THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

Hamilton, The Federalist

YEAR XXIX, 1987, NUMBER 1

ISSN 0393-1358

THE FEDERALIST

a political review

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and has been published in English, French and Italian since 1984. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE FONDAZIONE EUROPEA LUCIANO BOLIS

Editor: Mario Albertini. Three issues a year. Subscriptions: European Community, 25 ECU or $ 25; other countries (by air mail), 35 ECU or $ 35. Published by EDIF, via Porta Pertusi 6, I-27100 Pavia. All payments should be made by cheque or by bank transfer directly to EDIF. English language editing: Anthony Baldry.

YEAR XXIX, 1987, NUMBER 1

CONTENTS

Our Work for Federalism

In 1984, we began a new phase in the life of our review. The bases for this new phase were the theoretical and practical consequences that we drew from the very simple, yet in many ways highly problematic, observation that somebody must begin to plan their political action in world terms in order to overcome the preliminary difficulties and to prove that such a path is practicable.

The need for a world policy with a world subject (i.e. world mobilisation and deployment of forces) is clear. All mankind's greatest problems are world-scale problems and the greatest world-scale problem of all is peace, i.e. man's survival. But this world policy entails the passage of a growing number of men from national political behaviour to a world political behaviour. Yet, when this prospect arises, it seems so chimeric that most people immediately banish it to the deepest recesses of their mind, which remains firmly fixed at a national level while reality becomes increasingly supranational. We, on the contrary, want to take this passage as the starting point of our reflection and action, however infinitesimal our capacity and possibilities.

Endowing one's political action with a world dimension is an imperative of reason. For such imperatives, matters of ease, difficulty or presumed impossibility are irrelevant. What matters is the rule "Do what you will, come what may". This is the rule with which mankind has progressed and will probably continue to make progress, introducing things that still do not exist in the world, and which for the very same reason would seem impossible to achieve since they have not yet been submitted to the slow, careful and patient enquiry of reason. The first clarification we obtain with reason, if we decide to use it, is that in every case the problem is to take the first step, in other words it is always something that is within reach of will power. For this reason, the central problem of our review is examining the

theoretical and pratical aspects of the first step to be taken down this path which goes beyond nations and continents. Moreover, we stress that this examination must be carried out using federalist criteria because only with federalist means is it possible to extend democracy from the national level to the international level.

* * *

After three years of work, the balance sheet we can present readers with is as follows. The English and French editions of this review respectively have 150 and 60 subscribers. The Italian edition raises no problems, because its distribution is based on a solid reality of organized federalism with a strong cultural commitment and a relatively vast influence. In three years, our expenditure has been $89,000 (77,000 ECU) while receipts from subscriptions total $12,000 (11,000 ECU). Even though our costs are not high (no collaborator, except the translators, receives any payment), the deficit is considerable but includes launching costs. Certainly we will not be able to shoulder these costs indefinitely. For the time being, the brunt is borne by the Luciano Bolis European Foundation whose statutary task is to transmit federalist culture through publications. For us, however, the very fact that we have a preliminary nucleus of readers in English and French, and the fact that we are in a position to continue the undertaking we began without any certainty of success, is already a great deal.

* * *

In presenting this balance sheet we would like to remind readers that no such undertaking has ever been attempted before: a review which, while not being academic, is methodologically rigorous, published in English and French so that it can be read throughout the world. It is written and published only by federalists, with a view to obtaining - in potential agreement with all federalists wherever they may be - the maximum diffusion possible for active federalist policy, i.e. thinking which has both a practical and theoretical capacity.

Our assumption is that to achieve this we need to develop the theory of federalism as active thinking in the same way as liberalism, democracy and socialism were at the time of their historical affirmation. Indeed, we attribute the status of an ideology to federalism, precisely because we consider it to be the continuation and updating of the great traditional ideologies, i.e. of the thinking that has introduced the attempt to found politics on every man's liberty, equality and solidarity into the historical process.

Cultural fashion condemns the use of the term "ideology", which is considered a term that describes an acritical and illusory form of political thinking. And if it were only a question of words no question would be raised. But the fact is that if we renounce the use of words, we also renounce the use of things and ideas. In a confused way, but without any terminological alternative that has had any real development, the term "ideology" has long been taken as denoting active political thinking, capable that is of determining action by affirming certain values, recognizing the specific character of certain historical situations and understanding the workings of new institutions. It follows that the abandonment of the term "ideology" in fact casts a shadow over the very notion of active political thinking and is as such diffused or is capable of being diffused. Casting a shadow over this notion also entails losing the sense of values and the future, as well as reducing action to squalid daily "pragmatism", splintered into an infinity of small things which has nothing to do with philosophical pragmatism. "The rational meaning of every proposition," Peirce wrote, "lies in the future."

* * *

Since this is the character of our review, and given the current situation of active federalism in the world, we could not expect much in terms of initial subscriptions. But we are patient. Altiero Spinelli, who had the historical merit of being the first to conduct supranational political democratic action, died on May 23, 1986, after having dedicated his whole life to the struggle for the European federation, without ever seeing even the first political developments along the lines of the project for Union that he himself managed to get appproved by the European Parliament. We know that our fate will not be different because Europe's moment is a long way off and the world's moment even farther away. But we are not giving up the fight to make federalism known in the world because mankind has no other alternative: either we will manage to control the historical process in its technological and military aspects, with international agreements and federal powers increasingly extended to the world level designed to bring about definitive peace, or we will be lost.

The forces unleashed by the scientific and technological revolution are so powerful that without a world plan for their control they will be catastrophic. So far, we have been able to make do without such a

plan and it may be possible to go on like this for an unforeseeable number of years, maybe 50 or 100, but certainly we cannot go on like this indefinitely. We therefore need to pose the question, right now, of the formation and development of world political action, so as to be ready in the hour of need and danger.

* * *

One of the reasons why we decided to start up the French edition again and to undertake an English edition lies in a particular fact and the current limits to this fact. The fact is that there are many federalists in many countries. The limitation is that they are not able to co-ordinate their actions in an organized way because of the enormous cost of intercontinental meetings with sufficient regularity and representativeness. The review is obviously no substitute for this type of organization which we still need. But it does represent a reference point by which federalists scattered throughout the world, without any information about others' activity or existence, can be linked together. And with this reference point it will perhaps be possible to tackle the problem of the first rudimental forms of organization and mutual information, with a view to learning about the results achieved in other cities and other parts of the world and upholding them in every federalist circle.

This is probably the breakthrough that active federalism needs in order to develop its potential strength, something which still needs to be explored. It is possible to hope that, with co-ordination of this kind, and with the possibility of presenting militant federalism as a world-scale political avant-garde (even though initially it may not be present in all countries), we could perhaps reach a sufficient number of subscriptions to be able to finance an effective intercontinental organization in an autonomous way. If we succeed, especially vis-à-vis the new generations, then we will be starting a new chapter in the history of political behaviour.

The Federalist

The Baruch Plan as a Precedent for Disarmament and World Federal Government

JOSEPH PRESTON BARATTA

In June of 1946, while memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were still vividly in people's minds, the United States proposed a plan to the United Nations for the international control of atomic energy. The plan provided for the abolition of the Security Council veto and for creation of a strong atomic development authority; the authority was to be granted by the United States, through several stages, all US atomic technological information, raw materials, production plants, stockpiles of fissionable materials, and finally its remaining atomic bombs. The plan - known as the Baruch Plan, after the principal US delegate - augured the avoidance of a nuclear arms race and even the "elimination of war."

