

# THE FEDERALIST

a political review

*To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.*

Hamilton, The Federalist



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YEAR XXVIII, 1986, NUMBER 1

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*The Federalist* was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and has been published in English, French and Italian since 1984. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



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## Altiero Spinelli, Hero of Reason

Even in his style of life, inspired by an exemplary simplicity, and a realism which feared no truth, however bitter, Altiero Spinelli incarnated Max Weber's conception of the political hero perfectly. Weber, you may recall, concludes his essay on "Politics as a profession" with these words: "Politics consists in a slow and tenacious surmounting of great difficulties, which must be achieved with passion and discerning at the same time. It is perfectly true as history has borne out time and again that what is possible would never be achieved if someone in the world did not keep on trying to achieve the impossible. But whoever attempts to do so must be a leader, and not only that — in the sober sense of the word, he has to be a hero as well. And whoever is neither, must, from the outset, forge that temper which will stand him in good stead when all hopes collapse, for otherwise he will not even be able to fulfil the little which really can be achieved today. Only the man who is sure he will not fail despite a world too stupid or vulgar (from his point of view) to appreciate what he is offering and who can still stand up and say: 'never mind, let's press on!' has a vocation for politics".

It could not be put better and Altiero Spinelli could not be recalled in any other way. We should merely add that he was a hero of politics because he was a hero of reason. He had come to be recognized throughout Europe as one of the "founding fathers" together with Monnet, De Gasperi, Adenauer and Schuman. As the years pass, and as values are selected and the meaning of historical undertakings comes to be established, he will certainly be recognized as one of the few great political figures of this century. Certainly no-one more than he ever founded his political design more exclusively on reason. It is a fact that, though an Italian, Spinelli did not consider Italy as a reality to be accepted before being submitted to the scrutiny of reason. And it is a fact that, although he was

converted to democracy after his Leninist experience in early youth, he never considered the great ideologies of our political tradition (liberalism, democracy and socialism) as exclusive schemes, nor as a mental boundary within which political thinking should be confined. It is against this background that the meaning of Spinelli's European design emerges clearly. The whole political process, despite the increasingly unitary nature of the historical process, still remains directed towards changes to be made in one's own nation, as if this were sufficient to resolve the great and pressing problems of a continental and world nature: even peace, in this prospect, is seen as an objective which would be pursuable by merely adding up the sum of national policies. Spinelli was on the other side of the fence. Having freed himself of the national and ideological conditioning of the past, and starting from basic principles, he managed to map out supranational constitutional action for the strategic objective of our times in Europe: Unity, or to put it another way, the European Federation. He was thus the first to undertake political action based on the struggle for the creation of new powers rather than on the conquest and use of existing (national) powers. For this is the only way to re-establish the balance between technological capacity and political capacity and move the world down the road to true civilisation: organised peace.

Mario Albertini

## Chernobyl

*After the Chernobyl accident, the world will never be the same as it was before. Historically speaking, Chernobyl goes with Hiroshima, but with an additional feature because it proves that the threat that so far seemed to exist only as a military fact, and more precisely as the possibility of a nuclear war, does in fact affect a sector of social life, and the daily life of every man. Mankind runs frightful dangers, even the extreme danger of his self-destruction, and still does not know what to do to avoid these risks. The absurdity of nuclear war was such to 'authorize' the hope — a vain hope — that the risk was more theoretical than real, but after Chernobyl these hopes no longer have any sense.*

*The extension of the nuclear risk to the normal circumstances of life, due to events that occur in countries other than one's own, is now a proven fact. We now know that the threat does not only come from war, but also from what we call "peaceful uses", which, on close examination, do not exclusively concern the various applications of nuclear technology. In the last instance, the threat lies in the fact that the development of man's technological power (per se unstoppable because it is one of the hallmarks of the human race) has now reached a point where it has already begun to endanger the fundamental equilibria of the biological and physical spheres, and should, therefore, be subject as such, and not just in this or that aspect or in this or that country, to effective political control, obviously on a world level.*

*That mankind has now reached this point was already known. Einstein understood that in the nuclear era there can no longer be any salvation for mankind without a world government, i.e. without a new way of thinking and acting. This was, however,*

*a truth for a few people. With the Chernobyl accident, on the other hand, this truth has become a matter of great import for all, one that will not be forgotten. Potentially, it has become a risk for all mankind. The new way of thinking and acting, now demanded by many, but without instilling it with any recognisable meaning and without envisaging any effectively new form of action, will break through with difficulty in the long run, because historical-social reason proceeds by slow acquisition and not by sudden enlightenment. But its development is certain, because, henceforth, it will be sufficient to mention the world "Chernobyl" to arouse an immediate awareness of the absurdities in the old way of thinking and acting and the current political organization of the human race.*

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*To understand the matter fully, we need to refer to the transformations that the political process will undergo. In this respect, one of the decisive factors is that everybody — everybody involved in some way in the world circuit of information, however minimally — now knows that, without effective controls, the technological evolution threatens their life and in particular that of their children. Moreover, the very facts of daily life will constantly feed this awareness.*

*It is thus reasonable to think that the awareness of the need for these controls — although not necessarily accompanied by sufficient knowledge of the nature of these controls — will increasingly condition the political struggle and the very formation of consensus. In this respect, it may already be observed that while consensus will go on being manipulated in every part of the world, because of the absence or imperfections of democracy, it will never again lend itself to manipulation to the point where the peoples of the world will, without reserve, trust powers that do not face up to and resolve this fundamental problem for the destiny of mankind.*

*Furthermore, the old powers (i.e. the concrete expression of the old way of thinking and acting), not being able to defend themselves with the resources of knowledge and truth, will defend themselves, as they have already begun to do, with the most ancient means of *raison d'état*: silence, *arcana imperii* and *simulacra libertatis* (the iura inana that "compensate citizens for what is taken away from them in terms of rights and liberty by the ghosts of rights and liberty").*

*A struggle between *raison d'état* (nested in the absolute sovereignty of states and their subordination to the logic of power*

*in international relationships) and the very 'reason' of mankind (practical reason assisted by scientific reason) begins to take shape: a struggle that, although very difficult to resolve because it requires all mankind to recognize itself in active political thinking (a new ideology), can nevertheless be won because it will not cease to exist while there is a gap between the awareness of the need to control technological development and the fact that no such control exists. And it is human to hope that reason will not fail to achieve its task, which is substantially to become master of itself and its works.*

*The vital premise by which to achieve this task lies in taking on the task as a personal one, i.e. in an act of will. This premise goes for knowledge as well. What must be remembered is that if this will is missing, the result is that even the perception of the real terms of the problem ends up by being clouded. We become convinced that it is an illusion, and with this comes the presumption of reading the future of this particular matter and knowing for certain what is possible and what is impossible. Against this presumption it should be simply observed that practical reason need not necessarily be subservient to anything that already exists, and that theoretical reason is not obliged to consider any situation that exists (for example presumed impossibility) as being natural a priori, and even less as eternal, merely because it exists.*

\* \* \*

*The need to think the new, and the widespread incapacity of thinking about it seriously — i.e. the unconscious relapse into thinking about the old — act in such a way that recourse is still made to the idea of international agreements and regulations as a means by which to solve the problem of controlling the technological process. In the debate that developed after the Chernobyl accident, nobody went further, not even those who, evidently realizing the limits of the international agreements, called for "supranational" institutions. The fact is that this vague concept, which has not been defined even on this occasion, provides no real objective for political action, and therefore causes us to relapse into the routine of the past, which all those who exclude the need to transform the political setting of the world naturally conform to. We are thus still very far from the awareness of the fact that, to guide the transition from the current situation (absence of effective controls) to a new situation (effective controls), we need to know not only the point of departure,*

but the point of arrival, too. Only in this way will the first steps, however small they may be, really be steps in the right direction.

Confirming the sterility of the debate that has developed so far is the fact that, with rare exceptions, no mention has ever been made of the idea of a world government, not even when approaching the problem theoretically. Yet the need for a world government is evident. A small mental experiment is all that is needed to convince oneself of this. If we suppose, for example, that the "Chernobyl accident" had occurred in a political framework in which a world government already existed, whose tasks included controlling the technological process (even to ensure peace, etc.), we can immediately see that any opportune decision would have been possible, including, if need be, the decision to halt all the nuclear power stations existing in the world and to stop building any new ones. This would require measures in the energy sector and some form of compensation for the countries most affected economically by a measure of this kind. But for a world government this would not be a great difficulty.

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It goes without saying that, with the current international system, apart from being impossible (which means will is paralyzed), all this is not even conceivable (which means thinking is paralyzed). To control the technological process we need to: a) take world political decisions that are binding on all countries — with the current international system, however, only compromises between preconceived points of view are possible, because, in this system, the process of forming will (and knowledge of the facts in question) is restricted to the national level; b) take decisions on the development of mankind's technological power, i.e. vis-à-vis facts in constant evolution, while an international conference can only examine relatively static questions which can be identified in advance and which are well-defined; c) take world level decisions that, even when concerning individual cases, immediately involve the development, the security and balance of power in every country, i.e. situations which, with the current international system, can only be controlled by the states individually as holders of the faculty to decide in the last instance (absolute sovereignty, confederal limits to co-operation between the states).

The idea of controlling the technological process with international agreements is thus a pure and simple illusion. Having said this, it should also be observed that the greatest difficulty, as regards the acquisition of adequate knowledge of the problem, lies elsewhere. What I said about the relationship between

decisions and mechanisms for taking them is present in the mind of many, but is relegated to the depths of the semiconscious, or even removed, because we have no idea of how a world government can be reached. This is the real problem which needs to be cleared up and, here too, a premise is in order which is that what does not exist as a scheme in our mind cannot exist as a fact in our knowledge. Kant said that "reason only perceives what reason itself produces according to its design".

This criterion obviously applies to our case, too. Indeed, we realize immediately that whoever uses federalism as a scheme can identify the current regional integrations (the most advanced of which is taking place in Europe) with historical processes destined to lead Europe, Africa, Latin America etc. to the same political level already reached by the USA, the USSR, China, India, etc. (states of great dimensions with articulated sovereignty). In this light, a world government, founded on a few great continental pillars, is perfectly conceivable. Equally true is the fact that whoever for various reasons uses the traditional conception of state and nation coinciding — because, for example, he believes that this type of political community cannot be replaced, or maybe because he may not have thought about the historical problem of the evolution of states' sizes — is naturally led to thinking that a world government is inconceivable both because of the presumed impossibility of transferring a part of the sovereignty of these states to a world government and, in any case, because of the great number of states, which would seem to be incompatible with a common government.

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This analysis needs to be checked on one important point. The point is this: if the distinction between the federal system (which aims at world government) and the international system is interpreted in a mechanical way, only two situations are conceivable: one in which the support of power needed to take major world decisions exists and the other where this power support does not exist and where such decisions are thus impossible.

The consequences of this mechanical interpretation (whose error lies in taking a typology for reality) are serious. It is evident, firstly, that with this interpretation, on the theoretical level, the question of transition disappears (there would be no transition, but a jump); and, on the practical level, no consideration is given to the fact that the process of regional unification — which at a certain stage in its development will have to involve the reform

*and strengthening of the UN — must be considered as one of the episodes in the process of world unification. Equally clearly, ignoring the problem of the transition will fudge the prospect of intermediate power situations between the federal system and the international system.*

*In this respect, we have a useful experimental datum. The European Community has demonstrated that a process of unification of states, when reaching the stage where it is clearly perceived as such by the political class and by the population, constitutes a power support (generated by the change in expectations) that makes unitary decisions possible which, however inferior to those that a common government could take, are nevertheless clearly superior to international ones, i.e. to pure and simple compromises between governments.*

*The example of the European Community thus makes it possible to establish what could be the necessary power support for the first world decisions to be taken on controlling, however partially, some limited sectors of the technological process. It also makes it possible to assert that this power (which already exists minimally in the minimal awareness of the unity of the world) will express itself in a clear form — even by means of decisions of this kind — when the facts, already underway, of the process of world unification are recognized as such.*

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*If we consider the observations made so far as a whole, we may say that of the three factors needed for the development of the unity of the world, two are already present. The first and basic one has been present for a very long time: the growing interdependence of human action at a world level, that per se produces the need for a world control, i.e. new state forms. With the Chernobyl accident, the second factor has now made itself felt, the political lever to be used, which is the awareness of mankind's common destiny and the need for political decisions of world import. The third factor, the awareness of the way in which this lever should be used, is still missing.*

*Events of world significance, that brutally transcend the nations, go on increasing, but reactions to these facts are still purely national, in the precise sense that everyone tries to bring about only changes in the behaviour of his own national government. This condemns pacifists, ecologists, and many other people, to impotence. The new element to be introduced is a conception, common firstly to many and then to all (an ideology), that shifts the vision from the national to the world level and*

*which, at the same time, directs action not only towards the improvement of one's own state, but also, and in particular, towards the creation of great regional powers, and world power, which mankind needs to survive and prosper.*

*This ideology is federalism. It is a fact that federalism is the ideology which challenges the exclusive sovereignty of the national state and *raison d'état*, which liberalism, democracy and socialism had to bow to. It is also a fact that thanks to federalism a political formula was discovered by which to associate the nations (enlargement of the 'orbit' of democratic government from one to several states). The greatest problem is thus the development and the diffusion of federalism, i.e. the increase in the number of people capable of a true worldwide political reaction to facts of world significance.*

The Federalist

## European Union: a Character in Search of an Author\*

GIULIO ANDREOTTI

I have deliberately chosen a provocative title for the matters I wish to discuss, for the major task facing us in the current phase of European construction is, I believe, giving life to the concept of Union, whose presence has been felt for some time. It should be cast in the role it wishes to play rather than the role each of us would like it to play.

The task, with all the effort it requires, is made even more difficult by the fact that twelve different actors are now playing the same character. Understandably, specific national realities entail differences of emphasis and tone which it would be too simplistic to ignore. Less understandable, however, would be a state of affairs in which excessive sensitivity for these specific national realities ended up by prevailing over the prospect of a Europe in which all Europe's peoples can find a common perspective without losing their identity.

In an essay regarding the American constitutional model and the various attempts made at European unity, Altiero Spinelli, whose faith in federalism needs no demonstration, mentions the opinion of an English economist, Josiah Tucker, who, writing in 1786 on the North-American experience, argued that "Regarding the future greatness of America and the idea that it can one day become a powerful empire under a single head ... this is one of the maddest and most visionary follies that have ever been dreamt up by novelists..."! A judgment which was rash, to say the least, and which, of course, was proved wrong by history. The American

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\* This is the text of the Eighth Jean Monnet Conference, given on November 23rd, 1985 by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Istituto Universitario Europeo di Firenze.

