


# THE FEDERALIST

a political review

*To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.*

Hamilton, The Federalist



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YEAR XXVI. NUMBER 1. JULY 1984

# THE FEDERALIST

a political review

*The Federalist* was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value the *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



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## *Towards a World Government*

Our review, which has been published over the past twenty-five years, is now coming out in English too, with the aim of not remaining confined to the narrow Italian framework (nor in the French one, as it was in French that it was published from 1962 to 1974). In the nuclear age — that in which mankind has acquired the power to annihilate itself — it no longer makes sense to limit political research and discussion to a specific national context. And it is utterly impossible to do away with this obstacle by translations from every language into all the others. The number of national languages is by now so high as to make such an endeavour altogether inconceivable. But there is a further, and even more serious, consideration. Translations cannot in any way guarantee the verbal precision needed for unified theoretical research in political, historical and social fields, nor the universal diffusion of the ensuing results, without which it is impossible to ground political decisions on an increasingly objective basis.

It is because of this inherent limit of translations that the most advanced sciences, namely the sciences of nature, from physics to biology, have almost universally adopted not only a minimum common vocabulary, but also a common language, that is English. And it is obvious (but this consideration must be underlined to stress the link between a common language and the optimum yield of mental work) that without the common use of English those sciences would not have obtained the results they have in fact achieved either from a theoretical or from a practical point of view (namely wide and rapid diffusion of new theories and new technologies).

In spite of this, even in Europe, where culture has among its foundations Latin as a common tongue (and as an international horizon of the formation of the national languages themselves), the need for a world language has not yet manifested itself effectively in the sphere of political knowledge in a broad sense, including history and the social sciences, above all as they relate to the problems of action. In this sphere, which is also that of common feeling, the nationalistic prejudice which rejects a universal language — one for mankind in general — still persists, as if everybody's partaking in world thought through a world language were a loss rather than an advantage, even for the national communities themselves and their tongues, which could not thrive in the partitioned world of linguistic nationalism. And it must be observed that a universal language is even more necessary in the sphere of political action than in that of the sciences of nature.

Now more than ever in the past men need mutual understanding. The human species is now a community sharing a common destiny and can save itself only through a political change (a revolution) equal to the change that has occurred in the basic conditions of its survival. The crux of the matter, which everybody knows, is the following: nuclear and/or ecological catastrophe is possible, and will certainly become inevitable, if an effective political world control is not established. Only thus will science be used exclusively as a tool for furthering life, freedom and equality and not as an instrument of death. But if this is the crux, and this is the answer, then we must come to terms with the fact, that this goal — effective political world control — will not be achieved except through common actions, decided in common on the basis of common information. This is impossible without a common language. In this respect it may be useful to recall an analogy with the past. Just as the extension of the national languages to the whole of society created the linguistic prerequisite for the first democratic forms of government (unity of information and communication at the national level), so the gradual extension of the use of English to a greater and greater number of people (within a generalized bilingualism, also taken to mean a difference between English as a common language and English as spoken in the UK, in the USA, etc.) will create the linguistic prerequisite for world control (world unity of information and communication).

\* \* \*

This goal is far in the future, but we think it reasonable to

contend that the direction to take can be determined, and the course set, now. In our opinion — which coincides with the opinion of all those who have really occupied themselves with peace, and not only, under the cover of peace, with the success of their own faction — the final goal is world government. We must make it clear, however, that a world government cannot be obtained without rejecting the concept of nation as an exclusive entity and without adopting the principles of federalism. The exclusive nation (fusion of nation and state, the very idea of humanity emptied of its content) leads inevitably to the nation-state as the supreme level of political control (monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force), and hence to the use of force in the relations among the nations, to international anarchy and to the world as a world of war (world of armed nations). On the other hand, it is only through federalism as a new instrument for government, i.e. through the enlargement of the sphere of action of democratic government from the territory of a state to that of a plurality of independent and coordinated states, that we can command the institutional tool required to (i) transfer the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force to the world level, (ii) establish a political world control, (iii) disarm states and prohibit war in the framework of an effective political and legal — and, in prospect, economic and social — equality of all nations, be they large or small (world of peace, i.e. of disarmed nations).

Once the nature of the final goal is clear, let us see whether intermediate goals are conceivable, and what they may be. In our opinion, the point of departure for this inquiry is the following fact: the exclusive national states have long since been in the process of being overtaken by history. This manifests itself both at a regional and at a world level. At a regional level, the process has already reached a very advanced stage in Western Europe, where the right of voting has already been extended beyond the national borders (European Community). The same regional process has already spread to the other regions of the world that are fragmented into many states, as is shown by the initiatives and organizations for unity in Africa, Latin America, Near East, etc. On the contrary, at the world level, the tendency is less pronounced, partly because the great powers — the United States and Soviet Union — as well as China and India, already exhibit, albeit imperfectly, the character of multi-state and/or multi-national formations. We must bear in mind, however, that, in spite of the conspicuous failure of the League of Nations, the world, with the UN, has once again taken the path of unity. This shows that the process is active at the world level too, where

*it can assume its final shape as a unity of the great world regions, on the basis of the ever-growing unity of the world market and interdependence of all men and of all countries.*

*To be aware of this process, which, seen in this light, is nothing less than the beginning of a new era, is decisive for our analysis, and this for the following reason: the process of transcending the exclusive nation-states means ipso-facto overcoming division, i.e. getting closer to a world government. Thus the stages of this process make up the intermediate goals on the road towards a world government; and once such goals are identified, we can ask ourselves how they can be pursued, and with what results. The first thing to observe is that such goals are among those political options which everybody makes and cannot abstain from making. Indeed in all countries an individual is confronted with options for or against the progress of the regional unification in which his country is involved and/or for or against the strengthening of UN; and, if he has the will to do so, he can support not only his own area's regional unification, where that is on the cards, but also, in terms of foreign policy, the regional unification of other areas and the strengthening of UN. This means that all men can already give their own political choices the character of steps forward along the way that can lead mankind to a world government.*

*The second thing to observe is that such choices and the national ones do not interfere with each other, but the former orient the latter, so that a country can pursue the best of all possible national policies, namely cooperating with all countries for a balanced development of the world market and a settlement of international problems by negotiation. The third thing to observe is that this common search for political, economic and social progress is conceivable only if the beginning of the progress towards a world government, and the emergence of this new point of reference for public opinion and culture, cause the prospect of a united world in the world balance of expectations, which is a large element in the world balance of power, to outweigh the current prospect of a world which is unable to overcome its divisions and which thereby condemns everybody to national selfishness.*

\* \* \*

*To date, nobody has taken it upon himself to pursue such a plan of action. Mankind is aware of the nuclear risk, but does not yet know that the possibility of eliminating it exists, and hence cannot turn such a possibility into a guiding principle*

*for action. Man will succeed in this only if he ceases to accept passively the situation created by nuclear weapons (which is not properly understood also because it is mistakenly interpreted in the light of the national principles of the past) and tries to transform it into a situation recognized by thought and which thereby can be met by action. It is will which must initiate the first step. We must act for the world, not only for our country. This means that we must adopt as the first priority of our action the progress of mankind towards world government and not the exclusive welfare of our own country which, in a divided world, could not escape, whatever our intentions, from a destiny of death.*

*The second step must be taken by reason. Previously political thinking in its strong sense, as a guide for action, has not succeeded in controlling international reality and, thus, of the course of history. After liberalism and democracy, socialism too (in Europe with the breakdown of the 2nd International in the face of World War One, in Russia with the principle of construction of socialism in one country) has remained a prisoner of the exclusive conception of national sovereignty and of raison d'état. It has thus become a further element in international anarchy as a permanent test of strength among the states and as a situation in which there is no possibility for will guided by reason to determine the course of events.*

*It is impossible to get to the core of the crisis of ideologies, that is of the capacity to think about the future, without being aware of the limitations of traditional political thought. The great ideologies of the past have developed the capacity to focus men's attention and action on the problems relating to the improvement of their own state, and have helped to lead the countries most favoured by fortune to the stage of the rule of law and of the first rudimentary forms of liberty and equality. But they have not yet the capacity — and cannot develop it without adding federalism to their principles — to focus men's attention and action on the problems of transcending the world of war, which relate to the political organization of mankind, and require the extension of democracy at the international level and the transformation of the system of states — now based on relations of strength and on an unequal distribution of power — into a federal system based on law and on the general will of mankind. It is only with federalism, whose first explicit forms are to be found in Kant's philosophy of history and in Hamilton's constitutional thinking, that human thought has begun to tackle these problems, on whose solution the destiny of mankind now depends.*

\* \* \*

With the theoretical and practical orientation described in these pages, our review has set itself the task to work for the world unity of federalists and to constitute, to this end, a point of reference and an instrument for an exchange of information. Many people are aware of the necessity of federalism. With the nuclear risk, and with traditional thinking being unable of conjuring it away, the number of these people is destined to grow. But without unity of organization, i.e. without the opportunity to know that what is being done in one's own region, country or city is being done in other regions, countries and cities of the world as well, nobody can gain confidence in his own action and thus maintain it, thus contributing towards making federalism into a political force.

The difficulties are many. Federalism as a political priority is a new historical phenomenon. Hence it is not yet, like liberalism, democracy and socialism, an institutionalized body of thought, i.e. an orientation that reproduces itself on its own account. Federalism has the world as a theatre, and not only a particular nation. Federalism has not, as its political goal, the seizing of national power by means of the vote, or of violence, or of the representation of corporate interests. Consequently it can assert itself only if it is possible to make moral strength, supported by reason and knowledge, into a political force. But this weakness of federalism is at the same time its strength. Federalism is within everybody's reach just because it depends only on morality and science (including common sense, as far as this agrees with science) and can develop its unity on this basis instead of, like the traditional political forces, on the sharing of national power. And there is more to it than this. Just because it has no national government whatsoever as its reference point, federalism makes it possible to enlarge the unity of political action to the whole world and hence to build up — with the highest degree of spontaneity and with the minimum of organization necessary to ensure that each person's work shall be effectively combined with that of the others — a world political vanguard for the great world task of the construction of peace.

To adopt as one's political orientation the march of mankind towards world government is feasible; and it is feasible to make an agreement with all those who have chosen the same political course. This means that the conditions for trying exist. So we shall try.

The Editor

## War Culture and Peace Culture

by MARIO ALBERTINI

1. — A premise concerning the question of method. Political science and political realism. The search for a guiding thread to establish a connection among both war and peace facts.

I do not intend to examine the problem of peace from a strictly scientific standpoint. When we consider major political problems, if we claim to provide the analysis with a rigorously scientific method, insuperable difficulties arise. In the present situation of uncertainty of political science and sociology, in order to attain this goal it would be necessary to justify almost every term used, and it is clear that, therefore, it would be impossible to focus properly on one single theme (whether peace or another subject).<sup>1</sup> Thus, I shall limit myself to saying that the problem of peace ought to be looked at from four viewpoints (the non existence of a peace culture, the situation of peace, the existence or otherwise of a process working towards this situation, the way in which peace is conceived in political action) and also to tackle here the first aspect which to my mind seems crucial when studying peace as an aspect of cultural process, while trying only, as far as my way of approaching the question is concerned, not to depart from the tradition of political realism.<sup>2</sup> As regards my own outlook, I must say that it entirely coincides with the outlook of those who deem that peace should be made the supreme goal of political struggle, since war is now equated with the possibility of self-destruction of mankind.<sup>3</sup> I must say too that the various difficulties that I have encountered have affected the style of this paper. The first difficulty lies in the fact that what we are acquainted with (*bekannt*) — war and peace —

is indeed not properly known (*erkannt*) (we believe we know what war and peace are, but beyond the empirical evidence of a few isolated facts, there is no acceptable theory, and therefore no effective technique for avoiding war, etc.). The second difficulty lies in the fact that both war and peace are collective behaviour, i.e. events and situations which not only relate to theories, but also to beliefs, customs and so on. It follows that we must examine collective ways of thinking, i.e., in the last instance, cultural facts. And it is precisely here that the difficulty becomes clear since war culture does not exist as a specific view of the world but it exists as a certain connection between institutions, facts, beliefs, customs, fragments of ideas, etc., which are not always as such consciously related to war. The problem lies in searching for a guiding thread to establish a connection among all the facts of the sphere of war — regardless of the form they take in common thought — and, as far as possible, all the facts of the sphere of peace. Naturally this entails a certain degree of abstraction. And there is a further complication. As a guiding thread emerges, many historical and political problems appear in a new light, but, in order to avoid breaking the continuity of data to be connected to establish the guiding thread, these problems will be analysed separately in the notes that follow (also in the form of clarifications).

2. — *The lack of a peace culture. Kant's philosophy of history as the historical explanation of the non-development of a peace culture.*

I believe that we are making no mistake when we state that a peace culture does not as yet exist.<sup>4</sup> The dominating idea of the state as a closed national exclusive and armed society certainly does not belong to the world of peace. Nor should we overlook the fact that liberalism, democracy and socialism (Marxism too), which make up a great part of modern political thought, were, particularly in their creative periods, openly hostile to peace as a priority. That peace is denied the status of a priority is often apparent even in Utopian thinking (Thomas More in certain ways and Proudhon in other ways, and so on). Indeed, it can be reasonably argued that beyond this denial, there is little left. There is, to consider it properly, only the traditional pacifism, i.e. a Utopian viewpoint, lacking metaphysical vigour or historical sense, easily converted into a purely individual denial of war (conscientious objection) or the Manichean decision to fight war with war, which always finds an alibi in the idea that one's own war is the last war.<sup>5</sup>

The reality underlying this situation of political thought was analysed very clearly by Kant, who is very often wrongly included in the ranks of ingenuous pacifists. Peace is certainly one of the major themes of his political philosophy, but it should be recalled that he believed a radical change in the form of the historical process to be a presupposition of peace, and conceived this change as the transition from the state (still current) of a process exclusively guided by the natural characteristics of mankind to a process controlled by the will of all humanity (on the basis of the «equality of all reasonable beings» ).<sup>6</sup>

Kant's statements and conjectures about war and peace are very terse. He placed peace in a future context in which «civilisation (God knows when) will have reached perfection», the only time when «a permanent peace would be possible and salutary for us». He held, indeed, that, «given the degree of progress which human civilisation has reached, war is an indispensable means to make it advance». Without war there would be neither the transition «from barbarism to culture, which consists in the social worth of man», nor the constant development of human society («the danger of war is the only factor that mitigates despotism»). Finally, he stated that it will put an end to itself, causing the «lawless state of savages» in the relations among the states to be overcome, «after at first inadequate and tentative attempts», through a «union of peoples (*Völkerbund*)» .<sup>7</sup>

3. — *The culture we have inherited is a war culture. Clausewitz and the incapacity to conceive the unity of politics and war. Logic and forms of war culture.*

I have recalled this usually neglected aspect of Kant's thinking because of the clear way in which it outlines the historical picture of the non-development of a peace culture.<sup>8</sup> However, this is what most concerns us here. If it is true that no peace culture exists then it is also true that the culture that we have inherited, the one within which political and social forces think and act, is a war culture and a war-masking culture, i.e. a culture incapable not only of thinking peace, but also of bringing into the sphere of knowledge, in their true nature, all those facts which, though not having yet the external form of war facts, are nevertheless related in a non-fortuitous way with war.

Among these the first fact that needs to be taken into consideration is that war is always present in one way or another. It is not always present, of course, as a current war. (Every current war is a unique event, sited in a particular place and time, an

episode). But it is always present in the shape of the *world of war*, i.e. as a situation that makes this series of events (single wars) possible and inevitable. This situation has never been interrupted and is very clear and easy to see. War is always present in the shape of military preparation, as defence expenditure, as a constitutional obligation and so on, i.e., briefly, as one of the permanent and basic aspects of everybody's life.<sup>9</sup> And it must be said that this trivial observation takes on its full meaning, and poses problems that are far from resolved, if it is formulated more carefully, namely if we say that war is always potentially and often actually present, because the world of states (as well as the entire world of politics, in a sense to be established in a more precise manner) is based on war: *it is the world of war*. War is really, and so far always has been, the means by which supreme decisions, affecting the fate of nations and humanity itself, have always been taken.

The joint presence of politics and war is certainly one of the major causes (perhaps the greatest) of the difficulty there is in fully understanding both. I believe that this difficulty appears in a very precise manner, even at the verbal level, in the most advanced attempt at conceiving war: the attempt made by Clausewitz. What is meant by the phrase *war is the continuation of politics* by other means? Does it signify that politics no longer resorts to its means and therefore is substantially no longer politics but only war? No, according to Clausewitz, because he always emphasises that war is the means and politics the end and he does not fail to point out that it is impossible to conceive the means without conceiving the end. But why then « other means » and not, simply, one particular means (or a specific set of means)?

Effectively Clausewitz's formulation brings us to the crisis point in war culture: the fact that we recognise the unity existing between war and politics empirically but we are unable to reproduce this unity with clarity of thought.<sup>10</sup> The first datum (unity of politics and war) shows that it is the normal political behaviour of all men that gives rise to the world of war and keeps it going. The second datum (the imprecise translation into thought of the unity of politics and war) shows that the limit of war culture lies in the incapacity both to specify what aspect of political behaviour it is that connects politics to war, and even to pose the problem in these terms. The ensuing obscurity makes it impossible not only to act effectively for peace but also to decide whether a world of peace is feasible or not. There is in fact no real possibility of establishing whether the world of war is an inevitable fate inexorably affecting men and their behaviour or whether, at least

under certain conditions, it depends on man's will, until we know what aspect of the political behaviour lies behind war.

The logic and forms of war culture derive from this obscurity where thought, at least in part, loses contact with facts. If thought dwells upon the event "war" then it can only conceive it as a necessity, natural or metaphysical, because, as we have seen, it cannot ascribe it to any defined form of political action (at the limit: if in thought there is war, then there is not action); on the contrary, if thought dwells upon the event "action", then it must mask the world of war, because it cannot ascribe it exclusively to the principles of political action without perverting them (at the limit: if in thought there is action, then there is not war). In their concrete manifestations these forms of thinking entail, to a certain extent, a splitting of consciousness, an oscillation between two poles (either by nature or because of other people's fault wars always occur under the guise of necessity) as well as self-mystification. It should not, however, be overlooked that these forms of thinking (as long as we use them in a critical and realistic way) make it possible to recognise and examine real aspects of the historical process and politics, aspects which are, moreover, of great significance for the problem of peace.

In fact, with the idea of action, i.e. with the cultural heritage of the great traditional ideologies — liberalism, democracy, and socialism — history is viewed as an unceasing transformation of political behaviour and its social base. Equally the growth of the collective capacity to orientate individual actions with such values as liberty, justice and equality can be seen. What needs to be emphasised here, however, is the relationship of these values to war and peace. In a certain sense, these values belong to the realm of war, without which they could not have emerged historically against despotism and subordination of political power to class privileges. In another sense, however, they belong to the realm of peace inasmuch as they are a premise to it (peace cannot be constructed nor, indeed, pursued while despotic powers and class privileges exist, which can only be removed by war), and inasmuch as they inevitably suffer a process of nationalistic degeneration that may reach the excesses manifested by Fascism and Stalinism, unless universal peace is assured.<sup>11</sup>

On the other hand with the idea of *raison d'état* which is the most advanced theoretical expression of political realism, the world of power can really be seen for what it is. It becomes apparent that there is no authority placed above the states, and that, therefore, World Reason is the *raison d'état*, and that the world is governed by war and by force. It also becomes

apparent that even negotiations belong to the sphere which culminates with war because they are based exclusively on armed force relations between states, allow only decisions which are compatible with the scale of force relations, and therefore reduce the independence of medium and small states, if not completely to a mere fiction, at least to something not far short of this. Finally, we can see in the world political process the true force, still blind, on which all political events and the internal constitution of states itself depend.<sup>12</sup>

4. – *The practical basis of war culture. The coincidence of national behaviour with normal political behaviour as a connection between politics and war.*

The recognition of the limitations of war culture makes it possible to establish the practical basis of this culture. In view of that we must return to the point at which the capacity of this culture to understand runs low and try to proceed further. As I have already remarked, war culture never poses itself the question as to what aspect of political behaviour it is that connects politics to war. It is, however, sufficient to pose this question to get the reply that this aspect is the national aspect (indeed it is not possible, with reference to this aspect, to find any solution of continuity between politics and war). And when we get to this point, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the national aspect is always present in the political behaviour of all human beings in order to resolve the problem put forward by Clausewitz, i.e. to establish that there is a continuity between politics and war (taken as a single event) because there is coincidence between customary political behaviour and the world of war (the world of states as closed, exclusive and armed national societies).