The failure of the Baruch Plan has had such enormous consequences for world peace that it continues to draw attention of scholars and some policy makers as a precedent for arms control and disarmament negotiations. Today, when so little seems possible, it may be instructive to look back historically at the Baruch Plan.

It was a bold and magnanimous US proposal. It failed because negotiations were pressed in an atmosphere of atomic diplomacy, and because the plan was constitutionally inadequate for effective international control. Larry Gerber, who has most recently surveyed the literature, concludes that Baruch's "realism" about US national security as a world power, combined with his "Wilsonian internationalism" aimed at a liberal capitalist world order, and supported by similar attitudes and assumptions of other American policy makers, "prevented them from considering the possibility of agreement on anything but American terms." Barton Bernstein has similarly concluded that "neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was prepared in 1945 or 1946 to take the risks that the other power required for agreement,"

such as sharing atomic secrets or destroying the bomb stockpile, as the Russian demanded, or submitting to controls and inspections that would interfere with economic affairs, as the American did (1).

My argument is that recent histories of the Baruch Plan stop short at trenchant critiques of the "realist" conduct of foreign policy, without leaving the reader with a clear sense of a better alternative for the future. If, as Joseph Lieberman has said, the Baruch Plan was a "disastrous failure of statecraft," what might have been a success? If, according to Gregg Herken, the national security state has given us only the "illusion of security," what could give us real security and permanent peace? I answer, with Bernard Baruch himself, before the State Department limited his policy proposal, that it is an international authority granted sovereign powers to control atomic and conventional weapons of mass destruction and able to enforce its decisions on individuals. I reply also, with Grenville Clark, one of his critics, that mere elimination of the Security Council veto is not enough to make such a plan work, but the United Nations must be fundamentally reformed along the lines of a limited, federal world government, for only so extensive a reform would give nations and their peoples the confidence that the UN can be relied upon for their national security.

The political situation in 1946 was certainly more receptive to courageous proposals like the plan of the United States, but in many ways all that has changed is our memory of principle. After the Second World War, soldiers and people throughout the world were determined that never again would there be another general war. Statesmen were willing to bring their nations into closer relations within a general security organization. The United Nations Organization was founded on a universal basis. After the Moscow declaration of 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated: "There will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power," and these words were repeated by President Roosevelt a year later.

The idea of world federal government, empowered by the nations to enact world law reaching to individuals, was in the air. After atomic bombs were first used in war, Albert Einstein called for world government as the only form of international organization able to control the new force. The atomic scientists, who acquired immense prestige after 6 August 1945, and who felt acutely their responsibility for leading science into the business of war, broke free from wartime secrecy restrictions, became politicized and publicly advocated a policy of the international control of atomic energy. Many of the atomic scientists, individually if not as organizations, went further and advocated world

government.

The immediate policy consequence of this political ferment was the Acheson-Lilienthal report of March 1946. It recognized that the US atomic monopoly could not last and it called for international control, even the "end of all war." The authors expressed hope that, in solving the problems of atomic energy, "new patterns of co-operative effort could be established which would be capable of extension to other fields, and which might make a contribution toward the gradual achievement of a greater degree of community among the peoples of the world." As for the actual mechanism of international control, they limited themselves to an authority to superatomic disarmament and to maintain "strategic balance," without powers of enforcement. The authority could only provide an early warning system; in case of great power violation, all nations would revert to atomic development and production of bombs, just as in an uncontrolled arms race. The only enforcement conceivable was war.

Bernard Baruch's unique contribution was to conceive of enforcement on individuals, as in the contemporaneous trials at Nuremberg. Baruch was conscious of the honor of his appointment as US delegate to the newly created UN Atomic Energy Commission and of his historic opportunity to bring atomic energy under international control at the very start of the atomic age. He demanded and received a part in determining policy. From March to June 1946, he assembled a team of aides, wrestled with the issue, and eventually prevailed on President Truman to set a policy for the effective limitation of US sovereignty under the proposed atomic development authority. In the process, a first-rate internal debate about the world government implications of an adequate plan - very little known to this day - took place between Baruch and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The debate revealed the fundamental difficulty of all plans for effective disarmament.

Baruch's original idea was that the United Nations should be strengthened. Acheson squelched the idea: any new organization, like the UN itself, could only be established by *treaty*. But Baruch was convinced that atomic energy was revolutionary, that the only way now to satisfy the people's demand for peace was to abolish war once and for all, and he discussed such measures as a unilateral testing moratorium, control of conventional weapons of mass destruction, elimination of the veto power, world command of all armed forces, reduction of national forces to police levels, constitutional prohibitions against the threat or use of force in international relations, and enlarged world courts. "This may seem like an ambitious program," he wrote

privately, "but here is the opportunity to go towards the light at the end of the tunnel - eternal peace."

When the team began to explore the difficult question of what to do in case of violations, they recognized that the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal was a deception. It did not really provide controls and safeguards, nor did it abolish war. The public were being misled. Acheson retorted that the only alternatives were collective security, which meant war, or world government, which meant not a "damned thing." Any government is based on the emotional, spiritual acceptance of it by 95 per cent of the people. Not a fraction of that would exist for any new world government. Nevertheless, Baruch continued to maintain with Secretary of State James Byrnes and later with the President that some power of enforcement was essential, and it could only be provided by an enlarged international court or tribunal like that at Nuremberg for enforcement on individuals. An early warning system, he remarked at one point, was not "worth a damn." "Why not try to do the thing which must be done, rather than do something piecemeal which would raise hopes for peace, but never quiet the fears of war ?"

Finally, on 7 June, Baruch won the President's agreement, and on the 14th he announced the US plan in the UN with a stirring speach that reads well to this day. But the plan was not well thought out. It remained the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal, with Baruch's elimination of the Security Council veto and some florid talk about "individual responsibilty and punishment" added on; nothing was said about cessation of U.S. testing as a good faith gesture, and the time-table for implementation of full international control was passed over in silence.

The *New York Times* reported glowingly that the United States had made a first step toward a "world government over split atoms." The Russian press was suspicious of any Western proposal to convert the United Nations into a "world state" whose "mission it will be to save the world from atomic war." Grenville Clark, a prominent New York attorney who had worked with Secretary of War Henry Stimson during the war and who now was concentrating on the organization of peace, wrote Baruch that abolishing the veto, while leaving the league structure of the UN intact, was not enough to make the international control of atomic energy really work. The General Assembly would have to be transformed into a world legislature, according to a plan of weighted representation, for abolition of the veto to be acceptable to the Russians. They have to feel that they can carry decisions in the international organization on their merits. Then the Security Council

would have to become an executive branch, and the World Court a judiciary.

There was never any fundamental modification of the US plan in subsequent negotiations. A few days later Andrei Gromyko presented a Soviet plan that called for a convention to "outlaw" atomic weapons, destruction of the American stockpile, and *then* establishment of a system of control to insure compliance with the convention. National authorities would enforce the treaty commitments. He absolutely rejected the proposal to abolish the veto, since the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council was one of the cornerstones of the United Nations.

As the essence of the American proposal was limitation of sovereignty, so that of the Soviet was equality of sovereign power. The Americans demanded agreement on a control system before abolition of nuclear weapons; the Soviets, abolition before control. This initial Soviet response was seemingly so fundamentally contrary to the spirit of the American proposal that it was wideley viewed as a rejection. But actually, the "outlawing" of nuclear weapons was an idea that had occurred first to the Acheson-Lilienthal group about six months before; the logic of the problem compelled them to turn to an international *authority*. The Russians, too, gradually saw this, and by September they reached *unanimity* on scientific and technical questions, and by November agreement on inspections. By the time of the crucial vote on 30 December, only four sentences (all about the veto) were in dispute.

