# THE FEDERALIST
a political review

*To look for a continuation of harmony
between a number of independent uncon-
nected sovereignties situated in the same
neighbourhood, would be to disregard the
uniform course of human events and to
set at defiance the accumulated experience
of ages.*

Hamilton, The Federalist

THE FEDERALIST
a political review

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by Mario Albertini together with a group of members of the Movimento Federalista Europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.

CONTENTS

The journal index can be consulted at the website:
www.thefederalist.eu

Europe and the Great Transformations of the Digital Era

To borrow Virginia Woolf's expression, decrying the confusion besetting Europe on the eve of the Second World War, Western society today seems to be increasingly disoriented by "discordant and distracted twitter". To really get to the root of the growing climate of confusion now threatening to plunge our civilisation into social, economic and political chaos, and identify a common thread running through the various crises we are witnessing, we need to take, as our starting point, the transformations that, from the early part of this century, have begun to reshape political, social and economic behaviours within society. All these transformations are linked to the digital revolution that, through the Internet, now pervades production, administrative and financial processes, and influences economic behaviours.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the possibility of offering our continent the prospect of development and progress depends largely on how we respond to the challenge of controlling, governing and exploiting, rationally, the enormous development opportunities offered by the digital revolution. It must be appreciated that the necessary responses demand, first of all, a profound rethinking of the size of the state and of its role in promoting a reorganisation of the labour market, the system of wealth redistribution, and regional development, as well as more effective government of these areas. In this context, the state has a crucial role to play in ensuring that everyone, at different levels, has access to the digital network and the resources it provides. It must also be clear that the responses required need to be based on a careful analysis of the emerging socioeconomic setting – an analysis based on real facts rather than abstract or ideological ideas and models of government that belong to an era predating the scientific revolution.

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Many aspects of today's digital world were already taking shape prior to the advent of personal computers and smartphones. However, the digital revolution had the effect of dramatically speeding up the spread of certain phenomena that had been evolving gradually, over decades, and turning them into a powerful force of change.

Today, these effects of this change are already part of the daily life of every individual and every society. Yet around 50 years ago, they were only just being envisaged by those (like Radovan Richta and his working group) who had begun to analyse the political, economic and social implications of the scientific and technological revolution, and of the integration of production processes with those related to the transfer of information. In 2010, Yann Moulier-Boutang, in his book *L'Abeille et l'économiste*,[1] summarised the development logic of this aspect of the digital revolution, likening the functioning of a beehive to the mechanism by which the Internet creates added value. Bees do far more within the ecosystem than merely producing honey: they are responsible for pollinating numerous plants; indeed at least a third of global agricultural production depends on this activity. In the context of the Internet, through a similar process, the value of a product or application depends on the interaction, clicks and traces left by its countless users, who are constantly modifying and enriching it, and at the same time modifying and enriching the architecture of the network itself. We therefore need to be aware, in Moulier-Boutang's view, that we are moving from an economy based solely on production and exchange to one that also relies on Internet-based "pollination" and collaboration mechanisms.

At this point, there are two circumstances, in particular, to be noted. The first is the spread and establishment, over the past decade, of economic behaviours previously associated with small markets and barter-based economies. In the current digital age, one particularly popular alternative economic system is the sharing economy, of which Uber and Airbnb are the most famous and successful examples, albeit not the only ones. Through the sharing economy, which is based on the mechanism of collaborative consumption and the principle that everything can be shared at a reasonable cost, everyone today can become producers and consumers of goods and services. It is not the birth of a new economic behaviour that we are witnessing, but rather the emergence of the possibility of applying this behaviour, efficiently and reliably on

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[1] Yann Moulier-Boutang, *L'abeille et l'économiste*, Paris, Ed. Carnets Nord, 2010.

both the supply and the demand side, outside the traditional local setting. Unsurprisingly, we are now seeing that not only private citizens but also large companies are investing in this approach.

The second circumstance is the considerable use of automation and robotisation in different areas of modern life, including manufacturing, surgery, the piloting of vehicles and aircraft, and legal and financial analysis. This is putting a great strain on the labour market management policies of the traditional welfare state, and indeed showing them to be inadequate in the face of today's job creation and destruction rates and demographic trends. After slowing down for a period, which lasted until the early 2000s, the use of robots in society and in manufacturing is now increasing strongly once again. So much so that China, while certainly remaining a large labour pool, has become one of the world's leading markets for industrial robots, alongside the US, Japan and Germany.

The political, social and fiscal implications of this phenomenon are obvious. Historically, governments have already faced similar momentous transitions, albeit less rapid and disruptive ones. One need only recall the work of the Blue-Ribbon National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress[2] set up in the USA by President Lyndon B. Johnson in the 1960s to study the employment consequences of the first phase of automation and address the fears, apparent even then, over the processes of change that were evolving; or the trend recorded in Great Britain, the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, where productivity — the unit of output per hour worked — has, on average, increased by one third per generation since 1800.

Returning to the present day, and to our own continent, the European Commission recently issued guidelines drawing the EU member states' attention to the potential of the new collaborative economy (which in Europe yielded gross revenue of around thirty billion euros in 2015) and the need to regulate it, not ban it as some would like. Because new technologies, in themselves, do not eliminate work. Rather, they produce trends within the evolution of occupations — trends that need to carefully governed.

The problem is that whereas elsewhere in the world, the USA for example, governments are already working on the tax and insurance laws needed to safeguard producers and consumers in this new setting, and thereby facilitate the creation of wealth for the citizens, Europe still

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[2] http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26449.

lacks the institutional tools to do this on a continent-wide basis. Furthermore, the European states continue to respond to the Commission's indications in a random and contradictory manner, as shown by the reactions of Germany, France and Italy, and by the Spanish and Belgian governments' appeal lodged with the European Court of Justice: they want the Court to decide whether Uber should be classified as a transport company or as a digital service.

* * *

It is an illusion to think that the huge transformations induced by the digital revolution, and by previous major innovations, can be stopped though a return to barriers and borders and through national security and regulatory systems. It is of course possible to try and maintain, at any price and for as long as possible, the status quo, if the objective is to defend specific interests or economic privileges, or to maintain a given political and social order. This is also the way to encourage an entrenchment and strengthening of the most reactionary and demagogic elements within society, and in Europe it would mean a return to the past and all its ills, and would certainly not protect the Europeans from the consequences of the spread of scientific and technological innovation.

To govern the transformations introduced by new technologies, it is therefore necessary to create a European federal system of government, legitimised before the citizens, thereby superseding the old system based on voluntary cooperation between national governments. There is no doubt that the political and historical responsibility for creating this government falls to the Europeans who have already relinquished their monetary sovereignty, because the battle between conservation and progress, both in political terms and terms of governing today's new economy and society, can be won only through European integration.

The Federalist

The Need to Unite Europe
to Save Democracy

The year that has just ended was certainly a difficult and, in many ways, traumatic one. In 2016, the feelings of discontent and anger that had long been brewing in public opinion across Europe and the United States finally brimmed over, leading to protest reactions that were reflected in the results of all almost all of the year's major votes.

The causes and deep roots of this outpouring of rage and frustration, which is driving a seemingly unstoppable growth of nationalist-populist and xenophobic movements, have already been extensively analysed and described in detail. First of all, the Western world is suffering the backlash of the globalisation that the West itself actively drove and encouraged in the first place. Indeed, with considerable arrogance, the West, on the strength of models that hindsight has shown to have been hastily and poorly formulated, and in particular on the strength of the deeply flawed ideological and political thinking that has underpinned and been used to justify government decisions and policies of recent decades, actively championed and promoted this phenomenon. This error of judgement is now recognised as such by all the forces and currents of liberal democratic thought; and it is an error that the Western governments of Europe and the USA have attempted, at least in part, to rectify as they have addressed, with varying degrees of success, the emergencies thrown up by their different systems.

Before going any further, it must be stressed that globalisation has been, for the world as a whole, a huge opportunity. It has enabled four-fifths of the countries that 20 years ago were stuck in a state of underdevelopment to begin developing, and it has allowed five-sixths of the population of the underdeveloped world to break free from their previous state of poverty or absolute poverty. Conversely, for the Old World that previously enjoyed the monopoly on wealth, globalisation has been something of a psychological trauma, all the more so because it is also associated with a number of other, extremely complex issues. The

main one concerns the technological revolution and its effects on the labour market, which have actually been far greater than the impact of the increased competition brought by globalisation. Today's new technologies have enormous potential for improving the quality of life of our societies, but, as is true of any profound change, in their present, initial stage they are having highly destabilising effects (on different segments of the population and different regions) that society has not yet learned to handle. Added to all this, there is the problem of the aging population that, in the Western world, and in European countries in particular, is looming increasingly large and starting to threaten the solidity and sustainability of the different welfare systems. Finally, this whole picture is exacerbated and further complicated by the current severe geopolitical instability, in turn aggravated by the absence of an international order capable of promoting a cooperative equilibrium in what is now an interdependent world. All this adds up to a situation of anarchy that, stemming above all from the West's political weakness, is quite alarming due to the enormous difficulties it presents in terms of security and the management of migratory flows.

This explosive cocktail of challenges, transitions and changes has inevitably provoked widespread reactions of fear and anxiety, especially among those sections of public opinion that are culturally least equipped to cope with change. Many, in seeking to explain the protest reactions, loss of faith in the establishment, and drift towards nationalism — trends that emerged clearly in the results of the recent votes in Britain and the United States, and even in the constitutional referendum in Italy —, have associated them with the sections of society hardest hit by the recession. However, first impressions notwithstanding, on closer inspection, what actually emerges quite clearly is that, specific cases apart, there was no precise link between economic hardship and protest voting. The deciding line in all these votes was above all cultural, namely a line separating those who feel helpless and threatened in the face of challenges and changes they cannot understand (and nearly always do not even want to try and understand), partly because of the complex analysis required, and those who, on the other hand, are able, for different reasons, both to grasp the nature of the processes under way, and to equip themselves to tackle the new situation, even though the advantages of doing so may not be immediately tangible.

In today's global, interconnected and interdependent world, it is starting to become clear that the true demarcation line with regard to political behaviours, the line separating the desire for progress from the

desire to resurrect the past, is the one already identified by Altiero Spinelli in the *Ventotene Manifesto*. We refer to the line dividing those who, consciously or unconsciously, pursue integration and, in so doing, pave the way for the creation of supranational institutions able to govern interdependence democratically and for the common good (and are thus drawn to supranational federalism as a political theory and practice), and those who, instead, are drawn to nationalism, which argues that each country should pursue its own particular interest, and that divisions should be preserved and integration opposed. It is, therefore, also the line that marks the boundary between those who want to strengthen and develop democracy and those who allow themselves to be attracted by autocratic visions; between those who want to build peace and those who, perhaps unconsciously, create the conditions that make the war possible. Nationalism, in the age of global interdependence, is a dead end, since there exist no national recipes for development. For the same reason, attempting to keep globalisation outside one's national borders can only aggravate the problems of the single systems and societies, further deepening the crisis and feeding anarchy. Globalisation is a process from which there is no turning back and which cannot be avoided or reversed by pursuing and seeking refuge in some idealised past which, of course, was never as idyllic as it may be portrayed. Instead, globalisation is a fact that we need to learn to confront and manage with adequate political and cultural tools.

These tools are, precisely, the ones provided by federalism, in short, the same ones that first underpinned (and have since supported) the process of European unification, even though, to date, they have been used only partially, and therefore still insufficiently and inadequately. But it is only by developing them and implementing them to the full that politics can hope to find the points of reference that will make it possible to manage and govern the new world order. This is why the path chosen by Europe has such enormous significance for the evolution of mankind as a whole; after all, Europe has been, and still is, the test bed of democratic governance of international interdependence.

* * *

Europe and the United States are currently living through crises that are profoundly different, even though they share the same underlying problems. The difficulties of the United States, once the world's sole superpower and "winner" of the Cold War, as well as the undisputed driving force of globalisation, is now having to manage its declining

hegemonic power and its transition to a new and difficult role as a nation that, despite remaining the world's strongest country, is no longer in a position to exercise absolute supremacy, and is therefore having to redefine its strategic priorities. Without underestimating the enormous impact that global competition and the effects of technological development have had and are still having on the US economic and social system, the real reasons for Trump's victory lie precisely in this new predicament, especially geopolitical, in which the United States now finds itself. The truth of this is demonstrated by the fact that the economic choices and policies of the Obama administration, designed both to rebalance the system (through the introduction of greater controls over the financial sector and measures to provide incentives for manufacturing) and address the growing social gap between the small minority of the extremely wealthy and the rest of the population, were in fact effective. Indeed, although his government was, to a large extent, impeded by a hostile Congress, the figures recorded bear witness to its considerable efforts to improve the redistribution of wealth, showing substantial increases (at rates not recorded since the 1970s) in the income of middle and lower-middle class American families, and a great improvement in the economic conditions of the lower classes (the proportion of the poor in the US population has fallen over the past 25 years from 40% to the present 10%); furthermore, unemployment has returned to normal levels, even though job quality continues to be a problem in many areas of employment.

The record of the Obama administration in the area of foreign policy, however, is less positive. Although the start of the US decline dates back to the late nineties and was accelerated by disastrous choices made during the Bush presidency, Obama (despite recording some important successes) was the first US president forced to confront the loss of US authority on the world stage. He also had to assume responsibility for inaugurating a new era that sees the United States acknowledging that it is no longer able, by itself, to manage the global geopolitical balance. Accordingly, he has also been the first to personally experience, on behalf of his country, the changed attitude of America's partners on the international stage. There have, indeed, been numerous displays of real disrespect towards Washington, particularly from the BRICS countries as well as from former allies that have now become hostile. Equally worthy of note has been the United States' gradual loss of control over its traditional areas of influence, together with the uncertainties it has shown and the contradictions that have arisen in its at-

tempt to pursue and promote the creation of a multipolar world order without having first revisited and revised its strategic tendencies, still shaped by old Cold War doctrine.

The United States knows that it is still the world's most influential country; to quote Obama "if we don't set the agenda, it doesn't happen. There is not a summit I've attended since I have been president where we are not setting the agenda, where we are not responsible for the key result". But this knowledge is accompanied by a growing awareness that the USA "can't fix everything", and this is why America is now struggling to redesign its role in the world. America's difficulty in this regard, as Obama has often underlined, is certainly exacerbated by the political and military vacuum in Europe, which lacks the capacity to support the USA and help it to initiate the building of a new, cooperative global balance. The result of all this is a clear impasse that has increased the fears of the citizens and determined their lack of faith in the establishment and in the "liberal" policy that Obama has done his best to represent, by striving to convey the message that the reason for America's influence in the world lies in the strength of its political model, values and ideals.

It is therefore no coincidence that, as careful analysis of the vote in the presidential elections shows, it was the poorer classes that tended to vote for Clinton, while Trump's supporters were less likely to be afflicted by economic hardship as by the nervous uneasiness of those who see their social and cultural status threatened by today's rapidly changing world, with its as yet unknown challenges. All this explains why the Trump camp managed to gather so much consensus by using anti-establishment rhetoric (references to politicians who do not know how to protect American citizens, for example) and the nationalistic slogan "America First", and by launching accusations against free trade (held to be responsible for relocation of production and seen only as a form of unfair competition). On a cultural level, Trump's victory marks a resurgence of the xenophobic and racist tendencies that are still so strong in a section of American society, while politically it corresponds to unquestioning support for a political programme that, breaking with the ideology of a liberal-democratic United States that shoulders responsibility on the world stage, will instead see global challenges tackled from the perspective of how America can best exploit its relative supremacy at the expense of its international partners. In short, a plan for a new form of US hegemony, entirely rapacious, which leaves no scope for win-win solutions.

America's new stance will impact heavily on international balances. Although it is impossible to predict exactly what decisions the new administration will make and the details of its choices, until Trump is eventually beaten, either by events or in the course of the next presidential campaign, there can be no doubt that it will attempt to use US power — political, economic and military — to secure immediate national advantages. There have already been a number of signs that this is the case: statements suggesting that the existing global agreements on international trade will be rejected *en bloc*, to be replaced with bilateral negotiations between the USA and single countries, in which America would be better placed to bring its force to bear; the declared intention to drain resources from the rest of the world to finance domestic investments, thereby increasing the national debt and exploiting the benefits of the dollar's status as the world reserve currency; the attitude of absolute contempt that has been shown towards the European Union (illustrated, among other things, by the hand of friendship extended to the UK, which once again finds itself, contrary to Obama's position, high on the agenda of the US administration), and the hostility that has been shown towards China. Coming in the wake of two decades of growth and development created and guaranteed — errors notwithstanding — by the quest for integration of the world market, all these are attitudes that are bound to have very negative effects, also on the US domestic situation, and that, above all, will create further instability and only weaken America's power in the world, thereby increasing the likelihood of reactions of hostility and opposition.

It only remains to hope that the strength of the American system, and the strength of its culture and democratic public opinion, will make it possible to reverse this situation quickly, before the damage is too great. This hope stems from the fact that, despite its current difficulty redefining its strategic role and identity in the world, the United States remains a great country founded on solid and deeply democratic institutions, a country with a wealth of human and cultural, as well as political, resources. But another decisive factor will be the way in which the powers most challenged by this new cycle in American politics react to the new situation; we refer, in particular, to China's capacity to respond to this new attempt at American hegemony, but above all Europe's capacity to gain its own independence and shoulder global responsibility.

For the Europeans to rise to the challenge presented by the arro-

gant Trump presidency and stop abdicating their responsibilities in the field of foreign and security policy, it is surely now clear to all but the belligerently nationalistic that Europe has no choice but to complete its political unification. This has, in fact, been apparent ever since the explosion of the financial and economic crisis exposed the fragility of a system only half built. Europe's problem, then, contrary to America's, is that of accepting the challenge to grow, and its solution lies in the hands of the European people and depends only on their will. Even though Europe is seemingly weaker than other areas of the world at the present time, the fact is that the Europeans could increase their strength exponentially simply by proceeding with Europe's political unification, and thereby completing the building of the Community edifice. Since 2012, the European institutions have been preparing reports indicating the objectives to be pursued to this end, and setting out possible roadmaps and initiatives. What is more, right now, the European Parliament is helping to carry forward a comprehensive project of tremendous political value: the Committee on Constitutional Affairs recently approved two reports, one jointly drafted by MEPs Mercedes Bresso (S&D) and Elmar Brok (EPP) and the other by Guy Verhofstadt (ALDE), which will be discussed in a plenary session in February and should therefore be ready in time for the European Council meeting at the end of March in Rome. The first shows that the Lisbon Treaty already offers tools that can be used, immediately, to strengthen and deepen the integration of the Economic and Monetary Union, increase the efficacy of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and start adapting the common instruments for the protection of internal security. The second draws attention to the need to reform the Treaties to give the EU the means to act effectively, eliminating the abuse of opt-outs and derogations, and instead creating two different levels of participation in the European Union. At the first level, membership would be restricted to the single market, while at the second level participating countries would be members of the Economic and Monetary Union, which, the core of the European system, would no longer operate according to an intergovernmental mechanism, but would instead be highly integrated. Accordingly, the eurozone would have its own fiscal capacity, autonomous resources, a European treasury and a federal decision-making system. Within this framework, the European Commission would become a true European government.

