

THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

Hamilton, The Federalist




YEAR XXVI, NUMBER 2, OCTOBER 1984

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The Federalist was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE FONDAZIONE EUROPEA LUCIANO BOLIS

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The Problem of Peace and the European Parliament

Peace is closely linked with the evolution of power forms. Wars are waged because the power to make them exists (in the shape of the absolute sovereignty of nation-states). We will achieve peace when, and obviously if, mankind succeeds in creating a power capable of preventing all states from waging war. But the big question is the following: does the historical process, at least in germ, already contain within itself such possibilities? And through what type of action can such possibilities be actualized?

With « The Federalist » we would like to show that European unification is a good place to look for the answers to these questions, for the following reasons: firstly, European unification is a great historical work of pacification between proud states, which have always fought each other; secondly, unification is in fact a process implying the creation of an international democratic power and a profound transformation of the old absolute national powers; thirdly, on this basis, it can be reasonably argued that, with unification, some, at least, of the problems of power which will arise in the future on a World scale are in process of being tackled on the European scale (assuming, as men should fervently will, action is undertaken in the future to create a world power capable of ensuring a lasting and universal peace). It follows — and this is the fourth reason — that studying the power aspects of European unification we can already work out patterns of action which will also be valid for world unification; and it goes without saying that in this way it will also be possible to ascertain the possibility of such unification, which can be established precisely by assessing whether and how such patterns are applicable, i.e. are appropriate means of struggle.

We believe, therefore, that Europe is a great laboratory, a seat for experiment decisive for the future of mankind (in the wide meaning of the term 'experiment', as experience with some possibility of theoretical control). Precisely in the same way that Europe has diffused modern science and the great political ideologies throughout the world, Europe will make a serious contribution to the development of a positive theory of peace, if she is able to solve the problem of her unification. Nowadays peace, at least for those who believe in the identity between peace and world government, is thought of as a typology (as an *Idealtypus* in Weber's sense) but not yet as concrete knowledge of the real historical process of its creation. And from this point of view science remains mute (there is no science of historical contingency). And so it will remain until the time when it becomes precisely a science of what can be ascertained because it is happening, i.e. history. Hence the importance of Europe as a laboratory. Europe is permitting the first empirical observations of the aspects of the problem of peace which, as they have the character of new historical facts, can be studied only if they occur; and, of course, only if they are studied from this angle, viz. as aspects of a trend really transforming power and evolving towards international democracy.

There are essentially two aspects which can be studied with this method: firstly, the characteristics of the European political process — as a succession of situations in progress, conditioning political behaviour and thus counting, from the political point of view, as *de facto* powers, and secondly, institutional transformation, directly concerning human will, inasmuch as it corresponds to the possibility of taking new decisions in new fields of action. In this respect the fact to focus on is that in all unification processes — from the institutional state of affairs existing at the beginning of the process (a system of States with absolute sovereignty) to the final one (federal system) — intermediate and transitional institutions take shape which cannot be deduced from the typology, as they are new as historical occurrences, but must be studied and understood, lest the new possibilities of action they determine be lost.

* * *

There are some facts which demonstrate that the European Parliament can take on the role of « federator » (we may recall that de Gaulle argued it was impossible to go beyond the stage of l'Europe des Etats due to the lack of a fédérateur). But, before recalling such facts, we must remove some misunderstandings,

which seem to crop up abundantly when the question is about the European Parliament. There were, and still are, many uncertainties as to its role, which can, however, be easily explained. Europe is not a perfected political system, like the U.K., or France, etc. Europe is a political system in the making, and nobody is in a position to say a priori what will be the function of a Parliament which is still in the making, just like the political system to which it belongs; so much the more so if, as in the case of Europe, the system does not yet possess an independent government. What is certain, is that the European Parliament cannot carry out now the function it will have in the future, i.e. once the Community becomes the Union and, later the Federation. But this is precisely the aspect which is habitually overlooked when its achievements are judged on the basis of the idea of what it will be able to do only when Europe's construction is completed, or when at least it is farther advanced than now.

It is worthwhile elucidating as clearly as possible this curious demand. It is often asserted that the Community, and/or the European Parliament, should transform the Common Market into an internal market in the true sense of the word and at the same time ensure economic recovery, get rid of unemployment, make up for the ground lost to the U.S. and Japan in the field of new technologies, lessen regional imbalances, or draw up a common foreign policy, organize a common defence, etc. Then everybody notices that none of those goals is attained, nor even really pursued: so funeral songs are struck up, lack of European political will is complained about and the conclusion is drawn that Europe is a dream.

This type of reasoning makes about as much sense as wishing to live in a half-built house. It is self-evident that one cannot govern without a governing power; it is self-evident that normal political will cannot take shape where a will to govern cannot develop itself, etc. The problem lies elsewhere: Europe is in the making, the question is what stage in the process have we reached today? What possibilities for action are emerging? Only in this way is it possible to exorcize the verbal ghosts arising from poor use of language, and to replace them by real facts, i.e. the current degree of unity in Europe.

* * *

The European Parliament has taken on the role of a « federator » thanks to the « Spinelli draft ». We are speaking about the widely known Draft Treaty establishing a European Union, which defines the first forms of a real European government,

though provided with powers which are much more limited than we might wish. At any rate, it is clear that, if such a Treaty is ratified by the states, this should enable the Community to overcome her crisis, by giving her a limited, yet real, European capacity for government and raising her up to the status of an effective political Union. But there is more than this. The reactions to the Draft Treaty show that the European Parliament can play an important role, when pursuing advanced, yet realistic institutional goals ('realistic' when seen from the standpoint of common sense, and not from the viewpoint of many observers, experts, etc.). Now, by studying this we can ascertain how strong the power of the European Parliament is in a phase when it is directly elected by the citizens — and this cannot fail to have consequences — but when it does not yet possess the powers normally possessed by a Parliament.

It is interesting to note, firstly, that the events which have demonstrated the real role of the European Parliament were entirely unexpected, like all historical novelties, and, secondly, that these events have been unreasonably underestimated. Briefly, the sequence of these events and the attempts to brand and minimise them is as follows. When Altiero Spinelli suggested the European Parliament work out a Draft Treaty establishing the Union, to be submitted to the States for ratification, everybody said that it would not even have got a majority inside the European Parliament. When, a majority was won and the Draft Treaty was approved (February 14th, 1984, 229 for, 31 against, 42 abstentions), everybody said that no government would ever have given it the slightest consideration. When the Italian Cabinet and Parliament let it be known that they were in favour of ratification, everybody said that it was unthinkable that the other governments, particularly the French and German governments (let alone the British government) would adopt the same attitude. But when Mitterrand stated he was in favour on May 24th (a « divine surprise » for Spinelli, as a journalist wrote in « Le Monde ») and when Kohl made equally committing observations (on the occasion of the French-German talks which followed Mitterrand's declarations to the European Parliament) and when, finally, the leaders of other Community countries gave their consent, everybody was forced to admit that the majority of governments had taken up the European Parliament's proposal right away.

We are, therefore, entitled to assert that the European Parliament has succeeded in eliminating both obstacles which have been hindering the process of unification for more than ten

years. The French a priori refusal of any institutional reform has fallen. The road to Union, hitherto pursued in vain by governments, not even able to draw up a plan, has been re-opened. Without the intervention of the European Parliament, it would still be blocked. Both are results of very great moment since they show that the European Parliament has succeeded in assuming the role which rightly belongs to it in the current phase of European construction: namely the role of « federator ». The intuition of the very few people who were saying that thanks to direct elections the European Parliament would have been able to exercise the function of a permanent European constituent assembly — an expression used by Willy Brandt who unfortunately failed to turn it into personal commitment — has therefore been proved correct. Also proved correct is thinking about the work of governments as necessary in this respect, albeit insufficient by itself, because, by acting alone, they remain prisoners of the sterility of the intergovernmental (confederal) method, right from the phase when decisions and projects for action are first contemplated (now a power practically lost by the Commission).

The significance of these facts is clear. The European Parliament, as has been pointed out, so far has neither real governmental power nor the power to check the government (which insofar as it manifests itself, is autocratic because it is made up of national ministers not responsible either to the European Parliament or to the national Parliaments). It does, however, have a power which is much more important by far, so long as the construction of Europe is at stake: the power to be the sole effective partner for the national governments when, by means of the constituent power, new phases in the construction of Europe are about to be initiated.

So far those who see these events in this light are few. So both the events and their underestimation go hand in hand at the same time. Whereas we have the progress made with the appointment of personal representatives of heads of states and governments to the Special Committee, at the very same time we have renewed scepticism. It has to be said, however, that to wait for this struggle to come to an end in order to assess its consistency would be senseless, because all political enterprises may fail, which does not mean they are unreal. In political actions, good fortune still counts, as in Machiavelli's age, for fifty per cent. We do believe, however, that one may lose all the battles but win the war all the same, just as we believe that, in any case, what has already happened is enough to ascertain

the consistency of the European Parliament's power, provided one is not blinded either by the fear that Europe will not succeed in uniting or by the desire that she should not succeed.

One matter remains to be clarified. Some people believe that this success is not due to the European Parliament, but rather to an exceptional personality, like that of Altiero Spinelli. Now although we are convinced that Spinelli is an exceptional man, we must also bear in mind that Spinelli's plan has existed in his thinking and goals for about thirty-five years but that it only became a plan which governments accepted once the European Parliament adopted it, i.e. once Spinelli could exploit the power of the European Parliament with a view to implementing it.

We would like to draw two conclusions. The first is of a practical nature and concerns Europe. The conclusion is the following. Only if the European Parliament has effective power and this power is known, can Euro MP's either be appreciated when they exercise power well or criticised when they do not exercise it or exercise it badly. And only in this case do the citizens of Europe have the democratic possibility to strengthen its power even when they criticise the European Parliament's members, precisely as they criticise national Parliaments' members. The second conclusion is of a theoretical nature and concerns peace, and more precisely one institutional aspect of the transition from the world of war to the world of peace. The conclusion is the following. The vicissitudes of the European Parliament have allowed us to establish that, even inside an association of States still with no independent government (like the UN) and thus with no real governmental powers, a Parliament directly elected by the citizens — in this case of the entire world — can have a de facto constituent power, even though it can exercise this power only jointly with the governments and parliaments of the associated states. If we bear in mind, however, that constituent power comes from the people and can be effectively exercised by its representatives only with its consensus, we can also appreciate the fact that the consensus of all the people in the world would strengthen the action of the World Parliament (or partial World Parliament, in Einstein's sense), thus making possible what would otherwise be impossible: states spontaneously giving up part of their sovereignty.

A worldwide election is a distant goal. But this is far from being a good reason for not beginning to study it henceforth, also with a view to shaping the future and offering an object

for moral will. In this respect, knowing that this election would be useful (in a world already progressing towards continental federations and the strengthening of the UN), even before a World Government is established, is something which is not without significance.

The Editor

National Sovereignty and Peace*

LORD LOTHIAN

I suppose that never in human history has there been so intense and widespread a discussion of the problem of peace as that which has reverberated round the world since the outbreak of the world war in August 1914. That is largely due, no doubt, to the fact that the majority of mankind were drawn, directly or indirectly, into the maelström of the war, that modern war,

* This essay is the text of a lecture Lord Lothian (Philip H. Kerr, Marquess of Lothian) gave in the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution in March 1938. That it is an unpublished work becomes apparent when we read the correspondence between Lothian and the Secretary of the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution. The latter explained that the Institution was not in a position to publish the essay for lack of funds (cf. Edinburgh Records Office, Lothian Papers GD40/17/353/165).

Lothian's intense political activity that year aimed at bringing about a «Federal Union», the first federalist movement organised on a popular basis, and his imminent departure for Washington as the British Ambassador, prevented him from becoming personally involved in the essay's publication and it remained among his personal papers.

This essay follows *Pacifism is not enough* in 1935 but precedes *The Ending of Armageddon* in 1939. The reason why Lothian decided to leave it unpublished despite having been asked in May 1939 by the «Federal Union» to draw up the movement's first *pamphlet* (which was to be *The Ending of Armageddon*) is not explicitly stated. Perhaps Lothian considered *National Sovereignty and Peace* a theoretical essay with a wide-ranging philosophical basis unsuitable for that particularly dramatic historical period when it was vital to pass from thought to action.

The Ending of Armageddon contains a heart-felt plea through which Lothian put across the thesis held by Clarence Streit, the American federalist, for the immediate creation of a federation between Great Britain, France, the United States, Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, Finland and Ireland, the fifteen democracies then existing in the world.

as depicted in the press, the film and the radio, is more sensational and more dramatically violent than in earlier ages, and that it attacks non-combatants and especially women and children more fiercely than it did before the days of the bombing aeroplane. I doubt whether, in point of fact, modern war is really more horrible than ancient war — war in the days when there was no Red Cross, when armies lived on the country often destroying everything as they passed, when famine and pestilence was added to direct slaughter by sword or rifle. Its holocausts of killed and wounded at particular moments are certainly larger. But I question whether, in sum, there is more suffering than, for instance, in the Thirty years war when the population of Germany was reduced from 30,000,000 to 5,000,000 or even in phases of the American Civil War.

The real difference between the discussions about war and peace, which are going on today and those of preceding centuries, is a difference in motive. Except for relatively brief moments in the history of man, people have thought of war, as they have thought of earthquake, or pestilence, or storm and flood as a calamity, which by luck or geographical position or good management they might be able to escape or from which they might come out as victors rather than vanquished, but as something which was part of the inescapable lot of Nature and man. But since 1914 there has been a profound change in the outlook. Appalled first by the magnitude of the catastrophe and later by the obvious discrepancy between the price paid for victory and its reward, public opinion, at least over a great part of the earth's surface, has demanded that war as an institution should be abolished from the earth. War is no longer regarded as inevitable or as the will of God. It is recognised to be the outcome of defects in human nature or management or organisation and as such to be essentially remediable. That is an immense advance.

In some degree this change may be due to religion. Christianity has always deplored war and the killing of man by man as essentially contrary to the spirit of its Founder. On the other hand some of the churches have too often been identified with those vehement national patriotisms which in modern times have been the most stubborn causes of bellicosity and war. I remember when I walked through the gloomy anti-God Museum in Lenin-grad a few years ago, seeing displayed as evidence of the Marxist thesis that religion was the opium of the people picture after picture from country after country of ecclesiastics of many different denominations blessing battleships and battleplanes and other instruments of war. This need not be taken too seriously. But

there is no doubt that one of the reasons for the decline of the authority of much organised religion in recent years has been that so far, at any rate, the churches have not convinced the people that they have the solution for the insistent problem of war. I think, as I shall try to show, that they could do more than they have lately done to find the answer to this charge.

A more important factor in the change of attitude towards war has, I think, been the growth of the scientific spirit. Mankind has become so accustomed to seeing the mastery of Nature by man, to reading about the astonishing discoveries of natural science and to seeing marvels like the aeroplane and the radio or in the lessening of disease by sanitation, that they have begun to feel that no problem is insoluble, no evil is unconquerable, if people really set their minds to solving the one or curing the other. The shock of the disaster of 1914 made men say « This is the next enemy which shall be overcome ».

But if we are candid with ourselves we must admit that we have not made much progress towards our goal, so far. The League of Nations was the expression of mankind's bitter and poignant hope that the last war was the war which would end war and that in future war could be prevented and international disputes would be settled by pacific means. But it is now obvious to everybody that these hopes have not been fulfilled. I shall give some explanation of this later on. For the present it suffices to point to the fact that we are in the midst of the greatest period of re-armament the world has ever known and that two or three wars or undeclared wars are in progress in different parts of the world. Is that because of the errors or pusillanimity of statesmen, because they have failed to use the machinery to their hands, or is it due to the fact that our proposals for dealing with the problem of war were fundamentally inadequate? That is the question I want to discuss tonight, for we shall make no progress until we face the facts and find the answer to it.

As one who is condemned to play a part in politics I am particularly glad to discuss this subject today before the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution. The trouble with politics is that the leading actors almost always are compelled to deal with urgent and usually unforeseen and unforeseeable issues which come crowding upon them for solution hour after hour. Politics in practice is largely a matter of skilful improvisation. A ship is sunk or threatened in the Mediterranean, or a foreign minister says something in a speech, which indicates an unsuspected design on the foreign policy of another nation or inflames public opinion to uncontrollable indignation. Or a labour dispute flares up some-

where or there is a break in the Stock Exchange or a rise or fall in prices or the bank rate. Such things are happening all the time and no one can predict when and where the next crisis will come from. It is sometimes said, and I think with justice, that Governments are made or unmade not by the general policies they proclaim or on which they are elected, but according to whether they inspire confidence by the manner in which they deal with the thousand and one practical problems which rush up for immediate solution day by day. No Government will last under a parliamentary system, however popular its general policy may be, if it is obviously a failure in ordinary administration and there is an alternative party which can be put in power in its place.