For the revolutionary project of establishing the international control of atomic energy, time, additional signs of good faith, and modification of the negotiating text were needed. None of these were forthcoming. Truman, apparently to solve an Army-Navy inter-service dispute, permitted the Navy to undertake its highly provocative atomic tests at Bikini atoll only two weeks after Baruch introduced the US plan for the international control of atomic energy. After the second one at the end of July, the Soviets formally rejected the Baruch Plan. Meanwhile the State Department "clarified" the relation of the authority to the United Nations. Abolition of the veto was to apply *only* to cases involving atomic weapons, and then only if not "incidental" to a conventional war. This emptied the plan of all meaning. Then in September, Henry Wallace, the last New Dealer in Truman's cabinet, was forced to resign after he criticized the threatening American conduct of negotiations. Wallace vividly showed that the atomic build up, the development of the long-range B-36, and the acquisition

of strategic bases all around the globe were undermining Russian confidence. Moreover, he declared, the American stand on the veto was "completely irrelevant" since enforcement by the Security Council could only mean war.

Could the proposals have been reconciled? We now know that the Soviets were actively pursuing their own atomic energy program (they achieved a sustained nuclear reaction just before the vote on the Baruch Plan). Their "convention" would not have hindered this program except for final production of bombs. But neither would it have interfered with the American program, except to require destruction of existing bomb stockpiles. The ores, reactors, plants, labs, and fissionable materials were technically exempt. The international authority proposed by the Americans, however, would have terminated the Soviet program, for the authority would have sent out a small army of controllers, inspectors, licensors and researchers, who could hardly not have seriously interfered with the weakened, postwar Soviet economy. The Americans, by contrast, would have been allowed to retain and even add to their bomb stockpile until the last stage. "In time in America," Gromyko remarked in August 1946, "your plan will be seen to be unfair."

Acceding to Soviet demand of ceasing nuclear testing and destroying all atomic bombs might have been enough of an American good faith gesture to move the Russians to more seriously consider the necessary structure of the authority. The atomic scientists were quick to point out that the danger was not in the bombs, but in the plants and materials to make bombs. We now know that the number of bombs in the American "stockpile" was *twelve*. Could not twelve bombs have been sacrificed for the "elimination of war"?

On the other hand, the United States had already made a major good faith gesture in the offer itself to surrender its atomic power to an international authority, on condition of adequate safeguards. A like offer to give up a new strategic weapon, on which its future security might rest, could not be found in all national history. Even the timing of the disarmament stages was secretely planned to be only four to six years. Could not four years of American atomic diplomacy have been endured to place atomic energy, as the Soviets said, in the "service of humanity"?

Russian refusal to countenance the abolition of the veto was as understandable as American refusal to destroy the stockpile. Both were shaky props of national defense. The veto was one point on which the USSR could have budged. By upholding so rigidly the principle of great power sovreignty, the Russians were really defending the founding principle of the League of Nations, which had failed them so disastrously in 1938, and they were blocking reform on the United Nations, whose league structure had been proved inadequate by 1946.

On the other hand, the American proposal to abolish the veto only in cases of national violation of international atomic energy rules - leaving the veto intact for larger questions of aggression - was certainly unfair and unwise. Without a veto, the Soviet Union would have been exposed to the "majority" in the Security Council, then effectively within the sphere of influence of the United States. Council action according to the confederal rules of the UN would mean war. Acheson understood this (as did Wallace), and so did Gromyko. Yet retaining a veto over general questions was no solution, for any atomic dispute could hardly not escalate into a general one, and then the UN would be paralized as before.

The proposal of national enforcement vs. that of UN sanctions without protection of veto was a real impasse. Without organs of world law to reach individual violators, how could the international control of atomic energy really work? Only national leaders were apt to be guilty of clandestine atomic armament. The Russian proposal would have national law enforcement agents arrest national executives (Stalin, Truman) whose chief duty was enforcement of the law. The American would have the UN apply sanctions, ultimately including war, against a whole nation whose leaders were arming it with atomic weapons. Actually, the Baruch Plan was the more dangerous for the *United States*, for it would have allowed a combination in the Security Council to decide to make war on the US. This was hardly a "formula of lasting peace." Neither proposal went far enough toward world law.

Negotiations then followed the familiar pattern of the early Cold War. There came an awful moment on the day of the critical vote on the plan, which Baruch hurried despite progress in order to show that the Russians were to blame, when the old man admitted that enforcement under the plan meant *war*. "Let all nations that willingly set their pens to the terms of this treaty realize that its willful breech means punishment and, if necessary, war. Then we will not lightly have breeches and evasions." The vote was 10-0-2, the Russians and Poles abstaining. Although this was not an absolute rejection, and though negotiations continued until May 1948, the spirit of good faith was gone out of them.

This would be the end of the story, were it not that, parallel to the Baruch Plan negotiations, Grenville Clark was guiding through the

United Nations a true world government proposal. This effort has not yet been noted by historians, but it casts valuable light on the US plan.

Shortly after use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945, Clark had assembled a prestigious conference of internationalists in his home town of Dublin, New Hampshire. They issued a bold declaration calling for universal world federal government, in place of the new United Nations, in order to control atomic energy. After many interventions in high places, which Clark's prestige made possible, two appropriate resolutions were placed on the UN General Assembly agenda in 1946. One called for a Charter review conference, the other for a study committee on Charter review. A good deal of politicking and vote trading, exactly like that to get a bill through a state legislature or Congress, took place as the resolutions were guided by Clark's protégé Alan Cranston through a subcommittee of the Assembly's Political and Security Committee (First Committee). Meanwhile, as negotiations over the Baruch Plan broke down, President Truman and Foreign Minister Molotov engaged in a propaganda conflict in the First Committee itself. Russian refusal to accept abolition of the veto was proof of its refusal to make the UN work; American demands to abolish the veto were inconsistent with the Charter and a cover for maintaining monopoly of the atomic bomb. Then Carlos Romulo, the Philippine delegate, rose and made one of the great speeches in the United Nations.

Romulo compared US and British demands to abolish the veto in atomic energy matters with their refusal to abolish it in the context of thoroughgoing UN reform. He roundly excoriated the great powers for their subversion of the United Nations. The United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom at San Francisco demanded the veto as the price of any charter at all. Since the advent of atomic energy, however, many of their statesmen had expressed willingness to limit or abolish the veto. The United States proposed to abolish it in atomic energy matters; the Soviet Union, in the daily operation of their counter-proposed general disarmament commission. Yet all three voted against the clear proposals to call a general review conference for the fundamental reform of the UN. "Is this fair to the United Nations?" Romulo asked. "Is this fair to the *people of the world*?" The tendency of great powers to revert to national programs of military defense, he concluded was "*doing the United Nations to death.*" "We sit here and feel the United Nations tremble. We watch it fail to meet forcefully the great issues in our time. We know in our hearts that its structure

is faulty. We know that therefore no nation - yes, *no nation, great or small* - trusts the United Nations to provide its security and peace."