All that is needed, therefore, is for the member states' leaders to

prove that they have the political will, courage and ability to take the crucial step of sharing their sovereignty; unfortunately, however, the signs of tension over these issues that have been emerging from meetings of the Council, and especially of the European Council, are certainly not encouraging. The national governments seem to be prisoners of their own disunity, a state that emphasises their weakness and that of the European institutions, and is jeopardising democracy itself in our continent. In the current global setting, it is crucial to have the decision-making capacity to respond promptly and effectively to the multiple crises that tend to arise, and in this regard the Europeans find themselves entirely lacking. The European political system is built to go on working at national level, but this is a level that has no effective and authoritative responses to offer; meanwhile, at European level, where, instead, answers really could be found, there are no decision-making mechanisms and policy instruments in place for implementing them. As a result, democracy is under siege in our countries and the very survival of the European Union is under threat. If Europe is to endure, the citizens' anxieties and fears must be met with concrete responses, while the temptation to retreat in the face of the growing chaos must be resisted.

Leaving aside the specificities of the two situations, Britain's decision to leave the EU, like the resounding victory of the "No" side in the recent Italian referendum, both show that the fear and uncertainty that lead people to prevent change are currently very strong in public opinion and manifest themselves, at the earliest opportunity, through decisions that are based not on support for a true alternative project — no such project exists —, but rather on the desire to escape from reality. But this is only a temporary reaction, however, because as Greece has already shown us, and as the Austrian electorate recently confirmed, when the true (and devastating) implications of this escape from reality become clear, support for a reasonable course of action prevails once again. All the surveys show that in the key eurozone countries there continues to be support for a Europe that is truly able to act and respond in a concrete way to the various crises — a Europe capable of offering new horizons based on shared ideals, and ready to fight to affirm, globally, a model underpinned by clear values. This support must not be wasted, but must instead be harnessed as the foundation for courageous choices that will change the public's perception and revolutionise their expectations.

The task of bringing this about falls, first of all, to the national gov-

ernments, which, to save democracy in Europe, need to combine internal responsibility, fairness and solidarity among themselves with courage at European level; but, alongside this, everyone needs to learn not to be afraid of fighting for change, which is needed in all countries, but first and foremost in Europe. The forthcoming anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome, on 25 March 2017, could mark the start of Europe's salvation. It is the responsibility of us all to see that it does.

The Federalist

Political Realism, Federalism and the Crisis of the World Order[*]

SERGIO PISTONE

The current international system is in an extremely critical state, as shown by the existential challenges the world now faces on different levels: security, the socioeconomic situation and the environment. Federalisation of the European Union is an issue that must be viewed in the light of the need to build a more progressive international order, and pursuit of the objective of a European federation, now an urgent necessity, is a crucial part of this building process.

This paper sets out to recall the theoretical paradigm on the basis of which the European Federalist Movement (MFE) strives to understand the reality of international relations, and thus to determine its stance on, and practical approach towards, this reality. In this regard, a fundamental aspect of the concept of federalism espoused by the MFE is its link with the political theory of realism, especially the realist view of international relations;[1] that said, it should immediately be clarified that the federalist paradigm takes political realism as a starting point, with the aim of overcoming it.

The Realist Paradigm.

The realist paradigm rests on the basic assumption that there is a structural difference between the internal relations of states and their

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[*] This paper is a reworking of the address given at the meeting of the MFE's Ufficio del dibattito which took place in in Genoa on 5-6 March 2016.

[1] Political realism is linked to the tradition of thought founded on the raison d'état concept, which was born with Machiavelli and Hobbes, before undergoing a great development in German culture of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth (especially, Hegel, Ranke, Treitschke, Hintze, Meinecke, Weber, Ritter); the most recent expression of this tradition of thought is the realist current that runs through the sphere of international relations (especially, Niebuhr, Carr, Morghentau, Kennan, Osgood, Kissinger, Kaplan, Aron, Hoffman, Waltz, Gilpin, Buzan), and it is this that is referred to herein. I refer readers to J.J. Roche, *Le relazioni internazionali*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000 and M. Albertini and S. Pistone, *Il federalismo, la ragion di stato e la pace*, I Quaderni di Ventotene, 2001, n. 4.

international relations, which leads to the existence of a dichotomy between state sovereignty and international anarchy. In the case of the former, insofar as there exists an established sovereign state, i.e. a state founded on the placement of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in the hands of a central state authority, relations are governed on legal foundations: the state, by imposing law as the tool for regulating internal relations, establishes peace within its own confines and allows conflicts to be resolved without recourse to force, indeed making this structurally impossible. It goes without saying that this does not apply in the case of violent revolutions or civil wars, or in the case of failed states and states that have never actually come into being (tribal societies). In all these situations there is a return to (or persistence of) the condition of war of all against all that underlies and characterises international relations.

It should also be added that, by establishing this monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the modern state also created the conditions that made it possible to civilise the population — a great endeavour accomplished through a lengthy process that is, in part, still ongoing. The key aspects of this process are the moral advancement that comes from accepting (and thus progressively internalising) the relinquishment of the use of individual violence to safeguard personal interests, and the economic and social progress made possible by the certainty of law. It is in this framework that the state underwent a series of deep transformations driven by the emancipating ideologies rooted in the Enlightenment, namely liberalism, democracy and socialism. Moreover, in this regard it should be underlined that the peacemaking function of the state, rooted essentially in its monopoly on the legitimate use of force, has been consolidated in the Western world thanks to its integration with the rule of law and the separation of powers (liberalism), universal suffrage (democracy), and structured social solidarity or the welfare state (socialism).

The above political and social conquests (encapsulated, over the course of history, by the states of the Western world) help to prevent the state from being perceived as a power pursuing the interests of only one section of society instead of the general interest; accordingly, they favour consensus and a reduction of the tendency to resort to violence.

With regard to international relations, on the other hand, the realist paradigm essentially holds that these, unlike relations within states, are regulated on the basis of power relationships between the parties; in this context, international anarchy replaces sovereignty as the key

structural element. In concrete terms, international anarchy means the lack of a government, i.e. a supreme authority with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force that is capable of enforcing a valid and effective legal system. Since the international community of states lacks this essential condition for effectively enforcing the rules needed to ensure the peaceable coexistence of states, and the peaceful, i.e. legal, negotiation of international disputes, trials of strength between the parties remain the ultimate method for resolving these, and all international law can do is sanction this approach; it cannot prevent it. War is invariably on the agenda and is always lurking in the background, even in periods of peace — Kant defines these, more properly, as truces between one war and the next, while Raymond Aron, noting that relationships between states always unfold in the shadow of war, essentially says the same. Because the fact is that even in times of peace, states are alert to the ever-present possibility of war and ensure they are prepared for this eventuality. Accordingly, every state (even the smallest) is forced to practice "power politics". This does not mean, in the strict sense, that it pursues an overly aggressive or violent foreign policy, but rather that, in formulating its foreign policy, it takes into account the permanent possibility of trials of strength, in the form of actual or threatened use of force, and seeks to set up (ready for use in extreme circumstances) a series of essential power resources (arms, alliances, guarantees of protection from major powers, pre-emptive filling of power vacuums), or alternatively to apply cunning and deception. In the framework of international anarchy, the overriding concern, ahead of all other values, is to ensure external security, an objective that, in practice and to an extent that depends on the state's position in the international system, has authoritarian and centralist implications. As remarked by John Robert Seeley, "the internal freedom of a state is inversely proportional to the pressure that is brought to bear on its borders".[2]

The idea that there is a structural difference between the internal relations of states and their international relations (and thus the afore-

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[2] Cf. J.R. Seeley, *Introduction to Political Science*, London, MacMillan, 1902. See also L.V. Majocchi, *John Robert Seeley*, The Federalist, 31, n. 2 (1989). It is to be recalled that in the German realist current of the XIX and first half of the XX century (doctrine of the power-state), which examined in depth the distinction between island states (which are more liberal as they are more secure) and continental states (more authoritarian on account of the need to defend their less secure land borders) already made by Alexander Hamilton in the eighth essay of *The Federalist Papers*, there prevailed a tendency to justify the authoritarianism that emerged in the Prussian-German setting. Cf. S. Pistone, *F. Meinecke e la crisi dello stato nazionale tedesco*, Turin, Giappichelli, 1969.

mentioned dichotomy between state sovereignty and international anarchy), to be understood completely, requires a fundamental clarification. This idea does not equate with the notion that the international situation is simply a form of chaos, dominated by continuous, irrational and unpredictable clashes between states, and lacking any kind of order. In reality, the realist paradigm highlights the presence of other structural elements within the international setting, beyond the more general one of international anarchy — elements that render less chaotic, and therefore relatively more predictable the concrete developments in the international situation.

The first crucial structural element that introduces an, albeit very general, degree of order into the framework of international anarchy is the existence of a hierarchical organisation of the states in which a distinction is drawn between the great powers, i.e., the states that are effectively able to look after their own security and interests (i.e. through their own strength), and the medium-size or small powers that, instead, must seek either protection from one of the great powers, or unanimous recognition by the latter of their neutrality. What this means, of course, is that the fundamental decisions determining the evolution of the international situation are taken by the great powers, in other words by a very small number of sovereign states. These states are, in effect, governing the world, albeit on the basis, clearly, of a compromise between their respective national interests — interests that may be more or less farsighted and more or less acceptable to, or shared by, their allies. In the old European system of states, the major powers normally numbered five or six (a multipolar system), whereas the world system that emerged after the two World Wars was dominated, until the end of the East-West conflict, by the American and Soviet superpowers (a bipolar system). Today, as a result of the decline of US power and the rise — still problematical — of the BRICS countries, the situation is one of transition towards an as yet ill-defined form of multipolarism.

Another key structural element of international anarchy is the balance mechanism, in other words, a situation that, while unable to prevent the emergence of power relations and power conflicts, has had the effect of limiting these, and above all has allowed the preservation of the independence of the major powers, and thus of a pluralistic system of sovereign states. This, among other things, has made it possible to guarantee medium-size and small powers a measure of autonomy too. For the sake of completeness, these remarks on the balance of powers should be accompanied by reference to the epoch-making changes

brought about by the development of weapons of mass destruction (in particular atomic and nuclear arms); this led to the emergence and establishment of the system of deterrence also known as the balance of terror, in short, a situation in which a general conflict between the major powers is inconceivable (as it amounts to global self-destruction). This radically new situation did not bring an end to power relations between states, to small-scale conflicts (sometimes resulting from the use of intermediaries by the larger powers), or to localised (or civil) wars, but it did lead, in security policies, to a shift of emphasis away from defence and towards arms control and the prevention of war.

Remaining on the subject of the factors limiting violent manifestations of international anarchy, it should also be noted that states with liberal-democratic orders, which have a true division and consistent decentralisation of powers, find it more difficult than states with authoritarian or totalitarian regimes to put aggressive foreign policies into practice. This is because, in the former, the balance between the various powers of the state hinders rapid decision-making and intervention at international level. However, contrary to the thinking of democratic internationalism,[3] this certainly does not mean that the affirmation of democracy within states is automatically linked to the overcoming of power relations between them.

Finally, it must be underlined that, according to the realist paradigm, the hierarchy of states and the balance that has been established among the powers are the objective conditions that induced countries to acknowledge one another, formally too, as sovereign states and allowed the affirmation and gradual extension of international law, and its acquisition of a measure of effectiveness in spite of the fact that it does not emanate from a sovereign power. Given the objective impossibility of eliminating the sovereignty of the other states, the most prominent actors within the international system had to acknowledge the need to find a way of living side by side with them. While nevertheless preserving power politics and war as extreme measures, they had to find a way of regulating their reciprocal relations, and thus created a set of *sui generis* rules — *sui generis* in the sense that they le-

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[3] For a good framing of this current from a realist point of view, see, A. Panebianco, *Guerrieri democratici. Le democrazie e la politica di potenza*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997. In general, for more on the internationalism espoused by the liberal, democratic and socialist ideologies — all of which regard peace as deriving automatically from the affirmation of their principles within the state — see L. Levi, *Internazionalismo*, in *Enciclopedia delle Scienze Sociali*, Rome, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1996.

gitimate the normal use of force and are subordinate to the power relations and hierarchical relations between the states. This is the setting in which there emerged the international bodies (the UN is the prime example) that, after the Second World War and as an effect of the increasing destructiveness of war and the growing interdependence of all the world's states, both socioeconomic and environmental (with the related global risks), developed at a rate that, in comparison with previous eras, was quite unprecedented. This phenomenon was also accompanied by the gradual emergence of numerous international NGOs.

The Federalist Paradigm.

Federalist theory[4] overlaps considerably with realist theory in terms of its understanding of reality. The key aspect of the convergence between the two is the view of statehood as an irreplaceable basis for the pursuit of social peace and progress and, therefore, of the absence of statehood at international level as the structural cause of international anarchy and the power relations that dominate international relations. At the same time, federalist theory differs clearly from the realist model in terms of the value judgement applied in the interpretation of reality. The main value championed by realists is security, and thus the power of one's own state, because they see the overcoming of the condition of international anarchy as inconceivable. Essentially, they tend to regard the plurality of sovereign states not as a phase in the evolution of history, but as an insuperable point of arrival. This reflects an ideological prejudice of a nationalistic kind that leads the plurality of states (and, by extension, conflicts between states), to be viewed as an irreplaceable element of progress. Federalists, on the other hand, are guided by the value of peace, and thus by the conviction that the nation-state is a stage in the historical evolution of the state, and therefore that the creation of a world federal state, although the time is not yet

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[4] I here refer readers to the fundamental writings of M. Albertini and especially to *Il federalismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993 and *Nazionalismo e federalismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999. I also wish to recall: the writings of F. Rossolillo collected in *Senso della storia e azione politica*, edited by G. Vigo, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2009; S. Pistone, *Ludwig Dehio*, Naples, Guida, 1997 and Id., *L'unificazione europea e la pace nel mondo*, in *L'Unione Europea e le sfide del XXI secolo*, edited by U. Morelli, Turin, Celid, 2000; L. Levi, *Crisi dello Stato e governo del mondo*, Turin, Giappichelli, 2000 and Id., *La crisi del paradigma realistico e il paradigma federalistico*, Il Ponte, 63, n. 2-3 (2012); R. Castaldi, *Federalism and material interdependence*, Milan, Giuffré, 2008, and Id. (editor), *Immanuel Kant and Alexander Hamilton, the Founders of Federalism*, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2013.

ripe for this, is a realistic prospect. Furthermore, according to federalists, the present growing economic interdependence between states, linked to the advanced industrial revolution, and to the scientific and technological revolution, has opened up a historical phase in which commitment to the progress of mankind is irrevocably bound up with the endeavour to overcome violence in international relations. Underpinning this orientation are the enlightening reflections on peace developed by Kant, which I briefly outline here.[5]

First of all, Kant, starting from a realistic view of international relations, and thus from the dichotomy between state sovereignty and international anarchy, clarified beyond doubt that peace corresponds to an organisation of power that overcomes international anarchy, because it transforms power relations among states into true juridical relations, and thus, through the extension of statehood on a universal scale (by means of the federal system), renders war structurally impossible. Second, Kant established the existence of an organic link between the overcoming of international anarchy and the full implementation, within states, of the liberal-democratic regime (which must necessarily be complemented by the institutionalisation of social solidarity, even though Kant does not specify this). On the one hand, the existence of power relations between states, which makes external security the overriding concern, is an obstacle to the full affirmation of the liberal-democratic system; on the other, progress (albeit impeded by international anarchy) in a liberal-democratic direction introduces structural pressure pushing towards the elimination of war, the negative impact of which is, of course, felt mainly by citizens.

These ideas, let us remember, form part of a broader reflection of Kant's in which peace is seen as the necessary condition for the full development of man's moral and rational capacities. For as long as there exists an international system based on war, in other words, an objective need for all individuals to adapt their conduct to a social structure modelled on the authoritarian and bellicose requirements of the state, and their consciences to the ethics of combat that this structure produces, it will result in a limited and unilateral development of their creative faculties and hinder their moral progress. But once a power structure emerges that has the capacity to channel all social behaviours within the confines of law, it will no longer be possible to use war or the

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[5] Cf. I. Kant, *La pace, la ragione e la storia*, edited by M. Albertini, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1985.

permanent threat of war to legitimise the violence of men towards men. In this situation, the rational nature of men will be allowed full expression and they will be able to mould themselves entirely according to the principle of autonomy of the will. In other words, the ground will be laid for a radical transformation of relations between the individual and society, and the way opened up for the reaching of a condition in which it will, in all social relations, be possible always to treat men as ends, and never as means.

It must be pointed out that the project for perpetual peace developed by Kant at the end of the eighteenth century, being based on a clear awareness that it will take humanity a very long time to mature and realise it, cannot be considered a simple expression of utopian ideas. That said, it is a process that nevertheless has a very good chance of taking place. First of all, there is the historical precedent of the overcoming of anarchy within states through the creation of a state authority with the capacity to enforce respect for the law internally. This example of real historical progress makes it impossible to exclude in principle — here we see that Kant manages to overcome the anthropological pessimism of Hobbes — the possibility of further progress that will ultimately result in the overcoming of international anarchy. Second, this progress will be favoured — here we see Kant's exceptional ability to foresee the great challenges that, in the twentieth century, were destined to underlie the beginnings of supranational integration — by the combined impetus of two powerful historical forces. One is the growth of trade, which, being destined to make humanity increasingly interdependent and thus to increase the likelihood of conflict, renders ever more pressing the need to develop instruments for the peaceful resolution of conflicts (so as not to undermine the benefits deriving from interdependence), in other words, to bring about an extension of statehood. The other force, generated by scientific and technical progress, is the increasing destructiveness of war, which is making it increasingly urgent to overcome, through concrete measures, the very system of war, so that mankind's destiny is not one of collective self-destruction.[6]

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[6] In this regard, it is important to underline that Kant, precisely because he was not a naive pacifist, was able to appreciate that war is also a decisive factor of historical progress, in that it prompts rulers, in order to boost support for the power policy pursued by the state, to improve the conditions in which their subjects live. At the same time, he predicted that the continuous refinement of arms would ultimately result in the prevalence of the purely destructive aspects of wars, and render the overcoming of the same a pressing need.

Having established that federalists — on the basis of the teachings of Kant — see peace as the supreme value and, compared with realists, therefore apply a different value judgement in their interpretation of reality, it should also be underlined that the federalists' overcoming of the realist model is linked to the historical relevance of the struggle for peace. To grasp this, it is necessary to have a full understanding of the consequences — on the evolution of states and on inter-state relations — of the momentous changes brought about by the advanced industrial revolution, which evolved into the technical and scientific revolution. Realists take into account a series of phenomena of crucial importance: the growing economic interdependence between states (which has presented us with the phenomenon of globalisation), the advent of weapons of mass destruction, environmental interdependence and the global environmental crisis. But since their guiding values lead them to regard the plurality of the sovereign states as insurmountable, they are unable to see that these developments have introduced a new factor, with extremely far-reaching implications, into the system of international relations, namely the historical crisis of the system of sovereign states (also named the Westphalian system, after the peace agreement that ended the Thirty Years War in 1648 and constituted a key moment in the formal establishment of the principle of absolute state sovereignty); this crisis is a situation that makes commitment to the overcoming of international anarchy not only ethically essential but also a political necessity.