But this is only half the truth. What controls policy in the long run are two things — in the first place the facts: and not illusions or ideals or what psychologists call wishful thinking about the facts. In the second place the settled moral judgment of the electorate and its settled opinion as to the direction in which it wants society to move. And this settled judgment and opinion, at any rate in a democracy, is largely the creation of those who are capable of study and thought and are possessed of strong and independent moral conviction. I have long believed that the only basis upon which democracy can be made to work successfully is the same as that which underlies the jury system. The jury is only asked one simple question. It is not asked to sift the evidence or to make up its mind about the facts or the law. These things are done for it first by expert counsel who elicit the facts in accordance with the law of evidence enforced by the Judge, and later by the Judge who sums up the evidence in the whole case and declares the law relating to it. Then and then only is the Jury asked to decide whether the accused is guilty or not guilty. Experience shows that justice is best attained by combining this marshalling of law and evidence by experts with the common sense judgement of 12 ordinary men and women who are asked for one thing only, their verdict: guilty or not guilty. So, in politics what a democratic electorate is really qualified to do is to decide which of two parties and leaders and programmes it wants to administer the powers of the state, under the constitution for the next four or five years. The parties correspond to the expert counsel and judges: the electorate to the jury, and their verdict is given after hearing all sides at a general election. When you try to ask an electorate, necessarily consisting of people who are busy about their daily lives and who have no direct knowledge of the issues, to decide on complicated questions of policy you always get into trouble. I think

the famous Peace Ballot of 1935 was a conspicuous instance in point. It was an attempt to get the electorates to vote on policy by a kind of plebiscite. But a plebiscite is unknown to our constitution, which asks the electorate to decide between parties and men and programmes. In my opinion the Peace Ballot led to disasters from which we and other nations have not yet recovered and if we try to build on plebiscite, democracy itself will break down.

The truth is that initiative and leadership must come from political parties and leaders but that the limits within which parties and leaders can move is the settled judgment of the electorate on certain fundamentals. This settled opinion is partly the creation of the parties themselves and of the press affiliated to them, but it is also created, and in some ways most decisively created by thinkers and poets, and by students and men of religion, who are not directly engaged in politics at all. Some of them study the facts more deeply than active politicians can do and so discern forces which make little show on the surface but represent the deeps beneath. Others are concerned with truth and error, good and evil, and rouse the moral sense of the community. The best of them often belong to no class or sect or profession, but are what professional politicians often dislike most: — independents. And in this task of laying the foundations upon which public opinion rests there is no body of people more important than philosophers, or students of thought, government and religion. For they attempt to state, analyze and interpret the facts, to find out the deeper currents of the ocean of events and to mark upon charts the rocks and shoals to avoid and the clear channels along which the ship of state may move safely forward.

That is why I am particularly glad to be able to discuss tonight the problem of peace with this audience of the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution. For I believe that there has been something fundamentally wrong with our thinking about peace since 1918 and that we shall never make progress until we see what it is.

As I said at the beginning the whole human race has been longing for peace. The peace societies have been passing endless resolutions in favour of peace. There is not a political gathering or an issue of a newspaper which does not demand peace. The greatest effort in history was concentrated on creating a practical peace system — the League of Nations. Yet today we seem to be moving away from peace rather than towards it.

Why is that so? I do not believe we shall find the answer to the question merely by exposing the mistakes and failures of

the last twenty years. It is sometimes said that the League of Nations has been wrecked by the Treaty of Versailles. In a measure that is true. At any rate the hopes of peace were deeply undermined not only by the Treaty of Versailles but even more by what followed it. Here there is a summary of those fatal events. First came the rejection of the League by the United States, then the failure to set up a reasonably impartial Reparations Commission, then the repudiation of the Anglo-French Treaty of Guarantee to France, a nation of 40,000,000, against unprovoked aggression by Germany, a nation of 65,000,000, then the inevitable consequence, the building up of the French Alliance system against Germany within the League and finally the invasion of the Ruhr, which really created the National Socialist movement by rousing the German middle class, in order to compel Germany to remain weak and disarmed, with a demilitarised frontier. All these things have been the parents of our present discords, and the Locarno treaties failed to solve them because they sought to perpetuate the military discrimination against Germany. But this historical diagnosis does not go to the root of the problem. It does not explain why these mistakes were made: nor why the League was unable to remedy them. Nor does it explain why the Washington Settlement of the Far East in 1922, by far the wisest and justest settlement made after the war, has collapsed as fatally as the Paris settlement of Europe collapsed first.

It is the same with a kind of argument which has been very popular of late — that if only the British Government or some other Government had acted with resolution and decision, in Manchuria, in Abyssinia, over Spain, in Palestine, in China today and so on, all would have been well. No doubt if we had acted differently we should not be where we are now. We might be better off or we might be worse off. But, as I shall try to prove, the basic reason for these failures lies deeper than the Treaty of Versailles or the policies of ministries, either at home or abroad. In my experience both as a student of history and as one who for many years was near the heart of public events, the decisions of public men are far more often than not the only ones which are practical in the actual circumstances. No minister, not even the Prime Minister, has a free hand to do as he chooses. He can only act within limits imposed by facts on the one side and by what he can get his colleagues or public opinion or his allies to agree to on the other. While the personal factor is immensely important in the short run and it makes an immense deal of difference whether a good and strong or a bad and weak

man is in a particular office, the course of history in the long run is governed remorselessly by facts and deep seated principles and feelings which the individual minister, however powerful, is unable to alter.

Neither of these explanations of the failure of the great post-war peace movement and the present drift towards war, to my mind touch the root of the problem. If we are to make progress in the greatest task of our age, the conquest of war, I am convinced that we must think far more fundamentally and less emotionally about the problem of peace and about what peace, in the political sense of the word, really means and what are the conditions which are necessary for its establishment among men. For if we can discover the basic or scientific truth, that truth will begin to spread until it permeates public opinion and becomes part of that settled public conviction with which practical politicians have to deal.

What is peace? Peace is what follows the establishment of the institution known as the State. The State is the instrument which creates the reign of law — the system whereby resort to violence is forbidden and prevented because there is a legislative authority to enact and amend the law, a judiciary to adapt the law to particular circumstances and to decide disputes, and an executive to enforce, through police and army, the law and to administer the public departments of the State. Peace, in the political sense of the word, only exists within the confines of the State, and it is the primary and essential function of the State to establish and maintain peace. It is essential to realise this if we are to think clearly about the problem of international peace. There has never been peace on any corner of the earth's surface or at any period in human history except through the agency of the State. Whether one looks at a tribal chieftainship, a monarchical or feudal despotism, a vast federal democratic republic like the United States, or an even vaster creation like the Soviet Socialist Republic or the Empire of India, its internal peace depends upon the existence of the State. Progress does not affect the fundamental nature of the State. It simply alters the process by which those who wield the powers of the State, the power to legislate, to give judicial decisions and to enforce the law, are appointed. In primitive conditions that power passes by heredity or is seized by conquest. Under advanced conditions it is the result of an electoral process whereby authority is given to a party or group of parties to act as the Government by a majority of the electorate, voting freely at a general election, and itself compelled to act within the law and not arbitrarily

and with a decent respect for the rights and interests of minorities.

That is what peace is. And it is only when we begin to think about international peace from this standpoint that we can see, and see clearly, why we have failed, despite all our efforts, to create peace since 1918 and what are the basic conditions on which alone we can end war on earth. The essential reason why we have not had peace is that in the international realm the State does not exist. Every nation has insisted on its own full sovereignty, and so has claimed to be a law unto itself and a judge in its own cause. Moreover, despite the League of Nations, the position has been more difficult since the great war because it ended in an increase in the number of sovereign States. For instance, the number of sovereignties in Europe was increased from seventeen to twenty-six and the British Empire was transformed from an Empire substantially governed from one centre into an association of almost independent sovereignties.

The fundamental reason why the League of Nations has failed has been because it was a League of sovereign States and had itself none of the attributes of the State. While the League is an admirable piece of mechanism for States which want to co-operate or to find peaceful methods of settling disputes, it is, in its essential nature, only camouflage for the fact that its members, by insisting on their own sovereignty, are practically still living in conditions of anarchy, and as all history shows, war is endemic in anarchy.

Let us consider for a moment what the sovereignty of nations and its consequent anarchy means in practice. It means in the first place that every nation tends to look at every problem from the point of view of its own interests and especially its own security. It may and sometimes does try to look at things from a wider standpoint, but it is almost impossible for it to do so, for the reason that in a democracy at any rate, its inhabitants have no real knowledge of the rest of the world and because its government is responsible to and controlled by its own inhabitants alone. There is no government or ruler who can think or speak for humanity as a whole. Moreover, language, geography and culture impose upon every nation a national outlook, quite different from what the outlook of a government would be which represented all nations, races, languages and colours.

In the second place sovereignty means that in case of disputes between nations, there is no remedy, where voluntary agreement cannot be reached, but force — the giving way of the weaker party or a trial of strength in power diplomacy or war. So long as every nation is content with the *status quo* there may

be no serious difficulties, and conference round the table or arbitration on agreed terms of reference may suffice to solve disputes. But directly there is serious discontent with the *status quo*, and that is the usual condition of the world, as it is today, and discussion and diplomacy prove inadequate to find agreed solutions, the most discontented nations, especially if they are potentially powerful, begin to arm so as to compel attention to their claims or in the last resort to secure what they feel they are entitled to by power diplomacy or war. We can see this process going on all over Europe, North Africa and the Far East today. Yet immediately armament begins anywhere, neighbouring nations follow suit — so as to try to make themselves secure in the event of war. So we get to that competition in armaments which is a familiar feature of anarchy. And once competition sets in agreement becomes more and more difficult because the strategic factor rapidly becomes predominant on moral factors such as justice. For instance fear lest restored colonies might be used as air or naval bases is becoming a major consideration in the German colonial question today. Again it was fear of increasing the strategic power of Germany which induced the Peace Conference arbitrarily to forbid the union of the Austrian Germans with the German Germans even if they wanted to do so. The final consequence of the anarchy which follows insistence on national sovereignty is that nations begin to ally themselves together — some in order to alter, others in order to defend the *status quo*, until the world becomes organised in two or more rigid military alliances. Is that not exactly what you see going on today with the anti-Comintern Pact on one side and the Russo-French Treaty of mutual Assistance on the other — just as you saw it developing before 1914? And when the military alliances become sufficiently rigid the military timetable based on speed of mobilisation becomes decisive — and enables a fool, a rumour or an accident to let off a world war.

But there is a further result of national sovereignty — in some ways the most far-reaching of all. Every sovereign state begins to set itself up, under pressure from both employers and employed, as a more or less closed economic area by means of tariffs, and it tends to include within its own economic system, any colonial areas it may control. As the competition in armaments sets in there is added to the ordinary arguments for economic nationalism, the argument that the maximum self-sufficiency is necessary to national security in the event of war and so to ordinary tariffs are added higher tariffs, embargoes, quotas and so on, on the principle of autarky. But the inevitable

restriction of foreign trade which economic nationalism thus produces, results in the devastation of industrial areas which used to be engaged in the export trade or shipping, while raw material and food producing countries lose their old markets so that unemployment becomes a universal phenomenon all over the world. As this unemployment becomes severe, the social order becomes unstable, there is a universal demand for more and more governmental interference to provide palliatives or remedies or to maintain order, until democracy is overthrown by some form of totalitarianism or the democracies are driven to a universal governmental paternalism not in response to socialist theory but because of the necessities created by economic nationalism.

Can anybody in this room tonight dispute that what I have just described represents exactly the main process which we have witnessed in the last ten years? While statesmen and nations have made mistakes in plenty, is it not clear that the inexorable underlying driving force which has defeated the best intentions of statesmen and men of good will, has been the force of anarchy resulting from universal national sovereignty? That is the force which has led to national interests taking precedence over human interests, to the failure to revise the Treaties in the interest of justice in time, to rearmament, to impotence in face of aggression, and to the economic nationalism and alliances of the present day. And will not every student of history or of political science agree that these very phenomena are inherent in anarchy, and only disappear where there is a great State like the old Roman Empire or the old British Empire or the Government of India or the Federal Union in the United States or the Federal Government of Canada and Australia, which can maintain peace by being able to legislate for and police vast areas and the populations they contain. The nations today are really living in the same conditions as individuals used to live in the wild and woolly West in the early frontier days of the United States. Then every man carried a gun and his safety and that of his property and family, depended on the reputation he had for drawing it quickly and shooting straight. Civilisation and economic development were impossible under such conditions and they did not, in fact, begin to appear, until the Sheriff — the agent of the State — appeared and established the reign of law.

Above all, it has been this fatal force which has undermined the original hopes about the League of Nations. Because every member has retained its own sovereignty, national interests have always come first, to prevent it joining the League, or from giving

power to the League to do justice and revise treaties, or to limit economic nationalism or resist aggression. At every crisis you will find that national sovereignty has been what the Americans call « the nigger in the wood-pile ». The essence of this position can be seen in the fact that in the last resort the loyalty of the individual is owed to his own state and not to the League, so that if necessary he has to fight against the League.

If you really want to study the basic reason why a system of co-operation between sovereign States cannot possibly overcome the forces of anarchy or maintain peace and justice read the pages of *The Federalist* — the famous American periodical in which Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay set forth the bitter lessons of the period from 1781 to 1787 when the revolted American colonies were trying to manage their affairs as a kind of League of States, and argued successfully that nothing short of the pooling of some part of state sovereignty in an American federal constitution could give peace to America or prevent its being engulfed, like Europe, in chronic war.

The only foundation on which lasting peace can really be based is the principle of the State in the federal form. That is the lesson both of history and of political science. There was no peace in Britain, no ending of alliances between Scotland and France against England until you had the union first of the thrones and later of the Parliaments. Canada, Australia and South Africa could not solve their own internal problems until they formed a federation or union. It was the same with Germany and India, and with the American Confederation. It is obviously true of Europe today. It cannot get peace so long as it consists of 26 sovereign States. And it is really true of the world as a whole today, because inventions have so shrunk it in terms of time and space as to make it smaller than the British Isles alone were a hundred and fifty years ago.

It is not my purpose to suggest that this solution is within reach today, or can be applied tomorrow, or that we can begin with the world as a whole, or that the difficulties in the way, difficulties of race and colour, and culture and civilisation are not immense. What I am concerned with is to convince you ladies and gentlemen of the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution that the problem which concerns all, more than any other today — the problem of ending war and of establishing international peace — is only soluble in terms of federal constitutional government. We may have to get along for a time as best we can with makeshifts, with new variants of the League of Nations, or by the major military powers giving parts of the world an uneasy

respite from war for a time because no one dares to challenge their supremacy, or by systems like that by which a dominant British Navy prevented world war for a century from 1815 to 1914 though it was unable and did not try to prevent local wars — a system which can only be reproduced today by the United States and Great Britain acting together at sea. But even if these makeshifts can be constructed and can be made to work for a time they are only makeshifts. The vital thing which the thinkers among us must grasp is the fundamental truth that international peace and the possibility of a world governed by morality can be established by the principle of the State and in no other way. Then and then only will our thinking on this subject begin to be constructive and fruitful and we shall no longer rush hysterically up one blind alley after another, to failure and frustration and disaster, because we have persuaded ourselves that there was some shorter and easier road to peace, when, in fact, there is not. On the principle of the federal State and in that alone can the temple of peace be permanently reared.

On this main point may I recommend to your attention the argument put forward in a remarkable book by Mr. Lionel Curtis — the third volume of « *Civitas Dei* ». Mr. Curtis's theme is that the function of religion is not only to ensure the individual redemption of the individual but that the redemption of the individual requires that he act as a good citizen and that it is therefore part of the function of religion to bring into being a type of human society in which it is possible for the individual to love God by loving all his neighbours as himself. He argues that humanity has advanced in proportion as it has been able to extend the loyalty which men owe to others, as made possible in the institution of the commonwealth, by including a larger and larger section of humanity in the commonwealth. Thus in primitive societies loyalty and love is owed only to other members of the tribe — all others are enemies. The ancient empires came into being by conquest and retained their unity and power so long as the attributes of divinity could be accorded to the King and his descendants. But when these disappeared, by atrophy or conquest, the empire collapsed. Then the Israelites and the Greeks made two discoveries: the first was of the importance of free religious experience and moral principle as the foundation of society, the second was of the principle of the responsible democratic commonwealth as exemplified in the Greek City State. These were fused for the first time in history in England under the Plantagenets when the idea of representation made possible the creation of a democratic commonwealth coextensive with a

nation. And a few hundred years later the Americans, faced, as I have described, by catastrophe so long as they were unwilling to abandon any part of the sovereignty of the original thirteen States, discovered the principle of federation, whereby, while the individual States were left fully autonomous in their local affairs, the federal democratic Commonwealth was extended to include 48 States, an area as large as the whole of Europe, and 130,000,000 people.

I will now quote one or two passages from Mr. Curtis's book which give the essence of his argument. « To regard peace », he says, « as the end and object of policy in international affairs is, I believe, as great a mistake as it is to regard the maintenance of order as the end and object of domestic policy. War between States and disorder within them are the visible symptoms of a malady deeper than the sufferings they inflict... The essential disease is a failure in the system to develop in men the sense of duty they owe to one another ». « The institutions of a national commonwealth, however great and however highly developed, do not suffice to reveal to its citizens the interests of human society as a whole. Nor can they clearly reveal to the people of one nation how inseparably its interests are bound up with those of human society as a whole ». « Human nature cannot begin to realise its full possibilities until we have achieved a commonwealth which knows no limit but that of human society and renders all men obedient to laws common to all in things which affect them all ». « The virtue in human beings will grow insofar as the framework of society is designed to exercise and promote it. A State which disposes the minds of its members gathered in one locality to regard their duty to others as in any way limited to those who live in that area cannot develop their sense of duty in the highest degree. In a world divided into national States the growth of virtue in men, however developed in those States, must be arrested at a certain point ». « Indeed I have given reasons for thinking that anarchy not only does not develop moral virtue in nations but destroys it. People think of the national commonwealth contained by one frontier or coast as the last word in human development. The idea of the national State imprisons their minds. They can no more conceive a genuine commonwealth of nations than a Greek in the time of Aristotle could conceive a national commonwealth which contained all the Cities of Greece » — and it was because he could not conceive such an idea, now familiar to all of us, that the Greek civilisation was destroyed. « The profound belief in the national commonwealth as the last word in political construction is a gulf in the

minds of men which has to be bridged before we can move to a higher level of civilisation than we have now reached ».

