# THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

Hamilton, The Federalist

THE FEDERALIST

a political review

Editor: **Mario Albertini**

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.

CONTENTS

European Citizenship and Post-National Identity

The Maastricht treaty has introduced the concept of European citizenship into the Community's legal system. This issue may at first appear simply symbolic, but in reality it has major historical significance and numerous important political and cultural implications. From the time of the French revolution, citizenship has represented the individual's membership of a people. As such, on the one hand, it evokes the idea of popular sovereignty, and hence the citizen's possession of certain political rights deriving from it; and on the other, it identifies the political community to which the citizen belongs, and thus is historically associated to *nationality*.

This innovation of the Maastricht treaty highlights two crucial problems that the Community will be obliged to tackle. First, European citizens do not enjoy the most basic of democratic rights: that of selecting and controlling the men and women who govern them on a pan-European scale. Second, is the separation between the ideas of citizenship and *nationality*.

* * *

The strength of the idea of the nation is its capacity to provide its members with a sense of *identity*. It remains true that this sensation is based on a falsification, since the bonds which make a nation are ideological bonds. In the same way it is true that the idea of the nation throughout history has been frequently affirmed by violence, which has been used to suppress pre-existing natural identities, such as those local and regional ones that are based on personal intercourse and communal memory. This does not alter the fact that the nation, despite its artificiality, is a strong cohesive element between citizens; so much so as to give rise to a specific historical form of statehood, that of the *national state*. But nowadays, this form of the state is undergoing a crisis as regards the

principle on which it is based, and is on the point of being superseded in a larger framework, with the conclusion of a historical process that has lasted decades, but which has recently, with the European Community, started to give rise to an increasingly articulated institutional framework. Maastricht represents a significant stage in this process (whatever the result of the ratification process in Great Britain and Denmark). Today, therefore, the issue of a *post-national identity* is posed in explicit terms.

It is worth noting that this issue is not only a European one. The nation is also undergoing crisis in the United States. There, the potent unifying factor which derived from the idea of the *melting pot,* and was closely linked to a phase of American history in which immigrants were able to benefit from practically unlimited opportunities for economic success and hence social integration, now risks collapsing in the face of disruptive pressure that has been brought on by the historical tendency of development to slow down. Enormous pockets of poverty have been created, which mainly involve (apart from a significant portion of black Americans) Hispanics and other minorities, especially those who have recently settled in America. This situation has caused a crisis of the American identity, and sparked off a series of moves to rediscover original identities, often forgotten and frequently completely fictitious (as for black Americans' claims to an African identity; which, in reality, has been completely obliterated by centuries of separation from their continent of origin, and which never existed as a unitary factor even at the time of the slave trade).

Thus even the US is in a process of separation between the ideas of nationality and citizenship. Moreover, in this case the phenomenon assumes an exclusively disintegrative character, since it puts in danger the basic consensus which constitutes support for the democratic order, without providing a substitute for the mode of social co-habitation that has made the greatness of the American way of life. The situation in Europe is different. It is clear that also in Europe one of the factors contributing to the crisis of the nation are the separatist pressures within the national states, or, at least, the weakest ones (even if the groups that work to such ends use the idea of the nation in turn to dress up political movements whose real nature is simply tribal; thereby rendering the content of the idea of the nation even more obscure and contradictory). But in Europe the specific terms in which the issue of a post-national identity is posed are not the disintegration of existing states, but rather the opposite, that of their supersession within a larger European dimension. Hence the debate on this subject in Europe represents a significant

coming-of-age, the outward sign of the adaptation of the collective conscience and the conceptions through which it is expressed, as new modes of social co-habitation emerge, based on the overcoming of old barriers, on a dialogue between cultures and on a widening of the scope of solidarity.

* * *

Throughout this debate there exists a widespread understanding that in the era of the global village, the myth of the nation has now completed its historical course, and that its devastating revival in the ex-Communist countries represents nothing more than its death throes. Likewise, there is a widespread appreciation of the fact that no other myth will be able to take its place. Clearly, however, the European federation will be born as a sovereign state in a world of sovereign states, and this will tend to create an embryonic sense of "national belonging" in its citizens. But this sentiment will be weak, since it will be based on an ideology which has been overtaken by historical events, and which moreover is totally incompatible with the social and cultural reality of a pluralistic people, such as Europeans are. Neither will a European federation be able to disavow the profound historical significance at its foundation, which will be precisely the overcoming of the national principle and of its historical embodiment in the national state.

On the other hand, the sole fact of the continual enlargement of the range of mankind's interdependence, which is the material basis of the crisis of the national state, is not in itself sufficient to create a sense of solidarity, which represents the glue of every functioning state community. It is sufficient to recall how the strong degree of interdependence between the various Yugoslavian republics, and the resultant interest of all Yugoslavian citizens in maintaining the federal structure intact, was no effective hindrance to dissolution under pressure from a demagogic and violent minority. The cohesion of every state structure must therefore be safeguarded, above and beyond the necessary patterns of interdependence and material interests, by a sense of belonging to a community which is felt to have *legitimacy.*

Hence, in a post-national world the problem of determining a new legitimacy is posed; one which can provide the basis for a sense of belonging to state entities whose unity is no longer guaranteed by the bond of nationhood. The fact that the overcoming of the exclusive nation will revive a currently forgotten sense of local and regional solidarity is

not the answer to this problem, since such a sense of solidarity will only be an enrichment of democratic life if it is expressed within a supranational state framework; while it will encourage disorder and disintegration if it takes on the attributes of sovereignty. The problem of the new legitimacy therefore is that of identifying a suitable bond that can guarantee the unity of the global political framework.

* * *

Such a bond, if it is true that the myth of the nation is now in decline and cannot be substituted by another myth (and granted that the decline of the nation will not lead to the return of general violence in a state of nature), will by necessity have a rational foundation. Habermas claimed to have identified it in what he termed "constitutional patriotism," by which he meant the sense of common belonging that should unite citizens who recognise that the great values of democratic co-habitation (in relation to the prevailing stage of civilisation's development) have been enshrined in the material constitution of their state. This represents therefore a loyalty which is not required of citizens due to their membership of a community whose legitimacy rests on the fact of being considered "sacred" or "natural": but one which is freely matched to an institutional system that realises rational values recognised as having universal validity.

But in reality the formula of constitutional patriotism, if the ultimate implications of it are not made clear, is not a satisfactory response to the problem of a post-national identity. It denotes the bond which should exist, and which sometimes actually does exist, between the citizens of a particular state (which they find themselves to belong to by birth); and which is based on mutual loyalty, freely and rationally matched to their institutions by virtue of their democratic character. But, in contrast to nationhood, this formula provides no criterion to legitimise the size and borders of a state. And given that the size and borders of a state are not neutral with respect to democracy, the formula of constitutional patriotism undergoes crisis when a contradiction between the former and the latter is revealed; thus putting into question the political community itself.

* * *

This is what is happening in Europe, where democracy is undergoing

crisis precisely because of the national dimension. The formula of constitutional patriotism does not provide an answer to the problem of the new size of the political community within which citizens must pledge loyalty to the state and through this feel a sense of mutual solidarity. It is true that there does exist a broad consensus that the political framework which will allow (at least in an initial stage) the overcoming of the identification of state with nation will be one in a European context. But the borders of the future European federation are structurally undefined. The European federation of tomorrow could include only a part of the actual members of the Community, or the Twelve, or exist as a broader structure of indeterminate size, possible extending to parts of the CSI and even to some countries of North Africa and the Middle East. The most realistic forecast is that it will be born within a restricted area and will tend to grow gradually.

But it is important to point out that whatever size the federation may be during any of the stages of its creation and development, its borders will never be "natural" nor "sacred." Rather, its borders will remain arbitrary, that is they will be the result of chance historical events, and will never correspond to a territorial area defined (however imperfectly) by a principle of legitimacy that is as strong as the national principle; by virtue of which it is considered natural that the territory of France belongs to France, and that of Italy to Italy.

* * *

The European federation will be born out of a negation; the negation of sovereignty. As long as the federation remains limited to a region of the world, and is therefore in its turn a sovereign state, it will be intrinsically illegitimate as a consequence. Or rather, it will enjoy a provisional legitimacy, indispensable for guaranteeing its cohesion, only if it proves capable of expressing through its actions in world politics, its mission to promote the process of unifying all the peoples of the world within a cosmopolitan federation; whatever path history may take in order to attain this objective. Besides, if it is true that a post-national identity can only have a rational foundation, then the political community to which it refers can only be universal; just as the rules of reason are, which are not valid for one people or another, but for the entire human race. In the same way democracy, which is the foundation of constitutional patriotism, can only be imperfectly realised in the context of a sovereign state, since it is constrained by international anarchy to obey

the rationale of power politics and to violate the rule of law. Democracy will only be completely fulfilled in a federal world political structure. For this reason, if constitutional patriotism is not given substance by an active cosmopolitan mission, it will be unable to guarantee the federal unity of Europe without being corrupted. According to the particular circumstances, constitutional patriotism will become patriotism *tout court* (even if very weak, since the overcoming of the nation is irreversible), or it will lose completely its unifying strength, leaving the field free for the forces of disintegration.

* * *

European citizenship is therefore the forerunner of world citizenship, and as such poses the problem of cosmopolitan identity, which unites men solely on the basis of the mutual respect which they owe each other as beings endowed with reason, and which in the final analysis underpins all the great values of social co-habitation. A World federation is the only definitively legitimate political community. Only by working on the basis of this understanding will federalists be in a position to elaborate effective tools for analysis and action in their struggle for the indispensable intermediate historical objective of a European federation.

The Federalist

Micronationalism and Federalism *

GUIDO MONTANI

The European and World Order after the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has led to a period of instability and uncertainty in the balance of world power. The USSR did not succeed in completing the process of democratisation begun by Gorbachev: after the failed coup d'état in August 1991, the project for a reformed union was shipwrecked on the nationalist claims of the republics. The US has remained the only superpower, though its inability to bear the weight of governing world affairs has by now become clear: this explains why US foreign policy continually wavers between wild hegemonic ambitions and vague projects for a new international order. Western Europe has tried to accelerate the project of Political Union, spurred on by these dramatic events which have sorely tried the community's institutions that grew out of the cold war under the convenient protection of the US. However the plan set forth by European governments at Maastricht, while decisive regarding monetary unification, calls for stages that are too spread out over time and too vague regarding their terms for the construction of Political Union. Thus Europe remains incapable of responding decisively to the dramatic events presently tearing the Balkans apart. The danger is that the fire will spread. The same causes that have unleashed ethnic hatred in the Balkans and Caucasus, threaten within the near future the possibility of other dangerous flare-ups in every corner of the world. In Asia, Africa and America (Quebec) tense situations between different ethnic groups have existed for years now, and these could explode with catastrophic consequences if the disorder in Europe should worsen.

The nature of this phenomenon, its causes and possible remedies, remains controversial for the moment. Some have welcomed the inde-

*Speech at the forum on "Nationalism and Federalism," organised during the 9th International Seminar of Ventotene (September, 1992).

pendence struggles of Lithuania, Slovenia, Croatia, Nagorno-Karabach and Slovakia as a true affirmation of democracy (the self-determination of peoples). Yet judgment in this regard ought to be much more prudent and clearly thought-out. It is true that these problems have arisen during the democratisation process in the Soviet empire; however these difficulties are much more closely related (in both their causes and effects) to the ideology of nationalism than to that of democracy. The atrocious reality of concentration camps in the former Yugoslavia recalls the experience of Nazism so closely as to raise reasonable doubts.