States, which Tucker condemned to being "disunited till the end of time", have in fact lived up to the role that history has given them. Even we in Europe need to heed their example. The truth of the matter is, however, that the Congress, to which the 13 ex-British colonies belonged, resorted to the rule of unanimity in all its decisions until 1787, the year when Washington proclaimed the Constitution.

I do not wish to go into an assessment of what can be achieved by the federalist approach or by what Spinelli defines as the functional approach i.e. based on the creation, bit by bit, of supranational bodies. Indeed, the way European integration has developed since the Treaty of Rome has been such as to create a synthesis of both approaches which, while perhaps imperfect, is nevertheless fairly effective. So that today, in the wake of the European Parliament's proposals presented in the Draft Treaty for European Union, the Dooge Committee's report and so as to fulfil the decisions adopted by the European Council in Milan, we are in a position to propose the creation of the European Union in a concrete way.

But as I was saying, the character which needs to be played stands before us. Indeed, it has been before us for some time, since its first incarnation goes back to the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, where the six founder members' determination "to lay the foundations of an increasingly tighter union between the European peoples" was established.

We all know — and often through bitter experience — from what theatre of rubble and sorrow that commitment arose. We need only go back in our memories to the years that have passed since the end of the Second World War to appreciate the benefits that the process of integration has brought to Europe. And I am not just speaking about material benefits, measurable, that is, in terms of economic well-being and social stability, however significant they may have been and will be in the future.

Since history is not made of hypotheses, I cannot tell whether without the drive towards integration that has been the guiding light of governments and peoples in Europe, our portion of the Continent would have managed to abandon the traditional rivalry, that has characterised it in the recent past, and which, all too often, ended up in conflict. I only know that there is absolute incompatibility between integration and conflict and that the affirmation of the former in the European field has led to the irreversible decline of the latter. Nor am I in a position to know whether the European nations, taken individually, would have managed, in such a short time, to acquire the prestige that has



been achieved in the world by the European Community or to raise the hopes and expectations that many other countries now place in the European Community.

If I may be allowed to depart momentarily from my basic theme, we must not forget the role that Italy played in the years after the Second World War in forging the idea of Europe as we understand it today. It was to Alcide De Gasperi's great credit that he led our country into the European adventure. In other words, he must take the credit for realising that the pooling of coal and steel resources, which put an end to the centuries-old antagonism between France and Germany, was also a unique historical opportunity for achieving wide-scale integration of continental proportions rather than integration restricted merely to two countries.

Precisely for this reason, we, the heirs of De Gasperi, have an enormous responsibility. We must prevent others from distorting the original idea of Europe construed as a common fatherland and as a choice of civilisation. There is no partisan pride in my last comment. Europe is not the only area of civilisation in the world. It is, however, a basic and unrenounceable civilisation, because, among other things, it has become enriched over the centuries with the spiritual and cultural contributions of other civilisations, with which Europe has never shirked contact, but which it has encouraged and eagerly sought. A choice of civilisation which, precisely because it is a choice of civilisation, cannot be reversed. It is a decision which, in the first place, involves a way of living and thinking, one which, regardless of all the forms it may take, necessarily entails an overall way of living. The corollary is that it will certainly not be through fanciful projects of a "variable geometry" Europe that we can expect to resolve requirements whose solution demands the contribution of all.

I would like to make another remark which stems from a recent episode. Last week, the Second Conference between the European Community Members and the Central American countries was held in Luxembourg. It was a meeting which had been planned for a long time and which we Italians had been unable to hold during our six months' Presidency of the European Community, assailed as we were by the problems of the third enlargement of the Community, even though we were very keen that this meeting should go ahead. We were encouraged to call this meeting by the recollection of the enormous favour with which our Central American partners greeted last year's meeting at San José in Costa Rica.

What struck me above all last week in Luxembourg was what I would call the unitary effect that the prospect of the meeting with the Community had on the positions of our Central American friends. There is no mystery about the fact that in that tormented region it is not easy to overcome the tensions, which essentially derive from internal economic and social imbalance, but which international conditioning may certainly have made more serious. We should not be surprised by the fact that, on the very eve of the Luxembourg Conference, very deep divisions remained among our Central American partners regarding various aspects of their relationships.

Certainly, no miracle was achieved in the course of the Conference, but the fact remains that, in Luxembourg, the Central American countries and the Contadora Group countries managed to find a basis for agreement with each other which made the signing of an Agreement on Economic Co-operation and the Final Act possible. These are important agreements since they provide for the institutionalisation of political consultation at ministerial level in the European Community.

Other countries, therefore, look at their relationship with Europeans as being a means by which their internal ties can be strengthened and I wonder how much the fact that these countries have a partner whom they consider authoritative contributes to this positive development — a partner capable of reducing the tensions in various parts of the world, assuming, of course, it desires to do so.

I gave an example just a moment ago — though there are many others — about what is commonly but effectively called the "demand for Europe". This is a matter whose strength we ourselves, perhaps, underrate but which exists and which requires an answer, and which, together with the demand that arises within our own peoples, is a permanent spur encouraging us to advance bravely and boldly down the road to Union. Nothing is more sterile than the attitude of those who, content with the success obtained, do not know how to come to terms with — or may even not want to come to terms with — the changes that need to be made, those who continue to consider them useless and indeed pernicious, those who do not realise that, more often than not, remaining entrenched on certain positions does nothing to help preserve or strengthen them. Rather it brings about regression which it is difficult to recover from. In the case of Europe, these changes only go in one direction, namely the completion of the process of political and economic integration.

The European Community is not a monad or isolated structure, cut off from the influences of the surrounding world, of which, indeed, it is part. It is not difficult to appreciate — and it should not be difficult to draw the appropriate conclusions from this observation — that the pressures coming from outside the Community all favour the strengthening of unity. Moreover, this requirement is manifested in a concrete way. We need only recall the contribution made by European countries, in strict collaboration with the American allies, to preparing the Geneva Summit with assessments and proposals designed to encourage dialogue and the restoration of trust between the two Superpowers — though there is still a need in this context to take the more specifically European interests into due account.

Certainly, the pressure that Europe can exercise, considering in particular its economic size, is by no means small. But it could be much greater if Europe further strengthened the single nature of its external image by consolidating the mechanisms for European Political Co-operation within the European Union. These mechanisms must be weaned away from the initial approach based on inter-governmental collaboration which does not guarantee any unity of behaviour among the individual Member States, and must be extended to political and economic aspects of security.

In the light of the forthcoming European Council meeting, it is right to dot one's "i"s and cross one's "t"s, because it is not possible just to discuss and, maybe, approve a Treaty which, in some way, codifies the mechanism of European Political Co-operation and which is pompously defined as a Treaty on the Union, without facing the main problem of the future of the Community in all its aspects. Otherwise, we would risk rewarding inter-governmental co-operation at the expense of integration. In any case, the Italian government, backed up by Parliament, could not accept such a reductive approach in Luxembourg, which it rejected so firmly in Milan.

The complexity of the problems we are facing in today's society and which we will have to face up to even more in tomorrow's society, moreover, requires a commitment in terms of both human and material resources, which individual European countries would have difficulty in facing by themselves. The position in the field of technological research and development is emblematic in this respect.

There is a striking difference between the expenditure on research in the United States and Japan and all the European countries put together. By themselves, the United States and Japan cover two thirds of all research in the Western world. Only

three European countries (West Germany, the United Kingdom and France) spend enough to be classified as "big spenders" under OECD criteria.

Expenditure on research by big American companies, such as General Motors, Ford and IBM, exceeds by no small margin that of a medium-sized European country. I am not going to give specific examples so as not to run the risk of ranking medium-sized European countries, and in any case the OECD data are available to all.

Certainly, the effectiveness of a research policy cannot be assessed by considering only the amount of expenditure. A lot depends on the quality of human resources — which is certainly not lacking in Europe — and on organisation, which can always be improved. But one thing is certain: the growth in knowledge and the development of technologies are mostly determined by the number of resources used. It is not possible, that is, to step into certain sectors of technological research without resources exceeding a minimum threshold, particularly where public sector expenditure is concerned since it has to be directed towards many, diversified objectives, in contrast to large private companies who can concentrate their resources on well-defined specific projects.

We should not be surprised, then, by the pressure the scientific community is applying (and has been applying for a long time) about the significance of co-ordinated policy and greater European co-operation in technology. In this respect, I would like to make it very clear that, within Europe, the differences remain enormous. Great Britain, France and West Germany alone cover 80% of all research in Community countries.

I believe there is a very urgent need to avoid the very great risk that certain countries will decide to collaborate and exclude others. I do not say this because I fear that Italy could be excluded. Our tradition in the scientific field, the solidity of our structures, the quality of our researchers and technicians are such that we may consider ourselves reasonably safe from any attempt at discrimination. Moreover, our loyalty to the Community method is beyond doubt, in this and in other sectors.

I say this because I am convinced that only collaboration extended to other countries, however limited numerically in their contribution, will bring about any cohesion among the Community countries and achieve a real leap forward in quality with beneficial effects for the entire European economy and for employment. It is in this sense that we consider the Eureka programme as being propedeutic for, but not an alternative to, the European technological Community.

The development of common policies, among which, as I said, research acquires great significance, cannot go ahead unless we manage at the same time to create a framework which encourages it. There are various aspects to this problem, most significant of which are the completion of the internal market, the convergence of economies, the reinforcement of the EMS and the reform of existing institutions.

I cannot, in such a short space, illustrate and comment upon all the various issues currently being examined by the Diplomatic Conference and which will be submitted to the Heads of State and Government in Luxembourg. My concern here is to stress various aspects which I consider to be of significance. We all know that the construction of an effectively integrated single market is by no means easy, regardless of the greater or lesser flexibility of the mechanisms used.

Physical, technical and fiscal problems of no small import stand in the way as does the failure to achieve any progress in the convergence of economies. It goes without saying that the criteria laid down in the Treaty of Rome for the creation of the Customs Union cannot be applied to the process of completing the Economic Union. In this case, a transitory period had to be established, certain stages in this period had to be defined and internal levies gradually reduced. At the same time a common external tariff had to be introduced. In other words, there were very precise numerical reference points in the implementation of the Customs Union, namely the size of the levies existing in each country.

But there must also be a method of establishing a number of principles to be followed also in the gradual creation of an economic union! I will try to illustrate a few. While it is logical to harmonize legislations towards the top, i.e. in line with the levels achieved by the most advanced countries, we must safeguard the principle of free circulation and avoid those conditions which tend to push the economies of weaker countries "out of the market". But even without reaching this extreme hypothesis which, however, cannot be considered as purely academic, it seems to me to be essential to recognise that the measures needed to implement the domestic market must go hand in hand with the progressive attenuation of the disequilibria existing in the various regions of the Community. It is essential, in other words, to have a social impetus, which needs to be achieved in particular by means of a more consistent role of the Special Funds earmarked for less favoured areas.

Another important aspect of the process of integration is, as I observed a little before, currency, regarding which I would like to be allowed to sidetrack for a moment. The current international monetary system which arose from the ashes of Bretton Woods is now showing great weakness. The distortions in the exchange rates of various currencies, whose value is increasingly removed from the reality of economic indicators, which they ought instead to reflect, is making it increasingly difficult to achieve efficient allocation of resources and is also causing the resurgence of very dangerous protectionistic trends.

The further expansion and strengthening of a homogeneous area, such as the European Community around the ECU, taken to be a real currency and not just a unit of account, would certainly contribute to greater stability, whose beneficial effects would certainly not be limited to the Community, but would be extended to the entire international monetary system.

Europe, which is an important component in a new international system and which will be even more so if it manages to progress on the road to the EMS, must play its part. But here we must be very careful. It is not conceivable that the free circulation of capital can be achieved without at the same time laying the bases for greater stability in exchange rates. Nor is it conceivable that the free circulation of goods and services is a real achievement if it leaves each country the possibility of running its economic and financial policy without bearing in mind the existence of an integrated market.

Here we come up against another of the many sectors where politicians have the task and responsibility of adopting courageous and far-sighted decisions, as the German leaders did when they decided to set up the EMS in 1978 despite the opposition of the Bundesbank.

Finally, I would like to dwell on institutional issues and, in particular, on the problem of strengthening the European Parliament's powers. For six years now, the members of the European Parliament have been elected by direct universal suffrage. Now, without wishing to go any further into the significance of this, it should be noted that nobody can or should be surprised that direct elections to the European Parliament have speeded up the debate on the institutional balance within the Community and the ways to achieve the European Union.

Whether we are aware of it or not, the direct election of members to the European Parliament has created a powerful element of "disequilibrium" in the consolidated institutional settings, which we cannot avoid taking into account, even if we

wished to. I must confess, in this respect, that the rationale behind the various forms of hostility to giving the European Parliament greater powers and, above all, a more incisive role in the decision-making process often escapes me. I find this attitude difficult to understand, as it were, on a functional plane, inasmuch as it seems to me to be sufficiently clear that strengthening the powers of the European Parliament is not a question of removing the power of national Parliaments. Rather it is a question of achieving a much more balanced division of powers which under the existing treaties already belong to the Community's institutions. I often find it difficult to get this idea across to some of my partners in the Community.

The question of the role of the European Parliament does not, however, end with assessments of procedure, as is apparently believed by many who fear that a more incisive intervention in legislative activity will lead to delays and strains in a process which ought to be speeded up. The problem, it seems to me, lies elsewhere. The European Parliament is the only institution of the European Community which derives its legitimacy from a representation directly endowed to its members at a Community rather than a national level. Only through the European Parliament can people thus gain a concrete feeling of participating in the Community's life. In this sense, it is the true psychological base and the true motor of integration of European peoples rather than European structures.

It is somewhat strange, in this respect, that in many multilateral institutions, and most markedly in the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the accent is rightly placed by western delegations on the lack of representativeness of certain institutions of Eastern Europe. This is sacrosanct. But it is not legitimate that, in practice, people turn a blind eye or, still worse, do all they can to prevent the European Parliament, elected by universal and direct suffrage, from going beyond the exercise of its purely consultative powers. Representation may be formal in nature when referred to a constitutional monarchy but it must be substantial when it comes to an Assembly whose members are elected directly by the people.

As happens with majority voting in the Council's decisions, when we uphold the role of the European Parliament we are upholding a principle rather than an instrument.

In the Milan European Council we managed to trace the path to be followed, encouraged by the work of all those who preceded us in the attempt to shape the European Union and particularly by the work of the European Parliament. In Milan both sides

— the majority who wanted a Diplomatic Conference to amend the treaties and the minority which is also taking part in this Conference in a spirit certainly not based on any preconceived opposition — recognized that speaking about a Treaty on European Political Co-operation means facing the issue of the systematic formulation and implementation of a common foreign policy extended to all aspects of security.