To conclude, then, the failure of the Baruch Plan meant not only collapse of one of the great initiatives to establish the international control of atomic energy, but also meant the end of the United Nations as an effective international security organization. Or at least it meant the end of the UN as presently constituted. The Baruch Plan was never developed by the United States into even a fair proposal for the control of atomic energy, the Soviet Union did not respond to its potential, and very few countries were prepared to support a call for a general review conference to redraft the UN Charter. The plan was constitutionally miscast. As it stood, it actually provided that a veto-free atomic development authority, under the Security Council (where the veto would apply in full), would enforce its decisions by a kind of United Nations war.

Bernard Baruch sensed that the advent of atomic energy required an effective political response to control it, and he perceived that the veto was the source of paralysis in the existing international organization, but his thought did not progress much beyond a notion of "strengthening the United Nations." The State Department did not support him, and the Kremlin seemed only to delay. Why? We now know that the Department was preoccupied with the crisis in Eastern Europe, it was formulating the containment policy (which was announced in March 1947), and, most of all, it felt a need to retain the atomic bomb as a diplomatic instrument at a time of headlong American demobilization. The Russians, for their part, were certainly very slow to respond to the challenge of atomic energy, if not deliberately delaying, and they plainly resented the American atomic threat to their cities after suffering twenty million deaths in driving out the Nazis.

The spirit of nationalism and national habits of thought and action remained very strong. Hence, negotiations easily degenerated into a propaganda conflict. The United States could pretend it wished to abolish the veto, because it would still command a majority in the UN, where the Western European and Latin American countries were securely in the American sphere of influence. The Soviet Union could claim that American refusal to first destroy the bomb stockpile betrayed a belligerent intent, when probably what the Russians wanted was time to develop their own atomic bombs. They could charge that an atomic development authority not subject to the veto was in violation of the Charter, when really, as Gromyko acknowledged later, the Russians had no confidence in a "majority on whose benevolent

attitude toward the Soviet Union the Soviet people cannot count."

World statesmanship, of a type very rarely as yet in history, was necessary to achieve the "elimination of war."

The lessons for the future seem to be that a fair, adequate plan is necessary for any project of disarmament, and that negotiations must be flexible and pursued in good faith, without threats of nuclear destruction in case of failure to reach agreement.

Although the United Nations by the end of 1946 ceased to be the real basis of international security, it has not ceased to be the locus of efforts by many dedicated people to restore the UN to its proper place in international relations. Grenville Clark continued his efforts to formulate an adequate plan of UN reform, and this was published in 1958 as *World Peace through World Law*. In 1952, the UN Disarmament Commission was established, uniting the Atomic Energy Commission, which had been the aegis for Baruch's efforts, and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, which had grown out of the Soviet counterproposals. Henceforward there would be no more artificial distinctions between atomic and conventional mass weapons. The Commission has developed into the Committees, Conferences, and the Campaign for Disarmament of the present day. The Special Session on Disarmament (1978) very clearly recognized that the goal was twofold: general and complete disarmament, under effective international control. "Effective international control" has gradually acquired in the public mind the status of an indispensible principle, whose realization lies upon the lap of history.

NOTES

(1) For full citations, see my article, "Was the Baruch Plan a Proposal of World Government?", *International History Review*, 7 (November 1985), pp. 592-621.

Federalism and Linguistic Behaviour

FRANCESCO ROSSOLILLO

1. The nature of the problem.

The federalist scheme taken in its entirety (i.e. extended to a prospective World federation and hence not limited to the struggle for the European federation) is ultimately based on the belief that the progress which is underway towards closer ties between men on a worldwide scale presents essential political and institutional aspects. This political and institutional dimension, in its turn, is in dialectic relationship with the evolution of other areas of society: every institutional change favouring a world federation is both the expression of a certain degree of economic, social and cultural interdependence which has already been reached and, at the same time, the vital condition for pursuing a greater degree of interdependence.

But the growth of interdependence, in a world which, at least in its most advanced regions, is entering the post-industrial era does not mean, or does not necessarily mean, a levelling of all social behaviour on a world scale. On the contrary, in many cases, greater contacts between cultures will consciously enhance and encourage the originality of every culture and will provide an opportunity to recover lost or languishing cultural identities. Moreover, the new mode of production that goes by the name of the scientific and technological revolution is creating the conditions for a process whereby the uninterrupted increase in interdependence is accompanied by a growing accentuation of the political, economic and cultural identity of the local community.

In this respect, one of the essential aspects of society's development that needs to be followed carefully relates to language. The evolution of linguistic behaviour is an interesting means of monitoring the way in which the complex interdependence of the relationships between men (which constitutes the social basis of federalism) is

growing all the time.

Edwards notes, in a recently published book (1), that language, besides having an obvious communicative function, is a symbol of group identity. Federalism, in its turn, is an ideology that recuperates and revalues feelings of membership that history has repressed. Federalism does this by acknowledging these feelings institutionally. In other cases, federalism would release feelings of membership that only now have the possibility of emerging. Hence the great significance to be found in any examination of the linguistic situation emerging at a world level, fuelled by the evolution of productive forces which is the mainstay of the federalist phase of mankind's history.

Language is a problem which federalists have always had to deal with. We may recall the hurdles that the diversity of languages places on the road to European unification (not least of which is the grotesque situation which requires multiple translations to be made in the European Parliament). Equally significant are the difficult but recurrent relationships between federalism and the revival of languages and regional cultures and the friendly dialectic between federalism and the Esperanto movement.

Federalists must examine the problem of language carefully, never forgetting that linguistic behaviour is only an indicator of the degree of maturity reached in the process of transformation of society: a process in which conscious human will cannot have any influence, except by freeing it from the institutional bottlenecks that prevent any move ahead. A specific linguistic system, whatever it may be, cannot and must not become a strategic objective in itself, but only a major issue supporting our institutional battle.

2. The trilinguistic model.

The increasing interdependence manifested through the increasingly integrated economic relationships of the world market, the unceasing development of transport of men and goods and the transmission of images and information has been accompanied by the tendency to use English as the universal language of communication. This is a phenomenon common to both the industrialized world and the Third World, where it has been much facilitated by the linguistic inheritance of British colonial domination. But this process is accompanied by two other trends which apparently conflict with it. The first is particularly strong in Europe (even though we must not forget that even in the United States there is an ethnic revival, although with markedly

different features). It relates to the efforts to restore the fortunes of cultures humiliated by national centralism with its levelling function brought about by state schooling, compulsory military service and administrative centralization. Linguistically, this tendency is apparent in the re-evaluation of dialects and the attempt to restore the status of literary languages to the speech of outlying regions only partially assimilated by the dominant national culture.

The second trend operates in the Third World - in particular in Africa and Southern Asia - and is an attempt, which has met with varying degrees of success, owing to the diversity of the contexts, to impose a national language over and above the myriad of vernacular tongues that constitutes the linguistic reality of most of these populations. (This function cannot be achieved by English because of the negative symbolic associations which it normally generates and because of its status as a means of transnational communication). The solution to this problem is usually attempted, according to the case in question, by promoting a *lingua franca* to the dignity of national language (as happens with Swahili in Kenya) or by imposing the language of one ethic group over others (as happens with Hindi in India or with Malay in Malaysia) (2).

In the light of these trends, and with the caution that is essential when advancing a hypothesis that does not relate to the immediate future, we may conclude that the most plausible model towards which the world's linguistic behaviour is moving, at the dawn of the post-industrial era, is a trilinguistic model, i.e. a situation in which everybody will have at least three instruments of communication: English as a universal language, a national language and dialect.

