economic agents (made rational also by statements such as the one hoped for) on the one hand theoretically undermines the dynamic consistency of economic policy choices, characterized nonetheless by optimality *ex ante*, it can for the same reason help to determine a considerable "discipline effect" on "coexisting" economic policies, to the full advantage of the aim of *stability*; the spread (or rather, the generalized acceptance) of which still seems to constitute an absolutely unavoidable *political* condition for any further progress toward European economic unity.

Silvio Beretta

NOTES

¹ *A Strategy for the ECU* (A report prepared by Ernst & Young and the National Institute of Economic and Social Research on behalf of the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe), London, Kogan Page, 1990.

² *A Strategy for the ECU*, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

³ Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, *Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community* (mentioned hereafter as *Delors Report*), pp. 12-13.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 9.

⁵ R.S. Masera, *L'unificazione monetaria e lo SME. L'esperienza dei primi otto anni*, Il Mulino, 1987, p. 199 (see in any case all of Chapter V, pp. 197-259, entitled *L'Ecu: problemi e prospettive*).

⁶ *Delors Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

⁷ *A Strategy for the ECU*, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 26.

⁹ *Ibid.* p. 27.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ R.S. Masera, *L'unificazione monetaria e lo SME. L'esperienza dei primi otto anni*, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

¹² See D. Gros, *The ECU in the Common Monetary Policy* in "ECU Newsletter," April 1990, pp. 14-19.

¹³ *Delors Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ For a recent overview on the subject, see C. Montagna, *Interdipendenza economica internazionale e coordinamento delle politiche economiche: una rassegna* in "Rivista internazionale di Scienze sociali," January-March 1990, pp. 57-82.

Federalist Action

HISTORY WILL NOT WAIT FOR EUROPE *

1. The work of the intergovernmental Conferences on Political Union and Economic and Monetary Union, summoned by the December 1990 Summit in Rome, is about to end. Hence, it is being decided whether, based on the single market, we are going to have a single currency, and thus also European monetary, economic, fiscal, etc. policies instead of national ones. A decision is also about to be made concerning which institutional modifications of the Community are required to conduct these policies and to guarantee the role that Europe, having reached this degree of capability to act, should and will be able to play on the world scene. This is the problem of the Union. Hence what appears to be coming is a much more revolutionary change than those which took place in the last century with Italian and German unification. By definition, this change would not only give Europe a renewed independence, but it would also make a series of age-old problems which have always been left unsolved disappear: those not determined by the real needs of men, but by the division of Europe into exclusive nation-states. However, this is not the way the political class, the world of culture and the media consider the events that are taking place, the decisions to be made and the prospects opening up. In Italy, for example, only other matters are discussed, particularly the national reforms to be introduced to achieve *buon-governo*, without taking into account the fact that the best possible Italy would be a meagre thing in any case, an entity destined to be shipwrecked in an ever stormier sea, if Europe does not find a way towards true unity, and the world a way towards peace.

It is true that the governments, including Italy's, speak of Union, but

* Document drawn up by the President of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Mario Albertini, within the ambit of the "Campaign for a democratic Europe capable of acting" and approved by the Central Committee of the MFE on October 26th 1991.

they know perfectly well that they are concerned only with how to approach a Political Union, and not with how to achieve it. It is not, however, merely a matter of words. The fact is that by doing so they conceal to public opinion, to the world of ideals and of interests, what they are actually doing. If, along with the problems of a European currency and European defence they really did discuss the problems of a Union (in other words of a European democracy), public opinion would not be silent, as it is at present for lack of information, but with its questions, aspirations and opinions would arouse a much wider debate than the one presently in progress in Italy over the problems of internal reforms. In conclusion, the governments are making European decisions of prime importance in an anti-democratic way. It is not therefore chance that the real matter in dispute in practice concerns only a few defence and security problems and not also, as decided in Rome, the problems of European citizenship and democracy.

But what sense is there in a quasi-Union as far as currency and security are concerned? How will Community cohesion be ensured within the wider framework which is rapidly going to assert itself on the basis of the agreements already made with EFTA countries and with the inevitable, and hoped for, entry of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary into the Community? How will Europe be affected by the time factor which is making the very survival of the ex-USSR doubtful, and is leading the world ever closer to the final alternative between integration and disintegration?

A few governments intend to meet this challenge with the creation of a small European army side by side with real defence, which is still entrusted to national armies, whether integrated in NATO or not. But in this way they lead the undertaking of European construction into the sphere of division, because they continue to propose the choice between an autonomous European defence, and one depending on the USA, before even having the basis for an autonomous defence: European power. There is only one sphere in which Europe can really be united: that of European democracy, and of the overcoming of the national framework as the supreme point of political reference.

In fact, the basic historical problem, which must be confronted is not that of a unipolar world, as is commonly stated, but of its inevitable failure if in a not-so-remote future the force of the USA, at present enlightened, is not flanked by that of the ex-USSR as a nuclear power, and by a strong European centre; or at least by the latter, if it is already too late to defend the unity of the ex-Soviet Union. It is by this standard that what Europe

will be able to do in the next few years should be evaluated; whether its structure will still be those already in existence and prevailing within the intergovernmental Conferences, or whether it is provided with a true democratic government. If we allow that Europe has a potential equal to one hundred, it is certain that today, being still divided in the political sphere, it only exploits a minimal part of it. This becomes even more significant if we take into account that, rather than a potential for hegemony, Europe has a potential for internal and external unification sufficient to direct the world towards international democracy and away from hegemonies and traditional relations based on force.

2. To tackle the problem of what to do one cannot merely consider whether or not any small progress will be achieved in this or that field. So far, European construction has been sheltered by the Atlantic Alliance and the bipolar world, and this made possible and positive even a slow growth in unification. Now, instead the Community can progress only if it becomes one of the main factors in the development of the new world system. To give itself an order, it must contribute towards giving an order to Eastern European countries and to the ex-Soviet Union; and on this basis re-establish its relations with the USA and Japan on a new footing. If it is unable to do so, we will see not only the failure of a policy, but also of the very attempt at unification. Both the failure of the Community and its success, moreover, already have a precise form: either the dilution of the Community into a large free trade area unable to maintain political stability in a world that is disintegrating; or a European democracy without further delay.

This is the fundamental issue. Some governments seem to think it might be possible to achieve real progress in unification through the creation of a European currency after 1997, with the pledge to develop a small European intervention force, cautiously extending the European Parliament's powers of co-decision, or with other measures of this kind, which are inspired by the policy of small steps. But it is well known that a great policy can be achieved only when in possession of the specific consensus of a popular majority. And now it must be admitted, as many Heads of state and Delors himself never stop saying, without ever taking the necessary measures, that either the Community implements a great policy or it will disappear. While maintaining the single market, the European currency, the commitment in the field of security and an adequate widening of legislative co-decision, the following must be added: a) the appointment of the European Commission and its government programme must undergo the European Parliament's vote of

confidence; b) it is necessary to make the principle of majority decisions within the European Council and the Council of Ministers general practice; c) the constitutional intervention of the European Parliament is indispensable.

A generic consensus like the one actually existing in Europe is no longer sufficient. Even dictatorships can sometimes enjoy the approval of public opinion. Instead what Europe needs is a resolute consensus for a resolute policy in an open debate. No other means can unite Europe and wholly express all its potential. Any progress in the defence and security sector, that is not accompanied by the creation of a democratic government, would not make Europe more secure. On the contrary, it would make it less secure than a Europe that still lacks specific defensive competences but is already governed democratically. It remains a fact that the construction of Europe must still go on after the deadline of the intergovernmental Conferences. However, what must be understood is that this progress, which by now involves making strategic choices on the world scene, can only be based on a Europe which already has democratic institutions.

3. The alternative stated in the *Ventotene Manifesto* has now become an immediate deadline: either progress with European democracy; or decline if peoples and parties remain prisoners of national sovereignties. In actual fact, the turning point the Community is facing is, simultaneously, the turning point democracy has to face, too. The superiority of democracy has been confirmed in a historically grand way with the overthrow of the tyrannical régimes of Eastern Europe and with the attempt at democratization of the Soviet Union itself. But it should not be forgotten that democracy is on the defensive in those countries where it asserted itself long ago, that it is in difficulty in those same Eastern European countries and that along many fronts it is being weakened, humiliated or trampled on by the revival of nationalism. To prosper, democracy must prove that it is able to advance, and the road along which, in the present, it can really advance is only that of gradually spreading to international relations. The problem of European unity is one of the big world problems precisely because in Europe the first attempt at international democracy and its first experiment can be carried out. What the world is really facing is the prospect of integration or disintegration. What it still has to learn is that this is the alternative between federalism and nationalism. Humanity is facing terrible problems and democracy still has to prove that it is able to achieve a reasonable degree of liberty and equality not only between individuals but also between peoples; and it

must also prove itself able to guarantee permanent peace. Only along this road will it be possible to reconcile the citizens with politics, and to trust political thought again and its ability to construct the future.