We all knew that speaking about the completion of the domestic market and the development of new policies entailed the need to improve the Council's decision-making process, the need, in other words, to the respect of the principle of majority vote in the decision-making process and indeed its extension to new fields. We also recognised that for integration to be achieved it was necessary to restore the Commission's proposing, executive and management role, that the free circulation of people, goods, services and capital (the realisation of the four freedoms) was not conceivable without a precise commitment in the monetary field or without improved cohesion among the various regions of the Community. Finally, we also knew that a basic issue in the exercise of the Heads of State and Governments' duties was reinforcing the European Parliament's powers and giving the Strasbourg Assembly effective powers of co-decision.

The Diplomatic Conference has so far worked on this package of measures. My overall impression is that, in the preparatory work for the European Council, quite a number of countries have taken an attitude inspired more by a *horror vacui* or rather by a *horror novi* than by any enthusiasm which it would be legitimate to expect from those who are aware that they are involved in a commitment of historical dimensions.

I hope that the meetings over the next few days, the last of which will take place precisely on the eve of the European Council, will finally give conclusive vigour to an exercise which still today is making very slow progress. These meetings have, in fact, been described as a Conclave. In reality, true Conclaves, the ones electing the Pope, usually last longer, despite the help of the Holy Ghost. The forthcoming ones will, however, certainly be important and, let's hope, decisive meetings. Because — and it is well to be aware of this — in Luxembourg various reforms need to be decided. In Milan we foresaw these reforms all of which contribute to "making" the European Union.

I can understand the hesitations when facing anything that is new, since this is only human. I believe, moreover, than a man of action like Julius Caesar must have had his moment of hesitation on the banks of the Rubicon. Nobody faces the fateful *hic*

*Rhodus, hic salta* lightly. It has to be remembered that drawing up the Treaty of Rome was an exercise of prudence and patience. A few words — such as supranationality and High Authority — were carefully avoided. Only at the last moment, during the last re-reading of the text of the Treaty, was it decided to use the word “Community”.

So that I think history repeats itself, when, as then, it is a question of naming and when we are afraid to use the word “Union” instead of the word “Community”. But experience teaches us that very often courage prevails over prudence and that prudence is not always synonymous with far-sightedness.

We cannot certainly exclude the possibility that the practical application of general principles may take place, gradually and by stages, within a fixed period. But this, of course, can only happen provided that there is no margin for ambiguity in the European Council in Luxembourg regarding the acceptance of the principles or regarding the establishment of objectives and the adoption of the measures needed to achieve these objectives. The starting point must, of course, respect the minimum level beyond which the exercise would lose credibility and substance, let alone effectiveness.

We believe that this minimum level can only be safeguarded if we show in Luxembourg that we are able to achieve the following. Firstly, we will have to take on concrete commitments regarding the adoption of institutional measures (the most important of which are majority voting and the strengthening of the Commission's role), necessary for the complete achievement, by 1992, of the Internal Market (whose domain will have to be defined more clearly) and the new policies. Secondly, we will have to fix a precise timetable for bringing the European Parliament into legislative activity, the final goal in the process being, of course, full co-decision. Thirdly, we need to give greater cogency to the objective of cohesion among the Community's regions, with the idea of giving a social dimension to the solution of economic problems. Fourthly, we need to insert a reference in the Treaty to the need to strengthen the EMS. Finally, we need to institutionalise political co-operation.

We also believe that the European Parliament must be properly consulted over the definition of all the measures in this package, assuming they are adopted by the Conference and approved by the European Council, before they are translated in articles of a Treaty to be submitted to the national Parliaments' ratification.

In no case, finally, can we accept that the result of the Conference should consist merely in indications of formulae or institutional architecture which, however suggestive, are nevertheless devoid of concrete contents. Nor can we agree that any progress on one or more specific questions — and I am thinking in particular of political co-operation — will serve to hide failures in all other areas.

Jean Monnet wrote in his memoirs: “We must establish stages, not deadlines, we must keep going in one direction, but we must not be tied to compulsory appointments. This month or that month has nothing fateful about it and I would not be over-formal about a date. I am certain, however, that the progress of the seasons will necessarily lead us towards greater unity, which, if it is not the unity we have managed to organise, will be the one we will have to suffer”.

The essential fact is that the commitment by all to the construction of Europe should not suffer delays or a lowering of tone. The results achieved so far have not arisen from spontaneous germination, as flowers in a spring field. They were the fruit of clear political will. Of the same political will that made De Gasperi state: “We speak, we write, we insist, we do not leave a second for breathing: let Europe remain the argument of the day”.

The results of a recent opinion poll struck me very much. 76 out of every 100 Europeans who expressed an opinion on the European Union said they were in favour. We cannot underestimate people's opinion for too long. Nor, novel Gattopardians, can we continue to propose changing everything in order that everything remains as before. If the European Union is unable to find actors capable of interpreting it, it could always find its Author in the peoples of Europe who, even more clearly than ever before, will demand its birth and ask us to justify our hesitations.

## Europe on the Threshold of Union\*

MARIO ALBERTINI

1. - I would like to begin by observing that the political and cultural debate on the unification of Europe are both inadequate as is the discussion on how to further it. There are very few people who actually deal with this subject and, among those who do, the Europessimists prevail, though fortunately events have always proved them wrong. European unity, which time and again has been given up for dead is still alive and like all healthy bodies creates problems. It depends on human will. In other words, it is up to us, the citizens, and the political class to ensure that these are growth problems. So far, despite long periods of uncertainty and inevitable mistakes, we have managed to cope.

The inadequacy of the debate entails a serious risk, in the most serious sense of the term: the risk of not knowing what stage we have reached, and what needs to be done to go forward. At the beginning, and even before the real beginning, of the process of unification there was ample political debate on the political nature of the objective and the method to be followed to implement it. True, there were many unknown things, first and foremost the exceptional nature of the task. Historically speaking, there is nothing so difficult as the unification of well-

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\* This is the inaugural lecture to the University of Pavia's 1985-86 academic year. As compared with then (November 5th, 1985) the new events are the Single Act, i.e. a setback on the road to Union (but without the European Parliament's action, there would not even have been a Single Act) and the sad loss of Altiero Spinelli, who died in Rome on May 23rd, 1986. In the last few months of his life, Spinelli had already worked out a new plan for the struggle for the Union (cfr. the Herman report of March 17th, 1986).

constituted, well-characterized states with great traditions. One's thinking turns immediately to Classical Greece which, despite various confederal experiences, never managed to achieve unity and was overwhelmed, a fate which also befell Italy at the end of the 15th Century. But while it proved difficult — and we still bear the consequences today — to establish the effective historical meaning of undertaking unity, it was nevertheless possible to indicate the road to be followed quite clearly. Two roads were, in fact, suggested: functionalism, proposed by various scholars, who stressed the need to create European "functional areas" — starting with those areas where European interests were most clearly perceivable — but which dodged the problem of power; and constitutionalism, suggested by federalist groups which were formed during the Resistance, primarily by Altiero Spinelli, who still today courageously fights for this position which he reached in Ventotene, when he studied the works of Luigi Einaudi, and such British writers as Lionel Robbins and Lord Lothian. And it is not true, as many people think, that functionalism prevailed at that time.

What in fact prevailed was the idea of exploiting the possibilities of functionalism to achieve constitutionalism. The ECSC, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the solemn declaration made by Schuman on May 9th, 1950, inspired by Jean Monnet, reflect this strategy transparently. In itself the ECSC was a typically functional idea: a European pool, as it was called at the time, of interests in a major yet restricted field. But Schuman's statement on May 9th made it explicitly clear that the ECSC was designed to establish "les premières assises concrètes de la fédération européenne, indispensables à la préservation de la paix". Moreover, the role of institutions in Monnet's conception is well-known.

It is also right to recall De Gasperi's efforts, during the struggle for the European Defense Community, to ensure the primacy of constitutionalism, as a policy to which functional processes should be subordinated. Initially, the EDC was conceived precisely from a functionalist standpoint which, however, in this case became madness. People went so far as to think of putting the armies together just like coal and steel had been put together. The idea was to create a European army with no state and no fatherland. De Gasperi refused to accept such an aberrant plan and on December 11th, 1951, in the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Conference for the European Army, also attended by Adenauer and Schuman, De Gasperi, who had taken on the Foreign Affairs portfolio,

persuaded the others that the creation of the European army should be accompanied by the creation of the European Political Community. Subsequently, he also managed to get an agreement that the text of the political Community should be drawn up by a political body which, by its very nature, had a constitutional capacity: the ad hoc Assembly, as it was called, i.e. the enlarged Parliamentary assembly of the ECSC.

It is not my task here to illustrate the question of the EDC or the Political Community. Rather, I would like to recall two things. The first is that bad luck played a decisive role in the collapse of the EDC. France, which proposed the EDC on October 24th, 1950, rejected it with a Parliamentary vote promoted by Mendès-France on August 30th, 1954, when Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and Holland had already ratified the treaty and Italy was, in its turn, completing the ratification process. The strange fact is that up until the end of 1953 there had been a majority in favour of ratification in the Palais Bourbon. Equally singular is the fact that, if Stalin had not died in 1953 and if unfounded hopes had not been placed in the effects of his death, then this majority might well have survived. Although there are few Europeans who realize it, precisely because of the paltry debate on Europe, which never balances the course of events with that of ideas, what all this means is simply that with better luck and assuming De Gasperi's, Adenauer's and Schuman's *virtù* had remained the same, an open though not fully comprehensive European federation would have been in existence for some thirty years. The second thing to remember is that it is not true, as is often suggested, that the struggle for the EDC was a 'pie in the sky' and that the objective was too ambitious. It was a question of choosing between the reconstruction of the German army and the construction of a European army. History had raised the problem and a choice had to be made. Moreover, those who express these negative opinions about the struggle for the EDC should ask themselves whether, without this struggle, which lasted for four years, and without the feeling that in some way after losing the battle something had to be recovered, the political will which led to the Rome treaties and the Common Market would ever have arisen.

2. - With the EDC, functionalism had become constitutionalism in one swoop. With the fall of the EDC, the time span once more became very long. These now distant facts need to be recalled because they allow us to see the design underpinning the very logic of European unification, the laws governing its

development, and hence the rules to be applied to ensure this development continues. We cannot understand this highly significant aspect of the historical period in which we live until we realise that European unification is a process of integration (ascertainable with a functional criterion), which is strictly linked to a process of constructing institutions which, from time to time, become necessary (ascertainable with the constitutional criterion). Without each other, both parts of the process are either blind or empty. Nor must we forget that the degree of integration depends on the degree of construction. In the European case, data on which subsequent action is based are processed in a hurry, so rapidly that the terms "construction of Europe", "European integration" and "European unification" are used as synonyms. But this clouds the various parts of the process which consists in a *unification* (overall term) which depends on a *construction* (gradual) and the corresponding *integration* (also gradual).

We tend nowadays to speak rather, on the one hand, of "small steps" and, on the other, of a "big jump" or "difference in quality". But these terms mean something only when they are related to the structural characteristics of the unification of Europe. Only in this way is it possible to assess the real need for a "big jump" when such a need becomes apparent, i.e. when the degree of construction prevents any further integration and causes the process of unification to stagnate and prevents new political and social energies from being brought into play at a European level. Moreover, only in this way are "small steps" of any use precisely because we know the direction in which they must go. In all other cases, the "small steps" would proceed in a disorderly way towards chaos, a means of killing off unification without even realising it.

3. - These theoretical considerations are essential. Only with this guide worked out, albeit roughly, from the very beginning of the unification process, is it possible to speak of prospects and problems and establish exactly where we are on the map. Indeed, if we use it, we will very quickly see that integration has been stagnant for some years precisely because the degree of construction (the EEC, with its legislative and executive monopoly of the Council of Ministers, and its consequence, the right to veto) does not make it possible to move ahead any more. The Common Market has not become and is not becoming Europe's domestic market. The frontiers are not yet open. Once again we have entered a phase of unification in which a "big jump in quality", i.e. a much higher degree of construction, is needed to continue the march forward and effectively orientate the small



steps and daily management of integration towards development once more.

The terms of the problem are clear. Taken the matter to the absurd, we can put forward proof demonstrating where we are quite clearly. Let us suppose that the degree of construction of Europe remains as it is at present, and then let us try to see what Europe would be like in the nineties, which is easily done. Since the same cause — the Council of Ministers' monopoly over decisions — always produces the same effects, we can foresee that European agricultural policy, made even more difficult by the presence of twelve members, will continue to run apart and no other common policy will be achieved.

There can be no doubt about this. As I have said, and as I prefer to repeat, the same cause produces the same effects. The Community's current decision-making mechanism manages with increasing difficulty to achieve an increasingly worse agricultural policy and since 1970 right up to the present time it has never been possible to develop any other common policies, which nevertheless, as everybody knows and says, would be increasingly necessary both in the social sector, in particular as regards employment, in the industrial and monetary sectors, in high technology and research and so on. It is for this reason that since 1970 there has been no substantial progress towards the transformation of the common market into an internal market. The frontiers are, as I have said, the worst example of this.

The few good things in the seventies were done, in a more or less marked way, outside the institutions, which implies a weakening or even an elimination of their effectiveness as steps in construction and integration. We can therefore have no doubts about the situation Europe in which would find itself in the nineties if the institutions remained what they are today. It is all very well to say that the possibilities contained in the Treaties of Rome have not yet been completely exploited and that it is thus a question of deciding how to exploit them. The fact is that those who support this idea overlook the fact the institutions never correspond perfectly to the wording used to describe them in the treaties which establish them but, in all imaginable cases, they only correspond to the way they work in practice.

If some possibilities that exist on paper in the texts have never been exploited in the course of these thirty years, this means simply that they were illusory. Moreover, it is not hard to understand why this was so. The problem, as we have seen and as everybody knows, lies in the development of common policies. But with common policies we come back to a terrain

where nothing is easy since we are faced with the need to take decisions that require a state-like political power. How, in the modern world, can we take decisions affecting the general interest without a real government?

The presumption that common policies can be developed in the social, industrial, technological, monetary and other fields without a democratic executive responsible to parliament, or without a presidential government, but with a Council of national ministers of the current type, i.e. a monster with twelve heads which should at the same time both legislate and govern, is completely nonsensical. Would there be "common" policies in the USA if the American decisions were entrusted to an inter-governmental body made up of the representatives of the *states*? Would there be common policies in Italy if instead of the national government we only had a permanent conference of regional presidents? When we speak of the need to abolish the right of veto within the Community's Council of Ministers we are in fact referring to this problem without, however, identifying it and without clarifying it.