Integration and Disintegration. Contemporary history is entirely incomprehensible if the growing economic, social and political interdependence between all the peoples of the world is excluded from our judgements. Paradoxically the break-up of the USSR itself can be understood within this perspective, since détente only became possible when the arms race between the two superpowers had lost any rational justification, due to the certain self-destruction a nuclear conflict would have caused. Nevertheless it is in Western Europe that the process of economic and political unification has made the most progress. The countries of the Community have now decided to share their monetary sovereignty, and to pool their sovereignty over foreign policy and security issues. This decision will involve the transfer of national state sovereignty to the European level and lead (if carried to the point of no return) to an entirely new phase of international politics. Indeed, the political unification of Western and Eastern Europe will become possible, thereby placing Europe in a leading position in the now vital struggle for democratic reform of the UN, the common home of all mankind.

This crucial trend in European policy is nevertheless seriously threatened by the opposite tendency towards the break-up of states and, as a result, the disintegration of the entire European continent. The democratisation process in the Soviet empire has in fact come to a halt because of the break-up of the USSR into sovereign republics that are each seeking to create their own army and national currency as soon as possible. Yugoslavia has followed this bad example on a smaller scale, failing to contain the territorial claims of the various ethnic groups to any significant extent. The result has been a civil war fought with all the ferocity that racism is capable of producing. Each ethnic community wants to build its own national state, physically suppressing or expelling beyond its borders all "impure" elements that might infect the chosen race.

The European Union as a New Model of Political Community. The national states of the past were formed by affirming the principle of a political community enclosed within national boundaries: the national army and national currency (including customs duties) represented the material means for this policy. The border ensures that personal relationships with foreigners are impossible for all individuals without the explicit authorisation of the national government. The currency and army represent the instruments which in reality divide one political community from the other, and which guarantee politicians (who define themselves as "national") the maximum amount of power over their citizens. Passive obedience in this form of state, which accommodates democracy with difficulty, is considered a civic virtue; and everyone is obliged to accept the supreme sacrifice of one's life in order to defend the sacrosanct borders.

The European federation that is currently being constructed introduces a completely new principle of inter-individual relationships onto the international scene: Europeans belong to a political community that is open to world interdependence. In the European Union, the nation loses its monopoly over citizenship. European citizens are simultaneously English, Italian, Tyrolean, etc. The cultural identity of the European citizen will not be defined by a political power. European citizenship foreshadows and anticipates several features of cosmopolitanism. Europe has no natural borders to defend. It arises as a federation open to the entrance of all peoples who accept the fundamental principles of liberty and democracy that will be at the heart of the European constitution.

Nationalism and Micronationalism. Europe's borders represent the bloody wounds inflicted by nationalism on the living flesh of the European people. European history is not simply the story of nationalism, though nationalism in Europe has undoubtedly conditioned profoundly the very same idea of politics, despite the cosmopolitan aspirations of liberalism, democracy and socialism. Nineteenth-century nationalism consisted of the ideology of the unity of state and nation, during a period of history in which economies were gradually freeing themselves from their feudal burdens under the impulse of the new dynamic forces of the free market and industry. The modern economy would never have developed within the narrow confines of the fief. Nationalism thus favoured the integration of peoples within a single state over wide national areas: both in large monarchical states, such as England, Spain and

France, where political power had already succeeded in unifying vast territories; and in countries such as Italy and Germany, which through national unification managed to create the conditions for their economic development and entrance into the concert of the great powers.

This heritage still dominates the contemporary world. The principle of the sovereign national state governs international politics based on the balance of power: the only active subjects in world politics are the national states. It is nevertheless true that the principle of absolute sovereignty has nowadays been attenuated by the phenomenon of global interdependence, which forces sovereign states to co-operate in order to be better able to guarantee their own welfare. The birth and proliferation of the many existing international organisations cannot be explained otherwise. They are not the result of the goodwill or internationalism of the governments concerned: on the contrary, governments accept the constraints of co-operation as a lesser evil, since isolation often means impoverishment and marginalisation from the fruits of economic and social progress.

Micronationalism is thus a new phenomenon with respect to traditional nationalism. It does not accompany the integration of vast areas and populations but seeks to break up existing states, and to create small ethnic communities which are virtually pure within their territorial confines; adopting for this purpose violence and discrimination (the army and currency), the instruments of classical national states. It is the illusion of independence in an interdependent world. It is nationalism on a small scale.

The Ideology of Disintegration. Although the phenomenon of micronationalism has manifested itself violently with regard to the crisis of the Soviet empire, its roots are to be found deeper within the crisis of the traditional political ideologies, that are no longer able to propound an ideal of the state which is acceptable to the modern citizen. This crisis has hit both West and East to the same degree, though expressing itself in different ways. The state, as conceived of in past political thought, was able to unite a people (and in some cases different peoples) through common institutions. Liberty, equality and justice are not spontaneous gifts of nature but the result of collective institutions. Today, in an age of global interdependence, the idea of the state as a political community capable of guaranteeing the solidarity and independence of different peoples, ethnic groups, nations and regions, is in crisis.

It has nevertheless been the break-up of the USSR which has lifted the heavy ideological pall that was imposed by the two superpowers during the cold war, under which the disruptive forces of micronationalism were slumbering. Once the thawing-out process had begun, the political class in power in the USSR showed itself to be incapable of forming new democratic parties that could present citizens with serious programmes for state reform that drew their inspiration from the great values of the liberal, democratic and socialist traditions. Before the coup d'état in August 1991, the process of reforming the political life of the USSR had reached a threshold: the radical transformation of the Soviet Communist Party into a social-democratic one, and of the USSR itself into a democratic union of states. Even Yugoslavia had succeeded in starting a democratisation process during this phase, albeit with differing degrees of progress and intensity from one republic to the next. Finally, Czechoslovakia, which is now equally besieged by micronationalistic fever, had already achieved a democratic and semi-federal form of government.

In all of these instances, the seed of micronationalism took root with surprising rapidity, leading to the break-up of the previous state structure due to the need for the political class in power to find a legitimate alternative to the communist regime, which by then had been struck by an irreversible crisis. The simplest formula, and the nearest to hand, was nationalism; that is, the primitive and crude idea of ethnic cleanliness or a chosen race. The formation of authentic political parties whose appeal was based on the values of liberalism, democracy and socialism would have required the education and selection of a new political class, which the dramatic crisis of the Leninist regime made extremely difficult. It was much easier and more effective to launch a patriotic appeal, while holding out the myth of national independence. In fact all the present heads of the former Soviet republics (including Russia) were former heads of the Soviet Community Party disguised as saviours of the fatherland. A similar interpretation can be proposed for the Baltic countries, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia; countries where (given their marginal position within the empire) dissent towards communism had already succeeded in bringing a section of the democratic forces to power, but where provincial leaders and demagogues were forced to appeal to crude nationalist sentiments in order to strengthen their hold on power.

Micronationalism represents an ideology which has allowed a local political class, threatened by the process of democratic transformation already under way on a large scale, to obtain the necessary popular consensus for maintaining their hold on power by means of the pseudo-democratic phenomenon of the referendum (the democratic fraud here is

evident: the same people who only a few months before had voted Yes in the referendum on preserving the Union, subsequently voted Yes in the various national referendums to dismember it).

Nevertheless the destructive potential of micronationalism does not stop at the borders of the former Soviet empire. In Western Europe, where national states exist with well-established democratic governments, and where the process of the political unification of Europe has now reached a very advanced stage, micronationalism is slowly infiltrating itself into the intricacies of European politics. The movements for regional autonomy (which sometimes become the spokesmen of the real and legitimate aspirations of local communities) risk allowing themselves to become enchanted by the illusory objectives and erroneous methods of the struggle for micronationalism, during this dramatic period of reorganisation of the European order.

Regionalism and Micronationalism. The national states in Europe were formed and consolidated during the 18th and 19th centuries through a process of centralising power, gradually eliminating local feudalities and smothering regional cultures. The fundamental characteristics of the modern national state are in fact a centralised bureaucracy and the bureaucracy's desire to base itself on a specific and exclusive cultural identity (Italianness, etc.). This political ideology rejects the fact that there might be "lesser" cultures, different from the one that has been raised to national prominence, that might advance a claim to be placed on the same level as the dominant culture. As a result, there arise conflicts which last for centuries and which often erupt in violence, as if it were a question of choosing between incompatible lifestyles. Some examples of this are the Catalans and Basques in Spain, the Bretons and Languedocians in France, the South Tyroleans in Italy, the Irish and Scots in Great Britain, the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium.

The process of European unification calls into question the national states as regards both their exclusive claim to regulate international relations and their relationship with their local communities, which have finally seen the opportunity arrive for achieving complete political and administrative autonomy. In fact the process of European unification obliges the national governments to yield power upwards to the European government (currency and security), and downwards to the local territorial authorities (especially in tax matters and concerning the management of expanding social services, which the local communities will probably turn out to be more efficient at handling than the national level, since they are more sensitive to the needs of the citizens in their area).

It is natural that during this process the local communities (mainly cities and regions) will increasingly try to insist that their voice be heard and will claim greater powers. This is a legitimate aspiration and accords with the principles of modern federalism, which contrary to classical American federalism is not simply expressed at two levels of government, but aims to coordinate the various levels of government from the smallest village up to a world government. This entails fulfilling the idea of an open political community, from the village, city, district, region, and so on, up to the world level which includes all mankind. The simultaneous inclusion of the citizen in several territorial communities becomes perfectly conceivable and uncontradictory within a federalist framework, since the relationships between different governments no longer depend on their relative military or economic power, but on the regulations of a common democratic constitution. Ultimately, federalism will allow nations to assert themselves as spontaneous cultural entities, without resorting to the violence of armies in order to defend themselves from outside threats or to dominate their citizens.

It is nevertheless clear that the struggle of local communities to affirm their autonomy cannot be conducted with the methods of micronationalism (violence, terrorism, etc.), nor can such communities seek the same objectives (monetary and military sovereignty) if their autonomy is to be compatible with interdependence. The struggle for European federalism and local federalism can only progress side by side, since the achievement of a federal Europe is necessary to eliminate entirely the suffocating centralising powers of the national state.

In this phase of history, currency and security must become competences of the European government, while waiting for the right political conditions to entrust them once and for all to a World government. The local communities which seek to affirm their autonomy by means of armed sovereignty do not in truth wish to achieve federalism, but rather to break up the state by destroying the idea of solidarity between citizens and between different territorial communities. Such a policy also excludes the European union from feasible political ideals. Those who desire new borders are not federalists, since borders are discrimination and violence.

Micronationalism versus Democracy. In the age of global interdependence, democracy inside a country can only be established and prosper if the country participates in the process of constructing interna-

tional democracy. In fact the break-up of the USSR (which occurred when the US and USSR had laid the groundwork for the democratic reform of the United Nations system) has caused the previously planned reform of the international order to come to a halt.

The creation of new (and in several cases tiny) sovereign states compounds and aggravates the problem of Europe's ethnic minorities. The creation of a sovereign Lithuania has immediately raised the problem of the Russian and Polish minorities that live there. In Slovakia, as claims to sovereignty grow, so the rights of the Hungarian minority are threatened. Finally, in Yugoslavia we can observe almost daily the crimes against humanity that the unpropitious ideology of ethnic cleansing gives rise to.