This aspect of the federalist paradigm is based on a reworking, by Mario Albertini, of the fundamental precepts of the historical materialism theory,[7] from which federalists have assimilated the idea that the evolution of the mode of production (i.e. the process through which men continually transform the quality of their lives through technological innovation and the creation of new ways of organising the division of labour, and consequently transform society and cultural processes, too) influences the potential development of the state, in an institutional and also a territorial sense. On this basis they were able to see that, just as the passage from the agricultural to the industrial mode of production (which was given a powerful boost by

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[7] See L. Trumellini, *Mario Albertini's Reflections on a Critical Reworking of Historical Materialism*, The Federalist, 50, n. 1 (2008) and Id., *Mario Albertini's Reflections on Kant's Philosophy of History and its Integration with Historical Materialism*, The Federalist, 51, n. 2 (2009).

the development of trade between the late Middle Ages and the first two centuries of the Modern Age) had made it possible for the modern sovereign state to become established and, therefore, had created the conditions for possible transformations, within it, towards liberalism, democracy and the welfare state, so the advance of the Industrial Revolution and the transition to the technical-scientific revolution altered the economic and social basis of the states, making the question of their dimensions one of central importance. Although this process first manifested itself in Europe, it has now extended worldwide. But in a global society, sovereign states, even large ones like the USA, have far less capacity to control reality than did the powers of the past.

Having recalled all this, an examination of these issues can be broken down into three crucial frames of reference.

The first concerns the extent of the economic interdependence that gradually evolved with the advance of the Industrial Revolution and Post-Industrial Revolution. This brought to light the unavoidable need to create states of continental dimensions in order to avert social and economic decline and, therefore, to prevent democratic progress from drawing to a halt. But it also began a process destined, in the long term, to render even continental-size states obsolete and consequently to place on the agenda, in order not to impede progress, the political unification of the whole of mankind. A grasp of the political implications of economic interdependence is the indispensable key to understanding the fundamental developments of the XX century. Let us summarise these: first of all, the decline of the European nation-states led to attempts to build, through a hegemonic imperial design, a European state of continental dimensions and, in connection with these attempts, to a spread of authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies (accompanied by heinous crimes); after this, the dwindling power of the European nation-states, which were absorbed into the bipolar (USA-URSS) world order, opened up the way for the dismantling of the colonial empires and, above all, for the process of European unification on a peaceful and democratic basis; this radically altered the situation in Europe, in the sense that it restored momentum to socioeconomic development, democratic progress and peacemaking endeavours, and also stimulated, in other parts of the world, similar although much less deep-rooted processes (regional integrations); this phase was followed by the start of the formation, a process that accelerated sharply after the end of the Cold War, of an increasingly in-

tegrated global economic system (globalisation), dominated — albeit increasingly less so — by the USA. This system, of course, has produced strong economic growth but also recurrent, and increasingly severe, economic-financial crises accompanied by the persistence of serious social and regional imbalances (giving rise to destructive instability in entire regions and migrations of "biblical" proportions). At this point, it should be remarked that the development of global economic interdependence prompted the formation of international economic organisations (the IMF, World Bank, GATT-WTO, OECD, ILO, FAO, G7, G8 and G20) which, while they have not produced a level of integration comparable to that seen in Europe, do underline the need to create a collaborative global order, and thus make it possible to see world unification as a real prospect, however distant, and no longer just as a utopian idea.

In the second frame of reference, meanwhile, the emergence of challenges not only to progress but also to the very survival of mankind (challenges deriving from the discovery of weapons of mass destruction and the upsetting of the world's natural environment) are regarded as a factor in the historical crisis of the system of sovereign states. While the destructiveness of modern warfare, combined with the phenomenon of economic decline, presented the European states with the stark choice — "unite or perish"[8] — that is at the very root of the process of European integration, the development of weapons of mass destruction marked the start of the extension of this choice to global level, and thus put the need to overcome war as an instrument for resolving conflicts among states onto the historical agenda, since a general war implying the large-scale employment of weapons of mass destruction would mean not the continuation of politics through other means, but rather, as the consequence of a collective suicide, the end of politics altogether. And here it should be underlined that it is entirely unrealistic to regard the inconceivableness of a general war between the major powers as permanent protection against the risk of a nuclear holocaust. Not only is there no absolute guarantee that deterrence cannot fail, consideration must also be given to the fact that the inevitable proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will, in a setting characterised by chronic instability of the underdeveloped world, see these

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[8] "Unite or perish" was the choice on which French foreign minister Aristide Briand based his 1929 proposal for European unity. Cf. S. Minardi, *Origini e vicende del progetto di Unione europea di Briand*, Caltanissetta, Salvatore Sciascia, 1994.

weapons eventually finding their way into the hands of states, led by extremist and fanatical ruling classes, that have no democratic mechanisms, or even into the hands of terrorist groups that do not have a territory that deterrence can hold to ransom. In reality, the value of deterrence and security policies aimed at arms control and reduction can only be temporary. In other words, all they can do is provide the setting within which, to be truly realist, the extremely difficult and long-term plan to eliminate structurally the possibility of wars — a plan to which there exist no valid alternatives — must be pursued through the building of a global democratic state. The same argument applies to the danger of an environmental holocaust. International cooperation alone cannot be regarded as anything other than a temporary remedy, a remedy whose coherent development is possible only within the context of the gradual construction of a global state.

The third frame of reference, finally, is related specifically to the objective factors that, within the historical context we have described (characterised by economic interdependence and by existential threats), allowed the federalist commitment to peace to become politically relevant. Basically, the historical-structural crisis of the system of sovereign states, by triggering a crisis of legitimacy at all institutional levels, is responsible for a widespread aspiration to pursue a level of cooperation that extends beyond the boundaries of the state — the extraordinary proliferation of supranational NGOs is a main manifestation of this — and also the overcoming of absolute sovereignty that such cooperation demands; this crisis of legitimacy is also responsible for the growth of populism, which is a direct effect of the absence of effective supranational alternatives to the, now powerless, existing institutions, a situation that has created the kind of a vacuum that populism naturally tends to fill. In this setting, the federalists have identified two strategies. The first is to pursue regional integrations, starting with that of Europe, where the crisis of the nation-states is particularly advanced, as this can serve as a test bed able to encourage the development of unification processes in the world's other areas; the pursuit of regional integrations can also be seen as a means of promoting the stabilisation and socioeconomic advancement and political-democratic progress of underdeveloped regions. It is, in fact, clear that the fundamental pillars of a functional future world federation must be regional integrations and states that already have continental or subcontinental dimensions, since it clearly cannot be made up of hundreds of states and statelets. The other federalist strategy is, at the same time,

to continue strengthening the global international order, along federal lines, so as to be able to start responding effectively to the challenges facing the world.[9] A crucial aspect of the thinking behind the federalist commitment to peace is the conviction that federal completion of the process of European unification carries enormous strategic value, serving both as a model and a driving force for similar processes elsewhere in the world.

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While acknowledging that the federalist commitment to peace has become politically relevant, it must also be acknowledged that it comes up against major obstacles. The most important of these is the fact that while, on the one hand, the historical crisis of the system of sovereign states forces national governments to pursue policies of supranational and, in the more advanced cases, supranational cooperation, on the other, these governments display a structural resistance to the placement of limitations on their sovereignty. This attitude is rooted in the rule, first clarified by Machiavelli, that those who possess power tend to hold on to it, and this consideration underlines the need to ensure that the federalist struggle for peace is based on the existence of autonomous movements that are independent of national governments and parties.[10] A further obstacle is the opposition mounted by the populist-nationalist movements that have now become established in democratic countries where the structural crisis of democratic politics, which is due ultimately to the fact that states are no longer adequate to deal with the fundamental problems (a supranational order), is exacerbated by the significant delay in the process of bringing into being an effective and democratic form of statehood at supranational level.[11] It must also be said that the painful slowness of this process is also linked to the objective difficulty of building a new form of post-national statehood that, having no historical precedent, must be guided by an innovative interpretation of federalism that goes far beyond the concept underlying the federations that currently exist in the world.

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[9] For more on the structure of the world state based on federalism at all levels and on the principle of subsidiarity, see the excellent text by O. Hoeffe, *Democracy in an Age of Globalization*, Cahm, Springer, 2007.

[10] See S. Pistone, *Movimento Federalista Europeo: storia e prospettive di una strategia di azione politica*, Il Ponte, 68, n. 2-3 (2012).

[11] See A. Martinelli, *Mal di nazione. Contro la deriva populista*, Milan, Università Bocconi Editore, 2013.

The Crisis of the World Order.

The federalist paradigm, whose essential aspects I have herein sought to clarify (underlining in particular its elements of convergence with and overcoming of the realist model), shows us the way forward in order to tackle, effectively, the current crisis of the world order. It must first be established what this crisis is: basically, it is the existence of a set of three major emergencies, or challenges, whose combined effects represent an existential threat to humanity.

The first is that of *security*, which we see in the resumption (after the slackening of pace that followed the end of the Cold War) of the arms race, especially (but not only) between the major powers, which has led to a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that it is proving difficult to reverse in any substantial way; in the spread of wars (mostly civil wars but also international conflicts) related to the backwardness and chronic instability of entire regions (particularly the Middle East and Africa) and the phenomenon of failed states; and in international terrorism, of which the so-called Islamic State is a key driving force.

There is a strong link between this situation of widespread and extremely dangerous unrest and the end of the bipolar system, which was followed by the transition towards the present multipolar system in which there are no powers able to exert a stabilising leadership role. The bipolar system ensured relative stability as it was based on the hegemony of the two superpowers over much of the rest of the world, which in turn was strongly rooted in the concept of a universal conflict between the ideologies of democracy and communism. But the fall of these "ideological empires" had the effect of unleashing the ethnic, religious and tribal unrest that the bipolar world order had previously managed to keep in check; it also unleashed the force of international terrorism — a very real threat to global security. The end of the bipolar system (and of the global ideological conflict it represented) can also be linked, objectively, to the momentous changes brought by the advancement of economic interdependence, and also to the cost of arms. The disintegration of the Soviet bloc was clearly due not only to the economic burden of the arms race, but also to the growth of economic interdependence that, together with the increasing spread of information, rendered the economic backwardness deriving from the bloc's autarkic isolation increasingly unsustainable. What is more, even the USA, the other pillar in the bipolar system, following a period in which it held firm as the only superpower in an apparently unipolar world order, has now seen a sharp decline in its power on the global stage, as

shown by the current chaos in the regions lying on Europe's eastern and southern borders, for example.

In addition to these security issues, there is the *social and economic* challenge constituted, in particular, by the (now chronic) global economic and financial crisis that has generated growing tensions the world over. In addition, the gaps separating different regions of the world are widening and this — together with situations of chronic instability and environmental imbalances — is generating massive migratory flows that are seriously jeopardising the European integration process. A third aspect of the social and economic challenge facing the world is the monetary chaos that, with the spread of competitive devaluations, is having a backward effect on the process of global market integration. The fact that that globalisation is an ungoverned phenomenon is a key factor in this regard. Indeed, we have witnessed the creation of a highly integrated world economy that, despite having allowed great progress — billions of people, in China and India in particular, are now moving closer to Western-type standards of living —, is flawed by serious contradictions: in short, while the economy and society as a whole are both assuming a supranational character and global dimensions, political institutions remain predominantly national in size and scope; this can be attributed to the failure to complete European unification and the considerable weakness of the global economic organisations.

The third emergency, which is also the most serious of the three, is the *environmental problem* of global warming, a phenomenon that, in the absence of rapid and radical choices designed to promote an environmentally sustainable mode of production and way of living, is destined to have catastrophic consequences for mankind. In this regard, the key problem, once again, is that of ungoverned interdependence.

Having said all this, I feel it must be acknowledged that there is only one adequate response to the crisis of the international order that is manifested through this set of existential challenges: to build a new international order that represents a significant forward step in the direction of world unification — an extremely arduous project, certainly, but at the same time one that the unprecedented gravity of the threats facing mankind now makes it possible to pursue. Substantially, and in very brief and general terms, it is a question of setting out — in the field of security in the strict sense (which is nevertheless closely linked to the fields of socioeconomic and environmental security), — to build a systemic agreement between the main political players of continental or

subcontinental dimensions. In practice, this means moving from the current situation of confrontational multipolarism, which has followed the end of the bipolar order and the decline of American hegemony, to a structured multipolar system of cooperation, which should eventually be extended to all the global players. The fundamental basis and starting point for this evolution should be the realisation of an extension of the "Common European Home" concept, created by Gorbachev in the mid-1980s,[12] in other words, an international organisation for promoting cooperation and gradual integration between not only Europe and Russia (Gorbachev's model) but America, too — an organisation of which OSCE is but an embryonic prefiguration. The broader institutional framework in which to set this cooperative multipolarism should be that of a significantly strengthened UN, which would thus need to be democratically reformed and restructured on a regional basis. Its fundamental governing body should be a Security Council whose members, which would gradually take decisions by majority, would no longer be the main Allied countries that emerged victorious at the end of World War II (given the power of veto, moreover), but rather regional groupings of states that, as these gradually form and become established, would sit alongside the existing global players (i.e. those that, by dint of their size, already constitute macro-regions). This would allow all states, through their regional unions, to take part in the government of the world. The Security Council should be flanked by a universal parliamentary assembly — this would initially have to be made up of representatives of the parliaments of the regional unions —, thereby allowing all peoples to have a say in the government of the world.

Only through this extremely difficult, but absolutely necessary, evolution will it be possible to seriously tackle the aforementioned emergencies so as to be able to: i) resume the arms control and disarmament policy that had been introduced in the final phase of the Cold War (a policy that must include the gradual elimination of weapons of mass destruction, which must be brought under the control of a strengthened and more democratic UN, reformed in the manner outlined above); ii) launch a great plan to stabilise and bring peace to the Middle East and Africa (a plan that, by seeking to address the problem of failed states, resolve ethnic and religious conflicts, and promote re-

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[12] Cf. S. Pistone, *Considerazioni orientative sul tema della Casa comune europea*, in *Governo europeo, costituzione europea, federazione europea*, Atti del XXIV Congresso nazionale del Movimento federalista europeo (Catania 27-29 marzo 2009)*, Pavia, 2009.

gional integration, must endeavour to eliminate the root causes of underdevelopment, endemic wars and terrorism,[13] and thus go beyond efforts to destroy the so-called Islamic State); iii) wage an effective war on international terrorism (which means ensuring systemic and in-depth cooperation, both in the military sphere and, in particular, in the areas of policing and intelligence); and iv) bring about the gradual, but effective, creation of an international police force under the authority of the United Nations.

With regard to the social and economic challenge discussed above, the cooperative multipolarism solution would allow a crucial strengthening of the global economic organisations and thus allow them to govern the globalisation phenomenon. In this setting it would be possible to implement: i) a new Bretton Woods agreement to launch a process of global monetary unification, starting with the transformation of the special drawing rights system into a global system designed to limit exchange rate fluctuations (along the lines of the European monetary system that paved the way for the European monetary union) and end the hegemony of the dollar;[14] ii) a global economic integration progress in which removal of obstacles to the free movement of production factors (negative integration) is combined with instruments of positive integration, i.e. instruments designed to guide the world economy (in the grip of continuous and increasingly severe crises) and, in particular, to seriously address the regional disparities in development that, being a primary cause of political and social instability in vast regions of the world, are also responsible for the current out-of-control migratory flows and for international terrorism; iii) the creation of a UN economic security council to coordinate and strengthen capacity to act of the global economic organisations.

As far as the environmental emergency is concerned, the way ahead would be to establish a World Environment Agency or Organisation under the auspices of the UN, to which the States Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change would be subordinate. This

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[13] Cf. L. Levi, *Una Helsinki 2 nel Mediterraneo*, Policy Paper n. 12, Centro Studi sul Federalismo, 2015 e S. Pistone, *L'Europa e la sfida dello stato islamico*, in *Una Unione federale a partire dall'eurozona, Atti del XXVII Congresso nazionale del MFE (Ancona 20-22 marzo 2015)*, Pavia, 2015.

[14] Cf.: R. Triffin, *Dollaro, Euro e moneta mondiale*, introduction by A. Iozzo, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1998; Id., *The International Monetary Scene Today and Tomorrow*, The International Spectator, n. 4 (2015); A. Iozzo, *Rejoinder, 45 Years Later, to "The International Monetary Scene Today and Tomorrow"*, *ibidem*; A. Mosconi, *United States and Europe in a Multipolar World*, The Federalist Debate, 25, n. 2 (2012).

Agency or Organisation should have real powers and financial autonomy, be run by an independent authority (in the manner of the ECSC), and be required to create a global plan for balanced reduction of atmospheric emissions of CO_2, thereafter regularly reviewing and adapting the objectives of the same to the evolving situation. Its functions should include the provision of financial help to the most disadvantaged countries, the implementation of comprehensive and coordinated actions to counter global environmental emergencies, the development of new technologies in the energy sector, and the transfer of these technologies to countries in the process of industrialisation. Another possibility is the application of a carbon tax in the main polluting countries, such as China, India, the USA, the EU, Japan and Russia, as a means of speeding up their transition from fossil energy to renewable energy sources and of ensuring the direct funding, with a portion of the revenues from this tax, of the aforementioned World Environment Agency or Organisation.[15]

However, it must be underlined that if the new global framework is, indeed, to develop in the positive direction outlined above, then the creation of a European federation is absolutely indispensable, and must happen soon. It must also be recalled that the current impasse reached by the process of European integration (which raises the prospect of a catastrophic disintegration process) is having the effect of stalling other processes of regional integration that had been stimulated by European unification, drawing inspiration and real energy from its example. Conversely, a federal outcome to the process of European integration (which is now not only urgently needed, but also a realistic prospect, given that it offers a means of avoiding a fatal reversal of the unification process) would give fresh impetus to other regional integrations that are equally crucial bricks in the building of world peace. Furthermore, as we have said, the advance of the populist-nationalist movements that oppose policies geared at sharing state sovereignty stems mainly from the crisis of the sovereign states and the failure to develop any effective and democratic alternative form of statehood at supranational level. In this setting, Europe is ideally placed to play a crucial role; after all, Europe is where integration, even though the process is still midstream, has advanced to a level that renders the contrast between the two alternative directions particularly stark. If the populist-

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[15] Cf. R. Palea, *Un Accordo "storico" sul clima a Parigi: ma saprà l'umanità salvarsi in tempo?*, Policy Paper n. 14, Centro Studi sul Federalismo, 2016.

nationalist movements in Europe were to be defeated through the continent's full federalisation, this would automatically set back the widespread tendencies of this kind in the rest of the world. In addition, a Europe finally capable of acting on the international stage would, in its role as a global player, clearly make a decisive contribution to the aforementioned plan to stabilise and bring peace to the Middle East and Africa — a Marshall Plan-type programme necessitating huge and long-range efforts in terms of aid in the areas of security and the economy and the construction of modern state institutions. In the same way, efforts to move towards the extended version of the Common European Home, mentioned earlier, may bear fruit only in the presence of a Europe that, having succeeded in coming out from under the protective wing of the USA, has the capacity to significantly influence the conduct of the USA and the Russian Federation, as well as that of the other global players.[16]

Going beyond these specific remarks, it must also be underlined that it is the structural vocation of Europe (ideally placed to be the backbone of a multipolar system of cooperation) to work towards a more peaceful, more just and more environmentally sustainable world. In essence, Europe has an ingrained tendency to act as a "civil power", a power that pursues the overcoming of power politics. Precisely because European unification was born from the catastrophe of the two World Wars, and was the first significant response to the historical crisis of the Westphalian system, the EU is genetically programmed to strive to export the positive elements of its own experience, which we might refer to as the European way of life (liberal democracy, the welfare state, human rights, environmental awareness, low military spending), as well as the unification process itself. Indeed, in setting out (in Treaties and strategic doctrine) its planned international role, the EU speaks not only of European interests and security, but also of world peace, to be built through the instruments of solidarity, the rule of law,

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[16] Cf. A. Sabatino, *Ucraina: l'assenza di una politica europea*, Il Federalista, 56, n. 1-2 (2014) and S. Pistone, *L'Unione politica e le sfide della sicurezza*, Paradoxa, 8, n. 3 (2015). As regards Russia, the key problem is to help overcome its overwhelming dependence on exports of fuel and bring about real progress in terms of its integration with the economies of Europe and of the Western world generally. The progress (both socioeconomic and political-democratic) that would ensue would make it possible to eradicate the neoimperial tendencies in Russia that are clearly linked to economic and social backwardness and the country's authoritarian regime. The tool for achieving this is the Common European Home, which that a Europe truly capable of acting would effectively be able to pursue.

the liberal-democratic system, the globalisation of human rights, and regional integrations — in short, of multilateralism as opposed to unilateralism. This formal orientation is concretely reflected in the leadership role that, despite Europe's unification still being incomplete, is played by the EU in the areas of development and food aid, peace missions and the pursuit of human rights, as well as its key involvement in initiatives such as the International Criminal Court and agreements designed to combat global warming.