The right of veto has been imposed because there is no institutional system capable of developing autonomous European political life and basing European decisions on a secure foundation. And it is as sure as eggs are eggs that the right to veto will remain until European decisions can be taken in a democratic way, in the only framework that can safeguard them, i.e. a constitutional framework. In the current state of affairs, with the substantial power of decision exclusively in the hands of the Council of Ministers (i.e. national governments), a majority vote is synonymous with the risk of decisions being based on the interest of a few states to the detriment of others. The ridiculous wine or Spanish fishing boat wars, and so on, are only the most glamorous consequence — but certainly not the most significant — of the limits of this decision-making mechanism, which cannot take decisions based on the will and on the interests of all, and hence perpetually wavers between hegemony and immobilism.

4. - All those who have direct knowledge of the problem know how matters stand, even though they often prefer not to say so. And if this truth does not stand out in the information system, this is simply because the European debate is, as we should not tire of saying, very feeble and highly inadequate. But events, which are less malleable than words, have recorded this truth. Governments recognised the problem in 1972, when they solemnly declared their intention to construct the European Union by 1980. They have *de facto* come to realise and made



others realise that the Community as it is and was is no longer enough to guarantee that the process of unification will continue.

In terms of "integration" the facts have been clear since then. They even suggested an *ad hoc* denomination giving rise to a distinction between "negative integration" and "positive integration". "Negative integration" indicates the cycle which has ended, relating, in particular, to the abolition of classical forms of protectionism, duties and quantitative restrictions ("negative" because it required no active policies). "Positive integration" stresses the need for the development of active policies (the common policies) to transform the Common Market into a domestic market, a requirement which since then has been one of the guiding threads in the European debate. In terms of "construction", this naturally required, as I have already stated, a decisive reinforcement of the Community's capacity for action. The governments tried to pursue this objective, without managing to do so, with the proposal of the Union which in any case, however vague it may have been, could only mean something more, or something more political, than what already existed.

The analysis to be carried out today does not thus relate to the need for a Union, which is amply demonstrated and recognised, but rather to the fact that, despite the governments' orientations, and particularly those of the founding governments, no concrete results have emerged from the various attempts made, not even from the most significant of these, such as the mission entrusted on December 10th, 1974 to the then Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans, to draw up a report on the European Union after consulting "the representative milieux of public opinion".

This was inevitable. The governments in the seventies, badly advised, followed the wrong path. And they did not even pause to consider the fact that the governments in the first half of the fifties, when faced with the same problem, chose the right path. Although it may at first sight appear strange, in actual fact this is not the first time that the unitary process has placed the problem of the Union on the agenda. It is just as necessary now to achieve the goal of a truly united market, as it was when the idea of creating the European army was placed on the agenda. Now the study of this precedent — I have mentioned that the task of drawing up the Charter of the political Community was entrusted to the European Parliamentary Assembly — makes it possible to establish that the Union (or political Community, or political-institutional unity, or economic and monetary Union, all the terms that highlight various aspects of the same thing) can

be achieved only if the two basic factors of unification do their utmost. These factors are the national governments (the existing sovereignty) and the European democratic representation (the sovereignty to be established).

If we consider this issue only for a second, the matter becomes immediately clear. In actual fact, it is not realistic to think that the text which defines the Union — a constitutional text — may be drawn up by some other active participant who is not a political body qualified by direct democratic investiture. This conception is to be found embryonically in the Treaties of Rome themselves, under Art. 138 paragraph 3 of the EEC treaty which relates to the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. It is worth recalling what the actual wording is: "The Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States. The Council shall, acting unanimously, lay down the appropriate provisions, which it shall recommend to Member States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements".

Nobody can doubt the reasonableness of this conception. But if it is considered necessary to entrust the European Parliament with an electoral plan, how can the redistribution of power within the Community, a much more difficult project, be entrusted to people who are not selected by a European political struggle and not invested by a popular European vote? In actual fact since 1972 no progress has been made on the road to Union because, once the European Parliament was ignored, it was not even possible to draw up a good plan for the Union, i.e. a project which deserved to be taken into serious consideration by the national governments, and which could be submitted to the national parliaments.

The fact is that in this undertaking governments must, in a certain sense, transcend themselves. Since they are the tutors of national sovereignty, they cannot fail to propose its defence as a supreme task — and the same goes for officials and, in particular, for diplomats. There is — and how could it be otherwise — a kind of force of habit implicit in their job. All data, events, projects are always considered from a single viewpoint: the national one. It might be rightly objected that the Union, or rather what the term promises (in the formation of the USA the passage from a confederation to a federation was called: *the more perfect Union*), is now of supreme interest to the nations. But this is true as a concept not as a fact.

The Union cannot be created in a day. Day by day we need

to govern the states i.e. adapt feelings, thinking and will to national praxis. Indeed, from the concrete point of view of the protection of interests, the Union is effective only when it is achieved, i.e. when it begins to safeguard the interests on a European level previously entrusted to the states (only at that stage does it link up with everybody's daily affairs). This means that its political effectiveness becomes apparent only at the end, and not at the beginning of the action with which it is pursued. And at the beginning uncertainty will reign. Nobody knows whether it will succeed, i.e. whether all governments, or at least a sufficient number of governments, will agree to create a new sovereignty, a European sovereignty. And what makes the situation even worse is the fact that until then, although the hope and the goal of Europe is at stake, nobody, and in particular no politician and no official, can be free from his national responsibilities.

For these reasons, it is unthinkable that the governments, assisted by diplomats and national officials, can draw up a good European project. Under this method, what they will draw up can merely be — by the very force of facts — an expression of the initial moment with its uncertainty and wariness — and not the final moment with its certainty. Only a body whose *raison d'être* is European can rise to this standpoint. Moreover, the facts speak for themselves. In all the years which have passed since 1972 the governments have not been able to demonstrate what is meant by "Union": something which relates only to foreign policy? or also an internal market and the currency? or the reform of institutions? or European power?

These remarks not only highlight the radical imperfection of the governments' projects, they also explain the fact that all the projects of this kind were abandoned as soon as they were drawn up and proposed. As soon as they are engendered, their uselessness becomes immediately clear so much so that the governments — even when they tried to do things in a big way as in the case of the Tindemans mission — are unable to defend them. Indeed, if we consider all the phases of the complex procedure needed to achieve the foundation of the Union — each of which (the drafting of a treaty, the search for an agreement among the states, national ratification) requires agreement and/or majorities which are hard to achieve — we realise just how necessary a good plan is. Likewise, we can appreciate that it is the European Parliament which needs to draw it up.

5. - This is precisely what happened. Without waiting to receive a mandate from the governments (which at the time of

the EDC was duly given) the European Parliament, as soon as it was elected directly by the citizens, drew up and approved a draft Treaty for the European Union on February 14th, 1984 with a very large majority. This is a very good and very realistic project, which is in no way maximalistic. It has been judged, in federalist quarters, as the indispensable institutional minimum to give effective capacity for action to the European institutions in the economic sphere — already provided for by the Treaties of Rome — and in the economic and monetary field, relating to the EMS. And there is no need to spend too many words to confirm the soundness of this judgement.

The fact to be considered is that it is not possible, in democratic countries, to take important political decisions without basing them on the strength that comes from the support of the electors, which is mainly manifested in the vote but which is also expressed daily with the living dialectic of public opinion, fed by the information system. Now to be able to found political decisions on this force, it is necessary that there should be no watertight bulkhead between the electorate, Parliament and the Government. It is necessary, albeit in the minimum and initial form, that this direct channel should exist. With things as they are now, this channel does not exist in Europe, or, put another way, there are all the steps except the last. There is the European vote, there is the European Parliament, but there is no European Government. In its place there is a two-headed executive, the European Commission plus the Council of (national) Ministers. But the Commission, which may be censured by the European Parliament, does not have the power to take decisions which are of political significance, but only the power to study them and propose them to the Council of Ministers who decides. And the Council of Ministers does not in any way depend on the European Parliament. Thus the circle, instead of closing and giving life to the daily exercise of European political will, remains open, i.e. subject to the divergent will of different national policies, which at the very most can achieve mediocre compromises but certainly cannot govern Europe.

Now the greatest quality of the Draft Treaty established by the European Parliament lies in the fact that it achieves this direct channel by entrusting the European Parliament with: a) legislative power, to be exercised in conjunction with the Council of the Union (the current Council of Ministers, which, in this respect, would have a role similar to a federal Senate), b) the power deriving from Parliament's control over the Commission,

which would begin to take on the form of a European Government.

The other essential quality of the project is the fact that the creation of this direct channel — the first experiment of European political life true and proper — is not at all the fruit of any dangerous improvisation, nor gives rise to any "leap in the dark". This is demonstrated both by the fact that the unanimous vote (the right to veto) in the Council of the Union when "vital national interests" are at stake, is safeguarded for a long period of time. It is also demonstrated by the fact that, as regards foreign policy and security, in the Union the old inter-governmental (confederal) decision-making mechanism will remain, so that the decision-making power of states will not be affected in any way.

This option is, from the point of view of political prudence, reasonable. Only when the Union has demonstrated that it is able to function properly will it be possible to have the large majority necessary to give the Union sovereignty in the field of foreign policy and defence as well. For the meantime, on the basis of a true political unity in the economic and monetary field, we could supply a very solid base to political co-operation, thus giving more space to a Europe able to speak "with a single voice".

As may be appreciated, there is nothing uncompromising or unrealistic in the European Parliament's plan. Apparently, those who have expressed such an opinion cannot have read the project. There is, it must be stressed, only the institutional minimum to found the European decisions on the consensus of citizens; and hence to restore to democratic control those European decisions which national Parliaments no longer control, and that the European Parliament does not yet control.

6. - The European Parliament not only managed to draw up a good project, it also managed to bring it to the governments' attention, a rather hazy feat which needs to be explained. Like all true historical innovations, the events which revealed the European Parliament's capacity for action came quite unexpectedly and were quite unreasonably underrated on every subsequent occasion. Briefly, the sequence of events together with the attempts to play them down was as follows.

When Altiero Spinelli suggested to the European Parliament that it should draw up a Draft Treaty for the European Union, to be submitted to the states for ratification, everybody said it would never have obtained a majority, not even in the European Parliament. When there was a majority, and the Draft Treaty was approved (February 14th, 1984, 229 votes for, 31 against and 42 abstentions), everybody said that no government would

ever take it into serious consideration. When the Italian Government and Parliament voted in favour of ratification, everybody said that it was unthinkable that the other governments, the French and German Governments in particular (let alone the British Parliament certain to be hostile), would have taken the same attitude. But then came Mitterrand's declarations of support for the Draft Treaty on May 24th, 1984 in the great speech he made before the European Parliament, followed by similar commitments by Kohl in the Franco-German meeting soon after Mitterrand's statements. Subsequently, undertakings were made by the parliaments and leaders of other Community countries, to the point where the minimum number of states needed to found the Union (under the European Parliament's Draft Treaty) was exceeded.

At this point, the second phase of the procedure to create the European Union began — against all the experts' expectations. This stage consists in the search for an agreement among the governments or between a sufficient number of them. On June 26th, 1984, the European Council at Fontainebleau named a committee of personal representatives of the Heads of State and Government (the Dooze Committee) to examine the matter. The Dooze Committee presented its report to the European Council in Brussels (March 29-30th, 1985). This report was, of course, discussed at the European Council meeting in Milan (June 29-30th, 1985) which, at Italy's suggestion, decided by a majority vote, which caused a sensation, to call a diplomatic conference, under Art. 235 of the EEC Treaty, on the European Union and the necessary Treaty amendments.

7. - These are the facts to date. But what meaning can be given to them? Much progress has been made but a lot remains to be done. And we cannot yet say how far down the road to Union we will get or whether in fact we will get to the end. The Union is an embryonic form of state, and nothing is so difficult as creating a new state in an area which is already covered by many states. At every moment, right up to the very last moment, the undertaking is liable to fail. But what has already taken place is enough to make us realize that the European Parliament has managed to bring Europe to the very threshold of Union.

While this may give us hope, it also makes it possible for us to deepen our theoretical insight into the process of unification. Until today, we were unable to say what role the European Parliament would have played after the direct elections simply because there is no exhaustive theoretical model of the transition

from one system of states with absolute sovereignty to a federal system. Nor could anybody have known before what capacity for action a Parliament elected by the people would have in a political system with no government of its own.

Now we know. The European Parliament had enough strength to play another round in a game which seemed to have been lost. The road towards Union, vainly pursued by governments, who did not even manage to draw up a decent project, has been re-opened. Without the intervention of the European Parliament it would still be closed, perhaps forever. Although it has no powers regarding the government of Europe, nevertheless the European Parliament has a power which for the time being is more important: the role of "federator".

This is the lesson to be drawn from the facts. When constituent power is used to promote new phases in the construction of Europe and further progress towards integration, the only effective partner for the national governments is the European Parliament. This is true both for current action and action that will have to be undertaken in the future, when it will be necessary to give the Union powers in foreign policy or begin everything from scratch or carry out a long "trench war".

My examination ends with these observations. But I would like to end my commentary by recalling the meaning that Luigi Einaudi gave to the struggle for Europe. He expressed it in a very memorable way when he wrote on March 1st, 1954, "In the life of nations usually the mistake of not knowing how to grasp the fleeting moment is irreparable. The need to unify Europe is self-evident. Existing states are dust without substance. None of them is able to stand the cost of independent defence. Only the Union can make them endure. The problem is not between independence and the Union but between existing united and disappearing. The hesitations and disagreements among Italian states at the end of the 15th Century cost the Italians the loss of independence for three long centuries. The time which they had to decide in was a matter of a few months. The time remaining for the creation of the European Union will only last while the ideal of freedom survives in Western Europe. Are we sure that the factors which run counter to the ideal of liberty will not unexpectedly acquire sufficient strength to prevent the Union — by making some states fall in the North American sphere and others in the Russian sphere? An Italian territory will still exist, but no longer an Italian nation, destined to live as a spiritual and moral unity provided it renounces an absurd military and economic independence".