4. Each of the twelve governments of the Community can, hypothetically, accept — as many statesmen do — that what the federalists say is true, but that unfortunately important European decisions do not depend on individual governments, taken singly, but on the expression of the same will, at the same time, on the part of all governments; in other words on a difficult and fortuitous circumstance. This is partly true, and it is for this reason that the European battle is difficult. But only in part, because Europe, in spite of this, has advanced. For there really to be a struggle for Europe, what matters is that a government — or a group of governments — is able to propose European objectives whose reasonableness and necessity impose themselves as evident. In this case even those governments that are badly disposed are obliged, under the pressure of public opinion and the force of interests and ideals, to proceed. This is how the Community was born, and how it overcame the great turning points in its construction. This is what the MFE, as the Italian section of the UEF, asks of Italy; and what, together with the UEF, it asks of other governments. Italy has a double task: on the one hand it has to contribute to the formation of European democracy because it can remain within Europe only if Europe exists; on the other hand, it has to tidy up its internal situation. This kind of task cannot be realized by one party alone but by the whole nation, whether expressed through a common government of all the parties, or through a government and an opposition that are in agreement as far as the essential issue, Europe, is concerned.

Italy has already in the past, thanks to De Gasperi and Spinelli, managed to impose on the countries that were establishing with her the European vanguard also the attempt at establishing simultaneously a political Community of a constituent nature (ad hoc Assembly). Today the situation is immensely more favourable and it is certain, also taking into account the stance of Germany, Belgium, Holland and, albeit with greater difficulty, France itself, that Italy can win the battle for European democracy immediately, at Maastricht, or shortly afterwards.

But not only governments must commit themselves, but the parties, which at present are still idle, must do so too, as well as the media and all men of good will. Europe is within reach and we will achieve it only if we have the will to.

Mario Albertini

Federalism in the History of Thought

EDWARD H. CARR

During the second world war, as events seemed to be turning inexorably in favour of the Axis powers, Edward Carr¹, one of Britain's leading authorities on international relations, wrote an erudite book entitled *Conditions of Peace*². The work represented a strong critique of nationalism, which was put forward as the root cause of the war³. Carr's criticism was levelled chiefly at the principle of self-determination, which as the cornerstone of nationalist thinking had been adopted by the peacemakers at Versailles as the basic criterion for reshaping the European order, following the collapse of the Central European and Ottoman Empires. The fatal results of this choice were plain for all to see. But not all were convinced, and in fact there were those who continued to blame the war on the autocratic nature of regimes, on capitalism or even on the wickedness of the Germans. Because of such superficial interpretations, there was clearly a big risk that, once the monster Hitler had been defeated, the same errors, that had led to catastrophe before, would be repeated. This is the context in which Carr's critique was written; a critique which due to the richness of its historical documentation and the wisdom of its arguments probably stands as the most complete analysis ever to have dealt with this subject; and moreover as an extraordinary contribution to federalist thought that has for many years now singled out the national state (and nationalism in general) as the historic enemy. The text of this critique is the third chapter of Carr's book and we feel duty bound to propose it in its entirety to our readers, despite the fact that Carr has always been presented as having a totally different political stance and even of having derided the federalist position — as can be seen from several passages in the chapter. But, apart from statements that seem to be a little ill-considered (and which we will point out in the course of this brief introduction), Carr, as befits a great scholar and as often occurs in the Anglo-Saxon academic world, does not manage to lose sight of the

fact that he is first and foremost in the service of his science, and to a lesser degree, if at all, his political convictions.

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Clearly it cannot be argued that this commendable and extraordinary contribution of Carr's produced the desired effect. When the peoples of the Third World realised that the collapse of the European system of states had swept away even France and Great Britain (which at one time had been the great powers of European history) and they began the process of decolonisation, the principle all chose to invoke was that of self-determination. The same principle has been invoked by all other peoples aspiring to independence. And it is plain to see the effect of this principle with regard to the collapse of the Soviet Empire and of the Soviet Union itself, with consequences which no-one is able to predict. The tragic conflict which has set Serbs and Croats against each other is clearly indicative of a much more disastrous scenario which will unfold if ex-Soviet republics (having become independent and sovereign states with their own currency and more significantly their own nuclear weapons) should choose to confront one another militarily.

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We do not want to deprive our readers of the pleasure of discovering for themselves the well-developed and convincing arguments in this piece, whose tenor, even with regard to lexical features, is highly reminiscent of authoritative federalist texts. Rather, two points of great interest need highlighting, which even though they are very closely related to federalist culture, depart from it either in their formulation or conclusions.

The first concerns the concept of the nation. Carr uses Renan's definition according to which the essential element is a "*plébiscite de tous les jours*," although he notes this definition's lack of success outside of a small group of intellectuals. "On this view, typical of nineteenth-century rationalism, a Frenchman differed from an Italian or a German simply because he wished to be a Frenchman. By an act of will, he could presumably transform himself into a German or an Italian."⁴ The French are therefore those that wish to live amongst the French. Mario Albertini writing on this subject in 1960 commented that "...to give concreteness to the idea of Renan according to which nations are constituted of the

desire to live together, it is necessary to specify the way of such living together, and hence to state *as members of a nation*, at which point the difficulty that one wanted to avoid resurfaces."⁵ On the theoretical plain, Albertini's observation cannot be argued with. But this is not the level on which it seems Carr wanted to place it since he openly recognised the ambiguous (Albertini would use "ideological" in the sense that Marx intended it) nature of the term "nation." Carr uses Renan's formula rather as a suitable criterion for defining the dimensions and competences of states, giving individuals choice over the political community, which is understood as a machinery capable of protecting certain collective interests. Renan's formula does not therefore define a principle for legitimising a power, as the national one does with its claim of exclusive allegiance, even if it is true that "there is every reason to suppose that considerable numbers of Welshmen, Catalans and Uzbeks have quite satisfactorily solved the problem of regarding themselves as good Welshmen, Catalans and Uzbeks for some purposes and good British, Spanish and Soviet citizen for others."⁶ Their *will to live together* is therefore a will to live together *as citizens of a state*. That leads to the affirmation of a right that should be granted to all people: that of choosing the political community.

This point of view can be confidently accepted. When the federalists began to claim recognition for the constituent rights of the European federal people, they claimed precisely the recognition of this right to choose (over and above existing political communities) a political community capable of guaranteeing their security and economic growth. It can be recalled how the Federalists claimed (how they claim) this right in the name of, and on behalf of, a *potential people* — a grouping of citizens of differing nationalities but sharing a common destiny as regards economic, social and security issues. These citizens will constitute a *people in deed* the day their demand to constitute a state is recognised. It is worth pointing out in this context that the use of a collective subject (the people) is legitimate here because, different from the term "nation," which is usually thought of as a natural subject which exists and is the titular holder of rights aside from those of the individuals which form part of it, "people" in this context is a term that is used as a summarising expression that can be reduced to the specific individuals which form part of it. Moreover, this is precisely Carr's point of view when he affirms that "self-determination is not a right of certain recognised and predetermined nations, but a right of individual men and women."⁷

The second point concerns the "limits" within which Carr maintains

that a recourse to the principle of self-determination is legitimate and effective. These limits are precisely defined with regard to the requirements of the international order. Self-determination can no longer be conceived of as an absolute right to independence, but as a right that can only be exercised within a framework of obligations: "the right of national self-determination can be valid only within a new framework of mutual military and economic obligation."⁸ In short, the right of independence brings with it the duty of interdependence. That is the extent to which the peacemakers at Versailles were negligent. The error was fatal, yet did not need to be repeated because the world of which Carr spoke (even though it was a world before Dresden, Hiroshima and Chernobyl) had already shown clearly the extent to which military and economic factors had rendered national sovereignty an anachronism.