Obviously, to manifest this structural vocation effectively, Europe needs to be more than just an economic power; it also needs to become, through the adoption of a single foreign, security and defence policy, a fully-fledged global player. As a paradigmatic illustration of its potential we may consider the fact that giving the EU a single seat on the UN Security Council would effectively trigger the process of regionalisation of the UN that represents the strategic path towards the strengthening and democratisation of this organisation.[17]

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[17] Cf. S. Pistone, *The European Union As Global Player*, in U. Morelli (Ed.) *A Constitution For The European Union. Sovereignty, Representation, Competencies, Constituent Process*, Milan, Giuffrè, 2005; R. Castaldi, *La scelta per la civiltà europea moderna: unirsi o perire*, Paradoxa, 8, n. 3 (2015).

Towards a Sustainable European Immigration Policy

ALFONSO SABATINO

Migratory Flows, Political and Social Reactions, and the Risk of Disintegration of the EU.

The flood of migrants into the EU's Mediterranean countries has called into question the principles of solidarity on which the European Union was founded, and is now endangering all that Europe has achieved. The reality of this situation became apparent first from the suspension of the Schengen Agreement by some central and northern European member states and the erection of barriers at their external borders to close off the Balkan route into the EU, and then from the resistance, especially in central and eastern European countries, to the European Commission's plan, in 2015, to redistribute 160,000 refugees across Europe. It is also reflected in the strengthening of populist, eurosceptic and xenophobic movements in almost every European country, a trend that is threatening to overturn the political balances, both national and European, that have underpinned the process of European integration since the end of the Second World War.

What is more, the immigration question was certainly a key factor in Britain's vote to leave the EU; in Austria it threatened to play a part in giving the country a xenophobic president, while in France, polls suggest that the *Front National* has become the country's main party. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, Sweden and other Scandinavian countries, populist, anti-establishment and xenophobic political forces are on the rise, fuelled in part by reactions to the various episodes of Islamic terrorism in different European countries.

In the face of these political and social reactions, which are threatening to result in disintegration of the EU, it is clear that the European Union lacks the instruments: 1) to deal with the refugee crisis and the associated problems of hospitality and intercultural relations; 2) to address the persistent international economic downturn, triggered by the

US financial crisis of 2007/2008; and 3) to eliminate the hotspots of conflict on Europe's doorstep and respond adequately to the terrorist attacks of recent times in France, Belgium and Germany, and thus to offer guarantees of security. Meanwhile, the European Commission and European Parliament, which essentially amount to a power vacuum, are settings that have allowed the continued use of intergovernmental mechanisms and encouraged divisive, hierarchical power relations between the member states.

The current massive migratory flows, economic crisis and domestic and international security crisis are, together, undermining Europe's ability to accommodate migrants and ensure their integration into society, to tackle the root causes of the migration emergency in the countries of origin, and to meet the challenge of overcoming terrorism. Europe's citizens, feeling all their old certainties disappearing, are fearful and demanding security in different spheres of life: in the economic, domestic and international spheres and in their own sense of identity. Security will, indeed, probably prove to be the issue determining the future direction of the process of European integration.

In an in-depth analysis of immigration in Europe and its sustainability, several aspects must be considered, namely the number of immigrants present in the EU, the effect of external demographic pressure on a Europe whose own population is declining, the practicability of the current migrant reception policies, and the scope for a foreign and security policy designed to contain migration, render the migratory flows towards Europe manageable, and finally ensure peace, security and development in the areas around Europe that feed the phenomenon.

Some Statistics.

European Commission statistics indicate that the immigrants currently resident in the (pre-Brexit) 28-member EU number approximately 54-55 million out of the total European population of around 500 million. This estimate includes those who entered Europe in 2015, and thus the approximately 1.3 million Middle Eastern refugees who flocked into Germany and Sweden during that year, as well as those who have arrived in 2016. According to the available official EU statistics, on 1 January 2015, 52.8 million European residents were living in a country other than their country of birth.[1] Of these, 34.3 million

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[1] Cf. *Table 4: Foreign-born population by country of birth*, 1 January 2015, in http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Foreign-born_popula-tion_by_country_of_birth,_1_January_2015_(%C2%B9)_YB16.png.

had been born in a non-EU country, while the other 18.5 million were citizens of EU countries. These EU migrants — one immediately thinks of Romanians, Poles, Slovakians and so on, but they also include French, Italian, Spanish and German citizens, for example — have European citizenship status. Moreover, many of them are civil servants, business leaders or young people in search of better opportunities who, thanks to Europe's ongoing process of political unification and economic integration, have been enabled to live stably in another EU member country; nowhere is this more evident than Luxembourg, Brussels and the City (the financial district of London).

However, of the aforementioned foreign-born population, as many as 14.5 million non-EU and 3.2 million EU migrants (17.7 million in total) have, over time, obtained citizenship of their country of residence. As a result — we are still referring to EU data —, as of 1 January 2015 the EU population of immigrants with citizenship of a country other than that of residence amounted to 35.1 million people, of whom 19.8 million were non-EU and 15.3 million EU citizens. These figures obviously do not include the European born offspring of naturalised citizens, known as second or third generation immigrants. These individuals are citizens of the state in which they were born and live, and are therefore European citizens, but they find themselves in the difficult position of being perceived as foreign by the native population; furthermore, lacking their parents' strong links with their community of origin, they are vulnerable to a dangerous identity crisis that, in many cases, has resulted in their being drawn to Islamic fundamentalism. As regards the sustainability of the migration phenomenon, it should be added that the annual influx of immigrants has varied over time. According to OECD statistics for example (EU data on this aspect were not found), whereas in 2007 the main European countries received 2.33 million immigrants (some of these arriving under family reunification arrangements), in 2013 the figure was down to 1.811 million, before rising again, to 1.909 million, in 2014 as an effect of the increase in the refugee component. More interesting still is the fact that the influx to Germany doubled in this period, rising from 232,900 in 2007 to 574,500 in 2014, whereas marked decreases were recorded in Italy (from 571,900 to 204,100), Spain (from 691,900 to 183,700) and Greece (from 46,300 to 29,500) on account of the economic crisis which has hit some (especially these) European economies much harder than others. For the same reason, there have also been increases in the number of immigrants entering Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands

and Denmark.[2] What the OECD data do not show, however, is whether transfers from other EU countries accounted for a proportion of these arrivals. It is, in fact, important to consider another trend: the increasing emigration of young southern Europeans to other European countries (the UK and Germany mainly) and to the United States. According to AIRE (the Registry of Italians Residing Abroad), for example, the number of Italians living in other countries rose from 3.106 million in 2006 to 4.637 million in 2015. In 2014 alone, 101,297 Italians moved abroad[3] and the figure for 2015 is thought to be around 107,000.

There is no doubt that the immigrant population as a whole is unevenly distributed across the EU, with newcomers tending to concentrate in the countries of central and northern Europe, attracted by the better social support available there (a phenomenon that has been dubbed welfare shopping).[4] Obviously, only those who have obtained citizenship of an EU member state (and therefore European citizenship) can move around the EU legally, whereas the rest do so illegally and in clandestine fashion, seriously undermining the Schengen system.

A New Phenomenon: the Refugee Component.

For many years, migration towards the EU was almost entirely economic migration. In other words, those entering European countries were individuals looking for employment opportunities in Europe's expanding economies, and they included both intra-European migrants and people from non-EU countries. The latter, in the main, came from Ukraine and other former Soviet states, China, the Philippines, Pak-

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[2] Cf. *Table 1.1 Inflows of permanent immigrants into selected OECD countries 2007-14*, in *International Migration Outlook 2016*, http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2016_migr_outlook-2016-en#.V-58pYiLTcc#page19.

[3] Cf. http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/10/06/news/aumentano_espatri_italiani_migrantes-124460911. On the history of Italian emigration, see https://cambiailmondo.org/2016/04/13/la-nuova-emigrazione-italiana-e-tre-volte-superiore-ai-dati-istate-supera-il-numero-di-immigrati-economici-e-profughi.

[4] According to EU statistics, on 1 January 2015, the number of foreign born people living in Germany amounted to 10.220 million (12.6 per cent of the population). The number was 8.411 million (13 per cenet) in the UK, 7.908 million (11.9 per cent) in France, 5.891 million (12.7 per cent) in Spain, and 5.805 million (9.5 per cent) in Italy. These countries thus accounted for 38.235 million of the total 52.8 million (72.4 per cent). However, high proportions (over 15 per cent) were also recorded in smaller countries: Austria (17.2 per cent), Belgium (16.1 per cent), Luxembourg (44.2 per cent), Cyprus (20.9 per cent), Sweden (16.4 per cent). In Luxembourg and Cyprus, EU nationals accounted for the majority. Cf. *Table 4: Foreign-born population by country of birth, 1January 2015*, see note 1.

istan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Egypt, Morocco, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Since 2014, however, there has been an increase in the proportion made up of people fleeing from the Middle East and Africa, areas blighted by the presence of failed states, and gripped by war, terrorism, coups and military dictatorships, as well as famine and economic hardship. Data from the OECD (once again) show that the majority (77 per cent) of those who requested asylum in its member states in 2015 came from Syria (23 per cent), Afghanistan (16 per cent), Iraq (11 per cent), other Asian and Middle Eastern countries (13 per cent) and Africa (14 per cent). It can be assumed that almost all of these poured into Europe, as it is the region geographically closest to these parts of the world.[5]

Given their background, all these are migrants who should really be considered refugees. However, because refugee status is granted on an individual basis in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Convention[6] and the Additional Protocol of 1967,[7] this does not automatically happen. But there is another factor that explains why they are not automatically recognised as refugees: whereas non-EU citizens coming to Europe as economic migrants may, if they have no prospects of work and assuming they can be identified, be deported back to their own countries[8] (providing these are countries with which there exist agreements that guarantee their safe return),[9] refugees, on the other hand, are protected by international law, and must be detained and assisted. Given that the principle of free movement in the EU does not apply to them either, the responsibility for assisting them obviously falls to the first country to receive them (Dublin III regulation[10]), as do the related costs. This is a situation that has led the Mediterranean countries that are the migrants' first European destination (Greece, Malta, Italy, Spain) to complain repeatedly about a lack of support and solidarity from their European partners, and it is also the reason why the Euro-

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[5] Cf. *Origin of asylum seekers into OECD countries in 2015* (graph), http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/IMO-2016-facts-and-figures.pdf.

[6] http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html.

[7] http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html.

[8] Art. 79.4 TFEU gives member states the right to regulate the volumes of migrants entering their territory in search of work.

[9] In reality, most of them actually escape the controls and move about clandestinely in Europe.

[10] Cf. Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX 32013R0604.

pean Commission presented its controversial plan, mentioned earlier, to redistribute 160,000 refugees.

These considerations apart, there is no doubt that the massive influx of refugees highlights a general destabilisation of the areas close to the EU that desperately needs adequate political and economic responses, primarily for humanitarian reasons and to combat international crime. Indeed, the "great exodus" from the Middle East and Africa has resulted in an increase in human trafficking, as well as countless tragic losses of life in the Mediterranean. Finally, a substantial proportion of the migrants are unaccompanied minors, of whom, in many cases, all traces are sadly lost.

The Demographic Challenge, the Migratory Flows and the Need to Safeguard the Identity of Europe.

The current migration crisis, as shown above, has a clear structural basis and is set to continue in the future, not least for demographic reasons. Indeed, whereas the European population has an average age of between 40 and 50 years (and, as a whole, is shrinking), the Middle East and North Africa (from Iran to Morocco) are younger societies whose citizens are, on average, aged between 20 and 30 years. The current combined population of these two areas, estimated at 500 million, could grow to 800 million by 2050. Africa, meanwhile, continues to be an area on the brink of an unsustainable population explosion. In the central part of the continent, from the Sahara down to (but excluding) South Africa, the population has an average age of between 10 and 20 years, which clearly means that the African population, today standing at 1.1 billion, could well double in size by 2050. In practice, this could occur within the next thirty years, putting Europe under enormous pressure.

Uncontrolled population growth in these areas, in the absence of development and the necessary domestic social and redistribution policies, can only result in dramatic political and social upheaval. This, in turn, would leave Europe struggling for years with large migratory flows. For this reason, Europe has no choice but to address the problem with adequate domestic strategies on reception and hospitality, and through effective external measures and interventions, designed to reduce the factors that drive people to flee these areas.

Remaining, for the moment, within the ambit of policies on accommodation and social integration, it must be underlined that these demand, first and foremost, a strong political and cultural mobilisation

of newcomers, who must be made aware of Europe's identity, which, as clearly shown by the preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union is based on the pursuit of peace, democratic freedoms and cosmopolitan solidarity. Another important aspect to consider is that European society, as established over the centuries, expresses a vision of life, both urban and rural, whose values are based on the community and on the importance of developing "know how" and expertise, values that need to be transmitted to its new members, and also set alongside their traditional values in an enriching and potentially progressive meeting of cultures.

To ensure effective management of relations between the established European cultures and the cultures expressed by the new residents, due consideration should be given to the possibility of introducing a policy specifically designed to promote Europe's accumulated values, both political and community oriented; this could be done both through the school system, and through the introduction of a European civil service, which should be made compulsory both for Europeans and for foreign permanent residents; such a policy should also make provision for the extension, to the latter, of full voting rights.[11] A further important aspect, not to be overlooked, is the need for a revival of family values and an increase in the birth rate among Europeans, in order to reduce the decline in the native population and ensure that the traditions and community models that have enriched European culture over time are transmitted to future generations. All of the above will obviously require a resumption of the European integration process through institutional initiatives designed to establish a true and effective European federal government. This latter step is also essential to ensure an appropriate development policy, able to steer the evolution of the mode of production in Europe towards the information and knowledge-based society, and in so doing help to provide both the native and the immigrant population with job openings, housing and opportunities for social integration in an overall setting of radically changing professional and workplace requirements.[12]

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[11] On the subject of the recognition of voting rights of immigrants in Europe, see http://www.meltingpot.org/Il-diritto-di-voto-agli-immigrati-nei-paesi-europei.html.

[12] It should be remembered that during the years of Europe's post-war economic boom millions of people managed to improve their social condition. In particular, millions of peasants moved from outlying Mediterranean and Balkan areas to become part of the expanding industrial system of the Rhineland axis and northern Italy.

EU Management of Migrant Reception and How this has Evolved.

Immigration issues have been on the European agenda for decades. Ever since the 2009 Tampere European Council meeting, the European Commission has been seeking to build a European asylum, reception and integration system in accordance with Title V of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU (TFEU).[13] Recent years have seen various efforts to harmonise the member states' measures on asylum, favour the effective integration of legal immigrants, and repatriate illegal ones, but the results have been only partial. In 2014, a strategic instrument, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), was introduced, but that, too, has proved inadequate. The AMIF was set up with EUR 3,137.43 billion to cover the seven years from 2014 to 2020. Its purpose, among other things, is to support national initiatives on asylum and immigration. Denmark is the only EU member state that does not participate in its implementation.[14]

It was not until spring 2015, however, that the EU first collectively intervened on immigration issues. This intervention, prompted by a series of tragedies in the Mediterranean in the period spanning the end of 2014 and the start of 2015, took the form of a *European Agenda on Migration*.[15] The issues dealt with by the document included: search and rescue efforts; steps to combat the trafficking of people; fairer distribution of refugees among the member states; and shared and stronger management of the EU's external borders.

Unfortunately, other than strengthening European sea search and rescue efforts through the Poseidon and Triton missions (respectively conducted in the Aegean Sea and in central Mediterranean waters), the *European Agenda on Migration* has not achieved its objectives. As a result

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[13] The legal basis for establishing a European asylum, reception and integration policy (albeit shown by experience to be insufficient) is provided by Title V, chapter 2 (Articles 77-80) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. In addition, the right to asylum is recognised by Art. 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union whose Preamble constitutes a major affirmation of European identity, aimed at Europe's citizens, the human community and future generations. Unfortunately both texts, lacking the support of a coherent EU institutional framework, capable of producing implementing policies, are ignored by the governments of member states, the political forces, and European public opinion.

[14] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/asylum-migration-integration-fund/index_en.htm.

[15] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf.

of the chaos in Libya and the flood of refugees from Turkey in the summer of 2015, the human trafficking phenomenon has continued undisturbed, while migrants entering Europe still have to be detained and identified by the countries in which they first arrive. Furthermore, the *European Agenda on Migration*, in its efforts to address the issues of migrant reception and assistance, did nothing to engage with the local and regional authorities, even though these are the ones that bear the greatest burden, as highlighted by the "Opinion",[16] issued by the EU Committee of the Regions (CoR) on 3 December 2015, and by the subsequent debate organised by the Piedmont Regional Council on 4 March 2016.[17]

What the CoR "Opinion" and the Piedmont debate really underlined was the desirability of a multilevel approach, extending from European (Community) level through national and regional levels, right down to local level — in short a federal approach of the type that Europe currently lacks.[18] Indeed, in all existing federal states, the central government is responsible for external border control, for the granting of refugee status, and for providing refugees with the assistance they are entitled to receive, but it has the faculty to delegate some reception, resettlement and integration tasks to lower-level authorities. Indeed, in the USA, asylum applications are collected and assessed by a federal agency, the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), while the management of immigrant reception is regulated by the 1980 Immigration and Nationality Act, which gave rise to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), responsible for the funding and administration of federal programmes of refugee accommodation and assistance. The ORR is required to make resources available for professional training, English language training, and the creation of jobs, so that refugees may become financially self-sufficient. The ORR liaises with the federal states and local governments over the distribution of refugees, subsidises projects, and monitors the use of funds provided by the federal government. To receive federal aid for their settlement programmes, the states must first explain how they intend to achieve

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[16] Cf. http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/opinions/Pages/opinion-factsheet.aspx?OpinionNumber=CDR%202607/2015.