## Notes

### THE MEDITERRANEAN CRISIS AND EUROPE'S RESPONSIBILITY

*"Existing states are dust without substance", said Einaudi and never as in April of this year in the wake of the events in the Mediterranean was Einaudi's ruthless statement about European states truer. The Mediterranean crisis and Qaddafi's absurd arrogance — the head of a country with three million inhabitants challenging, humiliating and creating all kinds of difficulties for all Europeans — have one precise cause: the European power vacuum. This vacuum has two consequences. One is factual and consists precisely in the fact that three million Libyans have put 320 million Europeans on the spot (a count which includes only the countries of the so-called Community). The second is mental and is demonstrated by the stupid and vile conviction that violence can be dealt with by negotiations and diplomacy.*

*It seems that, even in the country of Machiavelli, Europeans have suddenly forgotten that politics consists of power relationships and that international politics consists of power relationships unmitigated by legislative restraints i.e. based on military means. Pursuing the idea of negotiations with those who use violence in the most brutal way, these Europeans who display such decadence and resignation forget that negotiations, too, are based on power relationships. The outcome of negotiations is no nice hypothetical solution that suits everybody but a solution in which the law of the strongest is the rule and everybody gets according to his might. Put bluntly, negotiations are simulated war. The rest (for example, words used at the UN or in so-called public international law) is merely repugnant make-up attempting to*

*mask the unremittingly fierce face of politics or the sinking of reason into a dumb silence: the absurd pretence of renouncing the use of force though paying the full costs, moral costs included, to have one (compulsory military service, expenditure on arms etc.).*

*For anyone who manages to grasp a minimum of "effettuale" political understanding — that puts an end to the sophism about the effectiveness of the law (what law?) and morality in a world still governed by brute violence, including nuclear violence — three considerations are valid: one about the USA, one about Europe and one about peace. The mistake of the Americans is not retaliation. It is not using force (which does not necessarily mean shooting) against Israel too, to force it to recognise the rights of Palestinians to set up their own autonomous state in Cis-Jordan and the Gaza strip. In this way Arab terrorism, deprived of its greatest source, would perhaps receive a fatal blow. Whatever the case, retaliation, currently far from effective, would become effective. But these considerations are valid only in the short term. In the mid-term it is necessary for Israel to have a guarantee based on fact, not words. And at this stage the responsibility of Europeans begins. With their division, their impotence, and the power vacuum they generate even in the Mediterranean, they prevent everybody — Israel, USA and Arab nations included — from being able to count on a regional balance capable both of containing the aggressive drive which always occurs when not checked by adequate power, and eliminating, in the long term, the causes of this particular type of terrorism with the unity and modernization of the Arab nation. With the stupid pretence of having European foreign policy but no European power — and preventing the European Parliament from developing such power — Europeans by choosing resignation and impotence not only threaten the fate of Europe but the world's fate as well.*

*And now peace. There are only two forms of peace: the precarious and armed form based on the balance of forces, which dissuades aggressors but requires every state to develop all its potential means of violence, and that of world government: true peace, according to Kant, since it would allow people to live unarmed and to defend their autonomy exclusively by lawful means. If this is true, and it is true for all those who have not lost their senses, then it is also true that whoever does not pursue a balance in power relationships, and does not attempt to direct it towards great regional unifications to fill the power vacuums and create the pillars of the future*

*world government, works for war and not for peace, although appearing on the public stage with an olive branch in his hand, idiotically happy whenever he manages to reduce the strength of his own state without remembering that this automatically corresponds to the strengthening of the other states.*

*At this stage all would be said and done were it not for just one other consideration about the cause of European states' weakness (with some differences: France behaves much better than the rest). At first sight it may in fact appear to be disconcerting that states with about fifty million inhabitants, advanced industrial development etc. can be subjected to all kinds of difficulties by such an underdeveloped and underpopulated state like Libya. The solution of the enigma becomes much easier to perceive if we remember that what holds true for individuals holds true for states as well: anyone with nothing to lose can be aggressive and therefore fearsome, while anyone with a lot to lose tends to become cautious and prudent. The enigma is solved entirely if we remember how Einaudi (who was one of the greatest Italian scholars of this century as well as being President of the Republic from 1948 to 1955) justified the statement I recalled ("Existing states are dust without substance") by explaining that "none of them is able to bear the costs of independent defence".<sup>1</sup>*

*And here we have him — the king stripped of his fine clothes. European states have no independent defence. To understand and judge European states all we need to appreciate is the kind of "raison d'état" existing in states incapable of independent defence. We need only wonder what kind of training and selection the political class undergoes in states of this kind.*

Mario Albertini

### **ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN LEFT IS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO THE DECLINE OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCI)**

*The XVII Congress of the PCI has endorsed the European turning point in the rank and file of the party. The troublesome process, which began with the Italian Communists' participation in the European Parliament and deepened thanks to the tenacious*

<sup>1</sup> LUIGI EINAUDI, *Lo scrittoio del presidente*, Turin, 1956, p. 89.

commitment firstly of Amendola and subsequently of Berlinguer, has finally led to a precise political proposal: "The PCI is an integral part of the European left", it is stated with great conviction in the Theses discussed by the militants in the pre-Congress debate. Nearly all the party leaders who spoke during the Congress approved the European turning point, expressing their consensus for this clear choice of alignment.

Natta himself, in his opening speech, tried to indicate the most important objectives of the struggle of the European left: "... The disunion of the left," said Natta "on the European question and the possibility of a common European policy at least on the essential themes of the international situation continues to make the European Community not much more than an economic agreement which in itself is fairly uncertain and troubled, and incapable quite of putting up sufficient resistance to the USA's hegemonic demands, even in the economic field. Europe still does not act as a true political entity... And we must propose that thinking and action should be undertaken for a convergence of the progressive forces and left-wing forces in the European Community to draw up a joint programme... We continue, above all, to believe in a reconciliation of the two great strands into which the workers' movement is split".

There can be no doubt about the seriousness of the PCI's commitment in this sense. Shortly before the XVII Congress, Natta visited the SPD and made it clear in the press conference with the SPD President, Brandt, that the purpose of his journey was to initiate a dialogue designed to draw up a common electoral programme for the left in the next European elections in 1989. The PCI's plan thus foresees a precise objective and finds important consensus in Europe. The end of the historical divide between Social democracy and Communism now seems within reach, thanks to the conquest of the European vote that has made it possible for all the parties of the European left to fight for common objectives within the European Parliament and to abandon ancient and now anachronistic prejudices. For this reason, the statement made by Zajkov and Zagladin, the Soviet representatives, sounds really pathetic. In a last-ditch attempt not to feel entirely excluded from the new policy line, they claimed that "even the Soviet Communist Party feels itself to be part of the European left".

Nevertheless, despite the progress made on the European issue, there are still uncertainties and contradictions in the PCI. A European left does not exist, and has no future, without European union. It is a plain observation: no serious draft

programme for the European left can take shape or, more significantly, be achieved in the absence of a renewed Community, with a European government with effective powers in the economic, monetary and foreign policy sectors.

Unfortunately, this prospect of political struggle, i.e. the realization of precise European institutional objectives, was not even mentioned by Natta in his speech and was equally absent in the speeches made by the delegates. It is regrettable to have to say this at a time when the resumption of the struggle for European Union after the disappointing conclusions of the Luxembourg summit and in reply to the glib scepticism of so-called Europeanists, requires strong commitment by all Italian and European parties. Spinelli indicated a precise strategy within the European Parliament's Institutional Commission, but to date no authoritative voice has been raised to defend this strategy. From this point of view the Communist Congress is a missed opportunity. It is not possible to claim to be an "integral part of the European left" without subsequently fighting coherently for those objectives that are vital in consolidating and developing the budding European left.

This lack of clarity on strategic objectives concerns not only the Communist Congress and is by no means a contingent position. It is a historical gap in the culture of the European left. Eloquent proof of this can be found in the Manifesto for the New European Left by Peter Glotz, executive secretary of the SPD, in which there is again no indication as to the institutional aspects of the European plan for the left; in other words, there is no indication as to how European democracy can be achieved. Mention is made of European policy on employment, technology and advanced research, about détente, international co-operation etc., but all the time the fact that without a European government all these fine prospects for progress are destined not to go beyond the stage of good intentions is completely forgotten.

It is true that European unity is not an end in itself. But it is still a vital means, the real sine qua non in any joint programme of the left. Without European unity any programmatic formulation is destined to remain a fine ideal and the PCI runs the risk of paying a heavy price for empty words not backed up by deeds. In politics, where the great ideal options are often evoked only to gain easy consensus, whoever wishes to achieve a particular end also has the duty to indicate adequate means. The destiny of the PCI, in practice its capacity to resist the forces undermining it from within (the decline in the number of party

members, the first signs of corruption in local authorities, the remoteness from the world of the young and so on), depends on the determination and the courage with which they manage to face up to the European choice. This is the sense of Lama's strong warning: "our active participation in the European left is a stimulating and exciting undertaking; otherwise our decline would be inevitable and deserved".

To avoid this danger it is now imperative that the European political turning point be accompanied by a radical cultural turning point designed to recuperate the dormant federal elements in European socialist tradition. We need only recall in this respect that the call for a United States of Europe had already emerged in the Second and Third International and that federal elements are increasingly important when judging contemporary history and orienting political action. It is not true, as is sometimes said even within the PCI, that you can be "modern" only by accepting a pragmatic and non-ideological vision of politics: for instance, the FGCI (young communists), perhaps a little too hurriedly, renounced an essential part of socialist culture defining itself as a "non-ideological organization". But whoever lacks the courage to judge the course of history in its entirety, effectively renounces the possibility of understanding the sense of political action and abandons, in the last instance, effective struggle for human emancipation (the revolution, to use the language of the 19th Century). Fortunately, within the PCI the debate on the "new internationalism and the third way" is still very much alive. It is natural that this should be the case in a party that bases its roots in the Bolshevik revolution and the European resistance movement. And the feeling of worldwide relevance of problems is also very strongly felt. The great questions of contemporary politics, peace, the environment, the advent of post-industrial society, the North-South dialogue, etc. are worldwide problems and cannot be tackled other than with the cultural instrument of federalism, i.e. with the political theory of the end of *raison d'état* through the establishment of democratic power at a level that transcends national governments, and which is capable of imposing peace and achieving international justice. Natta rightly wanted to remind the congress of Berlinguer's courageous statement<sup>1</sup> in favour of a "world government", now

<sup>1</sup> In his report to the XIV National Congress of the PCI (Rome, March 18th, 1975), Berlinguer stated: "it may be thought that the development of peaceful co-existence and a system of co-operation and integration which is broad enough to steadily overcome the logic of capitalism and imperialism

so indispensable in warding off the threat of a nuclear holocaust and ecological catastrophe for the entire planet. After mentioning Togliatti's criticisms of "the Soviet leaders on the nature of war in the modern era" Natta stated: "Many years later Berlinguer's desire, expressed at the XIV Congress, for a 'world government' seemed vain utopia, but given the risks and tragedies that were already occurring it almost became a kind of embarrassing prophecy. But it was not: it was the need to define a new horizon and indicate new ideals for the partial objectives of struggle that need to be envisaged bit by bit".

This is, in effect, the theoretical and practical challenge facing the PCI. The experience of the European Community, in the postwar years, seems to indicate a very sure road, if it is followed entirely, towards the peaceful co-existence of nations once ferocious adversaries on the battlefields. But how can this still precarious unity be consolidated? And by what means is it possible for Europe to make her message of peace and justice heard to the entire world, to guide it towards that world government now so indispensable to the solution of the dramatic problems of our times? These are the questions to which Italian Communists must find an answer here and now. And it is worthwhile recalling that, although the historical circumstances are entirely different, these are the same anguishing problems that were faced, during the years of the Second World War, by the founders of the European Federalist Movement.

Guido Montani

## THE METAMORPHOSES OF EUROPE

*Is the sleep which overcame Europe in the early seventies a sign of a thousand years of abdication heralding a world from which Europe will be absent? Or is it merely a fit of drowsiness just long enough to give Europe the strength she needs to resume*

and to understand the most varied aspects of economic and civil development of all mankind, could turn the idea of a *world government*, which is the expression of consensus and free concourse of all countries, into a reality. This idea could thus emerge from the realm of pure utopia to which the plans and dreams of various thinkers in the last few centuries have been confined".



*an active role in the greatest awakening of mankind since the neolithic revolution?*

M. Richonnier's *Les métamorphoses de l'Europe*<sup>1</sup> gives a haunting and dizzying vision of Europe's life and death, familiar to the readers of *The Federalist*. Both approaches, his and ours, may be combined to take stock of the situation facing Europe. No less than six historical periods, he claims, have come to an end during the thirty glorious postwar years (actually twenty-eight) lived in the comfort of ignorance:

— the end of the Stone Age's death throes. Thanks to genetic engineering, climate and weather will no longer affect agriculture, and natural reproduction will no longer restrict cattle-breeding. This revolution, which began in 1973, when Herbert Boyer of Berkeley and Stanley Cohen of Stanford first succeeded in their attempts at genetic recombination, means that man can now increase cells' production capability and even obtain substances that cells do not naturally produce by modifying their natural genetic programmes.

— The end of the European era: the collapse of the European (national and colonial) system of States which ended Europe's monopoly on modernity for good. Europe's geopolitical decline began just after the Second World War with the advent of a bipolar world dominated by the USA and the USSR and ended psychologically and symbolically with the end of the Vietnam war. The bipolar system contained the seeds of a multipolar system as is demonstrated by the EEC's and Japan's rise as economic powers and France's and China's membership of the nuclear club. Europeans experienced the end of the Vietnam war, the last major sequel of colonialism by proxy, and shifted their guilty conscience as former colonizers onto the USA. Without any qualms, Europeans accepted the price to be paid by the Vietnamese people by American defeat: a future of oppression. With their colonial past exorcized through Vietnam, Europe was now in a position to rehabilitate the notion of power, so vital to any universal ambition in a world of States.

— The end of the absolute reign of capital: the data processing revolution lasted from 1951 with the first commercial computer to 1971 with the first microprocessor. It heralded an era in which goods will be replaced by information as the object of trade; "monetics" will cause money to disappear; capital, at first restricted by the Unions and other labour organisations and subsequently

<sup>1</sup> Paris, Flammarion, 1985.

divided by mixed appropriation, will tend to decline as a production force and will be replaced by the science of elementary particles and living cells. Hence knowledge will increasingly replace private or public ownership as the power behind decisions in production units. While the generalisation of Fordism tended to turn the salary into a political fact, and while the adverse effects of the concentration of capital came close to causing ecological catastrophe with the destruction of the natural environment and sociological catastrophe with urban overcrowding, the first signs of a redistribution of production activities that would free society of the problem of siting of factories now began to appear.

— The end of the "mechanical principle" and its replacement with the "automatic principle": while the machine multiplied man's manual powers, automation is destined to increase his intellectual powers. Artificial intelligence is within our grasp and soon man will be freed from toil and will be able to pursue leisure and creative activities to the full.