Before providing this proof, however, it is necessary to remove a verbal complication that hinders our discourse. It was appropriate at the outset to ask what *aspect* of normal political behaviour connects politics with war because it is unreasonable to think that politics, in all its aspects, is connected to war. Nevertheless, if it is true that the national aspect is present in all political behaviour, then it is also true that to keep close to the facts it is both permissible and necessary to use the expression “national political behaviour” as a general frame of reference, and after that to specify other aspects present from time to time in actual manifestations of this behaviour. Indeed, with this frame of reference one is always in a position to specify who is acting and in what way, whereas that is not possible with frames of

reference of the type “liberal” or “democratic” or “socialist behaviour”, etc., because in reality these types of behaviour do not exist, but only liberal, democratic or socialist aspects of national behaviour. Having stated this, I would like to say the following about the proof. If we break up normal political behaviour into its component parts we find: (a) that the formation of political will is always concretely manifested only as the formation of national will (i.e. as the will to resolve in this or that way national problems of government, of the regime and social structure); (b) that the general political line is always in actual fact developed merely as the analysis of the national balance of power and as the planning of national actions; (c) that the actual, and not merely apparent, mobilisation of forces always, in fact, concerns national forces only, and always stops at the boundaries of individual states without ever crossing them. It is, moreover, obvious that foreign policy never in any way goes beyond this national boundary. In this sphere of action there are no real international seats of decision-making, nor international means for the formation of common will. Foreign policy is decided in national bodies, is designed to safeguard national powers (independence) and provokes changes in the international situation only when there are changes in the national policies of states.

If I am not mistaken, it is thus proved that normal political behaviour coincides with national political behaviour and hence with the world of war. The usefulness of this specification lies in the fact that it enables us to identify the point at which an inversion of the trend of the political process is to be caused if we really want to attempt to eliminate war and construct peace. An example serves to illustrate this. Many writers — in Italy Luigi Einaudi with particular clarity — have repeatedly stated that the actual distinction between the friends and foes of peace corresponds precisely to that between those who are willing, and those who are not willing, to sacrifice part of the sovereignty of their state including military sovereignty. In the last analysis this is true. But it is not enough. This truth has not become popular knowledge. Pacifists — and likewise, albeit with a different spirit, all those who believe they are acting “realistically” on behalf of peace — do not take this truth into account, and go on cherishing the dream of eliminating war without destroying the world of war, or believe that they are changing this simply because their purpose is to introduce more liberalism, democracy and socialism in their own nation state. The fact is that if normal (i.e. national) political behaviour coincides with the world of war

the very distinction between the friends and foes of peace is between those trying to change normal political behaviour with a view to removing the aspect that connects it to war and those who do not wish to change it for nationalistic reasons, or only because they do not realise that this change is necessary, and thus effectively support the world of war in what they do even though they sincerely desire peace.

5. – *National thinking as the cause of war being regarded as an inescapable fate or masked. The transition from war politics to peace politics as a strategy to face the challenge of our time.*

These considerations are, however, only the first step towards outlining the framework for the transition from war politics to peace politics. We know what is the world of war and what we must not do in order not to perpetuate it, but we do not know yet what is the world of peace, nor if there is any sign that makes it possible for us to say whether we are experiencing a process that could be guided towards the world of peace. Before trying to face these matters, I would merely like to note that the recognition of the principles of action, which constitute the world of war, makes it possible to enlarge the field of our knowledge. In particular we can now state that war culture is the culture of national behaviour, and thus we can stress the fact that the theoretical limit of this culture (inability to conceive the unity of politics and war with the result that this aspect of reality becomes an inescapable fate or is masked) depends on the practical limitations of this behaviour (reduction of world politics to the sum of national politics, i.e. something that everybody undergoes but which nobody determines). But what is even more important is that by abandoning the viewpoint of national political behaviour, and by attempting to adopt the viewpoint of the struggle for peace, it is possible to start to perceive the essential political features of to-day's world darkened by war culture.

Humanity has never been in a position like the current one. Technological development has already led the human race to the verge of the physical possibility of self-destruction through war or ecological catastrophe but, despite this, there has been absolutely no change in the way politics is carried out, is conceived of and studied. There are scientists designing increasingly destructive weapons and scientists attempting to make the world realise what the appalling dangers really are. But beyond these studies and information about the technical features of weapons

there is nothing, and nothing about the political fact that building and exploiting them is a matter of political decision. The fact is that war culture, by anchoring thinking to ideas which no longer have any sense, nor evolutive character, nor even reality (the national state and its armed defence), has the effect of feeding thought with ghosts and prevents thinking from ascertaining that the radical change that has occurred in military technology is, *ipso facto*, an equally drastic change in the moral, political and institutional situation of all mankind.

Despite this, the state is still thought about with the conceptions of the time (the whole of past time) in which it was unthinkable and unforeseeable that mankind would have become completely his own master, albeit negatively and for the worse, i.e. capable of self-destruction. The result is that the frightful degeneration of states goes unnoticed, a degeneration that is transforming states from being life defence organisations into organisations that are deliberately creating (hegemonic states) or passively experiencing (satellite or neutral states) the risk of the extinction of the human species. If we accepted this as a permanent fact of the political world (and no political party has so far rejected this degenerate form of the state), deterioration into barbarity would certainly be unavoidable. Education, the feeling of social solidarity, and every moral and cultural value would, indeed, no longer have any sense or credibility.<sup>13</sup>

Similar considerations are true for the other global aspect of technological development, the positive one. It is becoming increasingly apparent that productive development with unceasing technological innovation is leading mankind to the verge of the complete elimination of purely physical and repetitive work and is providing mankind with the power to replace this type of work with intelligent and creative activities. But politicians, still confined to the national horizons of war culture, are only capable of projecting national policies (or "international" policies with national powers, which is the same thing) when the real task is to build progressively a world power and world policies designed to develop the Third World, policies which ought to be coordinated with the economic and, above all, the political and social transformation of the already industrialised countries.

The consequence of this is that good fortune — more things produced for less work, the achievement for every man of the material possibility of spiritual freedom — is turned into the misfortune of corporativism, protectionism, unemployment and the uncertain future of the Third World.

But what is not possible with war culture may become possible in the political and moral context of the construction of a peace culture. Taken from this viewpoint, we can already see that we are not faced with two different tasks, but merely one. War cannot be abolished, nor can the risk of ecological catastrophe be eliminated without control over military and ecological aspects of the production process (the only worthwhile disarmament is controlled disarmament). And if we achieve this sort of political control, this sort of power in other words, it is evident that we also achieve the capacity to govern the world market and organise society not only in view of market efficiency and production (i.e. merely economic considerations), but also with a view to quality of life, solidarity, freedom of an emancipated mankind, as is vital today if we are to base full employment on its only possible foundation and if we are to use human labour for the purposes of defending and protecting our ecological and cultural heritage.

Peace culture is a new culture and a new culture is a new world, that mankind will learn to understand as it is built (if it is going to be built). In this respect, I would like, however, to point out that Kant's philosophy of history already makes it possible to state that such an epochal transition is thinkable. Kant, as I have already recalled, held that it would be war itself, by becoming more and more destructive, that would pose the problem of its abolition. And we can in fact see that mankind has reached this point. Kant also thought that only a civilisation that had reached perfection would have been able to abolish war. And if we bear in mind that in these passages of Kant civilisation is culture as man's social value, we can in fact remark that mankind is entering a historical epoch in which politics can aim to completely develop the social value of every man and realise perpetual peace. Whether this will happen, we cannot say, because what is thinkable is not what is real. But we already know that man's will can and must make this choice because the alternative is catastrophe.

## NOTES AND EXPLANATIONS

### (1)

#### *The problem of political science.*

The first problem of political science is whether a political science already exists (otherwise the space dedicated by the literature of this discipline to epistemology rather than to itself would be inexplicable). It seems reasonable to think that our time is still that of its foundation, rather than that of its normalisation (cumulative development, practical applications,

etc.). It is not easy to assert the contrary. For example, Sartori, a scholar who asks the question clearly and answers in the affirmative, recognizes nevertheless that «no scientific knowledge was ever born without having ordered its language and given it precision, because it is terminology that supplies the legs on which a science then walks»; and he notices that «a babel of languages spreads through the social sciences to the point where we can hardly understand each other».

This babel of languages, which in my opinion ought to suggest a negative reply to the question of the existence of a science of politics, is anyhow what forces us to redefine the meaning of every important term we use, if we aim at taking it out of common language and bring it into the language of science. This was indeed Giulio Preti's suggestion when he proposed using in this context the method of *explication*, theorized by Carnap and Hempel (a kind of *real definition* of the terms already in use, achieved by restricting their vague and ambiguous meaning for the purpose of making them «suited to an unequivocal and rigorous scientific speech»). But Preti points out also that «*explication* ought to make it possible to formulate a sound theoretical system». Thus he entirely recasts the problem of the foundation of the science of politics, because a theoretical system cannot be built up by means of a haphazard collection of *explications* (however, these remain very useful, and necessary when the question is about exploring the ground whenever the issues are clearly circumscribed). See GIOVANNI SARTORI, *La Politica*, SugarCo, Milan, 1979, pp. I and 45, and GIULIO PRETI, *Preface* to F.E. OPPENHEIM, *Dimensioni della libertà*, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1969, pp. XII-XIII.

### (2)

#### *Political realism.*

Political realism is a cultural datum that has a clear-cut physiognomy only in the field of the history of ideas (in that of the history of political theory it has a less clear identity). In this respect, there can be no doubt that with Machiavelli there began a new, independent way of looking at the specific nature of politics, and that this way of thinking has had some historical development, albeit amidst considerable uncertainty, with the idea of *raison d'état* (and with the criteria of *Realpolitik* and the balance of power). But in every other cultural context, the question of political realism is still quite open. At one end of the spectrum is the fact that political realism (which was the same thing as political science until well into the last century, and which is still to-day one of the most significant streams of thought of academic political science in the field of international politics) in no way presents the characteristics of a science (taken in a broad sense, as including, for example, economic science) nor those of an ordered set of well elaborated concepts. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the fact that, despite this, when it is adopted as a standpoint (i.e. when one adopts the trend of thought of its major authors, first of all Machiavelli) it is possible to describe, explain and sometimes foresee some important aspects of the political process which are otherwise concealed or obscured. Ascertaining this becomes so much more important if we keep in mind, as Waltz asserts in a greatly esteemed handbook of political science, that «from Machiavelli through Meinecke and Morgenthau, the elements of the approach and the reasoning remain constant (KENNETH N. WALTZ, *Theory of International Relations*, in *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. VIII, *International Politics*, ed. by FRED J. GREENSTEIN and NELSON W. POLSBY, Addison-Wesley Reading, Massachusetts, 1975, p. 35. This

essay by Waltz is also very useful as to the question of the existence of the science of politics).

Perhaps the most reasonable thing that can be said (and which is at the same time a criterion for good usage) is that political realism is closely identified with the century-old effort to achieve a positive and practically effective knowledge of politics; and that it still does not have a satisfactory theoretical arrangement (in much the same way that the academic science of politics, which tries to use a rigorous terminology, still lacks an adequate power of description and explanation) precisely because this course of thought has not yet achieved results that are at least equal to those achieved by Adam Smith in his understanding of economic facts.

As regards the terminology used in my essay, I should like to point out that, if we take on a pattern of political realism, then we have to use our terminology with greater freedom than is allowed by contemporary methodological thought.

(3)

*War and the risk of the extermination of the human race.*

However one may try to play it down, the fundamental fact is the following. There is no mechanism preventing wars, and none forcing the belligerents not to use nuclear weapons. It follows that either wars are abolished or else we live with the risk of war, which, in its turn, entails the risk of the destruction of the human race. Every other consideration is secondary and irrelevant. There are essentially two loopholes: either it is suggested that not everybody would die in a nuclear war or that nuclear weapons will never be used because of the effectiveness of the deterrent.

The first loophole, apart from being wrong, is revolting. It is revolting because the experts who support this thesis put forward horrendously large death figures, and when they present them they act as if the violent death of tens or hundreds of millions of people were a normal war prospect that is acceptable. And it is wrong because, while all (or nearly all) agree that the stock of nuclear weapons is sufficient to destroy mankind, nobody is able to foresee the way a nuclear war would go, the number of weapons used, and so on (war is the least controllable of all human situations, and nuclear war is by hypothesis even less controllable, since it removes the very idea of victory, and hence the essential operative criterion). On the other hand, these experts do not take into consideration two essential factors. Firstly, they fail to realize that we must not merely count the one or the other stock of weapons, but that we need to think of the capacity to produce them. Secondly, they fail to appreciate that the destructive potential of these weapons (and of others, like biological and chemical, weapons, and those of other kinds) is constantly increasing, because international politics compel every state to maximize its power, and will always compel every state to do so, until it becomes possible to achieve by peaceful means what can now be obtained only by weapons (like independence, etc.).

The second loophole is deterrence. In this case it is argued that nuclear weapons will never be used, because the intended purpose is not to use them, but to make people fear that they will be used. There is an obvious lack of logic in this argument; if it were positively certain that these arms would never be used, then the deterrence itself — i.e. the possibility of exploiting, in order to discourage a nuclear attack, the fear that they would be used, would disappear too. The truth is elsewhere. The real deterrent factor is independent of any strategy and concerns both the

first strike, the second strike and any other assumption of desk strategists, because it resides only in the harsh immediacy of the fact, i.e. in the diabolic nature of the decision to carry out a nuclear strike (whatever the so-called defence or attack situation). And when this is clear, it is easy to conclude that this guarantee (the presumed impossibility of such a diabolic decision) is not sufficient. Indeed it is clear that it is foolish to accept a situation of this kind and not to aim at changing it, i.e. at removing the danger of war once and for ever. Only with this purpose can the prospect of deterrence be made reasonable, both because of its transitory nature (the risk would only last for a limited period) and because the decision I called "diabolical" would become much more difficult, and perhaps quite impossible, to take in a world directed towards the creation of perpetual peace and international justice in a credible way.

One other observation. The problem of nuclear war should never lead us to forget both the barbaric nature of total war (which in our century has reached inhuman levels, without which fascism would have had no possibility to develop and seize power in Italy and Germany) and the relation of political and cultural continuity between total war and nuclear war. This too confirms that the true problem is the complete abolition of war.

(4)

*Regarding the term "culture".*

The term "culture" is often nowadays used inappropriately. But where the most important orientations in human society are concerned I feel that it is appropriate to use it because in these circumstances what is at stake is the collection of beliefs, knowledge, customs, etc. Naturally the exact meaning of the term depends in every case on the context in question because the idea of the unity of culture (or of society and so on) has not the value of a scientific theory, but only of a limiting concept, a regulatory criterion and not an accepted theoretical situation. In the case of this essay, which deals with peace and war, the term "culture" refers to beliefs and the like, inasmuch as they have the effect of orientating men towards war or peace (effective influence on social processes), and does not imply that where there is an orientation towards war there is only a war culture.

(5)

*The case of Teodoro Moneta.*

The case of the Italian Nobel Peace Prize winner for 1907, Teodoro Moneta, is an example. Born in 1833, as a boy he witnessed the five-day insurrection in Milan and actively participated in all aspects of Italian unification (he had been a member of Mazzini's and Pallavicino's *Società Nazionale Italiana*). Like many other Italians of his time, he associated both the feeling of European unity and the ideal of peace with Italian national feeling. Indeed, he opposed the first Italian expeditions in Africa and in particular the continuation of war after the battle of Adua in 1896. He did not hesitate to recall in public, whether in Italy or abroad, that the pacifist opposition to the war had gone so far as to sabotage the railways so as to prevent the departure of reinforcements for Africa (See *L'Italia e la conferenza dell'Aja*, a speech delivered by E.T. MONETA in Vienna on

May 5th 1907, published by the Società internazionale per la pace, Unione Lombarda, Milan, 1911, p. 8).

His pacifism, it should be recalled, was not incidental, the result of passing emotions. He claimed a cosmopolitical character for Italian culture, was influenced by Carlo Cattaneo's federalism and identified the cause of peace with the struggle for « European federation as a step towards a world federation ». But in 1911 he not only failed to oppose Italy's war with Turkey for the conquest of Libya, but even went so far as to support it. Criticised by a number of friends, he defended himself by saying that « after the kind of protectorate acquired by France in Morocco, Italy was compelled to safeguard its future not to become shut off, as had been repeatedly stated, in the Mediterranean » and by reminding people that: « since the world judges peoples by their fortunes in war, so Italy for a long time was judged as a nation that was simply unwarlike. And more than once, apart from what was written in the foreign press, words of scorn were expressed by Bismarck towards Italy. If I have dwelt on these facts it is because the immense pain they induced in me is what has ever since that time been what has decided my entire political conduct ». (See E.T. MONETA, *Patria e umanità*, Ufficio della Società Internazionale per la Pace, Unione Lombarda, Milano, 1912, pp. 13 and 23).

Moneta's case has been repeated umpteen times both individually and collectively. It demonstrates that when pacifism, as so far developed without any positive theory of peace, comes to the crunch, it ends up preferring war to peace every time that one's own nation's interests are affected. This brings out the latent contradiction between the will to have peace and the limitation of one's actual political behaviour to the national framework i.e. to the decisions regarding one's own nation's future. And we would be mistaken if we were led into thinking that this was a matter of the past. To take an example, Agnes Heller and Ferenc Fehér wrote in relation to the Falkland-Malvinas war « it is a fact that Great Britain, which not a moment before had been the noisiest battleground (together with West Germany) for two apparently identical pacifist and anti-nuclear movements, was suddenly overcome by almost universal patriotic fury. With the exception of Tony Benn's maximalistic tiny minority, the British anti-nuclear movement did not offer the slightest resistance to Mrs. Thatcher's war policy » (A. HELLER, F. FEHÉR, « Gli autoinganni del pacifismo », in *Mondo Operaio*, 1/2, 1983). For the limits of pacifism see LORD LOTHIAN, *Pacifism is not enough*, O.U.P., London, 1935.

(6)

*World government and the control of the historical process.*

There can obviously be no control over the historical process without a world government. This observation is trivial on its own but is otherwise quite useful inasmuch as it enables us to clarify a number of features of the notion of the historical process. When we consider the historical process as it has manifested itself so far, we notice that it has never been wanted, never been planned and never thought of as such. So far its direction has merely been the result of efforts made by each nation (or other historical types of political community) to exploit the international situation to its advantage, i.e. the resultant of the international clash of national wills and dominant national forces. In terms of decisions, nothing more than the unorganized total of uncoordinated national political decisions.

So far with these observations we have pointed out actual facts. But if the idea of a world government is missing, (i.e. if the idea of controlling the historical process is unthinkable) a pseudo-theory (i.e. an unproved and unprovable theory) creeps into this statement of fact because we are no longer merely ascertaining facts but are at the same time led to the idea that this situation is eternal. The historical process thus appears as the blind turning of the wheel of time, as a necessity that thought can only recognize and in the face of which every will must bend. (This is in fact the historical outlook of political realism and the reason why in Machiavelli's language "necessity" and "*fortuna*", in addition to "*virtù*", are crucial terms). And if thought attempts to explain this obscure destiny in some way, it is forced to conceive of history as a process dependent on some metaphysical or natural cause (both these explanations are to be found in Meinecke's thinking: see in particular the introduction to *Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte*).

The only alternative to this is not to think, i.e. to remove this reality from one's awareness and to replace it with an illusion (which is easily done because it is impossible to think of politics, in particular international politics, without setting objectives, nor is it possible to set up objectives without deluding oneself that one is able to control the world situation, with some degree of autonomy). But everything changes if, with the idea of world government, we acquire the possibility of conceiving not only the idea of an uncontrolled historical process, but also that of a controlled historical process. In the latter case the historical process takes the form of a set of co-ordinated political decisions, within which the *general will*, which now takes shape also at the world level, will no longer be subordinate to *necessity* (taken as the international clash of national wills). Political will thus passes from the sphere of heteronomy to that of autonomy. And this entails at the same time the passage from history characterised by determinism to history guided by freedom. This transformation was studied as regards its philosophical meaning by Kant, whose philosophy of history has in common with that of Marx the concept of historical determinism for the segment of history reaching up to world government, while remaining very different in its rational, severe and far from uncritical examination of the world of freedom.