[17] The minutes of the meeting can be consulted at the Regional Council of Piedmont website: http://serviziweb.csi.it/solverweb/IndexDocumentServlet?id=24178.

[18] Local and regional bodies can play a strategic role by empowering and giving responsibility to immigrants, involving them in the running of host communities and creating opportunities for active citizenship programmes. This is the thinking behind the attribution of voting rights to foreigners who are permanent residents, as occurs in Sweden.

the objectives set, after which they must meet assigned standards and finally present a report at the end of each fiscal year.[19] Obviously, we are talking about arrangements and facilities for settling refugees, not illegal immigrants in search of work, the majority of whom are Central Americans who still manage to cross the fortified border between the United States and Mexico.

In short, what the EU needs is centralised control of its external borders and of its refugee reception programmes, as seen in the USA, leaving the resettlement and integration side to be dealt with by the states and by regional or local authorities under European supervision. Another crucial line of intervention should target the external root causes of the massive migratory flows, but we shall return to this aspect later on.

The shortcomings of EU policy in this field have greatly weakened the mutual solidarity between the EU's member states; in particular, they have undermined the Schengen Agreement, one of the structural achievements of the European integration process relating to the freedom of movement of EU citizens.

That said, the migration emergency has forced the member states and the Commission to consider further and more advanced measures, such as a strengthening of the EU's border control agency (Frontex), the creation of a European Border and Coast Guard, and the introduction of coordinated European management of identification, redistribution and rejection procedures, under the supervision of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). As the debate currently stands, however, no provision is made for the creation of true, dedicated European agencies, only for the organisation of European offices run by personnel provided by the member states and given the task of coordinating the activities of the competent national authorities. In addition, the Commission pledged to take other steps by the end of 2016, namely to review the Dublin III regulation and present new proposals for combatting human trafficking, as well as new measures on legal immigration, through reform of the Blue Card for highly skilled non-EU workers. Finally, as Europe's approach in recent months clearly shows, there has been a radical evolution of its relations with third countries in the Middle East and Africa following the commitments made at the November 2015 summit on immigration in La Valletta (Malta) and the agreements reached with Turkey in March 2016.

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[19] https://www.uscis.gov/laws/immigration-and-nationality-act.

Germany's Change of Strategy and its Repercussions.

The new measures recently proposed or under examination by the Commission were also a consequence of Germany's unilateral decision, in summer 2015, to open its doors to the wave of Syrians at that time fleeing the Middle East via the Balkan route; this was a decision motivated by compelling humanitarian concerns, but also by the need to defuse the politically explosive situation that was developing in the Aegean area and in the Balkans. It necessarily led to a change in the EU's approach to the management of new arrivals — Germany's move in fact deligitimised the Dublin III regulation — and brought to the fore the crucial issue of relations with the third countries from which these migrants originate, or through which they are forced to pass. At the same time, however, this massive influx stirred up strong social reactions in Germany, and this has had repercussions throughout Europe.

Indeed, there has emerged a clear resistance among native communities to the arrival of social groups whose lifestyle habits, customs and religious practices are alien to local traditions; in addition, there can be no failing to observe the growth of a feeling of diffidence towards, and even mistrust of, Muslims generally as an effect of the establishment of the Islamic State organisation, the resulting persecution of religious minorities in the Middle East, and the series of terrorist attacks on European soil.

In addition to these reactions, it should also be considered that Chancellor Merkel's decision to open Germany's doors to the human tide coming from the Balkans created real difficulties both for the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) — this initially lacked the necessary software and staff to manage the formal procedures of identification and ascertainment of refugee status —, and for Germany's local authorities and voluntary associations that suddenly found themselves having to accommodate a multitude for which they were not prepared, in other words to feed and house them and set up social inclusion programmes. All this explains why, once this great exodus had been accommodated, it was decided to close Germany's borders.

Significantly, this influx of refugees has upset the political balance that has underpinned German politics since the Second World War. Indeed, in the eastern *Länder* in particular — these are the areas that once comprised the GDR and, from a sociological point of view, they are less open to cultural diversity—,[20] a new eurosceptic, xenophobic and

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[20] It is significant that similar, closed attitudes are found in the central and eastern European countries that were members of the Warsaw Pact (the Visegrad Group), and did

populist political force, *Alternative für Deutschland*, has performed strongly at the polls, and its hardline views on migration are influencing the extreme conservative wing of both the national CDU party and the Bavarian CSU, but also the social-democratic and liberal electorate.

Obviously, this discontent in Germany has had the effect of strengthening, in other European countries, the vast xenophobic front that uses the recent episodes of terrorism as an excuse for stereotyping all Middle Eastern refugees as terrorists.[21] And this, of course, is a particularly difficult new challenge, given the persistence of the root causes that are fuelling the migratory flows towards the countries of Europe.

The Social Inclusion of Refugees and National Models of Production: a Comparison of Approaches

With regard to social inclusion policies there are, unfortunately, differences of approach between the European countries. To illustrate this point we may consider three examples: the approach adopted by central and northern European countries, the one preferred by France, the UK and Belgium, and finally that of the Mediterranean countries.

In view of the significant numbers of Middle Eastern refugees entering Germany (over 1 million) and Sweden (around 160 thousand) in 2015, a profound debate between social forces and the governments is now under way in the Nordic countries (Germany and Scandinavia) on the heavy cost to public finances of the extended provision of economic and social support to refugees. Some, however, have argued that immigrant participation in the production process can, in the medium/long term, generate added value that offsets the costs of social inclusion, making the latter more viable. Other points raised in the debate concern the need for law and order, it being argued that inability to enter the workplace leaves refugees deprived of their independence and personal dignity and can foster social exclusion and delinquency, as well as dangerous friction between the native population and the immigrant population. For this latter reason, and thinking back to the ri-

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not participate in the founding process of the European Union.

[21] It should be noted that although there have been numerous cases of European citizens or Muslim immigrants living in Europe who have left Europe to join the ranks of the Islamic State organisation, and who may even have returned to Europe from the Middle East, these people have never made the perilous journeys that immigrants and refugees do, crossing the Aegean or the central Mediterranean in precarious boats. The European Commission is in fact considering the possibility of introducing a register to record the movements of people leaving or entering the EU through airports and other

ots in the French *banlieues*, the idea of providing large-scale residential solutions specifically for immigrants has been ruled out, the view being that refugees blend into the community better if they are more widely distributed. Furthermore, considerable importance has been attached to teaching of the national language and local culture. The debate has, of course, also covered the issue of the availability of employee work, given that the vast majority of refugees would find it very difficult to establish themselves on a self-employed basis.

Nevertheless, this approach is rendered complicated and costly by structural factors that became established in the countries of central and northern Europe as a result of strategic choices made, some considerable time ago, precisely in order to restrict economic immigration, which was encouraging low value-added activities and an underground economy.[22]

Since the 1980s, Germany and the Nordic countries have implemented a technologically advanced and highly qualified production system that is strongly export oriented and based on worker loyalty and retention. Workers, being the focus of intensive vocational training programmes, are regarded as corporate assets, and the entire system is supported by significant investments in R&D. Activities requiring considerable use of unskilled labour, which are nevertheless a necessary part of the production system, have largely been outsourced abroad and thus fuel a subcontracting system.[23] While the possibility certainly remains that refugees could be channelled into the less skilled jobs that still exist, it has to be noted that local trade unions would not welcome the start of a competition over wage levels as a means of keeping labour costs down. That said, in Nordic countries, given the advanced organisation of production industry and services there, the cost of labour is not a competitive factor and therefore not even an issue raised by businesses. The public authorities, for their part, do not want to see the

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[22] In the early 1980s in Germany, in the wake of three decades of economic growth and in the face of the growing influx of migrants from Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey, local governments, in particular, began to call for the introduction of caps on immigration. It should also be recalled that in 1999, in order to politically integrate a large number of immigrants living permanently in the country, until then considered "guest workers" (*Gastarbeitern*), the red-green coalition government changed the law on citizenship, extending the entitlement, on request, to immigrants who had been resident in Germany for at least eight years and to their children born in Germany.

[23] A large section of industry in northern Italy works for German customers, and this is also true in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The textile sector has been transferred almost entirely to Asia.

spread of an underground economy and the associated tax evasion, phenomena that in the past, when immigrants were offered low-paid employment, were widespread.[24]

Furthermore, Germany's employment offices, faced with the arrival of over a million refugees, have found that these newcomers do not have qualifications commensurate with the types of work that have become established in Germany in the course of the production revolution that began there a few decades ago. Only 20 per cent of migrants have university level qualifications, and in most cases any previous work experience they can offer fails to match the needs of the local production system. Finally, practically no migrants are able to provide documentation of their qualifications. To enable them to enter the workplace they need to receive German language tuition and training in the technologically advanced tasks that now characterise the country's labour market; equipping them to enter the workplace is a lengthy process, estimated to take between 3 and 7 years.[25] It should also be added, still with reference to Germany, that the labour reform of 2004, implemented by the Schröder government, eliminated over 6 million workers from the production system, workers who are now mainly employed in part-time or poorly paid jobs; it is clear, however, that the political authorities do not intend to allow an expansion of this secondary market area. Similar problems are, of course, also found in other central and northern European countries. Finally, it should be noted that Germany has approved a 93.6 billion euro refugee-assistance programme for the period 2016-2020.

It is worth remarking that the difficulties now facing the countries of central and northern Europe may be taken as a forewarning of the problems and social and production costs that Europe as a whole would need to deal with were it to decide to initiate a broad technological modernisation plan and embrace immigration as a means of offsetting the decline in the native population.

In view of the approach adopted by the Nordic countries, which is intended to bring about proper social inclusion, the models pursued by countries such as France, the United Kingdom and Belgium, which are

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[24] Cf. Anne Britt Djuve, *Refugee migration – a crisis for the Nordic model?*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, April 2016 http://adapt.it/englishbulletin/wp/refugee-migration-a-crisis-for-the-nordic-model.

[25] Cf. Matthias M. Mayer, *Germany's Response to the Refugee Situation*, Newpolitik, Bertelsman Foundation, 2016 http://www.bfna.org/sites/default/files/publications/Germanys_Response_to_the_Refugee_Situation_Mayer.pdf.

based on the marginalisation of immigrant communities, appear unacceptable. In France in the last century, for example, it was decided to create dormitory districts specifically to accommodate the African (mainly Arab) immigrants who, as a result of decolonisation and the demand for labour in that the period, flowed into the country. This arrangement clearly left them in a state of isolation that is now reflected in the fate of the second and third generations. In the United Kingdom, settlements of immigrant communities enjoy a kind of extraterritoriality that allows them freely to govern their own private and religious relationships, a situation that has led to the coining of the expression *Londonistan*. A similar situation has arisen in Belgium, where the marginalisation of immigrants is a result of their having been settled in the deprived neighbourhoods of the major cities, such as the Molenbeek district of Brussels, which has turned out to be a den of terrorists. Finding themselves socially and culturally excluded, many young French, British and Belgian citizens, the offspring of immigrant parents, struggle with an identity crisis that leaves them vulnerable to the deadly siren call of Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, whereas their parents had been absorbed, albeit in lowly jobs, by a labour market sustained by economic expansion and industrial development, they, being equipped only with mediocre education and training, have little to offer a production sector that, technologically, is undergoing a transformation towards the information and knowledge society. As a result, and this is true in France in particular, they are prevented from entering the workplace; what is more, even those who do manage meet the necessary professional requirements find that they are discriminated against when seeking work in the private sector on account of their surnames, which indicate their origins. Since they have French, British or Belgian citizenship, they obviously encounter fewer obstacles when seeking public sector employment, especially in the armed forces or police service; indeed, the victims of terror attacks in France by Islamic extremists have included members of immigrant families employed in these services.[26]

For Italy and the other Mediterranean countries, the experiences of the central and northern European countries and the political debate that has unfolded there have purely emblematic value and, for the moment, remain largely ignored. The situation in countries with a less ad-

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[26] We recall the three military victims of Montauban and Toulouse attacks in 2012, and the police officer killed by the attackers fleeing after the shooting at the editorial offices of *Charlie Hebdo* in January 2015.

vanced production system, like those of southern Europe, is such that immigrants are more likely to spontaneously enter low-skilled and poorly paid work (as carers, in the construction industry, in agriculture, or door-to-door sales), and it also favours an expansion of the underground economy. These realities leave the development model adopted in these countries, which lie on the fringe of the migration phenomenon, open to severe criticism and also to an extent justify northern European reservations about the Mediterranean countries. They also raise concerns about the stagnant productivity of these countries, whose competitiveness, moreover, is based mainly on employment mobility, containment of labour costs, the existence of a vast underground economy, and tax evasion. These negative considerations aside, however, it is worth highlighting the efforts made by numerous regional and local authorities in Italy to meet the need for welfare assistance and social inclusion of immigrants, in part through the intervention of cultural mediation organisations. Unfortunately, however, in the absence of adequate public support policies, such efforts are bound to fail, like the attempts to repopulate Alpine and Apennine areas whose populations have been declining as a result of the pull of the lowland towns and cities. Given that these mountain areas have also suffered a gradual shrinking of essential public services (healthcare, schools, transport, telecommunications and postal services), efforts to revive and re-establish communities there will inevitably fail unless these services can be restored and the new residents helped to preserve these areas' traditional economic activities (farming, forestry, crafts). In this instance, too, the Italian authorities could draw inspiration from successful initiatives adopted elsewhere, namely Switzerland and Austria, and the autonomous Italian provinces of Trento and Bolzano, all of which actively strive to safeguard the economic activities of mountain areas. Finally, it should also be remembered that as a result of the economic and employment crisis that has hit Italy and other Mediterranean countries, many young Italian, Greek and Spanish citizens, like the majority of migrants, are keen to move to northern Europe.

What these various national scenarios show is that social inclusion must be politically monitored, and that it comes at a price. To believe that Europe's demographic decline can be slowed down through permissive policies on immigration is to seriously underestimate the problem, as this idea overlooks the complexity of the EU's needs; Europe, in fact, needs workers with different levels of qualification, but above all it needs people with high qualifications if it is to maintain its competitive

growth rates and support its social welfare system in the future. It is simplistic to think that openness to immigration is enough, as this idea fails to take into account the fact that the population decline is an effect of real existential distress due to a series of factors — a loss of fundamental values, a shortage of employment opportunities, a lack of job security, inadequate welfare support, and a lack of measures to support working women —, all of which weigh heavily on the decisions made by young couples thinking about settling down and starting a family. From this perspective, it is easy to see why most immigrants are males and why family reunifications are permitted only when the head of the family has job security, and a home is available for the family; it also explains why immigrants themselves end up having fewer children, replicating the small nuclear family that is the prevalent model in Europe.

External Intervention.

Another consequence of Germany's unilateral initiative has been a growing realisation of the need to set up agreements with third countries, specifically the migrants' countries of origin and the transit countries.

In this regard, it is worth examining, in chronological order, the decisions reached at the EU-Africa summit in La Valletta of 11-12 November 2015,[27] the EU-Turkey agreements, the *Migration Compact* presented by the Italian government, and the *New Partnership Framework with third countries* proposed by the Commission.

In La Valletta, the EU reached agreements with African countries aimed at reducing the flow of migrants to Europe's Mediterranean coastline; the proposed measures concerned the provision of support for local development plans and for the organisation of refugee camps in transit countries. In view of the prominence of Ethiopia as a country of origin (as well as transit and destination) of Europe-bound irregular migrants and refugees from the Horn of Africa, the most significant of these agreements was the EU-Ethiopia *Joint Declaration for a Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility*. In addition, the summit resulted in the adoption of a political declaration, as well as an action plan aimed at addressing the root causes of irregular migration and improving cooperation on legal migration and mobility; it also saw the formal launch of the "Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa",

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[27] Cf. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-valletta-summit-press-pack.

to be fed with EUR 1.8 billion from the EU budget, a sum that complements the existing aid assistance (over EUR 10 billion until 2020) provided by the EU to these and other African regions.[28]

At the summit, the EU also declared its readiness to set up a Regional Development and Protection Programme in the Horn of Africa, aimed at stopping the flow of migrants. Supported by EU, national and local funds, the programme covers refugee assistance, and is also intended to help local authorities develop their capacity of intervention. In this context, the possibility of the EU returning migrants to their countries of origin, providing the crisis factors have first been eliminated, was left open.

Instead, the March 2016 agreement with Turkey[29] — this was a controversial move given the internal regression of Turkey even before the night (between 15 and 16 July, 2016) of the failed *coup d'état* attempt — was reached as a result of the personal diplomacy of Chancellor Merkel. It may be seen as an attempt to ensure the existence, outside Europe, of a safe haven offering proper humanitarian protection, and thus to avoid further tragedies in the Aegean Sea and counter the international criminal activity behind the illegal crossings, as well as an attempt to dissuade Turkey (through the incentive of EUR 6 billion in aid, to be delivered in two installments) from encouraging Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan refugees present in its territory to try and reach EU countries, as instead it had done in the summer of 2015.

However, the fact is that the EU-Turkey agreement is open to criticism for a number of reasons. First of all, it addresses only the migrant flows likely to use the Balkan route. Second, it effectively considers all new migrants arriving in Greek territory irregular, given that it requires the Greek authorities to return them to Turkey without taking account of asylum applications in accordance with the Dublin Regulation. Indeed, to avoid formally infringing the Dublin regulation, and to ensure compliance, by Europe, with the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, under the agreement Turkey was unwisely declared a *country of first asylum* for Syrian refugees and a *safe third country* for non-Syrian refugees. But, in fact, both these definitions have been contested by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UN-

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[28] Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_factsheet_emergency_trust_fund_africa_en.pdf.
[29] Cf. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement.

HCR) due to the dubious level of protection refugees are actually afforded by Turkey, whose internal legislation needs to be modified in order to fully guarantee asylum seekers, in particular non-Syrians, the protections provided by the Geneva Convention. This restrictive provision is only partially attenuated by the EU's willingness to resettle up to a maximum of 72,000 Syrian refugees in the EU, in a proportion of one for each Syrian returned to Turkey.

In April 2016 the Italian government, concerned about the likely impact of the EU agreement with Turkey on the central Mediterranean route into the EU, presented its *Migration Compact*,[30] a document suggesting a strategy of intervention in African countries and a reorganisation of Europe's development aid tools.

On 7 June, 2016, the Commission responded to this initiative with a "Communication on establishing a *New Partnership Framework with third countries*".[31] Its plan, geared at "substantially stepping up the impact of [European] actions on the external dimension of the European Agenda on Migration", envisages coordinated efforts by the EU and member states to conclude compacts with third countries based on a combination of positive and negative incentives designed to improve cooperation with these countries over migration. The document also underlines the need to "complete the compacts with Jordan and Lebanon" on the provision of aid to the refugees hosted by these countries, "take EU-Tunisia cooperation to the next level", "launch and agree compacts with Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia", and be "ready to support the Libyan Government of National Accord".

To deliver these compacts, the EU plans to deploy around EUR 8 billion over the period 2016-2020, in addition to the development aid already provided by the member states and the Union. In the longer term, it also plans to step up efforts to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and develop reception capacities at local level, envisaging, for that purpose, the possible mobilisation of a further EUR 62 billion.

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[30] http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/immigrazione_0.pdf.