Every sovereign mini-state will be forced to impose heavy limitations on the civil rights of its citizens. Monetary independence will be a fiction, since no national currency can be independent nowadays in the face of the great economic giants (even Germany has acknowledged the need for, and advantages of, European monetary union). On the military level (during a period in which even the superpowers have recognised the need for co-operation and controlled disarmament in order to avoid the danger of a nuclear catastrophe) it is clear that no micro-nation can hope its army will be able to carry out any functions other than those of an internal police and border guard. Finally, it will be very difficult for any micro-nation to participate in the fruits of international economic co-operation, since the defence of monetary sovereignty (which means control over exchange rates, customs protection, etc.) will represent a serious impediment to full participation in the world market. In short, it is very likely that the political leaders who have promoted the attainment of sovereignty for their countries will have no other choice but to install regimes which are apparently open to democratic procedures, but which are in substance based on fraud and demagoguery. Only in this way will they be able to hold on to power, by keeping their citizens ignorant of the huge costs of an absurd sovereignty.

Micronationalism versus European Unity. Micronationalism can hamper the European unification process in two ways.

Some hold that just as the attainment of national sovereignty and independence for the great national states of the past preceded the phase of integration and unification, so the new nations must today affirm their right to self-determination before they can begin to move towards unification with other Europeans. This rough comparison between what took place during the 18th and 19th centuries, and current events leading up to the year 2000, completely ignores the fact that the processes of European unification and World unification (though still in an embryonic stage) are already under way. World history has already led to crisis for existing national states, including the largest ones (such as Germany, the US, etc.). Therefore the most sensible way to take part in this great adventure towards the political unity of mankind is not by provoking new secessions, discrimination, hatreds and wars, but rather by fighting to strengthen democracy in one's own country; in order to contribute through peaceful co-operation with other peoples to the elimination of anachronistic borders. Democratic life is reinforced and strengthened through conscious participation in world progress, and in the emancipation of mankind from the scourge of misery, war and racism. Those who provoke divisions, who sow hatred, who isolate themselves from the world, wish in reality simply to defend their own power and privileges by hiding these crude ambitions behind the pompous rhetoric of national sovereignty.

The second way in which micronationalism threatens the construction of European unity consists of a particular interpretation given to the popular slogan: "The Europe of the Regions." It is clear for the reasons mentioned above that the construction of European unity favours the development of local autonomy. Yet some argue that the regions hold a privileged position within Europe, both with respect to lesser territorial communities (the communes for example, who under this plan would be considered authorities inferior to the regional level) as well as to the national states (which in extreme cases could be dismembered to create new regional units and eventually macro-regions, such as Padania, Languedoc, Bavaria, etc.). This proposal for a European order is once again based on the ideology of micronationalism, and in fact represents the effective sabotaging of the project for European unification, since a European union based on hundreds of regions would either turn into an empire (if the needs of the central government ended up prevailing over those of the small local powers) or a free-trade area (if the arrogance of the local powers prevailed over the needs of unity).

The European Union versus Micronationalism. The world of states has until now revealed itself to be incapable of combating micronationalism. The explanation for this is simple. Micronationalism appeals to the principles of sovereignty and self-determination on which the order of the existing sovereign states is also founded. In fact the contem-

porary international world order, including the most important international organisations, such as the UN, is impotent before the misdeeds of micronationalism.

Only the Europe of the Community has attempted (albeit insufficiently) to counter this tendency towards disintegration by means of the opposite process of conferring monetary, and a share of security, sovereignty to a supranational body. Nevertheless the process under way has been late in producing tangible results for the surrounding world, which is assailed by the corrosive force of micronationalism. We must nevertheless pursue with even greater determination the path of union, going so far as to achieve an effective European federal constitution that will explicitly clarify to the peoples of the world the principles on which it is possible to base the coexistence of free and disarmed nations. In particular, the European constitution should include an article, similar to Art. IV, Section 3 of the US Constitution, which prohibits the dismemberment of the states making up the Union, while the union of two or more states is only permitted with the approval of Congress.

This can only partially solve the problem. In truth the European Union must begin to take responsibility for the future of the states of Central and Eastern Europe which aspire to enter the Community, but which are finding it difficult to bring the democratic process to a conclusion without yielding to the enticements of micronationalism. With regard to these countries the Community should have the courage to declare immediately that it is open to their membership, agreeing on the stages and transition measures needed to allow their economic systems to bear the competition of the internal European market, and warning them against possible dismemberments. The European federation will be able to function the more effectively, the more limited the inequalities between its member states are. It is unthinkable that states such as the unified Germany, Slovenia or Lithuania should share equal powers of government within the Union. One solution might be the granting of the special status of "territory" (whose population would be represented in the European Parliament but not in the Senate of the States) to the smallest countries, while waiting for larger units to form within the Union. As an alternative a weighted voting system according to population could be established for the states in the Senate, as currently happens in the Bundesrat.

European Union and Regionalism. Europe in the wake of Maastricht has now entered the constituent phase when it becomes important to define clearly the institutional model that will regulate relations between

the European Union, national states, regions and the smaller territorial bodies. In principle, if we exclude authority in the areas of currency and defence, there seem to be no plausible reasons for granting a specific authority to any particular level of government.

While it is true, for example, that national states will have to yield power upwards (to the European government) and downwards (to the regions and lesser territorial bodies), this in no way means that the national level must be completely deprived of functions. If we consider one of the most important features of the crisis of European national states (the crisis of the welfare state) then it is clear that there is no simple, obvious recipe. The welfare state is the result of social struggles which, beginning in the last century, contributed to introducing the idea of solidarity between citizens into the collective consciousness. And this radical change in the collective consciousness was achieved during the 19th and 20th centuries within the old national states. Today in many European countries (Italy, Spain, France, etc.) it is rightly held that the regional (or communal) level could carry out several of the typical functions of the social state much more effectively than the national level currently does; for example health care, care of the elderly, etc. Nevertheless this does not mean that all the functions of the welfare state must be given over to the local level. Pension funds, created with deductions from salaries and wages, can probably be more effectively managed at the national rather than the local level, and it would certainly be absurd to propose creating a European mega-pension system. In other cases, such as unemployment subsidies, it would instead be appropriate to add a European fund to the national ones, in order to create an automatic income-transfer system from the richer regions of Europe to the poorer ones and those undergoing crisis.

These few examples will perhaps serve to justify the view that in Europe it would be opportune to construct a federal state system at several levels (not only two, as in the US) in order to allow each territorial community to participate in elaborating all policies, without exception. In order to put this form of participation into practice, every government level must have effective, though not exclusive, powers over budgetary and legislative matters (in other words, powers that are coordinated with the levels of government above and below it).

In order to achieve such coordination between different government levels, every territorial community must have a senate (where the representatives of the lesser territorial bodies would sit) alongside the usual legislative assembly (parliament). For example, according to this

concept, the region must itself become a "Federal state": in the sense that the senate of the provinces (or of the departments, districts, etc., according to local traditions) must be created with joint decision-making powers alongside the regional parliament; the senate of the regions must be placed alongside the national parliament; the senate of the national states (the current Council of Ministers appropriately reformed) must flank the European Parliament.

This constitutional model would permit each government to coordinate its own policies with the levels of government both above and below it. In this way the regions would be able to participate in the European legislative process through the powers they would possess in the national senate (as the *Länder* presently do in the *Bundesrat*), which would have the power to debate and vote on community treaties and directives. It would however be erroneous to expect the regions to be directly represented in European institutions (for example in the European Senate of the States) on a par with the national states. This would represent a form of power abuse and imperialism, not so much with respect to the national governments but on the part of the smaller territorial bodies, such as the communes. Federalism must allow each territorial community, small or large, to feel that it is equally involved in, and in agreement with, the Union government; and this will prove impossible if one level of government desires to overwhelm the communities smaller than itself, or if the smaller communities seek to exercise power on an equal basis with larger territorial communities.

Notes

LATIN AMERICAN FEDERALISM

The call for Latin American countries to unify dates back to the time of the fathers of independence. Simón Bolívar, the foremost among them, wrote that "this new world has a single origin, a single language and religion; hence it requires a single government to unite within a confederation of the various states that are in the process of being born."

Unfortunately, in contrast to what occurred in the thirteen colonies of North America in the wake of independence, the Latin American federation has remained to this day in the realm of fantasy. In the introduction to their work *Le Système politique de l'Amérique Latine*, Jacques Lambert and Alain Gandolfi explain this situation as being "due to insurmountable geographical obstacles" which at the time of the battles for independence, obliged "Hispano-American population centres...to obtain by force from a weakened Spain, a separate independence, through military operations that were isolated and spread out over the period 1811 to 1825." They give equal emphasis to the fact that "in Latin America, where the circumstances of independence offered the possibility of union along the lines of Anglo-Saxon America, the Latin temperament did not prevent the vast Portuguese-Brasilian empire from strengthening its unity until it formed the United States of Brasil."

* * *

The political system of the powerful and unsettling neighbour to the north has nevertheless influenced the political framework of Latin America; proof at the level of internal federalism is provided by the federal constitutions adopted in the 19th century by some of the largest countries of the sub-continent: Venezuela (1818, following an initial failed effort in 1811), Mexico (1824), Brasil (1834) and Argentina (1853).[1] It is also worth remembering numerous fruitless attempts at federalism in Chile (1828-1830), Peru, New Grenada, renamed Colom-

bia after its independence (with several experiments between 1853 and 1866, not to mention the failed project for a Grand Colombia between 1822 and 1830), and in the United Provinces of Central America (1821-1838) which, following the execution of the Honduran Francisco Morazán in 1842, are still in search of their lost unity.[2] Nevertheless it is worth emphasising the formal nature that most often underpinned this type of federalism: Jacques Lambert and Alain Gandolfi defined it as "centralising federalism;" and the British writer K.C. Wheare was led to comment in his book *Federal Government* that in essence, the republics of Latin America did not provide the necessary conditions for a federal system to become established.

As regards plans for Latin American unity, various attempts in the first half of the 19th century came to nothing. The Venezuelan Francisco de Miranda had proclaimed federalism since the end of the preceding century. In 1823 Bolívar invited Mexico to join a Confederation of American States. This proposition was the central feature of the 1846 Congress of Panama, where the principal concern was to "organise a Confederation of American States that guaranteed a sound defence" against both Europe and the US, whose pretext of protecting "America for Americans" deriving from the Monroe doctrine of December 1823 poorly disguised her imperialist ambitions.[3] Bolívar, as well as the Cuban José Martí and other Latin American thinkers, had understood from the outset the danger of involving the "Northern colossus" in the affairs of the sub-continent, and it was in this vein that he wrote in 1829 that "the United States seems destined by Providence to fill America with misery in the name of liberty."