After stressing the fact that we cannot conceive world government, i.e. peace, without at the same time conceiving control of the historical process, I would like to analyse briefly the significance of these observations for the theory of historiography. If we ask ourselves, for example, what aspects of the historical process would be directly controlled by a world government, we can reply that, more or less, they would be those that national governments delude themselves that they control. And if, after giving this reply, we recall that among these aspects there are some which have or could take on the character of regularity, of constant repetition, etc. then we can begin to see that a new type of relationship between this type of situation and political decisions begins to emerge.

We can consider these aspects from Braudel's point of view. In this case we find ourselves faced with "*longue durée*", and we can, case by case, try to establish whether and how far the "*longue durée*" depends on political decisions. Alternatively, we can consider these situations from the points of view of historical materialism and *raison d'état*. In these cases we find ourselves facing the facts made up by the necessary linkages between the relations of production and of the evolution of the world balance of power. We can easily verify that events of the sphere of *raison d'état* would be superseded by the decision of the world government, and that

the events of the sphere of material production could leave an increasing scope for free decisions of a world government and of the other coordinated governments as scientific and technical production replaces classic industrial production.

We should also, finally, consider that world government would put an end to history as the history of wars. And that raises the problem of histories that come to an end and, more generally, the problem of the unity of history as a limiting concept of all histories, to be studied with different criteria in as much as they are dependent on different laws of development.

## (7)

*Kant and the contradiction between human nature and civilisation.*

See Immanuel KANT, *Werke*, Insel Verlag, Frankfurt a.M., 6. Band, pp. 91, 99-100, 38, 98, 42-43. I would like to recall at least that Kant, when speaking about Rousseau, states that «he clearly shows the contradiction existing between civilisation and the nature of the human race» and he goes on to explain: «Indeed, from this contradiction all serious evils are born which cause suffering in human life and which also cause all vices which dishonour life, since civilisation, based on the true principles of man's and citizen's upbringing, has perhaps not even begun and therefore is far from being achieved. The inclinations and tendencies that lead us to evil habits, and which are therefore blamed in this account, are, however, good in themselves and, as such, conform to the purposes of nature; but, as they were geared with the state of nature as such, they are impaired by the progress of civilisation and impair it in their turn, up to the point where art, having reached perfection, becomes nature again, which is the ultimate goal of the destiny of mankind». (*Op. cit.*, pp. 93-95).

## (8)

*The reason for the non-development of a peace culture.*

According to Kant war belongs not to the world of metaphysics or biology but to the world of history. It exists together with a number of facts, and therefore, at least hypothetically could disappear with the disappearance of these facts. We are, quite clearly, in the realm of conjecture, but of reasonable conjecture that Kant distinguishes from the various vain ones. See Immanuel KANT, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86, 42-43, 47-49, and generally all works of the philosophy of history. Now I think that only through this historical conception of war is it possible to explain the failure of peace culture to develop. The crucial fact is this: until our times peace has never been a priority because war has always been a necessary means to resolve the problems posed by the historical process i.e. to affirm the values that in turn prove to be possible. The consequence of this on the theoretical plan is evident. Since the elimination of war has never been posed as a practical problem, thought has always been based on war as an aspect of reality, or on the masking of war. In this context when peace appears to the conscience as a practical aspiration (struggle for peace) or as a theoretical problem, it remains quite separate and isolated from any other fact or theory, and never appears as one aspect, one part of the historical process, thus being doomed to abstraction or impotence. This is why not only is there no peace culture, but people are not in fact even aware of its absence. Peace is usually talked of as if it were something

well-known to everybody and that without looking at the need to enrich our thoughts with those of great thinkers who have been concerned with the subject.

## (9)

*The refusal to deal with war.*

After asserting that war is a feature of human behaviour, Cyril Falls states that aversion to «the brutality and irrationality of war» can be turned «into puerile attempts to minimize its importance and refusal to concern (oneself) with it». (CYRIL FALLS, *Introductory to The Art of War, from the Age of Napoleon to the Present Day*, OUP, London-New-York-Toronto, 1961. Falls is pointing his sights at English historians of the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, but the observation is more widely applicable.) Thus both the influence of wars fought in the past on the customs of peoples and the fact that some sort of war is always planned in all countries (including neutral countries) even when no war is actually taking place, are matters which are left in the shade. In reality, defence is nothing more than a defensive war plan established and constantly adjusted by governments and military authorities with the agreement, active or passive, of citizens without exception (whence the importance of examples of military valour and warlike capacities in the rites of the State, in the nationalistic perversion of history and so on).

There can be no doubt about the existence of this agreement, although it is true that it is manifested more passively than actively and much more unconsciously than consciously. The fact is that generally men, apart from Fascists, although proud of the military virtues of the people they belong to, prefer to think of themselves in a different way. This either removes awareness of individual military responsibilities, i.e. war responsibilities, or when international politics puts these facts harshly within everyone's gaze, puts the responsibility of the tension and the threat of use of force, and so on, onto the foreigners of the rival camp who, since they are enemies, in this way cease to be human beings. When this happens their death may be viewed with satisfaction and even with joy, and does not provoke any feeling other than pride in the readers of apologies or pseudo-histories of national wars.

## (10)

*Unity of and distinction between politics and war.*

The necessity to acknowledge the unity of politics and war and the difficulty of conceiving it depend on objective factors. In some ways, politics and war are inseparable: wars are the fruit of political decisions, and the possibility of carrying them out (armaments, military service etc.) is in its turn the result of an ever-present political praxis. In other respects, on the other hand, they rule each other out. Common sense tells us that this is so whenever we hear that wars occur when there is no room left for *political solutions*. In this case, politics coincides with peace: it is the opposite of war and the means by which efforts are made to avoid it. And what should be noticed is that although this interpretation is denied by the facts (the decision to go to war is always a political decision), it is not entirely arbitrary, at least as a projection on all the sphere

of politics of certain characteristics of politics that are, quite reasonably, considered to be essential.

Indeed, it is true that states are a political creation and *it is true that within each state politics is precisely the activity by which conflicts are peacefully resolved* (just as it is true, on the other hand that, despite a number of steps backwards, history presents a constant tendency towards an extension of the size of states i.e. the transformation of previous war zones into zones of internal peace). Now pushing this interpretation to the limit, politics may be interpreted as a gradual process of elimination of wars; and thus war may be interpreted as the expression of the imperfection of politics, and peace as the expression of the perfection of politics. In this way, it is possible to conceive the historical and present unity of politics and war without arbitrarily assuming the eternal unity of politics and war (which makes it possible to think of all the ways in which politics and war are different). In support of this interpretation is the fact that politics as action towards peace coincides with the most developed aspect of political thought and with the most conscious forms of participation of citizens in political life.

# (11)

## *Development and crisis in ideologies.*

In the discussion on the crisis in ideologies (now hitting Marxism also) a very pertinent observation made by Lionel Robbins has never been taken into proper consideration. As regards liberalism, he states that «international liberalism is not a plan which has been tried and failed. It is a plan which has never been carried through — a revolution crushed by reaction ere it had time to be fully tested»: and he extends (virtually) this observation to socialism. The adjustment thereby made to the framework of discussion is obvious. If this is the case, the worst evils in our century in international, national and social policy must obviously be ascribed to what is not yet liberal and/or socialist, and not to liberalism and socialism as such, since, because they are not fully developed, they have not had a chance to prove their full validity (they should appropriately be re-assessed only if it were possible to show that their complete development is impossible).

Robbins's reasoning is unassailable. In a nutshell, and put in another form, it can be expressed as follows. He notices that with the current international system, based on the absolute and exclusive sovereignty of national states, any economic plan (in the sense that he ascribes to the term i.e. including a liberal plan) can only be national; and then he shows easily how these plans cannot fail to contain very strong elements of protectionism and corporatism because national governments (i.e. the centres of decision that formulate such plans and handle them) are supported by a balance of power that includes all protectionist and corporatist interests and excludes an increasing portion of the liberal and socialist ones (those which have their seat in the framework of the nation but which can be enforced only on the international plan because their scale of realization is international). The ultimate reason for this lies in the fact that, while the lot of the protectionist and corporatist interests depends exclusively on the respective national governments, that of the liberal and socialist interests in question depends on the contrary on the behaviour of many governments (in the limit of all of them) and not only on that of one's own, i.e. on a power

situation escaping direct electoral control of the citizens. This is why a national vote is effective in the former case, ineffective in the latter. In fact only in the former case do favourable or unfavourable governmental decisions appear altogether as gains and losses of votes and support for the party (or parties) in power. It follows that liberalism and socialism can only develop fully with an international (world) plan, and that an international plan can be implemented only by a world government (See LIONEL ROBBINS, *Economic Planning and International Order*, MacMillan, London, 1937, p. 238 for the precise quotation. See also, by Robbins, *The Economic Causes of War*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1939 and, for the international failure of socialism, BARBARA WOOTTON, «Socialism and Federalism», in *Studies in Federal Planning*, ed. by P. RANSOME, MacMillan, London, pp. 269-298. I would like to note in passing that the fact that this is not common knowledge is because of the continuance, even now, of errors that the "early liberals" made according to Robbins: i.e. (i) the tendency to describe the liberal market in terms of spontaneity, without giving equal consideration to the liberal plan as the system of political, legal, administrative and economic bonds making such spontaneity possible, and, (ii) the naïve trust in the possibility of a liberal international market functioning without a world power.)

Robbins's analysis is important also because it makes it possible to obtain results that in his work are only implicit. One such result is the possibility of distinguishing, for each of the ideologies in question, its *historical affirmation* (which has already been obtained) from its *complete realisation* (which has not yet begun), and the consequent possibility of asking whether the complete development of these ideologies goes through identifiable phases. The second result makes it possible to reply affirmatively to this question. It derives from the (already established) relationship between international liberal and/or socialist plan (*complete realisation*) and world government (peace), i.e. the *relationship between peace and the last phase of development of these ideologies*; and it lies in the possibility of establishing analogous relationships for the other phases. Indeed, in the same way that we must make assumptions about peace to be able to conceive the last stage of development, *in much the same way we have to think about war to be able to conceive the first phase, that of the historical affirmation*, as a struggle against power situations based on the forcible and legal exclusion of individual freedom and of the liberation of all classes (absolutism and/or subordination of political power to class privilege). And at this juncture, an intermediary phase between the first and the last becomes apparent, *that of a (partial) development within a legal framework*. In this phase development can neither be complete nor immune from the risk of a relapse into the previous illegality, but it is, nevertheless, as the facts show, sufficient to consolidate the historical affirmation of the ideologies in question to the point where their values become indestructible, at least as concerns ideas. This is why a real revolution, once made, is made for ever. *This phase also has a clear relationship with a typical war and/or peace situation: namely the transition from the world of war to peace*. This is demonstrated by the fact that war becomes once again a primary objective whenever such values as freedom, justice and equality are trampled on. In this negative rather than positive sense, albeit very real, it may be said that liberalism, democracy and socialism are the premises needed for peace.

This conclusion demands a brief comment. Indeed, the fact that liberalism, democracy and socialism are really the concrete political premises to peace (a different reasoning would be in order if the matter were about

religious and moral premises) has led to the erroneous assumption that they are also the means by which peace can be achieved. But rather the opposite is true. In reality, whilst the *historical affirmation* of each of these ideologies is one of the premises to peace, peace (as world government) in its turn is the necessary premise for *their complete realisation* and this immediately shows that it is not possible to construct peace by merely strengthening these ideologies. But this aspect has remained in the dark; and this obscurity has brought about both unilateral pseudo-theories of peace (i.e. peace identified with a side's own success: opposing economic theories of peace put forward by liberals and marxists, and national democratic theories of peace put forward by democrats), and, as regards the field of action specifically, an ideological reflex: the masking of war (which is inevitable since in theory nothing denies liberalism, democracy and socialism more than war).

These consequences — as well as the internal structure of these ideologies and their present situation — can be easily appreciated if we remember that the passage from the *historical affirmation* phase to the *legal development* phase coincides with the passage from offensive to defensive. The reasons for this transition are clear. The liberals could not fail to defend individual liberty after they had achieved it by struggling against absolutism and the aristocratic monopoly of power and the same is true for democrats as regards political liberty and for socialists regarding economic and social liberty. But what matters most, as regards our theme, is also the fact that these victories were achieved by means of the struggle of one class (on each occasion the class which could not free itself without affirming one of these aspects of freedom and which was at the same time able to support it institutionally) and by means of a specific form of state (the state which was compatible with individual freedom and the liberation of classes i.e. the national state). Hence, by passing from the offensive to the defensive, liberals, democrats and socialists not only respectively defended individual, political and social liberty but also a class and a form of state.

This class limitation, which has become static as a result of a defensive position, explains the (often observed) fact that democratic action was necessary to enlarge the domain of individual liberty, and socialist action to enlarge the domain of democratic liberty. On the other hand, this state limitation, which had become static in its turn for the very same reason, explains why liberals, democrats and socialists accepted the world of war (even though this took place more through the masking of war than through the recognition of its normality in a world of national states).

The following then is the situation: once class freedom has been achieved, advances can be made only in the field of the liberation of individuals as such and only by means of a new ideology: the ideology of peace (federalism). It is vital to recall that class freedom has entailed an increase in, but not complete development of, individual, political and social liberty which is still subordinate both to corporative limits (in the framework of the dissolution of classes) and also to the supreme negation of liberty by the duty to kill and die for the state (nation). The struggle for peace thus coincides with that for enlarging the sphere of individual, political and social liberty, by means of the full liberty of man as such. This requires liberals, democrats and socialists to overcome their ideological limitations. And it also means that each of them has to develop a positive theory of peace and a strategy that makes peace, and not merely good fortune for one's own nation, the supreme goal of political struggle.

(12)

*Raison d'état and the political system.*

A constitution is commonly interpreted as the highest expression of a people's autonomy, as the basic expression of its character, etc. But the opposite is also true. It cannot be denied that Ranke was right when he wrote: «The degree of independence gives a state its position in the world; and imposes at the same time the necessity upon it, to shape its internal relations in view of the objective of its affirmation. This is its basic law.» But this commonsense truth is not easy to admit (in spite of its conspicuousness: consider the constitutions of almost all European states after the Second World War), simply because, owing to the fact that it partially disagrees with the facts, it is not possible to admit the principle adopted to explain it, namely the primacy of foreign policy over domestic policy.

It is thus necessary, in particular, to recall that although Ranke had stressed the fact that the constitution of individual states depends on the international balance of power, he did not give up thinking about the state in terms of autonomy. In the very same essay he wrote: «Our country is not the place where we have managed to live best. Our fatherland is inside us and with us... This secret something, which fills both the humblest and highest things alike — this spiritual aura which we aspire to and which we breathe in — *precedes any constitution, enlivens and fills all its forms*» (My italics. See LEOPOLD VON RANKE, *Politisches Gespräch*, in *Die grossen Mächte. Politisches Gespräch*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1958, pp. 60, 57 and, for the subsequent passage, p. 58. It should be noted, to avoid any misunderstanding, that according to Ranke it is not the fusion between state and nation that gives this spiritual character to states. He said that state and nation cannot coincide — in his opinion France itself did not include all Frenchmen — and he believed that the state is a «modification of human existence, just as much as it is a modification of national existence»).

Ranke would thus have asserted both one thing (the state's autonomy) and its reverse (the state's heteronomy). The real point is that, expressed in this way, the problem is badly posed. In the first place, it is vital to observe that it is not possible to distinguish foreign policy and domestic policy without first having a theory of politics in its unity, i.e. without seeing how both are connected. In the second place, it is necessary to observe that if we do not specify the meaning and context of the discussion about the autonomy and heteronomy of states in relation to the world balance of power, we may end up by attributing to *will* what from another point of view must be attributed to *necessity*. We can say for example that a state is able to react to external pressures with valour (autonomy of will) or that it *must* adapt to these circumstances (necessity).

To escape from this ambiguity it is necessary to consider that the principle of the primacy of foreign policy is merely the poor formulation of the fact that states are not political systems but subsystems, and that there is only one political system, the system of states (which has now been fully realised as the world system of states). When viewed in the light of this criterion, it becomes immediately clear that all political events (whether foreign or domestic policy) modify the world balance of power, and that all states have to adapt to these variations of the whole (as an illustration of this the lucid intuitions of Hamilton, and the historical works by Dehio and Hintze, are examples). Furthermore, it should be remembered that political analysis needs to be restricted to political facts. By this I mean that if we observe the political system, we can ascertain relationships

between the variations in the system and the variation in the behaviour and/or in the institutions of states, and nothing more. Any talk about the genius of peoples or their character or their value, if it has any sense at all (and very often it has none: it is amazing that a statesman of the calibre of Schmidt could say that one German soldier was worth three Russian and five American soldiers in the Second World War. See ROBERTO DUCCI, « Colloquio con Schmidt », in *Il Corriere della Sera*, December 30th, 1982) has sense only inasmuch as it is based on serious anthropological, sociological, and economic analyses and so on. In such cases it is anthropology, sociology, economics and so on which illuminate politics and not vice-versa.

(13)

*The nuclear danger and human condition.*

There is as yet insufficient awareness of the fact that, on the one hand, nuclear arms have shown the limitations of the current form of state, which has proved to be quite incapable of containing the nuclear threat, and, on the other, are causing its complete degradation (even to the point where the state's function as defender of life is being overthrown). In substance, there is passive acceptance, which gets us to consider as inevitable fate what is in fact a choice made by certain people and suffered by the others. We speak about nuclear weapons, but very little about the fact that political power has acquired the character of being the power to produce, install, and use arms of this kind. The consequences of nuclear war are widely studied and publicised by biologists, physicists, physicians and so on, but what is not considered are the consequences of the acceptance of a political world which has created, and recreates every day, the danger of extermination of mankind. Generally speaking, political scientists keep quiet about this.

There are two facets to the problem. One concerns the way in which mankind is likely to live. This aspect of the problem has been thoroughly studied by Jonathan Shell. He observed that men are by now faced with a choice between the acceptance of the danger of destruction of mankind and the attempt to overcome the problem with the destruction of nuclear weapons and with a political world order which makes it impossible to build them again. He also noticed that this is a choice between two different overall ways of living. He also established very carefully the criterion by which to assess the meaning of the first alternative, fully illustrated by him. He wrote that «by threatening to cancel the future generations, the nuclear peril not only throws all our activities that count on their existence into disorder but also disturbs our relationship with the past generations». And he went on to say: «The present is a fulcrum on which the future and the past lie balanced, and if the future is lost to us, then the past must fall away too». (See JONATHAN SHELL, *The Fate of the Earth*, Avon Books, New York, 1982, pp. 165-166, and, generally speaking, all the chapter called *The Second Death*).

The second aspect of the problem is political because the choice between these two ways of living is a political choice. It is a question of choosing between two opposing conceptions of power and the state: on the one hand, to-day's state, which attributes the power of building, installing and using any type of weapon to a number of people, on the other hand a new form of state, articulated and universal, which attributes to all mankind the monopoly over the legal control of physical force (failing

which any attempt at disarmament would be destined to failure). This choice concerns the mighty ones of the earth as regards decisions, but also concerns all mankind as regards consent and dissent. And it should be pointed out that the campaigns to ward off this or that immediate risk of conflict or to reduce the number of missiles etc. are not enough. With these actions we remain in the framework of the world which has created, and recreates every day, the danger of nuclear catastrophe, without proposing either to destroy it or to tackle the problem of the new forms of power and state needed to give back to human life a sense of the future and of the past.

## North-South Relations and European Reform

by JOHN PINDER

### *Stagnation in South and North and the new Europessimism.*

History seems to use coincidence to teach man a lesson. It was in 1974, in the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, that the Third World's claim for a New International Economic Order reached its climax. The proposals emanating from the Third World contained a number of valid points. But they were vitiated by one fatal weakness. The Northern economy was seen as a given cake, from which a slice should be cut and given to the South. It had to be in the very same year that the long spell of Northern stagnation began to teach the hard way that it is not a slice from a static cake but prosperity and growth in the Northern economy that enables it to transmit to the South some of the forces of growth.

Although there may have been no need for Europeans to be taught the same hard lesson, Europe's South has suffered the same sad fate. A typical case is, unfortunately, Italy's South, where thanks partly to Italian development policies, « progress is evident up to the beginnings of the '70s; after that, as the national economy began to be afflicted by serious problems, the development of the South came to a halt ».<sup>1</sup>

Weak demand in the North inhibits exports from the South; and Northern industries in crisis see an interest in protection against competitors from newly industrialising countries (NICs).