Mr. Curtis ends his book by an appeal to religious and philosophic thinkers to begin to break down this almost universal inhibition against thinking in more than national terms and to lift man's thought to the imperative need of thinking in terms of our all being fellow citizens of all other men and individual members of a world commonwealth, before our present anarchy destroys our civilisation, as it has destroyed civilisation after civilisation throughout history. I would add my plea to his. Is not the essential question we have to face one asked by Mr. Curtis « Can the progress of civilisation continue beyond the level it has now reached, or indeed maintain that level, unless and until the ultimate allegiance of all human beings is rendered to one sovereignty »? My answer is clear. Unless we can rise to that new level civilisation will certainly find itself in danger of the catastrophe of another world war.

You will probably expect me to say something about the more practical aspects of the problem, for you will naturally say « even if you are right in your statement of principle how can we proceed in practice? » I clearly cannot argue the question in detail tonight. But I will briefly enumerate one or two basic ideas as food for thought.

In the first place we shall not end war or re-establish the reign of morality in the international sphere, or even gain the power to control either our own national or world affairs, until there comes into being an authority which can survey world problems not as a conflict between national States but from the standpoint of the well-being of humanity as a whole.

In the second place that authority must be derived not from the national states, as is the case with the League of Nations, but from all the individuals comprised within its jurisdiction, must, in some way, be responsible to them, and must be able to enforce its laws on the individual, in the world federal sphere of power and not as against the nation State. For as James Madison said in the Philadelphia Convention which drew up the American Constitution, « The only way in which a State can be coerced is by war, and order and liberty cannot rest upon the power of a federal government to make war upon a State ». This is very like Edward Grey's statement about the League of Nations: « I do not like the idea of resorting to war to prevent war ». Liberty but not peace can be preserved by war.

In the third place the federal authority must alone be empowered to organise professional armies, navies or air forces,

though the States might be free to raise militias for purposes of internal order, and it must have taxing powers of its own sufficient to enable it to pay for its own services so that it has not to rely on subventions voted by the constituent States.

You may ask, how are you ever going to get the nations of the earth, divided by race, language, colour, levels of civilisation and economic development and by vehement nationalism itself, to combine or to trust their fate to majorities of other races? My first answer is this. If you travel about the world much, as I have done, the most obvious fact is the speed in which the daily life of people is coming to be almost exactly alike in all the industrial areas of the world. We all tend to eat the same food, wear the same kind of clothes, do the same kind of work, read the same news and the same books, listen to the same music and talk about the same things. We are not nearly so different as we think, but under anarchy every difference is exaggerated, while under unity, while individuality would remain, artificial differences would tend to disappear. Take too, the apparently insurmountable problem of language. It is really one of the easiest to solve. Most educated people learn two languages. Why should they not all learn the same second language?

My second answer is that the integration of the world commonwealth will not begin, as the League of Nations began, with an attempt to bring the whole world in at a single time. It will begin with a group of nations who have thought their way through to the conclusion that they cannot solve their own domestic problem or obtain stable prosperity or peace unless they pool their sovereignty, abolish gradually trade restrictions between themselves and form a common government for their supernational affairs. Once a group of like-minded, civilised nations do this, for instance the English-speaking nations, or the democracies, or some other self-governing group, and have found the system of representation which will enable the federal authority to be responsible to and deal directly with all the citizens of the new federation, the access of strength, the increase of freedom, the rise in their prosperity will be such that other nations will want to join — and they should be admitted provided they accept the basic principles on which the federation rests.

In point of fact I am not so pessimistic as most of you probably feel about the possibility of achievement of this kind. It is astonishing what results the truth can achieve once it is proclaimed and once the disasters which follow its rejection begin to befall us. Just look at the inconceivable revolutions which have overtaken the world in the last twenty years. The

Russian Tsardom has become an entirely new kind of State, the USSR. The ancient Sultanate of Turkey has vanished. Fascism as well as Communism has gripped millions of youth into blind obedience. The British Empire has become a so-called Commonwealth which will soon become over 20 sovereign States with no stronger bond than an hereditary, non-political Crown. Either wisdom or disaster may make us move just as rapidly in the opposite direction from that in which we have been moving for the last twenty years — the direction of more and more self-determination and more and more anarchy. But the necessary condition is that enough people should begin to proclaim the truth that the pooling of some part of national sovereignty in a federal union is the only remedy for war.

But there are probably some members of my audience tonight who are already saying that I have ignored the most important factor of all, the economic factor, as the cause of war, the socialist argument that it is capitalism, with its competition and profit making and inner contradictions, which is the root of all our troubles. I have not forgotten Karl Marx's famous diagnosis as set forth in the Communist Manifesto of 1848 and the vast flood of literature it has since produced. But I am not going to discuss this thesis, except very briefly tonight, because I am convinced that it is not true. Socialism as I see it, is a half truth. The humanitarian and idealist sentiment which lies behind it is entirely sound, and it is because the doctrinaires of « Laissez faire » overruled those considerations that Socialism has become so popular in the last half century. But the Marxist diagnosis that almost all the evils of society are due to the private ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, is, I believe, a gigantic delusion, which has distracted us from the far more fundamental evil of national sovereignty and is leading many people to the disastrous belief that universal nationalisation is a preferable foundation for our economic life than free initiative and enterprise regulated by law. The really central fact of our modern industrial civilisation is not the private ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, but the division and specialisation of labour as a result of the discoveries of natural science and the use of machinery. That is what has made possible the gigantic increase in the standard and variety of living in the last century. But the only method whereby supply and demand can be kept in relation with one another in a society based on the division of labour, by which capital and labour can be moved to the places in which they are needed, and whereby the consumer can decide what is to be produced,

is the free market. That is the fundamental mechanical balance wheel of modern industrial civilisation and Marxism proceeds on the assumption that you can suppress it altogether and substitute for it the dictatorship of a central planning committee. But such a system requires superhuman ability in the planners and even so can only survive by the most drastic and dictatorial control over individual life for the inescapable consequence of central planning is that all private initiative must be suppressed because otherwise it will destroy the plan. In practice it only substitutes exploitation by an irremovable bureaucratic dictatorship for the much less dictatorial exploitation of competitive capitalism especially if capitalism is regulated by democratic law. I am convinced that the system is going to break down in practice as being beyond both human endurance and human capacity and recent events in Russia seem to point to the beginning of that breakdown.

I am not going to discuss this vital and fascinating subject further tonight, except to refer you to another very remarkable book which has already been published in the United States and which is shortly to appear in this country also, Mr. Walter Lippmann's book called « The Good Society ». It will well repay your attention. It is one of the most clarifying books on the whole capitalism and socialism problem which has appeared in this generation.

The fundamental cause of the economic troubles of the modern world is not capitalism but the national sovereignty which has made it almost impossible for capitalism even in its most controlled and benevolent form, to work, and which is also the root cause of war. It was national sovereignty which was the ultimate cause of the world war of 1914, which dislocated the old economic order so badly that it almost broke down altogether; it is national sovereignty which through tariffs, embargoes, quotas, exchange restrictions, reparations and war debts, has been the principal impediment to postwar recovery through the unemployment, revolution, dictatorship it has caused.

There is the real enemy — not capitalism, which in itself unifies the world and overrides racial and language obstacles. If it were not for state sovereignty, trade would be free, migration would be far easier, slump and booms would be far less, the rise in the standard of living would be far more rapid. Once the fatal forces generated by anarchy and national sovereignty have been exorcised by some form of international federation, it will be in the combination of the fundamental institutions of capitalism, which generates a gigantic flow of energy, initiative and invention,

with democracy, which redistributes wealth through taxation and enacts in the interest of all the people the laws within which capitalism should function and which protects the individual from the effects of competition in the market by insurance, old age pensions, and the whole stately edifice of social reform, that the hope of peace, freedom and economic prosperity for all will be found to lie.

I would end, therefore, on a note, not of pessimism but of hope. We are living in a difficult, a dangerous, indeed a painful age. On the one hand we face great disasters; on the other we are also within reach of tremendous accomplishments if we have eyes to see and courage to act. Mankind, as a result of the turmoil of the last twenty-five years, has within its grasp an advance greater than that of the Renaissance and the Reformation, for if it can overcome international anarchy through the federal principle it will be able to add to the liberty taught in that era, the unity and law and peace without which liberty cannot be made secure. And you, the thinkers of the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution can make your contribution to this cause if you will insist on shedding the illusions of the last twenty years and thinking organically once more about what the true foundation of international peace alone can be. I feel, indeed, today very much like Sir Owen Seaman when he wrote some memorable verses at the outbreak of the world war.

Quote.¹

¹ Quotation is omitted in the manuscript.

Federalism in a Post-Industrial Society

FRANCESCO ROSSOLILLO

The shrinking world of today is suffering from a serious disease: centralization. It manifests itself in the tendency for functions and resources to accumulate in relatively small areas, dominating the rest of the territory and relegating it to a subsidiary role.

A century ago, the decisive imbalances and tensions of society concerned its vertical structure and set social classes against one another in each state, region, city and village. Now, the front is shifting to the territorial dimension. On the one hand, the improvement of the conditions of life of the working class in the industrialized countries has deprived class-struggle of its character of focal drama in the advanced societies. On the other, with ever growing human interaction, and ever growing incapacity of politics to secure a rational steering of social forces, regional imbalances tend to grow deeper and to become less and less acceptable. Due to the pervasive influence of the media, the attractive images of the better-off are daily conveyed to the eyes of people living in the underprivileged regions, making them aware, by contrast, of their miserable conditions of life and inciting them to leave their homes and settle in the great cities and in their industrialized surroundings. Thus, thanks to the increasing mobility of men and resources, the process becomes self-sustaining.

The main divide of the world to-day is that between the rich north and the poor south. But at every level we witness a dramatic polarization between the congested centre, with a hectic life, and the abandoned periphery. In Western Europe a tremendous concentration of resources and functions has taken place in the triangle comprised between Paris, the Ruhr and London, whereas the southern, western and northern fringes are increa-

singly deprived of economic and cultural life. At the national level, in countries like France, the imperialist domination of the capital and its region has reduced the rest of the country to the rank of an internal colony. In the regional framework, cities like Milan, or Naples, sprawling wildly in all directions, attract men, wealth and activities from the smaller towns and villages in their regions. These are reduced to the role of dormitories, deprived of life and identity. Nor is this process limited to the industrialized world. On the contrary, the most disastrous examples of territorial polarization exist in Third World countries, like Mexico or Nigeria.

This trend brings about dramatic consequences both for the areas profiting by polarization and for those injured by it. In the former we find congestion, waste of resources and pollution. The latter are plagued by underdevelopment, cultural decline, depopulation and — in the case of the poorest of peripheries, the so-called Fourth World — by starvation. In both areas, life is dehumanized, the environment is degraded and people lose all capacity to adapt their circumstances to their needs.

The great city is the place in which all these tensions and contradictions appear in their most dramatic form. Congested in its centre, deserted on its outskirts, it is the cockpit in which an uprooted humanity pursues a feverish existence, whose meaning it has lost sight of and which it is unable to control. Mental illness, drugs and delinquency are the legacies of an urban development which has lost touch with the most elementary needs of human life.

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Alongside the pursuit of peace, the urban crisis is the main challenge facing the world to-day — and Western Europe in particular. But in order to tackle it with any chance of success, it is first necessary to clarify the cultural aspects of the problem.

The devastating process of centralization all over the world has been both the cause and the product of the culture of nationalism, i.e. the culture which has accompanied the process of industrialization in the whole of the 19th and in the first two thirds of the 20th century.

Nationalism has as its basic tenet the idea that humanity is divided into « natural » communities, totally alien to one another, each of which is entitled to exact the unrestricted allegiance of its members. It emphasizes uniformity and closure as the fundamental aspects of society.

This is true whether this culture appears in the form of traditional nationalism, or is disguised by an insidious form of

regionalism, growing today as a consequence of the decline of the nation-state. Such regionalism indeed marks a further backward step, because it applies the national way of thinking to a narrower spatial horizon, and reproduces all its evils without retaining any trace of its historical greatness. But about this, later.

What is needed today is a new cultural approach, founded on pluralism and openness. An approach capable of taking into account the reality of our multiple allegiances and of the anachronism of the division of the world into sovereign nations.

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In order to give some hints of what such an approach might be, it may be useful to make reference to the analysis conducted by the German geographer Walther Christaller, on factors influencing the geographic distribution of human settlements in a cultural environment such as Europe. According to Christaller, for the supply of goods and services, each man belongs naturally to a number of *service areas* of different size, ranging from the immediate neighbourhood, in which housewives do their shopping, children go to school and where, in general, people's most elementary needs are satisfied, up to areas of increasing size, within which more specialized services are provided (while a primary school, for instance, normally serves an area comprising a few thousand people, a university caters for some hundreds of thousands and a highly specialized post-graduate research institute for millions).

Such a hierarchy of services corresponds to a hierarchy of *central places* (i.e. places in a territory in which the « institutions » providing the services are located: hamlets, villages, towns, cities, etc.). In absence of inhibiting factors, maximization of convenience causes the central places to spread out all over a given territory in a balanced and decentralized pattern, as new « institutions » tend to be set up in places inadequately serviced by the existing ones, i.e. mainly on the peripheries of existing service areas.

This is the distribution pattern founded on what Christaller called the « market principle », as contrasted with the « traffic principle » and the « administration principle », which apply when the spontaneous action of demand and supply is influenced by the presence of particularly loaded traffic axes — attracting central places to cluster along them — or by the centralizing force of political power.

Before the industrial revolution made its full impact, many European regions presented a balanced and decentralized structure

convincingly corresponding to Christaller's model based on the market principle. Some of them have kept it up to now (e.g. Tuscany, or Southern Germany). Yet, in most cases, the process of industrialization overthrew previous structures, leading to the disastrous development that gave its present shape to the environment in which so many Europeans must now live.

Let us briefly refer to the many direct and indirect links between the structure of territory in Europe and the industrial revolution.

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The growing interdependence between industrial sectors on the one hand and between industry as a whole and banking, insurance, administrative and professional services on the other has, in the 19th century and in the first two thirds of the 20th, made such functions seek geographical proximity in order to maximize their economic efficiency. Furthermore, the increased mobility of people due to the transport revolution made it possible for workers and customers to cover long distances to reach their places of work or to obtain the services they needed, whereas, previously, capitals and services would have been obliged to move closer to their homes. This way, the growth of the major cities and the congestion of the regions more favourably situated was strongly accelerated. Far from trying to counteract this trend by rational planning, the nation-state, a product of the industrial revolution, encouraged it, as the drift towards centralization of functions matched the demand of the central power to control from the capital, administratively and militarily, the whole of the national territory with the minimum waste of effort and resources. Thus, to cite only the most conspicuous example, the policy of railway and road construction was never conceived by national governments to enable people and resources to flow without hindrance in all directions throughout the territory of the state, but always with the aim of maximizing access for people, goods and services to and from the capital and a few other great cities, thus isolating the peripheral regions from each other.

In this way, many of the natural aspects of human interaction which, with all its poverty and backwardness, gave medieval society its particular variety, have been disrupted. The life of large numbers of people, previously identified with their own neighbourhoods and surrounding areas, were forced into unnatural patterns. Hence the lives of the commuter, the neighbourhood shopping centre being progressively ousted by hypermarkets on

the peripheries and the huge week-end migrations to holiday resorts.

As a consequence, community life, the basis of self-government, withers away. Any healthy relationship between town and country collapses. Agriculture suffers from this trend both in the central regions — where it is increasingly pushed back by the advancing urbanization, and the peripheral regions, where it is more and more impoverished by the lack of capital and the loss of vitality of the urban centres of the region. Everywhere the link between man and nature is severed.

* * *

Yet the monstrosity of modern urban life, which has by now become the lot of so many people all over the world, is perhaps a sign that the process is approaching a turning point. The *scientific and technological revolution* makes it possible to imagine a future in which things could go differently. The crisis of the nation-state, which has taken on a particular dimension in Western Europe, opens up the possibility of doing away with the main political obstacle blocking a reversal of the current trend.

The new mode of production might transform profoundly existing patterns, leading to the decentralization of functions and resources and enabling people to recover a quality of urban life that seems to have been lost. Let us mention some of the most probable consequences of the introduction of new technology which is now under way.

a) The scientific and technological revolution shifts the accent from the production of goods to the production of services, especially of the so-called « quaternary services », viz. those connected with culture and scientific research. Thus, the new mode of production increases the role of human intelligence and individual responsibility as factors of production, at the expense of capital-intensive processes, opening the way to unprecedented possibilities of the decentralization of plants.

b) Automation makes the present worker role obsolete. The trend towards an increasing division of labour within the factory and between the different branches of production is reversed. A few highly specialized technicians control processes which, before the introduction of the new techniques, required the repetitive work of thousands of hands. Concentration of huge masses of workers in the same place tends to become less and less necessary.

c) Data processing dispenses with the excessive division of labour in white collar jobs, shifting repetitive operations onto

machines and enhancing the worker's scope and responsibility. Furthermore, the use of terminals makes possible the instantaneous exchange of information, freeing many functions from dependence on physical proximity. Hence, in the field of administration, banking, insurance, professional services, etc., the need for physical concentration tends to fade away.

d) The increase of the average level of both welfare and culture — which is both the cause and the effect of the introduction of new techniques — makes it possible for many services to be supplied economically and efficiently for ever smaller areas (some decades ago, for instance, a university could only be sustained in a service area comprising some millions of inhabitants, whereas today a service area of two hundred thousand people is sufficient. The same is true of most other services).