It is clear that throughout the 19th century the multiple expansionist or colonialist aims and activities of the Europeans and North Americans greatly influenced Latin American pro-unity thought. It was in effect the invasion of Mexico by France, the last in a long line of aggressive acts, which brought about the creation in Chile in 1862 of the *Sociedad de la Unión Americana de Santiago* which can be considered as the first popular-based federalist organisation in the continent. This society had counterparts in other towns such as Lima, Valparaiso, La Serena, Quillota; contacts or correspondents in other countries as far apart as the US, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia; and included among its members the heroes of Chilean independence and numerous intellectuals of renown under the direction of Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna. On top of its support, also by providing funds, for the Republic of Mexico against France's Second Empire, the *Unión Americana* of Santiago published two important

collections of texts and documents in 1862 and 1867. In a letter of June 1862 to its affiliate in Santiago, the *Unión Americana* of Valparaiso wrote that "it is not up to governments but to the people to embark on and carry out the task of destroying barriers and to bridge the gap that currently separates the differing nationalities which reside on American soil, with the aim of uniting them in a whole."[4] Francisco Bilbao, a member of the *Unión* of Santiago and known by his contemporaries as the "*apóstol de la libertad de América*", published in 1865 his "*Iniciativa de la América. Idea de un congreso federal de las Repúblicas*" in which he concluded "What do we want? Liberty and Union. Liberty without union is anarchy. Union without liberty is despotism. Liberty and union, that will be the confederation of the Republics."[5]

During the 20th century the perspective of unification, even if not necessarily always of a federal nature, underlay the politics, at least on a rhetorical level, of all the individuals and political thinkers concerned with the development and emancipation of Latin America. Moreover, this was clearly visible in the new political ideologies (at times populist) which inspired "revolutionary nationalism", a common characteristic of different periods and regimes (Argentine radicalism and Peronism, Peruvian aprism, Chilean socialism, Mexican Cardenism or Brasilian Varguism), all of which did affirm one day their validity as a continental model. The best example of this is the Peruvian *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (*APRA*) whose leader and founder Raul Haya de la Torre declared in Paris in June 1925 that "one of the most important projects of imperialism is to maintain our America divided. Latin America united, federal, would make one of the world's most powerful countries and would be regarded as a danger for the imperialist Yankees;" he made political union one of the five demands of his political programme.

An intense joint effort developed at this time between Latin American intellectuals on the theme of anti-imperialism and continental union. This is demonstrated by the much-vaunted signing-up of the Argentine José Ingenieros as a member of the *APRA* in 1927; he was a founder of his country's socialist party and *Unión Latinoamericana* movement.

It was within this context that the crisis of 1929 revealed the need for another model of economic development, by necessity centred on continental integration; that Brasil was moving closer to its Spanish-speaking neighbours, for the first time and in a lasting way; and that certain voices, at first isolated, such as that of the Chilean Eugenio Orrego Vicuña, began to make themselves heard.

In the post-second world war period, and above all in the framework of the UN, the will for unification came to be demonstrated in a more concrete manner, leaving the realm of ideas to find its first limited applications in the economic field. In September 1957 the *Comisión económica para América Latina (CEPAL)* of the UN, created in 1947 and long presided over by the Argentine economist Raul Prebisch (whose interest in Jean Monnet and his European action is well-known), concluded at Buenos Aires some of its work by stressing "the opportunity to establish gradually and progressively a multinational and competitive Latin American common market open to all the countries of Latin America." Numerous experiences of free trade and economic integration have been attempted since then.[6] Initially the directors of *CEPAL* and the *Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID)* (created in May 1958 despite the initial doubts of the US) gathered around Raul Prebisch and the Chilean Felipe Herrera, and worked in a clearly integrationist perspective.

Some political movements, organised to a greater or lesser extent on a continental level, were engaged in the parallel battle for union or federalism and had been so since before the second world war. We mention briefly the name of some of these that we were able to identify for the period from the end of the second world war up to the middle of the 1970s, when the last of them seems to have disappeared: the Argentine *Unión Federal* which, before being banned by a pro-Nazi military regime had had a parliamentary group, its own publication, and had played an important role in the establishment of a Customs Union treaty with Chile (that was never ratified due to the change of regime in Buenos Aires); the various groups of anti-fascist European exiles, such as *Italia Libera* or the anti-Nazi groups in various countries which gathered around the publication *Das andere Deutschland*; the *Movimiento de Integración Latinoamericana (MILA)* which united for a time some Chilean Christian Democrats and Socialists at Valparaiso in the 1960s; or the *Movimiento Acción para la Unidad Latinoamericana (MAPLA)*, created in Buenos Aires in 1963, and which nominally counted national committees in 18 countries.

The most interesting and well-known of these movements was the *Movimiento Pro-Federación Americana (MPFA)*, founded in 1948 in Bogota on the occasion of the creation of the Organisation of American States (OAS) by the Colombian world federalist Santiago Gutiérrez; it published his review, *Nuevo Mundo*, first in Bogotà then in Buenos Aires from 1953 until the beginning of the 1970s, and remained in regular contact with the World Movement for World Federal Government (WMWFG), to which Gutiérrez was even affiliated for some years after the *Asociación Pacifista Argentina (APA)* became the sole continental contact of the WMWFG from the time of its creation immediately after the end of the war.

The economic difficulties encountered by Latin America since the 1960s (deterioration of exchange rates, worsening of foreign debt) as well as the role played by the military dictators, who were nationalistic and opposed to all moves towards integration,[7] did not permit the achievement of convincing economic results nor lead political integration to a positive conclusion. The decade of the 1990s seems to be opening under more favourable auspices. New perspectives have emerged with respect to pre-existing plans for integration, such as those established by the Presidents of Brasil and Argentina signing in July 1986 the *Programa de Integración Argentino-Brasileña*. This programme concerns matters as varied as agriculture, payment systems, advanced technology, commerce, culture, energy (in particular nuclear energy) and military cooperation. The project, initially bilateral, has since been extended to Uruguay and then to Paraguay, with the signature in March 1991 of the Treaty of Asunción which defines the outlines of the *Mercado Común Austral (MERCOSUR)*.

Three other Latin American countries, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela ("the Group of Three"), have in turn announced their intention to create a free-trade zone in 1994. Mexico is simultaneously pursuing the negotiations of the NAFTA treaty (North American Free Trade Agreement), signed with much publicity on the 12th August 1992, with the US and Canada (and to which Chile is tempted to "tag on"). Mexico is undertaking a role at the sub-regional level in re-launching the integration of its neighbours in Central America.

Among the most recent initiatives it is worth highlighting finally, and particularly due to its democratic and electoral implications, the decision of the countries of the Andean Pact to create a common market by 1995, even forseeing, following the European example expressly cited, the election of an Andean parliament with direct universal suffrage; and this despite the serious difficulties in which it was hammered out, after the failure of the Quito meeting in June 1992, which was supposed to conclude the customs union, and which caused Marcel Niedergang of *Le Monde* to write that the Andean Pact was in a state of "disintegration" and "in crisis", torn between the requirements of Colombia and Venezuela (concerned about attaching themselves to the Mexican economy) and

those of the other members.

* * *

These new perspectives could and should be exploited now that the weakness and inadequacy of the national state as the exclusive framework for modern economic and political life seem increasingly clear; as the most recent studies of the directors of the *Instituto para la Integración de América Latina* (*INTAL*) and *BID* show. While along with the return to democracy it is worth celebrating (as for *INTAL* in 1989) the renewed activity of regional parliaments, it is indispensable in order to achieve the democratic and federal unification of Latin America (which alone will permit it to enter the 21st century on a firm footing) that a new generation of militant federalists emerges and that they organise themselves politically in a supranational manner, respecting the basic principles that were declared by the militants who preceded them: those of the *Uniones Americanas* of the last century who stressed the principle of calling on the constituent people; or more recently those of the *MPFA* who have, on many occasions, correctly insisted on the need for the federalist movement to be autonomous in relation to the states and national politicians.

Jean-Francis Billion

NOTES

[1] We have intentionally quoted in brackets only the date of the first federal-style constitution adopted by each country.

[2] As for those dating from the post-second world war period in various countries of the EEC, the Central American constitutions currently in vigour contemplate (with the exception of Costa Rica's) the possibility of abandoning some sovereignty on condition of reciprocity. That of Honduras has even recognised that the country is *"un Estado disgregado de la República Federal de Centroamérica"*. Further south, the 1967 constitution of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay contains a clause which allows for Latin American integration within a very broad context.

[3] It is important not to confuse pan-Americanism and Latin American federalism. As far as pan-Americanism is concerned, grouping together not only the states of Central and South America but also their neighbours to the north, it has had progressive successes: in creating in Washington in 1889 the *Oficina Comercial de las Repúblicas Americanas*; at the conference of 1938 which aimed to achieve the entrance of the majority of Latin America into the second world war on the side of the Allies; at the Conference of Chapultepec of 1945, concerning the problems of the war and subsequent peace; and finally at the 9th Inter-

American Conference in Bogotà, 1948, at which the Charter of the Organisation of American States was approved. Regarding the Conference of Chapultepec, which preceded that of San Francisco where the UN was born, it is worth highlighting the position of the Latin American states, almost the only states of the Third World to be independent at that time: refusal of the right to veto; demands for a permanent place on the Security Council for Latin America; a federal structure for the UN, rather than confederal, as being the only possible guarantee of maintaining peace in the opinion of the numerous state officials and diplomats gathered there (in particular Ezequiel Padilla, then Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs).

[4] See Ricaurte Soler, prefaces to the Panamanian and Mexican reprints of 1976 and 1978 of *Unión y confederación de los pueblos hispanoamericanos*, the first of these two volumes (notice that the second of the two collections was never republished). Apart from important documents relating to the Congress of Panama of 1826 and to the Inter-Parliamentary Congress of Lima of 1848 (which had adopted a treaty of confederation that united New Grenada, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile but which ultimately failed to pass the hurdle of national ratification), these two volumes, despite certain omissions due to the difficulties of communication at that time, include numerous texts and essays by Bernardo Monteagudo, Pedro Félix Vicuña, Juan Bautista Alberti (father), Benjamín Vicuña Maquenna, Manuel Carrasco Albano, Francisco Bilbao, Francisco de Paula Virgil and José Mariá Semper.

[5] See *Historia de las ideas de integración de América latina* by the Colombian historian Javier Ocampo López. Among the federalist thinkers of the second half of the 19th century, also his compatriot José Mariá Torres Caicedo, author in 1865 of a book on the *Unión Américana para la defensa comun* is quoted.

[6] *Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (ALALC)* in 1960 (transformed into the *Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración-ALADI* in 1980), *Mercado común centroamericano (MCCA)* in 1961, *Asociación de Libre Comercio del Caribe (CARIFTA)* in 1965, *Mercado Común del Caribe Oriental (MCCO)* in 1968, *Grupo Andino (GRAN)* in 1969 and *Comunidad del Caribe (CARICOM)* in 1973.

[7] It is worth recalling on the one hand the withdrawal of Chile under Pinochet from the Andean Pact; and on the other the role of this body in the re-establishment and consolidation of Bolivian democracy.

PROSPECTS FOR GLOBALIZATION AND THE CONTROLLED USE OF PROTECTIONISM AS A MEANS OF INTEGRATION

The global economic order in the post-war period has been controlled by certain international institutions: international financial relationships have been handled by the International Monetary Fund; GATT has controlled the development of international commerce; the World Bank has financed investment projects, contributing to the growth of stability and to the spread of economic development.

These institutions have exercised their role within a relatively stable political context that has been provided by the United States' leadership of Western interests, and those of most non-aligned countries. The activity of these institutions has therefore been deeply influenced by the United States: initially, American influence was decisive, but has declined over time; despite this, US control over these institutions has never completely disappeared.

US leadership supported international integration, thereby enabling growth in free trade. European integration developed within this framework, and benefited from the stability guaranteed from outside. The European Community did not oppose global free trade integration; instead it established a region where integration was highly successful.

This situation underwent its first crisis in 1968 when the customs union of Europe was fully established.