<sup>1</sup> ARISTIDE SAVIGNANO, « Credit Institutions and the Development of Southern Italy », *Mezzogiorno d'Europa*, April/June 1983, p. 150.

In principle, most European governments disavow protectionism. In practice, with over twelve million unemployed in the European Community, they require a strong will if they are to do so; and their will is sapped by the prevailing climate of European pessimism.

This new Europessimism found expression in the European Parliament's 1982 report on the competitiveness of Community industry, produced following the submission to the Parliament of a Commission report on the subject.<sup>2</sup> The report thought it « quite likely that within a few years we shall find ourselves in difficulty, not to say in a position of inferiority, not just in relation to the USA and Japan, but also in relation to a growing number of newly industrialising countries » and believed the Community had become « a society withdrawn into itself which has adopted a defensive attitude towards a changing world ».<sup>3</sup>

The perception of inferiority towards America seems rather subjective. The table below, which the European Parliament uses to indicate positions in the league table of high technology industries (by using specialisation indices to indicate comparative advantage), itself shows, not a relative European decline, but a relationship between EC and US that is virtually unchanged between 1970 and 1980. It is true that Europe cannot match Silicon Valley and IBM (although much of IBM's productions is in Europe). But given this American superiority in the core area of information technology, the implication appears to be that Europeans have been catching up on Americans in other fields, thus keeping the average *décalage* more or less constant; and this confirms the impression that in most fields of industry the Europeans have been catching up on the US since the mid-1960s, when Servan-Schreiber touched such a raw European nerve with his book about American technological supremacy.<sup>4</sup> That Servan-Schreiber had made what was, in 1967, an accurate observation but a poor forecast is confirmed by the table's statistics, which show a widening of the American lead in 1963-70, before it levelled out in the following decade.

<sup>2</sup> The Parliament's report was reproduced in SILVIO LEONARDI, « The Competitiveness of Community Industry », in G. LEODARI and A. MOSCONI (eds), *Strategies and Policies of the European Community to Improve the Competitiveness of European Industry*, Venice, CESIV-European Centre of Studies and Information, 1984, pp. 17-44.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 30.

<sup>4</sup> J.-J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, *Le Défi Américain*, Paris, Denoël, 1967.

*Changes in comparative advantage in exports of high technology products*  
(indices in relation to total world manufacturing exports)

	1963	1970	1980
EC <sup>a</sup>	1.02	0.94	0.88
US	1.29	1.27	1.20
Japan	0.56	0.87	1.41

<sup>a</sup> including intra-EC trade

Source: *Technological Innovation in European Industry*, EC Commission DG II, January 1982, cited in LEONARDI, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

An American lead in information technology is certainly worrying, but it seems legitimate also to remember that industrial productivity has been dynamic in Europe during the past decade while in America it has been static, and that the microelectronic revolution will have its main effect on industrial processes, and to some extent products, across almost the whole range of industrial sectors in which Europeans have since the end of the 1960s been more dynamic than Americans. Further evidence that the Americans may have become more rather than less like the Europeans comes from the similar response of both to the amazing rise of Japan, as reflected in the table and shown in the record of Japanese market penetration and Euroamerican protection. Japanese superiority in a growing number of branches of manufacturing should certainly spur Europeans to action; but whether it should cause us to feel ourselves « a society withdrawn into itself », expecting to be generally « in a position of inferiority », must depend not only on whether our reactions to Japan can be sufficiently effective, but also on whether there is only one Japan or whether there are other large populations capable of a similar performance.

This brings us to the NICs, in relation to which pessimism is surely a less appropriate attitude for Europeans to adopt than recognition that we face competition that we will have to meet. The European Parliament was worried that « certain Member States' exports are even specialising in product areas where they are — or will be — competing with newly industrialising countries ».<sup>5</sup> But just as North America, Western Europe and

<sup>5</sup> LEONARDI, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

Japan developed all the industries that first arose in Britain, so we must expect the South to develop all the industries that now exist in the North. The question therefore is not whether Europeans will eventually have to compete with the NICs across the board, but whether Europe can be more successful than Britain has been in retaining its industrial dynamism while others are catching up. In an age when the microelectronic revolution is replacing the concept of mature sectors, having stable technologies that can be transferred for use by cheap, semi-skilled labour in the NICs, by that of dynamic technologies in factories from which labour in a traditional sense has disappeared, it is defeatist to expect that Europeans will be unable to retain sufficient dynamism in relation to the NICs.

While it is reasonable to expect the Japanese to derive industrial advantage from their peculiar society and culture for many years to come, the grounds for expecting European inferiority in relation to the Americans and the NICs appear to be more psychological than objective. There is no good reason to suppose that Europeans cannot achieve adequate economic progress over the long run, provided that pessimism does not inhibit their capacity to act. The fashionable Europessimism seems, however, itself to stem from a sense of incapacity for action, which has political and intellectual rather than economic origins, and which interacts with the pessimism in a vicious circle that could involve a needless economic decline. Without a sound analysis and the ability to draw the necessary conclusions for policy and political institutions, Europeans risk falling back on simplistic and obsolete reactions that would serve to reinforce the vicious circle, not to break it.

#### *Obsolete reactions or a practical approach.*

Having established a postwar consensus for the mixed and open economy, which was the foundation for unprecedented prosperity and growth, Europeans appear, in their mood of uncertainty and pessimism, susceptible to the urge to abandon it in one of two directions: protection or *laissez-faire* liberalism.

The doctrine of protectionism was discredited by the catastrophes of the 1930s and 1940s followed by the success of the 1950s and 1960s. When, on top of this, we are embarking on a new industrial revolution which will increase the need for specialisation and, in some sectors, scale, to make protection into a doctrine is hardly a credible activity. But to resist ad hoc measures of protection that could eventually have the same result requires

arguments that are convincing both politically and intellectually. The *laissez-faire* brand of liberalism that has emanated from Chicago has convinced many intellectuals and politicians. But neither theory nor practice should lead one to believe that this doctrine will have staying-power in the modern economy.

Doctrinaire monetarism and contemporary *laissez-faire* liberalism have their theoretical base in a version of neo-classical economics, which has a high-powered static equilibrium analysis but no adequate theory of economic development and growth. While, therefore, one can have confidence in the ability of policies based on this family of doctrines to cut out some uneconomic activities (though even in this, a certain reluctance to recognise the extent of market imperfections makes the policies less effective than is claimed), there are no good grounds for confidence that enough economic activities will be generated to ensure technological progress and economic growth. On the contrary, if new competitors are intruding into markets where high research, development and investment costs have been financed through oligopolistic pricing policies, as they were during the successful period of postwar Western expansion, one might expect profits to become too low for firms to invest in technological progress and the creation of enough new jobs; and the vicious circle of low profits, low investment, slow adjustment and continued low profits resembles European experience in the last decade too closely for comfort.

In practice, the only example of an economy being caught up on by others over a long period is Britain. To those for whom contemporary political polemics loom larger than the lessons of history, this may be diagnosed as an English sickness caused by protection and the welfare state. In fact, the decline relative to others, first America and Germany, later Japan, France and other European countries, began more than a century ago; and during the first fifty years of relative decline, Britain was the only country to adopt a policy of complete free trade, while all the others grew behind systems of protection. Even since the first world war, the British economy has not been more protected than the average; and since the second world war, the welfare state has not been more extensive than that of other countries that grew twice as fast.<sup>6</sup> The British economy is still the most open of

<sup>6</sup> For example, public expenditure is now about 45 per cent of GDP in the United Kingdom, compared with 69 per cent in the Netherlands.

all the medium-sized industrial countries, by the empirical measure of imports of goods and services, which are about one third of GDP.

None of this is intended to make a case for a doctrine of protectionism, as distinct from the use of measures of protection in given cases to ease adjustment or give time to achieve international competitiveness. But both theory and practice do indicate that comprehensive doctrinaire beliefs, based on what, given the present state of knowledge, can only be inadequate understanding of how the modern economy works, will be a worse guide for action than a more practical approach, which considers the likely effects of particular policies on technological progress and economic growth, paying more attention to the experience of the successful countries such as Japan, Austria, Germany and France than to doctrinal preconceptions. It is this approach that can enable us to roll back Europessimism, and hence the self-defeating reactions of *laissez-faire* or protectionism, by offering the convincing prospect of a recovery of Europe's economic health.

#### *European integration, mixed economy.*

A policy for industrial development should not be seen only, or even mainly, as a policy for particular sectors. Macroeconomic instruments such as interest and exchange rates are more important. Yet the EC lacks an effective policy towards American interest rates or the Japanese exchange rate, although these are critical for European competitiveness and development.

High interest rates caused by the impact in European capital markets of borrowing to finance the American budget and payments deficits are one of the principal impediments to European industrial investment. This distortion could be countered in various ways: by Community-wide subsidisation of interest on loans for industrial investment; by restricting, as the Japanese do, the access to capital markets; better than either, by building up the European Monetary Fund (EMF) and the European Currency Unit to a point that gives the EC a real bargaining power to influence American monetary and exchange-rate policy. The EMF, disposing of an important share of EC member states' reserves, would likewise be able to influence the Japanese exchange rate, for example by buying yen in order to help establish a better equilibrium between Japan and the international economy, and in particular to remove the element of distortion in Japanese export pressure on European markets.

Proposals such as these may seem to the reader to lack credibility. But some such action would certainly be seriously considered if the EC disposed of adequate common monetary instruments. It is the Community's absence as an actor on the world monetary stage — one aspect of the lack of an effective government for the EC economy — that inhibits us from thinking properly about what needs to be done. Can it really be regarded as an incredible alternative that we should recognise our need for such instruments and such a government if we are to be able to steer our common economy on to a path of economic development?

Nor should the case for the microeconomic aspects of industrial policy be ignored, and for common Community action with respect to those as well. The role of public finance in research and development follows from the social benefit of the resulting technologies when diffused beyond the originating firms,<sup>7</sup> and from the big scale of some crucial projects. Policy to promote technological diffusion and the smaller-scale projects is within the reach of EC member governments; but some of the developments of which the Americans and Japanese are capable can hardly be financed by the European governments individually. The *Esprit* programme of common research by leading EC firms in the field of information technology is a modest response to the Japanese efforts to develop a fifth generation computer or to what the Americans can finance in relation to their defence effort and within their largest firms. But it is wise to start small in such a difficult matter as Community support for multinational research and development, provided that this is seen as a launching pad for more ambitious efforts.

The EC has begun to open up the member states' public sector markets to competitive tendering from other member countries; but in the vital field of telecommunications the process has hardly begun. Progress with this policy is one condition of European development in information technology.

The reduction of capacity in Europe's crisis industries has been retarded by the weakness of the Community's institutions. For economic as well as political reasons, firms can prolong the life of capacity which serves only to undermine a sector's strength. Even in the steel industry, where the ECSC Treaty gave the

<sup>7</sup> Some of the evidence for this was discussed in ANDREW SHONFIELD, «Innovation: Does Government have a Role?», in CHARLES CARTER (ed.), *Industrial Policy and Innovation*, London, Heinemann for NIESR, PSI and RIIA, 1981, p. 8 ff.

Community more policy instruments than it can apply to other sectors, its financial and regulatory instruments have been inadequate to secure a reduction of capacity than would have been undertaken as a matter of course in a crisis sector in Japan. With respect to man-made fibres, the Commission refused to recognise the legitimacy of the producers' plans for a concerted reduction of capacity, thus failing to set a precedent for a combination of competition policy and industrial policy that could have accelerated the return of a number of other sectors to competitive health.

Since the instruments of external trade policy belong to the Community, it can use these too to promote adaptation in crisis sectors, by making protection conditional on adequate adjustment measures. The EC could also employ temporary protection of new industries, particularly in the field of information technology, in order to enable firms to achieve international competitiveness. If we doubt the Community's political capacity to make sensible choices about such things, we should approach such policies in an experimental way, as has been done with the *Esprit* programme, applying them in only a very few cases until successful experience has been acquired.

The most popular slogan among opponents of industrial policy is that governments cannot pick winners; and it is true that political considerations will often bias a government's choice. But this slogan misses the point that in some countries, such as Britain, the financial institutions themselves are ill-equipped to choose industrial investments within a long-term perspective; and it is a legitimate aim of policy to promote the development of institutions that are so equipped. One of the most effective ways of doing this would be to encourage integration among financial institutions of the EC member countries; for the skills in relation to industrial investment that are possessed by, for example, the German *Grossbanken* would then be more readily transferred to countries such as Britain that are less well-endowed in this respect. Here again, the EC has been extraordinarily slow to realise the benefits of a truly common market.

The aim of this short list of possible elements in a Community industrial policy has been to show that a constructive analysis, not inhibited by ideology or by acceptance of a passive role for the Community, can offer various approaches to the relaunching of European industrial development, of a sort that should replace doctrinaire or lethargic attitudes by a realistic propensity for action.

*North and South in Europe and the world.*

Although the main contribution to prosperity in Europe's South must come from economic growth in the EC as a whole, the Community's regional policy can also play a significant part. More resources for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) should become available after the size of the Community budget has been enlarged; and the Commission's policy is « to assess the regional impact of Community policies and draw the logical conclusions ».<sup>8</sup> But the Community is still far from « a convergence of opinions... on the need to undertake all public intervention in the economy in relation to the development of the South », such as prevailed in Italy by « the beginning of the 70s ».<sup>9</sup> This can come only with the development of the Community into a more genuine polity, one condition of which is a reform of the Community institutions in a more federal direction.

General prosperity in the Community is likewise the best contribution it can make to the growth of the Southern part of the world. But here again, specific policies for the South can be important. The European Development Fund performs a function similar to that of the ERDF within the Community; and the Lomé Convention and Generalised Scheme of Preferences open the EC market to some extent to exports from the South. But the EC's protection is directed particularly against the NICs; and while the Southern countries themselves apply a brake to the most effective vehicle for technological transfer, to the extent that they fail to do what they reasonably can to reach a *modus vivendi* with multinational companies, the Community should also do what it reasonably can to ensure that such a *modus vivendi* is reached. If the Community is to succeed in maintaining a strong technological progress in future, it will need the framework of a widening market, just as the widening of Western Europe's national markets through the EC market provided a framework in which to develop the industries of the 1950s and 1960s. This implies the future perspective of a process of mutual liberalisation between the Community and not only the US and Japan but also the more advanced of the NICs; and this process is bound to be a difficult one, requiring a common EC foreign policy to set the hard economic choices in a broad enough context,

<sup>8</sup> *Programme of the Commission for 1984*, Brussels, 1984, p. 29.

<sup>9</sup> ARISTIDE SAVIGNANO, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

just as the postwar international liberalisation was in tune with the American and European foreign policies of that period.

*European reform.*

Both European prosperity and North-South relations require, then, active monetary, industrial and external policies for the Community, which can hardly become effective without a reform of the Community institutions, following the principles that underlie the European Parliament's Draft Treaty establishing the European Union;<sup>10</sup> and constructive North-South relations, on which continued European prosperity will ultimately depend, will in turn require that the European Union be seen in the perspective of a long-term process of integration in the world economy.

These conditions are politically demanding, even daunting. But there is an underlying trend that can give cause for a certain optimism. The prolonged troubles of the 1970s caused many economists to remember Kondratieff, with his concept of a long cycle of alternate phases of technological progress and stagnation. Behind the apparent stagnation of the 1970s, the first stirrings of the coming microelectronic revolution could be detected; and now that all-pervading technology is all around us, with others such as bio-technology, lasers and new materials hard on its heels. This Kondratieff upturn offers the prospect of a revival of industrial dynamism; and if the experience of each previous upturn is any guide, this should be followed, despite luddite fears to the contrary, by a renewed expansion of employment. The upturn of the cycle that is now coming to an end was the occasion for the establishment of the Community within the postwar international trading order. Should not the next upturn give people the confidence to convert the existing Community into a European Union, and the present international economic disorder into a new order in which liberal economic relations can prevail?

<sup>10</sup> European Parliament, February 1984.

## Notes

### ON ENGLISH AS A UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE

*The decision of the editorial board of Il Federalista to start an English edition of the review has been under consideration for a long time.*

*Federalism has a cultural history in Italy since the Ventotene Manifesto of 1941. It is not our task to assess the value of this tradition, since we are the ones who have kept it alive for the last twenty-five years. But as long as it remains in the suffocating confines of the Italian linguistic area, the body of ideas that has been developed so far by Italian federalism, and that is still being developed, whatever its value be, cannot even begin to find a place in world culture, initiate anything more than a parochial debate, confront criticism and enrich itself by it.*

*Federalism is a message addressed to the world: hence it must furnish itself with a linguistic instrument capable of conveying it to its audience. This instrument can only be English.*

*We know that we face a difficult challenge. The predominance of English in world communication is one of the many facets of the growing interdependence of human action, thought and ways of life produced by the advancing scientific and technological revolution. A world marching towards unification needs a lingua franca. Until the Second World War, when the world balance of power took shape, or at the latest until 1954, when the European Defence Community project failed, it could have made sense to ask which of the existing tongues would take on this function. French had a real chance. But no such doubt is legitimate to-day, since the drive of English towards the standing of a universal language has by now reached the point of no return.*

*What needs to be underlined, however, are the consequences of this process not having yet been completed. Setting aside the case of the world community of natural scientists and, partly, of economists (even if in this particular realm the process is not yet as advanced as many people believe), the world domination of English has enormously enhanced the receptivity of the non-English-speaking world to messages coming from the Anglo-Saxon area. But it has not equally increased the capacity of the former to address messages to the latter. The result is Anglo-Saxon cultural imperialism, which is highly detrimental to the cultural life both of the English-speaking and of the non-English-speaking parts of the world.*

*In a perceptive contribution to a symposium on translation published by the Times Literary Supplement of October 14, 1983, George Steiner remarks that « to write one's play or novel in one or another branch of Anglo-American is to have a potential of an almost global readership. Writers in "smaller" languages (ontologically there is, of course, no "small" language) look more and more pressingly to the chance of having their work transferred into English. Where the literate public does not yet read English, or only haltingly, the Anglo-American literary output is extensively translated. From Stockholm to Valparaíso and Tokyo, but also from Paris to Cairo and, censorship permitting, to Budapest, bookstore windows are crowded with translations into the native tongue of what New York and London have published.*

*Every facet of the economics, sociology and techniques of literary translation has been affected by this linguistic power-play. Much of the current canon of "important" fiction, drama, poetry, is the result not of any considered apprehension of intrinsic quality, but of the Anglo-American predominance. Untranslated, or poorly translated, available in English only fragmentarily, a writer of the very first rank — I am thinking of specific cases in German, in Italian, in Portuguese, in Hungarian, but also in French — will remain in the shadow-zone of a purely national or an academic-esoteric recognition. The consequent distortion of values is the more ironic as neither the English nor the American novel, to take the most visible genre, are, at present, in any major phase ».*

*This means that the real source of Anglo-Saxon cultural imperialism lies in the fact that the process of establishing English as a world language is only half completed. A passive knowledge of it is by now widely enough diffused to make the rest of the world highly receptive to every manifes-*

tation of Anglo-Saxon culture (and pseudo-culture) but its active knowledge is far too inadequate to enable non-Anglo-Saxon culture to penetrate the Anglo-Saxon world. Both cultural areas can only suffer from this fact. The reason is obvious with respect to the rest of the world, since any cultural production in a language other than English is by now deprived of any chance to reach an international public, thus being excluded from the world circuit, and that in an age in which the national framework — and France is no exception — is far too narrow to sustain more than a provincial cultural life. But the same is true for Anglo-Saxon culture as well, for in the present situation it is doomed to play a world role it is not equipped to take on, and is deprived of the possibility of enriching itself thanks to a permanent confrontation with a whole panoply of alien contributions. Indeed, cultural imperialism, like any other unequal human relationship, impoverishes both master and servant.

The adequate response to this paradoxical phenomenon is not to shut one's eyes to the reality of a process which is going ahead whatever attitude we may adopt. It is no good clinging obstinately to national languages, or, still worse, engaging in the reactionary (and culturally suicidal) endeavour to revive regional languages long fallen to the rank of dialects, which are good only to convey poor ideas to a poor public.

The only progressive response is to take up the challenge and to use English not only as a vehicle to receive, but also to transmit ideas. This means giving up the foolish attempt to stop an inevitable course of events, which is, moreover, a sign that mankind is becoming, for the first time, one cultural community.