The conditions making it possible to realize a decentralized pattern of distribution of urban settlements, conforming to Christaller's model, are thus coming about again, at least in Western Europe. Furthermore, the emergent mode of production makes it conceivable to go beyond Christaller's model and altogether bring to an end any hierarchy of central places. We can thus visualize a situation in which every citizen could have access to services of the same quality and quantity, wherever he lives, and in which the difference between centre and periphery, town and countryside would largely disappear.

All this would not mean that the hierarchy of services, dependent on their specialization and hence on their geographic influence, would disappear in its turn. But what becomes conceivable is that: a) with the passage of time, the same services could be provided by a larger number of smaller « institutions », which could thus be dispersed on the territory and brought nearer to the users; b) some complex « institutions », like the universities, could be split up into their component parts (departments, faculties) and these distributed among several central places of the area concerned; c) the indivisible « institutions » would not all need to be concentrated in the principal town of the area concerned, but could be scattered throughout its territory (thus the ministries making up the central administration of a state could be located in different towns and connected through terminals, and thus remove one of the major causes of congestion in state capitals).

Thanks to the scientific and technological revolution, the idea of the city-region begins to take on a concrete shape. Compactness becomes a less important qualification for urban settlements, with the obvious exception of the urban neighbourhood,

which provides the daily environment for face-to-face contact, and where people live near each other, walk about and meet in the streets. Outside this nucleus, all the inhabitants of the region should, thanks to a rational transportation and communication system, enjoy on equal terms the facilities available in other parts of the city-region with a minimum waste of time.

Only in this way can the advantages of modern urban life — i.e. of civilization — be made accessible to everyone without paying the cost of the growing sprawl of the great cities — the main cause of the present degeneration in the quality of life — and thus bridge the traditional cultural gap between metropolis and province, town and countryside.

Thus domination of state, regional and provincial capitals, like that of the city centres over their suburbs, would come to an end. People would recover the sense of belonging to each of a series of ever bigger communities, starting from the neighbourhood and extending to the district, region, macro-region, state, continent and ultimately, the world.

It must be emphasized once again that the part of the world in which these new opportunities can best be exploited is Western Europe. It is only Western Europe that meets the essential conditions for such a development, namely: a) a sufficiently advanced stage of technological development, b) an urban network inherited from the past that, though partially disfigured by the industrial revolution and the action of the nation-state, can still serve as basis for effective work of decentralization and c) the real possibility of deliberately overcoming, by the political unification of the continent, the existing structure of the nation-state, i.e. the institutional set up which tends to perpetuate centralization.

But it must also be emphasized that, if the new culture of decentralization makes its appearance in Western Europe, it will, like all the great emancipatory revolutions, spread beyond its borders and serve as an example for the rest of the world.

* * *

Restoring and enriching the original plurality of areas of human interaction would give people an awareness of their composite cultural identity and create a network of intersecting community ties providing the social basis for multiple allegiances.

Such allegiances, as we have seen, were partly eroded by the monolithic ideology of nationalism which, with the help of the centralizing action of the industrial revolution and of the state power, surreptitiously diverted people from their previous lo-

yalties towards exclusive allegiance to a single dominant and artificial community.

Now people can revert to their many old loyalties. It must be emphasized that the aim is not to replace one totalitarian allegiance by another, exclusive one. The object is to acknowledge that people can have multiple loyalties commanding equal respect, none of which is more important than the others.

In the present crisis of the nation-state, some movements and individuals believe that they have discovered, under the umbrella of the « artificial » national community, « natural » communities, usually smaller, with an ethnic foundation, sharing a common natural language, common tradition and even being of common blood (thus sliding into racism). Yet, the truth is that none of these criteria can be used to define clear-cut human groupings.

In reality, throughout the world, and with particular evidence in Europe, variation of natural languages (i.e. dialects) merely constitutes a continuum, which makes the tracing of boundaries of definite linguistic regions highly questionable. With the exception of a limited number of cases, wherever we draw the dividing line between two supposed linguistic regions, we usually find that the idioms spoken at the opposite ends of each exhibit far greater differences than those spoken in any two neighbouring places on either side of the boundary; and analogous conclusions could be reached after observing territorial variations of customs, anthropological parameters, etc. There are obviously rare cases in which abrupt changes occur (especially where great natural obstacles obstructed communications for many centuries), even though such leaps are never as abrupt as people normally think, since intermediate forms are always to be found. In any case we must remark: a) that the presence of this phenomenon has nothing to do with the idea of dividing the whole of the European population into a number of mutually exclusive ethnic regions, having by and large the same size, but is related to the totally different problem of the existence of a limited number of minorities, where the linguistic frontiers do not coincide with the political frontiers of the nation-states; b) that no such minority is ever monolithic, as all of them include sub-minorities and areas with a mixed population, so that the problem of minorities and of their protection has always to be envisaged in its multiple dimensions.

* * *

Thus it can safely be asserted that, if the scientific and technological revolution, on the one hand, is creating the conditions that

make it conceivable — at least in Europe — to plan an overall restructuring of the territory according to Christaller's model, on the other hand, no argument of an ethno-linguistic nature can be advanced to invalidate such a conclusion.

At this point, however, human action has to come in. We must not forget that the scientific and technological revolution presents us only with the technical possibilities of reversing the trend towards centralization. Like any technical device, such remarkable new opportunities may be used by people for good or for ill. The new technologies (computers, atomic power and the new sources of energy, genetic engineering, etc.), if utilized as instruments of power rather than as instruments of emancipation, could accelerate the trend toward centralization instead of reversing it, by enhancing its disruptive potential.

That is why the scientific and technological revolution faces humanity with a challenge — particularly in Western Europe: that of bringing political action and the expression of political will on a par with the new technological possibilities so as to control and direct them towards a revolutionary change in the quality of life.

* * *

What is in question is planning, which must be subject, however, to a number of qualifications. First, it has to be *comprehensive*. Planning in our context means giving people the capacity to take their destiny into their hands. So it cannot be limited to single sectors of collective life, leaving the rest a prey to anarchy. All essential decisions should be taken in accordance with the general plan, since the evolution of the mode of production has so enhanced the interdependence of human action as to make it impossible to distinguish areas of social life and types of political decisions which would enjoy a real degree of autonomy.

In this view, even the expression « territorial planning » no longer refers to something distinguishable from other descriptions of planning. Territory is by now merely the spatial dimension — a dimension about to become increasingly paramount — of any kind of policy, be it industrial policy, education, defence, agriculture, social security or finance.

Secondly, planning must be *democratic*. As its goal is not an abstract economic efficiency, measured by quantitative parameters, but improvement in the quality of life, the responsibility of determining its concrete objectives must not be entrusted to technicians and bureaucrats, but has to be, as far as possible,

brought home to the citizens themselves, i.e. to those who are the sole legitimate judges of the soundness of the decisions taken.

Finally, it must be *diffused*, because the quality of life can best be improved by decentralization and decentralization cannot be achieved by centralized decisions. This means that the corporate will of the citizens must form and express itself where the problems exist. One example is the urban neighbourhood, i.e. the framework of everyday life, where the « quality of life » is immediately under stress.

For the democratic will to express itself correctly and not to degenerate into bureaucratic compulsion and disruptive competition between pressure groups, decisions must be entrusted to those who are affected by them. This means that the major part of the decisions implementing the plan must always be taken and enforced at the lowest tier of government, so as to be as close as possible to the needs and hopes of those directly concerned.

Self-government in small communities can, however, only become a reality, i.e. enjoy a real degree of autonomy, if, and only if, their outer environment is in a relative state of balance, i.e. if the problems having a wider application are tackled in their turn by democratic planning authorities of a corresponding jurisdiction. Such a requirement concerns a whole range of territorial spheres of ever larger dimension, reaching to the entire world as, due to the shrinking of distances and the growing interdependence at all levels, many problems are now acquiring, and will increasingly acquire in the future, a world-wide dimension. Suffice it to refer to the need for a fair sharing of energy resources, which are now being controlled, under a regime of oligopoly, by just a few governments.

Diffused planning must therefore be devolved to *independent* levels of self-government, from the urban neighbourhood upwards. But they must be *coordinated* with each other at higher tiers of government, ultimately reaching the world level.

* * *

Let us now come to the problem of the political institutions needed for the planning defined above. Independence and co-ordination of different levels of government are, according to Wheare, the essential characteristics of federalism. It is in federalism, therefore, that we find the clue enabling us to visualize the solution to the problem. It must be noted however, that federalism, as an institutional model, cannot be patterned uncritically on the experience of the federations which exist today. On the contrary their example has to be adapted to new circum-

stances. Let us indicate briefly what are the major novel features of « post-industrial federalism ».

1) A post-industrial federal state has to consist of many levels of government instead of the classical two in the American tradition (the nation and the states). Trying to define the criteria for establishing the number of such levels and for tracing their territorial boundaries would take us too far. More than that, finding appropriate criteria for everywhere would be a sheer impossibility, as this would demand detailed field research. What should be accepted, however, is that there is need for more than two tiers, ranging from the urban neighbourhood up, through a number of intermediate tiers (i.e. the district, the sub-region, the region, the macro-region, the state, the continent) right up to the world level.

2) The traditional criterion, in the existing federations, for allocating competences to different levels of government according to the issues to be dealt with, is incompatible with comprehensive planning, which implies that every level of government should be competent on every matter, within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. In post-industrial federalism, therefore, the division of competences has to be governed exclusively by the territorial dimension of the problems to be tackled (while not in conflict with the principle of subsidiarity).¹

3) The area of jurisdiction of the governments at each level need not be exactly confined to the area under the jurisdiction of the government of the next level, but may intersect two or more of them (it might prove necessary, for instance, to create, in Europe, a macro-region on both sides of the Rhine, including parts of Switzerland, France, Germany and the Low Countries). Such an institutional device would conform with Christaller's theory, according to which the service areas of a given tier always intersect those of the tier immediately above it, as new functions tend to concentrate on the edge of the sphere of influence of the existing central places, i.e. in the regions less satisfactorily serviced by them. Besides, in any enclosed spatial frame, market forces push functions towards its geographic centre, as the natural meeting point of converging routes; whereas an institutional setting for the development of overlapping areas of interdependence would counteract any centralizing trend.

4) As the primary goal of planning is to improve conditions

¹ This principle implies that higher tiers of government only undertake those tasks which cannot be effectively executed at lower tiers.

of life, it must start where people live, i.e. in the local community. Other levels of government will have as their main task the guarantee of external conditions to secure the independence of the lower tier. Of paramount importance is the electoral system, i.e. the way in which the general will finds its form and its expression. This must be organized so as to interlink all tiers of government from the lower to the higher, to ensure that planning decisions with wider implications take account of those reached within the narrower framework of the lower tiers. In other words, the general will must reach up the whole ladder of the different levels of government, from the lowest to the highest, so that those who interpret it, i.e. the elected representatives of the people, can at any moment be aware that the decisions they are called upon to take represent the consensus emerging from the fusion of subsidiary decisions, whose overall aim is the improvement of the quality of life for ordinary citizens living in the cities, towns and villages.

It is with this view in mind that Albertini proposed an electoral system, according to which the representative bodies of the various levels have to be elected in fixed succession, beginning with the neighbourhood and ending up with the top tier of government. The election would follow a precise timetable, so that the issues debated in each electoral campaign would develop as a result of the previous debates which had already taken place during elections for the lower tiers.

5) Federal bicameralism (a Lower House elected by « one man one vote » with an Upper House representing the component units having equal weight) should not be confined to the general level, as in the traditional federations, but should be extended to all tiers (with the obvious exception of the lowest, which has no component units). Thus it would be possible to counteract the tendency for territorial imbalances to become even more distorted due to the greater electoral weight of the areas where wealth and population has tended to accumulate, as the over-representation in the Upper House accorded to the interests of the disadvantaged regions would provide a corrective to restore the balance.

6) The above considerations are also relevant when considering the structure of the executive. As planning, in a post-industrial federal state, is supposed to become the principal government activity, and as it demands the strict co-ordination of legislative and executive action, it would be incompatible to provide the executive body with an electoral basis different from that of the legislature (as in the presidential system in the USA). It is well known in fact that the American system brings about frequent

conflicts between the two branches of government, which would run counter to good and rational planning. Besides, the direct election of the chief of the executive personalizes the electoral campaign at the expense of considered confrontation over the concrete policy issues. Democratic planning requires a debate strictly concentrated on issues.

7) One further important feature made necessary by the role planning is supposed to play in post-industrial federalism, concerns fiscal policy and the control of money. These are in fact two of the most powerful instruments through which central power — in all existing federal governments — has acquired a position of supremacy over the member States. Besides, raising money by taxation is directly related to financing of the plan. A decentralized plan would lack credibility, should the funds necessary for financing it be raised through centralized channels, or by agencies different from those which have to use them. That is why the institutional framework for post-industrial federalism should provide all levels of government with an equal share in the fiscal decision-making process and in the control of money.

8) The last feature of our federal model concerns giving the planning process a constitutional framework. The plan sets the limits within which decisions are meant to be made by public bodies and private citizens. That is why, if the plan is to fulfill its fundamental role, then it must not be left to the mercy of changing parliamentary majorities, but must in a sense become part of the constitution. This has consequences both upon the procedure by which the plan has to be drafted and amended by the legislature of the various levels of government — which must be more rigid than that adopted for ordinary legislation — and upon the competence of the judiciary to control its enactment and compatibility of ordinary legislation with it.

* * *

The cursory remarks made about the institutional structure for post-industrial federalism are not intended to be a ready-made recipe for a reform to be undertaken here and now. Some of the suggestions made could only be effectively applied when the basic principle of federalism — the overcoming of national sovereignty — is fully realized right up to the world level. All of them, at any rate, need further and more detailed study.

But the federalist stage of the course of history has now set in, and having a model, however sketchy, of how institutions

will have to be arranged at the end of the road could prove essential for guiding the intermediate steps of progress.

The point to which the attention of federalists has to be called is that federalism is a developing theory and that its great tradition of thought, far from making up a fixed corpus of dogma — which is the case for ideas that have already exhausted their historical function — needs constant revision to make it capable of responding to the challenges of the dawning post-industrial society.

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Notes

SPINELLI, « MAN OF THE WORK »

The first volume of Spinelli's memoirs¹ is a great book written by a great historical man. No federalist can afford to ignore it. Nor can anyone intensely involved with the history of our age turn his back on this book. Like all those who have read it, I could not fail to be deeply moved by the story of how Spinelli, thrown into the fascist gaols at a very young age, managed to turn the sixteen years during which he was first imprisoned, and subsequently condemned to forced residence in two small islands, into a source of spiritual wealth and liberty. Only later did I go through the pages of the book once more, this time guided by an inquisitiveness to learn the reason why, despite this, someone, like me, who has been a federalist for almost thirty years, whose life was transformed by the new line of the Ventotene Manifesto and who is today committed to the battle Spinelli leads, nevertheless, while never failing to respect and to admire him, still feels this man to be a complete stranger.

I looked for an answer to my curiosity in the beautiful passages, scattered here and there in the book, in which Spinelli condenses the main lines of his Weltanschauung.

One of them, for instance, deals with his conception of history. Spinelli is a post-Hegelian: he read and understood Hegel, but then set him aside, firstly, because Hegel's philosophy did not

¹ ALTIERO SPINELLI, *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio*. 1. Io, Ulisse, Bologna, Società editrice Il Mulino, 1984. The following quotations are drawn from pp. 166, 208, 277, 319, 343.

meet Spinelli's need to change the world rather than being merely contented with interpreting it and, secondly, because Spinelli could not accept considering himself and his actions as a part of a design or of a wider meaningful context. « I very much enjoyed, Spinelli writes recalling his reading of Hegel, the grandiose philosophy of history in which the world mind incarnates itself in an adventurous, yet dialectically rigorous, succession of epochs and philosophies, ending up in the both Apollinean and Dionysian awareness of having achieved itself and ... all of it proclaimed in a lecture hall in the University of Berlin in the eighteen twenties. All this enchanted me like a poem, and I have often re-read some of those wonderful pages, but have remained unconvinced. Having foresaken the Marxist philosophy of history which believes that, after many adventurous metamorphoses, mankind is bound to achieve a perfect communist society, I could no longer take the Hegelian one seriously, or indeed any other. I felt much more in sympathy with Croce's idea of history as a history of freedom, i.e. of continuous human creation, in which there is no final point of arrival, but each landing is a departure for a new route ».

A second significant reflection, again conveyed in the form of a recollection, concerns the foundations of Spinelli's ethics. Here too, he pays homage to historicism, but rejects it. In fact, he goes beyond such rejection and, quoting St. Paul, denies « any obligation to abide by a pre-existing idea of good ». « What fascinated me, Spinelli adds, was the existential problem of deciding what to do, on the very brink of the existent and of the non-existent. And I felt obliged to acknowledge that good is not something we apply: it is we — and in the last instance each of us — who are creating it through our action. Protagoras was right: 'Man is the measure of all things', even of good ». This phrase does not, of course, have for Spinelli the sense of the existentialist dizziness of utterly arbitrary choice. Man must on the contrary create good by « constructing », i.e. with his own labour. But the relationship between man and good is always one of creation ex nihilo.