The very success of the European customs union brought the political and economic context in which it had developed to a crisis point. This happened when Europe realised that it could aspire to a role of equal partnership with the United States, at least in economic terms. Starting with a monetary crisis, the world was shaken by a series of crises in the 1970's which were mainly due to the growing difficulty of keeping pace with the redistribution that was underway in the world's centres of economic and financial power. These crises then widened to involve trade relations. Finally, the European ambition of gaining an international political presence which reflected its economic importance emerged.

While severe, these problems did not stretch international relations past breaking point. The bi-polar characteristics of the world did not allow for any challenge to American supremacy in the West. European ambitions had to accept this limitation on any claims for equal partnership.

A decisive change took place in 1989. Caught between Eastern European economic emancipation on the one hand and the collapse of the Russian Communist regime on the other, the Yalta world order began to crumble. The fall of the Berlin wall was the visible symbol of the quickening of this break-up. A new era opened in international politics which offered novel possibilities on all levels.

Two alternative world scenarios started to take shape. On the one hand there was the chance to accelerate the integration of all countries, no longer obliged to opt for one bloc or the other. On the other vast regional areas began to consolidate, within which co-operation and integration could aspire to greater levels than those currently practised in the new world order.

To understand which of these scenarios will prevail in the short to medium term, two factors are decisive. First, there is the issue of restructuring international bodies. Second, and closely connected with the first, is the decisive importance that Euro-US relations are destined to have in the new world order.

The first scenario, which we could term "mondialist", requires new bodies to manage the new monetary, economic and political world order. It will only be possible to define these new organs as the fruit of the historical process. At present the only realistic option is to define the fundamental issues, and to try to single out some trends which may indicate possible solutions.

The basic problem is not very different to the one already faced by Europe at the outset of its progress towards integration. This involved trying to integrate countries with different stages of development and economic capacity together in a single community. Solidarity grew in time based on institutional solutions decided upon in an increasingly democratic manner.

To sustain the globalization process the following bodies must be reformed: the UN, the IMF and the World Bank. Moreover new international bodies need to be created to manage world problems which did not even exist in the 1950's. Here I am referring especially to problems associated with the use of mankind's common resources such as our oceans, the atmosphere, outer space, and Antarctica; to this can be added ecological problems which have now become a world-wide concern. To realise this alternative, the historical problem is to find solutions that ensure the widest possible consensus among all the countries of the world.

Europe has managed to progress towards unification over the last four

decades by adopting a functionalist strategy. The idea of federation, which until now no-one has attempted to define, was adopted as the final objective. Confederate structures were set up, into which federal elements were introduced gradually, sector by sector. Hence the historical process was left with the task of defining what was meant by federalism. The current widespread debate on subsidiarity is only the latest example of Europe's ability to search for an identity in the course of events, in an innovative manner, free of any fixed model.

Differences in economic or political development in the world today are certainly greater than they were in Europe when integration began. World unity can only begin if the solutions proposed take this reality into account.

Central to this process is the issue of Euro-US relations. The reform of international bodies leading to world unity under present circumstances implies the recognition of an equal partnership between these two areas. This leading partnership will attract other continental (or quasi-continental) areas, such as Russia, Japan, China, and India on increasingly equal terms. The responsibility for starting the process, therefore, lies mostly with Europe and the United States.

The difficulty of seating all the world's leaders around the same table together, including those from the Third and Fourth worlds and the major world powers, is self-evident. The crux of the issue is leadership. Such leadership cannot be concentrated on the US, using the same methods that were current up to 1989. Democratisation on a world scale cannot come about without American recognition of a full equal partnership with Europe.

Perhaps this will not come about soon; indeed, there is a thought-provoking precedent. European integration was initially hindered by Great Britain; not by coincidence it was the only European country which could truly consider itself to be one of the winners of the second world war. Integration only really began when the continental countries decided to go ahead after accepting British self-exclusion.

There are many similarities between the British attitude to European integration in the post-war period and America's position today regarding mondialist reform of international institutions. However, there is one important difference: other European countries continued without Britain. They expected her to follow later. Today the mondialist evolution of world institutions seems unrealistic in the face of American opposition.

This does not mean that in the future, or even perhaps soon, mondialism will not develop without the United States, at least initially. But the

right conditions do not yet exist.

These considerations lead us to the historic responsibilities that the two most highly developed areas in the world shoulder today in international relations. Of the two, Europe has the greater burden because it can influence the US more than the US can influence Europe. By completing its progress towards integration, Europe will be able to exercise a greater role in the evolution of international relations than any other area.

European integration began as a Franco-German initiative. Each advance made towards greater integration was due to the initiative of these two countries. The United States and Europe, on condition that the latter reaches full unification, could adopt an analogous role on a world scale.

The launching of a new Atlantic treaty could be the turning-point in the development of a scenario which we have hitherto defined as mondialist.

The alternative is the breaking-up of the world into cohesive continental groupings. Relations between these areas could evolve in two different directions: either towards competition and conflict or towards co-operation. The fundamental problem is understanding the forces that are pushing in these directions and singling out the factors which lie behind this process. In particular we need to find solutions that can reduce the danger of conflict between these regional groupings.

International relations run the risk of undergoing a withdrawal from economic exchange concurrent with a tendency towards autarky.

Once the old order, characterised by US leadership in world free trade, has entered its final crisis, an uncertain transition period with no clear outcome may ensue. In this event regional systems, needing security in the face of international disorder, may react hastily by closing themselves off from other groupings. The resulting world order would be highly unstable. While in the long run this situation would be destined to change, given the tendency of world economic development to create increasingly stable and larger markets, it is nevertheless difficult to foresee exactly when this change will come about. Nor is it possible to predict how serious the conflict between groupings could become. The line dividing commercial wars from armed conflict could be crossed.

A return to autarky may not always be the result every time protectionist policies are implemented.

Protectionism distorts the international economic system; yet at the same time it can be the result of distortion, and as such have a neutralising effect.

The competitiveness of goods on the world market depends not only on the competitive capacity of producers but more generally on the competitiveness of the political systems that producers belong to. The ability of systems to compete also depends on socio-economic policies. Free circulation of goods and services in the absence of coordination between political, social and economic policies in any given system tends to impose a realignment in line with the conditions which prevail in the least-regulated system.

This outcome is not necessarily the best. For example let us take the case of a country that has no old-age pension scheme, no national health service, no welfare for its poorest citizens, no environmental protection laws and other similar *laissez faire* policies. It is obvious that products from this country would invade the world market. In such an event the adoption of protectionist barriers by other countries would put producers on an equal footing by lessening the impact of unfair advantages or disadvantages due to the area they live in.

Economic theory has long concerned itself with protectionism, which is an instrument of political economy that can only be evaluated from the context within which it is applied. The abuse of protectionism should not lead us to think it is necessarily evil.

The problem is that it is very hard to distinguish "good" protectionism, which corrects pre-existing imbalances, from "bad" protectionism, which distorts the world economic system. Hence the reluctance to approve of an instrument which by its very nature is susceptible to discriminatory uses.

Such observations lead us to a possible solution. If the world forms large economic blocs, protectionism will inevitably ensue. The basic problem will then be how to regulate its application world-wide, to ensure that protectionism will be used to support fair competition between economic blocs and to help maintain the balanced development of international relations by managing resource redistribution.

A partial overlap thus emerges between the mondialist scenario and the multi-polar one. The global control of protectionism could force regional economic areas to converge, thereby avoiding serious conflicts between them.

Once again, the history of European integration provides many lessons. Take for example the European Monetary System (EMS) which has enabled progress towards a currency union. When the EMS was created, the hitherto exclusively national power of devaluating or revaluating currency was transferred to the European level. Such

currency value changes have the same practical effect as customs duties. European governments have continued to use these conventional instruments of political economy, but the EMS has obliged them to use them "virtuously." That is, it has obliged them to use these powers in a manner compatible with the overriding objective of increasing integration.

If the world consolidates into large economic blocs, it will become an urgent priority to guarantee that currencies from different areas are not used to create distortions. Freedom of capital investment should be regulated according to the level of economic integration. Otherwise speculation could provoke autarkic countermeasures.

The mondialist scenario means reforming the IMF into a Central World Bank. Increasing integration will be possible in a world organised into economic blocs if the lessons learnt in Europe regarding gradual integration are applied. An example of this would be the establishment of a "super-EMS" to co-ordinate regional currency unions.

In the monetary field the argument on European and US responsibilities can be applied in a concrete way. A prerequisite for a world currency agreement is the full monetary union of Europe. Moreover a "super-EMS" cannot be established in the short term without an agreement between the Unites States and Europe which is open to all regional economic systems.

The same applies for all the international organisations needed to manage the commercial, environmental and other aspects of the world economy.

The history of Europe's integration shows that the solutions needed to continue the process have emerged from the process itself. When we examine the various possible future scenarios for the world, we must appreciate that any route taken, even if we take the evolution towards growing world solidarity for granted, cannot be concluded if we adopt a fixed model of development.

To assume the moral responsibility of contributing to social, economic and political development in the current situation means having the foresight and determination to take part in the process, and to act upon it in such a way as to ensure that the most progressive solutions are adopted.

Dario Velo

Federalist Action

THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF EUROPE IN THE WORLD AND THE ROLE OF THE FEDERALISTS *

I. The collapse of the communist regime in the USSR, the break up of the Union and the end of its hegemony over its ex-satellite states, means that the old balance of world power no longer exists. From the end of the second world war this balance ensured world government despite alternating periods of tension or détente. This world government was precarious and dangerous, being based on the threat of mutually-assured destruction. However it had a legitimacy of its own, whose basis was the conflict between communism and democracy, which guaranteed discipline within the two blocs by mobilizing alliances and reinforcing the power of the countries on either side of the divide. Certainly, the ideological confrontation between democracy and communism was a veil behind which power politics hid. Yet, this cover was dense enough to make world problems such as economic development, political emancipation and environmental protection recede into the background. These problems could not be solved within the terms of the US-USSR balance of power, and exploded with great virulence once that equilibrium collapsed.

The end of this global balance of power raised great hopes and opened up new prospects for the future. An awareness of mankind's common destiny began to spread — that the great problems of our time, pushed into the background and frozen by super-power confrontation, could be solved through the mutual collaboration of the peoples of the world. But at the same time the end of the bi-polar balance of power tore off the ideological veil that had given a precarious and flawed justification to a

*Pre-congress paper for the XVI Congress of the European Federalist Movement (Pescara, 30 April - 2 May 1993).

world order which was equally precarious and flawed. Consequently, these new developments caused a crisis of legitimacy for existing world powers and led to the disorder and disintegration of world affairs. Some good examples of the devastating effect this has had are the situations in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union itself, the Middle East and Somalia, to name just a few.

The characteristics of the new balance of power which is seeking to rise from the ashes of the old world order are still unclear. However, an awareness has spread that only a global authority can create and consolidate a new order, based on peace and capable of solving the great problems on which the survival of the human race depends. The UN is called on to intervene in every place a crisis breaks out, or where economic or environmental problems become acute. The clear definition of a possible need is the first step towards a solution for the problem itself. Nevertheless the United Nations continues to be, as it has always been, inadequate for the many tasks given to it. It has no army, it is permanently beset by budgetary problems, and it lacks the political clout which could come from a broadly-based consensus expressed through democratic institutions. Its decision-making mechanisms are of a diplomatic nature, and hence ineffective. The very countries which call for its intervention often deny their financial support. In fact, the United Nations has only intervened successfully when its main backer has been the United States, the world's last great military power.