— The end of the Second Industrial Revolution: the sharp increase in the price of oil in 1973 precipitated the use of alternative energy sources, the most promising of which, controlled nuclear fusion with its potential for free energy, passed from basic to applied research during the 30 glorious years. This oil shock signalled the steady abandonment of oil technology. At the same time the explosion of biotechnologies indicated there will be a boom in biomass chemicals.

— The end of a Kondratiev cycle. The Russian economist ended his famous study in 1920, the very year when a new period of declining prices began (the great 20th Century deflation). It ended with the Second World War and was followed in 1946 by a new long-term phase of rising prices which lasted until the end of the Vietnam war (1973). Despite hard-to-control inflation generated by the oil shocks, the current crisis ought to be seen as a trough in a long Kondratiev-type movement. But various new trends have arisen in the midst of this crisis which may well trigger off a new phase of growth that will reach its "cruising speed" around 1995.

The seasons now coming to a close lasted respectively ten millennia, six centuries, three centuries, two centuries, one century and half a century. Europe is not surprisingly dazed by this traumatic conjunction of historical turning points and by an unprecedented leap into the unknown. Surprisingly, Richonnier, a contemporary historian, treats these six metamorphoses very unequally: a chapter for the Kondratiev periods, a big paragraph and two or



three points on electricity and chemicals, three or four points on automation and nothing or next to nothing on the social changes that all this brings, hardly more than a few passing references to dates related to the world balance of power (but a full paragraph on European wars) and two allusions to the neolithic era. In fact *Les métamorphoses de l'Europe* is less a book on "when" and "what" and more a book on "where" and "who". The protagonists are not production methods or state systems but the prevailing or rising industrial powers. The reader gains in concrete information what he loses in theoretical formulation. Richonnier is mainly concerned with the decisive twists and turns of history on the march, the rhythms of innovation, the progress and setbacks of the various 'warring' competitors rather than with establishing socio-historical laws.

Richonnier argues that sleeping Europe will have to answer the following questions: How is technological progress achieved? Why does one country rather than another become the seat of industrial revolution? What assets are needed to close the gap and overtake the leader?

To answer the question "Why England?", Richonnier borrows Arnold Toynbee's explanation of the English mystery and at the same time throws light on the Japanese mystery: "The first industrial revolution was the answer England found to the challenge of a shortage of firewood". Japan's case recalls that of England: "as a response to a challenge which was its energy dependence, Japan frantically launched itself into the technologies of information and living matter which will be the spearheads of the Third Industrial Revolution".

England's success may also be explained by Britain's unity, achieved before French (1791) and German (1833) unity: "the innovations which shook the textile industry, multiplying the spinning productivity a thousandfold between 1764 and 1779, required large markets capable of absorbing such rises in output". Besides, this market was protected not only against Indian calicoes but also against the textile industry of continental Europe.

Why Germany and the United States? A unified market capable of absorbing new manufactured goods was essential if Britain's leadership was to be challenged. Here Richonnier fails to point out the technological explanation for the average size of nations produced by processes of 'national unification' or, alternatively, fragmentation of Empires by "balkanization": this average size corresponded precisely to the size of the British Isles, where the First Industrial Revolution occurred. But Richonnier does, on the other hand, point out that a market of

this size was not in itself enough and goes on to explain what he calls the "industrial Trafalgar" of France and hence the difference between France and Germany. German industrialization would have failed without the success of Friedrich List's theories on customs unions and "educational" duties, which were only justified when protecting a country's "infant industries". This idea was taken up by Alexander Hamilton and allowed American industry to express its full potential. But German industrialization was mainly stimulated by a dynamic birth-rate and an exemplary educational system: "in 1850 for every thousand inhabitants, the number of sixty-years olds was a hundred in France, as compared with seventy-five in Germany and England". Primary education became compulsory in England in 1880 and in France in 1882 (Jules Ferry's law) — a century after Prussia.

If the First Industrial Revolution was an English response to shortage of firewood, the Second Industrial Revolution in the United States was a response to an equally exceptional challenge: "In those days American enterprises were faced with a shortage of qualified manpower at a time of sturdy economic growth". Economic growth was of course linked to the home market's growing territorial and demographic proportions. The problem was that most of the 15 million immigrants who went to the US between 1880 and 1915 were unskilled and had never even worked in a factory. Hence Taylor's stroke of genius: streamlining work organisation so as to reduce the qualifications needed for jobs to be performed.

Protecting infant industries is also a feature of the Third Industrial Revolution: the development of microelectronics was fostered by the great US military and space programmes and Japan's heavy socio-cultural protection. Once again the revolution occurred in unified markets with over a 100 million consumers, a necessary but not in itself sufficient condition for the revolution to take place.

Richonnier quite rightly mentions the other factors: in Japan, the forced march that led to the automation of the production system and the high level of education of the population; in the USA flexible working hours and the dynamic financing system.

Europe fell asleep because she was sleepy. This is often as far as many diagnoses go. Of course, on the strength of his well-documented and rigorous analysis of successful past and present therapies, Richonnier is able to indicate by a process of contrast and analogy what treatment is needed to wake Europe up.

First he stresses the fact that European results are not uniformly bad. Well-known exceptions that confirm the existence of

a technology gap include Europe's successful nuclear industry, Airbus, which (sometimes) successfully competes with Boeing, and the Ariane rocket, which has beaten the American shuttle as a commercial satellite launcher. But claiming, for example, that Western Europe's share of the world pharmaceutical market is 30% or that its share of the telecommunications market was 27% in 1982, i.e. significantly higher than Europe's share of the world's gross product, is misleading. Europe, claims Richonnier, is a sick man unaware of his real condition.

Despite these exceptions, Europe's real and deep disease can no longer be hidden. Europe suffers from under-information and will drop out of the "hit-parade" of innovation. Jacques Delors, the President of the Commission often asks his listeners "Is Europe running short of ideas?"

The answer is, of course, that Europe is suffering not from any lack of ideas but rather from an identity crisis. Europe has always been the champion of the free circulation of capital and ideas, respect for others and the rejection of prejudices. The nation state, which stands for closure, exclusion, injustice and idolatry, has attacked "this magical square" and destroyed Europe. The nation state harbours the concentration camp and mass extermination just as the wind brings the storm.

Last year, Europe celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the end to an aberration which divided men into superior and inferior beings, a victory from which Europe as a political project was born. But until Europe is re-established as a cosmopolitan Union, both this victory and the political project for Europe will remain incomplete. They will be incomplete until a European Union replaces the excess of injustice Europe is guilty of with an excess of justice consisting of the following: recognizing others as one's brother; guaranteeing rights and freedoms and promoting the legislative framework on which they are based; working towards equal rights thus reconciling the differences between men while recognizing and respecting these differences; becoming aware of the brotherhood which reunites free men with equal rights.

This victory will not be complete until, by means of the Union, Europe does not oppose to the excess of idolatry of nations for themselves, both the excess of resistance to collective oppression by removing the idols which subdue mankind, thus liberating the person and giving men equal status as brothers in a community of rights, and the excess of humility in politics and organization of life in society.

One word will sum up these two sides of the square: democracy. When Europe shows its true, human face, there is no room for a master-race or master-party.

No other project can justify the will to unite Europe: a point which must be stressed — even though circumstances sometimes provide good reasons for starting with the other two sides of the square, for example, passing bouts of competition or the self-preservation instinct, where Europe is construed as a safety belt and where the idea of European security is forgotten. We should not lose sight of the fact that the loosening of the constraints shackling innovation in Europe, which Richonnier only touches on so as not to drift off of his subject, is in itself a return to Europe's past, a rediscovery of Europe's identity. Like any project, Europe's union is primarily a matter of memory. Europe will be justice, humility, open-mindedness and tolerance or she will be nothing.

No wonder Richonnier, a keen European, puts forward two major requirements:

— "creating a vast common market" which means, and this has too often been forgotten, free circulation of capital, a great European financial market which can "defend itself", which means, and Richonnier is too discreet on this essential point, a single common currency and an autonomous federal bank in charge of the internal and external stability of this currency. The ECU's advocates are right to push hard in this direction: by taking advantage of this "metamorphosis", Europe can break down the conservatism in the way she finances innovation;

— freeing the circulation of ideas, information and culture inside Europe is just as important as removing the obstacles to the circulation of goods and capital. Before the end of the century, all Europeans will be able to receive the same TV programmes in the language of their choice directly by TV satellites. Provided cable is used to serve direct TV rather than being a new tool for chauvinistic narrow-mindedness. A European audio-visual space will be a powerful factor in the promotion of a European identity and solidarity, provided Europe creates its own programme industry right away.

Despite these few reservations, Richonnier has included the vital requirements in his inventory of existential stakes that Europe needs, namely identity and safety.

Europe has begun to appreciate its weaknesses and primarily the weakness arising from its division and has now realized that nations' withdrawal into themselves would be as fatal to Europe as it was to the Mings and the Ottomans.

*At the very moment when Europe was initiating what we call Modern Times, China was shrinking into itself: just when China's navy managed to link Sumatra to the coasts of Africa non-stop, China retreated into itself and erected the Great Wall. The isolation of the intelligentsia has harmful effects on intellectual life. The Ottoman Empire, after possessing the best artillery in Europe, failed to modernize and adapt to keep pace with the West's advances and eventually many years later, in the 18th Century, had to call in Baron de Tott, a French engineer, to reorganize things. Already at the end of the 16th and especially the 17th Century, the current of trade turned into mere exploitation of the Empire's resources and the Empire itself became a simple outlet for European manufactured goods, a consequence of the industrial progress of Western Nations and Easterners failure, for various reasons, to adapt to the "metamorphoses" of Europe, the most amusing of which Richonier has drawn from Jean-Paul Roux's L'Histoire des Turcs. "Modernizing their fleet, improving their ships which were hardly sea-worthy was a possible response to this European challenge. But to do so the Turks would have had to lower the decks of their ships, and this could not be done because they would have had to reduce the height of their turbans... ».*

*Will the Europeans be able in good time to lower the height of their "turbans" of under-information, under-investment, under-education and over-regulation? Only if they learn about the weaknesses of their competitors.*

*Richonier reminds us that the Japanese model is weak on the social side and the American model is vulnerable on the growth side. The smoothness of the Japanese system is bound to be disturbed in coming years. The emancipation of Japanese woman, with its corollary — equal wages for equal work — should become a reality before the end of the century. In 2020, Japan will be the oldest country, the number of people over sixty will reach 22%. Expenditure on social security will therefore rise faster than in Europe. The competitiveness of Japanese firms will decline.*

*The strong growth recorded in the USA in 1984 could not last, if we take the record balance of payments deficit into account. "The US will not be in a position to play their currency trump with impunity much longer... Sooner or later the US will have to fund their public deficit... by inflation or an increase in taxes. In both cases their growth will be jeopardized in spite of their regalian monetary power or they will run the risk of triggering world... economic disaster".*

*Nothing then is lost, but two remarks are in order:*

*— Europe will not be penalized by solidarity if she can combine it with mobility. The European social security system will remain the most progressive and fairest as Chancellor Willy Brandt rightly wished, if the mobility risk is provided for, in the same way that the risks of old age, accident and illness are provided for.*

*— By developing the ECU, Europe can free itself from the dollar and place itself in a good position to take over from the US in steering growth: by so doing, Europe will ensure (and reassure) the world against the dollar risk. Michel Albert has emphasised a possible recovery. Under the leadership of Fernand Herman, the European Parliament has listed the actions which are within the grasp of national and community powers. The ball is now in the government's camp.*

*When giving a lightning sketch of Europe's handicaps in technological competition with the US and Japan, it is not very surprising to find the inner market high on the list. Whether it is a matter of promoting European identity or trying to make up lost ground, free circulation is the problem. It is the priority.*

*The European inner Market: restraints on intra-EEC trade add 20% to the costs of goods and services, thus hindering new enterprises more than in other countries. A fledgeling business can try its wings in the US and Japan where the home market is big enough for it to reach medium size before selling abroad. This is not possible in Europe. As time goes by, the effects of a fragmented European market grow worse: development costs rise, products' life spans decrease and investment becomes increasingly difficult to amortize on the domestic market alone. The Commission's 1992 deadline, however prudent, is welcome.*

*The Europe of Public Spending: Public markets are enormous amounting to 17% of the EEC's GDP. The member states are not using their purchasing power properly. Discrimination in favour of domestic manufacturers occurs with practically all high technology products. Further discrimination favours the big groups. Conventional European wisdom has it that each country would be in a better position to face American competition by supporting a national champion. The policy now followed in ESPRIT (European Strategic Program of Research and Information Technology), RACE (Research on Advanced Communications in Europe), BEST (Bio-technological European Systems Team) and now, on a larger scale, EUREKA is a decisive change.*

*The Europe of Venture Capital: Europeans have been wrong in relying on State subsidies to finance their young innovative*

enterprises instead of using venture capital. Besides, sums invested by the market are barely 10% or 20% of American investment. It takes 18 months to finance a young firm's projects in Europe as against 3 months in the USA. A European capital market with no restrictions or restraints is badly needed.

The Europe of Human Resources: The German precedent or the Japanese model should enlighten us. As we have seen in the historical part of his work, Richonnier examines the role played by the close co-operation between the budding German chemical industry and the Universities at the end of the 19th Century. Today European academics are civil servants who very often work in archaic conditions and who consider businessmen either as philistines or as class enemies. The climate has been improving recently and scientific "parks" are the best example of this. But Japan and the US still have more scientists and engineers per worker in industry. Europe's problem is made all the more difficult by the increasing brain drain, which has proved particularly harmful for young industries — indeed the position for European biotechnology is alarming. Richonnier is thus absolutely right in proclaiming the need to reshape European education systems: the European school of the 21st Century has yet to be invented.

The Europe of Law: Legislation inhibits innovation in Europe in three fields. Firstly, income tax. This is far too heavy and ought to be replaced by a tax on spending, as suggested by the British Social Democratic Party in a recent green paper. The term "tax on spending" is, however, ambiguous since it is not a tax on consumption like VAT. All the money a person saves would be free of tax while the net amount that he does not save would be taxed. Secondly, as already mentioned, there is the problem of financing young innovative firms: professional privileges, outdated legislation and company laws are obstacles in most European countries to instant financing, inventiveness of the financial market and risk-taking by investors. Finally, professional mobility: Western European legislation endorses mobility as a basic requirement for companies rationalizing their production but as a rupture for workers who lose their job security. Future European legislation must recognize work mobility as a permanent social structure encouraging the development of workers' skills. This revolution is called *flexitime*.