A third splendid passage concerns the idea Spinelli had, and presumably still has, regarding divinity. For him « it was not something high, perfect and immovable, towards which one has to strive, but something low, powerful, eternal and chaotic, from which one must attempt to emerge, as if from darkness, to create for oneself a brittle world of light. Such a divinity is not Spinoza's quiet, harmless substance. It is an abyss mercilessly swallowing and endlessly generating among men a sense of humiliation and impotence... ».

Another, somewhat enigmatic, facet of Spinelli's philosophy can be seen in some passages taken word for word from something he wrote in the Ventotene period. « There is a language of the night. It is not a reasoning unfolding in the sunlight and taking on a clear shape, comprehensible to all, or at least to those ready to make the effort to understand. It is a language which rebuts the others because it is a sheer monologue.

The language of the day, on the contrary, can only be a realistic language. gauging the existing forces, calculating how they are interwoven with each other, how it is possible to act upon them and in what way.

To speak the language of the day with assurance, one must know the language of the night, only by means of which the themes to be unfolded during the day are sketched.

Thinking in the day with the language of the night only exposes one to the risk of being misunderstood. But thinking in the night, i.e. in the hour of panic contact, when one experiences detachment from one's own particular personality and from one's own lot — thinking in the night with the language of the day means going astray in any meditation, striving to preserve one's self when one should get lost. It means depriving oneself of the meaty food, full of a mysterious nourishing force, for the realistic language of the day.

That is why during the day one must attach importance to calculations, manoeuvring, skillfulness; but during the night one must refrain from trusting them entirely. The problem, in this case, is to understand what happens, not by virtue of calculations, manoeuvring, opportunities, but in spite of them ».

And later: « Mythical language is a necessity. It is impossible to speak otherwise when one has grasped something essential, but does not yet succeed in understanding it. Plato realized this perfectly, and his superior intelligence is proved by the ease with which he gives up reasoning and goes about modelling and remodelling myths, with the sole purpose of not losing sight of something essential for the stupid reason that it cannot yet be expressed in the common language of reason ».

One last sentence deserves quoting, the closing sentence to the book, which describes the moment when Spinelli, having returned from Ventotene, went back to civilian life: « While directing my steps towards the house of my parents with the wary walk of a peasant newly come to the city, unaccustomed as I had become to the traffic, I bade an imaginary farewell to my gaol comrades of all tendencies. Their innermost gregarious pride lay in the awareness they were one by one returning to their

fighting post in their own political formation, which was there, was well-known, had been waiting for them and was getting ready to receive them joyfully for their tenacious faithfulness. My lonely pride was of a wholly different nature, as no existing political formation was waiting for me, nor was setting about to welcome me, to receive me in its ranks. It would be I who would create from nothing a new and different movement for a new and different battle — a battle that I, and probably for the time being only I, had decided to consider, even though it did not yet exist, more important than those which were then being fought and to which all the others were going to commit themselves. I had nothing with me, for the moment, but a Manifesto, some Theses and three or four friends who were waiting for me to learn whether the action about which I had spoken to them so much would really begin ».

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The kind of relationship with life and with history emerging from these and many other passages in the book, made me think of an essay by Heidegger. (Heidegger does not in fact appear among Spinelli's cultural references, but Nietzsche is repeatedly referred to). I am thinking of the first essay of Holzwege,² entitled « Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes », on the nature of the work of art, but which considers the foundation of a state (die staatsgründende Tat) to be profoundly akin to the work of art. According to Heidegger the essential meaning of the work both of the artist and of the state founder is the founding of truth (Stiftung der Wahrheit). Truth, like Spinelli's good, is not thus something which « has always existed somewhere among the stars », but something which happens, which is not discovered, but created. 'Work' is the result of the permanent conflict between the world (die Welt), the principle that sheds light on things, opens up clearings in the inextricable forest of being, determines the decisions upon which a people's destiny depends, thus giving a sense to its historical existence (Spinelli's « brittle world of light ») and the earth (die Erde), the primitive, dumb and dark element of hidden-ness (Verborgenheit), which is at the same time the foundation supporting both the work of the artist and the State founder and the material he uses to create his world,

² See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, *Holzwege*, Frankfurt a. Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1963 (1st. ed. 1950), pp. 50-62.

something very akin to Spinelli's divinity, « low, powerful, eternal and chaotic ».

Thus, in no sense does history link its successive phases into a single design. It is not a discourse each generation receives from the preceding and hands on to the subsequent one, to continue it in its turn (even, of course, by coming to grips with the past and denying it). Rather it must be said that each people and each epoch have a truth and a sense of their own: the one they receive from the creators of the works which found the truth (« each landing is a departure for a new route »).

But for truth to live in any work, we need more than the creator (*der Schaffende*). Since founding the truth means opening a space, a clearing in the forest of being, raising a part of being above the earth, which remains its foundation, but tends to swallow it up once again in its closed impenetrability, we need the presence of someone who stays in the clearing opened by the creator, who guards the work (*die Bewahrenden*). Truth is thus founded by a few creators and entrusted by them to those capable of guarding their work.

All the others, with an everyday existence, addicted to the *Alltäglichkeit*, play no part in the game. History is a theatre in which a handful of men act, there are a few onlookers, while the rest pass by without noticing anything.

* * *

Even more precise are the correspondences between Spinelli's reflections and the features of that stage of Eric Weil's *Logique de la philosophie*³ which Weil himself calls « the work », *l'oeuvre*. In Weil's phenomenology the man who embodies the « attitude » of « the work » is post-Hegelian: he knows Hegel, but transcends him, not by refuting him, but simply by rejecting him. « He knows that all knowledge leads to absolute science; he does not want to know, not because he believes he is not 'particularity' — in point of being and of knowing he knows he is thus and nothing else —, but because he does not want to be 'particularity', i.e. something having its meaning not in something else (not to say: not even in something else), but in what is its disappearance in the universal ».

This does not mean that « the man of the work » (*l'homme de l'oeuvre*) is an egoist, or an egocentric. On the contrary, he

³ ERIC WEIL, *Logique de la philosophie*, Paris, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1974 (1st ed. 1967). The following quotations are drawn from pp. 362, 363, 352, 357, 354, 353, 357, 358, 359.

has no interest in his own ego: « he is 'the work' and nothing but 'the work' ». « The work », on the other hand, is a creation, « making something that did not exist before ». And it « has no meaning in the world; it only gives meaning to the world, and this meaning cannot be anticipated, because it lies in its creation ». The creator is one and the same with « the feeling of the work », (*le sentiment de l'oeuvre*) « which receives the name of violence in the language of those for whom the truth of existence is living together; and this is how it is called by « the man of the work » himself, when he thinks it appropriate; it is a total violence, no less complete than discourse, a violence which knows nothing but itself, which has created, is creating and will create all that has been, is and will be. Discourse is refuted by fact; nothing is understood, nor comprehensible, vis-à-vis the creative fact; history is not at an end: there is no history, nor comprehension, nor discourse vis-à-vis the 'feeling of the work' ». The « man of the work » does not have a language, he is the master of it. Hence, because he is not plunged into a discourse which is already there before him and which is the constituent element of the « generic » character of man, underlying the innermost communion of every man with each of his fellows (to whom he feels equal because he shares the same meanings), the « man of the work » is « not only unique... but alone. It would be absurd for him to imagine himself in somebody else's position, since there are no comparable places, nor beings. 'Men' do not exist, save in the sense in which the species *homo* has to be dealt with separately from the species *canis*; there is he, and even this is almost false, because the question is not about being, but about making, and any theoretical judgement has no bearing, save in the practical domain, He is alone, absolutely alone, not isolated like someone who has been outcast, or has withdrawn from a community to which he still belongs. The others look on him as one of them: so much worse for them; he can let them go on believing this, indeed even credit it, just as he can show himself to be a staunch enemy of theirs, with whom 'one cannot live', who is 'mad' or 'a genius': all this depends on him, on his 'work' and on the means he thinks fit to achieve it ».

This does not mean, of course, that the creator should refrain from using the language which existed before him or from using it for speaking to other men. « The work » is carried out in the world — and hence through men as they actually are. But language is only an instrument for achieving « the work ». « Men are nothing but means... language serves to use them, but has no meaning in itself, i.e. independently from its function ». Behaving

in this manner, « the creator is sincere, for he is 'the feeling of the work', which as such is not at all concerned with logical consistency, with having de la suite dans les idées ». « The language of the 'man of the work' is therefore a language of feeling, which is directed towards feeling. And that is why he can be sincere, because it is not his words or their content that matter... What the creator says does not therefore constitute a discourse; if we want to label its changing yet ever-identical content with a specific term, then we may call it myth. ». These words remind us in a very suggestive way of Spinelli's opposition between language of the night and language of the day (where the language of the night, the « sheer monologue », the « panic contact » is the « feeling of the work »).

But, if it is true that it is upon language that the « genericalness » of the human species is based, i.e. if language is the tie that links men in their feeling that they all belong to humanity, the fact that language is used as a mere instrument implies that men are used as instruments as well. This comes out clearly from Weil's sentence quoted above: « Men are nothing but means... »; and later: « Men are the mass, the material of 'the work' », « the 'man of the work' cannot speak with the others, but only to the others ».

This is evidently true also for those who share his design, for « the 'man of the work' has nobody beside him. He has collaborators, he may have friends among those who, albeit not collaborating in his 'work', accept his myth, he has enemies, those in particular who oppose another myth to his ... but he cannot have equals ».

* * *

I am inclined to recognize myself, and those fighting on the same front as I am, in another of Weil's categories (where recognizing oneself in a category means taking it as a regulatory criterion for one's political behaviour): this is the category of « action » (l'action) (a category which in reality falls in with that of « meaning », even though Weil could not concede this since, as a pure philosopher, he was obliged to keep them apart and to hypothesize the latter as consequent on the former). The « man of the action » (l'homme de l'action) is not the master of language, but is aware of himself as a link in a significant chain, which is history. He is, to be sure, a link that continues the chain and which, therefore, helps determine the meaning of the whole context. That is why he acknowledges the reality of a language

which was already there before him and through which he has given a name to things and a shape to the main decisions in his life. It is a language in fact whose meaning is not « somewhere, among the stars », but inside men, inside every man, and which makes up the atmosphere rendering communication among men possible, and enabling them to collaborate with a view to enriching the meaning of their living together: i.e. with a view to continuing the choral discourse of history, by setting up a continuity of meaning between the dead, the living and those to come.

It is precisely this language, in which everybody participates but of which nobody is the master, which is the foundation for that essential equality among men that enables each of them, potentially at least, to see the truth that is inside others and to work towards achieving it. Meaning, in fact, is often buried in men's soul: it will come out explicitly only at the end of pre-history. For the present, the struggle for human emancipation cannot completely dispense with cunning and violence. But the main instrument of the « man of the action » is rational discourse, the dialogue between men of equal dignity, in a common search for truth in history.

Hence the « man of the action » does not have two languages but, at least tendentially, only one. And historical transformation is not for him a creation from nothing by a single individual, but a collective undertaking, at once theoretical and practical, through which man becomes what he is, i.e. uncovers and reveals his essence.

* * *

I believe that in order to bring about, in our age, a great historical transformation such as founding the European Federation, both the « man of the work » and the « men of the action » are necessary, however deep the psychological gulf dividing them may be. Moreover, it must be recalled that the « man of the work » is a hero, and hence is one and one alone, and cannot be replaced, whereas each of the « men of the action », taken individually, is replaceable. That is why I profoundly admire Spinelli, though feeling no affection for him, and, although not ranking among his followers, I support him at present with all my strength.

Francesco Rossolillo

Problems of Peace

THE THIRD EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The Third European Convention for Nuclear Disarmament met from July 17th to 21st 1984 in Perugia.

Even for those who actually attended, it is difficult to give a complete account of the debate for two reasons: firstly, the number of participants representing themselves or a myriad of movements, organizations, groups and, secondly, the paucity of working documents and written motions.

A number of characteristics did, however, emerge very clearly which have marked out the Peace Movement since its inception.

One such characteristic is an awareness that the problem of peace has become a world problem, and that mankind's fate has become a common destiny. Yet this awareness has not yet been backed up either by adequate analysis or by an effective solution to the problem.

The basic premise for anybody wishing to affirm any value as a political objective is a clear definition of that value.

Only with federalism has a start been made to the work of developing radical thinking on the value of peace and the means to achieve it, thinking based on Kant's philosophy of history and Hamilton's constitutional thinking.

Federalist thinking conceives of peace as meaning the creation of a world state which, by taking away individual states' monopoly of physical force, compels all states to manage their relationships with each other peacefully and lawfully.

The Peace Movement's continued failure to recognize this has two consequences: firstly, an inability to consider peace as an

independent value, and, secondly, an inability to overcome national confines.

As regards the first consequence, the Peace Movement has done nothing more than reflect the positions of traditional ideologies, which claim that war depends on a lack of freedom, equality and justice, and that it is enough to achieve these values for peace to be obtained at the same time.

Thus, for example, the religious components of the Peace Movement have stressed the need to affirm the evangelical principle of love towards one's neighbour as a premise for mankind's peaceful co-existence. Other components believe that this premise should be a respect for human rights.

The majority of the Peace Movement has, however, attributed the causes of war to the absence of justice and equality between peoples and, therefore, strives for the creation of a new world order based on these values. Although it is true that a profound gap exists between rich and poor countries and that this is one of the greatest problems of our age, it is also true that a « new world order » is an empty formula unless we define the political framework in which it can take shape, a framework that ensures peaceful settlement of international disputes.

By not adopting this outlook, the Peace Movement runs the risk of being a passive reflection of the current situation as regards power in the world, in which any attempt to escape from imperialism becomes acceptance of the opposite imperialism. Moreover, the unquestioned acceptance of the current world balance of power means that the Peace Movement is not even laying the bases for reducing international tension and the risk of war.

One section of the Peace Movement advocating the creation of a new world order does not, in fact, exclude recourse to war, to achieve this end. In a document presented to the Perugia Convention we read: « One way of helping potential victims of a nuclear war in Europe is to defeat the imperialist forces who victimize the Third World's population today » and that to achieve this, « we must back the armed struggle of those who have been forced by hunger and injustice to take up arms ».

Although in the past the use of violence and war to assert such values as liberty and equality was considered inevitable, in the nuclear age, and in particular after the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons, the danger that a limited conflict will degenerate into total nuclear war throws doubt on the wisdom of armed struggle as an instrument against oppression. In our age, there is no reason to set about trying to define exactly, really what a « just

war » is. Rather we need to ask whether « just war », whatever its definition may be, is, in actual fact, at all possible.

The Peace Movement has not asked this decisive question because it does not entertain the prospect of eliminating war definitively through political institutions which make war impossible and which guarantee at the same time international justice and democracy.

International democracy means that citizens, clubbed together in a world federation, participate directly in the government of the world. By insisting on negotiations between states which maintain their full sovereignty, the Peace Movement is conning itself into believing war can be defeated for good by means of « good foreign policy ». The real priority is eliminating foreign policy, at least in the long term.

It is certainly true that in the current international scene, an end needs to be put to the increasing tension between the two Superpowers. Equally it is true that the creation of a climate of détente between them will be brought about by negotiation and agreement. But the premise making this possible is a change in the world distribution of power.

Only the creation of a stable multipolar system which is more flexible than the current bipolar system, would give greater room for diplomacy and would halt the USA's and the USSR's tendency to give an armed or rearming response to every conflict that arises.

For this reason, the Peace Movement should concentrate its attention and energy on those processes of unification which exist in various parts of the world, the most advanced of which is the process of European unification, in the long term prospect of creating a world government.

If the Peace Movement remains chained to its deviating national outlook, many of its watchwords will remain merely affirmations of principle. Demanding total nuclear disarmament, heedless of the substantial changes in the international order, is mere utopia, because, as Jonathan Schell points out, « as long as nations can defend themselves with arms of any kind they will be fully sovereign, and as long as they are fully sovereign they will be at liberty to build nuclear weapons if they so choose ».

The intermediate stages that the Peace Movement proposes in order to move towards total disarmament are a reflection of the Peace Movement's difficulty in facing up to the problem of peace in political terms. The proposals for unilateral disarmament and the creation of nuclear-free zones, as well as entailing implicit acceptance of the domination by those who have not given up arms, are based on an illusion, the illusion that good will and

example are enough to set off a process of progressive disarmament that will lead to universal disarmament.

We may, thus, conclude that the Peace Movement is certainly an attempted response to the new historical phase that we are in, typified by current institutions' growing incapacity to peacefully manage a continually evolving society now possessing forms of co-existence that are not compatible with the structure and dimensions of existing powers, a society which, with the invention of nuclear arms, has even placed its own survival in doubt.

But this attempted response is still tied to categories of interpretation of history and reality that are obsolete, whose inadequacy is clear, both in theoretical terms and in terms of concrete proposals.

As Albert Einstein said: « Freedom from the power of the atom has changed everything, except our way of thinking ».

Anybody wishing to become an active force in history must take his cue from this affirmation. We need to move towards the development of a peace culture which is no mere reflection of what actually exists, but which points to instruments of thinking and action which alter reality concretely.

Nicoletta Mosconi

WHAT DOES « EDUCATION FOR PEACE » MEAN?