At the same time the United States needs UN cover for its world hegemony. This is due to an important inconsistency in today's global politics. With the disappearance of the enemy, the power of the US has lost its previous, albeit fragile, legitimacy. The world does not accept domination based on the naked exercise of power. Today, and for sometime into the future, power in world politics will remain separated from legitimacy. A true world order can be established only when legitimate world power is established, based on consensus and collaboration between all the world's countries, with each accepting the responsibilities that this implies. Such a perspective can only mean the introduction of democracy within the United Nations, and its transformation into a true world federal government, endowed with a monopoly over the use of military force.

We are far from a solution. But the problem has been posed and it is no longer possible to ignore it. Each time the UN is called upon to intervene in a crisis, it will either fail, as seems to be happening in Cambodia, or be a cover for American action, as recently in Iraq and cur-

rently in Somalia. In both cases any hope of finding a real solution to these problems has been lost. This contradiction leads us to the conclusion that the world federalist ideal has found a concrete field of application and is therefore no longer an abstraction. A cosmopolitan federation has become the realistic political end point for all regional federalist struggles, starting with European federation. This can no longer be carried out on the assumption that Europe is a closed system and indif-ferent to the needs of the world.

II. Rather than lessening the importance of the struggle for European federation, this state of affairs increases it. A future world federation cannot unite the 180 countries represented at the United Nations. They are too many and all too different from each other in terms of population, political systems, and levels of economic development. A world federation can come about only as a union of great continental federations, the establishment of which will involve the consolidation of democracy and economic progress beyond the confines of the Western world. The whole process is centred on the dissemination throughout the world of an alternative political vision to the "nation" as the social base for the sovereign state. This new political culture will promote increased emancipation by widening the territorial scope of democratic statehood, while guaranteeing, within this framework, the independence of smaller and smaller areas. This is what is meant by federalism, and Europe is the place where it can for the first time form a great multinational state. This example will be able to influence mankind much in the same way as the French revolution diffused the nationalist ideal over the last two centuries, albeit with tragic results.

Only by being open to the prospect of world federation can European federation acquire legitimacy. European federation, the first step in this process, should have absolute strategic priority. The growth of a federalist consciousness between all people and not just between a few activists, depends on the success of the project for European unification. Federation is the only way to institutionalise the interdependence of the world's peoples, and therefore to secure peace and progress. Should the project for European unification fail or be postponed indefinitely, the increasing intensity of political, economic and social relations would end up aggravating the instability of the world. Disintegration and violence would characterise the world stage for a long time. Europe, which by uniting could become a positive model for the world, would, by remaining a house divided, become a negative one. Nationalism or micro-

nationalism, which have led to the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, could infect the whole of Western Europe and the European Community itself, where its seeds are already present. In such a situation, the illusions of those who believe that the *acquis communautaire* can be maintained without moving rapidly to monetary and political union will be dashed.

Without progress towards political union in Europe, democracy may itself cease to exist, or falter, in most of the member states of the Community. It is now impossible for political parties to present citizens with the vision of a better future in a national context. This route has been barred by history. The incapacity of certain politicians and political parties to think seriously in European terms has led to the increasing degradation of political behaviour and consequently a drastic loss of popular trust combined with a disturbing increase in the weakness of democratic governments. A natural effect of these changes is the growth of violent, xenophobic and separatist movements. It cannot be denied that these tendencies have been fuelled by intense immigration and the present economic crisis. However, it is also true that these problems are closely connected to the weaknesses of a divided Europe and to international disorder, which Europe is not only unable to control but is actually exacerbating. Federal union, therefore, is the only possible solution that can establish a new relationship between politicians and the public, and thereby lead to the rebirth of politics and democracy, which today is going through a worrying decline.

III. The process of European unification is at a crucial point in its history. The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by Great Britain and Denmark is still uncertain. If it is not ratified, the Community will go into a crisis which will have unpredictable consequences. But even if the Maastricht Treaty is ratified, Europe will still not have a strong enough base to enable it to shoulder the burdens which loom upon it. The new Union will continue to lack an effective foreign and security policy and hence it will remain an impotent intermediary or a simple bystander in the conflicts which are tearing ex-Yugoslavia and the Caucasus apart. It will lack initiative in crisis areas such as the Middle East, where its active presence on the basis of a clear policy could radically change the political picture, fostering unity, peace and development. Add to this the weakness of monetary union: its far-off application date, the extremely fragile semi-fixed exchange rate mechanism, the setbacks the European Monetary System has suffered from the present crisis, and finally the scandal-

ous reluctance of Community governments to endow the Community with the necessary resources to finance an effective policy of economic recovery. The EMS is currently exposed to international speculation and European governments are faced with the choice of aligning their interest rates with German ones and accepting the resultant deflation, or re-nationalising their monetary and economic policy, and hence returning to the catastrophic situation already experienced by Europe in the 1970's.

Europe cannot afford the luxury of choosing between going forwards or standing still, because the very survival of the Community depends on its capacity to move forwards. Today the issue of enlarging the Community to include other members has been posed with insistence by the governments of Great Britain and Denmark, making the seriousness of the situation even more acute. The Danish presidency has begun negotiations with Austria, Sweden and Finland, is gearing up for others with Norway, Malta and Cyprus, and has an eye on future contacts on the same issue with the ex-Communist countries of Central Europe.

European federalists must make it clear that any enlargement of the Community which is not preceded by a profound reform of its institutions, will result in its dissolution. In its place will be a vast free-trade area lacking cohesion, democratic consensus and the capacity for effective action. Even the decision-making procedures of the Maastricht Treaty itself are only a small and hopelessly inadequate improvement in this direction. In a confederate structure, such as that laid down by the Maastricht Treaty, the very fact of an increase in the number of member states will increase the difficulty of reaching the necessary level of agreement to take any decisions. This situation will only be worsened by the different economic structures of the countries involved, and the variety of issues that they will present the Community.

The Community's response to the radical challenge currently facing it is clear. It must first of all, before contemplating any enlargement, enact a *federal constitution* that sets up a European system of government based on the principle of subsidiarity (that is, with limited but real powers, unlike the present system which tends to extend competences indefinitely without creating effective democratic decision-making procedures). The new constitution should involve reforming Community institutions as follows: full legislative powers to the European Parliament, to be placed on the same level as the Council on all matters regarding the Union; the transformation of the Commission into a true government with full executive powers and answerable to Parliament; the transformation of the Council into a true Senate of nations, which takes decisions in public

sittings on a majority basis; finally the conferment of the collective Presidency of the Union on the European Council.

Given the great instability characterizing the current state of affairs, it is impossible to foresee exactly what opportunities will present themselves in the immediate future regarding the objective of creating a federal Europe. The continuing turbulence of the money markets has led many governments, political parties and centres of economic power to express the desire to see monetary union brought about without delay. The most plausible solution involves taking a first step towards its introduction by limiting it initially to the most stable core, comprising certainly France and Germany. Such a decision can only strengthen the front favouring political union, because a monetary union without common democratic instruments of government would be inconceivable in the mid-term. While the political objective of the federalists is the reform of the Community's institutions in democratic and federal terms, they should also view economic and monetary union as a *strategic* objective, that is, as a milestone on the way towards reaching their final goal.

Real action towards fulfilling these objectives means having to face two crucial political issues. The first is the need to involve the *European federal people* in the process through their legitimate representatives. With a view to the historic decision to overcome effectively the exclusive sovereignty of the Community's nations, the intergovernmental decision-making mechanism, in use until now, will not allow any progress to be made whatsoever. This will remain the case unless governments are put under strong democratic pressure by the European Parliament. For this to happen each step towards the adoption of a federal European constitution must be taken in accordance with recognition of the *constituent powers of the European Parliament*. Of course a constituent treaty cannot exist without the cooperation of national parliaments and governments. However, for the constituent phase to reach its desired conclusion, the European Parliament must be the driving force behind it. Only the political will of the legitimate representatives of the people will be able to overcome the reluctance to relinquish sovereignty that all national governments by necessity exhibit. In concrete terms this means that the European federal constitution must be approved by the European Parliament according to a procedure by which diplomacy and national governments do not hold full sway, and the citizens of Europe are given a decisive role.

The second issue is the framework within which this decision will be

taken. Whatever route the process will take, it is inconceivable that the will to give up sovereignty (even only monetary sovereignty) will occur simultaneously in all the member states. The level of maturity in European matters differs not only between governments and parliaments, but also between the public opinions of the twelve member countries. The present attitude of the United Kingdom and Denmark is a case in point. For this reason decisions of such historic importance as the establishment of a European federal union (or indeed monetary union) cannot be subject to the veto of a minority of dissenting countries. Those countries which make up the original nucleus of the Community must be able to forge ahead, both politically and economically, creating a union which will be open to others as long as they accept the terms of membership. The attempt to suffocate such initiatives by accusations of wanting to create first and second class nations is motivated solely by the desire to hinder any progress towards political and monetary union, so that *all* countries in the Community will remain second class. The fact is that any initiative taken to *proceed with those willing*, will create a pole of attraction which all the other member states would soon want to join, and will allow the Community to be enlarged without weakening its cohesion and efficiency. The Maastricht Treaty already lays down a similar procedure regarding monetary union. For political union, the problem can be dealt with by introducing a clause in the future constitution-treaty which will allow such a union to come into force if it is approved by a qualified majority of member states that represents a qualified majority of the Community's population.

IV. In this era of historic challenges, there has not so far existed any centre for initiatives within the European political arena which is either aware of the epoch-making nature of these decisions or capable of expressing the political determination needed to enact them. It is true that at times the French and German governments seem to realize the need to act, and to act quickly, especially with regard to monetary union. However, the methods of inter-governmental agreement which they are condemned to follow are designed to enable compromises between national interests, and as such are structurally unsuited for decisions in favour of measures that are incompatible with national sovereignty. The European Parliament, with the exception of a small number of deputies, is weak and inert, and does not go beyond making a few good resolutions which are, however, destined to be pigeonholed. Political parties, apart from the occasions when there are extraordinary links between national

political battles and decisions of European importance (as happened during the French referendum on ratifying the Maastricht Treaty), are strikingly narrow-minded since they are preoccupied with national issues.

On the other hand, the issue of political and monetary union remains, since all the most important problems which concern the citizens of the Community countries can no longer be solved at a national level. This realization emerges from time to time in the consciousness of politicians and public opinion. As events gather speed, the impotence of national policies and intergovernmental accords will become increasingly evident and dramatic. Crisis situations will arise that lead to the ever greater involvement of European citizens. The governments that set down the terms of the Maastricht Treaty realized the need to give formal recognition to the status of European citizenship, but neglected to confer on the newly-created European citizens the formal rights that their status implies. Such a contradiction may be exploited to enhance public awareness of European issues. Hence today, the role of the federalists can prove decisive. They can find support, because the democratic political parties (on which the real power of the European Parliament depends) will only be able to overcome their crisis and regain popularity if their policies start to reflect European issues. The citizens of Europe have abandoned their old political allegiances and are prepared to listen to the federalist point of view.

To gather the necessary strength for this struggle, the federalists must be able to get across the message contained in the *Ventotene Manifesto*, which defined the identity of the Federalist Movement at its foundation. They must not forget that their uniqueness lies in their awareness of the "very new line", which today separates progress from reaction, those who struggle for peace and prosperity from those who wantonly or purposefully provoke violence and disorder. This line separates those who strive for European federation as the only salvation, from those who believe that a future still exists for nation states, and that it still makes sense to try and find nation-based solutions to the problems of our age.