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Carr had no faith in international law which "though it provides machinery for the settlement of disputes, recognises no compulsory jurisdiction."⁹ This lack of faith, which recalls almost word for word the terminology of Kant's critiques, also reveals itself in his radical opposition (inspired by the same principles) to a hypothetical revival of the League of Nations — even if this revival were to be subordinated to the introduction of "a few modifications designed to 'strengthen' it"¹⁰ This is not at all surprising. What is surprising instead is that Carr places these false prophets of the international order on the same level as those which propose a federal Union.¹¹ He loses sight of the fact (despite a vast body of literature which from the time of Hamilton onwards had strongly influenced British political thought) that cooperation between states and the institutionalisation of such cooperation (League of Nations and like organisations) is one thing, and the federation of states quite another. Such federation is statehood at the level of international relations, the only political formula capable of enforcing international law, of settling controversies between states legally, and of guaranteeing peace. That Carr knew of the Federalists and appreciated their influence is clearly stated in this passage: "One popular approach is to plunge immediately into the elaboration of some constitutional framework for the whole world or for whole continents — a federation, a revived League of Nations, a 'United States of Europa'."¹² But, "except in so far as they keep public opinion alive to the necessity of radical change, the supporters of projects like Federal Union exercise a pernicious influence by grossly

over-simplifying the problem and by obscuring the need to study with patience and humility the historical perspective and the economic organisation of the world for which they prescribe."¹³ That was not enough: "There is a kind of naïve arrogance in the assumption that the problem of the government of mankind, which has defied human wit and human experience for centuries, can be solved out of hand by some neat paper construction of a few simple-minded enthusiasts."¹⁴ Hence Spinelli, besides his naïve arrogance, was a simple-minded enthusiast along with Lord Lothian, Clarence Streit, Emery Reves, Albert Einstein and others!

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Carr cannot extract himself from having to justify such a sweeping statement. But the justification has too much of a sense of *dejà vu* about it: "A constitution, in Burke's famous phrase, is 'a vestment which accommodates itself to the body'."¹⁵ This is a clichéd assessment which Montesquieu had proposed even before Burke. Marx also expounded this view (influencing in a disastrous manner the attitude of the left towards the problem of European unity after the second world war) when he relegated political institutions to the rank of mere superstructures. Theoretically, the fact that the statement is clichéd proves nothing about its substance or lack of it. In practice, however, this cliché of Carr's lacks substance. Let's follow his reasoning. What is the "body" that must be built? The answer is simple: a series of sectoral authorities which organise military, economic and monetary cooperation in Europe and, using Europe as a base, throughout the world.¹⁶

For these authorities to be effective two conditions need to be met. First, "Great Britain and the United States, together with Soviet Russia, should place their overwhelming military and economic power and resources behind the new Authority and make it effective over the area in which it operates."¹⁷ Even here there is a sense of *dejà vu*: Vienna defined a stable order in Europe rather than Versailles because the great powers committed themselves to guaranteeing it.¹⁸ But stability is one thing, peace another. Perhaps Carr is not concerned here with the conditions for peace? And again: the body which he talks about also does not need a vestment, a vestment which lacks the democratic institutions capable of enforcing international law, and thus coincides with the "concert" of the great powers to which that capability is attributed? In short, faced with the dilemma: "federation or hegemony", Carr opts for the latter.

Even more interesting is the second condition which shows clearly how Carr, while not neglecting in the slightest the importance of the democratic element, interpreted its function in a peculiar way: "It may be appropriate to begin by regarding these various 'European' authorities as representing for the time being, not so much the governments or the nations or even the peoples, but simply the people, of 'Europe'."¹⁹ But why and how could intergovernmental cooperation bodies be more representative of the people than an institution whose decisions are based on electoral fact? This Carr does not explain. On the contrary he is convinced that "it is by some such direct appeal to the people themselves, to the 'little men' of all countries, rather than through any constitutional process of league or federation, that a European order, and ultimately perhaps a world order, may come into being."²⁰ In short, better the OEEC and NATO with their strong popular support (for Atlanticism and anti-Communism) than a European federation, with its government responsible to an elected parliament and actively promoting federalism in the world and opening the way for world federation!

This affirmation is truly paradoxical. One could argue that, on the conclusion of the war, events went exactly as Carr predicted. But in this case, one could also argue that, as happens often in history, the events themselves were paradoxical as well.

NOTES

¹ E. H. Carr is primarily famous as a historian of the Bolshevik revolution, but at the time of writing *Conditions of Peace* he was professor of International Politics at the University of Wales and had already published important works on this subject.

² *Conditions of Peace*, London, Macmillan, 1942.

³ Between 1936 and 1939 Carr was a member of a Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. This renowned London-based institute of international politics (also known as Chatham House) was founded by Lionel Curtis together with Lord Lothian and the Astors. The Study Group, of which Arnold Toynbee was also a member, produced a report on the theme of nationalism (cf. E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis. 1919-1939*, London, Macmillan, 1941, p. XI).

⁴ *Conditions of Peace*, cit., p. 40.

⁵ M. Albertini, *Lo stato nazionale*, Milano, Giuffrè, 1960, p. 23.

⁶ *Conditions of Peace*, cit., p. 63.

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 47.

⁸ *ibid.*, p. 66.

⁹ *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, cit., p. 246 and on.

¹⁰ *Conditions of Peace*, cit., p. 165.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 165.

¹² *ibid.*, p. 164.

¹³ *ibid.*, p. 164.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 164.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 165.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 242 and on.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 270.

¹⁸ L. Dehio, "Versailles after Thirty-five Years", in *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, English translation by D. Persner, New York, N.Y., Alfred A. Knopf, 1960.

¹⁹ *Conditions of Peace*, cit., p. 271.

²⁰ *ibid.*, p. 271.

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THE CRISIS OF SELF-DETERMINATION

From the time of the French Revolution onwards, it came to be accepted that nations like men have rights, above all, the right of freedom or, as it was afterwards called, self-determination. The liberation of "oppressed peoples" went on, amid the applause of radicals everywhere, throughout the nineteenth century. In this triumphal progress national self-determination and democracy went hand in hand. Self-determination might indeed be regarded as implicit in the idea of democracy; for if every man's right is recognised to be consulted about the affairs of the political unit to which he belongs, he may be assumed to have an equal right to be consulted about the form and extent of the unit. "The proclamation of the sovereignty of the people led undesignedly but inevitably to the question, What people?... The abstract logic of democracy may tend towards cosmopolitanism, but the practical working of it had, and was bound to have, the psychological effect of intensifying nationalism."²¹ The analogy between men and nations was regarded as complete. The community of nations, like the democratic community, was a community of members each enjoying certain indefeasible rights which other members of the community were under an obligation to respect. In nineteenth-century liberal philosophy, freedom was the cardinal right of the nation as of the individual.

The settlement of 1919 was the apogee of the right of national self-determination. The sequel has tarnished its splendour. Intelligent people can no longer believe that the breakdown has been due merely to failure

to apply the principle of self-determination widely or impartially enough. The principle itself — far from providing, as Woodrow Wilson and others believed in 1919, the infallible short cut to a political paradise — has incurred discredit as the apparent cause of some of our most intractable political and economic problems. The crisis of national self-determination is parallel to the crisis of democracy. Self-determination, like democracy, has fallen on evil days because we have been content to keep it in the nineteenth-century setting of political rights. We have failed to adapt it to the twentieth-century context of military and economic problems; and we have failed to understand that the right of nations to self-determination, like every other right, is self-destructive unless it is placed in a framework of obligation. National self-determination requires to-day to be reinterpreted in this new light. There is no task which imposes itself more urgently on those engaged in formulating the outlines of the new world which must emerge out of the war.

Self-Determination and Nationality.

The first stage in our investigation must be to clear up an important ambiguity as to the nature of the right itself — an ambiguity which arises from a common confusion between the subjective right of self-determination and the objective fact of nationality. The principle of self-determination, strictly defined, requires that a group of people of reasonable size desirous of constituting a state should be allowed to constitute a state. But this proposition, as enunciated in the nineteenth century, more often took the form that a “nation” had the right to constitute a state. The belief in self-determination as a natural corollary of democracy found concrete expression in an alliance between democracy and nationalism or, as it was commonly called, the “principle of nationality.” This alliance, which identified self-determination with nationalism, and treated the nation as the natural basis of the state, continued to dominate political thought down to 1918.

The words “nation” and “state” carry with them a number of undefined and shifting implications which have led in the past, and still lead, to much confusion of thought. The state, whether we think of it as the apparatus of government or as the field in which that apparatus works, is the unit of political power. The nation is a community of men; and though modern usage restricts it to communities of a political character or having political aspirations, the nation is still a group of human beings, not a territory or an administrative machine. Hence the state may, in a loose

way, be described as “artificial” or “conventional,” the nation as “natural” or “organic.” A state can be created, mutilated or destroyed overnight by a document drawn up in due form prescribed by international law. A nation grows or decays by a process which is independent of any single conscious act of the human will.