3. The universal language. The diffusion of English and the presumed dangers that this involves.

We must not hide the fact that the road that separates us from this goal is long and full of hurdles. Nor should we forget that the model sketched here is currently far from winning the approval of all those interested in sociolinguistics. It is worthwhile questioning the more serious difficulties that seem to prevent the achievement of the model and the most widespread objections raised about its legitimacy.

We may begin with an examination of the universal language level. In this respect there is agreement - ample though not general - on the need for an instrument which fulfils this function. The problems arise when it is a question of establishing what this instrument must

be. In particular, many people have voiced strong objections against the asserted vocation of English as a world *lingua franca.* Such objections are basically matters of opinion which come down to nothing more than the idea that the tide must be stopped. Such ideas do not generally detract from the indisputable fact that English *is* acquiring the status of a universal language. The arguments used to support this thesis are essentially the following:

I) The hegemony of the English language is a by-product of American imperialism (and in a previous phase of British colonialism). By accepting it, the peoples whose mother tongue is not English demonstrate their submission to the United States, thus perpetuating their inferiority vis-à-vis the United States even in this decisive way. In other words, they renounce their own mother tongue in international relationships: in so doing, they fail to express their own thought and desires with maximum propriety and effectiveness and fail to understand the nuances of other people's thinking. Americans (and other English-speaking peoples) are, on the other hand, able to express themselves in a mother language and enjoy an intolerable privilege.

II) The spread of English is both a sign and vehicle of cultural retrogression since it is the linguistic side of behaviour, a way of life, culture, tastes, dress, etc. which is considered vulgar and which was exported from the United States to the rest of the world in the postwar years.

III) The penetration of English has polluted national languages whose specific identity, developed over centuries of glorious literary history, needs to be protected. This type of worry has, in some countries, led many people to believe that certain languages, at least in certain contexts, have been so profoundly adulterated by contacts with English as to be considered hybrids (hence disparaging names like "Franglais" or "Japlish").

4. An artificial language as a means of universal communication?

These arguments are put forward by those who, explicitly or implicitly, deny the usefulness or the desirability of a universal language and by those who claim that this function must be carried out by an artificial language. The latter use the further argument that all natural languages and English, in particular, have a phonetic, lexical, grammatical and syntactic structure with no rigorous logical coherence, which makes them unsuitable for rapid learning, facility and propriety of use.

The ideal of the artificial language, as Andrew Large recalls (3) in a recently published volume, has been kept alive with mixed fortunes in European culture for more than three centuries now. The issue has thus acquired sufficient dignity to merit closer examination.

The most convincing reply to the supporters of artificial languages who reject the use of English is what has in actual fact happened. The reality is that English is on the way to become a universal language and that the undeniable existence of this trend is the most effective reason for persuading a growing number of people throughout the world to take the time and trouble to learn it, in the awareness that their efforts will bring concrete short-term results. It is thus a self-generating process which may now be considered unstoppable.

People prefer to learn a relatively difficult language, which is ambiguous and full of idioms, but which many people speak, rather than learning a language that only a few people speak, even though, theoretically, its simple, logical and transparent structure would make it the ideal candidate for a universal language. Here we come up against the problem of reaching the critical mass that Zamenhof, the founder of Esperanto, was perfectly aware of. In his book, which was published in Russian in 1887 and in English in 1889 with the title *An attempt towards an international language* (4), he invited readers to send him back a declaration in which they committed themselves to learning the new language once the number of commitments he had received went over the million mark. This figure was never even remotely achieved. It was just a bet destined to go wrong, one that could never have worked out.

The plain truth is that the critical mass necessary for the spontaneous diffusion of a language cannot be created through voluntary action or propaganda - not even when carried out by a dedicated set of militants as happens in the case of Esperanto. The great national languages have grown up in the various countries and outside them thanks partly to political power which has not infrequently resorted to brute force in imposing them. But not even the most brutal of despots (and fortunately nothing suggests that the problem of the universal language in the future will be tackled and resolved by despotical power) would have had the strength to impose a dead language in any significant community, or even a language spoken by a small number of individuals. Power has been effective only where it has used a linguistic instrument that had an independent communicative function as the language of the majority or a considerable part of the population, or the region where the capital was, or as the language of the political

and cultural élite. The proof of this statement can be found in the history of the Irish language. In the course of the struggles for independence from Great Britain, Gaelic had had a great function as a symbol of national identity and, with the proclamation of the Republic in 1921, the Irish government was actively committed to turning it into a true national language, helped in this by the fact that the language competing with Gaelic, English, was the language of the historical enemy of Ireland. But all their efforts proved ineffective, and the decline of Gaelic has continued unremittingly. It currently has the status of a mother tongue only for a relatively isolated rural portion of the population of Ireland. Evidently, the communicative advantages of the use of English (which were directly tied to the number of people who, in Ireland and in the rest of the world, already used English) were and are so clear as to make the call for Gaelic a largely symbolic one.

The example which is most frequently quoted in support of the possibility of "creating" a language from nothing is Hebrew. In actual fact it is only an exception in part, and one that more than confirms the rule: Hebrew has always been used in the Diaspora as a ritual language and by many groups even on non-ritual occasions. Moreover, its rise in modern times depends on two facts: firstly, in the years of the foundation of the state of Israel, the population consisted of groups who had come in a short space of time from many different places and who spoke a wide variety of disparate languages; secondly, first-generation immigrants were motivated by extraordinarily intense national and religious convictions (5).

Zamenhof realized that an artificial language does not have all the resources, both communicative and symbolic, that natural languages normally have, one of which is of great significance: being the mother tongue of a sizeable population. He tried to get round this handicap which is inherent in an artificial language, by stressing the symbolic side of its use and thus impressing on the Esperanto movement an almost religious vocation, which is still apparent in the missionary ardour often motivating its members.

The need to instill the movement with a strong, militant spirit also derived from the fact that Esperanto had to, and still must, face competition from many other artificial languages (Volapük, Ido, Latino Sine Flexione, Novial, Occidental, etc.) each of which is recommended by its devotees because of its greater rationality, simplicity, flexibility, etc. vis-à-vis the others. Now the main condition for the success of an artificial language is that there should only be one: in the case of Esperanto, to achieve this, it was necessary to kill off the competition. Hence the violent diatribes that have characterized the history of the relationships between the devotees of some twenty artificial languages that have been drawn up since the last twenty-five years of the 19th century, diatribes from which Esperanto has emerged as the only language that, precisely because of the not exclusively linguistic character of the movement that supports it, has kept together a band of followers albeit modest and hardly on the increase (6). The somewhat maniacal devotion to the cause of many of these people is measured by the fact that, according to Large, in the world today there are even some poor children, the offspring of militant Esperanto couples, whose mother tongue is Esperanto.

The price paid by the Esperanto movement for assuring its survival has been very high: the presence in its ranks of an abnormally high percentage of cranks, who as Vossler, quoted by Large, said "want to speak merely for the sake of speaking, quite regardless of what or with whom they are speaking" (7) and who, again taking a quotation from Large, this time quoting C. K. Ogden, "are, as it were, the fundamentalists of a not very evolutionary Faith, and in the bitter internecine quarrels of the past forty-five years... have developed a method and style of controversy that is reminiscent of the religious logomachies of earlier ages" (8). But this is a detail which is far from having a decisive importance, because the causes of the unworkability of an artificial world language lie elsewhere. Nevertheless, it has contributed to halting the spread of Esperanto.