The European Federalist Movement has been faithful to this message since its creation. Because of this it has created a new way of conducting politics, based on voluntary efforts by activists, and on political, financial and cultural independence. These methods have allowed the federalist movement to influence European political events considerably, without being entrapped by national power and experiencing the progressive deterioration which has led to its crisis. Its political prestige has benefited

from its unclouded idealism, which has been its constant driving force from the outset. The European Federalist Movement will need to continue to draw on this idealism in order to stage a popular campaign which can mobilize the citizens of Europe, thus spurring political parties, the European Parliament and Europe's governments to take the decisive step, which today is closer than it has ever been, to found the European Federation.

Federalism in the History of Thought

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975), taught classical philology at Oxford University. As an expert on Middle-Eastern affairs, he was part of the British delegation at the Conference of Versailles. From 1919 to 1924 he was professor of Byzantine literature at London University, and for a long time he directed the Studies Centre of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Much of the great amount of material he produced was dedicated to contemporary issues. His moral involvement with such issues emerges specifically in one of his books, *Mankind and Mother Earth* [1], which he wrote towards the end of his long life. In it he outlined the universal history of man from his origins on Earth. This book conveys a message, a sort of spiritual testament which solemnly calls for peace between men and with their "Great Mother", the Earth.

Here we publish the final chapter, but it is worth mentioning some other passages from the book which underline his closeness to federalist thought, both with respect to certain interpretations of the evolution of the historical process, and with regard to the conclusions that he drew from his general analysis.

The fundamental premise that led Toynbee to cover the entire history of mankind was the safeguarding of life on Earth. One of the principal ideas throughout the book on which the author, witth keen disquiet, invites reflection, is the dialectic between the potential malignancy of man ("Human beings are unique in being able to be wicked, because they are unique in being conscious of what they are doing and in making deliberate choices") [2], and man's capacity, arising from his individual conscience, of hating and condemning all that is evil.

This unease derives not so much from man's ability as a conscious being to choose between good and evil, but rather from the fact that mankind is conditioned by being a part of institutional or technical-productive structures that have not yet been completely mastered. For

Toynbee there are two fundamental myths which man is still a prisoner of: namely, sovereign states, and the conviction that mankind is in perfect control of his exploitation of the biosphere.

He writes, "Sovereign states have been mankind's paramount objects of worship during the last 5,000 years; and these are goddesses which have demanded and received hecatombs of human sacrifices. Sovereign states go to war with each other, and in war they each require the choicest of their young male subjects to murder the subjects of the "enemy" state at the risk of themselves being murdered by their intended victims. Till within living memory, all human beings except a few small minorities... have looked upon killing and being killed in war as being not only legitimate but meritorious and glorious."[3]

Turning to the second myth, equally dangerous for the safeguarding of life on Earth, Toynbee writes: "The biosphere has been able to harbour life because the biosphere has been a self-regulating association of mutually complementary components, and, before the emergence of Man, no single component of the biosphere... ever acquired the power to upset the delicately adjusted balance of the play of forces by means of which the biosphere has become a hospitable home for life...

Man is the first of the biosphere's denizens that is more potent than the biosphere itself... Man can succeed in surviving till he has wrecked the biosphere."[4]

Therefore one of the challenges that must be faced today is that linked to the discovery and use of atomic energy, snatched out "of the hands of life's father, the Sun... Today we do not know whether Man is going to be willing or able to avoid bringing Phaethon's fate on himself and on his fellow living beings."[5]

The constructive aspect of Toynbee's philosophy is his identification of the context within which problems belong, and which cannot be overlooked if a solution is to be found. That is, the progressive development of global interdependence, which has its roots in the distant past, but which is now the fundamental logic by which we must direct our plans for the future. "Mention has already been made of the discrepancy between the political partition of the *Oikoumene* into local sovereign states and the global unification of the *Oikoumene* on the technological and economic planes. This misfit is the crux of mankind's present plight. Some form of global government is now needed for keeping the peace between one local human community and another, and for re-establishing the balance between Man and the rest of the biosphere, now that this balance has been upset by Man's enormous augmentation of human material power..." [6]

The choice between good and evil is therefore the choice between union and division that the federalists identify as an alternative between federalism and nationalism. Toynbee does not explicitly indicate the federal state as being the institutional structure most suitable for world government. However he hints at its characteristics and democratic potential when he suggests the creation of a "global body politic composed of cells on the scale of the Neolithic-Age village-community — a scale on which the participants could be personally acquainted with each other, while each of them would also be a citizen of the world-state."[7]

The same alternative between union and division was the defining characteristic which was the basis of his interpretation of Greece in the VI and V centuries BC.[8] These were the centuries of the flowering and final decadence of a microcosm which bears remarkable parallels, even with obvious distinctions, with the history and perspectives of modern Europe.

Toynbee argues that Greece's economic revolution, based on colonisation and commerce, together with the maintenance of the political sovereignty of the very small territorial units of the city states, created an imbalance that could not last. The city states, if they did not want to return to autocracy and economic backwardness, should have been obliged to give up part of their sovereignty and create a pan-Hellenic political organisation to manage common problems. The opportunity to face the political issue of unity, says Toynbee, was offered by an external enemy, the Persians. The only alternative for the Greeks in the face of the Persians' ability to expand was to unite. However the opportunity was only partially seized. A common defence allowed the Greeks to repulse the invasion, but the end of the war coincided with the renewal of internal divisions and Greece's irreversible decline.

The European situation is not different: the process of economic integration started after the second world war can only develop to its full potential if there is political management of the economy by a common government; while the creation of a federal Europe is the only alternative to an enemy which Europe has had to face for nearly two centuries — nationalism. The decline which Europe will suffer if such divisive factors gain the upper hand, will be considerably more serious than that suffered by the Greek city states. This is because the effects will be felt not only by European countries, but by the entire world. If division prevails, then this historical experiment encapsulating the cultural and moral, as well as political, germs of the unity of mankind will end, that is the overcoming of the absolute sovereignty of states which, as Toynbee pointed out, is the

greatest danger for the salvation of man and "Mother Earth".

NOTES

[1] A. J. Toynbee, *Mankind and Mother Earth*, London, Oxford University Press, 1976.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 13.
[3] *Ibid.* pp. 12-13.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 27.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 17.
[6] *Ibid.* p. 587.
[7] *Ibid.* p. 593.
[8] A. J. Toynbee, *Hellenism. The History of a Civilization*, London, Oxford University Press, 1959.

* * *

A RETROSPECT IN 1973

The future does not yet exist; the past has ceased to exist, and therefore, in so far as a record of the past survives, the recorded events are immutable. However, this immutable past does not present the same appearance always and everywhere. It looks different at different times and places, and either an increase or a decrease in our information may also change the picture. Our view of relations of past events to each other, of their relative importance, and of their significance, changes constantly in consequence of the constant change of the fugitive present. The same past viewed in the same country by the same person, first in 1897 and then in 1973, presents two very different pictures; and no doubt the self-same past will look still more different when viewed in China in 2073 and even more different again when viewed in Nigeria in 2173.

In the present chapter, the writer of this book has picked out, for mention, features in the record of the past that looked salient and significant to him in 1973 and that seemed to him likely (a hazardous

guess; to present the same appearance when viewed at later dates in other places.

Since our ancestors became human, mankind has lived, during all but the last fraction — perhaps the last sixteenth part — of its time-span to date, in the Lower Paleolithic way. A band of Lower Paleolithic food-gatherers and hunters had to be small in numbers and to give a wide berth to other bands. At this stage og technology and economy, a concentration of population would have spelled starvation. In the Lower Paleolithic Age, technology was almost static, and each band was small enoughfor all its members to be acquainted with each other personally. This was the setting of human social life till recently.

Perhaps 40,000 years ago, or, at the utmost, not more than 70,000 years ago, there was a relatively sudden and rapid advance in technology. The event is well attested by archaeological evidence, though the cause of it is unknown. Lower Paleolithic tools were replaced by a series of Upper Paleolithic improvements. Since then technology has gone on advancing. Its advance has not been continuous. There have been successive bursts of technological invention, with intervening pauses. The principal bursts, to date, have been the Upper Paleolithic (improved tools, bows and arrows, domestication of the dog), the Neolithic (still better tools, together with the domestication of more species of animals and plants, and the invention of spinning and weaving and pottery-making), the fifth millennium B.C. (sails, wheels, metallurgy, writing), and the Industrial Revolution (a vast increase in mechanization) which started two hundred years ago and is still in progress. Thus the progression of technology has not been uninterrupted, but it has been cumulative. The loss of an acquired technique has been rare. In the Aegean area, the technique of writing was lost in the twelfth century B.C., but this was an exceptional event.

Technology is the only field of human activity in which there has been progression. The advance from Lower Paleolithic to mechanized technology has been immense. There has been no corresponding advance in human sociality, though advances in this field have been called for by the changes in social conditions that have been imposed upon mankind by its technological progress.

The most important of Man's successive technological advances to date has been the domestication of other animals, besides the dog, and the invention of agriculture, in the Neolithic Age. Agriculture and animal husbandry have provided the base for all subsequent technological progress, including the current Industrial Revolution, and also the base

for the way of life of all the civilizations that have risen and fallen to date.

The Neolithic-Age village-community was larger in numbers than the pre-agricultural food-gathering and hunting band, but it was not so large that the personal relations between its members had to be eked out by the introduction of impersonal institutions, and Neolithic technology was not so complex as to require any appreciable amount of specialization and division of labour beyond the physiological differentiation between the functions of the two sexes. Moreover, though the Neolithic village-community was sedentary, it was insulated from other village-communities by intervening stretches of virgin wilderness. Thus, though the change in the technological and economic conditions of life between the Upper Paleolithic Age and the Neolithic Age was great, the measure of sociality to which mankind had been conditioned during the immensely long-drawn-out Lower Paleolithic Age could be stretched to meet the needs of the Neolithic-Age way of life. This is why, in the fourth century B.C., more than a thousand years after the replacement of this way of life by civilization in China, Taoist philosophers in the Age of the Chinese Warring States looked back to the conditions of the Neolithic Age nostalgically. Their experience of life in their own age made them feel that the subsequent progress of technology, and the social consequences of this, had been misfortunes.

In 1973 peasants living in village-communities of the Neolithic-Age style still constituted a majority of the living generation of mankind, but they were rapidly drifting out of the countryside into shanty-towns enveloping the cities, while, conversely, the mechanization that had been invented for processing inanimate matter in factories was being applied to agriculture and to animal husbandry. Moreover, for the past 5,000 years, the Oikouméne's peasantry had been saddled with the burden of having to support a superstructure of civilization.

This had been possible because, in the fourth millennium B.C., the advance of technology had begun to produce a surplus of production over and above what was needed for bare subsistence, while Man's Paleolithic heritage of sociality had proved to be morally inadequate for allocating the use of this surplus beneficently. Part of the surplus had been misspent on war; the rest had been appropriated inequitably by a minority of the members of society whose collective work had produced it.