The French Revolution gave birth to the view, which in the nineteenth century came to prevail over a large part of Western Europe, and which was regarded merely as another way of defining the principle of self-determination, that “states” and “nations” ought to coincide, that states should be constituted on a national basis, and that nations ought to form states.² This appeared to be a natural corollary of the right of self-government which was as valid for nations as for individuals. This view leads, however, to an awkward dilemma. If we define a nation as a voluntary association of people who wish to live under a form of government uniting them, and distinguishing them from the rest of the world, on a basis of nationality, then the fundamental identity of self-determination and nationality, of democracy and nationalism, is saved, but the natural or organic quality of the nation is denied. If on the other hand this quality is asserted as something independent of the will of the individual, then the principle of nationality is, as Acton maintained, potentially incompatible with democracy since it “sets limits to the exercises of the popular will and substitutes for it a higher principle.”³ Most nineteenth century thinkers had no doubt which horn of this dilemma to embrace. A nation was simply a group of people who wanted to be a nation. In Renan’s famous phrase, the very existence of a nation was “*un plébiscite de tous les jours.*” On this view, typical of nineteenth-century rationalism, a Frenchman differed from an Italian or a German simply because he wished to be a Frenchman. By an act of will, he could presumably transform himself into a German or an Italian. This theory had its application in the not uncommon practice, recognised by all states, of “naturalisation.” In Western Europe, the assimilation of Jews went on apace and was approved by most enlightened Jews and non-Jews: the Jew, by an act of will, became a German, a Frenchman or an Englishman. In the Western hemisphere dissident Englishmen and voluntary migrants from other parts of Europe were creating a new American nation. Membership of a nation was an act of voluntary allegiance, and the right of a nation to self-determination was a corollary of the democratic principle.

It seems doubtful whether, outside a limited circle of intellectuals, this rationalistic estimate of the nature of nationality ever really carried

conviction. Most Englishmen who chanted the Gilbertian chorus

In spite of all temptations
To belong to other nations
He remains an Englishman

probably treated as ironical not only the suggestion that an Englishman might prefer to be a Russian, a Frenchman or a Prussian, but the whole implication that nationality was decided by personal choice. Whether national distinctions were based on differences of physical type, or on differences of language, culture and tradition, it was apparent to most people that they had an objective character so far as the individual was concerned. Nationality was not simply a matter of political opinion or of voluntary allegiance. A Frenchman could not become an Englishman in the same way as a monarchist might become a republican or a free-trader a protectionist. In most countries, an increasing spirit of national exclusiveness made admission to membership a matter of difficulty even for the most eager recruits. Once nationality was recognised as an objective attribute, there was always a potential incongruity between it and self-determination. If the individual Frenchman or Italian was a Frenchman or an Italian for reasons independent of his own volition, it could not be assumed as a logical and necessary corollary of the existence of a French and an Italian nation that the members of these nations desired to create or maintain an independent French or Italian state.

This potential incongruity appears to have been ignored by the peacemakers of 1919, who were unconscious of any discrepancy, or indeed any distinction, between the principle of self-determination and the principle of nationality. Woodrow Wilson had emphatically insisted, prior to the entry of the United States into the war, on the right of self-determination: "Every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live."⁴ Yet when he came to elaborate the Fourteen Points, he spoke in terms not of self-determination, but of objectively ascertainable nationality: "A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognisable lines of nationality ... The relations of the several Balkan states to one another [should be] determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality." Others concerned in the drafting of the peace settlement were equally blind to any inconsistency between the two principles. Some discussions took place as to the admissibility of derogations from the principle of nationality or self-determination on strategic and economic grounds. But it was assumed without more ado that nationality and self-determination meant the same thing and that, if a man had the

objective distinguishing marks of a Pole or a Southern Slav, he wanted to be a citizen of a Polish or Southern Slav state. The confusion continued to prevail many years later. "The new political frontiers of Europe are Wilsonian," wrote Fisher in his *History of Europe*, "and so drawn that 3 per cent only of the total population of the Continent live under alien rule. Judged by the test of self-determination, no previous European frontiers had been so satisfactory."⁵

The failure to make any distinction between the principle of self-determination and the principle of nationality was due to one simple cause. In Western Europe, and in most of those overseas countries whose civilisation was derived from Western Europe, the distinction had ceased to have practical importance; and the political thought of the nineteenth century, which was still unchallenged in 1919, was the product of Western civilisation. It was characteristic of these countries that national feeling had grown up with, and within the framework of, an existing state. Nationalism meant loyalty to the state; and though it would not have been true to say that men were Frenchmen or Dutchmen simply because they wanted to be Frenchmen or Dutchmen, it was true on the whole that Frenchmen and Dutchmen did in fact want to be citizens of independent states called France and Holland. In Germany and Italy, the historical background was different. German and Italian nationalism came into being before the German Reich and the Italian Kingdom existed, and helped to create them. But between 1870 and 1914 it became, within the frontiers of both countries, indistinguishable from loyalty to the state (though it left a problem, virtually unknown in Western Europe, of German and Italian irredentism outside those frontiers). Most Germans and Italians wanted to be citizens of Germany and Italy. Across the Atlantic it could be assumed with even greater certainty that the people of the United States wanted to be American citizens. Throughout the area occupied by the most advanced and progressive peoples of the world, the principle of nationality and the principle of self-determination were in substance identical. Advanced and progressive thinkers, such as those whose teachings inspired the peace settlement of 1919, assumed therefore that the two principles were identical elsewhere.

This assumption was a symptom of the profound ignorance prevailing in Western Europe about conditions east of Berlin and Vienna. In Eastern Europe, as well as in many parts of Asia, national feeling was rife. But except perhaps in the Far East, there were hardly any of those nation-states which were the characteristic feature of Western civilisation. In some cases national feeling held together a ruling group exercising sway

over an alien population. In others national feeling united a subject population struggling to throw off alien rule. In these cases, social issues complicated national issues and tended to overshadow them. Elsewhere national differences were intertwined with religious differences and were scarcely distinguishable from them. In all these countries national feeling was far less widely disseminated than in Western Europe and affected a far smaller proportion of the population. If a peasant of what used to be the eastern marches of Poland were invited to express his view of self-determination, he would probably think of his desire to use his own particular forms of speech, to maintain the local customs of his village, to receive the ministrations of the Catholic or the Orthodox Church according to his own choice, to exchange a bad landlord for a good one, or perhaps — if he were capable of so daring a flight of imagination — to own his own land. It is unlikely that membership of a Polish or Russian national state would enter into his calculations at all. The conception, applicable in the Western world of closely integrated communities held together by the joint principle of nationality and self-determination, was almost wholly irrelevant elsewhere.

Before they had finished their work, the peacemakers of 1919 had some inkling of the complications of the problem. They fully understood that the territorial intermingling of different peoples made the drawing of frontiers in Eastern Europe on the basis of nationality a matter of extreme difficulty. They understood in part that the objective marks of nationality were not always clearly defined, so that it was impossible to say dogmatically whether the Ukrainians were a separate nation or merely Russians speaking a variant dialect, and whether Slav-speaking Macedonians were Serbs, Bulgars, or just Macedonians.⁶ What they hardly understood at all was that, even where the objective marks of nationality were perfectly clear, the possession of these marks did not necessarily give the clue to the state of mind of their possessor. Mesmerised by the assumption that the principle of nationality and the principle of self-determination were indistinguishable in their results, and by the fact that this assumption on the whole worked in Western Europe, politicians and propagandists alike were content to believe that the man whose mother-tongue was Polish or Serb or Lithuanian wanted to be a citizen of a Polish or Serb or Lithuanian state. Only where the "lines of nationality" were not "clearly recognisable," or where for some other reason the fate of an area was especially debatable, was the expedient of a plebiscite adopted. To ascertain the will of the people was a method of applying the principle of nationality, only necessary where simpler methods of determining na-

tionality were for some special reason inadequate.