Bad legislation, we should always remember, will cause the loss of valuable time, creating obstacles to international competition. Richonnier reminds us of the severe restrictions placed

on steam coaches in England by the Locomotive Act which decreed that any engine-driven vehicle should be preceded by a man on foot carrying a red flag. The Locomotive Act remained in force until 1896 and severely crippled the British car industry for a long time.

He who says law says law-maker, and the transition is easy from these handicaps of a divided Europe to Richonnier's political conclusion which resolutely puts him in the European Union party.

So much for the criticism. This critic finished his reading reinforced in three of his convictions:

— the first is federalist: the recovery and rebirth of Europe is first of all a political issue in the full sense of the word. Only thorough reform of official Europe can give "the ever closer union" of Europeans the capacity to take the wholesome action dear to Richonnier. For Europeans the preparation for the 21st century begins with the European Union based on the European Parliament's Draft Treaty. Europe's citizens now expect this sign from Europe's political community;

— the second is practical: "today's technologies will be out-of-date by the year 2000". We should not waste our time catching others up. We should jump ahead of the Americans and the Japanese and fight the battles of the future. If this philosophy inspires the EUREKA project and other subsidiary projects, then the game is not won in advance but Europe still has every possibility of winning. Europe's chances are not only its trump cards, like the formidable resources locked away in its unfinished construction, but also the weaknesses of its competitors, whose failures and successes will be as many lessons for Europe;

— the third is cultural: free circulation is a right. To come and go as one pleases is a revolutionary freedom. All Europeans must have equal rights in this respect. This review has begun a debate regarding language. The Adonnino Committee has insisted on bilingualism from the nursery school. Perfectly bilingual Europeans could learn two additional modern languages without too much difficulty in the course of their secondary studies. I believe there are two vital points to be made: English should be one of the four; the first or second cycle of university-level studies should take place in a country other than the country of birth. These reforms are of the utmost urgency. "If they fail to transcend the narrow framework of the nation state (Europeans) will not be able to avoid the decline which is ready to engulf them".

*We agree wholeheartedly with Michel Albert, another docteur ès Europe, when he recently wrote that Richonnier "should be put on the curriculum".*

*Thinking of California, where Richonnier, like so many other people, was able to measure the distance between Europe and success, I feel the need to supplement his lesson by giving my fellow Europeans this following terse motto: MOVE.*

Bernard Barthalay

## Federalism in the History of Thought

### LORD LOTHIAN

*Philip Henry Kerr, better known as Lord Lothian, was born in London in 1882 and died in 1940 in the USA, where he was UK ambassador.*

*An aristocrat by birth, he studied at New College, Oxford and went to South Africa after University. There, with the help of other young Oxfordians, he drew up a plan for federal unity among the four British colonies, the success of which led Lothian and Lionel Curtis to found the Round Table Movement, whose goal was to turn the British Empire into a federation.*

*Appointed private secretary to Prime Minister Lloyd George in 1916, he helped him throughout the Versailles Conference. Disillusioned by the Conference's failure to bring lasting peace to Europe and the world, Lord Lothian decided to leave his post and dedicated himself to international politics. The fruits of this labour are to be found in his works which discuss international anarchy, peace and federalism.*

*The passages published here are taken from one of his works whose title<sup>1</sup> ought to make all those who have taken part in the peace debate or who have worked towards the construction of peace culture pause to think. "Pacifism is not enough": the idea of disarming this world, which is based on weapons, without eliminating states' powers to arm themselves, is hollow. Only an end to the international political system as a system of exclusive*

<sup>1</sup> LORD LOTHIAN, *Pacifism is not enough nor Patriotism either*, O.U.P., 1935, ch. II-IX, *passim*.

and armed sovereign powers will turn "negative" peace, i.e. the temporary absence of war, into what Lothian calls "positive" peace, i.e. "that state of society in which political, economic and social issues are settled by constitutional means under the reign of law".

The need to replace the "kingdom" of force with the "kingdom" of law is all the more urgent, as the rise in production forces has created a world system characterized by increasingly interdependent relationships, by a much wider sphere of international politics and, hence, by greater pressures from anarchy, disorder and authoritarian control.

The possibility of conceiving and planning the future is thus dependent on the possibility of controlling relationships between states by shaping international relationships as a process made by men and subject to men's decisions. Failing this, conflicts between states will have to be considered as irremovable and international politics, with its characteristic features of war, power relationships and unequal distribution of power, will be beyond our control: we can only know what has happened, but cannot plan what ought to happen.

Lothian believed that the only plan which will make it possible to face world problems constructively and achieve definitive and irreversible peace, is the creation of a world federal state, which, as such, removes states from the blind game of power relationships without removing their individuality.

He reached this conclusion after realizing that the nation state, despite being the institution under which the process of human emancipation occurred during the liberal, democratic and socialist revolutions, had now become completely inappropriate to the development of production forces and, bent on the defence of its own absolute sovereignty, continued to be the primary cause of international anarchy and war.

Lothian wrote: "Until the peace movement realize this central fact and base their long-distance policy upon it, it will stand in the ranks of those who follow Sisyphus. Every time it succeeds, by immense and consecrated effort, in rolling the stone of national sovereignty near to the top of the hill of international co-operation, it will find that stone slipping out of its control and rushing down to overwhelm its leaders and their followers behind them".

## II

What is war? And what do we really mean by peace? War is armed conflict between sovereign states or states claiming to be sovereign. It may be concerned to bring about political or

economic reform, or to satisfy greed or ambition; it may arise from misunderstanding or the necessity of self-defence; or it may spring from accident or a chivalrous desire to help the weak. The occasion of war is irrelevant. War is the *ultima ratio regum*, the legislative instrument whereby issues between sovereign states, which will not yield to voluntary agreement, can alone be settled. War is a struggle of will between states or groups of states each using every possible resource, including mass destruction of human life, which is necessary to enable one side to enforce its will on the other.

What is peace? Peace is not merely the negative condition in which war is not being waged. It is a positive thing. Peace is that state of society in which political, economic, and social issues are settled by constitutional means under the reign of law, and violence or war between contending individuals, groups, parties, or nations, is prohibited and prevented.

Peace, in the political sense of the word, does not just happen. It is the creation of a specific political institution. That institution is the state. The *raison d'être* for the state is that it is the instrument which enables human beings to end war and bring about change and reform by constitutional and pacific means. Never from the beginning of recorded history nor on any part of the earth's surface has there been peace except within a state. The state may be a primitive tribal rulership in Africa or a vast Communist empire like Soviet Russia. It may be an advanced democratic republic like the United States, a totalitarian dictatorship like National Socialist Germany, or a placid constitutional monarchy like modern Sweden. But peace only appears when there is a government whose business it is to consider the interests and command the allegiance of every individual within the confines of its territory, and possessed of the power to make laws regulating society which the citizen is bound to obey and which, where obedience is withheld, it is able to enforce. Until the state appears there is only anarchy and violence and private or public war. And no other institution has ever been devised as a substitute for the state, because the coming into being of the state is itself the ending of war and the substitution for war of the reign of law.

The state, as an institution, is in fundamentals the same under all the different forms I have mentioned. The differences lie in the method whereby and the purposes for which the omnipotent power of the state is used. The director of executive action and legislation may be a single autocratic ruler, an aristocracy, the propertied bourgeoisie, the proletariat, or a majority of the

representatives of the people voting by universal suffrage. It makes a great deal of difference to the practical conditions of life how those who wield the power of the state are appointed or elected, for the nature of the laws and the consideration they will give to the interests of the different classes of the community, will depend upon it. Civilization develops in proportion as a free public opinion replaces dictatorship as the controller of the powers of the state. But none of these things affect the principle of the state itself. The state is the institution which ends anarchy and its consequence, war, by creating an organically united community, and sets up legislative, judicial, and executive organs whereby its citizens come to live under the reign of law and are prevented, collectively or individually, from attempting to make their own will prevail by fraud or violence.

The state itself does not eschew violence. On the contrary, it claims that it alone is entitled to use violence. It could not, indeed, exist without the use of violence. It habitually uses violence. Moreover, the violence it uses is irresistible violence. A great number of the laws it enacts and the changes which it brings about are inevitably objected to by individuals or sections of the community. They are often only obeyed by minorities because they know that disobedience involves fines, imprisonment, or death. Yet if the state did not enforce the law, and do so irresistibly, individuals and groups would inevitably begin to use violence or fraud to defend or promote their own rights or interests, and society itself would dissolve in anarchy. In one sense, therefore, the state is violence, but violence only used in accordance with law and, in a democratic and constitutional state, in the interests of the community as a whole and as a result of a decision by a majority of its citizens.

### III

In the modern world the functions of the state are steadily increasing. One reason for this — though not the only one — is that modern scientific invention has immensely increased the flux and change in every aspect of human life. The need for constant legislative and administrative adjustments in order to keep society functioning smoothly and to enable its elements to live in harmony with one another is greater than it has ever been. Unless the laws of the state are changed to meet the needs of the community, revolution follows; that is to say, some group tries to capture the machinery of the state by violence so as to use its power for their own ends or policies.

The need, however, for constant change and adjustment is just as great to-day in the international sphere as the domestic. There was a time when the world was static, when wars were waged between kings and ruling oligarchies to obtain territory and revenue for themselves, while the life of the peasant and the merchant remained almost unaffected. That has disappeared. The world economically has become an interdependent whole. Fewer and fewer people are individually self-supporting. More and more are performing a tiny specialized job in a huge economic process which has its roots and ramifications in every part of the globe. Mankind can now only live in peace and prosperity if the constant adjustments which are necessary inside the state are also made in the international sphere. Yet the world as a whole to-day has no means of making these changes, where negotiation fails, save by resort to war. The state, the instrument of peace and for political and economic adjustment by pacific means, does not exist in the world as a whole.

It is my purpose to-day to attempt to establish three propositions. The first is that war is inherent and cannot be prevented in a world of sovereign states. The second is that the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact, however valuable they may be as intermediate educative steps, cannot end war or preserve civilization or peace. The third is that peace, in the political sense of the word, that is, the ending of war, can only be established by bringing the whole world under the reign of law, through the creation of a world state, and that until we succeed in creating a federal commonwealth of nations, which need not, at the start, embrace the whole earth, we shall not have laid even the foundation for the ending of the institution of war upon earth. I shall, in conclusion, endeavour to show that events are forcing us to action far more rapidly than most people realize, and I shall make a few observations about the nature and the possible ways of establishing such a federation.

### IV

If you asked an intelligent citizen to name the principal causes of war he would probably choose some among the following causes: unjust treaties, racial or religious or cultural differences, maltreatment of minorities, need for raw materials or markets, imperialist ambition, strategic consideration, or the arms traffic, and he might end with one of two omnibus words, capitalism or nationalism. I venture to think that none of these things is the fundamental cause of war.



Most of these so-called causes of war, the grievances of minorities, the pressure of economic competition, class rivalry, differences in race, religion, culture, and language, exist inside states. They produce controversy and political conflict. But they do not produce war. They do not produce war for two reasons. First, because inside the state the government has the power and the duty to legislate and enforce solutions in what it thinks the best interest of the community as a whole. Second, because strategic considerations do not arise. The basic cause of war is that there is no authority to decide international problems from the point of view of the world community as a whole, and that in international negotiation considerations of reason, justice, and goodwill are constantly and inevitably thrust on one side by considerations of security, by the supreme and overriding necessity in a world of anarchy that nations must think in terms of what will happen to them in the event of the outbreak of war.

Let me apply this argument to the two omnibus explanations of war — capitalism and nationalism.

## V

When people — other than educated socialists — say that capitalism is a cause of war, they mean that in their opinion the present poverty and unemployment and depression, which certainly make powerfully for revolution, dictatorship, and international tension, and therefore for war, are due to the economic failure of the capitalist system to work. Socialists, on the other hand, regard private property in the instruments of production as the root of all evil, and war as the inevitable outcome of the capitalist system.

I venture to take exactly the opposite view. Whatever may be the merits or demerits of capitalism, it is international anarchy which is wrecking capitalism, not capitalism, as a system, which is producing either economic nationalism or war.

The main cause of unemployment in the world to-day is that the international division of labour, the adjustment between world supply and demand, which under a system of free enterprise is brought about by the effect of price in the market, has been interrupted by the action of the sovereign states, in going to war, — a political act — in creating tariffs and other barriers in the name of self-sufficiency, and in refusing to make voluntarily the adjustments in international indebtedness which economic nationalism requires. Looking at the world as a whole, economic nationalism, the characteristic expression of state sovereignty, has

gradually turned the traffic lights into toll bars, with the inevitable result that people are being forced to make things in their own countries of which there is already a glut in the world as a whole, and some producers are therefore forced to sell them at prices below the cost of production in the world market or burn them or throw them into the sea. This economic nationalism, the product of state sovereignty, has made impossible that constant movement of capital and labour to those places and occupations where they are producing goods and services which, in sum total, are exchangeable with one another, which is necessary to full employment and a constantly rising standard of living. It is inter-state anarchy which is the fundamental cause of poverty and unemployment, of the partial breakdown of capitalism, and of war, in this modern world.

To say that capitalism is a cause of war seems to me to be a complete fallacy. Capitalism, in itself, is an international force. Business men have few racial or national prejudices in their business. They will trade, build, or bank wherever they can do so profitably. It is perfectly true that both capitalists and trade unions are largely responsible for evermounting tariffs, and endeavour to enlist the support of Foreign Offices in their search for foreign markets or to protect their interests abroad, or their standard of living at home — all of which adds to international tension. It is perfectly true that certain armaments manufacturers and certain newspapers have fomented international suspicion as a method of getting profitable orders or circulation for themselves. But these things are the consequences and not the cause of the division of the world into sixty sovereign states. The division of the world into state sovereignties long antedated modern capitalism. Capitalism does not cause war inside the state. Nor would it produce war inside a federation of nations. It is the division of humanity into sovereign states which disturb the pacific functioning of capitalism as an international force and causes war, not capitalism which is the cause of the division of the world into an anarchy of sovereign states.

Can socialism remedy these evils? Only if it creates a federal commonwealth of nations. In my personal view there are only two basic ways in which it is possible to conduct the economic life of the world. One is communism — a system in which production, distribution, and exchange are planned and carried out as a single whole by an economic general staff, which determines everything as in an army and in which individual initiative and private property are necessarily entirely suppressed because to permit them would dislocate the plan. The other is the system



with which we have been familiar hitherto, under which the power of economic initiative and therefore the right to private property is left open to the individual, and production, distribution, and exchange are ultimately governed by the free choice of the consumer as reflected by price in the market, but subject to an increasing social regulation by the state and to a considerable field of monopoly work and development being carried out by public authority.