[31] Cf. Communication from the Commission COM (2016)385 final. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160607/communication_external_aspects_eam_towards_new_migration_ompact_en.pdf. It is also interesting to note the position taken by the Italian Senate on the *Migration Compact* and on the *New Partnership Framework with third countries:* http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/17/DOSSIER/987259/index.html?stampa=si&part=dossier_dossier1-sezione_sezione2-h3_h318&spart=si.

What Strategy is Needed to Develop a Sustainable Immigration Policy?

The problems that have emerged in relation to migrant reception and inclusion policies, and the various efforts to develop an external intervention able to bring migratory flows to Europe under control, clearly highlight a single issue, namely how difficult it is for the European institutions (Commission, European Parliament, European Council) to build a comprehensive common strategy. The reason for this difficulty is the European Parliament's lack of essential powers and full democratic legitimacy, which in turn results in a deficiency in the process of political will formation.[32] Indeed, the European Parliament has no fiscal powers or foreign and security policy powers, yet these are the very powers it needs if it is to be able to take meaningful action on immigration issues, and give executive orders to the Commission. Because of the failure to complete the process of European integration, these powers have remained in the hands of the member states, with the result that immigration, development and foreign policy issues continue to influence political competition at national level. Consequently, a decisive role in the functioning of the EU institutions is played by the Council, whose action is crucially determined by the divisions that exist between the governments of the member states, and especially between those of the main European countries, each of which is intent on pursuing its own interests. And because the different countries' attitudes to reception and inclusion policies are conditioned by their own production development policies and cultural constraints, they do not all offer the same opportunities for integration. The divisions between the main EU countries are also the main factor influencing attempts at external intervention, with each country, again, determined to pursue its own interests, in this case in the Middle East, Libya the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel. Even the Commission's proposed *New Partnership Framework with third countries* is structured in such a way as to ensure the maintenance of bilateral relations between each EU member state and the various African countries. In this respect, Europe has failed to learn from the lessons offered by the United States in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, when it launched the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe, making this intervention conditional upon the Europeans' undertaking to manage jointly the aid that was provided, and the North Atlantic Treaty, under which, faced with the threat of Soviet expansionism, Washington assumed responsibility for

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[32] It also explains the lack of true alignments of European political parties and plans for EU government.

guaranteeing security in Europe. The increased security and development created in Western Europe had the effect, among others, of ending the pressure to emigrate to other continents, while intra-European migration was brought within the framework governed by the European Treaty provisions on the free movement of workers. These lessons of yesterday are crucially important for Europe today, if it is to bring migratory flows under control, revitalise its identity, develop an openness towards intercultural exchanges, and lead the way in promoting peace, security and development in its neighbouring areas[33] — in short, export and establish its own supranational democratic model of government.

It must be strongly emphasised, in this regard, that migratory flows are not stemmed by building walls or tightening controls at national borders, as the populist movements in some of our European states seem to believe, or by erecting walls at common external borders. This latter solution (by some dubbed "Fortress Europe") would isolate us from the rest of the world and only increase the instability in the neighbouring areas, a situation that would have dramatic consequences for Europe. The current flows can be reduced and regulated only by ensuring peace and security in the world, and in the Middle East and Africa in particular, so that the local populations might begin moving towards a future of freedom from foreign servitude and domestic feudalism — a future built on democracy, development and egalitarian and supportive social models. What is more, the humanitarian grounds on which, quite rightly, every effort must be made to save migrants in difficulty at sea are the very same ones that demand activation of a policy in support of peace and security, as well as aid to promote the economic, political and social development of the areas that are feeding the migration crisis. Another aspect of the phenomenon that should not be overlooked is the cost to the countries of origin in terms of the loss of human and economic resources, which obviously impacts on their prospects for development. Indeed, those most likely to emigrate are the young and enterprising and those who have managed to save the money needed to pay for their journey (in so doing feeding the coffers of the international criminal groups that organise these "journeys of hope").

It will, however, be far from easy to normalise the areas lying on Europe's external borders, primarily the Middle East, given the regional power struggle under way, in Syria and in Yemen, between, on the one hand, the Gulf petro-monarchies and Turkey and, on the other, Iran.

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[33] See Article 3 of the EU Treaty.

This is a situation that is being monitored, from a distance, both by the USA, whose inclination is to disengage from the Middle East, and by Russia, which instead would like to draw all the region's protagonists within its network of influence, so as to present itself as the only power able to protect and intervene in the balance in the region (but also, potentially, to be the only power able to control the flow of oil to Europe).

Leaving aside the Venice Declaration of 1980,[34] Europe has never really considered implementing a true project for pacification and reconstruction in the Middle East, be it by encouraging a normalisation of relations between Israelis, Palestinians and the Arab peoples, or by fostering pressure to overcome the feudal dynasties of the Gulf region and a spread and a strengthening of democracy and the rule of law in the countries of the area, from Afghanistan to the Maghreb countries, Turkey and Yemen. The EU remained passive in the face of the "Arab Spring" and is now faced with the grave consequences of this inertia — war in Syria and Yemen and the destabilisation of Libya. The latter was actually catalysed by the intervention of France and the UK, which undoubtedly wanted to get their hands on its oil resources and were certainly not driven by a desire to encourage a democratic transition in the country. Indeed, the level of interest, among foreign powers, in bringing about a democratic transition of Libya is nowhere near as great as their interest in pursuing the same objective in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and so on.

Similar considerations apply to the confrontation between European and non-European powers wanting access to Africa's resources. However, the new approach initiated in La Valletta, and strengthened by the documents in favour of bilateral relations with the individual Arab countries (respectively Italy's *Migration Compact* and the Commission's *New Partnership Framework with third countries*) would have had far greater impact had the EU and its member states decided to make their provision of aid and development assistance conditional upon the creation of regional groupings among the beneficiary states — groupings that should have been required to develop common infrastructure projects in the fields of energy (like the *Desertech* project[35]),

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[34] This declaration issued at the end of an EU summit opened the way for the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO and for the birth of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 1994.

[35] The Desertech project, sponsored by the leading German energy producers, aimed to build a network of solar power plants in North Africa, the Sahara and the Arabian peninsula, in order to produce energy for local needs and for exportation to Europe. The

water governance, education and common security, as the first steps in processes designed to lead to economic integration and political unification in the region, along the lines of the European Coal and Steel Community that marked the start of Europe's own integration process. The risk that the planned aid for Africa may be used to support the area's largely corrupt governments, which are not only inefficient but also serve the interests of external powers, seems to have escaped European public opinion. In a similar way, the recent agreement with Turkey carries the risk of strengthening a destabilising regional power.

To be able to achieve political normalisation and economic stabilisation of the areas lying on its borders — crucial objectives for reducing the migratory flow towards Europe to sustainable levels —, the EU needs to provide clear signals that it is restarting its own process of political unification, even if this initiative might initially embrace only a core group of states ready and willing to be involved. But to have internal and external influence, this project must be credible, and in this sense it would be valuable at least to launch a plan to complete the Economic and Monetary Union (by giving the European Parliament powers to finance, through "own resources", a budget for the euro area to fund domestic and foreign investment programmes, by completing the banking union, and by transforming the European Stability Mechanism into a monetary fund able to help absorb any asymmetric shocks to member states' finances).

Following in the wake of the introduction of European elections and the creation of a single European currency, completion of the economic and monetary union among those countries ready to take this step would, in itself, by helping to bring about concrete affirmation of the concept of European sovereignty, send out an important political signal and have major consequences. Neither should we forget, in this regard, the experience of the past, namely how the decisions, in the 1970s, to introduce direct elections of the European Parliament and launch the European monetary system resulted, in the decade that followed, in Altiero Spinelli's drive for European constituent power within the European Parliament and the completion of the monetary union, and even more significantly, how the revival of the European process precipitated the crisis of the USSR and the end of its influence over

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project, which was suspended after the failure of the "Arab Spring", would have allowed the oil producing countries to limit extractions, distributing them over time and saving resources for future generations, to cut emissions of CO_2 and, above all, to introduce a form of regional cooperation that could have evolved politically.

central and eastern Europe and the Balkans. That virtuous cycle went on to produce the reunification of Germany, the Maastricht Treaty, the creation of the euro, and the enlargement of the EU to numerous former communist countries.

It is important to heed this lesson in order to understand the impact that a revival of European integration would have today, both within Europe and externally, specifically on the power situations in the Middle East and Africa, on relations with Russia, and on the Ukraine question. To really appreciate the value, both internally and externally, of relaunching the process along lines designed to lead to the creation of a European federal government, it is essential to recognise what Europe needs in order to bring immigration down to sustainable levels, reduce the pressure of the refugee crisis, and marginalise the populist movements within its member states. The European Union needs federal institutions that can foster an advanced development model capable of generating the resources needed not only to give the European people real future prospects again, but also to enable Europe to offer sustained external development assistance and, in so doing, assume responsibility for promoting the establishment of peace and democratic freedoms in the Middle East and Africa.[37] Only in this way will it be possible to free these peoples of the need that drives them to abandon their homelands, and reduce the migration phenomenon to levels that European society is able to sustain.

As Europe prepares to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome (on 25 March 2017) and looks towards the next European elections in 2019, this is the great challenge facing its politicians.

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[37] It is worth remembering the strategic importance of the New Deal which set the stage for the involvement of the United States in World War II and allowed the country to assume the leadership of the Western world in the postwar period.

Notes

NATIONAL FISCAL SOVEREIGNTY
OR EUROPEAN TAXATION?

With its two recent proposals for Council directives,[1] the European Commission has, once again, brought the issue of the harmonisation of corporate tax bases into the spotlight, its aim being, initially, to introduce a single criterion for determining the common tax base, and at a later stage to move on to the issue of a consolidated tax base. The proposed regimes — these would be mandatory for EU groups with a total consolidated group revenue exceeding €750 million and for non-EU groups that generate such a revenue in the territory of the Union, and optional for corporations with a lower revenue — would not involve the imposition of a single rate across the EU territory, only the establishment of criteria for determining taxable profits. It is a scheme that would not allow derogations through individual agreements and that should lead to lower administrative costs for businesses operating in several member states; furthermore, certain profits, such as investments in research and development, would not be taxable.

The idea of introducing a common corporate tax base actually dates back to 2011, when the Commission first issued a proposal for a Council directive on a set of common rules for computing the tax base of European companies.[2] However, that proposal, which envisaged an optional regime, was opposed by some member states and never resulted in an act of the European Union.

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[1] Proposal for a Council directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base, COM(2016) 685 final, 25.10.2016 and Proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) COM(2016) 683 final, 25.10.2016.

[2] Proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121 final, 16.3.2011.

The European Commission's latest attempt to propose common rules in this field may be seen as a response to recent tax scandals, especially the one involving the Apple companies in Ireland. The Commission has declared that Ireland's fiscal treatment of these companies is illegal under EU state aid rules,[3] and that, as a result, the Irish government must recover the unpaid taxes, which amount to around €13 billion, plus interest. This particular affair has attracted more media attention than others not just because of the huge amount of money involved, but also because the Irish government has indicated that it (like Apple) intends to appeal against the Commission's decision; indeed, it is unwilling to recover the sum in question for fear of losing its status as a tax haven for multinational corporations. This situation arose because Ireland had previously issued Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe, two Irish incorporated companies, a tax ruling that allowed them to allocate the majority of their profits to a "head office" that, not being based in any country and having no employees or premises of its own, did not actually exist; consequently, these profits were not taxed anywhere. According to figures released during US Senate public hearings, Apple Sales International recorded profits of around €16 billion in 2011, but as an effect of the tax ruling only a small proportion of this total (€50 million) was considered taxable in Ireland: as a result, the corporate tax effectively paid by Apple Sales International corresponded to a rate of 0.05 per cent on its overall annual profits.

This affair, like the other tax scandals that have come to light in recent years, raises the issue of the fiscal sovereignty of the EU member states and the impact that EU law has on it. Even though the power to levy taxes remains exclusively in the hands of the member states and the European Union has no fiscal capacity of its own, there can be no doubt that European Union law does, to some extent, interfere with this sphere of state action.

As a case in point, the Apple/Ireland affair seems to have arisen from two conditions: first, the fiscal sovereignty of the member states, which allows each one to decide, independently, its tax treatment of companies operating on its territory, and second, the freedom of movement provided for under the Treaties, which allows enterprises to move around freely within the Union. As a result of the coexistence of these conditions, together with the absence of a harmonised fiscal system,

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[3] Cf. European Commission – Press release, 30 August 2016 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2923_en.htm).

multinationals seek to transfer their profits to the member states where the tax burden is lowest; at the same time, the member states become engaged in an out-and-out fiscal race, competing with each other to lower their tax rates so as to encourage investments in their territory and protect their tax base.

The measures provided by EU law for countering such behaviours are actually rather weak. Specifically, with regard to the possibility, for companies, of taking advantage of the freedom of movement provisions in order to transfer profits to countries with more favourable rates of taxation, the European Court of Justice (*Halifax*[4] and *Cadbury Schweppes*[5] judgments) has underlined that this conduct, perfectly legal if it corresponds to effective business transactions, is prohibited only in cases in which a company creates fictitious scenarios (i.e. not corresponding to its true business activities) solely for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining advantages provided by Community law. Furthermore, the EU does not prohibit member states from applying favourable tax rates to companies operating on their territory; what it does prohibit is the selective granting of preferential treatment to *certain* companies, as this conduct would harm competition and violate the state aid rules.

However, the coexistence of 28 different tax systems undoubtedly makes it hard for smaller enterprises to conduct business within the territories of a number of member states, as it is more difficult for them than for large multinationals to form a clear picture of the applicable tax regulations. A harmonised corporate tax base would serve, precisely, to simplify this picture. Although it would not in fact entail the imposition of a single rate of taxation, it would make it possible to establish what profits are taxable and in which member state they are payable, and would also significantly reduce administrative costs, especially for medium and small enterprises. The Commission has estimated that, under the proposed Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base regime, the costs, to these enterprises, of opening a subsidiary abroad could in fact fall by as much as 67 per cent, while they could see an up to 30 per cent reduction in their tax burden.

In view of Apple's tax affairs in Ireland, the issue of fiscal sovereignty also clearly needs to be addressed from another, more strictly macroeconomic, perspective. In fact, the Irish government's intention

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[4] ECJ, judgment of 21 February 2006, case C-255/02, *Halifax and others*.
[5] ECJ, judgment of 12 September 2006, case C-196/04, *Cadbury Schweppes*.

to contest the Commission's decision concerning the recovery of the aid and thus, ultimately, to forgo €13 billion, provides a clear illustration of just how important it has become for some eurozone countries to implement a fiscal policy aimed at attracting investments within their territory, given that they are no longer able to use monetary policy instruments to achieve their macroeconomic objectives. As Apple pointed out in a letter to the Apple Community in Europe following the Commission's decision, this decision, should it be upheld, "would strike a devastating blow to the sovereignty of EU member states over their own tax matters".

It should nevertheless be stressed that it is an illusion to believe that member states are entirely sovereign in fiscal matters. Although back in the 1970s, the Werner Plan, envisaging the possibility of a single currency, insisted that monetary policy could not be separated from economic and fiscal policy, the choices made in Maastricht, namely to transfer monetary policy to European level and leave economic policy and fiscal policy in the hands of the member states while coordinating them at European level, went entirely against this. The economic and financial crisis of recent years, creating a need for increasingly stringent measures to coordinate the economic and budgetary policies of the eurozone countries, and effectively leading the European institutions to interfere more and more in the areas that are still the responsibility of the member states, has certainly shown this model to be unsustainable. Although fiscal policy continues to be considered one of the cornerstones of state sovereignty, this is clearly true more in theory than in practice: indeed, many decisions concerning the choice and use of fiscal resources are now dictated by Europe.

As a result of a reluctance to take the important step of transferring economic and fiscal policy competences to supranational level, we are now left with a situation in which there is no longer any level of government equipped with effective economic policy tools — a situation that has serious implications from a democratic legitimacy perspective. Indeed, what we are seeing in the euro area today is an erosion of the power of the states to exercise their fiscal powers autonomously and, as a result, an erosion of the power of the citizens to control, through the national parliaments, the management of these powers; at the same time, increasingly stringent supervisory powers are being transferred to a level (the European one) where there is no democratically legitimated government. As a result, the power to determine the orientation of the eurozone member states' fiscal policies is in the hands of organs

over which the citizens have no control. This is a contradictory situation that can be remedied only by linking monetary with fiscal policy, in short by creating a eurozone fiscal capacity under the supervision of the European Parliament.

Giulia Rossolillo

FEDERAL UNION
AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE

As we have seen at different junctures over the decades, it is not easy to solve the problems that, still today, prevent the Europeans from enjoying autonomous capabilities and credibility in the area of their foreign and security policy. This was seen to be true shortly after the end of Second World War, with the failure of the European Defence Community project when the process of European integration was still in its infancy. Similarly, in the decades following the end of the bipolar world order, a period that had seemed to offer openings for the construction of a new continental and global order based on a logic of mutual security between East and West, no easy answers could be found. At the start of the present century, when the occupation of Iraq by US and British troops prompted France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg to renew calls for the creation of a European military headquarters with greater autonomy from the USA, once again the depth of the difficulties to be overcome was clearly apparent.

Today, as a result of the British vote for Brexit, to say nothing of the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, Europe's defence has become a pressing issue once again, and, as in the past, we are seeing just how great the difficulties are. The proposals put forward so far are extremely cautious for two reasons: first, the national governments and the European Commission are aware of the present tensions between the different European countries, and second, the single governments, unwilling to take chances that might damage their performance at the polls, are opting for inertia. As repeatedly un-

derlined by Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HRVP), the idea of creating a European army in a short space of time is currently out of the question. Indeed, not only is this objective not even on the table, and impossible to pursue in the framework of the current Treaties, it would also be pointless, given that "even NATO does not have a NATO army".[1] This latter assertion is actually true only in a formal sense, however, as there can be no denying that NATO's credibility is based on the strength and capacity for action and deterrence of an army — the US army — that has played a fundamental role in all the major military operations in which it has intervened since the end of the Second World War, and remains a decisive force today.

Donald Trump, tapping into a sense of malaise and discontent that has been brewing for some time on the other side of the Atlantic,[2] has repeatedly and emphatically called for a loosening of America's commitment to Europe's defence. Yet even the anxiety generated by the prospect of a US disengagement, financial as well as military, from Europe does not seem to be enough to convince the Europeans that they need to abandon the mindset that leads them to pursue nothing more than a mere strengthening of their existing military alliance, and instead endeavour to create a true European defence union.

To take stock of, and summarise, the concrete developments in the debate on these issues now unfolding in Europe, we here briefly outline, in chronological order, the various proposals that have so far been advanced.

    I. The European Commission's *Global Strategy for the European*

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[1] See, in this regard the statements made by Federica Mogherini in her addresses given on 5 and 27 September and in the press conference of November 14 on the occasion of emergency meeting of the 28 foreign affairs and defence ministers to discuss the implementation of the *Global Strategy* proposed by the Commission, www.facebook.com /f.mogherini/?fref=ts.

[2] An explicit and formal request to the Europeans to shoulder more responsibility for their defence had already been advanced during the Obama presidency by the then US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, who issued the blunt warning that "there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress — and in the American body politic writ large — to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense." The *Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO),* as delivered by Secretary of Defence Robert M. Gates, Brussels, Belgium, Friday, June 10, 2011, https://www.scribd.com/document/57526818/Secretary-Gates-Address-About-NATO-s-Future.