The advance of technology in the fourth millennium B.C. had required specialists (miners, smiths, and the planners, inspirers, and organizers of large-scale public works, e.g. for drainage and irrigation). The specialists' contribution to the production of the surplus was greater than that of the unskilled majority of the workers, and a differential distribution of the economic reward, though not amiable, was perhaps not unjust in principle, and anyway was probably inevitable, considering that Man, like every other species of living being, is innately greedy, and that the restraint imposed on his greed by his Lower-Paleolithic degree of sociality no longer sufficed in Man's new technological and social situation. The "differentials" in the distribution of the surplus were inequitably great, and they also tended to become hereditary. Thus social injustice and war were the price of collective affluence. These two congenital social maladies of civilization still afflict mankind today.

Since the dawn of civilization there has been a disparity between Man's technological progression and his social performance. The advance of technology, particularly the most recent advance during the two centuries 1773-1973, has vastly increased Man's wealth and power, and the "morality gap" between Man's physical power for doing evil and his spiritual capacity for coping with this power has yawned as wide open as the mythical jaws of Hell. During the last 5,000 years, the widening "morality gap" has caused mankind to inflict on itself grievous disasters.

Man's spiritual inadequacy has set a limit to his social progress and therefore to his technological progress too; for, as technology has grown in scale and in complexity, it has increased its requirement of social co-operation among the producers of wealth. Since the beginning of the current Industrial Revolution, mechanization has introduced a second limitation on technological progress. Mechanization has been making industrial work more productive materially at the cost of making it less satisfying psychologically, and this has made the workers restive and has tended to lower the standard of workmanship.

Productivity was increased at the dawn of civilization through the draining and irrigation of the jungle-swamps in the lower basins of the Tigris and Euphrates and of the Nile. This required an increase in the scale of technological operations; this in turn required an increase in the numerical strength of communities that went far beyond the limits of a sociality based on personal relations between the members of society. When the requirements of technology constrained the founders of the earliest civilizations to assemble man-power in excess of the narrow limits of pre-civilizational communities, they invented a new social device: impersonal institutions. These can sustain larger communities because they can generate co-operation between human beings who have no personal acquaintance with each other. But institutionalized social relations are both frigid and fragile. Human beings have never felt at

home in them as they do feel at home in personal relations. Institutions are always in danger of losing grip and breaking down, and consequently the persons in authority who are responsible for maintaining them are always under temptation to resort to coercion as a substitute for the voluntary co-operation that institutions often fail to evoke.

Since the dawn of civilization, Man's master institutions has been states — in the plural, not in the singular; for, to date, there has never been one single state embracing the whole living generation of mankind all round the globe. There has always been a multitude of states coexisting side by side, and, unlike the Paleolithic bands and the Neolithic village-communities, the states of the Age of the Civilizations have not been insulated from each other; they have collided with each other, and their collisions have precipitated the wars that have been one of the maladies of civilization.

The usual type of state has been a local sovereign state juxtaposed with a number of other states of its own kind. There are about 170 of these in the present-day global Oikouméne; its political configuration is the same as that of Sumer in the third millennium B.C.

Local sovereign states are an awkward institution. They fall between two stools. Even a city-state, not to speak of a nation-state or a federation of city-states or of nation-states, is far too large to be capable of being based socially on the personal relations in which human beings feel at home. On the other hand, the largest local state is still only one of a number of states of the same kind. It has the ability to make war, but not the ability to provide peace. Wherever and whenever there has been a set of local sovereign states juxtaposed to each other, they have always fallen into warfare with each other, and, in the past, this warfare has always ended in the imposition of peace by the forcible establishment of an empire embracing as much of the Oikouméne as has lain within the horizon of the liquidated set of warring local states. The Pharaonic Egyptian civilization was singular in having been united politically by force at the dawn of its history, without the protracted preliminary bout of warfare between local states. It is significant that this civilization was the most stable and the most durable of all the civilizations that have arisen so far.

The present-day global set of local sovereign states is not capable of keeping the peace, and it is also not capable of saving the biosphere from man-made pollution or of conserving the biosphere's non-replaceable natural resources. This ecumenical anarchy on the political plane cannot continue for much longer in an Oikouméne that has already become a

unity on the technological and economic planes. What has been needed for the last 5,000 years, and has been feasible technologically, though not yet politically, for the last hundred years, is a global body politic composed of cells on the scale of the Neolithic-Age village-community — a scale on which the participants could be personally acquainted with each other, while each of them would also be a citizen of the world-state. However, the Oikouméne cannot now be united politically by the barbarous and ruinous traditional method of military conquest. In 1945 an Oikouméne that was still un-unified politically was overtaken by the invention of the nuclear weapon, and the Oikouméne could never be united by the use of this deadly weapon; annihilation, not unification, would be the inevitable outcome of a nuclear world war.

The record of Sumerian, Hellenic, Chinese, and medieval Italian history demonstrates that a set of local sovereign states can be no more than a transitory political configuration. In the age in which mankind has acquired the command over nuclear power, political unification can be accomplished only voluntarily, and, since it is evidently going to be accepted only reluctantly, it seems probable that it will be delayed until mankind has brought upon itself further disasters of a magnitude that will induce it to acquiesce at last in global political union as being the lesser evil.

At this point in our history, we human beings might be tempted to envy the social insects. These have been conditioned by Nature to co-operate with each other on the grand scale. The individual bee or ant or termite subordinates and sacrifices itself in the service of its community, and its self-surrender is neither voluntary nor enforced by external compulsion; it is inherent in the constitution of the insect's psyche. It is going to be harder for Man the amphibian to stretch his sociality from the modicum required of him, and acquired by him, in the Lower Paleolithic Age till an enhanced human sociality embraces the whole of the bio-sphere; for Man, unlike the termite, ant, and bee, is not just an inherently social psychosomatic organism; he is also a soul which possesses consciousness and which therefore can, and must, make choices, either for good or for evil.

Fortunately, Man's sociality is not confined within the narrow com-pass of personal relations that was adequate for pre-civilizational human societies. A human being does have a sense of compassion for any other human being whom he finds in distress, even if, in tribal parlance, this fellow human being is an "alien". A human being will take pity on any sick person and on any lost child, and will come to the sufferer's aid. In

empires, such as the Chinese Empire and the Roman Empire, whose rulers equated their dominions with the whole of the Oikouméne, the rulers' subjects came, in the course of time, to look upon themselves as being, not victims of alien conquerors, but citizens of an ecumenical state. The missionary religions set out to evangelize the whole of mankind, and the Chinese philosopher Mo-tzu held that a human being ought to love and serve all his fellow human beings with an impartial devotion. Confucius' most authoritative interpreter, Mencius, rejected Mo-tzu's precept as being impracticable; he stood for the Confucian ideal of a graduated order of loyalties; but experience shows that love inspired by personal acquaintance and love for all fellow human beings simply in virtue of a common humanity need not be mutually exclusive expressions of sociality. In India, the range of love has been restricted by the barriers of caste, but it has also been extended to include Man's fellow living beings of every species. In the Oikouméne in the Age of the Industrial Revolution, human love needs to be extended to include all components of the biosphere, inanimate as well as animate.

These were the reflexions, in 1973, of one British observer who had been born in 1889. What, in 1973, were the relexions of the writer's fellow human beings? How far were they aware of the past? And how vigorously were they acting on lessons that they had derived from a retrospective survey of history?

Evidently few people are ready to recognize that the institution of local sovereign states has failed repeatedly, during the last 5,000 years, to meet mankind's political needs, and that, in a global society, this institution is bound to prove to be transitory once again and this time more surely than ever before. Since the end of the Second World War the number of local sovereign states in the Oikouméne has more than doubled, in spite of the fact that, at the same time, all the politically sundered fractions of mankind have become more and more closely interdependent, on the technological and economic planes.

The Chienese people, who once equated the Chinese Empire with "All that is under Heaven", have now resigned themselves to seeing their country play its role as a member of a set of warring states in a global arena. Implicitly, the Chinese are ignoring the grim chapter of their own history when China herself was an arena for local warring states. On the other hand, the Chinese appear to be alive to the history of China since her political unification in 221 B.C.; for they are making energetic efforts to avoid a rewcurrence of the estrangement of the civil service from the peasantry that was "China's sorrow" ever since the reign of the Emperor Han Wu-ti.

In the second century B.C. this Emperor had inaugurated the recruitment of the Chinese civil service by merit, and the assessment of the candidates' merit by examination. The Chinese Imperial civil service had been the best of any in the Oikouméne; it had held together a larger number of human beings in peace and order for a greater number of years than any other civil service anywhere. Yet, time after time, the Chinese civil servants had betrayed their trust and had brought China to grief by abusing their power for their own personal advantage. China's leaders have taken steps to prevent this from happening again. Whether they will be more successful than earlier Chinese reformers remains to be seen, but at least the vigour of their current action is a good augury.

If the Chinese take to heart the lesson of past Chinese errors, and if they succed in saving themselves from repeating these errors, they may do a great service, not only to their own country, but to the whole of mankind at a critical stage in mankind's enigmatic course.

Man is a psychosomatic inhabitant of the biosphere that coats the surface of the planet Earth, and in this respect he is one among the species of living creatures that are children of Mother Earth. But Man is also a spirit, and, as such, he is in communication with — and in the mystics' experience, is identical with — a spiritual reality that is not of this World.

As a spirit, Man possesses consciousness, he distinguishes between good and evil, and in his acts he makes choices. In the ethical field, in which Man's choices are either for evil or for good, his choices produce a moral credit-and-debit account. We do not know whether this account is closed at the death of each short-lived human being or whether (as Hindus and Buddhists believe) it runs on through a potentially endless series of reincarnations. For the network of relations between incarnate human beings that constitutes human society, the account is still open and will remain open so long as mankind allows the biosphere to remain inhabitable.

Will mankind murder Mother Earth or will he redeem her? He could murder her by misusing his increasing technological potency. Alternatively he could redeem her by overcoming the suicidal, aggressive greed that, in all living creatures, including Man himself, has been the price of the Great Mother's gift of life. This is the enigmatic question which now confronts Man.

(Prefaced and edited by Antonio Mosconi)

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

JEAN-FRANCIS BILLION, Member of the Comité Régional Rhône-Alpes of the Mouvement Fédéraliste Européren.

GUIDO MONTANI, Co-ordinator of the Debate Office of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Member of the World Council of the World Federalist Movement, Professor in Theory of Economic Development, University of Pavia.

ANTONIO MOSCONI, Member of the National Council of the Movimento Federalista Europeo.

DARIO VELO, Co-ordinator of the Economic Commission of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Professor in Economics, University of Pavia.

Some articles from recent numbers:

1989

Editorials
The Meaning of the European Referendum in Italy.
Perestroika and Communism.
Europe and the World after 1989.

Essays
Francesco Rossolillo, Federalism and the Great Ideologies.
Gerhard Eickorn, German Reunification and European Unity. Twelve Theses.
John Pinder, Federalism in Britain and Italy. Radicals and English Liberal Tradition.
Guido Montani, Robert Triffin and the Economic Problem of the 20th Century.

Notes
Third World Debt and a Renewal of the World's Economic and Political Order.
Political Aspects of the Ecological Emergency.

Interventions
Dmitry Smyslov, The Rouble, the Transferable Rouble, the Ecu and the International Monetary System.

Thirty Years Ago
Technical Analysis of the Struggle for Europe.

Federalism in the History of Thought
Giovanni Agnelli - Attilio Cabiati.
John Robert Seeley.

Thirty Years Ago
A Draft Manifesto for European Federalism.

Federalism in the History of Thought
Karl Jaspers.