The result of these plebiscites, which were conducted with sufficient fairness to ensure that all, or virtually all, the voters recorded their political preference without interference or intimidation, was most illuminating. Two were held within the confines of Western Europe: in Slesvig and in the Saar. In both the results showed no appreciable divergence from the language statistics. It was, broadly speaking, true that people who spoke German or Danish or French wanted to be citizens of a German or Danish or French state. The results of the remaining plebiscites — in Allenstein, in Marienwerder, in Upper Silesia and in Klagenfurt⁷ — were equally conclusive in the opposite sense. In Allenstein, the 1910 census showed, by the test of mother-tongue, 46 per cent of Poles; in the plebiscite just over 2 per cent of the votes were cast for Poland. In Marienwerder, the corresponding figures were 15 and 7.5 per cent; in Upper Silesia 65 and 40 per cent. In Klagenfurt, census figures showed 68 per cent of Slovenes, the plebiscite figures just under 40 per cent. The expert who has surveyed these results observes that "language statistics gave little indication of national sympathies." Indeed, "in certain sections in Upper Silesia, Allenstein and Klagenfurt the results of the voting were the exact opposite of what the language figures seemed to portend."⁸ One positive conclusion may however perhaps be drawn. The divergences, though variable in extent, were all in one direction. It seems justifiable to infer from these figures that, whereas people speaking German as their mother-tongue did as a rule desire to be citizens of a German state, only a proportion of people speaking Polish or Southern Slav as their mother-tongue (in one of these cases, a negligible proportion, in none of them a proportion exceeding two-thirds) preferred to be citizens of a Polish or Southern Slav rather than of a German state. This inference tallies with the conclusion already reached on other grounds that the supposed coincidence between the principle of nationality and the principle of self-determination is, generally speaking, valid for the peoples of Western Europe, but not elsewhere.

This conclusion is obviously one of considerable importance. In a sense all government rests on the consent of the governed. No political unit will be strong or durable which cannot count on the more or less spontaneous loyalty of a considerable part of its component population. The most effective unit will tend to be one made up of people who want to form a unit and are prepared for the necessary amount of self-sacrifice to maintain it. There is therefore much to be said for the principle of self-determination. But there is hardly anything to be said for the principle of

including people in a particular political unit merely because they speak a particular language. In future, when we seek to apply the principle of self-determination outside the limits of Western Europe, we should be careful to disentangle it from those misleading associations with nationalism which nineteenth-century Western thought fastened on it.

The recognition of a right of self-determination for nations thus involves the question, What nations? And this question requires not a theoretical general answer, but particular answers based on the facts of particular cases. In the last resort the only rights are the rights of men. In order to assert the right of a nation to self-determination, we must first enquire whether the men on whose behalf the claim is made want to be a nation, and what kind of rights they want to claim. The problem is one of great difficulty and of immense practical importance. The peacemakers of 1919, obsessed with the belief that nations were clearly defined entities possessing clearly defined rights, sometimes uncritically accepted self-appointed groups of men, many of whom had long been exiles from their native country, as repositories of these national rights, and shirked the admittedly thorny question how far the claims made corresponded to the wishes or interests of the "nation" in whose name they were made. This mistake must not be repeated. It can be avoided by keeping constantly in mind the truth that self-determination is not a right of certain recognised and predetermined nations, but a right of individual men and women, which includes the right within certain limitations to form national groups. It will probably conduce to clear thinking on this subject if we speak less than we are at present in the habit of doing of the rights and claims of Ruritania as such and more of the rights and claims of individual Ruritanians.

The Limits of Self-Determination.

Apart from the Wilsonian confusion between national self-determination and nationality, it is now clear to most observers that the peacemakers of 1919 attached too absolute a value to self-determination as a key to all political problems. Woodrow Wilson described it as "an imperative principle of action";⁹ and even those who remembered the importance of other criteria for the fixing of state boundaries almost apologised for mentioning them.¹⁰ Self-determination is one important principle which should be taken into account in deciding the form and extent of the political unit. But it cannot be safely treated as the sole or overriding principle to which all other considerations must be subordi-

nated. There can be no absolute right of self-determination any more than there can be an absolute right to do as one pleases in a democracy. A group of individuals living in the middle of Great Britain or Germany cannot claim, in virtue of the principle of self-determination, an inherent right to establish an independent self-governing unit. In the same way, it would be difficult to claim for Wales, Catalonia and Uzbekistan an absolute and inherent right to independence, even if a majority of their inhabitants should desire it; such a claim to exercise self-determination would have to be weighed in the light of the interests, reasonably interpreted, of Great Britain, Spain and Soviet Russia. The same consideration of what is reasonable in the interest of others is also applicable to units which already enjoy an independent existence.

In these circumstances, a certain amount of fluctuation and inconsistency is inevitable in the meaning given to the right of self-determination. There can be no fixed standard of number or size establishing a right to form an independent unit; for the limit of what is possible and reasonable varies from one place to another and from one period of history to another. In classical Greece, 100,000 people could easily form an independent unit. Nobody would pretend that this is possible to-day. Hence every country tends to be inconsistent in affirming or denying the right of self-determination. The American colonists claimed and exercised it against Great Britain in 1787. Three-quarters of a century later the descendants of some of them refused it to the descendants of others. This did not deter a Democratic President of the United States, half a century later still, from maintaining, in the phrase already quoted, that "every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live." Lansing's cogent, though belated, comment is well known: "When the President talks of 'self-determination', what unit has he in mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial unit, or a community? Without a definite unit which is practical, application of this principle is dangerous to peace and stability."¹¹ Even Lansing, however, does not seem to have realised that this uncertainty was not a quality of Wilson's mind, but was inherent in the principle itself. Though the inconsistency with which the principle of self-determination was applied in the peace settlement of 1919 has been frequently censured, few of the critics have grasped that the principle is one which in the nature of things does not admit of consistent application.

If then we ask why "the liberation of oppressed peoples," which had rightly been regarded as a progressive principle in the nineteenth century, came to appear a reactionary and retrogressive principle which helped to put the clock back after 1919, the simplest answer is that Woodrow

Wilson and his associates failed to recognise that the principle was a variable one requiring constant modification in the light of political and economic conditions, and that the extension given to it at Versailles was utterly at variance with twentieth-century trends of political and economic organisation. By treating the principle of national self-determination as absolute and by carrying it further than it had ever been carried before, they fostered the disintegration of existing political units, and favoured the creation of a multiplicity of smaller units, at a moment when strategic and economic factors were demanding increased integration and the grouping of the world into fewer and larger units of power. The makers of the 1919 settlement did indeed recognise that the effective self-determination of small nations was incompatible with unbridled military power and with complete independence in the military sphere. But they had no inkling of the developments of modern military technique; and the safeguards which they provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations were inappropriate as well as inadequate. What proved, moreover, equally serious was that they altogether failed to recognise that the self-determination of small nations was incompatible with unbridled economic power and complete economic independence. "You cannot create a large number of new states," said Stresemann towards the end of his life, "and wholly neglect to adapt them to the European economic system."¹² But the peacemakers of 1919 understood nothing of the European economic system or of the need of adaptation to it; and they were content with a pious, and not wholly sincere, aspiration in favour of "the equitable treatment of the commerce of all members of the League." Thus national self-determination, as applied in 1919, came more and more into conflict with the realities of military and economic power. The future of self-determination must be studied primarily in its relationship to power in these two forms.

Self-Determination and Military Power.

The crisis of self-determination in relation to military power lies in the fact that the principle of self-determination has been invoked to justify the creation of an ever larger number of small independent states at a time when the survival of the small independent state as a political unit has been rendered problematical by developments of military technique.

The problem of the small independent state first emerged at the Congress of Vienna, where the affairs of the small Powers were settled over their heads by decisions of the Great Powers. The system then

pursued, unsatisfactory on paper but tolerable in practice, was that of the nineteenth-century "Concert of Europe." Small Powers were encouraged to conduct their own affairs on the assumption that they had no voice in the affairs of Europe as a whole. In wars between Great Powers, their status was one of neutrality. During the nineteenth century, the practice of states and the zeal of international lawyers built up a substantial code of rules for neutrality in time of war; and these rules were on the whole tolerably well observed in the spacious period of local and limited wars. In these conditions a real though limited right of independence could be enjoyed by small states.

The first serious blow to this conception of an honourable and ordered status of neutrality and independence for small states was struck by the war of 1914-18. Two small countries, Belgium and Greece, were directly forced into the war by military action. Others were induced to participate by extensive promises or by various forms of military or economic pressure. Others felt that, as their interests were bound up with the victory of one side, it was both profitable and honourable for them to fight on that side and hasten the victory. Those which remained neutral found that the exigencies of the blockade strained almost to breaking-point many of the rights which neutrals had hitherto enjoyed, and that they were hardly more immune from the consequences of war than the belligerents themselves. A considerable number of small countries did succeed, even in close proximity to the principal war zones, in upholding their neutrality throughout the war and in avoiding at any rate the direct ravages of military operations. Nevertheless there was no doubt that the neutrality, and therefore the effective independence, of small states had received a severe shock.