To be sure English will not escape some tensions and distortions in the process. The lingua franca which is taking shape at the world level will diverge more and more from the languages actually spoken in any of the English-speaking countries, the more so as the process goes on, and as more and more people outside the Anglo-Saxon world use English to express contents stemming from other cultural sources. Thus it can be foreseen that, in due course, with the developing world language increasingly absorbing the most diverse suggestions from everywhere, the idioms actually spoken in the US, Great Britain, etc. will become almost as distinct from international English as French, or German, now are.

This said, it must be remembered that English shows a particular disposition to take on the role of the Latin of our age (though in actual fact the grounds for its having acquired a dominant position are not intrinsic to the language as such, but

are of a political and economic order). Its double layer of roots (Anglo-Saxon and Latin) gives it a sort of polymorphism that makes it capable of fitting into the most diverse cultural niches. Thanks to its loose grammatical and syntactic structure, it can be twisted and strained far beyond what would be considered the threshold of acceptability for any other language. It is not indeed by chance that people in the Anglo-Saxon world generally show more linguistic tolerance than anywhere else.

One must not fear that the drive towards world predominance of the English lingua franca will endanger national and regional cultures. Culture expresses itself at many levels — world-wide, national and local — each of which needs a vehicle of its own. It can be foreseen that, in a not too distant future, the whole of mankind will be bi- or trilingual, thus realizing a sort of linguistic world federalism. It must not be forgotten, besides, that such a situation has been already foreshadowed in the past, when Latin was the universal language of the learned and provided the common soil out of which the national tongues could draw the nourishment that enabled them to attain the dignity of great vehicles of cultural communication.

At that stage, all men will be culturally equal. But the most effective contribution to reaching it will be made by those who can overcome the stupid linguistic nationalism which tries to make cultures impermeable and to perpetuate the current disastrous babel of languages.

Francesco Rossolillo

## GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

The neutralist option has recently resurfaced with considerable force in the unending debate in West Germany on Germany's reunification, which has alarmed Bonn's European and Western partners, and, as usual, France in particular. The belief that, if the two Germanies left their respective blocks, a decisive contribution to lasting détente would be achieved and that this would open up the possibility of overcoming Germany's division into two states, was supported by leading and highly-qualified exponents of the German Peace Movement. An example of this was the "Krefeld appeal" an open letter to Brezhnev when he visited

Bonn in November 1981, signed by Havemann, the well-known East German dissident, by many West German intellectuals, including Böll, and by several SPD deputies, trade unionists and ecologists.<sup>1</sup> A book, *Die deutsche Einheit kommt bestimmt*, which received some attention from the foreign press, has been a significant factor in the "New German Patriotism", the name given to this line of thinking. It was published in April 1982 in Bergisch Gladbach by Lubbe and contains essays by its editor Wolfgang Venhor and other contributors from all parts of the German political spectrum, ranging from Harald Rüddenklaue, a Christian Democrat, to Peter Brandt, the son of the current SPD President, very much to the left of this party.

Despite the divergent positions, it is the common belief of all the book's contributors, well-expressed by the editor, that European unification is not the key to German unity but rather that German unity is the key to European unity. This belief is based on the conviction that Adenauer's decision to opt for the Atlantic Alliance and West European Unity, which the SPD came to adopt at the end of the fifties and beginning of the sixties, significantly stiffened the system of opposing blocks in Europe and ran completely counter to such goals as reunification, détente and peace. A radical rethinking of West German foreign policy can no longer be delayed because the current phase in the blocks system is causing a sharp increase in the arms race which, unless checked, will inevitably lead to a nuclear conflict with Europe, and Germany in particular, as the main battlefield. In other words, if Germany is to be a real source of détente bringing about a reversal in the current critical international position and encouraging the process of Germany's reunification, then a transitory phase, a confederation between the two Germanies, must become the overriding priority, which (according to Venhor, who does not explain how) would be compatible with an unchanged status within NATO and the EC on the one hand and the Warsaw Pact and Comecon on the other, and would thus not create any very complex problem immediately. This would be a launching pad towards overcoming the blocks system,

<sup>1</sup> As regards the presence (considered marginal by the present author) of the issue of Germany's reunification in the German Peace Movement and the reactions to it outside Germany (considered disproportionate here) see WILFRIED VON BREDOW, « Zusammensetzung und Ziele der Friedensbewegung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland », in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, an insert in the review *Das Parlament*, June 19th, 1982.

gradually to be replaced by a United Europe, as a collaboration of sovereign states, including a fully reunified Germany.

How reassuring it was, given such deviant positions as this, that a book by Eberhard Schulz (deputy director of the Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), *Die deutsche Nation in Europa*, appeared in the same month and the same year under the auspices of the Europa-Union Verlag in Bonn. This book has proved exceptionally valuable in restoring clarity to the German reunification issue (although needless to say the foreign press has had nothing to say about it so far, since irrational positions at least at the outset get more space than rational positions). Not only does it show clearly the inconsistencies in the "New German Patriotism" outlook; it also shows up the limitations of the official policy on the reunification issue put forward by the major political forces in Bonn, and hence the Government too, limitations which are partly responsible for the periodic resurgence of irrational positions, highly damaging to this crucial issue in German politics.

In his criticism of the neutralist position, the author stresses in particular that the Soviet Union would never give up control over such a key state as East Germany, unless it was forced to do so as a result of a radical shift in the balance of power, since it wishes to maintain its imperialist position in Europe and, thus, throughout the world. Schulz further points out that the Soviet Union would not welcome even a Communist unified Germany, because such a political entity, in view of its power, would create even more problems than arose from the break with China. If on occasion the Soviet Union seems to float some prospect of German reunification in return for a more or less neutralist option, this should merely be interpreted as an expedient, a tactic designed to weaken Bonn's ties with NATO and the EC. Quite apart from considerations of the total lack of reality in the neutralist option, Schulz's decisive criticism concerns the outdated nationalistic thinking underlying "New German Patriotism", which prevents its exponents from appreciating that the national State has for a long time been a historically superseded political structure and that the priority in German politics should be the completion of European unification and not the reconstitution of the German national state destroyed by the outcome of the Second World War.

Whilst criticising the neutralist option, Schulz defends the basic validity of the West German Government's foreign policy since the War. However, as mentioned above, he brings to light the limitations he finds in the West German Government's current

official policy on German reunification and this is the most original and interesting part of the book. The central tenet of this policy, officially supported by all the major political forces in Bonn, despite their differences over the Ostpolitik, is that the German issue will remain unresolved, until the German people as a whole is given the right to bring about its own reunification into one state by exercising self-determination and by stipulating a peace treaty defining the boundaries of the reconstituted German State in such a way as to be acceptable to all parties. West German constitutional bodies consider this view to be upheld by the 1949 Constitution, the introductory articles of which lay down that the new State's international objectives include maintaining the national and State unity of the German people, as well as participation in a United Europe. The Ostpolitik of the Brandt-Scheel Government is therefore considered by Bonn's government as a provisional measure. This is because the Federal Republic, but not the future State emerging from the German people's implementation of their right to self-determination, is bound by the 1970 treaty with Poland, containing recognition of the Oder-Neisse line between Poland and the German Democratic Republic, and by the 1972 treaty between the two Germanies relating to their mutual recognition. Significantly in 1973 the Constitutional Court upheld the validity of the 1972 treaty when it was contested by the Bavarian Government but ruled that the Constitution requires the Federal Republic's constitutional bodies to pursue reunification of the German people into a single State.

Schulz maintains that although this view was historically comprehensible when the Federal Republic was founded, in the light of the uncertain developments in Europe and the world as a whole, nevertheless it is totally outdated in the current situation and merely has adverse consequences.

Its most serious limitations concern the relationships between the Western European partners. For as long as Bonn continues to assert officially that its objective is German reunification a very large obstacle to progress in European integration will remain, since the nationalistic tendencies affecting Bonn's EC partners, France and Great Britain primarily, will always be able to use to their advantage worries arising from the hegemony that a united Germany would objectively have in the EC given the size of its economy and population. While weakening Bonn's credibility over its pro-European policy outside West Germany, inside West Germany it opens up the path for those who urge Bonn to weaken its European and Western ties in favour of the goal of reunification.

The very fact of considering the German issue still unresolved also has very adverse consequences as regards relationships with Eastern Europe. The prospect, however theoretical, that one day the Oder-Neisse line may be questioned, merely encourages more pro-Soviet and anti-liberalising trends in Poland, easily whipped up by the ghost of German revanchism, while continued official policy statements favouring reunification affect relationships with the German Democratic Republic even more, since this objectively means that at the first opportunity this State will be absorbed and Berlin will be made the capital of the new German State. However unrealistic this policy may be, its continuation has the effect of both strengthening East Berlin's more pro-Soviet trends and the effect of providing a good excuse for improving neither human contacts between the two German populations nor the ever precarious position of West Berlin. The more positive aspects of the Ostpolitik thus come to be checked.

Finally the West German Government's official policy on German reunification has far from positive effects on public opinion within Germany. The very fact that a politically unachievable goal has been proclaimed by Bonn to be its basic foreign policy objective for decades (a policy achievable only if unexpected changes naturally representing a great threat to peace were to arise) has merely created despondency among West German politicians and weakened the population's democratic awareness. All of which opens up the way, particularly among the younger generations, for irrational political trends even as regards the question of a divided Germany.

Schulz argues that these considerations ought to lead to a thorough revision of the current West German policy on the German issue and he suggests somewhat implicitly that some aspects of the Constitution might need to be altered should they prove to be an unsurmountable problem in this respect. The idea is that West Germany's major political forces, and hence the government, should state that Bonn's primary foreign policy objective is European unification, a much more coherent position. And as regards the German issue, the official policy should be to pursue the sacrosanct task of eliminating the barriers which exist today preventing contact between the people of East and West Germany and not the reconstitution of a single German State, the accent being placed on the possibility for East Germans to exercise democratic self-determination i.e. to give themselves a democratic regime with the possibility of participating in the

EC, while maintaining the Democratic Republic's statehood.<sup>2</sup> Various key German politicians including Strauss, Scheel and Brandt have suggested they favour this position, although none of them has yet had the courage to draw up a precise proposal designed formally to revise the official Government line, partly because of the Constitutional Court's ruling. Apart from removing one of the greatest obstacles to the furthering of European integration, this position would open up the way for supporters of détente and liberalising trends in East Germany and Eastern Europe in general and would contribute in the short term to greater relaxation of the frontiers between the blocks and in the long term to the prospect of decisive changes within the Soviet block, in relation to the furthering of European integration.

We cannot fail to agree with Schulz's analysis and his conclusions, not least for the simple reason that his ideas tally with those which have long been included in the European federalists' political platform. We may merely recall here the resolution of the Italian MFE on the German question in 1963, the 1966 declaration of the Europa-Union Deutschland approved in Baden-Baden and the ten theses approved in 1980 by the Hauptausschuss of the Europa-Union, one of which contains the following formula: « Two States in Germany - under a European roof ».<sup>3</sup> Leaving aside legitimate satisfaction over the fact that an eminent scholar has upheld the validity of one of the federalists' most significant policies after a fairly complete and detailed analysis, we must recognize the great political topicality of Schulz's discussion given the crucial decisions facing the European Community at the current time. We are clearly referring to the

<sup>2</sup> A similar thesis was implicit in KARL KAISER's book *German Foreign Policy in Transition. Bonn between East and West*, Oxford University Press, London, 1982, but, never until now, at least to our knowledge, had it been formulated so explicitly and so well constructed (apart from the positions of the European federalist organisations which will be discussed below) as in Schulz's book. His argument against the goal of reconstituting a single German state is diametrically opposed to Rosario Romeo's position in his book *Italia mille anni*, Florence, Le Monnier, 1981, where abandonment of reunification, whether open or covert, is a grave political and moral error both for the majority of West Germans and for Germany's allies. A quite lucid assessment of this aspect of Romeo's book was made in DINO COFRANCESCO's article, « Riflessioni sul nazionalismo. La Germania e l'Europa », in *Storia contemporanea*, 1982, n. 3.

<sup>3</sup> The first two documents are published in S. PISTONE, *La Germania e l'unità europea*, Naples, Guida, 1978. The third (mentioned by Schulz) is published in the September 1980 issue of *Europäische Zeitung*, the official journal of the Europa-Union Deutschland.

question of the revision of the Community's structure which has been put on the agenda by the European Parliament and which will face the crucial test, ratification by the Member States, in the period following the European elections in June 1984. Incidentally, we should point out that precisely because of the lack of up-to-date information on the European Parliament's action, Schulz's discussion of the concrete possibilities of furthering the process of European integration constitutes the only weak point in the book, since his discussion goes no further than recording the deep crisis that the Community is currently undergoing, without sufficiently stressing the progressive trends brought about by the European Parliament's direct election. It should furthermore be pointed out that, as regards the battle over the restructuring of the Community's institutions, a clear move by Bonn to distance itself from its current official line on the German question would contribute enormously to a positive outcome in this respect in France, the country which will be decisive for the whole undertaking and where, it should be remembered, the battle for the EDC (the European Defence Community) was lost at a time when the ghost of the danger of German hegemony was the main weapon of those who opposed the construction of Europe. Insofar as Schulz's proposals will stimulate a wide and productive debate in Germany on the limitations of the traditional reunification policy, a debate in which German federalists could play a decisive political and cultural role, his proposals will contribute substantially to bringing about positive developments as regards this policy.

Sergio Pistone

## REFORM OF THE COUNCIL: THE BUNDES RAT MODEL \*

### Introduction.

*In any discussion on institutional reform of the Community one of the most important and sensitive aspects is the future of the Council. It is through the Council that the governments of*

\* The article assumes a knowledge of Community institutions on the part of the reader.

the Member States participate in the Community's decision-making process, and it is the composition, procedures and powers of the Council that determine the degree of autonomy of Community policies from national governments and the ability of the Community to do more than settle for overdue compromise based on the lowest common denominator of national interests. In short, the whole concept of national sovereignty is in question here, and the effectiveness of any reform of the Community will depend on how this is dealt with.

The European Parliament's Committee on Institutional Affairs, preparing the proposal for a new Treaty on European Union, examined many options ranging from proposals for a « Chamber of States » elected by national parliaments to proposals aimed at reinforcing the current structure and powers of the Council. Finally it opted for proposals<sup>1</sup> that would make only a few changes to the existing system, hoping that these would be small enough to be politically realistic yet important enough to represent a significant improvement. In doing so it adopted an institutional model that is not far removed from that of the Bundesrat in the Federal Republic of Germany, a model that must have been in the minds of many Members of the Committee when they discussed it.

The Bundesrat bears a striking resemblance in its composition, working methods and procedures to the Council, even as it exists at present. The purpose of this article is to examine these similarities<sup>2</sup> and identify the differences that allow the FRG to operate as an effective federal system, while the Community is bogged down in some of the worst features of intergovernmentalism; and to assess whether the changes proposed by the European Parliament would be sufficient to achieve a lasting improvement.

The Bundesrat: structure and procedures.

Under the FRG constitution (Basic Law) the Land (State) governments are not only responsible for their own areas of competence (education, police, etc.), but also for the implement-

<sup>1</sup> Draft Treaty establishing a European Union, adopted by the European Parliament on 14 February 1984 (O.J. C 77).

<sup>2</sup> The author is indebted to the Bundesrat officials he met on the occasion of a study visit of EP officials in 1981, who provided useful information and explanations. In particular he would like to thank Dr. ZILLER, Director of the Bundesrat, Mr. RADERSCHALL, Head of the Bundesrat's liaison office with the European Parliament, and Dr. DIETLEIN, Clerk of the Conciliation Committee.

ation and execution of federal laws. For this reason, and also because the fathers of the constitution hoped to avoid the emergence of a strong, central government,<sup>3</sup> the Bundesrat was recreated as an organ through which Länder governments « participate in federal legislation and administration » (Article 50 - Basic Law). It is not a proper second chamber, and not part of « the Parliament » divided into two chambers as in most bicameral parliamentary systems. However, it is an organ of the federation, the members of which are Land Ministers, and not an organ of the Länder. Therefore it is not used for coordinating Land policies, which is done through standing conferences of Länder ministers (eg. the conference of culture ministers which has a standing secretariat as large as that of the Bundesrat). In the European Community, the Council is also supposed to be a Community institution, acting within a fixed legal framework. However, the two functions of deciding on common policies in some areas and coordinating separate policies in others are not separated: the Council does both. The only formally distinct « standing conference » to coordinate national policies is the Conference of Foreign Ministers dealing with European Political Cooperation, and their separation is due to entirely different reasons.<sup>4</sup>

Just like the Council, the Bundesrat is composed of ministers representing their government. Similarly, voting takes place by a weighted majority: five votes for large Länder, four for medium size, and three for small. These votes must be cast as a block. In theory, these votes correspond to the number of seats each Land has in the Bundesrat, but in practice they can be cast by a single minister. Often, therefore, only one minister (the relevant one according to the subject under discussion) is present. Any minister of a Land government may represent his/her Land in the Bundesrat though no more than an equivalent number to the number of votes available to the Land can sit at any one time as members: any surplus number are deemed to be assistants.

<sup>3</sup> K. von BEYME in *The political system of the FRG*, Farnborough, Gower, 1982, page 159 notes that when the Basic Law was created « no central power in Germany existed » and « the two existing powers in the country, the Allied Powers and the governments of the Länder », both sought to establish a decentralized system « unimpaired by a central government ».

<sup>4</sup> The separation is in any case becoming blurred, e.g. the Solemn Declaration adopted at the Stuttgart Summit on 19 June 1983 referring to « The Council and its Members » for all matters.

The Bundesrat sits about 15 times a year — every three weeks — normally for one day (Friday). Heavy agendas are dealt with quickly. They are prepared by a meeting of Land officials on the Wednesday before each sitting, who note on which points there is general agreement and which need further discussion. Only the latter are discussed during the sitting. (This is very similar to the COREPER - Council system of the EC with its A points and B points). In the plenary, only one person from each Land (the relevant minister) speaks, and usually only those from Länder concerned with a problem (e.g. Berlin is not likely to speak on steel). Debates are therefore short and to the point. They are open to the public (although secret sessions are possible, there have only been two since 1949), but rarely televised. « Question time » to the federal government exists in theory, but has only been used six times since 1949. Decisions in the Bundesrat are not taken by simple majority of votes cast but by a majority of votes possible. Most of its practices date from the old Bundesrat established in 1871.

There are no political groups in the Bundesrat. Members sit and act according to their Land just as in the EC Council they sit and act according to national interests. Länder with different political complexions often vote together. Saarland (CDU, FDP) and Nord-Rhein-Westphalen (SPD) for instance, often vote together in defence of the steel industry, or Bremen (SPD) and Niedersachsen (CDU) on shipbuilding. Only on very important political questions do party lines emerge,<sup>5</sup> and these are complicated by the fact that different coalitions exist in different Länder, and Land parties are anyway not always in agreement with their corresponding Federal parties. In this way, the Bundesrat genuinely represents regional rather than party interests, unlike the Chamber of States in many other federal systems. This again makes the Bundesrat comparable to the Council, in which party or ideological divisions rarely arise: national interests are the main feature.<sup>6</sup>

The Bundesrat has 14 specialised Committees. Each one has 11 members — one for each Land, which can have the consequence that the political majority is different from the plenary. Although Land Ministers or Prime Ministers may sit on the Committees, they can send officials to replace them. This results in Committees

<sup>5</sup> See also the analysis in GERHARD LEIBHOLZ and DIETER HESSELBERGER: « Bundesrat und Parteiensystem » in *Der Bundesrat als Verfassungsorgan und politische Kraft*, Neue Darmstädter Verlag, 1974.

<sup>6</sup> They do arise sometimes, however (e.g. Vredeling directive).

being used for detailed scrutiny by staff of Land ministries in the same way as Council working parties and COREPER scrutinise Commission proposals. Länder bureaucracies have, through this and other mechanisms, become increasingly involved in the preparation and implementation of federal laws.<sup>7</sup>

The Bundesrat's own staff is very small (120 in 1981 compared to 100 in 1949!), as research work and preparation is carried out by the staff of the relevant ministry in each Land. Only in foreign affairs do the Bundesrat staff play a major preparatory role, as the Länder have no ministries responsible for this area.

Another parallel with the Council is that Bundesrat members may attend and speak at Bundesrat plenary and committee meetings and Bundesrat members may address questions to them.

From the above, it can be seen that in its form the Bundesrat corresponds remarkably to the Council. Let us now turn to examine its powers and responsibilities.