Union's Foreign And Security Policy (EU Global Strategy, EUGS), submitted to the European Council in late June, rests on three guiding principles, all of which are taken up in the various other proposals mentioned below.

The first principle is to make full use of the possibilities offered by the existing Treaties. To begin with, Europe could finally deploy the EU Battlegroups. Directly controlled by the Council of the European Union, the EU Battlegroups are military units, each consisting of 1500 troops provided, in rotation, by member states. Although the system reached full operational capacity in 2007, no Battlegroup has yet seen active service. It is easy to see why this instrument has never been used. The headquarters of the groups rotates, according to their composition, and the resources at their disposal depend on the amount that each of the single states contributing to a Battlegroup is willing to spend. Their organisational and operational structure is further complicated by the fact that the countries participating in the different groups also include non-EU NATO members (Norway and Turkey), as well as countries that are not members of either the EU or NATO (Macedonia and Ukraine). On the other hand, other countries (Denmark and Malta), despite being EU members, do not contribute to any of the Battlegroups. But the most important point highlighted by the EUGS is the possibility to implement Articles 42.6 and 46 TEU, which gives certain EU countries the possibility of strengthening their cooperation in military matters through the mechanism of permanent structured cooperation. This, too, is an instrument that so far has never actually been used given that, even though it can be implemented through a qualified majority vote by the Council, its workability is limited by the fact that adoption of the cooperation's decisions and recommendations is subject to unanimity among the participating Council members (which must therefore have decided unanimously, beforehand, what they intend to do together). Conscious of the difficulties inherent in launching and implementing this mechanism in practice, HRVP Mogherini also recalled the possibility of evoking Article 42.7 (on the obligation of aid and assistance towards member states that are the victims of armed aggression on their territory) and the hitherto unused Article 44 (under which the Council can entrust a group of states with certain military tasks).

The second guiding principle of the EUGS is to fully explore the possibilities for better planning and coordination of joint military and civilian operations in crisis areas, while its third is to identify the strategic industrial and technological capabilities in the field of de-

fence that need to be promoted jointly, also through financial incentive mechanisms.

Clearly, on an institutional level, the development of the EUGS, to which the member states were invited to respond with considerations and proposals of their own, never goes beyond the framework of the intergovernmental method as defined and structured (for the field foreign and security policy) by the existing Treaties. Accordingly, both the launch of closer cooperation and, above all, the implementation and funding of this mechanism are issues that remain firmly in the hands of the Council.

II. France and Germany were quick to respond to the EUGS, putting forward considerations and suggestions that, however, remained essentially in line with the approach adopted by the Commission. Indeed, following the presentation of the European Commission's strategy, as many as three papers were submitted jointly by French and German government ministers. The first was presented by foreign ministers Jean-Marc Ayrault and Frank-Walter Steinmeier (27 June), the second by interior ministers Bernard Cazeneuve and Thomas de Maizière (23 August), and the third by defence ministers Jean-Yves Le Drian and Ursula von der Leyen (11 September). In this latter paper, the two ministers underlined the importance of translating the EUGS into concrete actions, of actually using the permanent structured cooperation mechanism, and of setting up a central military headquarters. But they also specified that any chain of command should be headed by the Brussels-based EU Political and Security Committee, which is composed of the member states' ambassadors in Brussels and chaired by representatives of the European External Action Service. On the financial side, the two ministers, while calling for the creation of new dedicated financial instruments, failed to specify how these might be sourced and governed.

III. German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, delivering a speech last October, was similarly vague. While stating that the European Union would "soon need a common defence budget" and that the EU countries' financial resources in the defence sector, if pooled, would greatly exceed Russia's military budget, he failed to outline the framework that would allow such a sharing of resources, or how his proposal might be reconciled with current German policy in this area. Indeed, the German government, after 25 years of cuts, recently decided unilaterally to significantly increase its national defence budget for the next five years.

IV. Italy's contribution to the ongoing process of reflection on the EUGS is a paper recently presented by then foreign minister Gentiloni and defence minister Pinotti. Although this document, too, remains in the ambit of policies that can be pursued within the existing framework, and among other things expresses support for deployment of the Battlegroups and recourse to the permanent structured cooperation mechanism, it nevertheless urges the European partners to go a step further. Indeed, the paper suggests that full use of the possibilities offered by the Treaties should go hand in hand with discussion, among interested member states, of a more ambitious option, namely the launching of a kind of European Defence Union, modelled on the Schengen system. By pooling their forces and commands and sharing their control, manoeuvre and response capabilities, the countries participating in this Union could create, as the core of a future integrated European force, a joint military European force permanently available to the EU military headquarters. This proposal, unlike the previous ones, addresses the issue of the nature of a future European military force, yet it fails to consider the institutional context in which this should be set. This is actually rather surprising in view of the paper's opening assertion: "when the context no longer corresponds to the aspirations of the times in which we live, then we must change the context".

V. On November 14, 2016 the EU's 28 foreign affairs and defence ministers approved the *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence* presented by Federica Mogherini.[3] This plan, which will be presented to Europe's heads of state and government at forthcoming summits, has been hailed by the French and German defence ministers as an important step, moving Europe closer towards greater strategic autonomy in military matters and decreasing its dependence on Washington. In reality, however, it does not constitute a significant advance with respect to the other proposals on the table. In two parts in particular (the ones dealing with the financial aspects and the actual implementation of permanent structured cooperation in the defence area), it only provides confirmation of the various governments' dif-

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[3] *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence*, by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission, and Head of the European Defence Agency, 14 November 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/11/pdf/implementation-plan-on-security-and-defence_pdf.

ficulties and hesitations when faced with a real chance to set out on this route. With regard to the need for increased financial solidarity, it merely remarks that "Member States to agree to consider financing in a comprehensive manner, reinforcing solidarity, effectiveness and flexibility to underpin the Level of Ambition and enhance CSDP [Common Security and Defence Policy] responsiveness" (point 11 of the document). With regard to the second aspect, i.e. making full use of the Treaty potential, the member states simply declare that they "agree to explore the potential of a single and inclusive PESCO [Permanent Structured Cooperation] based on the willingness of Member States to strengthen CSDP by undertaking concrete commitments. If so requested, the HRVP can provide elements and options for reflection" (point 12 of the document).

For the moment, then, the need to change the institutional framework in which decisions are made and action is taken does not seem to be a priority concern among those apparently wanting to give Europe its own defence capability. And yet this is, precisely, the crucial point, as was recently emphasised by, among others, the authors of comments on the German government's 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy[4] published by *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, from which we quote a particularly significant passage. "In short," write the authors of the comment "CSDP has failed to fulfil its potential due to a lack of political will. Using the concept and the term "union" in the context of European integration implies that this can only mean a long-term communitisation of the policy field, as has been the case with monetary union. This could mean, for example, creating the post of a fully-fledged EU Commissioner with authority over EU troops and transferring parliamentary approval from national parliaments to the European Parliament. This significant leap towards integration may well be an objective of German security policy. But those in favour of this objective should be absolutely clear about it and outline the steps to get there with a binding timetable, as was the case with monetary union. Given the current widespread aversion to greater integration, the argument in the White Paper for a Security and Defence Union initially appears ambitious, but it suffers

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[4] *The 2016 White Paper on German Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, Federal Ministry of Defence, https://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLL M9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pNyydP1wkHxOun5kap5-QW6uIwDwHf6z.

from the impression of indecision and half-heartedness."[5] These are, in fact, criticisms that may be extended to practically the whole of the ongoing debate on Europe's defence.

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The EU countries, geopolitically caught between the US and Russia, and situated on the fringe of African and Middle Eastern regions that are plagued by persistent and acute political and economic instability, are structurally exposed to the risks of unrest and agreements made at their expense. And unless these dangers are addressed rationally and systematically, European security will be undermined and the EU itself will be at risk of disintegrating. It is no longer just a question of preserving Europe's level of well-being; what is at stake now is peace. Given the close interactions that exist between security policy and foreign policy, which, in turn, are closely intertwined with trade and infrastructure and policies on transport and communications, as well as industrial and energy policies, it is clear that the value of any attempt to address Europe's security, both internal and external, can only be palliative if it amounts to nothing more than the pursuit of greater sectoral cooperation in the military field between states and governments, and fails to even consider the issue of the creation and management of a European army (however big or small this may be, and however complex and coordinated, between national and European levels, its operational framework). Furthermore, in an era in which nuclear deterrence is destined to continue to play an important role, it is equally unrealistic to imagine that the nature and structuring of a European defence capacity are issues that can safely be left in abeyance. This is, after all, an era in which, as remarked last April by the Russian-American Valdai Discussion Club in a report entitled *What Makes Great Power War Possible*, we are seeing "a clear trend away from strict rules of warfare or the existence of any tangible separation between war and peace." It is an era in which conflict between major continental powers has extended to the space and cyber domains, to the great electronic control and monitoring infrastructures, and to the energy, financial and

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[5] Markus Kaim, Hilmar Linnenkamp, *The New White Paper 2016 – Promoting Greater Understanding of Security Policy?,* Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) - German Institute for International and Security Affairs*,* Comments 2016/C 47, November 2016, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2016C47 _kim_lnk.pdf.

information domain, and one in which even a regional flare up, to say nothing of an eventual conflict, could "destroy important parts of the modern world all states depend on."[6]

As history itself has taught us, attempts to achieve sectoral integration in the military field, being inextricably linked with foreign policy and with the issue of political scrutiny, are bound to fail unless they are accompanied by a project for political union. We need only recall the failed attempt to create a European army through the European Defence Community (EDC). The idea behind the EDC project was to create institutions similar to those of the European Coal and Steel Community, but with military as opposed to economic competences, and without any reference to political institutions of a democratic and federal nature. It did not take long, in fact, for the negotiations to come up against the obstacle represented by the contradictory situation of attempting to address the defence of 1950s Western Europe without also resolving the crucial issue of the government that would be needed to manage it. Altiero Spinelli and Alcide de Gasperi found a way of overcoming this contradiction, namely to link the creation of a European army to the establishment of a supranational political body to be elected directly by the Europeans. This solution found concrete expression in the draft European Political Community (EPC) Treaty drawn up by an Ad Hoc Assembly established for the purpose. It is worth recalling here the opening words of the *Information and Official Documents of the Constitutional Committee*, a text prepared up by Von Brentano (chairman of the Constitutional Committee set up within the Ad Hoc Assembly) as an introduction to the Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community: "When signing on 27 May 1952 the Treaty of the European Defence Community, the Six Governments said that they were conscious 'that this is a new and essential step towards the creation of a united Europe'. The Treaty did not confine itself, in point of fact, to giving verbal expression to the common determination of the Six Countries to integrate their armed forces in a European army within the framework of a supra-national community; it also laid down the procedure to be followed in determining the definitive structures of Europe. Under Article 38 of the Treaty, the Assembly of the EDC was instructed to examine within six months from its inauguration 'the constitution of an Assembly of the European Defence Community, elected on a de-

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[6] http://valdaiclub.com/files/10683.

mocratic basis' which might 'constitute one of the elements in a sub-
sequent federal or confederal structure, based on the principle of the
separation of powers and having, in particular, a two-chamber system
of representation'."[7] In short, the original plan for sectoral integration
in the military field, to be feasible, should have been set within an un-
ambiguous plan for political unification, that, had it been carried
through to completion, would certainly have marked the start of the
construction of a true European federal state.[8]

It is no coincidence that Guy Verhofstadt, speaking before the Eu-
ropean Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs on July 12,
2016, recalled the historical precedent of the EPC, and did so precise-
ly in order to underline that the key issue that must be addressed, if Eu-
rope is to find a way out of the various crises and overcome its own
powerlessness, remains the creation, a process still unfinished, of a po-
litical community, a political union. In fact, the Verhofstadt report[9] sets
the issues of defence and foreign policy in the framework of a federal-
type reform of the European institutions.

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In the light of all that has been said above, it is clear that today, as
in the last century, the crucial problem of Europe's defence cannot be
resolved merely by tackling certain sectoral issues and without creat-
ing the conditions that will allow an evolution, in a federal direction,
of the current EU structure. By merely pursuing greater integration in
the military field without really wanting to overcome the purely inter-
governmental perspective, Europe runs a very high risk of failing, pre-
cisely because, in the defence field, even more than in the monetary
one, capacity to act is not just a question of rules, but of *power* and
sovereignty.

As happens in other sectors, first and foremost the economic and fi-
nancial sectors, where effective European policies are urgently needed,
the governments' reluctance to build a true supranational (federal)
power at European level means that the current proposals on defence
are limited by the will to keep them within the intergovernmental

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[7] http://aei.pitt.edu/991/1/political_union_draft_treaty_1.pdf.
[8] In this regard, see Sergio Pistone in *Il ruolo di Altiero Spinelli nella genesi dell'art.
38 della CED e del progetto della CEP*, Contributions to the Symposium in Luxembourg,
17-19 May 1989, Publications of the European Community Liaison Committee of His-
torians, Giuffré, Milan 1993.
[9] This report is currently under discussion in the European Parliament, which is due
to vote on it by the end of 2016.

framework. Instead, as Wheare pointed out, it is only in a federation that a government with the power to decide and operate in areas of common interest can be the tool for action.[10]

The time has come to stop making excuses and instead strive to combine the issue of European defence with the development of a federal union design. This must be the priority for all those who truly appreciate the desperately urgent need to work for peace in Europe and in the world.

Franco Spoltore

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[10] K.C. Wheare, *The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth*, Oxford University Press, London, 1963. See, in this regard, his considerations on considerations on the limits of cooperation, pp.128-129 and 135-136.

Documents

SPEECH BY THE
EMERITUS PRESIDENT
OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC,
GIORGIO NAPOLITANO*

I am indebted to President Anselmi and to all those who, with laudable tenacity, keep the noble tradition of the federalist movement alive here in Italy. I am also both grateful and honoured to be the recipient of an award that, most generously motivated, means all the more to me for having previously been conferred on one of Italy's most respected protagonists of European integration, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi. I am particularly grateful for the opportunity this has given me to pay tribute to Altiero Spinelli, as we approach the 30th anniversary of his death.

The significance of the presence here today of the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, the President of the Senate, whom I thank for his warm and cordial words of greeting, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, will escape no one. We are grateful to all of them.

Like them, I cordially greet the authorities and the special guests here present. My particularly affectionate greetings go to Renata Colorni, who was so dear to Altiero and Ursula, as were all her sisters.

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Over the years I have, on a number of occasions, had the opportunity to express, publicly, my views on Spinelli's ideas, on the extraordinary unfolding of his life's work, and on the legacy he left behind, the first time being when I addressed the House of Deputies on the first anniver-

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* This is a translation of the speech delivered by the Emeritus President of the Italian Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, on 22 January, 2016, in the Sala Zuccari of the Italian Senate. The occasion was a ceremony during which he was presented with the "Riconoscimento Altiero Spinelli", an award conferred by the European Federalist Movement on individuals deemed key contributors to the building of a federal Europe. The ceremony was attended by the President of the Republic and the President of the Senate.

sary of his death. More recently, speaking at the University of Pavia, I underlined how much I, personally, am indebted to his teaching, and how remarkable his life story was. Spinelli's long and difficult years in prison and then in exile culminated in the Ventotene Manifesto, a great project for Europe, conceived by him together with Ernesto Rossi and Eugenio Colorni. With the fall of fascism, however, Spinelli regained his freedom but found himself isolated politically. He thus embarked on his long journey, strengthened only by the feeling that he had a mission to fulfil.

In order to reflect, today, on the arduous path of European integration and on how best to address the choices that lie ahead, I wish to take, as my starting point, Spinelli's final message, which dates back to March 1986 when he had, in his words, "almost reached the end of my life". The message I refer to is contained in the introduction to a second part of his autobiography that, unfortunately, remained in draft form.

In that introduction he recalled his defeats and failures, and those of the federalist movement, which were also, therefore, setbacks for the cause of European unity. He wrote: "None of those failures, however, has left me with that grudge against reality that so often thrives in the hearts of those who are defeated. [...] It must be understood that the value of an idea, even before it finally succeeds, is reflected in its ability to rise from its defeats". In fact, the process of European unification, begun 65 years ago, has suffered numerous major crises and out-and-out failures and defeats. And when we say that European integration has advanced through repeated crises, it must be clear that we are referring to events that cannot all be put on the same plane.

Certainly, there have been moments of tension and crisis in relations between the different Community member states, and in relations between the member states and the European institutions. The most notorious include the tension that arose in the mid-1960s between de Gaulle's France and the European Community (known as the "empty chair crisis"), and the famous crisis a decade later between Great Britain, under Margaret Thatcher, and the Community. I refer, in this latter case, to the "juste retour" dispute that culminated in the British prime minister famously, and most unphlegmatically, shouting "I want my money back".

These two crises stemmed not only from divergent interests and excessive national demands, but also from opposing views of what European unity means. And they were resolved, like others after them, through compromises, adjustments and ambiguities, thereby generating disappointment and dissatisfaction in the most coherent advocates of integration.

Out-and-out failures and defeats, on the other hand, are something

quite different and far more serious, given that we are referring to events that have been responsible for interrupting the process of European integration, or diverting it off course, for considerable periods of time. The first and most serious of these setbacks was the rejection of the EDC Treaty in 1954. How exactly did this come about, and how did it interfere with the European project? Let us look back at the whole story. In May 1950, the six-member European Community had been defined and launched through the Schuman Declaration, a text inspired by a noble political vision. Indeed, even though initially the idea — to pool Franco-German coal and steel production — had seemed to be of a merely technical nature, it soon became clear that it was essentially seen as a means of taking action on one "limited but decisive point", namely the "manufacture of munitions of war" of which France and Germany had "been the most constant victims". The explicit aim, as the Declaration showed, was to make "any war between France and Germany [...] materially impossible". And what could possibly be more political than the objective of preserving peace in Europe?

The European Coal and Steel Community, introduced in 1951-52, was thus originally conceived, and clearly defined, as "the first concrete foundation of a European federation". In line with this, the idea of a European Defence Community (EDC) treaty very soon came to the fore. Certainly, the creation of a common defence would, from a federal perspective, have been a valuable political development, and it is perhaps only now that we can really appreciate what a mistake it was to prevent it from coming into being, condemning it remain, to this day, a vital missing link in the construction of European unity.

A decisive political intervention, in this period, came from De Gasperi who, in close consultation with Spinelli — theirs was an extraordinary and emblematic partnership —, insisted on having Article 38 inserted into the EDC Treaty. Under the terms of this article, an Ad Hoc Assembly was entrusted with drawing up a draft statute for a European political community. Soon afterwards, in March 1953, this Assembly met with the purpose of adopting the resulting 117-article document. From today's perspective, it is quite astonishing to see how far the new, rapidly established democratic leaderships in Italy and Germany were prepared to go in order to offer countries devastated by dictatorship, war and defeat a radically new horizon. Inspired by the hopes of their peoples, engaged in the immense task of reconstruction and aspiring to a better future, they sought to press ahead in spite of divisions and opposition within their own countries. If we consider the boldness and vision

of leaders of the caliber of De Gasperi and Adenauer, the narrow horizons and petty calculations that weigh so heavily on the decisions of today's EU member states appear mean and depressing to say the least.