At the close of the war, there was a vague realisation in many quarters that the concept of the neutrality and independence of small states had somehow been destroyed or modified. At the same time, the peacemakers were committed, in virtue of the principle of self-determination, to the creation of more and more small states. A supposed solution of this dilemma was found in the League of Nations, whose Covenant declared that any war was "a matter of concern to the whole League" and that any member of the League resorting to war in defiance of its obligations under the Covenant "shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League." "Between members of the League," declared the British Government on one occasion, "there can be no neutral rights, because there can be no neutrals."¹³ The small states, no longer assured of independence by the maintenance of a strict neutrality,

were to take sides in any future war between Great Powers, fighting in alliance with the "victim of aggression" against the "aggressor." This was the system which came to be known as "collective security."

There were several fallacies in this system. The first was the illusion that an arrangement whose basis was necessarily the preservation of the *status quo* could ever be universal: in fact there was never a time when the League of Nations included more than five of the seven Great Powers, and even this maximum was achieved only for a short period. The second fallacy was to suppose that the criterion of "aggression" was either equitably applicable or morally valid. The third and most important fallacy lay in the fact that modern warfare requires months or years of preparation, that if states are to collaborate effectively in war they must concert their preparations in advance, and that it is impossible, especially for a small country situated in proximity to one of the belligerents, to wait until an "act of aggression" has brought about a state of war before deciding on which side to fight. The only conception of collective security which was not hopelessly unrealistic was the French conception of a European alliance against a specific enemy under French leadership; and this conception was unacceptable to the small Powers. The doctrine current in the 'twenties that neutrality was obsolete, though in substance true, was discredited by the only alternative doctrine offered as a substitute for neutrality. Recognition of the hollowness of this substitute, combined with natural conservatism, led small states to cling fervently to the shadow of their nineteenth-century independence. In the 'twenties, when the prospect of war seemed mainly academic, Switzerland and Germany — then a weak state — cautiously contracted out of any League obligation which might involve them in a breach of neutrality. In the 'thirties, when the prospect of war became real, the small Powers emphatically proclaimed their intention to remain neutral.¹⁴ The doctrine of collective security embodied in the League Covenant was already bankrupt. It required the experience of 1940 to demonstrate that a return to the nineteenth-century conception of neutrality and independence for small states was equally impracticable.

Two factors in modern warfare have combined to destroy the independence of small states based on the principle of self-determination. The first of these factors has been the rapid growth of military disparity between strong and weak Powers. In the days when the rifle was the main weapon of offence and a fortress an impregnable barrier, a resolute small Power could offer serious resistance to a much stronger attacker, particularly if the main forces of the attacker were occupied elsewhere. In such

conditions the strongest Power would have an inducement to respect the independence of small neutral countries and not add more of them than he could help to the list of his enemies. In 1914 these conditions were already passing away. But even then the gallant delaying actions of the Belgian army were an important factor in the campaign which ended with the Battle of the Marne. In 1940 the resistance of small Powers had no more than a nuisance value. By this time the conduct of war depended primarily on the accumulation and marshalling of a vast mechanical equipment far beyond the industrial resources of a small country. Denmark did not attempt to defend herself; and the defences of Norway, Holland and Belgium, even with such hastily improvised assistance as could reach them from outside, did not delay the German forces long enough, or exact sufficient sacrifices from them, to affect in any material way the course of events. Henceforth the only way in which a small country could hope to defend itself against Great Power A would be to hand over the charge of its defences well in advance to Great Power B. But such action would not only be resented as a breach of neutrality by Great Power A,¹⁵ but would constitute a virtual surrender of independence to Great Power B, since the Power which is responsible for the defence of a territory must necessarily control its policy in essentials. "Absolute neutrality," wrote the *Izvestia* in April 1940, "is a fantasy unless real power is present capable of sustaining it. Small states lack such power."¹⁶ In modern conditions of warfare a small state cannot defend its independence against a Great Power except by methods which in themselves constitute a surrender of military independence. Interdependence has become an inescapable condition of survival.

The second factor which has destroyed the effective independence of small and weak states is that, in the highly developed conditions of modern warfare, the mere existence of neutral territory in proximity to the belligerents is likely to prove an embarrassment to one side and an asset to the other, so that neutrality, however passive, is rarely neutral in effect.¹⁷ The intensification of economic warfare has probably contributed more than anything else to this result. Prior to 1914 a belligerent might well hesitate, even if some military advantage were involved, to attack a neighbouring country which, so long as it remained neutral, would constitute a source and channel of supplies. When in the early years of the present century, the German General Staff elaborated its plan for invading France through Belgium, Holland was excluded from the plan because a neutral port at Rotterdam was essential if Germany was to receive adequate supplies from overseas. The creation during the war of

1914-18 of a wholly new kind of blockade which prevented Germany from drawing the expected economic advantages from the neutrality of Holland revolutionised the position. When the German General Staff drew up its plans for the invasion of 1940, it may safely be assumed that there was no inclination to exclude Holland. It was now clear that the countries of the Western European seaboard could no longer serve in time of war as channels for overseas supplies to Germany. On the contrary, owing to British command of the sea, they were sources of supply to Great Britain; and what was more important still, they helped to shield the coasts of Britain from German attack. A neutral Rotterdam could not serve as an *entrepôt* for German war trade. Rotterdam in German hands might serve as a valuable base against Great Britain. Dutch, Belgian, Norwegian and Danish neutrality was, quite apart from anything these countries might think or do, an asset to Great Britain. The German General Staff drew the necessary conclusion.

The present war has revealed the empty character of the formal independence enjoyed by small states. The only choice now open to them is a policy of peace at any price, which is the negation of a policy; and the humiliations entailed by it, even where it succeeds in sparing them the physical horror of war, have been amply illustrated by such countries as Sweden and Turkey. Small states can no longer balance themselves in dignified security on the tight-rope of neutrality. Still less can they rely on an indeterminate system of collective security which leaves open the identity of the future enemy and the future ally. The small country can survive only by seeking permanent association with a Great Power. The mutual obligation which such association will involve cannot be limited to the contingent liability to do certain things in certain eventualities — the most that the League Covenant ever sought to achieve. It must be a continuing obligation to pursue a common military and economic policy and to pool military and economic resources under some form of common control. Experience has shown conclusively that nothing less than this can in modern conditions assure a reasonable degree of military security. The right of national self-determination is conditioned by this military necessity.

Self-Determination and Economic Power.

The threat of military power to the right of national self-determination and to the independence of small states was at any rate recognised by the peacemakers of 1919, though they had little understanding of the nature

of the problem created by modern military technique. But wedded as they were to nineteenth-century conceptions of *laissez-faire* and of the divorce between economics and politics, they failed to detect the more recent and more insidious threat of economic power. It is one of the anomalies of the Covenant that, while practical experience of the war of 1914-18 had made its framers well aware of the potentialities of economic power as a weapon of defence, it never occurred to them to consider it as a potential weapon of attack. When some years later Soviet Russia proposed to remedy this omission by a pact of economic non-aggression, the suggestion was ill received. It is indeed true that the definition of economic aggression would meet with still more insuperable difficulties than the definition of military aggression. But the theoretical justification of the proposal was undeniable. The system of the Covenant was defective not merely because it failed to cope adequately with the problem of military power, but because it ignored the problem of economic power. A similar lacuna may be discerned in the minorities treaties concluded in 1919-20. "In their view of what was essential," remarks Mr. Macartney of the framers of these treaties, "they were naturally guided by their own experience. Now the minorities struggle in the West had for a long century past been essentially political ... Liberal thought had naturally come to attach the greatest importance to the problems of which it had the chief experience."¹⁸ States bound themselves to accord to minorities the cherished political rights of nineteenth-century democracy. But these did not include the right to work or the right not to starve. Petitions against racial discrimination in such matters as evictions and land settlement were received and discussed at Geneva. But there were a hundred ways in which a well-organised state, which punctually discharged its treaty obligations, could still reduce a minority to penury and despair by such simple devices as refusal to allocate contracts, or to grant financial credits, to firms managed by, or employing, members of the minority. The minorities treaties, like the Covenant, afforded no protection against the oppressive use of economic power; and during the years from 1919 to 1939 it was economic power which counted most.

This fatal neglect of the economic factor by the peacemakers of 1919 was the main theme of Mr. Keynes' famous book on *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*: "To what a different future Europe might have looked forward if either Mr. Lloyd George or Mr. Wilson had apprehended that the most serious of the problems which claimed their attention were not political or territorial, but financial and economic, and that the perils of the future lay not in frontiers and in sovereignties, but in

food, coal and transport." And again: "The fundamental economic problem of a Europe starving and disintegrating before their eyes was the one question in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of the Four."¹⁹

In retrospect it is not difficult to see that the prudent course would have been — and the same would be equally true to-day — to attend first, as an immediate practical measure, to the urgent needs of economic recovery, and then to evolve, in the light of the experience gained, the necessary compromise between the claims of national independence and the imperative exigencies of economic interdependence. What was in fact done was to give unconditional priority to the claims of national self-determination, so far as they could be satisfied at the expense of the defeated Powers, and leave the economic consequences to look after themselves. The growing importance of economic power, and its revolutionary consequences for unqualified political independence and for the right of national self-determination, were ignored.