To round off the subject, we should mention briefly the possibility, in which Zamenhof himself did not believe, of having an artificial language imposed by the authorities through schools. Two observations need to be made in this respect. The first is that a policy of this kind can, in theory, be successful only if it is adopted everywhere at the same time by all the governments in the world, or at least by a majority of them. Apart from being absolutely improbable in itself, this possibility is so remote as to make it quite clear just how absurd the idea is in a world in which the acceleration of interdependence is speeding up the drive that scientists, managers, men of culture and the young have to learn English.

The second is that, even if, absurdly, this possibility were conceivable in the short term, it would be unthinkable that, in a world moving towards growing freedom in teaching, the introduction of an artificial language in the school syllabus would be accompanied by the contemporary elimination of English by decree. Clearly, the initial advantage of English is so great, since it is a language spoken by al-

most a billion people in the five continents, as to make the idea of learning an artificial language quite unappealing for youngsters. It is indeed clear that, while the learning of English does not discourage the learning of other natural languages, which are irreplaceable instruments for direct access to other cultural traditions (9), the same could not be said for an artificial language, whose use is entirely communicative.

5. Language, politics and culture. Linguistic pollution. International English.

Once the artificial language alternative has been discarded, it remains to be seen if the destiny that awaits us, namely the increasingly strong role of English as the universal language, is as tragic as some would hold. In particular, a reply needs to be given to the three objections to the diffusion of English I mentioned previously.

I) It is claimed that accepting the diffusion of English means accepting American imperialism. But, the very fact of cutting itself off from the world communicative context and denying itself access to scientific, technological and economic information essential for development, and hence political independence, would be exactly the behaviour by which a country now in the American sphere would almost certainly make its dependency definitive and irreversible. By refusing to speak English, anybody with ideas for transforming the world balance by transcending the superpowers' blocs and hegemony - and federalists are among these - would have to give up the idea of making their opinions known to the rest of the world and getting the world to listen to them.

It is true that the root of the diffusion of English lies firstly in British colonialism and American hegemony subsequently. But precisely the fact that the same language was used by the former colony as the linguistic means by which to reverse the power relationships with the motherland, effectively shows that the diffusion of a language is the effect and not the cause of a power situation and hence - at least for the purposes of this argument - a language is neutral vis-à-vis the power situation. As a neutral instrument, it can lead an entirely independent life from the power situation that caused its diffusion. (Think for example of the use of *koiné* in the age following the dissolution of the Alexandrian Empire). A language can even be used to alter the power balance.

Finally, we must recall that whoever speaks two languages has a

communicative and cultural advantage as compared with whoever can only speak one. It is thus possible to claim, at least in the mid-term, that the diffusion of English in the world must be considered for the Americans as a cost of hegemony and not a benefit.

II) Leaving to one side the far from settled question as to whether it is appropriate to consider European society between the two wars, i.e. before certain features of the American way of life began to make themselves felt, as being more civilized than it is currently, we must examine the more general ties between language and culture. Now, nobody denies the clear fact that human groups that speak the same language can communicate cultural contents to each other with greater ease. But this does not mean that they must necessarily do so, i.e. that language and culture are the same thing. If men in the five continents are able to understand each other, this is so because the languages they speak can be translated, i.e. can communicate the same contents (with the partial exception of poetry which is intrinsically tied to the form and music of words). In reality, language is neutral even vis-à-vis culture, so much so that, as in fact often happens, different cultures can be expressed through the same language in just the same way that the same culture can be expressed through different languages (10). English spread throughout the world even with certain particularly vulgar contents. But this does not detract from the substantial neutrality of this language - still the language of Henry James and T. S. Eliot. It is up to those who use a language to fill it with the richest and noblest contents rather than try to unload the responsibility for vulgarity on a particular language.

III) The concern about linguistic pollution has no foundation. While languages are living structures and not petrified in the role of ritual instruments, they are in perpetual transformation and unceasingly undergo and transmit influences and loans. The idea of a pure language is just as mythical as the idea of a pure race. Many linguists, on the other hand, hold all that languages have their own particular structure which defines their individuality, which certainly changes historically, but according to an internal logic and not under pressure from outside influences (Sapir's concept of drift). In this way, they can retain their identity even when they change in the course of time and acquire many lexical loans from other languages, as happened with English at the time of the Norman occupation (11). The conclusion is that an influence like the one currently exercised by English on languages with a solid cultural standing is restricted to a few areas of the lexicon. Considered within these limits, the phenomenon of mutual fecunda-

tion among different languages must even be considered as a process of enrichment.

All this does not mean that a language cannot die as has happened on many occasions in the past and as is still happening. But languages certainly do not die because they become unrecognizable through the effects of linguistic pollution, but simply because they cease to be used as a means of communication.

Finally, consideration must be made as regards the destiny of English as a universal language. On the basis of the tendencies already clearly perceptible in current usage, we should expect that the more the role of English as a universal language gains momentum, the more its use will tend to become distinguished in the different national varieties. There already exists an international English with its own clearly defined characteristics. This process of identification is destined to continue thanks to the contributions, that will become increasingly intense with the passage of time, from the national languages of those who, in ever-growing numbers, will use the international *lingua franca*. Clearly, however, the tendency towards differentiation will become more marked the more numerous and significant the contributions made in all the major sectors of world communications by non-English mother tongue speakers are. Consequently, we must stress that, if, on the one hand, the current diffusion of English at a world level is tied to the economic and political hegemony first of the British and then the Americans over much of the world, on the other hand, full status for English as a universal *lingua franca* will go hand in hand with the march towards the World federation, and hence with the progressive creation at a planetary level of relationships of equality among peoples both from the political and economic standpoint.

The development of international English will be encouraged by the existence of many national varieties of English, which in their turn are undergoing a process of increasingly marked reciprocal differentiation encouraged by a work of standardization that is not carried out with the intention of unifying the use of English in the entire English-speaking area, but with the opposite function of describing the autonomous evolution of different national varieties. We must, moreover, remember that in English-speaking countries, where the greatest undertakings in lexicography of all time have been made, the descriptive attitude to language traditionally prevails over the prescriptive (12), as is demonstrated by the absence of official bodies entrusted with the task of establishing the correct use of the language, as happens in other countries with institutions such as the *Académie*

française, the *Accademia della Crusca* or the *Real Academia Española* (13). This is linked to the traditionally tolerant attitude of English mother tongue speakers to errors and linguistic imperfections that non-mother tongue speakers of English perpetrate. These features in their turn depend on the great geographical distribution of English mother tongue populations, i.e. on the very fact which has turned English into the only natural candidate for the status of a universal *lingua franca.*

6. National languages.

An institutional federal mechanism can live and work effectively only if it is backed up by coherent social behaviour. The essential characteristic of this behaviour is a plurality of loyalties, the fact that men do not feel they are members of only one community, but of a series of communities of different dimensions but equal significance and dignity, for each of which there is a different variant of mankind's culture. Language is a major instrument for easier and more immediate access to one or more cultures expressed in that language.

Multilingualism is hence an important characteristic of federal social behaviour that is slowly taking shape in the world and thanks to whose progressive introduction the ideal of a World federation begins to take on the concreteness of a political objective even though not an immediately attainable one.

Evidently, all this does not mean that, in a post-industrial model of World federation there should be a distinct linguistic area for every sphere of self-government. It only means that multilingualism - and in particular trilingualism - which seems to me to constitute the arrival point of the current process of transformation, is destined to be an important component in the articulated cultural identity of the citizen of the future World federation. In this respect, the national linguistic level plays a vital role. In its absence, we would have a direct universal language-vernacular opposition, and the linguistic expression of the cultural originality of every human group would be entrusted exclusively to a communicative instrument used in extremely restricted environments, not standardized or suited to expressing contents which are simply as restricted as its area of diffusion. The absence of an intermediate linguistic environment with sufficiently large geographical dimensions to effectively counterbalance the use of a universal language, would hence seriously upset a balance which is important in guaranteeing a suitable cultural basis for federalism.