The Bundesrat: powers and responsibilities.

The Bundesrat has two main tasks: participation in the federal legislative process (including budgetary matters and ratification of Treaties) and supervision of the executive. In the former, it is in a different ball game to the Council of Ministers of the EC in that it shares power with the Bundestag, which usually has the final say, whereas the Council only effectively shares power with the Parliament on budgetary matters. In the latter, we can again find some striking similarities. Let us examine each task in detail.

Legislation.

The Federal German legislative process is as follows: all bills go to the Bundesrat before they are introduced into the Bundestag. At this stage, the Bundesrat may state its position in the form of a resolution which is passed on to the Bundestag. After the Bundestag has adopted its position, the bill comes back to the Bundesrat for a second reading. Here the power of the Bundesrat varies according to two categories of bill: (i) Bills concerning taxes, international Treaties or affecting the Länder directly require the consent of the Bundesrat, that is, it has a right of veto and

<sup>7</sup> To the extent that some observers consider Bundesrat votes as merely the official sanction given to compromises worked out elsewhere. See J. FROWEIN, « Bemerkungen zu den Beziehungen des Bundesrates zu Bundestag, Bundesregierung und Bundespräsident » in *Der Bundesrat*, cit.

a bill will fall if it is not accepted by both Houses. (ii) For all other laws, the Bundesrat can only make objections which can be over-ruled by the Bundestag by a majority of its members. If the objection is made by a two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat, then a two-thirds majority is equally necessary in the Bundestag. The Basic Law, on occasion interpreted by the Constitutional Court,<sup>8</sup> defines which bills come under each category. Since 1969, about 55 percent of all bills required Bundesrat consent.<sup>9</sup>

When the opinions of the Bundestag and Bundesrat differ, either side may invoke a meeting of a Conciliation Committee (Vermittlungsausschuss). This is composed of 22 members: one from each state from the Bundesrat side and an equal number from the Bundestag: just like the current European procedure. Chairmanship rotates every three months between the Bundestag and Bundesrat. Whatever the particular majorities, the Conciliation Committee has to negotiate compromises acceptable both to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, if legislation under the first of the two categories mentioned above is to be adopted.

The meetings of the Conciliation Committee are strictly confidential and no reports of its proceedings are published. It is felt that this is the key to the success of the Committee, which in an overwhelming majority of cases<sup>10</sup> reaches a compromise acceptable to both Houses. The fact that its members are usually experienced politicians is also important. Nevertheless, it is often necessary for a bill to go back to the Conciliation Committee two or three times before it is acceptable to both Houses, and there is no time limit on the work of the Committee.

#### Supervision.

The role of the Bundesrat in supervising the executive branch stems from the fact that federal law is usually applied and administered by the Länder, just as Community law is applied by the Member States. Article 80 of the Basic Law specifies that for most statutory instruments, the federal government may act only with the consent of the Bundesrat. Furthermore, the government often tends to rely on advice from Bundesrat committees as it has no direct experience in administering certain sectors. Although one would hesitate to push the analogy too far, there

<sup>8</sup> See notably the Court's ruling in 1974, B Verf GE37, 383.

<sup>9</sup> K. von BEYME, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

<sup>10</sup> In less than 10% of all cases was no final agreement worked out (*ibid.*, p. 164).

is clearly a parallel here with the numerous articles in the Community treaties requiring Council approval for what is basically an executive measure, and those which allow the Commission to act only with the approval of the Council, or indeed the procedure that allows the Council to step in when it disagrees (cf. management committee procedures). It is not unprecedented that governments can only act in their executive capacities under very strict control of one branch or another of the legislature. This does not as such turn this branch into a joint executive, but it does have important consequences as to the balance of power between the different elements — and therefore the different interests — in the system. The Community system permits a very strong control over executive matters by the Council — and therefore national governments — but the difference is essentially one of degree (though nevertheless important).

#### Lessons for the Community.

From the above comparison, both of form and of content, of the Bundesrat's role in the governmental system of the FRG with that of the Council in the EC, one can dismiss a number of factors frequently cited as the cause of paralysis in Community decision-taking, and suggest that only two or three changes in the Community's institutional system would suffice to transform it into something similar to the German model, and thus into an effective decision-taking system.

Factors often cited as a cause of paralysis include the fact that the Council is composed of ministers representing the government of their state; the highly-developed involvement of national civil servants; the obligation to cast votes as a block; and the fact that ministers present constantly change according to the subject under discussion. The Bundesrat example shows that none of these are in themselves obstacles to decision-taking (though they may be criticized for other reasons).

The two or three changes that would be necessary are: (i) majority voting in the Council on all matters within given time limits; (ii) the sharing of legislative (including ratification and budgetary) power with the Parliament (« co-decision »); and, though arguably to a lesser extent, (iii) the strengthening of the Commission's executive autonomy.

Of course, these purely institutional changes in themselves would not be enough to transform the Community into a classic federal state. For this a large increase in its competences, finances and the range of its activities would be necessary. Indeed, the

Parliament's proposals for a new Treaty concentrate as much on these aspects as on the purely institutional matters. However, our concern here is simply with the decision-taking procedures, (the effectiveness of which is arguably a pre-condition for enlarging competences anyway).

Majority voting for all matters in the Council would be perhaps the most important step forward in allowing the Community to work more effectively. The stifling effect of the practice of unanimity has been described in countless articles. Majority voting need not be by a simple majority, as the Bundesrat requirement for an absolute majority shows. In the Community case, a different level of majority might be desired for different subject matters.

Concerning the Community's legislative process, it would suffice that the assent of the European Parliament be required to adopt Community legislation for the Community to be in a similar constitutional position to that which prevails in the FRG for the first of the two categories of bills (those for which the assent of both the Bundesrat and the Bundestag is necessary). The existing conciliation procedure would in this way be given teeth (lacking at present, as it is up to one side — the Council — to declare it closed and adopt the final position) and applied to all areas.

The procedure used in the FRG for the second category of laws mentioned (those in which the Bundesrat can merely oblige the Bundestag to take a second decision by a higher majority), whilst not without parallel to the Community procedure regarding the non-obligatory part of the budget, would be a far more sweeping change to Community legislative procedure.

The strengthening of the Commission's executive autonomy would be the third change that would help place the Community in a comparable situation to the FRG. Like the German Federal Government, the Commission is responsible to the « lower » chamber, though it can only be dismissed by a two-thirds majority. Its appointment, however, is not subject to the approval of the European Parliament. It is appointed by the Member States, collectively, and in practice by each one individually as far as their own members are concerned. Clearly, a procedure involving a designation of a genuine collective team and subject to the approval of Parliament would strengthen both the Commission's independence and its political accountability. This is, however, possibly only of secondary importance to the effect that majority voting and co-decision would have on the Commission: it would be much freer to manoeuvre and to rely on majorities, no longer

having to tailor its proposals to the lowest common denominator acceptable to national governments. Similarly, a greater autonomy in deciding on implementing regulations without the constant and detailed reference to Council which characterizes current procedures would certainly be a benefit, but need not go too far, as shown by the above mentioned German provisions<sup>11</sup> for the Federal Government to act in such matters only with the approval of the Bundesrat.

The argument that these three measures — majority voting, co-decision and, to a lesser degree, a strengthening of the executive — would suffice to transform the Community's decision-taking procedures can be illustrated by considering what the German situation would be if Community procedures applied in these matters. Let us imagine that the final decision on all legislation in the FRG were taken by the Bundesrat, with the Bundestag only being able to give its « opinion »; that there was no time-limit to discussions, and the Länder governments had a « gentleman's agreement » to take decisions in the Bundesrat only by a unanimous vote. In such a situation, the Federal Government would immediately become the prisoner of the Länder governments — all the more so if it was appointed by them — and be able to act only at the speed of the most reticent Land. Power would have reverted, *de facto*, to the Land governments even in those areas subject to Federal jurisdiction. Elections to the Bundestag would offer the voter little chance to influence policy. The FRG would not be the important power it is to-day, but a collection of squabbling States.

The European Parliament's proposals.

Has the European Parliament's proposal for a new draft Treaty made provision for changing the Community structure along the lines that an analysis of the Bundesrat model would indicate as being necessary?

On the basis of the two or three changes suggested above as being sufficient to transform the Community into a model comparable in its effectiveness to that of the FRG, it can be seen that all three are included in the Parliament's proposals. Indeed they are the essence of its proposals, as the other institutional changes suggested are of smaller significance.

<sup>11</sup> Basic Law, Article 80.2.

First, majority voting within time limits is laid down. Although Member States would be allowed for a transitional period to postpone voting by invoking a vital national interest, this would cease after ten years, with the exception of political and diplomatic aspects of foreign policy. The provision for time limits would effectively preclude the possibility of Member States again reaching a "gentleman's agreement" not to put a matter to a vote when a Member State has reservations.

Second, co-decision is required for the adoption of legislation. The details of the procedure differ somewhat from those of the Bundesrat-Bundestag procedure for laws requiring the assent of the Bundesrat, but the essential characteristics are the same: the assent, or at least, non-opposition, of both houses and the provision of a conciliation committee to negotiate compromises. Where conciliation fails, however, procedures differ substantially: in the FRG system the conciliation process continues until a compromise is reached acceptable to both sides. In Parliament's draft Treaty a second reading is foreseen in which Parliament may approve the text as adopted by Council or, by absolute majority, adopt amendments to it proposed by the Commission. This text can then be rejected by Council by a qualified majority. This complex set of provisions implies that either Council and Parliament finally agree (in which case we still have co-decision) or else that a text on which Parliament and the Commission agree can be adopted if supported by a minority in Council large enough to prevent it rejecting the text by a qualified majority. In this last case we no longer have real co-decision, but it is surrounded by sufficient safeguards, and at the end of a long enough procedure, to be regarded as exceptional.

Thirdly, the autonomy of the Commission as the executive body is strengthened. It is specified that implementing regulations and decisions shall be determined by the Commission and merely notified to Council and Parliament. We have seen above that this is not strictly necessary, as the operation of Article 80.2. of the FRG Basic Law shows, though it is certainly desirable to eliminate some of the excesses of current Community procedure in this respect. More important are the proposals for the appointment of a new Commission. Its normal term of office would be for five years and a new one would be appointed after each European election by a procedure involving the designation of its President by the European Council, his/her constitution of a team and programme, and a vote of confidence by the Parliament allowing

it to take office. Such a procedure would link the formation of a new Commission to the European elections and require it to secure a Parliamentary majority to take office. The role of "Head of State", in designating the President of the Commission, is played here by the European Council. The President of the Commission has considerable freedom to choose his collaborators and allocate portfolios. The procedure differs from that of the FRG in that the vote takes place on the whole team and programme, whereas in the FRG it is only on the chancellor. This would not be substantially different in that the German chancellor must have already made some tacit agreement on his team and programme if he is to secure his vote of confidence. A more substantial difference is the fact that unlike the Bundestag, the Parliament would not be able to vote for its own candidate if it rejects the one put forward by the "Head of State".<sup>12</sup> This reflects a desire to guarantee a role for the Member States directly, through the European Council, and is an important, though not crucial, difference from the FRG system.

In the main then, Parliament's proposals for a new Treaty seem to incorporate the three essential changes necessary to allow a European Union to act as an effective, democratic, quasi-federal, decision-taking system. The other institutional changes proposed by the Parliament (designation of a permanent minister to lead each national delegation in Council, designation of Members of the Court of Justice half each by the Parliament and the Council, specification of the task of the European Council, etc.), whilst not without significance, are of secondary importance. Of course, Parliament's proposals are as much, if not more, about increasing the competences, finances and activities of the Community as they are about improving its decision-taking capacity. Nevertheless, we can assert as regards the latter that, in basing its proposals on the model of the Bundesrat, Parliament is on the right track.

Richard Corbett

<sup>12</sup> This is possible in the FRG as a last resort, if the candidate put forward has not received an absolute majority. However, if the Bundestag's own candidate does not himself obtain an absolute majority, the Head of State is not forced to accept him but can call for new elections (Article 63, Basic Law).

## THUROW AND THE PROBLEM OF EQUITY

In a recent book L. Thurow emphasizes that « our society has reached a point where it must start to make explicit equity decisions if it is to advance ».<sup>1</sup> In other words, not only there is no harsh trade-off between equity and efficiency, but economic growth itself requires an increased income equality.<sup>2</sup> If the equity goals that people find acceptable are not fulfilled, corporative degeneration of society is promoted and interest groups and lobbies are fostered. A power situation is thus brought about where an effective control of the economic process becomes impossible. The conflicts of interest, not solved through political decisions, are eventually mediated through inflation.<sup>3</sup>

An alternative must — and can — be found. In the United States the earnings of the top twenty per cent of the fully employed white males are five times as large as those of the bottom twenty per cent, but for the rest of the population the same ratio is twenty-seven to one. At the same time there is no disincentive to work for the white males; on the contrary, they are fully engaged in promoting economic growth, trying to raise their social status by strengthening the position on the market of the organization in which they work. But the existing inequalities bring about continuous efforts to catch up on the part of the other less-advantaged sectors of the labour force. Large effects of wage drift follow, that feed inflation. Thus, the first conclusion that

<sup>1</sup> L.C. THUROW, *The Zero-Sum Society. Distribution and the Possibilities for Economic Change*, New York, Penguin Books, 1981, p. 194.

<sup>2</sup> On this point see also, by the same Author: « Equity, Efficiency, Social Justice and Redistribution », in OECD, *The Welfare State in Crisis*, Paris, 1981, pp. 137 ff.

<sup>3</sup> In our opinion Thurow's analysis is based on this logical structure: a) efficiency = "economicity" (the state of being economic); b) the high or low degree of economicity appears as an economic issue, but has political reasons; c) control of the economic process = policy that optimizes the utilization of the available resources, i.e. permits the exploitation of all the economic potential; d) it is not sufficient to distinguish the policies, it is necessary to distinguish the power situations, since there are power situations that make possible, or not, effective economic policies, that bring about necessarily, or not, an inefficient (uneconomic) utilization of the available resources; e) the power situations are different since they can approach, or depart from, the pole of the general will or the pole of the supremacy of the particular will; f) the absence of equity (of the degree of equity held as fair in the framework of a living culture) is one of the factors that shift the balance of power from the pole of the general will towards that of the particular will.

Thurow reaches is that « our general equity goal should be to establish a distribution of earnings for everyone that is no more unequal than that which now exists for fully employed white males » (p. 201), that is with a maximum spread of five to one.

A second point follows from this analysis, regarding taxation and in particular the progressive income tax. « The appropriate degree of vertical equity depends on how closely we come to achieving an equitable distribution of market earnings. If we reached a distribution of market earnings in accordance with that suggested above, a proportional tax system would be appropriate. To the extent that we have not achieved an equitable distribution of market earnings, the tax system should be structured to move whatever distribution of market earnings does exist toward an after-tax distribution of income that approaches our equitable distribution of market incomes » (p. 207). Thus, the progressive income tax finds its *raison d'être* in the divergence between the actual and the optimal distribution of income, and can be utilized to approach the latter in so far as the market fails to reach this goal by itself. But if an *ex-ante* incomes policy is able to correct the earnings inequalities that originate in the market, a proportional income tax with a flat rate or a very weakly progressive tax can be introduced because equity goals — as accepted by the majority of the people in the current phase of social development — are now realized through another policy instrument. Henceforth, direct taxation need only guarantee an optimal differential treatment of income according to its source — mainly labour or capital, given the different degree of sacrifice necessary to gain a wage or capital revenue —, or to the different uses (for instance, giving a preferential treatment to income saved and invested in selected sectors that public policy targets as a first priority).

Another point, that derives from Thurow's analysis of the crisis facing modern industrial societies, relates to the problem of unemployment. The economy, as it is structured especially after the onset of the post-industrial revolution, can neither provide a job to everyone wanting to work through the free play of market forces, nor solve the problem by boosting effective demand directed towards industrial goods or other services. To realize a plan for guaranteeing full employment a political decision is needed. This must be mainly a responsibility of the government. « The only solution is to create a socialised sector of the economy designed to give work opportunities to everyone who wants them but cannot find them elsewhere » (p. 206). A guaranteed job programme must have several characteristics to

achieve the objectives for which it is intended. First, it cannot be a programme of employment at minimum wage rates. The goal is to open to everyone a structure of economic work opportunities equivalent to those open to fully employed white males. Second, the programme must be open-ended, providing jobs to everyone who is able and willing to work, without any further condition. Third, the programme should not be viewed as a temporary anti-recession measure, but as a permanent feature of a modern industrial society.

The policy suggestions emerging from this book would probably be considered unrealistic by someone tied to a solid pragmatism, especially in the present conjunctural phase of slow expansion after a three-year period of inflation combined with a deep recession. But stagflation is largely caused precisely by the inability of modern industrial societies to cope effectively with the problems of equity. Social groups, endowed with strong monopolistic power on the market, are fighting bitterly over the distribution of national income and the government is consequently losing control of the economic process. In the meantime, given the anarchic conditions prevailing at the international level, some regions and countries become richer and stronger, while others are hard hit by the slump. The problems of equity — both at the national and at the international level — are thus urgently on the agenda and economic recovery cannot be secured if they are not solved by achieving not only a fair distribution of national product among individuals, but also a less unequal level of per capita income among different regions and countries.

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The same target that Thurow suggests for income distribution among individuals — a ratio of five to one from the top to the bottom twenty per cent — should be pursued among the different countries at the international level. Given the income gap between the industrialized and the poor countries,<sup>4</sup> it is quite clear that this target can be attained only in the long run. But a suitable policy must be started at once through a European "Marshall

<sup>4</sup> Between the per capita income of the United States and the average income of many very poor African countries the existing ratio is twenty to one. Hence, even if it seems insufficient compared to a purely ideal standard, the attainment of the proposed target is rather difficult. Further, it must be stressed that it would produce a big progressive impact on the whole world economy.

Plan" for the Third World,<sup>5</sup> capable of making effective the potential demand existing in these countries. Actually, at the international level, the postulates of Keynesian policy are still well-grounded. If a more equal distribution is not achieved, a power situation is created which makes it impossible to manage the world economy or to secure the deep structural adjustment that the post-industrial revolution requires. The international anarchy thus removes the possibility of a balanced growth of the world economy.

In Europe too an economic policy must be pursued that is oriented towards stable growth and a fair distribution of resources inside the Community. Here an increase in the size of the Community budget is indispensable, so that the more redistributive policies, such as regional and social policy, can be strengthened and new policies implemented. But, at the same time, the need to finance a larger budget can be exploited to introduce more progressive sources of revenue. Income tax could be adopted for this goal, using a simple device. First, the total expenditure to be covered from this source would be distributed among the different member countries according to the share of each country's national income in total EC income; then this share would be modified by applying a progressivity coefficient given by the ratio between the per capita income of that country and the European average. So the richest regions would pay more and the weakest less. What each country has to pay to the EC budget would be eventually distributed among its citizens according to the degree of progressivity of its own system of income taxation.

A strong incentive for redistribution would be embedded in the fiscal system of the Community with this scheme, since the more divergences in per capita income are reduced, the less the richest countries would have to contribute to the European budget. At the limit, if a perfect equalization is attained, the budget is financed by an income tax with a flat proportional rate together with the other "own resources". Here a new point of contact with the analysis developed by Thurow can readily be identified. Within each country too, progressive income taxation is justified only by the existence of large inequalities in income distribution. If an effective incomes policy is pursued, this necessity lapses and proportional taxation or a weakly progressive rate can be adopted.

<sup>5</sup> On this point see: G. MONTANI, «L'unità europea e l'emancipazione del Terzo mondo», *Il Federalista*, 1980, p. 128.

The main task, at the European level, is thus the management of a general economic policy, in order to guarantee a stable growth, and an adequate transfer of resources, in order to reduce the disadvantage of the less-favoured regions — the more so in the perspective of the enlargement.<sup>6</sup> Yet it is at the national level that an effective welfare policy must be pursued. If a fair regional distribution of resources — setting as a temporary goal a ratio of five to one between the richest and the poorest regions — provides a sufficient consensus supporting a real common European policy for economic stabilization and growth, the redistribution of resources among the individuals and other measures typical of the welfare state must be attributed to the lower levels of government, where a deeper degree of social solidarity can be found. Thus, each member country must choose the degree of progressivity for income tax best fitted to its social welfare function. And equally, an effective income policy, assisted by the necessary measures of price control,<sup>7</sup> should be implemented to get the desired distribution of individual incomes. In this way a real control of the economic process is given back to the collectivity, in a world heavily characterized by rivalries among powerful social groups, by fixing an adequate target for income distribution — for instance, by seeking a ratio of five to one.