Today we increasingly hear about peace education, an issue of particular interest to all those in education who are aware of their great responsibility vis-à-vis the young. The growing attention paid to this matter by serious educational journals such as the *International Review of Education*, which recently dedicated a special issue to the peace education debate, is further evidence of this interest.¹

¹ See n. 3, vol. 29, 1983. The table of contents lists the following contributions: M. HAAVELSRUD (editorial article), *An Introduction to the Debate on Peace Education* (pp. 275-280); J. GALTUNG, *Peace Education: learning to hate War, love Peace, and to do Something about it* (pp. 281-287); S. MARKS, *Peace Development, Disarmament and Human Rights Education: the Dilemma between the Status Quo and Curriculum Overload* (pp. 289-310); R. BURNS-R. ASPELAGH, *Concepts of Peace Education: a*

This issue cannot be overlooked by those concerned with the young, who are aware that educating primarily means inducing the young to commit themselves to a better society and who appreciate that nowadays this can only be brought about by serious reflection on the question of peace. The fact that humanity must live with the constant threat of a nuclear holocaust, firstly, makes entertaining any proposal about educating for a better tomorrow very difficult and, secondly, casts doubt on the very existence of a future, unless we commit ourselves to eliminating the prospect of war from mankind's history. The young are aware of this danger and seize every opportunity of showing it, as evidenced by their mass participation in peace demonstrations. Even so, demonstrating for peace does not necessarily mean making progress towards its achievement. We need to be able to turn the rejection of a world dominated by the nuclear threat into concrete action today. But we cannot think of any effective means of struggle unless we, firstly, rigorously define what the enemy to be defeated is — namely the causes of war — and, secondly, unless we work out a realistic framework for the historical situation within which we can act.

The issue which also involves the educational world today is, therefore, to cater for young people's need to possess the necessary cultural equipment with which to understand reality and to orientate their current action towards a realistic struggle for peace, which makes their future still possible. In the opening essay to the collection that we shall be referring to, J. Galtung² begins by recalling what the basic question is that education for peace must focus on: « If peace and war are, above all, relations among the states and if peace education is something that takes place, above all, among teachers and pupils at school, then, how

View of Western Experience (pp. 311-330); A. PIKAS, *Symmetric Peace Education and Unesco's Potential for Promoting it* (pp. 331-343); B. BROCK-UTNE, *Symmetric Peace Education as Advanced by Anatol Pikas. A Critique and an Analysis* (pp. 345-356, includes A. Pikas' commentary and a reply by B. Brock-Utne); J. ESSER, *Friedensdidaktische Bausteine für Ausbildung, Unterricht und Sozialarbeit* (pp. 357-368); C. GARCIA, *Latin American Traditions and Perspectives* (pp. 369-389); A. NASTASE, *The Culture of Peace and Peace Education* (pp. 391-401). In the final part there are a number of comments on « Peace and human rights » by L. Borrelli, C. Kumar-D'Souza, N. Tchakarov.

² J. Galtung founded the Oslo International Peace Research Institute in 1959. He also founded the « Journal of Peace Research » and the « Bulletin of Peace Proposals », which for years have carried on an intense debate on peace education, which is well-known in English-speaking countries.

are the pupils going to make use of what they have learnt? » (p. 282).

Peace education must not then be reduced merely to informing and making the young aware of the horrors of war as compared with the joys of peaceful living however praiseworthy and necessary this may be. And in much the same way the debate among teachers must not be restricted to studying school teaching packages designed to illustrate this data to young people. This is the warning that Galtung directs to all those, and there are many, who do not face up to the problem of turning their theoretical commitment into political action (« Peace and peace education are profoundly political »). History teaches that in politics, good will is not enough. Yet the voluntaristic myth whereby peace will be achieved when all men learn to abhor war and any form of oppression, seems to permeate most of the arguments put forward, with a high degree of formal complexity, in the articles presented in this special issue of *International Review of Education*.

This attitude is the logical consequence of an error when defining what war is and what peace is, common to all those who speak of it without reflecting that: « The occasion of war is irrelevant — as Lord Lothian wrote in 1935 —. War is the ultima ratio regum, the legislative instrument whereby issues between sovereign states, which will not yield to voluntary agreement, can alone be settled. War is a struggle of will between states or groups of states each using every possible resource, including mass destruction of human life, which is necessary to enable one side to enforce its will on the other... Peace is not merely the negative condition in which war is not being waged. It is a positive thing. Peace is that state of society in which political, economic, and social issues are settled by constitutional means under the reign of law, and violence or war between contending individuals, groups, parties, or nations, is prohibited and prevented.

Peace, in the political sense of the word, does not just happen. It is the creation of a specific political institution. That institution is the state. The *raison d'être* for the state is that it is the instrument which enables human beings to end war and bring about change and reform by constitutional and pacific means. Never from the beginning of recorded history nor on any part of the earth's surface has there been peace except within a state »³.

³ LORD LOTHIAN, *Pacifism is not enough, nor Patriotism either*, O.U.P. London, 1935, pp. 7-8.

Within the peace education debate war is frequently identified with violence. By so doing, we end up by associating the causes of war with a long series of sources of conflict present in contemporary society such as racism, prejudice, discrimination between the sexes and so on, which, albeit undisputed sources of serious conflict within states have absolutely no bearing on the logic behind the relationships between states, which justifies recourse to war. Many others argue that militarism is the root cause of war, whereas, if anything, it is in fact the consequence of the fact that war is always possible since mankind is divided into sovereign states, which obey the laws of *raison d'état*. Inevitably, any identification of the enemy in terms of violence equals war will not lead to a political strategy designed to promote an institutional system which objectively makes recourse to arms impossible but to purely voluntaristic indications of action (education based on tolerance, non-violence, etc. may seem enough to remove the causes of war).

Albeit only partially, the essays by J. Galtung and A. Nastase seem to break away from this widespread trend which overlooks the political dimension of the problem. But only partially, because, albeit implicitly, their analyses end up by accepting the argument that violence is the root cause of war, and they never question the watchword of unilateral disarmament. Indeed, anybody who believes that an act of goodwill is possible by a nuclear power in an international context in which rigid adherence to the balance of power entails the logic of power relationships between states, falls back into the voluntaristic utopia that has historically proved incapable of halting the arms race. This is witnessed by the failure of the first pacifist battles, which attempted to check the outbreak of the First and Second World Wars and the nuclear proliferation of recent years.

Nastase approaches the problem of contrasting — in the sense used by Lord Lothian — a positive definition of peace with the negative one prevalent today. This is the unrenounceable starting point for giving life to a peace culture, i.e. a full-blooded cultural revolution based on the new state of affairs now facing humanity: peace is the crucial value in the current historical age. Which is why, « Just as Bronze-or-Iron-Age culture has periods in which man was described as *homo faber*, so the culture of peace should be concerned with the creation of a new human type, conscious of his powers, but at the same time aware of the danger his force engenders; acknowledging the fundamental significance that peace has for mankind in this period, the new type of man should be able to be described as *homo pacis* »

(p. 395). In this sense, peace culture is defined as a doctrine which has not remained abstract, but which is orientated towards action: the problem is to set off a gradual « process of organising the multi-value international interdependences as well as resolving any disputes which appear, by means that exclude the use of force and that emphasize the finding of adequate forms of co-operation ('positive peace') » (p. 395). This process can aim at strengthening existing international bodies, such as the UN: a peaceful resolution of conflicts between states can be achieved by their arbitration. Nastase's analysis practically stops at this point, leaving many questions unanswered. In particular, it is difficult to understand if he intends to allude to forms of co-operation between sovereign states, without envisaging an end to absolute sovereignty, even in the very long term; nor is it clear if he is reasoning, albeit inexplicitly, in terms of the progressive unification of all men in a world government. In the first instance, it is not clear whether he can think of banishing war without eliminating the primary cause, i.e. the division of mankind. If on the other hand, he is thinking of the ultimate objective of a world federation, it is difficult to understand for what reason the battle for the growth of great continental federations (Europe, Africa, Latin America etc.) is not indicated as possible concrete action today. Such action would represent both a break with the current rigid bipolar system and a concrete example of ending the nation-state principle. Indeed, the second part of his article, contradicting the initial analysis, which stressed the political dimension of problems and the role of logic in relationships between states in the arms race, goes no further than indicating that teachers should prepare the young for "moral disarmament" (this expression was coined in the thirties by a Rumanian diplomat, N. Titulescu, who in a very generic way defined it as « The revising of school textbooks, in order to develop in young people the spirit of international solidarity », p. 398).

For his part Galtung introduces the problem of security: peace cannot be reasoned about without recalling that the peaceful development of human activity presupposes that there are political and institutional guarantees. Hence citizens can derive the certainty that they will never have to endure outside aggression. However, the current means of defence of states has a dual nature: they are instruments of defence for the state which possesses them and at the same time potentially a means of aggression vis-à-vis other states. Far from increasing security, the arms race progressively erodes it because it is an objective factor in international tension. We need to think of a defence

system based on « a good defensive defence capability (both in the conventional military, the para-military and the non-military-non-violent sense) and a high level of invulnerability » (p. 285). Non-aggressive defence is territorial defence and invulnerability is guaranteed by « a higher level of local self-reliance and autonomy, so that a country cannot be immobilized simply through cutting off from the outside supply of such essentials as food, medicaments, energy and means of defence » (p. 285).

Invulnerability is a crucial concept, then, in Galtung's thesis which goes so far as to state that « The key to national invulnerability is local-level invulnerability » (p. 281). Nevertheless, this is precisely the most problematic point in his analysis. It is not clear, in particular, what is meant by « self-reliance » and local-level « autonomy ». In some places it would seem he is referring to complete economic self-sufficiency, to be associated with sovereign control of the defence system. This would mean an end to national states, deprived of two crucial powers such as defence and economy. But Galtung does not seem to question the existence of a national level of government. He does not even refer to a federal system, the only state form that guarantees local communities (respecting « unity in diversity ») the autonomy which is denied by today's centralized nation states and which should not be confused with the autarky evoked by Galtung's thesis.

It is moreover, hard to believe he does not realise that material self-sufficiency of a local community is unthinkable in a world like ours in which interdependence of human activity is so marked as to make world unification conceivable at least as a prospect.

Finally, he seems to base himself on a conviction that local communities are peaceful by definition whereas they are so today only because they are part of a state which has taken upon itself a monopoly of physical force and has taken on the task of imposing recourse to the right to solve internal controversies. What matters is not the size of the entity in which men are divided, but the fact that they are divided politically.

Galtung is forced to resort to this ambiguous idea of invulnerability — apparently so formulated as to be based on the attribution of sovereignty to the local level — because he thinks of the state in purely national terms. From this point of view, in fact, it is impossible to reconcile the need for security and democracy of local communities with the need to encourage world interdependence of human activity. Moreover, one ends up by conceiving that bellicosity is ingrained in the very essence of the state. Since local communities are not by definition pea-

ceful, so the state is belligerent only when construed of as a sovereign entity in a world of sovereign entities, where the law of the strongest is imposed at an international level and centralisation and militarism are imposed within each of the individual states.

The watchwords of territorial defence and unilateral disarmament are unrealistic until they are associated with action to modify the current power system in the world.

Marita Rampazi

Federalism in the History of Thought

LIONEL ROBBINS

On the occasion of the death of Lionel Robbins (on May 15th, 1984; Robbins was born in 1898) The Federalist wishes to recall the significance of his work as an economist and as a federalist. In both respects, his work has been singularly underestimated by the academic world and indeed by the world of culture in general.

Although he was fifteen years his younger, Robbins' career was interwoven with Keynes'. During the years of the Great Depression it was inevitable that the divergent points of view of two great economists would clash. Current opinion on this divergence over doctrine and politics is summary and incorrect. Nobody questions the fact that Keynes' opinions proved adequate to the situation. The consequence of this is that Robbins came to be considered a great interpreter and continuer of classical liberal tradition but not a theoretical innovator.

This is not how matters stand in actual fact. Robbins' and Keynes' differences concern two main questions: (a) public policies needed to cope with the economic crisis and reduce unemployment; (b) the nature of the international system capable of guaranteeing the world economy a high and balanced development. Now, while as regards the first question Robbins recognized very honestly on a number of occasions that he had been wrong in opposing Keynes' measures, he did not change his opinion as regards the second.¹ Yet it is precisely his reflections

¹ On these matters see L. ROBBINS in his *Autobiography of an Economist*, Macmillan, London, 1971. RICHARD F. KAHN (in *The Making of Keynes'*

on the international economic order which are systematically ignored by almost all academic economists who are prisoners, as was Keynes, of the myth that an international economic order, and consequently growth and welfare, is possible in a world of sovereign states.

*Keynes' intellectual evolution is highly significant in this respect. In 1919 he very courageously resigned his position as the British Government's representative at the Paris Peace Conference to show his complete disagreement with the insipid position taken by the Great Powers whose victory was used to humiliate Germany with incredible claims for «reparations». Thus, a post-war European system grew up, which, from the outset, was infected by the 'germs' of revenge, as Keynes correctly pointed out in *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. But Keynes' proposed remedies were the typical ineffective remedies of liberal internationalism, namely an appeal to democratic governments' good will, in particular the United States', and never questioned a reconstruction of Europe based on the principle of absolute sovereignty of national states. The very most Keynes proposed — and even then only for reasons of economic expediency — was the creation of a Free Trade Union among European countries, that he hoped the United Kingdom would join. The facts disproved this excessively simplistic vision of international policy and in the thirties, faced with the growing threat of Fascism and Nazism, Keynes abandoned his faith in international liberalism and even went so far as to embrace the doctrine of protectionism and autarky. «The age of economic internationalism,» he wrote in 1933, «was not particularly successful in avoiding war; and if its friends retort that the imperfection of its success never gave it a fair chance, it is reasonable to point out that a greater success is scarcely probable in the coming years». Therefore, Keynes declared: «I sympathise with those who would minimise, rather than with those who would maximise, economic entanglement between nations».²*

These political leanings are important if we are to properly understand the economic policy proposals that Keynes was dev-

General Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, p. 184) recalls that in a speech to the House of Lords on July 28th 1966, Robbins stated: «In the inter-war period when mass unemployment actually prevailed, I was on the wrong side: I opposed measures of reflation which I now think might have eased the situation».

² J.M. KEYNES, *National Self-Sufficiency*, in *The New Statesman and Nation*, July 8th and 15th 1933. Now in *The Collected Writing of J.M. Keynes*, vol. XXI, *Activities 1931-1939*, Macmillan, 1982, pp. 236-7.

eloping in those years and which are the backbone of the General Theory. Keynes' unemployment policies were designed for a closed political system within national boundaries and a world with little, indeed very little, trading between nations. This is certainly an anti-historic vision of the evolution of international relationships but it faithfully reproduces the United Kingdom's position in those years, namely a colonial power in decline, no longer able to carry out an active role in world politics. From this limited perspective in fact, Keynes was able to free himself only partly, when under United States' pressure, he became concerned with the postwar re-organization of the international economy.

Robbins' reply to the crisis in the European and World political order was very different. The Great Depression, Robbins believed, was not caused by the mistakes of this or that government, but by the inability of each of them to keep control of a state of affairs which really called for a supranational body empowered to organize the market on a world scale. These reflections led Robbins to re-examine the very bases of international economic theory and to rediscover the forgotten truths that inspired the authors of the first federal constitution in history. His contribution, as he wrote with a touch of pride in his Autobiography, consisted in extending the principles of the Federalist from the specific American case to the « international anarchy of the twentieth century ».³

This updating made a considerable yet almost completely overlooked contribution to economic theory itself. During the thirties a great debate grew up around the meaning of a planned economy and its relationships with the market. The general tendency was (and still is) to contrast plan and market. But in Economic Planning and International Order (1937), Robbins introduced a completely new, yet decisive consideration as regards the understanding of international problems. « The issue, Robbins claimed, is not between a plan and no plan, but between different kinds of plans ». More correctly we need to speak of the existence of a liberal plan, as we speak of a socialist or a national plan. « 'Planning', in the modern jargon, involves governmental control of production in some form or other. It was the aim of the liberal plan to create a framework within which private plans might be harmonised. It is the aim of modern 'planning' to

³ L. ROBBINS, *Autobiography of an Economist*, cit., p. 160.

supersede private plans by public — or at any rate to relegate them to a very subordinate position ».⁴

Robbins was thus able to speak out against this weakness in the liberal (and socialist) position at an international level. Classical economists had supported the need to introduce a series of institutions, such as money, currency and property controls and so on, in order to allow the market to work: the invisible hand is in truth, wrote Robbins, the legislator's hand. But while classical economists believed that these government measures were necessary within the state, they ingenuously believed — in a situation characterized by political anarchy — that a well-ordered and properly-functioning international market might be created spontaneously. It follows that at the international level, where there is no government, liberalism (like socialism) has never existed.

This is a crucial observation for the understanding of contemporary problems and the difficulties encountered by traditional political thinking when trying to face up to them. For this reason, it is worth quoting in full a comment that Mario Albertini made regarding Robbins' contribution. « In the discussion on the crisis in ideologies (now hitting Marxism also) a very pertinent observation made by Lionel Robbins — says Albertini — has never been taken into proper consideration. As regards liberalism, he states that "international liberalism is not a plan which has been tried and failed. It is a plan which has never been carried through — a revolution crushed by reaction ere it had time to be fully tested": and he extends (virtually) this observation to socialism. The adjustment thereby made to the framework of discussion is obvious. If this is the case, the worst evils in our century in international, national and social policy must obviously be ascribed to what is not yet liberal and/or socialist, and not to liberalism and socialism as such, which, because they are not fully developed, have not had a chance to prove their full validity (they should appropriately be re-assessed only if it were possible to show that their complete development is impossible).