National languages must thus be considered as an instrument of decisive importance for the protection of the individuality of various traditional cultures, and in particular those which have their own literature, poetry and theatre.

All this does not mean, it should be stressed, that language is an indispensable factor in the formation and maintenance of a cultural identity, not even the national one (so much so that there are human groups which consider themselves nations though they speak several languages or share their language with other nations). It means, however, that language is a privileged vehicle for immediate access to a cultural tradition: hence the diffusion of a national language to all inhabitants in a certain territory is rightly considered as an essential moment in the process of nation building.

7. National languages in the industrialized world and in the Third World.

The problem of the survival - or the creation and strengthening - of a national linguistic level takes on a radically different shape in Europe and the Third World.

In Europe what is prospectively at stake is the capacity of the national languages to respond to the challenges of the post-industrial era. It seems to me to be beyond question that the great historical languages - used for written and oral communication by national communities of tens of millions of men, rigorously standardized and strengthened in their prestige by long-standing literary tradition - are destined to have a long historical life even though they will continue to evolve in the future as they always have in the past. More uncertain is the fate of languages on which the status of a national language was imposed in the most exasperated and chaotic phase of the struggles for national independence in Europe (I am thinking in particular of certain Balkan languages) (14). These are languages that are spoken by groups of a few million people and which have a much less consolidated literary tradition than the languages of the great nations of Western Europe. Now it is clear that the existence of these languages is questioned by the growing interdependence of the culture market. The existence of a potential book market limited to a restricted number of readers will tend in the future to dissuade anyone from undertaking the career of writer in a language such as Greek or Romanian. For this reason, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that the increasingly rapid evolution of cultural communication towards increasing interdependence may progressively reduce certain languages to the rank of dialects. This is, moreover, a trend that our will cannot change since this is a permanent feature of the world's linguistic history.

The problems of the Third World and, in particular, Africa and Asia are very different. Here it is not a matter of conserving but of creating, or at least consolidating, national languages which generally, in the current situation, are only potentially national languages.

This is a problem with prohibitive difficulties. European colonial domination usually marked out the borders between territories which then gained independence becoming sovereign states in a way which entirely ignored the cultural and linguistic map of Asia and, in particular, Africa. Linguistically homogeneous groups often came to be divided into several states, and most of the states are now inhabited by linguistically heterogeneous groups. Even so, and indeed, precisely for this reason, most governments in the Third World countries, in an effort to give their peoples a conscious identity and the minimum degree of unity necessary for peaceful co-existence which transcends divisions into tribes, are committed, with different degrees of success, to imposing a national language based on a *lingua franca* (like Swahili in Kenya) or by the language of the prevailing ethnic race (such as Malay in Malaysia or Hindi in India).

Now, it is difficult to predict the outcome of these attempts. Some of the new states have such a fragmented linguistic map that it seems hard to imagine the undertaking will meet with success. In Cameroon, to take just one example, the political class has deliberately abandoned any such attempt and has made English the compulsory language of the educational system (and in part French) together with the use of various vernacular languages (15). But in many other states, governments are committed to creating a national language (which is not necessarily condemned to failure) which testifies to the priority importance that they attribute to the problem.

This is not a chance occurrence, and raises the problem of the dispensability of the national stage in the Third World's passage to continental unity in Asia and Africa. I am inclined to think that, in this process, the national stage is in fact a necessary step. It is difficult to believe, for example, that African unification may be reached among populations in which only tribal loyalty is essential in much the same way as it is difficult to imagine that the process of construction of nations occurs exclusively through the diffusion of the use of English, which is a linguistic vehicle closely identified with colonial domination and which, because of its potentially universal character, is not

suited to transmitting a sense of internal unity and originality vis-à-vis the other peoples in the region to the populations in question.

It thus seems that the national linguistic level must correspond to a real and living need in every part of the world. It is a need - and here we must return to an issue that was already touched upon previously - that also occurs in countries where English is the mother tongue since the variety that is spoken in each of them will increasingly tend to acquire its own characteristics just as international English will accentuate its peculiar nature and will increasingly tend to evolve into autonomous national languages, with their own separate development.

It is appropriate to repeat, to conclude this point, that, in a federal institutional framework, national loyalty would lose its exclusive nature. Stripped of the attribute of sovereignty, nationality would lose all its aggressive connotations and intolerance of diversity. This would have important repercussions on the linguistic situation of multilingual border regions. These regions, in a national framework, are condemned to a permanent identity crisis and are often afflicted by the plague of intolerance. This situation would be reversed in an authentically federal framework. In such a framework the absence of the exclusive character of the feeling of belonging to a nation would give the inhabitants of the regions situated on the borders of different linguistic areas the awareness of finding themselves in a privileged situation inasmuch as they represent a point of contact between two cultural traditions. The silly barriers that currently exist for example in South Tyrol and which rigorously separate the two communities would disappear. The frontier regions would become link-regions and would tend as such to develop their own specific identity, based precisely on the possession of two cultures.

8. Dialects.

Let us now take a brief look at dialects. The vernaculars have different degrees of vitality in different parts of the world, but almost everywhere they tend to recede in the face of national languages or English.

The decline of dialects is clear from two distinct indicators: the decline in the number of the people that speak them and the decline in their cultural dignity. There are two main causes. One is the deliberate policy of cultural centralization of national states, which operated in Europe in the course of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th, and which Third World governments are trying to emulate at the present time. It has had the effect of weakening dialects, preventing their use among cultured classes, transferring semantic contents increasingly to the national language and, in general, debasing all the symbols of community identity. This is confirmed by contrast by the fact that the only federal state that currently exists in Europe, Switzerland, is also the one where dialects (in particular the infinite varieties of Schwyzdütsch and the Ticino dialects) are very diffuse and are spoken by all social groups in the population. The other is the growing mobility of the population due to the continual evolution of the means of communication in a situation of strong territorial disequilibria at all levels which forces enormous masses of men and women to transfer from poor to rich regions to improve their lot. This is also true (and dramatically so) for the great cities of the Third World where immigration from the most varied and distinctive regions is particularly frenetic and chaotic and in which the inhabitants cannot understand each other when they speak their native dialects.

It follows that dialects tend to be confined to the less developed areas, from which people emigrate, and thus to be associated with poverty and material and cultural underdevelopment. The abandonment of dialect in the education of children thus becomes a symbol of social promotion everywhere.

9. Regional languages and revival movements.

There are, however, some signs of a reverse trend. In Europe, in particular, the monopoly of the national level of society which affects even language is questioned both upwards through the growing diffusion of English as a *lingua franca* over and above national linguistic barriers and downwards through the attempt to recuperate regional varieties.

The objective meaning of this phenomenon certainly goes in the direction of the trilinguistic model that I have attempted to delineate. It can, of course, have dangerous and aberrant forms. The revival movements, that are currently springing up everywhere in Europe (and as we shall see subsequently, in a different form, even in the United States) do not set out to end the exclusive character of national identity but oppose a "national" nationalism with regional micronationalism.