However, the French National Assembly's veto of the EDC treaty in August 1954 brought down the entire political project and created a real risk that the newly initiated and still very fragile process of integration would also crumble. Altiero Spinelli was acutely aware of this risk, but his response to the defeat was not to bear a "grudge against reality", but rather to set about doing all he could to save the European integration project. In this, he worked in complete harmony with the other great originator and strategist of European unity, Jean Monnet.

But the fact remains that the process of European integration was steered away from the political sphere and into the, extremely important but ultimately suffocating, economic arena, where it ended up remaining stuck for some considerable time.

We all know how this situation was overcome, and about the significant role played by Italy: from the Messina Conference to the 1957 Treaty of Rome that founded the European Economic Community. In that ambit, of course, Europe went on to achieve historic results that represented progress for everyone; these advances were punctuated by the addition of new member states and by applications from others to be part of the unification process. But it was to be 1979 before a major new step forward was taken in the political sphere, and it came in the form of the direct election of the European Parliament.

This development allowed Altiero Spinelli, elected as an MEP, to resume his work with a vengeance, and he worked enormously hard to gather support for his draft Treaty establishing the European Union. This text was adopted by the European Parliament in Strasbourg in February 1984. Coming a full 30 years after the collapse of the EDC project, it was a great triumph for Spinelli. This triumph was short lived, however, as the difficulties implementing the text, given the European Parliament's lack of constituent power, soon became apparent. The intergovernmental negotiations that ensued gave rise to the Single Act, which left Spinelli bitterly disappointed. But he was soon back at work, devoting the limited time and energy he had left to paving the way for the gradual incorporation of important elements of his plan into subsequent European Treaties.

After Spinelli's death, it was the Maastricht Treaty that, by creating the single currency and European Central Bank, and thus requiring the eurozone member states to transfer monetary sovereignty to suprana-

tional institutions, finally marked a federal breakthrough. It represented a real and substantial deepening of European unity that also created the conditions for a major enlargement of the European Union. However, with the imminent prospect of EU membership rising to 25, and then 27, members, the time had come to re-iterate the EU's underlying ideal, and give it a constitution. A lengthy and profitable process of discussion and elaboration resulted in the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which was duly signed by all the EU member states. However, in a further dramatic setback, the constitutional project was quickly derailed by the outcome of the relative referendums in France and the Netherlands, showing, once again, just how difficult and often disjointed the road to European unity really is.

Meanwhile, in the absence of political support, the monetary union, though a great innovation, was left fatally weakened. Indeed, it failed to become an effective economic as well as monetary union.

After this it was the turn of the global financial and economic crisis, with its repercussions in Europe and the eurozone in particular, to determine EU decisions.

In recent years, attention has inevitably been focused on the immediate and serious problems that have naturally dominated and shaped the thoughts of peoples and public opinion, and the reactions of the member states, and in this setting there has been little scope for political advances. Through recourse to intergovernmental mechanisms, frantic efforts have been made to establish, as was indeed necessary, greater coordination and discipline in budgetary policies, through decisions that, however, have actually impacted little on essential choices in the field of economic and fiscal policy in Europe.

Moreover, choices belonging to the framework of so-called austerity have now exhausted their purpose, leaving Europe needing to advance further towards more comprehensive integration and a fully political vision. New proposals have been drawn up to this end — I refer, in particular, to those of the presidents of European institutions —, but the pace is slow and the hesitations and inconsistencies numerous; furthermore, the situation is complicated, dramatically, by the migration emergency, which has exposed a series of problems: a crisis of the very ideals on which the Union is founded, growing disillusionment among the citizens/voters, shaky national political balances, and poor working of Europe's institutional order.

In short, a series of crisis situations have, let us say, culminated in a single and complex muddle of risks and challenges. What we need to

do today is work to resolve these critical problems, and Italy, drawing inspiration from Spinelli's message and example, which are both still very much alive, must play its part in this.

This means fighting the centrifugal tendencies and resurgences of nationalism that, more than ever before, are posing a real threat to the European edifice, and with it the future of European integration. Because if the EU falters, we Europeans — all our countries, without exception — will be pushed to the margins of global development and the search for a new world order.

These are now the incontrovertible reasons for pursuing European unification. What is more, being imposed by the changes that have taken place in different real-life settings and in global power relations, they lend dramatic truth to Jean Monnet's prophetic affirmations, made in 1976. He stated that our nations today must learn to live together under common rules and institutions, freely arrived at, if they want to attain the size necessary for them to progress and remain masters of their destiny, and underlined that the sovereign nations of the past are no longer the framework within which they themselves can solve the problems of the present.

What we must not do is withdraw within nation-state boundaries and revive the national sovereignties, in other words heed the preaching of the eurosceptics and those who would see Europe destroyed. The time has also come, I might add, to react to the continued and coarse denigration, coming from these quarters, of the achievements of integration and European unity — to respond not only on the level of historical truth, but also by highlighting the progress that has been made, even in our present, extremely troubled, times.

In this regard, I may cite, as examples, the role the ECB has played in safeguarding the single currency, in order to allow our economies to hold firm and recover; the steps that have already been taken towards the creation of a banking union; and the greater unity and incisiveness shown by Europe in its efforts, in the area of common foreign and security policy, to achieve a positive outcome to the crisis in Iran, to work patiently towards agreements over Syria and Libya, and to combat the greater overall threat posed by Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.

Justified criticisms of and complaints over the present state of the European Union must be made taking great care not to endorse the position of those who are interested only in doom-mongering. This is the task of all the pro-European forces.

Let us now talk about Italy in particular, including a current situa-

tion that, in different ways, we find rather worrying. In this regard my comments will be dictated purely what we can learn from past experience and from the teaching of Spinelli. Contrary to what sensationalist headlines in certain newspapers might suggest, there is no showdown looming between Rome and Brussels. How can there be between a country — Italy — that has identified with the European integration process from its earliest beginnings, and an institution — the Commission — that Italy has always seen as the heart (together with the Strasbourg Parliament) of a supranational Europe?

Objective discussions and clarifications of the real differences to be overcome are possible and necessary, and they must take place in a climate of mutual respect, avoiding heated outbursts. Reasonable agreements can certainly be reached, above all with the Commission, even on the interpretation, application and simplification of the major rules.

Over the years, Italy has given the European Commission in Brussels men of true European mettle — men who have served as guides or occupied positions of great responsibility. First and foremost among these is, of course, Altiero Spinelli, who served as a European Commissioner from 1970 to 1976. Furthermore, a considerable number of Europe's finest civil servants and diplomats have been Italian, while the ruling class of the Italian Republic has produced numerous individuals who stand out for their dignity and authoritativeness in their dealings with the European institutions. The records show that the contribution of Italy, especially during its presidencies of the EU, has been decisive in a number of crucial moments for the advancement of European integration.

Italy has been and indeed remains, more than ever, the country best equipped to give voice to the needs of the European integration process and propose the most effective solutions for helping this to advance: this it has been and, in collaboration with its equally motivated partners, this it will continue to be, both within the European institutions we know, and within those that will evolve in the future. The powerful speech given by the President of Italy, Sergio Mattarella, in Strasbourg, and the daily manifestations of his (which is also our) Europeanism show that this unwavering commitment is expressed and defended at the very highest level.

It is in the light of these considerations that Italy's European partners should view the criticisms advanced by our country, and its reservations over decisions it does not share. After all, Italy remains increasingly called upon to address and pursue, in a positive and proactive manner, general objectives, and not just ones that are purely in the

national interest. It is, of course, crucial not to lose sight of the great and original objectives running through the story of European unification: that of the pursuit and affirmation of the common European good, the consolidation of a "de facto solidarity" and the establishment of mutual trust among all the states of a united Europe. In our present times of alarming centrifugal tendencies, we must ensure that the historical link between the founding countries, especially the major ones (Italy, Germany and France), remains solid. This is indeed the decisive factor in our capacity to withstand any shock, to push European unification forward, and to ensure that the objectives set by the five presidents, and the commitments set out by the Commission, from the plan of investments in joint European projects to the Energy Union, are actually realised, and not left hanging in mid-air.

To this end, we must pursue a close understanding between the leaderships of the leading and most European-minded states, focusing, first and foremost, on the priority issue of how to manage the current migratory flows. This will allow us to implement, finally, the lines of conduct that have already been defined, namely to combine hospitality with security rather than setting the two in opposition, especially in the context of vigilance against terrorism, and without undermining the fundamental system introduced by the Schengen Agreement or jeopardising the inalienable achievement that is the freedom of movement of persons in Europe.

And we must not hesitate to pursue even bolder advances, towards a political union, a fiscal union, and common government of economic recovery and development policies, with the ultimate aim of institutionalising — for this some clarification will be required also within the eurozone — the area comprising those countries that intend to move towards ever closer union, regulating their relations with the other EU member states. Advances of this kind can potentially gain consensus among those citizens, especially in Europe's main founding countries, who retain a deep of feeling of Europeanness; consensus for these advances will emerge providing there also emerges a strong political will for unification driven by an honest, complete, clear and truthful account — something that, to date, has been lacking — of the extreme risks facing Europe today and in the future.

The time has come to shake off mutual prejudices and reject stereotypes, like the idea that the North of Europe is virtuous while the South is the continent's millstone, and the image of Germany as dominant and Italy as unreliable. In Italy, we are, on different levels, resolving in-

consistencies and overcoming longstanding structural delays. And as for the spectre of a German Europe (which only Hitler was capable of conceiving), it must be appreciated that no member state, whatever its objective weight and however apparent its influence, will ever be able to dominate or impose its hegemony within the European Union, without the Union itself coming to an end. Furthermore, there has long been a deep convergence of interests between Italy and Germany, and today, as Minister for Foreign Affairs Gentiloni has underlined, our two countries share common views and positions in areas such as foreign policy and migration. It is between our respective ruling classes and societies, at all levels, that we need to foster greater mutual understanding and an ongoing climate of cultural and human exchange.

I wish to end by going back to the point from which I started: the piece written by Altiero Spinelli in March 1986. It contains a vivid account of the meeting (organised in Milan by Spinelli, Rossi and Colorni on 27-28 August 1943, a week after Altiero was liberated) that resulted in the founding of the European Federalist Movement. The account brings out his wonderful personality, in which utopian passion was interwoven with political pragmatism and political realism.

As we have seen, the story of Spinelli and the movement he inspired is one of unpredictable developments and moments of consensus, ups and downs, great obstacles, recurrent uncertainties and crucial tests. To follow his example, we must — if we believe in Europe — now be driven by a sense of urgency and a readiness to act to implement decisions for which the time is now more than ripe, and also by a sense of the historical significance of the undertaking ahead: to complete the transition from a Europe of nation-states wielding absolute sovereignty, spewing nationalist poison and dogged by internal wars to a united Europe with strong, supranational, federally inclined institutions.

"Anyone who embarks on a great enterprise" — this is Altiero Spinelli's final message — "does so in order to give something to his contemporaries and to himself, but in truth no one really knows whether he is actually doing it for them and for himself, or for them and their children [...] or instead for a more distant generation, still to be born, who will discover his unfinished work and make it their own".

Altiero Spinelli worked for us and also for generations much younger than both his generation and indeed my own. With wisdom, he showed us the courageous course of action at every critical juncture, and, in the long term, the value of unwavering tenacity. We remain in his debt.

Thirty Years Ago

ALTIERO SPINELLI, HERO OF REASON*

Even in his style of life, inspired by an exemplary simplicity, and a realism which feared no truth, however bitter, Altiero Spinelli incarnated Max Weber's conception of the political hero perfectly. Weber, you may recall, concludes his essay on "Politics as a profession" with these words: "Politics consists in a slow and tenacious surmounting of great difficulties, which must be achieved with passion and discerning at the same time. It is perfectly true as history has borne out time and again that what is possible would never be achieved if someone in the world did not keep on trying to achieve the impossible. But whoever attempts to do so must be a leader, and not only that — in the sober sense of the word, he has to be a hero as well. And whoever is neither, must, from the outset, forge that temper which will stand him in good stead when all hopes collapse, for otherwise he will not even be able to fulfil the little which really can be achieved today. Only the man who is sure he will not fail despite a world too stupid or vulgar (from his point of view) to appreciate what he is offering and who can still stand up and say: 'never mind, let's press on!' has a vocation for politics".

It could not be put better and Altiero Spinelli could not be recalled in any other way. We should merely add that he was a hero of politics because he was a hero of reason. He had come to be recognized throughout Europe as one of the "founding fathers" together with Monnet, De Gasperi, Adenauer and Schuman. As the years pass, and as val-

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* This year marks the thirtieth anniversary of the death of Altiero Spinelli. This editorial was written by Mario Albertini as a tribute to him, and originally published in issue n. 1, 1986 of this review.

ues are selected and the meaning of historical undertakings comes to be established, he will certainly be recognized as one of the few great political figures of this century. Certainly no-one more than he ever founded his political design more exclusively on reason. It is a fact that, though an Italian, Spinelli did not consider Italy as a reality to be accepted before being submitted to the scrutiny of reason. And it is a fact that, although he was converted to democracy after his Leninist experience in early youth, he never considered the great ideologies of our political tradition (liberalism, democracy and socialism) as exclusive schemes, nor as a mental boundary within which political thinking should be confined. It is against this background that the meaning of Spinelli's European design emerges clearly. The whole political process, despite the increasingly unitary nature of the historical process, still remains directed towards changes to be made in one's own nation, as if this were sufficient to resolve the great and pressing problems of a continental and world nature: even peace, in this prospect, is seen as an objective which would be pursuable by merely adding up the sum of national policies. Spinelli was on the other side of the fence. Having freed himself of the national and ideological conditioning of the past, and starting from basic principles, he managed to map out supranational constitutional action for the strategic objective of our times in Europe: Unity, or to put it another way, the European Federation. He was thus the first to undertake political action based on the struggle for the creation of new powers rather than on the conquest and use of existing (national) powers. For this is the only way to re-establish the balance between technological capacity and political capacity and move the world down the road to true civilisation: organised peace.

Mario Albertini

THE MEDITERRANEAN CRISIS
AND EUROPE'S RESPONSIBILITY*

"Existing states are dust without substance", said Einaudi and never as in April of this year in the wake of the events in the Mediterranean was Einaudi's ruthless statement about European states truer. The Mediterranean crisis and Qaddafi's absurd arrogance — the head of a country with three million inhabitants challenging, humiliating and creating all kinds of difficulties for all Europeans — have one precise cause: the European power vacuum. This vacuum has two consequences. One is factual and consists precisely in the fact that three million Libyans have put 320 million Europeans on the spot (a count which includes only the countries of the so-called Community). The second is mental and is demonstrated by the stupid and vile conviction that violence can be dealt with by negotiations and diplomacy.

It seems that, even in the country of Machiavelli, Europeans have suddenly forgotten that politics consists of power relationships and that international politics consists of power relationships unmitigated by legislative restraints i.e. based on military means. Pursuing the idea of negotiations with those who use violence in the most brutal way, these Europeans who display such decadence and resignation forget that negotiations, too, are based on power relationships. The outcome of negotiations is no nice hypothetical solution that suits everybody, but a solution in which the law of the strongest is the rule and everybody gets according to his might. Put bluntly, negotiations are simulated war. The rest (for example, words used at the UN or in so-called public international law) is merely repugnant make-up attempting to mask the un-

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* This Note, published in The Federalist, 28 n. 1 (1986), pp. 37-39, is a declaration made by Mario Albertini on 16 April 1986. His remarks came immediately after the so-called Gulf of Sidra crisis had culminated in U.S. air strikes on Tripoli during the night of the 14-15 April 1986 (in retaliation for the bombing of a Berlin discotheque frequented by US military personnel), to which the Libyans had responded by firing two Scud missiles at a U.S. facility on the island of Lampedusa on 15 April. These events were also part of a climate of extreme and growing tension between the U.S., Italy and Libya within the broader framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and they followed in the wake of the October 1985 "Sigonella crisis" — the occasion when, at the NATO Air Base at Sigonella, Italian military police prevented U.S. Army Delta Force soldiers from seizing the four terrorists who had hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, together with Abu Abbas, who, on behalf of the PLO and at the request of the Italian government, had been sent to negotiate the release of the hostages.

remittingly fierce face of politics or the sinking of reason into a dumb silence: the absurd pretence of renouncing the use of force though paying the full costs, moral costs included, to have one (compulsory military service, expenditure on arms etc.).

For anyone who manages to grasp a minimum of "effettuale" political understanding — that puts an end to the sophism about the effectiveness of the law (what law?) and morality in a world still governed by brute violence, including nuclear violence — three considerations are valid: one about the USA, one about Europe and one about peace. The mistake of the Americans is not retaliation. It is not using force (which does not necessarily mean shooting) against Israel too, to force it to recognise the rights of Palestinians to set up their own autonomous state in Cis-Jordan and the Gaza strip. In this way Arab terrorism, deprived of its greatest source, would perhaps receive a fatal blow. Whatever the case, retaliation, currently far from effective, would become effective. But these considerations are valid only in the short term. In the mid-term it is necessary for Israel to have a guarantee based on fact, not words. And at this stage the responsibility of Europeans begins. With their division, their impotence, and the power vacuum they generate even in the Mediterranean, they prevent everybody — Israel, USA and Arab nations included — from being able to count on a regional balance capable both of containing the aggressive drive which always occurs when not checked by adequate power, and eliminating, in the long term, the causes of this particular type of terrorism with the unity and modernization of the Arab nation. With the stupid pretence of having European foreign policy but no European power — and preventing the European Parliament from developing such power — Europeans by choosing resignation and impotence not only threaten the fate of Europe but the world's fate as well.

And now peace. There are only two forms of peace: the precarious and armed form based on the balance of forces, which dissuades aggressors but requires every state to develop all its potential means of violence, and that of world government: true peace, according to Kant, since it would allow people to live unarmed and to defend their autonomy exclusively by lawful means. If this is true, and it is true for all those who have not lost their senses, then it is also true that whoever does not pursue a balance in power relationships, and does not attempt to direct it towards great regional unifications to fill the power vacuums and create the pillars of the future world government, works for war and not for peace, although appearing on the public stage with an

olive branch in his hand, idiotically happy whenever he manages to reduce the strength of his own state without remembering that this automatically corresponds to the strengthening of the other states.

At this stage all would be said and done were it not for just one other consideration about the cause of European states' weakness (with some differences: France behaves much better than the rest). At first sight it may in fact appear to be disconcerting that states with about fifty million inhabitants, advanced industrial development etc. can be subjected to all kinds of difficulties by such an underdeveloped and underpopulated state like Libya. The solution of the enigma becomes much easier to perceive if we remember that what holds true for individuals holds true for states as well: anyone with nothing to lose can be aggressive and therefore fearsome, while anyone with a lot to lose tends to become cautious and prudent. The enigma is solved entirely if we remember how Einaudi (who was one of the greatest Italian scholars of this century as well as being President of the Republic from 1948 to 1955) justified the statement I recalled ("Existing states are dust without substance") by explaining that "none of them is able to bear the costs of independent defence".[1]

And here we have him — the king stripped of his fine clothes. European states have no independent defence. To understand and judge European states all we need to appreciate is the kind of "raison d'état" existing in states incapable of independent defence. We need only wonder what kind of training and selection the political class undergoes in states of this kind.

Mario Albertini

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[1] LUIGI EINAUDI, *Lo scrittoio del presidente*, Turin, Einaudi, 1956, p. 89.

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