The causes of this blindness can be easily diagnosed. The peacemakers of 1919 were living in a past world, whose transient conditions they assumed as a postulate of the future settlement. In the nineteenth century, economic interdependence was in some measure a reality. Great Britain, whose commercial and financial predominance made the free flow of goods and credit a paramount British interest, was powerful enough to secure the general acceptance of certain standards of international economic behaviour. There were certain conventional limits beyond which states did not use economic weapons against one another. There was a tacit understanding that certain kinds of economic unity would be maintained. Civilised countries accepted the gold standard, did not depreciate their currencies and did not disown their debts. Moderate protective tariffs were in use almost everywhere. But they were commonly mitigated by acceptance of the most-favoured nation clause; and the ingenious dodges by which this clause can be rendered virtually meaningless had not been discovered. Quotas and subsidies were in their infancy. The potentialities of national economic power as a weapon of outstanding importance in international politics were undeveloped and almost unthought of. In these relatively idyllic conditions, British predominance assured a certain minimum of real economic interdependence, and even a weak independent state had nothing to fear from economic discrimination. The peace-makers of Versailles assumed that these conditions were perpetual, and that no economic factor militated against the unqualified recognition of the right to national independence.

The settlement of 1919 was thus valid only for economic, as well as for military, conditions which no longer existed. The history of the twenty years between the two wars showed the Great Powers using the new economic weapon against one another and against the small Powers, and the small Powers using the same weapon against one another. There was no profit in the endless controversies on the issue who began first. The question was not a moral one. Modern industrial conditions had enormously developed economic power and the importance of the economic factor, both in national and in international politics. In the midst of political disintegration and the multiplication of political units, economic power had undergone a rapid process of concentration. As an American writer puts it, "the contemporary evolution of nationalism has reached an impasse between a popular determination to have smaller cultural units and a will to effect larger economic aggregations."²⁰ It soon became clear that the satisfaction given in the name of self-determination to national aspirations had aggravated economic problems; and the economic crisis of 1930 revealed the hollowness of the structure long before the iron hand of Hitler supervened to dash it brutally in pieces. The wielding of unlimited economic power by a multiplicity of small national units had become incompatible with the survival of civilisation.

The economic repercussions of the unrestricted right of national self-determination are perhaps in the long run more significant than the military repercussions; for they impinge directly on the daily life of the ordinary man. The world has been changing its shape. A recent Irish writer quotes the observation of a young Irishman that the world is not "the same size as it was in 1916." The demand for prosperity has spread and deepened. "With the change this small country grew a shade smaller; it could no longer provide more than a fraction of its children with the standard they had been taught to expect." The young generation had begun to be dissatisfied with a "walled-in Gaelic state."²¹ Political rights have failed to provide a key to the millennium. Just as the right to vote seems of little value if it does not carry with it the right to work for a living wage, so the right of national self-determination loses much of its appeal if it turns out to be a limiting factor on economic opportunity. The rights of nations, like the rights of man, will become hollow if they fail to pave the way to economic well-being, or even to bare subsistence, and offer no solution of the problems which most affect the man in the street and the man in the field. Just as political democracy must, if it is to survive, be re-interpreted in economic terms, so the political right of national self-determination must be reconciled with the exigencies of economic

interdependence.

The Future of Self-Determination.

Recognition of the nature of the disease may give us a clue to that re-definition of national self-determination which, like a re-definition of democracy, is so badly needed. If we remember that the principle at stake is the principle of self-determination, and avoid confusing it with the principle of nationality, we shall be clear that this principle is not necessarily one of disintegration. Men may "determine" themselves into larger as readily as into smaller units; and the reaction which we have already noted against the principle as applied in 1919 is the symptom of a movement in that direction. It is true that the individual wants to see the group of which he is a member free and independent. But it is also true that he wants to belong to a group large and powerful enough to play a significant role in a wider community and thus lend a sense of reality to the service which he renders to it. If the activities of his group seem trivial and ineffective, his membership of it will become meaningless to him, and he will be open to transfer his loyalties to a larger unit. Where the individual himself is incapable of making this adjustment, it may occur readily enough in the next generation. Once the cramping and confining effects of small national markets, small national political systems and even small national cultures come to be felt as restrictions on a larger freedom, the days of the small independent national state, the embodiment of the ideals of 1919, are numbered.

These trends have been intensified since the outbreak of war, both in those countries which have been direct victims of military attack and in those which have maintained a precarious neutrality, by a consciousness of the military helplessness and the economic confinement of the small national unit. In December 1940, the acting Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a remarkable broadcast from London, spoke of the war-time cooperation between Norwegian and other "freedom-loving forces in the world" as "a work which is at the same time forming the basis for a state which must and shall endure after the war — a political cooperation which will secure our national freedom and protect us from attacking tyrants, and which economically establishes social security and prevents financial crises from destroying economic life and stopping social developments."²² There is everywhere increasing recognition that self-determination is not quite the simple issue — not the clear-cut choice between mutually exclusive alternatives proclaimed by a cross on a ballot

paper — which it seemed in 1919. If it is true that the multiplication of independent states was in fact what the peoples concerned then desired, it is by no means certain that this would be their desire to-day. It is a matter of vital interest to consider here and now what conditions for an effective future organisation of the world are dictated by military and economic exigencies, and how to reconcile these conditions with the strong tendency of human beings to form independent, and potentially hostile, groups for the preservation and cultivation of a common language and tradition, common customs and ways of life, and common interests.

Certain tentative conclusions emerge quite clearly. In the first place, we must discard the nineteenth-century assumption that nation and state should normally coincide. In a clumsy but convenient terminology which originated in Central Europe, we must distinguish between "cultural nation" and "state nation." The existence of a more or less homogeneous racial or linguistic group bound together by a common tradition and the cultivation of a common culture must cease to provide a *prima facie* case for the setting up or the maintenance of an independent political unit. Secondly, we must lay far less stress than was done in 1919 on the absolute character of the right of self-determination and far more on its necessary limitations. The conception of obligations must be invoked to counteract the undue nineteenth-century emphasis on rights. The right of self-determination must carry with it a recognised responsibility to subordinate military and economic policy and resources to the needs of a wider community, not as a hypothetical engagement to meet some future contingency, but as a matter of the everyday conduct of affairs. Both these conclusions require further elaboration.

The divorce between nation and state, or between "cultural nation" and "state nation," would mean, expressed in simpler language, that people should be allowed and encouraged to exercise self-determination for some purposes but not for others, or alternatively that they should "determine" themselves into different groups for different purposes. There is nothing in such a division incompatible with human nature or with normal human aspirations. Almost all civilised men and women are members of different groups formed to satisfy different needs, and find no difficulty in reconciling the claims of a church, a sports club, a horticultural society and a trade union. Indeed, it can be plausibly argued that healthy social life can exist only where there is some such intertwined network of loyalties and interests, and where no one institution — whether state, church or trade union — makes an all-embracing demand on the allegiance of its members in every field of their activities.

Moreover it is clear that such a compromise really can be effected even when one of the loyalties concerned is loyalty to the state. There is every reason to suppose that considerable numbers of Welshmen, Catalans and Uzbeks have quite satisfactorily solved the problem of regarding themselves as good Welshmen, Catalans and Uzbeks for some purposes and good British, Spanish and Soviet citizens for others.

An extension of this system of divided but not incompatible loyalties is the only tolerable solution of the problem of self-determination; for it is the only one which will satisfy at one and the same time the needs of modern military and economic organisation and the urge of human beings to form groups based on common tradition, language and usage. The difficulty of such an extension is doubtless very great at a period when the power and authority of the state are everywhere increasing and are covering, more and more effectively, more and more departments of life, and when economic organisation, education and the direction of opinion on matters vital to security have become recognised functions of government. It would be rash to look for a reversal of this trend. But the very process of concentration and centralisation which this development entails inevitably ends by setting up a compensating process of devolution; for the more far-reaching and more ubiquitous the activities of government, the more necessary does it become to decentralise control in the interests of efficient administration. It is in this interplay between centralisation and devolution, in this recognition that some human affairs require to be handled by larger, and others by smaller, groups than at present, that we must seek a solution to the baffling problem of self-determination. "The troubles of our day," writes Mr. Macartney, "arise out of the modern Conception of the national state: out of the identification of the political ideals of all the inhabitants of the state with the national-cultural ideals of the majority in it. If once this confusion between two things which are fundamentally different can be abandoned, there is no reason why the members of a score of different nationalities should not live together in perfect harmony in the same state."²³ Once the broader military and economic framework is securely established, there is no limit to the number or to the functions of the smaller national units of self-government which may be built up within it. In this context the natural and ineradicable desire of the human group for self-determination in the conduct of its affairs can be given the fullest scope and expression.