In conclusion, it is necessary to favour an evolution of the political system at the world level towards a form of federal organization that provides, following Wheare's classical definition, unity where it is needed, as much as variety and independence where uniformity is not essential, in order to achieve the targets of equity indicated by Thurow, whereby the take-off of a phase of balanced growth is eventually determined. Thus, at the world level, where the possible degree of unity is still very low, a policy supporting the growth of Third World countries must be fostered; and Europe can help towards this by launching immediately, in the framework of the Lomé Agreement, a Keynesian policy to make the potential demand of the associated countries effective.

<sup>6</sup> Now the ratio between the richest and the poorest region's per capita income within Europe is larger than 10 to 1. The poorest region has a per capita income only one fourth of the average Community income.

<sup>7</sup> Price control must not be intended in a bureaucratic sense, but as a policy intervention to guarantee a well-functioning market, thus overcoming the hindrances and the rigidities determined by the strong degree of monopoly that industrial firms largely enjoy. A real control of economic process thus requires not only an effective income policy, but also a check on the power of the firms to manipulate prices.

But Europe can help the evolution towards unity at the world level most by pressing to its federal conclusion the process of political unification, which in the Old Continent is more advanced than in other parts of the world.

In this way an effective distribution of the tasks relating to economic policy management could be secured, entrusting the European level with framing the general lines of economic policy and with ensuring the transfers of resources needed to reduce the disparity of income among the Community countries and thus guarantee the cohesion of the union; whereas the national and the lower levels of government would be charged with the fulfilment of the proper goals of the welfare state, through redistribution and social policies.

In a federation two sovereign levels would exist, and the European one would be preserved from the pressure of lobbies and interest groups. The corporative degeneration of the welfare state — unavoidable where consensus can be promoted through an increase in public expenditure, even if it is deficit-financed — could be prevented and this real control of the economic process would become again possible. On the other hand the achievements of the welfare state could be protected against the attempt, hopeless though it may be, to regain control of the economic process at the national level.

Useful suggestions can be drawn from Thurow's analysis also in the field of policy to reduce unemployment. A European Labour Agency with a multi-tier structure, from the local community to the European level, must be built-up,<sup>8</sup> with the main goal of providing a job for all those who want to work and do not find job opportunities on the market. In this way labour mobility can be organized efficiently at the Community level, taking into account the overall needs of the European economy and, in the meanwhile, regional conditions in the labour market. Of course, the functioning of this European Labour Agency must be strictly connected with the implementation of an effective incomes policy and with the redistribution of resources among regions, all being instruments of the same policy that aims to link equity with efficiency.

If Europe is really able to cope with these problems in an effective way, it can provide useful proof that social justice can

<sup>8</sup> See L. LEVI, «Politica dell'occupazione e Agenzia europea del lavoro», *Il Federalista*, 1980, pp. 260 ff.

*be organized at the international level with a federal link that guarantees both unity, where that is necessary, and the independence of the member states, which retain their capacity to follow the policies best suited to the preferences of their citizens without interfering with the stability and growth of the overall economy.*

Alberto Majocchi

## The Federalist Action

### THE RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICS AND CULTURE IN THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EUROPEAN FEDERALIST MOVEMENT IN ITALY \*

#### I

The movements which compose the UEF have more or less different ideas as regards the relations between politics and culture in the federalist struggle, from which they have drawn different consequences as regards their organization and their character. So it cannot be denied that, within the UEF, we are confronted with pronounced diversities, with deep roots in the history of its component parts. It would therefore be unrealistic to think that the same model could be imposed everywhere. Such a purpose would produce only the consequence — catastrophic indeed — of breaking up our international organization. What matters in reality is that each of us respect the experience of the others, especially as we can see, within each of our movements, many admirable examples of self-denial and devotion to the cause of European unification. It must moreover be remembered that each of our movements, for all their differences, always represents in its country the vanguard in the struggle for European unification. This does not mean, of course, that we should refrain from comparing our points of view and seeking to identify as clearly as possible our divergences. As a matter of fact, each of our

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\* Speech delivered in Landshut, at the UEF seminar on 11-12 November 1983.

organizations, with its own identity stemming from forty years of history, is a living and open reality and can thus find, in the experience of the others, important stimuli to evolve and enhance its capacity to act and to mobilize people's energy. That is why we must talk with each other and know one another better. I want therefore to express my appreciation to our friends Krause, Wessels and Schwartz for having taken the initiative of organizing this meeting. As for myself, my aim is to explain briefly the concept of the relation between politics and culture on which the historical identity of the Italian MFE is founded.

## II

The idea which is at the basis of the historical identity of the MFE in Italy is that the problem of uniting Europe in a federation is not merely one of an institutional order and a regional scope, *but is the main political and cultural problem of world history in the second half of the twentieth century*. In this view, the federalist enterprise takes on the same global character as those which gave their sense to the great historical transformations of Europe in the last century. The liberal, democratic and socialist movements promoted both great institutional changes and great cultural revolutions. They affirmed new values, changed the terms of the political debate, brought in new canons of historical interpretation and above all fashioned the cultural instruments for thinking the future in a new way.

The great revolutions of modern history took place at points of time in which the culture produced by the existing order of things was no longer able to give men a vision of the future in terms of progress towards the emancipation of mankind, freedom from oppression, affirmation of reason. The effervescence of revolutionary historical phases is accounted for by the fact that a new culture, promoted by the agents of change, gives back to men, and to young people in particular, the capacity to imagine a future, i.e. the perspective without which politics necessarily degenerate into a mere power-play, driving away from it the very best forces of society.

## III

We believe that the federalist turning-point of world history will have the same cultural significance. Federalism became a political movement in the course of World War Two. Some men, drawing their inspiration from the political reflections of Kant, the British

federalists and Einaudi, understood that the destructive potential of war had by then reached such a monstrous degree as to give Kant's philosophical scheme the reality of a concrete political project. Federalism therefore started in Italy as a reflection on peace and a struggle for the realization of peace, and has since remained true to its original inspiration. Its relation to peace is the same as that of liberalism, democracy and socialism to liberty, equality and social justice. In this perspective the struggle for European unification must be viewed as an episode of a much more long-term historical endeavour, aiming to realize peace through a world federation. Founding a European federation thus appears as the first step in the progress of federalism in world history. This significance can be already delineated, if only in embryo, in the segment of European integration which is already behind us. For, even though the federal unity of Europe is far from having been achieved, thanks to the presence of this goal, an unprecedented work of peace-making has been realized in the ending of the historical enmity between France and Germany, which had been soaking Europe in blood during the whole course of modern history since German unification.

## IV

This is the kind of awareness which has formed the historical identity of the MFE in Italy. What had to be done in the years of its foundation, and still has to be done to-day, is to fight a battle which is both for an institutional change and for affirming a new culture: the culture of peace, which has to appropriate what is permanent in the cultures of freedom, equality and social justice and go beyond them in a larger perspective. In this way the character of federalism as a comprehensive cultural concept comes to the fore. In fact it implies, on the one hand, the awareness that peace cannot be realized except by overcoming state sovereignty, and it presents us, on the other hand, with a difficult and fascinating intellectual challenge: to revise the marxist conception of history as a history of class-struggle, and to go beyond it through laying the foundations of a new conception of history as a history of the coming of peace (a clear argument for the need for such a revision is to be found, among many examples, in the *impasse* of traditional historiography in face of the problem of interpreting European fascism). We have moreover to elaborate new models of society, whose realization would be made possible by overcoming state sovereignty. This means giving back to men and women, and to young people in particular, the

capacity to look to the future, to think of the history to come as a history of the accomplishment of what is specifically human in man. This is what the liberal, democratic and socialist ideologies are no more able to do. Hence, after having been the great driving force of the history of Europe in the nineteenth century, they are to-day but empty shells, deprived on any power to attract and to mobilize support.

## V

That the problem of peace is the crucial problem of our age is shown with the utmost clarity by the tremendous echo evoked by the initiatives of the peace movement in Europe. We have not, in this context, to take sides for or against the peace movement: as long as no institutional solution to the problem of peace is advanced, everybody is both right and wrong in the debate which is under way in Europe. It suffices to remark that, since the end of the war, no other problem has acquired the capacity to provoke such a vast and profound popular mobilization. Such a stirring does not happen by chance, for it is with respect to this problem that the destiny of Europe is at stake. But, if this is the case, the decisive challenge is to succeed in making the peace movement (and all those who, while not taking part in the public manifestations, are aware of the danger threatening Europe) become aware that there is no solution to the problem of peace except in federalism. It is — be it said once more — a political task indeed, but also a cultural one: to bring the peace movement, and all those who want peace, to adopt the culture of peace.

## VI

Creating the culture of peace, however, is one of our responsibilities. It cannot be found ready-made in books. The official culture does not call state sovereignty in question. To be sure, the culture of peace has forerunners: from Kant up to the British federalists and Luigi Einaudi. But the federalist aspect of these great thinkers' works has been forgotten, almost removed by the culture of war. It is our task to reassess their thought, bringing its real value to the fore, to continue it and to deepen it.

## VII

The great institutional and cultural transformations of history occur when they are made possible by objective modifications of

people's everyday behaviour. When such modifications are so radical as to make the existing power structure obsolete, they are not understood by those in power, who always try to control a new reality — which eludes them — with the material and cultural instruments of the past, thus causing contradictions to accumulate and problems to become more and more intractable. *In reality the great historical transformations are never effected by the existing power structure.* In order for them to break through, a force must emerge able to take on in its own right the responsibility for effecting the change and to make this the reason for its political existence. This is our situation, and herein lies the great difficulty of our task. There is a passage in Machiavelli's *Prince* which has an important place in the cultural stock of the Italian MFE. It is said in it that « there is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through than undertaking the introduction of new orders. The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new. Their support is lukewarm partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the existing laws on their side, and partly because men are generally incredulous, never really trusting new things unless they have tested them by experience ».

## VIII

This is our situation. We must know that we cannot expect anything from the existing order, i.e. from the national one: neither from political nor from economic power nor from the media nor from official culture. This means that the essential condition of our survival as federalists (since we can always survive as an advertising agency of the European policy of national governments) resides in our capacity to build up, on our own account, the basis of our influence, to create our own information channels, to finance our organization ourselves and, first and foremost, to work out our own culture. That is, in a word, the primary requirement of *autonomy*, in the fields of politics, organization, finance and culture. Here is to be found the fundamental criterion which determined the basic choices that account for the specific nature and structure of the Italian MFE.

Let me point briefly to the way in which the choice of autonomy has been put into effect as regards i) our relations with political parties, ii) our criteria for selecting and training active members and iii) the raising of our financial resources.

i) Autonomy in our political relations has as its main manifestation *the refusal by the group of members who provide the leadership and management of the MFE to identify themselves with any national party*. We are but ourselves, neither right-wing nor left-wing, neither Christian Democrat nor socialist, since such distinctions belong to the order we want to overcome. It must be noticed, however, that it is just because of this position of independence (which is anyway compatible with tactical alliances) that we have been allowed to establish and maintain very good collaborative relationships with all democratic parties in Italy.

ii) The selection and training of active members are guided by the purpose to avoid restrictions which would be imposed on the movement by a too burdensome and costly administrative apparatus, which would inevitably depend, for its survival, on external funds. That is why *ours are all part-time active members*, each having a job which assures him economic independence, while leaving enough time to devote to federalist activity. In this way our organization is not expensive, and we are sheltered from any possible pressure or blackmailing by any centre of political or economic power.

iii) The specific institution of financial autonomy, however, is self-financing. Every young man recruited in the Movement knows that being active in the organization will never procure him financial advantages, but rather will cost him money. Here lies the financial basis of our independence. To be sure, all this does not prevent us from receiving external contributions sometimes: but these are mainly used to finance particular actions, whereas the organization's permanent structure functions thanks to our own resources. This shelters us, once more, from any outside influence.

## IX

But the real foundation of all such choices is cultural autonomy. The sole motivation, in the absence of power and money, which can push active members to persevere, sometimes for decades, in a toilsome and difficult commitment, is the awareness of our irreplaceable historical role, i.e. of being those who are tracing a new way, who have a point of view allowing them to grasp, before others do, in their true sense the inarticulate ferments and aspirations of society in our epoch, that the others see with a biased eye, or do not see at all. Such awareness is a thoroughly cultural one. That is why we think that politics and culture are two inseparable aspects of our activity. This means, let me repeat

once more — that it is the federalists themselves who have to produce their culture. This is the reason why each MFE section in Italy strives to be at the same time a centre of political activity and of cultural creativity, in which lectures, training courses, etc. are given by the active members themselves. And it could not be otherwise, since federalist culture is in the making, and who could make it but the federalists? It is a task that certainly could not be entrusted to academics, nor to other exponents of official culture, who represent the old order and who, as such, can have but the function of supporting the existing power.

## X

This figure of the activist, being at the same time a man of action and a man of culture, is the ideal to which the MFE has oriented itself throughout its history. To be sure, as always happens, reality has fallen short of the ideal from many points of view. Models, however, are important in the life of a movement which wants to be revolutionary (though this word, in the case of the MFE, has to be carefully stripped of any violent connotation). I am convinced that the influence exerted in Italy by the MFE lies in its always having attributed a primary importance to the selection and formation of men. Let me conclude with another quotation from Machiavelli. In the *Discourses* he asks whether it is true that money is « the sinew of war ». And he answers that, « contrary to the general opinion, (...) the sinews of war are not gold, but good soldiers; for gold alone will not procure good soldiers, but good soldiers will always procure gold ». And good soldiers, in the current struggle for peace, can be found only if we are capable of working out a culture opening up a new outlook on the future of mankind.

Francesco Rossolillo

## Federalism in the History of Thought

### ALBERT EINSTEIN

*Federalism has by now a long history and a rich cultural tradition. But this tradition is largely ignored, for it does not fit into the conceptual grid of the prevalent culture, based on the unconscious acceptance of national sovereignty, and hence of war, as inescapable traits of historical reality. That is why some federalist authors are now entirely forgotten, while others are remembered only for the part of their work which has nothing to do with federalism.*

*This section of The Federalist intends to reassert the value of this tradition, submitting to the attention of the readership short selections of the works of forgotten federalist authors or of forgotten federalist works of well-known personalities of the world of culture of the past.*

*We begin with one of the latter, and a great one: Albert Einstein.*

*Einstein was an indefatigable combatant for peace. He was always keenly aware that peace and national sovereignty are two incompatible terms, and that a struggle for peace cannot succeed without a radical cultural change. In a telegram sent on May 23, 1946 to several hundred prominent Americans, appealing for contributions on behalf of the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, he wrote: «The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe».*

*The world has not taken up his warning. His words have remained unheard by politicians as well as by intellectuals and by the majority of common people.*

*It is to the credit of O. Nathan and H. Norden to have patiently put together and presented a collection of Einstein's writings, bearing witness to his activity in the cause of peace.<sup>1</sup> In his introduction, after having recalled the great scientist's constant pacifist commitment, Otto Nathan writes:*

*«Einstein was by nature an internationalist; he disliked, to the extreme, nationalism and chauvinism, the excesses of which he held responsible for many evils in the world. He deplored the existence of political frontiers and their insidious and divisive impact upon mankind. As a scientist he was engaged in work which, more than anything else, is necessarily international despite the many efforts — sharply criticized by Einstein — toward scientific secrecy in the last two decades. Einstein hoped for intensification of cultural and scientific relations among the countries of the world when he advocated in 1914 a United Europe and when he welcomed in 1919 the establishment of the League of Nations and, in 1945, the United Nations. But his belief in the desirability of a world organization had been inspired even more by another consideration: Einstein had long since realized that the maintenance of international peace required the partial relinquishment of national sovereignty in favor of an international organization which would possess the administrative and judicial institutions necessary for the peaceful settlement of international conflicts and which alone would be entitled to maintain a military force; he hoped that the Covenant of the League of Nations and, later, the Charter of the United Nations would, in time, be so modified that an organization capable of maintaining world peace would emerge. Einstein's insistence on the need for an appropriate world organization gained momentum with the increase in the striking power of modern weapons. The production of the atomic bomb and its use over Japanese cities in 1945 made Einstein less tolerant than ever of token gestures toward peace. He had never believed that disarmament by small stages was a practicable policy against war, a policy which would ever lead to total disarmament and peace; he was convinced that a nation could not arm and disarm at the same time. He felt this even more strongly when, after 1945, the possibility of nuclear war threatened the annihilation of the human race. It was during those years of the postwar period that he became actively engaged in the movements for world government. He did not conceive of world government as*

<sup>1</sup> O. NATHAN, H. NORDEN, *Einstein on Peace*, Avenel Books, New York, 1981.

*an institution supplanting the primary functions of existing national governments; rather, he thought of an organization which would have circumscribed authority only in matters directly relating to the preservation of peace: any infringement upon the sovereign power of member nations would be limited by the world organization's obligations in the cause of international security. Einstein would have been the last to advocate the establishment of a huge power complex in excess of specific and immediate needs. He supported the establishment of a centralized, supranational body for the sole purpose of guaranteeing international security; otherwise, he was a strong advocate of decentralization.*<sup>2</sup>

*With the aim of offering our readers an approach to Einstein's thought, we have chosen some particularly significant pages, which highlight the themes of the causes of war, of peace as organization and of the path towards peace.*

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*About causes and cure of wars.*

Dear Mr. Freud:

The proposal of the League of Nations and its International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation at Paris that I should invite a person, to be chosen by myself, to a frank exchange of views on any problem that I might select affords me a very welcome opportunity of conferring with you upon a question which, as things now are, seems the most insistent of all the problems civilization has to face. This is the problem: Is there any way of delivering mankind from the menace of war? It is common knowledge that, with the advance of modern science, this issue has come to mean a matter of life and death for civilization as we know it; nevertheless, for all the zeal displayed, every attempt at its solution has ended in a lamentable breakdown.

I believe, moreover, that those whose duty it is to tackle the problem professionally and practically are growing only too aware of their impotence to deal with it, and have now a very lively desire to learn the views of men who, absorbed in the pursuit of science, can see world problems in the perspective distance lends. As for me, the normal objective of my thought affords no insight into the dark places of human will and feeling.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. IX-X.

Thus, in the inquiry now proposed, I can do little more than to seek to clarify the question at issue and, clearing the ground of the more obvious solutions, enable you to bring the light of your far-reaching knowledge of man's instinctive life to bear upon the problems. There are certain psychological obstacles whose existence a layman in the mental sciences may dimly surmise but whose interrelations and vagaries he is incompetent to fathom; you, I am convinced, will be able to suggest educative methods, lying more or less outside the scope of politics, which will eliminate these obstacles.

As one immune from nationalist bias, I personally see a simple way of dealing with the superficial (i.e., administrative) aspect of the problem: the setting up, by international consent, of a legislative and judicial body to settle every conflict arising between nations. Each nation would undertake to abide by the orders issued by this legislative body, to invoke its decision in every dispute, to accept its judgments unreservedly and to carry out every measure the tribunal deems necessary for the execution of its decrees. But here, at the outset, I come up against a difficulty; a tribunal is a human institution which, in proportion as the power at its disposal is inadequate to enforce its verdicts, is all the more prone to suffer these to be deflected by extrajudicial pressure. This is a fact with which we have to reckon; law and might inevitably go hand in hand, and juridical decision approach more nearly the ideal justice demanded by the community (in whose name and interests these verdicts are pronounced) insofar as the community has effective power to compel respect of its juridical ideal. But at present we are far from possessing any supranational organization competent to render verdicts of incontestable authority and enforce absolute submission to the execution of its verdicts. Thus I am led to my first axiom: The quest of international security involves the unconditional surrender by every nation, in a certain measure, of its liberty of action — its sovereignty that is to say — and it is clear beyond all doubt that no other road can lead to such security.

The ill success, despite their obvious sincerity, of all the efforts made during the last decade to reach this goal leaves us no room to doubt that strong psychological factors are at work which paralyze these efforts. Some of these factors are not far to seek. The craving for power which characterizes the governing class in every nation is hostile to any limitation of the national sovereignty. This political power hunger is often supported by the activities of another group, whose aspirations are on purely mercenary, economic lines. I have especially in mind that small

but determined group, active in every nation, composed of individuals who, indifferent to social considerations and restraints, regard warfare, the manufacture and sale of arms, simply as an occasion to advance their personal interests and enlarge their personal authority.