It is not my purpose to discuss the merits of these two systems to-day. I only want to point out that the international anarchy inherent in state sovereignty makes impossible the functioning of either. The catastrophe which economic nationalism has wrought to the so-called capitalist system is now a commonplace. Everybody admits it. But the problem would not be solved if all the sixty states became socialist states. Sixty socialist sovereign states can no more be self-supporting than can sixty capitalist states. Only Russia and the United States, by tremendous efforts, might make themselves self-contained under either system. Yet it is going to be no more easy for sixty sovereign socialist states to agree upon what each is to produce for and take from the other, with the tremendous consequences involved on the internal standard of living and the distribution of labour employment in each, than it is for sixty capitalist states to arrange barter systems or mutually beneficial tariff systems. Their relations might even become more violent because every economic act would be an act of state which might bring ruin or starvation to other states. The root of our economic as of our political troubles is the division of the world into sovereign states. Neither capitalism nor socialism can function until this anarchy is overcome.

## VI

I come now to nationalism. What is nationalism? Is it race, language, culture, religion, or civilization? Or is it, fundamentally, the product of membership of the sovereign states? I have no doubt whatever that in its evil aspect — for nationalism within its right limits is a noble and creative force — it is the product of state sovereignty.

Differences in race, language, culture, religion, or civilization are not, in themselves, necessary foundations of the state, though in the modern world they have tended to become so. There have been many states whose inhabitants have been divided in these ways which have for long maintained unity and peace. The Russian Empire was one. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

is another. The British Empire has been a third. The United States have been a fourth. Differences of this kind exist. They will continue to exist for a very long time. It will never be desirable that humanity should become a single uniform nationality. Variety of individuality, collective as well as individual, is the seasoning of an interesting society. These differences admittedly make the union or federation of states extremely difficult. They are, perhaps, the principal impediment in the way. But they are not in themselves incompatible with unity, or the cause of war. They exist, and make for controversy, and sometimes for political conflict, within the state. They exist, indeed, in greater or less degree in every state. Yet they are not a cause of war within the state. Why? Because it is the purpose of the state to make adjustments in the interest of harmony of the whole, and every individual owes loyalty and obedience to the whole before he owes it to the section to which he himself belongs.

What makes these differences seem the cause of war is the fact that so often they coincide with divisions between state sovereignties. Then they immensely inflame every inter-state controversy with fear, hatred, and suspicion. But nationalism, at bottom, is not race or language or culture, though these are important enough; it is the feeling of common citizenship, common loyalty to the state, buttressed in every possible way by the law, by the omnipotence of the legislative and executive authority, by diplomatic antagonisms with other states, by the duty of every citizen to lay down his life in defence of the state, if it is attacked or its rights impugned. Everything in the sovereign state focuses in the state itself.

Hence, it is the anarchy of sovereign states, not race or language or culture, which is the dynamic fountain of nationalism, the factor which stresses the separateness of every citizen from his fellow men elsewhere, which encourages him to look at international problems only from his own national point of view — to view with fear and suspicion every act by another state which may affect his own state's security or prosperity, to confuse national selfishness and self-consciousness with the great virtue of patriotism. There, to quote an Americanism, is the nigger in the wood pile of war.

It may be said that the growth of democracy has been a factor in intensifying inter-state divisions. This is true in so far as the process of electioneering tends to stimulate appeals to race, language, religion, and other elements of nationalism for vote-catching purposes. Thus it has been the spread of democracy which has intensified Dominion nationalism and has broken the

old unity of the British Empire into an association of six, in effect, sovereign states under the Crown. The demand for that national self-determination which has Balkanized Europe has been in some measure a by-product of the democratic movement. It has been the vote, with its consequence that those who can command a majority will wield political power, which has intensified communal divisions in India, and which, if the precedent of Europe prevails, is tending to break India into states based upon race and religion, as the unifying power of Britain is withdrawn. It is certainly true that the peacemakers of 1919 had an infinitely more difficult task than the diplomats of 1815, because they were dependent on majorities in democracies which had been inflamed by four years of one-sided wartime propaganda.

But while hitherto democracy has intensified popular nationalism I do not think that democracy any more than capitalism is a cause of war or a permanent impediment to a world state. Democracy disrupts empire, but if it receives autonomy need not make for separate sovereignties. Thus federation is the remedy for the disruptiveness of provincialism in India, as it is everywhere. All the great federations, in fact, have been democratic. Democracies, indeed, in temperament, are less warlike and less expansionist than dictatorships, for they respect the right of other to govern themselves. They accept more readily, I think, the ideal represented by the League of Nations, the concept of the brotherhood and equality of nations, the basic presuppositions on which an organized world community must rest. In the case of democracy, as in the case of capitalism and nationalism, it is the existence of the sovereign state which is the dynamic cause that makes for war. If the separate state did not exist democracy would not create it. It would only demand provincial autonomy within a federation of nations. [...]

## VIII

Let me now turn to what has happened since 1918. During the war groups of thinkers among the allied nations, notably in Britain, the United States, and France, in seeking for an explanation for the catastrophe which had overtaken civilization and for the remedy, had been driven to the conclusion that the main cause was international anarchy. They realized that war was inherent and would be chronic in a world without government — as it was before 1914 — especially as scientific invention was hourly contracting time and space — and that the only remedy was to end anarchy by creating an ordered world society based upon the reign of law.

The outcome of these deliberations, moulded by the statesmen and politicians assembled at Paris into what was regarded as being practical at that time, was the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Covenant created an assembly intended to include representatives of all the states of the world which was to meet at Geneva once a year to consider the international problems of the time, and it gave that Assembly executive organs in a Council meeting not less than four times a year and a permanent Secretariat. The main function of these bodies was to take cognizance of disputes which might lead to war and to promote a just settlement of them by peaceful means. All members undertook to submit disputes to the International Court, to arbitration or to investigation and report by the Council or Assembly of the League, which was to be rendered within six months, and to refrain from resort to war until three months after presentation of the judgement, award, or report. The Covenant further provided that the Assembly should have the right — under Article XIX — to advise the reconsideration of treaties which had become inapplicable and about international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world, and — under Article XVI — that members were under the duty to take common action — called sanctions — against any state, member or non-member of the League, which went to war without first resorting to the pacific procedure laid down in the Covenant. One of the primary tasks of the League, recognized to be necessary to its success, was to bring about a measure of universal disarmament.

It is important to note that the Covenant did not forbid resort to war altogether, but only before the pacific procedure laid down in the Covenant had been used. The total renunciation of war as an instrument of policy, which is often erroneously attributed to the Covenant, did not take place until the Kellogg Pact of 1928.

Has this noble ideal succeeded in realizing the hopes of its authors? The League for the first time has made millions realize that it is possible to end war and substitute justice as the ruling principle in world affairs. It has done admirable work in settling disputes of secondary importance and in organizing reforms of a non-political kind. It has given the small nations a place in the councils of mankind. It has been an effective focus for world opinion. What is much more important, perhaps, its existence and activities have broken the old spell of isolated nationalism and have begun to make multitudes of people everywhere think in collective and not merely in national terms. Its establishment unquestionably marked a turning point in world history. But it requires no argument to show that in fundamentals it has so far

failed. It has not been able to secure the adherence of all nations. It has not been able to abate economic nationalism and lower the tariffs and restrictions which have caused unemployment everywhere and destroyed democracy in many lands. It has not been able to bring about all-round disarmament. It has not been able to revise the treaties of peace except in ephemeral and minor particulars. It has not been able to mobilize the kind of strength which would enable it to compel one of the great Powers to conform to that public opinion. To-day, international politics are less and less being discussed on their merits, in terms of right or wrong, justice or the reverse, but more and more in terms of power, prestige, and security in the event of war. What is the reason for this? What is it which has thus inexorably destroyed the real effectiveness of the League and is ruthlessly leading the world back to armaments, ever-mounting tariffs, poverty and unemployment, power diplomacy and war?

The answer is perfectly plain. It is not the malignity of any nation. It is not general international ill-will. These factors exist. But what inflames them all, and is more important than all, is that the Covenant, like the Kellogg Pact, is built on the foundation of the complete sovereignty of the signatory and member states. The fact of state sovereignty is the vital flaw in the Covenant. For acceptance of state sovereignty in effect perpetuates anarchy, and therefore, despite all our hopes and professions, tends powerfully to nullify the effect of the other provisions of the Covenant and to let loose the evils to which anarchy inevitably leads. The sovereignty of the national state has been the main cause of the failure of the League and the post-war peace movement, as it was the ultimate cause of the World War and will be the dynamic cause of the next war, unless we can mitigate it in time.

You may reply, with justice, that nothing else was possible, that the idea that the nations, in 1918 or to-day, were or are prepared to abate their sovereign independence is absurd and that you must deal with the world as you find it. I don't deny this in the least. I was at the Peace Conference and know that nothing else was possible. But it does not lessen in the slightest degree the truth of what I am trying to convince you of to-day — that the League cannot save us from war and that we can never escape from war as long as we build on the sovereignty of the national state.

Until the peace movement realize this central fact and base their long-distance policy upon it, it will stand in the ranks of those who follow Sisyphus. Every time it succeeds, by immense

and consecrated effort, in rolling the stone of national sovereignty near to the top of the hill of international co-operation, it will find that stone slipping out of its control and rushing down to overwhelm its leaders and their followers behind them.

## IX

Let me first try to justify this view on grounds of theory. There are four main reasons why the League or any system based upon the contractual co-operation of sovereign states is bound sooner or later to fail and to lead back to anarchy and war, as every such system has done from the Confederacy of Delos, through the American Confederation from 1781 to 1789, to the League of Nations to-day and perhaps the British Commonwealth of Nations to-morrow.

The first is because every unit in the League or Confederacy inevitably tends to look at every issue from its own point of view and not from that of the whole. There is no body whose business it is to consider the interests of the whole. Each representative in the Council or Assembly is, in the last resort, the delegate of his own state, controlled by it and responsible to it. Every important problem, therefore, tends to be considered as a conflict of national points of view. The Council and the Assembly are, in essence, diplomatic conferences. Thus the League has done little to create a European or world patriotism. State patriotism is, if anything, stronger to-day than it was in 1920.

The second reason for failure is that the Council or Assembly cannot wield any real power. By the very nature of its constitution it can possess no revenues of its own nor command the obedience of a single citizen. For its revenues and armies it must depend upon the subventions and contingents of the sovereign states. If these are withheld it is powerless. If there is a conflict of opinion between the League and any member or state the allegiance of the individual citizen is owed to the state and not to the League. All experience shows that in Leagues and Confederations sovereign units invariably fail to act together. They may fail because of internal difficulties of their own, because they dislike the policy, or because no direct national interest of their own is involved. Directly one important member defaults others begin to default also. No league of sovereign states can proceed by majority decision. Agreement in critical matters is usually impossible to reach and decisive action is prevented by fear of provoking secession. The League, therefore, is a body incapable either of decision or responsibility. Its meetings may carry moral weight. It may

reflect world opinion. But it has none of the attributes of power, either as government, legislature, or court.

The third reason is that neither the Council nor the Assembly can revise any treaty, modify any tariff or commercial discrimination, or remodel in any way the political structure of Europe or the world, except with the voluntary consent of the state or states immediately concerned. This, in important matters, it is never able to obtain. And it is unable to obtain it, not only because sovereign states find it difficult not to behave selfishly, but because in a world of national sovereignties their policy is invariably subordinated to the necessity of security. Moral considerations are thrust aside by strategic considerations. That is why disarmament is impossible under a League system. Disarmament may be possible for a time where all states in a region are satisfied with the political *status quo*: it is impossible where some nations are dissatisfied and there is no prospect of obtaining a remedy by pacific means.

The fourth and final reason why the League system cannot end war is that the only weapon it can use either to bring about change or to prevent other nations from attempting it by aggression, is war or the threat of war. When the League can mobilize overwhelming economic and military preponderance sanctions may be effective without war. Where it is not overwhelming to use them merely risks turning a local conflict into a world war. Thus Mr. Baldwin, speaking in the House of Commons in July, 1934, said: 'There is no such thing as a sanction that will work that does not mean war; or in other words, if you are going to adopt a sanction you must prepare for war.' To use sanctions is to attempt to coerce a sovereign state against its will, and that means war, if the power or powers in question resist. In other words, in the last resort, the instrument of the League is war. It is not a peace system. It is only a system for making war an instrument of collective instead of national policy.

It was this fatal flaw which forced the Philadelphia Convention in 1786 to decide that federation was the only solution of the problem presented to the revolted and independent thirteen American colonies. It saw that not only could the Federal Government not succeed if it had to depend upon the voluntary support of the states, but that even if it was authorized to give them orders the only way in which it could compel them to obey was by war. The essence of the federal system, the only true peace system, is the division of governmental power between two organs each responsible to the people for the exercise of the

powers in its own sphere and neither having power over or being responsible to the other.

It is exactly the same on the larger world field. You cannot erect a peace system on a basis of the coercion of governments by governments, because that is trying to build a peace system on a foundation of war. The only basis for a peace system is a pooling of sovereignty for supernational purposes, that is the creation of a common nationhood, above but entirely separate from the diverse local nationhoods. To end war the principle of the state — the instrument of peace — must be applied on a world-wide scale. We must bring into being a constitutional union of nation states with a government able to look at world problems from the point of view of the well-being of the whole, empowered to legislate in matters of common concern, and to wield the irresistible power of the state to enforce obedience to the law not on the governments but on the individual in its own supernational sphere, and entitled to claim the loyalty and obedience of every individual in that sphere.

The pacifist may lay down his life in order to refuse to kill his fellow men. He will have done little to end war. The League of Nations enthusiast may bind himself in the name of collective security to take sanctions and go to war against an aggressor anywhere. He will have done little to end war. He may wage wiser and better wars than national states have done, but he will wage war none the less and run the risk of turning every local conflict into a world war. The isolationist may hope to escape war. He will fail because every war now tends to become a world war and so imperil the security of his own state and compel him to take sides. There is no way of ending war and establishing peace and liberty on earth save by creating a true Federation (not a League) of Nations. That is the central truth which I want pacifists and realists alike to realize. Only then shall we begin to move, however slowly, towards our real goal.

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

MARIO ALBERTINI, President of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Honorary President of the European Union of Federalists, Professor in the Philosophy of Politics, University of Pavia.

GIULIO ANDREOTTI, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Italian Government.

GUIDO MONTANI, Member of the Secretariat of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Professor in the Theory of Economic Development, University of Pavia.

BERNARD BARTHALAY, Vice-President of the Mouvement Fédéraliste Européen, Maître assistant in Economic Sciences, Université de Lyon 2.

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