The other conclusion which requires emphasis is that national self-determination, like democracy, must be re-defined in terms which match the assertion of rights with the equally valid assertion of correlative

obligations. In 1919 it was assumed that, once a "nation" was recognised as such, the right of self-determination conferred on it an absolute claim to national independence, and that the concession of this claim must have priority over any serious discussion of mutual obligations between nations. This neglect of the correlation of rights and obligations, based on acceptance, tacit or avowed, of the doctrine of the harmony of interests, was characteristic of the thought and policy of Woodrow Wilson, who assumed, with an unquestioning readiness which seems incomprehensible to-day, that the universal recognition of the right of national self-determination would bring universal peace. Rights were absolute; to recognise a right and make it effective was a good in itself; the assumption of a countervailing obligation was voluntary, and the recognition of the right could not be made dependent on it.

It would be foolish to underestimate the extent of the revolution in men's ways of thinking which will be required to restore the issue of national self-determination to its true perspective as a right exercised within a framework of obligation. For the small nation, it involves the abandonment of the exceptionally favoured position enjoyed by small countries in the nineteenth century, when neutrality was the only price asked of them for military security, and when their territories and their interests (including, sometimes, wealthy overseas possessions) were protected by an overwhelmingly powerful navy for which they were not responsible and to which they made no contribution. For the Great Power, it involves the assumption of a direct and permanent share of responsibility both military and economic — such as Great Powers have rarely been prepared to undertake — for the welfare of other nations. For Great Britain — to take the concrete case — it means making the defence of, at any rate, some European countries a common unit with the defence of Britain, and accepting the principle of a common economic policy which will take into account the interest of, say, French, Belgian and German industry or of Danish and Dutch agriculture as well as of British industry or agriculture. The military security and economic well-being of Great Powers, not less than those of smaller countries, is bound up with the acceptance of a new conception of international obligation.

The same principles will also apply to the difficult problem of the right of national self-determination for colonial peoples. It has often been said that the Allied Governments behaved inconsistently in 1919 when they asserted the right of self-determination in Europe and rejected it in Africa and Asia. Logically, this charge is irrefutable. Yet apart from the still undeveloped capacity of many of these peoples for self-government and

from such special problems as that created in India by the diversity of races and religions, it is clear that to break up existing military and economic units in the name of national self-determination would in fact have been a reactionary measure. In Europe the present need is to build up larger military and economic units while retaining existing or smaller units for other purposes. In Africa and Asia it is to retain large inter-continental military and economic units (not necessarily the existing ones in every case), but to establish within these units a far greater measure of devolution and an immense variety of local administration rooted in local tradition, law and custom. The heedless and unwitting extermination of native ways of life and the imposition of a mechanically uniform system of administration has perhaps been as great a factor in the decay and depopulation of many colonial areas as direct and deliberate exploitation by economic interests. The conception of Africa as a series of vast and more or less uniform areas divided from one another by arbitrary geometrical frontiers must give place to an administrative patchwork based on the self-determination of the tribal unit. In this sense, the "balkanisation" of the tropics is a consummation devoutly to be wished.

It would seem therefore that the international relations of the future must, if the alternatives of complete chaos or brutal domination are to be avoided, develop along two lines: recognition of the need for a larger unit than the present nation for military and economic purposes, and within this unit for the largest measure of devolution for other purposes, and recognition that the right of national self-determination can be valid only within a new framework of mutual military and economic obligation. The crisis of self-determination, like the crisis of democracy, turns ultimately on a moral issue. But it expresses itself in military, and above all, like the crisis of democracy, in economic, terms. There can be no solution of it unless we can solve the economic crisis which is the most conspicuous and most far-reaching symptom of the troubles of our time.

(Prefaced and edited by Luigi V. Majocchi)

NOTES

¹ William Temple, Archbishop of York, *Thoughts in War-Time*, pp. 112-13.

² How deeply this idea has taken root is shown by the linguistic confusions to which it has given rise. Thus the English language, never having taken the trouble to evolve derivatives from the word "state" speaks of the "national debt" and the "nationalisation"

of railways. The French language forms no adjective from *Etat*, but can speak of "Biens d'Etat" (though there are also "Domaines Nationaux") and has the useful if clumsy words *étatisme* and *étatisation*. In the United States of America, "state" is necessarily reserved for the component states of the Union, and "nation" is now frequently used to designate the Union as a whole. The "League of Nations" is a notable example of this confusion of terminology.

³ Acton, *History of Freedom*, p. 288. Cf C. A. Macartney: "To claim ... that every nation must form an independent state is to substitute for true self-determination a very different thing, which should rather be called national determinism." (*National States and National Minorities*, p. 100).

⁴ *Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy*, ii, p. 187.

⁵ H. A. L. Fisher, *A History of Europe*, iii, p. 1161.

⁶ It was confidently assumed that the principal objective mark of nationality was language. "In Central and Eastern Europe," wrote Professor Toynbee, reflecting the assumptions of Peace Conference, "the growing consciousness of nationality had attached itself neither to traditional frontiers nor to new geographical associations, but almost exclusively to mother tongues." (*The World After the Peace Conference*, p. 18). Mr. C. A. Macartney traces back to Schlegel and Fichte the recognition of language as the essential criterion "both as constituting the spiritual link between the members of a nation and as offering proof of common origin." (*National States and National Minorities*, p. 99).

⁷ A plebiscite at Sopron was conducted in markedly different conditions from the other plebiscites, and its results could scarcely be regarded as a safe guide.

⁸ S. Wambaugh, *Plebiscites Since the World War*, i, pp. 202, 493. The figures cited above are taken from this monumental work (i, pp. 133-4, 198, 350).

⁹ *Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace*, i, p. 180.

¹⁰ For example Balfour wrote to House in the following terms: "Strong frontiers make for peace; and though great crimes against the principle of nationality have been committed in the name of 'strategic necessity', still if a particular boundary adds to the stability of international relations, and if the populations concerned be numerically insignificant, I would not reject it in deference to some *a priori* principle." (*Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, ed. C. Seymour, iv, pp. 52-3).

¹¹ R. Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations: a Personal Narrative*, p. 86.

¹² G. Stresemann: *His Diaries, Letters and Papers*, ed. and transl. E. Sutton, iii, p. 619.

¹³ *Memorandum on the Signature of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of the Optional Clause*, Cmd. 3452, p. 10.

¹⁴ A typical pronouncement was one made by the Netherlands Foreign Minister in the Lower House on November 24, 1934: "Holland will never surrender her traditional policy, and it is a mistake to believe that Dutch territory can be disposed of by other parties for the defence of another state ... Our country has no desire to follow in the wake of any one European state or group of states." In July 1940 when the unreality of such a position had been conclusively and dramatically demonstrated, Mr. De Valera was still assuring the world that his Government was "resolved to maintain and defend the country's neutrality in all circumstances" (*The Times*, July 5, 1940).

¹⁵ In a note of May 10, 1940, to the Netherlands and Belgian Governments, the German Government made it a ground of complaint that they had concerted plans of defence with Great Britain and France and had thus forfeited their neutral status. This charge was unfortunately ill-founded. The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has since revealed that, in the week preceding May 10, the Netherlands Government received from its intelligence service information about the impending invasion "enough to cause the most serious alarm." But "even then the Government did not warn the Allies; we wanted to be absolutely certain that a founded accusation could never be made against us for having

secretly abandoned the neutrality we had so consistently observed." (E. N. van Kleffens, *The Rape of the Netherlands*, p. 110). M. van Kleffens appears somewhat apprehensive of the impression which may be made on his countrymen by this confession; for he proceeds to argue that help could not in any event have reached them in time. This may have been true in the particular case, but hardly affects the moral.

¹⁶ *Izvestia* (leading article), April 11, 1940.

¹⁷ Switzerland is perhaps, thanks to her geographical situation, one of the rare exceptions.

¹⁸ C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities*, pp. 281-2.

¹⁹ J. M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, pp. 134, 211.

²⁰ C. J. H. Hayes in *International Conciliation*, No. 369 (April 1941), p. 238.

²¹ Sean O'Faolain, *An Irish Adventure*, pp. 304-5.

²² *The Times*, December 16, 1940.

²³ C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities*, p. 450.

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