But recognition of this obvious fact is merely the first step toward an appreciation of the actual state of affairs. Another question follows hard upon it: How is it possible for this small clique to bend the will of the majority, who stand to lose and suffer by a state of war, to the service of their ambitions? (In speaking of the majority I do not exclude soldiers of every rank who have chosen war as their profession, in the belief that they are serving to defend the highest interests of their race, and that attack is often the best method of defense.) An obvious answer to this question would seem to be that the minority, the ruling class at present, has the schools and press, usually the Church as well, under its thumb. This enables it to organize and sway the emotions of the masses, and makes its tool of them.

Yet even this answer does not provide a complete solution. Another question arises from it: How is it that these devices succeed so well in rousing men to such wild enthusiasm, even to sacrifice their lives? Only one answer is possible. Because man has within him a lust for hatred and destruction. In normal times this passion exists in a latent state, it emerges only in unusual circumstances; but it is a comparatively easy task to call it into play and raise it to the power of a collective psychosis. Here lies, perhaps, the crux of all the complex factors we are considering, an enigma that only the expert in the lore of human instincts can resolve.

And so we come to our last question. Is it possible to control man's mental evolution so as to make him proof against the psychosis of hate and destructiveness? Here I am thinking by no means only of the so-called uncultured masses. Experience proves that it is rather the so-called «intelligentsia» that is most apt to yield to these disastrous collective suggestions, since the intellectual has no direct contact with life in the raw but encounters it in its easiest, synthetic form — upon the printed page.

To conclude: I have so far been speaking only of wars between nations; what are known as international conflicts. But I am well aware that the aggressive instinct operates under other forms and in other circumstances. (I am thinking of civil wars, for instance, due in earlier days to religious zeal, but nowadays to social factors; or, again, the persecution of racial minorities.) But my insistence on what is the most typical, most cruel and

extravagant form of conflict between man and man was deliberate, for here we have the best occasion of discovering ways and means to render all armed conflicts impossible.

I know that in your writings we may find answers, explicit or implied, to all the issues of this urgent and absorbing problem. But it would be of the greatest service to us all were you to present the problem of world peace in the light of your most recent discoveries, for such a presentation well might blaze the trail for new and fruitful modes of action.

Yours very sincerely,

A. Einstein<sup>3</sup>

#### *Peace as organization.*

The first atomic bomb destroyed more than the city of Hiroshima. It also exploded our inherited, outdated political ideas.

A few days before the force of nature was tried out for the first time in history, the San Francisco Charter was ratified in Washington. The dream of a League of Nations, after twenty-six years, was accepted by the Senate.

How long will the United Nations Charter endure? With luck, a generation? A century? There is no one who does not hope for at least that much luck — for the Charter, for himself, for his work and for his children's children. But is it enough to have peace by luck? Peace by law is what the peoples of the world, beginning with ourselves, can have if they want it. And now is the time to get it.

Everyone knows that the Charter is only a beginning. It does not guarantee peace. Yet the hopeful and passionate words of Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco created one very real danger: that millions of Americans will relax and believe that by ratification a machinery has been set up to prevent another war.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 188-191: Einstein's open letter to Freud (July 30, 1932). In his long reply (dated September 1932) Freud is somewhat ambiguous: in some places the causes of war are traced back to the conflict of interests between groups, which are constantly resolved through violence, due to the lack of «a supreme court of judicature» with adequate executive powers, and elsewhere he traces them back to the surfacing and breaking through of the death instinct, which becomes an impulse towards destruction when it directs its action outward, against external objects.

We think it our duty to warn the American people that this is not so. The Charter is a tragic illusion unless we are ready to take the further steps necessary to organize peace. Coming East from San Francisco, President Truman said in Kansas City: « It will be just as easy for nations to get along in a republic of the world as it is for you to get along in the republic of the United States. Now when Kansas and Colorado have a quarrel over water in the Arkansas River they don't call out the National Guard in each state and go to war over it. They bring a suit in the Supreme Court of the United States and abide by the decision. There isn't a reason in the world why we cannot do that internationally ».

These words were historic words, pointing our road to a future far beyond San Francisco.

For thousands of years men have learned that wherever there is government by law there can be peace, and where there is no law and no government human conflicts have been sure. The San Francisco Charter, by maintaining the absolute sovereignties of the rival nation-states, thus preventing the creation of superior law in world relations, resembles the Articles of Confederation of the thirteen original American republics. We know that this confederation did not work. No league system ever attempted in human history could prevent conflict between its members. We must aim at a Federal Constitution of the world, a working world-wide legal order, if we hope to prevent an atomic war.

It happens that at this anxious moment of our history a small book has been published, a very important book, which expresses clearly and simply what so many of us have been thinking. That book is *The Anatomy of Peace* by Emery Reves. We urge American men and women to read this book, to think about its conclusions, to discuss it with neighbors and friends privately and publicly. A few weeks ago these ideas seemed important but perhaps reachable in the future. In the new reality of atomic warfare they are of immediate, urgent necessity, unless civilization is determined on suicide.

In his last address, which he did not live to speak, Franklin Roosevelt wrote words which were his political testament: « We are faced with the pre-eminent fact that if civilization is to survive we must cultivate the science of human relationship — the ability of peoples of all kinds to live together and work together in the same world, at peace ». We have learned, and paid an awful price to learn, that living and working together can be done in one way only — under law. There is no truer and simpler idea in the

world today. Unless it prevails, and unless by common struggle we are capable of new ways of thinking, mankind is doomed.<sup>4</sup>

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[...] There can be no doubt that world law is bound to come soon, whether by coercion or by peaceful agreement. No other effective defense exists against the modern methods of mass destruction. Should man misuse science and engineering in the service of selfish passion, our civilization is doomed. The nation-state is no longer capable of adequately protecting its citizens; to increase the military strength of a nation no longer guarantees its security.

The present condition of international anarchy, which forces mankind to live under the constant threat of sudden annihilation, has led to a dangerous atomic armaments race. The Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists is conscious of its serious responsibility to advise the citizens of this country, and of every other country, that nations can no longer think in terms of military power or technical superiority. What one group of men has discovered, other groups of men who pursue knowledge intelligently and patiently will also find out. There are no scientific secrets. Neither can there be any effective defense against aggression on a purely national basis.

The release of atomic energy has created a new world in which old ways of thinking, that include old diplomatic conventions and balance-of-power politics, have become utterly meaningless. Mankind must give up war in the atomic era. What is at stake is the life or death of humanity.

The only military force which can bring security to the world is a supranational police force, based on world law. To this end we must direct our energies.<sup>5</sup>

### *The path towards peace.*

We are caught in a situation in which every citizen of every country, his children, and his life's work are threatened by the terrible insecurity which reigns in our world today. The progress

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 340-341: letter to the editor in *The New York Times* on October 10, 1945.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 407: message for a meeting of an unidentified group (May 1947).

of technological development has not increased the stability and the welfare of humanity. Because of our inability to solve the problem of international organization, it has actually contributed to the dangers which threaten peace and the very existence of mankind.

The delegates of fifty-five governments, meeting in the Second General Assembly of the United Nations, undoubtedly will be aware of the fact that during the last two years — since the victory over the Axis powers — no appreciable progress has been made either toward the prevention of war or toward agreement in specific fields such as control of atomic energy and economic cooperation in the reconstruction of war-devastated areas.

The United Nations cannot be blamed for these failures. No international organization can be stronger than the constitutional powers given it, or than its component parts want it to be. As a matter of fact, the United Nations is an extremely important and useful institution *provided* the peoples and governments of the world realize that it is merely a transitional system toward the final goal, which is the establishment of a supranational authority vested with sufficient legislative and executive powers to keep the peace. The present impasse lies in the fact that there is no sufficient, reliable supranational authority. Thus the responsible leaders of all governments are obliged to act on the assumption of eventual war. Every step motivated by that assumption contributes to the general fear and distrust and hastens the final catastrophe. However strong national armaments may be, they do not create military security for any nation, nor do they guarantee the maintenance of peace.

There can never be complete agreement on international control and the administration of atomic energy, or on general disarmament, until there is a modification of the traditional concept of national sovereignty. For, as long as atomic energy and armaments are considered a vital part of national security, no nation will give more than lip service to international treaties. Security is indivisible. It can be reached only when necessary guarantees of law and enforcement obtain everywhere, so that military security is no longer the problem of any single state. There is no compromise possible between preparation for war, on the one hand, and preparation of a world society based on law and order on the other.

Every citizen must make up his mind. If he accepts the premise of war, he must reconcile himself to the maintenance of troops in strategic areas like Austria and Korea; to the sending of troops to Greece and Bulgaria; to the accumulation of stockpiles

of uranium by whatever means; to universal military training; to the progressive limitation of civil liberties. Above all, he must endure the consequences of military secrecy, which is one of the worst scourges of our time and one of the greatest obstacles to cultural betterment.

If, on the other hand, every citizen realized that the only guarantee for security and peace in this atomic age is the constant development of a supranational government, then he will do everything in his power to strengthen the United Nations. It seems to me that every reasonable and responsible citizen in the world must know where his choice lies.

Yet the world at large finds itself in a vicious circle since the United Nations powers seem to be incapable of making up their minds on this score. The Eastern and Western blocs each attempt frantically to strengthen their respective power position. Universal military training, Russian troops in Eastern Europe, United States control over the Pacific islands, even the stiffening colonial policies of the Netherlands, Great Britain and France, atomic and military secrecy — are all part of the old familiar jockeying for position.

The time has come for the United Nations to strengthen its moral authority by bold decision. First, the authority of the General Assembly must be increased so that the Security Council as well as all other bodies of the United Nations will be subordinated to it. As long as there is a conflict of authority between the Assembly and the Security Council, the effectiveness of the whole institution will remain necessarily impaired.

Second, the method of representation at the United Nations should be considerably modified. The present method of selection by government appointment does not leave any real freedom to the appointee. Furthermore, selection by governments cannot give the peoples of the world the feeling of being fairly and proportionally represented. The moral authority of the United Nations would be considerably enhanced if the delegates were elected directly by the people. Were they responsible to an electorate, they would have much more freedom to follow their consciences. Thus we could hope for more statesmen and fewer diplomats.

Third, the General Assembly should remain in session throughout the critical period of transition. By staying constantly on the job, the Assembly could fulfill two major tasks: first, it could take the initiative toward the establishment of a supranational order; second, it could take quick and effective steps in all those danger areas (such as currently exist on the Greek border) where peace is threatened.

The Assembly, in view of these high tasks, should not delegate its powers to the Security Council, especially while that body is paralyzed by the shortcomings of the veto provisions. As the only body competent to take the initiative boldly and resolutely, the United Nations must act with utmost speed to create the necessary conditions for international security by laying the foundations for a real world government.

Of course there will be opposition. However, it is by no means certain that the USSR — which is often represented as the main antagonist to the idea of world government — would maintain its opposition if an equitable offer providing for real security were made. Even assuming that Russia is now opposed to the idea of world government, once she becomes convinced that world government is nonetheless in the making her whole attitude may change. She may then insist on only the necessary guarantees of equality before the law so as to avoid finding herself in perennial minority as in the present Security Council.

Nevertheless, we must assume that, despite all efforts, Russia and her allies may still find it advisable to stay out of such a world government. In that case — and only after all efforts have been made in utmost sincerity to obtain the co-operation of Russia and her allies — the other countries would have to proceed alone. It is of the utmost importance that this partial world government be very strong, comprising at least two thirds of the major industrial and economic areas of the world. Such strength in itself would make it possible for the partial world government to abandon military secrecy and all the other practices born of insecurity.

Such a partial world government should make it clear from the beginning that its doors remain wide open to any nonmember — particularly Russia — for participation on the basis of complete equality. In my opinion, the partial world government should accept the presence of observers from nonmember governments at all its meetings and constitutional conventions.

In order to achieve the final aim — which is one world, and not two hostile worlds — such a partial world government must never act as an alliance against the rest of the world. The only real step toward world government is world government itself.

In a world government the ideological differences between the various component parts are of no grave consequence. I am convinced that the present difficulties between the United States and the USSR are not due primarily to ideological differences. Of course, these ideological differences are a contributing element to an already serious tension. But I am convinced that even if the

United States and Russia were both capitalist countries — or Communist, or monarchist, for that matter — their rivalries, conflicting interests, and jealousies would result in strains similar to those existing between the two countries today.

The United Nations now, and world government eventually, must serve one single goal — the guarantee of the security, tranquillity and the welfare of all mankind.<sup>6</sup>

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We meet today, as intellectuals and scholars of many nationalities, with a deep and historic responsibility placed upon us. We have every reason to be grateful to our French and Polish colleagues whose initiative has assembled us here for a momentous objective: to use the influence of wise men in promoting peace and security throughout the world. This is the age-old problem with which Plato, as one of the first, struggled so hard: to apply reason and prudence to the solution of man's problems instead of yielding to atavistic instincts and passions.

By painful experience we have learned that rational thinking does not suffice to solve the problems of our social life. Penetrating research and keen scientific work have often had tragic implications for mankind. On the one hand, they produced inventions which liberated man from exhausting physical labor, making his life easier and richer; but on the other hand, they introduced a grave restlessness into his life, making him a slave to his technological environment, and — most catastrophic of all — creating the means for his own mass destruction. This is indeed a tragedy of overwhelming poignancy!

However poignant the tragedy is, it is perhaps even more tragic that, while mankind has produced many scholars so extremely successful in the field of science and technology, we have been so inefficient in finding adequate solutions to the many political conflicts and economic tensions which beset us. No doubt, the antagonism of economic interests within and among nations is largely responsible for the dangerous and threatening situation in the world today. Man has not succeeded in developing political and economic forms of organization which would guarantee the peaceful co-existence of the nations of the world. He has not

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 440-443: Open Letter to the General Assembly of the United Nations (October 1947).

succeeded in building the kind of system which would eliminate the possibility of war and banish forever the murderous instruments of mass destruction.

We scientists, whose tragic destiny it has been to help make the methods of annihilation ever more gruesome and more effective, must consider it our solemn and transcendent duty to do all in our power in preventing these weapons from being used for the brutal purpose for which they were invented. What task could possibly be more important to us? What social aim could be closer to our hearts? That is why this congress has such a vital mission. We are gathered here to take counsel with each other. We must build spiritual and scientific bridges linking the nations of the world. We must overcome the horrible obstacles of national frontiers.

In the smaller units of society man has made some progress toward minimizing sovereignty with its antisocial implications. This is true, for example, of life within cities and, to a certain degree, even of life within individual states. In such communities tradition and education have had a moderating influence and have brought about tolerable relations among the people living within those confines. But in relations among nations complete anarchy still prevails. I do not believe that we have made any real progress in this area during the last few thousand years. All too frequently conflicts among nations are still decided by resort to brute force, by war. The unlimited desire for ever greater power seeks aggressive outlets wherever and whenever a physical possibility offers itself.

Throughout the ages this state of anarchy in international affairs has inflicted indescribable suffering and destruction upon mankind; again and again it has impeded the progress of men, their souls and their well-being. At given times it has almost annihilated whole areas.

However, the desire of nations to be ever prepared for war has still other repercussions upon the lives of men. The power of every state over its citizens has grown steadily during the last few hundred years — no less in countries where the power of the state has been exercised wisely than in those where it has been used for brutal tyranny. The function of the state to maintain peaceful and orderly relations among its citizens has become increasingly complex and extensive largely because of the concentration and centralization of modern industry. In order to protect its citizens from aggression a modern state requires a formidable, expanding military establishment. In addition, the state considers it necessary to educate its citizens for the possibility

of war, an "education" that not only corrupts the soul and spirit of the young, but also adversely affects the mentality of adults. No country can avoid this corruption altogether. It pervades the citizenry even in countries which do not harbor outspoken aggressive tendencies. The state has thus become a modern idol whose suggestive power few men are able to escape.

Education for war, however, is a delusion. The technological developments of the last few years have created a completely new military situation. Horrible weapons have been invented, capable of destroying in a few seconds huge masses of human beings and tremendous areas. Since science has not yet found protection from these weapons, the modern state is no longer in a position to prepare adequately for the safety of its citizens.

How, then, shall we be saved?

Mankind can gain protection against the danger of unimaginable destruction and wanton annihilation only if a supranational organization has alone the authority to produce or possess these weapons. It is unthinkable, however, that, under existing conditions, nations would hand over such authority to a supranational organization, unless the organization had the legal right and duty to solve the kind of conflicts which in the past have led to war. Under such a system the function of individual states would be to concentrate more or less upon internal affairs; and in their relations with one another they would deal only with issues and problems which are in no way conducive to endangering international security.

Unfortunately, there are no indications that governments yet realize that the situation in which mankind finds itself makes the adoption of revolutionary measures a compelling necessity. Our situation is not comparable to anything in the past. It is impossible, therefore, to apply methods and measures which, in an earlier age, might have been sufficient. We must revolutionize our thinking, revolutionize our actions and must have the courage to revolutionize relations among the nations of the world. The clichés of yesterday will no longer do today, and will, no doubt, be hopelessly out of date tomorrow. To bring this home to men all over the world is the most important and most fateful social task intellectuals have ever had to shoulder. Will they have enough courage to overcome their own national ties to the extent that is necessary to induce the peoples of the world to change their deep-rooted national traditions in a most radical fashion?

A tremendous effort is indispensable. If it fails now, the supranational organization will be built later, but then it will have to be built upon the ruins of a large part of the world. Let us

hope that the abolition of the existing international anarchy will not need to be brought about by a self-inflicted world catastrophe, the dimensions of which none of us can possibly imagine. The time is terribly short. We must act now if we are to act at all.<sup>7</sup>

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I am grateful to you, Mrs. Roosevelt, for the opportunity to express my convictions on this most important political question.

The belief that it is possible to achieve security through armaments on a national scale is, in the present state of military technology, a disastrous illusion. In the United States, this illusion has been strengthened by the fact that this country was the first to succeed in producing an atomic bomb. This is why people tended to believe that this country would be able to achieve permanent and decisive military superiority which, it was hoped, would deter any potential enemy and thus bring about the security, so intensely sought by us as well as by the rest of the world. The maxim we have followed these last five years has been, in short, security through superior force, whatever the cost.

This technological as well as psychological orientation in military policy has had its inevitable consequences. Every action related to foreign policy is governed by one single consideration: How should we act in order to achieve the utmost superiority over the enemy in the event of war? The answer has been: Outside the United States, we must establish military bases at every possible, strategically important point of the globe as well as arm and strengthen economically our potential allies. And inside the United States, tremendous financial power is being concentrated in the hands of the military; youth is being militarized; and the loyalty of citizens, particularly civil servants, is carefully supervised by a police force growing more powerful every day. People of independent political thought are harassed. The public is subtly indoctrinated by the radio, the press, the schools. Under the pressure of military secrecy, the range of public information is increasingly restricted.

The arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, initiated originally as a preventive measure, assumes hysterical proportions. On both sides, means of mass destruction

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 493-496: message for the World Congress of Intellectuals at Wroclaw, appeared in *The New York Times*, August 29, 1948.

are being perfected with feverish haste and behind walls of secrecy. And now the public has been advised that the production of the hydrogen bomb is the new goal which will probably be accomplished. An accelerated development toward this end has been solemnly proclaimed by the President. If these efforts should prove successful, radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere and, hence, annihilation of all life on earth will have been brought within the range of what is technically possible. The weird aspect of this development lies in its apparently inexorable character. Each step appears as the inevitable consequence of the one that went before. And at the end, looming ever clearer, lies general annihilation.

Is there any way out of this impasse created by man himself? All of us, and particularly those who are responsible for the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union, must realize that, although we have vanquished an external enemy, we have proved unable to free ourselves from the war mentality. We shall never achieve real peace as long as every step is taken with a possible future conflict in view, especially since it becomes ever clearer that such a war would spell universal annihilation. The guiding thought in all political action should therefore be: What can we do in the prevailing situation to bring about peaceful coexistence among all nations? The first goal must be to do away with mutual fear and distrust. Solemn renunciation of the policy of violence, not only with respect to weapons of mass destruction, is without doubt necessary. Such renunciation, however, will be effective only if a supranational judicial and executive agency is established at the same time, with power to settle questions of immediate concern to the security of nations. Even a declaration by a number of nations that they would collaborate loyally in the realization of such a "restricted world government" would considerably reduce the imminent danger of war. [...] <sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 520-522: remarks presented in a television program conducted by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt on February 13, 1950.

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