« Robbins's reasoning is unassailable. In a nutshell and put in another form, it can be expressed as follows. He notices that with the current international system, based on the absolute and exclusive sovereignty of national states, any economic plan (in the sense that he ascribes to the term i.e. including a liberal plan)

⁴ L. ROBBINS, *Economic Planning and International Order*, Macmillan, London, 1937, pp. 6-7.

can only be national; and then he shows easily how these plans cannot fail to contain very strong elements of protectionism and corporativism because national governments (i.e. the centres of decision that formulate such plans and handle them) are supported by a balance of power that includes all protectionist and corporativist interests and excludes an increasing portion of the liberal and socialist ones (those which have their seat in the framework of the nation but which can be enforced only internationally because their scale of realization is international). The ultimate reason for this lies in the fact that, while the lot of the protectionist and corporativist interests depends exclusively on the respective national governments, that of the liberal and socialist interests in question depends on the contrary on the behaviour of many governments (at the limit, of all of them) and not only on that of one's own, i.e. on a power situation escaping electoral control of the citizens. This is why a national vote is effective in the former case, ineffective in the latter. In fact only in the former case do favourable or unfavourable governmental decisions appear altogether as gains and losses of votes and support for the party (or parties) in power. It follows that liberalism and socialism can only develop fully with an international (world) plan, and that an international plan can be implemented only by a world government.»⁵

If these observations are correct, the contemporary world cannot renew itself or resolve its dramatic problems without adding Robbins' essential contribution to Keynes' thinking. It is certainly no mere chance that the current economic debate takes note, on the one hand, of the crisis in Keynesian policies, which, on a national scale, can no longer stand up to the waves of inflation and depression coming from every corner of the globe, and, on the other hand, the urgent need for a new international order based on justice, peace and equality among all peoples. The old world based on closed national states is on its death bed and a new world cannot be created on the basis of a thinking which ignores the vital need for international economic development. The lack of awareness of Robbins' contribution causes our inability to plan the indispensable reforms needed for a rational government of the world economy: the alternative to economic disorder and depression is a world development plan.

After having spoken of Robbins' greatness, it is not, however, possible to overlook his limits as regards his commitment to

⁵ M. ALBERTINI, « War Culture and Peace Culture » in *The Federalist*, Year XXVI, no. 1, July 1984, pp. 26-27.

federalism. His admirable intellectual coherence was not matched by an equal commitment to pursuing the political project for a European Federation, as the first step to overcoming international anarchy. He conceived of the federal solution to international problems as a technical expedient to make liberalism achievable and he never ceased to be a liberal above all else. Thus, when Hitler's threat dissipated and Western Europe began its reconstruction, with the help of the USA, he felt the commitment to the construction of a European Federation as a less urgent priority. Only later did he return to his old prewar theses.⁶ Nevertheless, his contribution to the history of federalism must be considered

⁶ In a preface, written in 1968, to a reprint of *The Economic Causes of War* (1939), Robbins himself declared his attitude vis-à-vis the question of European unification. « The essay here reproduced — says Robbins — ends with a section written in the first weeks of war, pleading passionately for the creation of a United States of Europe within which German creativeness and energy might serve the common weal rather than periodically disrupting it. It also contains a foot note referring to plans for a wider Atlantic Union put forward by Mr. Clarence Streit and others, in which I express cordial appreciation of the idea but considerable scepticism concerning its practicability. At that time, I did not conceive the possibility of an isolationist United States allowing itself once more to be involved in the internecine quarrels of Europe.

A great deal has happened since then. Japanese and Nazi aggression destroyed isolationism during the war, and since then, fortunately for the rest of us, the hostility of the Soviet Union and later of China — whether based on fear or on expansionist ambition we need not enquire — has prevented any serious recrudescence thereof. With its massive armaments and its incomparable economic power, the United States is today the active leader and defender of the civilisation of the West.

Such gigantic changes of circumstance could not but affect the perspective of thought regarding the possibilities of the future. In the years immediately following the end of the war, despairing of the stability and political reliability of some of the states of Western Europe and revolted by the anti-Americanism current among influential continental politicians and thinkers whose very existence had been saved by American intervention, I abandoned my earlier position and argued against British entry into a purely European Union, setting my hopes on a larger structure developing gradually from the North Atlantic Alliance. In this I now think I was wrong, not in my conviction of the fundamental necessity of preserving the link with the United States and Canada, but in my failure to realise the potentialities both of the creation, in these circumstances, of a United Western Europe and of the part which could be played in it by Great Britain. I underestimated the inability of those responsible for British policy to see where their true interest lay — in a vigorous development of something like Atlantic Union — and I failed to foresee the colossal folly of the Suez episode which deprived us of our standing as a first-class power with freedom to take influential initiatives. At the present time, therefore, I once more support an approach to the more limited union with Western Europe. So I am back in a frame of mind in which the peroration of this essay is not something which I wish to repudiate ».

of fundamental importance, as the authors⁷ of the Manifesto di Ventotene explicitly recognise and as is also apparent from subsequent outcomes in federalist thinking which do not tire of recalling Robbins' decisive teachings on the meaning and limits of liberal and socialist internationalism.

* * *

I. International liberalism *

[...] As consumer the citizen buys in the cheapest market. As producer he sells in the dearest. In this way the maximum division of labour which is compatible with given tastes and given technique is continuously enforced. In this way the inhabitants of the most diverse parts, as producers, whatever the width of the jurisdiction of the government under which they happen to reside, co-operate in an organization which is tending continually to make their range of effective choice, as consumers, as wide as is compatible with an absence of arbitrary curtailment in their favour of the range of choice of their fellows.

But is this not the very negation of planning — a « planless economy », an « individualistic chaos »?

This view is widely prevalent nowadays. And, of course, if the term planning is *by definition* to be restricted to the operations of a centralized control, then the institutions of international liberalism are indeed excluded. The principle of international liberalism is decentralization and control by the market. If we say that the term plan must not be applied to an organization in which free initiative is guided to the service of free choice by

⁷ Spinelli in his memories (A. SPINELLI, *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio. Io, Ulisse*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1984, pp. 307-8) writes: « Requested by Rossi, who as Professor of economics was authorized to write to him, Einaudi sent him two or three books on English federalist literature which had flourished towards the end of the thirties as a result of Lord Lothian's influence. Apart from Lionel Robbins' book *The Economic Causes of War*, which I subsequently translated and which was published by Einaudi, I cannot recall the titles or authors of others. But their analysis of the political and economic perversion that nationalism leads to, and their reasoned presentation of the federal alternative have remained to this day impressed on my memory as a revelation.

Since I was trying to obtain clarity and precision in thinking, my attention was not drawn by the foggy and contorted ideological federalism of a Proudhon or a Mazzini, but by the clean, precise thinking of these English federalists, in whose writings I found a fairly good method for analysing the chaotic state of affairs into which Europe was plunging and for drawing up alternatives ».

* Excerpted from *Economic Planning and International Order*, cit., Ch. IX, p. 223-233 and pp. 238-246.

an impersonal mechanism, then we have settled a point of terminology. But we have not judged the significance of the organization.

But the terminology is surely unfortunate. The essence of a plan is that it is an attempt to shape means to ends. In a world of change the essence of a successful plan of productive organization is that it should bring about continual adaptation to changing technical conditions and changing demands of consumers. Now the various plans which we have examined hitherto do not do this. They involve a paralysis of the mechanism of adaptation: they tend to make the plan the end and the frustration of the consumers the means. They involve a tendency to a curtailment of productivity in a world which is certainly not overburdened with plenty. Surely it is wise to attempt to avoid this kind of plan, to attempt to erect a world order which is capable of adaptation and which provides incentives to adaptation. It is this which is the object of international liberalism. It is an institutional pattern especially designed to meet the difficulties of economic organization on an international scale. If planning is an attempt to create institutions conducive to the satisfaction of the citizens, then international liberalism is a plan.

It is a plan, too, in the sense that it is to be the creation of government.

It is often held that liberalism denies all functions to government. The naïve belief that unguided self-interest is necessarily conducive to public benefit is thought to be the foundation of the liberal social philosophy: and a system which is held to rest upon such a superstition is, not unnaturally, condemned without examination.

For this belief the liberals of the past are not altogether blameless. It is, of course, a grotesque libel to suggest that men such as Hume, Adam Smith or Bentham regarded government as superfluous.⁸ To attribute to the great utilitarian philosophers the

⁸ Mr. Keynes' celebrated pamphlet *The End of Laissez-Faire* has been regarded, both by its author and by the general public, as a great advance on the classical economists: indeed a final (or ought we to say *penultimate*?) emancipation from the tyranny of their ideas. The full extent of our debt to Mr. Keynes is perhaps best to be estimated by a textual comparison of his own description of the *agenda* of the state and that of Adam Smith which was the basis of the classical outlook.

Let us put enlightenment first. « The most important *agenda* of the State relate not to those activities which private individuals are already fulfilling, but to those functions which fall outside the sphere of the individual, to those decisions which are made by *no one* if the state does not make them. The important thing for government to do is not to do

jejune presuppositions of an anarchistic philosophy of society can only be regarded as propagandist rhetoric. But it may be true that, in their preoccupation with the discovery of the laws of the market, they were apt sometimes to take the market itself for granted. It may be true too that, in their zeal to expose the results of interference with the disposal of property, they may have laid insufficient emphasis upon the framework of law and order which made the institution of property possible. In this way they, and still more the politicians who simplified their analysis for popular consumption, laid themselves open to misunderstanding and misrepresentation.

But, notwithstanding all that has been said to the contrary, it is a gross misconception to suppose that government and governmental bodies do not play a most important and indispensable rôle in the liberal plan of co-operation. To emphasize this is not to claim any additional virtue for the plan. In spite of certain contemporary habits of speech, there is no intrinsic virtue either in government or the absence of government: the utilitarian calculus weighs governmental and nongovernmental actions indifferently. It is only to draw attention to an aspect of the plan, failure to understand which may lead to total misconception of the whole system. The characteristic institutions of a liberal society are inconceivable without government.

It should be obvious that they are inconceivable without security. If there is no authority armed with coercive power, the plans of the different citizens must be to some extent self-frustrating. They must provide for an apparatus of defence. This is necessarily wasteful; and it is often itself provocative. They must be short-run plans: it is not worth while planning for a long run of great uncertainty. Even so they are liable to continual disturbance. There can be no world-wide division of labour, no extensive accumulation, no elaborate organization of production

things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse: but to do those things which at present are not done at all» (KEYNES, *The End of Laissez-Faire*, pp. 46-47).

And now for the classical night. «The sovereign has ... thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions which it never can be for the interest of any individual or small group of individuals, to erect and maintain: because the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society» (ADAM SMITH, *The Wealth of Nations* (Cannan's Edition), vol. ii, pp. 184-185).

From what a quagmire have we been delivered.

if arbitrary force is not restrained by force which is stronger but which is not arbitrary.

But this is not enough. The mere absence of violence is not a sufficient condition for the efficient working of free enterprise. For co-operation to be effective it must be restrained within suitable limits by a framework of institutions. Neither property nor contract are in any sense natural. They are essentially the creation of law; and they are not simple creations. For purposes of exposition, we may sometimes speak as if property rights and the system of contract were homogeneous and simple. But if we allow ourselves to be led into supposing that this is anything but the crudest of simplifications we fall into gross error. The system of legal rights in any existing society is a matter of the utmost complexity, the actual result of centuries of legislation and judicial decision. To determine wherein these rights are to consist if they are to be conducive to the satisfaction of the public choice, to delimit their scope and their content, is a task of the utmost difficulty. In what objects are property rights to be recognized? Are they to cover ideas and inventions? Or are they to be limited to scarce material resources and their utilization? If so, what type of utilization? May a man use his property in ways which mean damage to others? If not, how is damage to be defined? Are contracts to restrict trade permissible? If so, in what circumstances? If not, what is the definition of restriction? It is in the solution of questions of this sort that the task of legal planning consists. It is in the reference of particular cases to such a system of norms that the plans thus made are continually translated into practice. The system of rights and duties of the ideal liberal society may be thought to be a good plan or it may be thought to be a bad plan. But to describe it as no plan is not to understand it at all. The idea of a co-ordination of human activities by means of a system of impersonal rules, within which what spontaneous relations arise are conducive to mutual benefit, is a conception, at least as subtle, at least as ambitious, as the conception of prescribing positively each action or each type of action by a central planning authority: and it is perhaps not less in harmony with the requirements of a spiritually sound society. We may blame the enthusiasts who, in their interest in what happens in the market, have paid too little attention to its necessary framework. But what shall we say of those who argue perpetually as if this framework did not exist?

But this is not all. The provision of security and a suitable legal system is a function more important and more complex than is often suspected. But it does not exhaust the province of

government. The market apparatus has its limits: and outside these limits arise certain generally acknowledged wants which, if they are not satisfied by governmental action, will either not be satisfied at all or, at best, will be satisfied very inadequately.

It is not possible or desirable exhaustively to enumerate such cases. But it is not difficult to describe their general nature. On the one hand, there exist wants which must be satisfied collectively or not satisfied at all. Of this class provision against infectious diseases is a conspicuous instance. It is comparatively useless for the individual to make private provision here. He may be willing to pay all that is technically necessary. But unless all others are doing likewise his expenditure may be ineffective. On the other hand, there arise wants which can be formulated individually, but for whose supply spontaneous contracts between private property owners is not effective. Of this class the demand for certain means of communication is typical. It is possible for individuals to offer money for means of access to different places. But, in many cases, in the absence of government action in some shape or form the supply will not be forthcoming. It is not inconceivable that an extensive road system should be satisfactorily created by private enterprise. But it is not probable: and, if it is not, then there may be need for another kind of plan.

This necessity has long been recognized. Adam Smith made in the third of his list of duties of the sovereign « to erect and maintain certain public works and certain public institutions which it can never be to the interest of any individual or small group of individuals to maintain ». But in recent years it has become more important. The development of technique has brought it about that many services of obvious utility are best rendered by methods which involve the use of a network of long strips of land difficult to establish save by compulsory acquisition — rail transport and canals, drainage, water supply, electricity, telegraphic and telephonic communication, and so on. It is not certain that the supply of these services is best organized on the basis of governmental or quasi-governmental monopoly. Current discussion of the matter is usually interested or superficial: the task of independent scrutiny of the most suitable institutions here has scarcely yet begun. But it is certain that in some form or other, governmental action is necessary. It is certain, too, that the field of such necessary action is extensive.

If this reasoning is correct, it is therefore wrong to regard the proposals of international liberalism as involving no plan. On the contrary, they constitute the one plan we have so far

examined which does not at once display conspicuous internal weakness when conceived on a world scale.

It would be equally wrong to regard them as a plan which has ever yet been realized. Much of the order which exists even at the present owes its origin to private enterprise and the market. If there were no markets and no private enterprise our position would be even worse than it is. It is indeed one of the strongest recommendations of liberal institutions that their vitality as organizing influences is displayed even on the smallest scale and in the most adverse circumstances. But, as our earlier investigations have shown, the world today is not predominantly liberal. It is nationalist and interventionist; and the continual succession of political and economic catastrophes which this involves gives what market mechanism exists a task which no mechanism can perform. It is not liberal institutions but the absence of such institutions which is responsible for the chaos of today.

Indeed, if we preserve a sense of perspective, the conspicuous fact that emerges from any historical survey is radically different from what the reactionaries — both fascist and communist — endeavour to make us believe. International liberalism is not a plan that has been tried and failed. It is a plan that has never yet had a full chance.

[...] International liberalism is not a plan which has been tried and failed. It is a plan which has never been carried through — a revolution crushed by reaction ere it had time to be fully tested.

We can see this all the more vividly if we try to sketch out for ourselves some of the changes which are necessary to make international liberalism a reality. To imagine that, in the present state of opinion, these changes will come about may be as absurd as to imagine the establishment of an Oceania or a Utopia. But it is always useful to know the significance of different directions of movement. And if we have found that other plans lead to institutions which seem to be ultimately unworkable, it is, at least, interesting to know whether this plan would be doomed to frustration for similar reasons.

We do not have to look far before coming to the main requirement. According to the outline of the functions of government which we have already made, the first essential is security. There cannot be an orderly international division of labour, there cannot exist the complicated network of financial and economic relations essential to the proper development of the earth's resources, if the citizens are continually in danger of

violence. In the present state of technique as regards communications and production, this is more important than it ever has been. Without order, no economy: without peace, no welfare.

But it is in just this most elementary requirement of a comprehensive international plan that our present organization is most conspicuously lacking. There is world economy. But there is no world polity. The different national states each arm against the other. Between their members there is not the ordered freedom of the liberal state but the brutish anarchy of the state of nature. The opportunities of division of labour make us members one of another. But for lack of proper governmental machinery we make war or prepare for war continually. We should regard it as absurd if the inhabitants of the county of London maintained armed forces for defence against the inhabitants of the surrounding counties and the inhabitants of surrounding counties maintained armed forces against them. We should regard it as childish, atavistic, wasteful, if not actually productive of chaos. Yet, because of the division of the world into national units, similar arrangements between areas, equally interdependent and equally indistinguishable by any criteria other than the arbitrary heritage of past governmental arrangements, are not merely taken for granted as inevitable but even regarded as contributing to the general good. These are no doubt matters of ultimate valuation. Whether it is a good thing or a bad thing to kill without judicial process is a question which, even at the present day, is often decided differently according to the nationality of the victims. But this thing is certain. The nationalistic anarchy is wasteful. Whatever value we may put on the military virtues as such, there can be no doubt that, at the present time, the existence of this apparatus for eliciting such virtues is more costly, in terms of the other things we have to sacrifice, than any other luxury the human race affords. How much misery might have been avoided, how much poverty prevented, had the accident of history not divided the seat of sovereignty.

It is just here that we can perceive one of the main deficiencies of nineteenth-century liberalism. It was the great achievement of the men of those days to have realized the harmony of interest of the inhabitants of different national areas. But they did not sufficiently realize that the achievement of this harmony was only possible within a framework of international security. They thought that if they demonstrated the wastefulness and futility of economic and political warfare it was enough. If each national

state were limited to the performance of the functions proper to a liberal government there would be no occasion for international conflict. There would be no need for a super-national authority.

But this was a grave error. The harmony of interests which they perceived to be established by the institutions of property and the market necessitated, as they had demonstrated, an apparatus for maintaining law and order. But whereas *within* national areas such an apparatus, however imperfect, existed, *between* national areas there was no apparatus at all. Within the national areas they relied upon the coercive power of the state to provide the restraints which harmonized the interests of the different individuals. Between the areas they relied only upon demonstration of common interest and the futility of violence: their outlook here, that is to say, was implicitly not liberal but anarchist. But the anarchist position is untenable. It is true that, for the citizen who does not love war as such, abstention from violence is an obvious matter of self-interest. It is true that, in the long run, aggression seldom pays the aggressor, and that even victory is associated with impoverishment. But if we are not content to rely on such arguments for the preservation of order within the nation, we have no reason to believe that such reliance would be effective in preserving international order.

*Es kann der Beste nicht in Frieden leben
Wenn es dem bösen Nachbar nicht gefällt⁹*

The existence of *one* state whose leaders have evil intentions can frustrate the co-operation of a world of peaceful peoples. It is not by the demonstration that burglary and gangsterdom do not pay that we restrain the activities of burglars and gangsters: it is by the maintenance of a mechanism of restraint. And it will not be without a mechanism of restraint that international burglary and gangsterdom are banished from the face of the earth.¹⁰

« A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt that if ... states ... be wholly disunited or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they

⁹ Even the best man cannot live in peace when the wicked neighbour does not agree.

¹⁰ This is a subject Cannan made his own long before it was a matter of popular discussion. See especially his valedictory address to the London School of Economics, « Adam Smith as an Economist »: *An Economist's Protest*, p. 417 *seq.* Also a lecture on « International Anarchy from the Economic Point of View », reprinted in the same place, p. 65 *seq.*

might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To presume a want of motive for such contests as an argument against their existence would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive and rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighbourhood would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages. »¹¹

But how is the apparatus of restraint to be provided?

It is becoming very obvious that mere associations of sovereign states are ineffective. The confederation — the *Staatenbund* — has never been very successful: and in our own day its weaknesses are only too painfully evident. So long as the different states retain their sovereignty, so long can decrees against them be enforced ultimately only by armed alliances of other states. Every word that was written by the founders of the American constitution against the confederal form of government has been vindicated again in our own time by the history of the League of Nations.

« Government », wrote Hamilton, « implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of law that it be attended with a sanction. ... If there be no penalty attached to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force: by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men: the last kind must of necessity be employed against bodies politic or communities or states. It is evident that there is no process of a court by which the observance of the laws can in the last resort be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of their duty: but these sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. ... »

In every political association which is formed upon the principle of uniting in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior ones by the operation of which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common centre. ... »¹²

¹¹ HAMILTON, *The Federalist* (Everyman Edition), p. 20.

¹² *Op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

Only the surrender of sovereignty, of the right to make war, by the national governments can remove the danger.

But a completely unitary world state is neither workable nor desirable. Its unworkability depends essentially upon the extent of the area and the complexity of the language conditions over which it would have jurisdiction. We have seen this difficulty in surveying the possibilities of international communism. It would arise even in a completely liberal system. For a central authority to be responsible for roads and public health both in Austria and Australia would be absurd. Nor could we be sure that such a body would be an efficient safeguard of liberty. Caligula once wished that the whole Roman people could be united in one head so that at a single blow he might have the supreme ecstasy of decapitating it. That great Leviathan, the unitary world state, might present similar temptations to our modern sadists. If independent sovereignty is chaos, the unrestricted unitary state might be death.

There is only one solution to this stupendous problem. The first need of the world is not economic but political revolution. It is not necessary that a world state should have powers unrestricted by constitution. But it is necessary that the national states should surrender certain rights to an international authority. The right of making war and the power to do so must be given up. But they need not give up all their rights of independent government; and the rights of the international authority must also be limited. There must be neither alliance nor complete unification, but Federation; neither *Staatenbund*, nor *Einheitsstaat*, but *Bundesstaat*.

Here we once more see the far-reaching wisdom of the founders of the American constitution. They did not produce a perfect constitution. Perfection of political arrangements is not to be hoped for, is indeed not even conceivable. It is obvious that both in the American Federation which exists and in any world or smaller federation which might be modelled on it, there remain great problems of providing for proper adaptation of the division of federal and state powers and adjusting the areas of regional administration. No sane person will pretend that the American constitution today provides an instrument which is at all perfectly adapted to the necessities of government under present technical conditions. But when all these obvious deficiencies are taken into account, the fact remains that they did construct an instrument which has reconciled the interests of a multitude of people over vast stretches of the earth's surface and has created an area of peace and internal freedom for

economic co-operation which is without precedent in history. They did establish a principle which offers the one hope of escape from the fear of destruction which today overshadows humanity. And when we contrast the peace and the riches of that great Union with the chaos and anarchy of the unhappy nations of Europe we know that this was something worth doing, worth preserving, worth fighting to preserve. We can read Abraham Lincoln's noble dedication of the deeds at Gettysburg and know that his claims were just.

II. *International socialism* *

[...] Let us suppose that the planning authorities have a completely free hand to do what they like with the national resources. Even so, the assumption that they would dispose of these resources in such a way as to promote what, from the international point of view, would be the optimal forms of international co-operation, rests upon very weak foundations.

For the fact is that if production is controlled by extensive quasi-monopolistic units of this kind, the disposition of resources which seems most conducive to the advantage of the members of these units is not necessarily a distribution of resources which is in any sense optimal from the point of view of society as a whole. If a small state sets up trading monopolies in a world of otherwise competitive markets, it is improbable that its operations will very greatly affect the course of the markets in which it deals. If it follows the movements of the markets, it will be conforming to the requirements of the international optimum. The policy which maximizes its takings will contribute also to the maximization of world production, measured in price terms. But if it forms a large element in any of these markets, then contradictions arise. The interests of the group may be opposed to the interests of the rest of the world. The group may gain by restriction, the rest only by plenty. And if this method of organization becomes general, then further disharmonies are probable. The world market is frozen into a series of geographical monopolies: and its nature is completely transformed. There is no longer any reason to believe in the emergence of internationally harmonious arrangements. There is no price which is determinate apart from considerations of strategy. The result of the process of exchange is determined by a sort of political negotiation. There

* Excerpted from *Economic Planning and International Order*, cit., Ch. III, pp. 63-67.

is no presumption at all that it conduces to anything which, from the international point of view, can be called a rational utilisation of resources. For the presumption that regulation of production according to the dictates of the market will be conducive to general harmony, is justified only when the units which deal are relatively small. There is no presumption whatever that the different national states form units which satisfy this criterion.

But, it may be asked, would not the organization of the different national areas on socialistic lines be merely a prelude to their amalgamation into a system of world socialism? Is not this perhaps another of those disagreeable transitions through which it is necessary to pass before reaching more satisfactory arrangements? It is this hope which inspires many socialists who urge local nationalization while still rendering lip-service to the international ideal.

It is not our intention at this stage to investigate the problem whether socialism on completely international lines would be a satisfactory solution of the problem of rational international planning. That will come up for extensive discussion later on. But it is certainly germane to our present enquiry to observe that the organization of the world on national socialist lines is not necessarily a step in that direction. Indeed, it is almost certain to make the achievement of international socialism much more difficult than ever before.

For international socialism, whatever else it is, is essentially a state of affairs in which the resources of the different parts of the world are the property of the world as a whole. It is clearly incompatible with this that the resources in the different national areas should be owned by the national states. But, once the instruments of production have been nationalized, the obstacles to their internationalization are likely to be most formidable. For the value of the instruments of production in the different national areas varies greatly; and the real income per head, calculated on the assumption of collective ownership of these resources, varies greatly also. Some areas, such as Great Britain and the United States, are relatively rich. Others, such as Italy and Japan, are relatively poor. Let us suppose that complete socialization takes place within such areas and that the average incomes thus calculated become actual. Is there any reason to suppose that the citizens of the wealthier areas will be prepared to share the sources of their incomes with the citizens of the poorer? It is surely most improbable. It is difficult enough to get the inhabitants of local government areas where the value of rateable property is high to merge their rights of taxation

with those of the inhabitants of areas where the value of rateable property is low. When it is a matter of pooling the total resources of different national units, the obstacles are likely to be so great as to be totally insurmountable — at any rate by peaceful methods. From the international point of view, national socialism involves the creation of forms of inequality which are likely to be more permanent and more productive of extensive friction than anything which arises in a regime of free enterprise and diffused ownership. There is no vested interest more intractable than the vested interests of national groups.

It is surprising that this has not been more widely recognized. For it has long been generally acknowledged that collective ownership of the instruments of production used in particular industries by the people who happen to work in these industries, is incompatible with the existence of a socialist order of society and is likely to impair its achievement. The incompatibility of socialism and industrial syndicalism is an ancient platitude.¹³ But collective ownership of the instruments of production used in particular areas by the people who happen to live in those areas is on a precisely similar footing. «The mines for the miners» and «Papua for the Papuans» are analytically similar slogans. Industrial syndicalism and national socialism are highly symmetrical concepts. They are each incompatible with the realization of the international socialist ideal.

III. *The United States of Europe* *

If this is so, then the remedy is plain. Independent sovereignty must be limited. As citizens of the various national states, we may hope to diminish the danger of conflict by opposing policies which tend to evoke it. But this is not enough. The apparatus of modern war is so formidable, the cost of its maintenance so onerous, the dangers of actual conflict are so great, that we cannot afford to rely on spontaneous goodwill as our only safeguard against catastrophe. There must be an international framework of law and order, supported by solid sanctions which prevent the emergence of those policies which are eventually responsible for conflict. We do not need a unitary world state; such an organization would be neither practicable nor desirable. But we do need a federal organization; not a mere confederation of sovereign

¹³ Witness the celebrated Fabian gibe, «The sewers for the sewage men?».

* Excerpted from *The Economic Causes of War*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1939, pp. 104-109.

states as was the League of Nations but a genuine federation which takes over from the states of which it is composed, those powers which engender conflict. The founders of the League of Nations were right in that they recognized the need of a super-national authority; their error was that they did not go far enough. They did not realize that the effective functioning of a super-national authority is incompatible with independent national sovereignty. But to-day we know this. The history of the League of Nations is one long demonstration of the truth of the proposition long ago set forth by Hamilton and Madison, that there is no safety in confederations. We know to-day that unless we destroy the sovereign state, the sovereign state will destroy us.¹⁴

Now, of course, it is quite Utopian to hope for the formation in our time of a federation of world dimensions. There is not sufficient feeling of a common citizenship. There is as yet no sufficiently generalized culture. In present conditions, even the electoral problems of such a body would present insurmountable difficulties. The formation of a world system, the political consummation of the unity of the human race, may well be regarded as the divine event towards which all that is good in the heritage of the diverse civilizations of the world, invites us to strive. But, whatever we may hope for in the distant future of the planet, it must be clear that, at the present stage of human development, any attempt at so comprehensive an organization would be necessarily doomed to disaster.

But it is not Utopian to hope for the construction of more limited federations — for the merging of independent sovereignties in areas where there exists the consciousness of a common civilization and a need for greater unity. In particular it is not Utopian to hope for the formation of a structure of this kind in that part of the world now most menaced by the contradictions of its present political organization — among the warring sovereignties of Europe.¹⁵ So far is it from being Utopian that,

¹⁴ For a fuller elaboration of these arguments see my *Economic Planning and International Order*, chaps. ix, x and xi. The general argument of Mr. CLARENCE STREIT'S *Union Now* should also be consulted.

¹⁵ Perhaps a word is necessary here concerning the relation of the suggestion here put forward and that put forward by Mr. C. K. Streit. Mr. Streit's scheme, it will be remembered, is for a union of the Atlantic democracies including the United States and the British Empire. I have no objection to this. If Mr. Streit could induce his fellow-countrymen to come forward with the proposal, I should be delighted to see our government accept it; the larger the federation, the smaller the area of future wars. But I think it very unlikely that this will happen. It does not seem

for those with eyes to see, it is the most urgent practical necessity of the age.

For it is surely plain that the present political organization of Europe has completely outlived its usefulness and is now nothing but a menace to the very existence of the civilization it has helped to bring forth. When the sovereign states of modern Europe emerged from the feudalism of the middle ages, their functions were liberalizing and creative. They eliminated the mass of local restrictions which were strangling economic development. They pacified the warring barons and princes and established uniformity of law over areas given over to particularism. But, at the present time, it is not their unifying, but their separatist tendencies which have become dominant. They restrict the activities of an economic life which, in its spontaneous development, spreads far beyond their borders. They are uneconomic units for the administration of what positive functions they discharge; and the burden of maintaining the apparatus of defence which is necessary to secure their independence, threatens more and more to absorb all the energies of their inhabitants. The existence of restrictions to trade and movement between the different states of Europe to-day is as absurd as the existence of similar restrictions between different provinces at earlier periods. To an intelligent outsider unacquainted with the background of our history, the maintenance of vast armies by the states of Europe for defence against each other must be hardly less ridiculous than would be the maintenance of armies for the separate defence of the towns or departments within these states. The system has reached breaking point; and, with the development of modern military techniques, it has no longer survival value. As gunpowder rendered obsolete the feudal system, so the aeroplane renders obsolete the system of the independent sov-

probable that, in our generation at least, the citizens of the United States will feel that compelling urge to union with other peoples which would alone make it possible. On the other hand, the disunity of Europe is so great and the evils likely to result from its persistence are so frightful, that it seems possible that, out of the extremity of our danger, a movement for unity might arise. After all there is a common European consciousness; and it is surely in the logic of history that sooner or later this should be enshrined in common political institutions. I see no insurmountable difficulty in the relation of the British Dominions to a federal Europe. Either they could enter the federation as full members; or they could retain via the British Crown the same loose relation as exists at present. I see much greater difficulty in the inclusion of Russia. For Russia is not European in spirit; and totalitarian dictatorship is incompatible with the federation of free peoples.

ereignities of Europe. A more comprehensive type of organization is inevitable. Will it come by mutual agreement or by caesarian conquest? That is the unsolved question. For either there must be empire or federation; on a long view, there is no alternative.

But to create such a federation will not be easy. We have a common culture. But we have no common language. We have a common history. But it is riven by fratricidal quarrels. No one who has realized the nature of the interests involved in the perpetuation of the present powers of the independent sovereign states can be blind to the strength of the opposition to any attempt to eliminate our disunity. The federation of the thirteen secession states of the new world was almost wrecked by local particularism, even though they were united by a common tongue, common habits and the memory of recent action against a common enemy. How much harder must it be for the warring states of Europe, with none of these aids to establish a basis of unity. It will not be easy to make the new Europe.

Nevertheless, of all the tasks which present themselves to our generation, it is that which is most worth while attempting. The age in which we live is an age in which men have worshipped many idols and followed many false visions. It has seen nationalism run mad and collectivism turn oppressor. The ideals of the romantic rebellion have proved dead sea fruit in our hands. But the great ideals of liberty, justice and mutual tolerance and the heritage of art and learning which is their spiritual outcome, have not been found wanting. The more they have become endangered, the more important we have discovered them to be. But it is just these things which are in peril from the disunity of Europe. The political structure amid which they have developed has developed stresses and strains which threaten to overwhelm them; if they are to be preserved, a constructive effort is necessary. Not merely because war is terrible, not merely because it impoverishes, but because it threatens all that is most valuable in the cultural heritage of Europe, we must devise institutions which banish it from our midst. It is because the civilization of Socrates and Spinoza, of Shakespeare and Beethoven, of Michelangelo and Rembrandt, of Newton and Pascal, is at stake that we must build a new Europe.

And now that the war has come and our hopes of peaceful developments lie shattered, this necessity is all the greater if the end is not to be chaos. We are fighting Germans. If European civilizations is not to perish, we must destroy the tyranny which rules over them. No one with any sense of history and art will deny the existence of a real German problem in Europe — the

incapacity for self-government, the tendency to brutality and sadism, the fascination with the death motive, the moral clumsiness, the deep sense of spiritual insecurity, which again and again, since the rise of Prussia, have been a menace to the peace and liberties of Europe. But for all that, Germans are Europeans. They are part of our civilization; and Europe can never be completely healthy till Germany is healthy too. Somehow or other we must create a framework in which the German *Geist* can give its best, not its worst, to Europe. A draconian peace will do nothing. The Nazis must be extirpated; but we have neither the strength nor the will to keep Germans in subjection for ever. What more appropriate outcome of our present agonies, therefore, what more fitting consecration of the blood which is being shed, than a peace in which this great people, purged of its devils, shall be coerced into free and equal citizenship of the United States of Europe?

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