They thus try to recuperate speech that at the current time has dialectal characteristics (variability, absence of standardization, almost exclusively oral use) giving it or restoring the dignity of a literary language. This is what happens with Celtic languages in Great Britain,

Ireland and Brittany, for Provençal, Basque and Catalan, Sardinian, Friulan, etc. We may note that in this way regional languages are placed in direct competition with national languages to which they are opposed and which they should *ex hypothesi* replace.

In putting their case, regionalist movements can often point to the fact that at least some of the languages that they are trying to restore can boast a respectable literary history which has been interrupted by the nation-states through the instruments of state schooling and compulsory military service and even with recourse to violence. All this is very true, but also entirely irrelevant. Until now in history, most stages in the material and civil progress of mankind have involved heavy costs. The affirmation of certain values has always taken place at the cost of sacrificing other values. If this awareness were sufficient to legitimate condemnation of any historical change, no event in the history of human emancipation would escape this judgment from the paleolithic to the post-industrial era (take for example the terrible consequences in terms of misery and death of the Industrial Revolution). What is certain is that anyone who currently has the fortune to be a mother tongue speaker of one of the great European languages, which usually acquired its current status through conquest and oppression, possesses an instrument of access to culture that places them in a privileged position vis-à-vis those born in a linguistic area of a few million people, condemned by the limited size of the market to cultural backwardness.

It may be added that the trilinguistic model based on English, a national language and dialect foreshadows a stable linguistic situation because each of the three linguistic instruments has its own sphere of application, sharply distinguished from the others and hence does not compete with them. On the contrary, as Edwards notes (16), bilingual or multilingual situations within a single community are highly unstable in that whichever of the languages in question is most suited to resolving the problems of communication and symbolic identification arising in the same social context will tend to oust the other. In the conflict between a great national language and a regional language which attempts to regain the status of a literary language by means of an increased use of the written variety and increased standardization, the outcome is decided *a priori*, and it is right that it should be so. Revival movements hence work for the King of Prussia. By trying to rid local languages of their vernacular status and opposing them in a confrontation destined *a priori* (and fortunately) to be lost to the national languages, they prop up the shaky monopoly of the latter and obstruct

the emergence of authentic pluralism.

10. The specific character of dialects.

The problem takes on an entirely different complexion if the objective becomes recuperating dialects as such. The characteristic of dialects is that they have an entirely different field of application from national languages in that they are used for daily communication within the local community. Hence they do not have, and do not pretend to have, the status of literary languages (which does not prevent the development of a minor literature which expresses itself in the vernacular, and which is generally destined to be listened to, rather than read, in that, when written, it uses rather uncertain, non-standardized and very subjective rules of phonetic transcription). It is their lack of standardization that causes their continual variability in time and space and makes it impossible, in particular, to draw precise territorial borders between one dialect and another. The territorial variability of dialects constitutes, as Saussure pointed out (17), a *continuum*, in which it would be arbitrary to attempt to identify definite linguistic environments with a centre and periphery.

It must be noted that this characteristic of dialects makes them an indispensable communicative instrument.

They are in fact much less rigid forms than national languages, tied to less rigorously standardized rules. Dialect is the speech closest to daily life, the needs, feelings, humour, fantasy of ordinary men, multiform, iridescent, mellow and difficult to capture with a standardized linguistic instrument which necessarily evolves slowly. As such they are also the *humus* on which national languages feed. National languages' standardization entails the risk of petrification. Hence they can only draw vitality from permanent confrontation with a vernacular reality which is very mobile and varied.

From this it becomes even more striking just how much regional micronationalism could compromise the linguistic heritage of a territory if it managed to impose itself, for example by turning a region into a sovereign state. Not only would a poor language with limited distribution come to replace a great language of culture, spoken and written by tens of millions of people, as a literary language; it would also dry up the endless source of meanings coming from the multiplicity of vernacular idioms by standardizing a single variety and promoting it to the dignity of the official language of the region.

It is easy to imagine that the variety liable to suffer this destiny

would, in the majority of cases, be the spoken language of the regional capital, which would become the primary symbol of the cultural identity of the population in the region. Now, as we have seen, the essential characteristic - and the source of the vitality - of dialects is precisely their infinite territorial variety which allows every single community to have its own independent cultural identity which is different from all the others. When a single variety becomes the symbol of regional identity, all the others would be degraded to "impure" manifestations of the same identity. National cultural centralisation would be replaced by a regional one, much more suffocating and oppressive because it is much narrower and poorer in content.

11. The New Pluralism.

One of the essential characteristics of dialects is to express, on the one hand, the infinitely differentiated linguistic identity of every single local community but, at the same time, to reflect the *continuity* of speech in a territory. In Europe, apart from an extremely small number of linguistic frontiers which have generally been maintained artificially by feeding political and ideological tensions, vernaculars change imperceptibly passing from one point to another in the territory, so that the differences between the ways of speaking in two different places increases in proportion to the distance between them. Dialect is thus not a factor of conflict, but of agreement between territorially close communities. In this way it is clear that the problem connected with the dialectal level and its function of safeguarding the variety of linguistic expressions in the territory have nothing to do with what in the United States is called New Pluralism (18). This expression designates a trend, manifested with particular force in the seventies by groups of immigrants attempting to recuperate their original national cultural identity. This aspiration to return to one's roots runs counter to the idea of assimilation and the melting pot, which has constituted the essential symbolic element in the formation of the American identity. The leaders of the movements which are collectively called New Pluralism claim that the melting pot is only an ideology, which serves to hide and justify the political, cultural and economic predomination of the oldest level of the population, the so-called WASPs (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants). They argue that the best way to oppose this domination would thus be to refuse assimilation and keep one's own original cultural character.

What seems to me to be important is to stress the fact that this

"pluralism" is the exact contrary of what is manifested through the variety of dialects. The pluralism of dialects is the result of a deep attachment of the population to the territory, while the result of simultaneous presence in the same territorial horizon of communities having profoundly different cultural and linguistic matrices is the reverse: the uprooting which followed the exasperated geographical mobility that arose in the last century owing to increased interdependence in a framework of growing territorial disequilibria. Thus while the variability of dialects is the sign of the strong consistency of the social structure, the co-existence of completely different cultures in the same city or the same quarter is the sign of a pathological situation of social disgregation.

12. Towards a less mobile society.

One of the principal tenets of federalism is upgrading local communities (even culturally) and hence promoting pluralism. But the demand for pluralism, in the form in which it is carried out by ethnic minorities in the United States, or at least by their most intransigent leaders, were it to be successful, would mean the end of an American identity and the dissolution of American society in a jumble of opposing groups not capable of a common design. This means that a healthy cultural pluralism in the United States of tomorrow could only develop on the territory as the variable expression of a single American identity and hence after the problem of the assimilation of linguistic minorities has been resolved.

All this leads to the question of mobility. It must be noted that mobility is the origin of ethnic and linguistic problems in Europe and the United States, as well as the cause of the decadence of dialects in Europe. Moreover, mobility is commonly considered as a specific connotation of modern civilization and increased interdependence, and hence is thought of as being destined to become accentuated with the advancing of the process.

In reality it is a connotation typical of a specific phase in the process of industrialization, and, moreover, of a phase which is about to be transcended. Perhaps the most promising of the prospects opened up by the scientific and technological revolution is the end to territorial disequilibria. This means that everybody will have the possibility of leading a rich and creative life in his birthplace to which he is tied by feelings, memories and affinities. In this prospect mobility is reduced to the movements that everyone will decide to carry out to en-

rich their own culture and to satisfy their own curiosity or other freely determined motivations while mobility determined by need would disappear. Men would find their roots again. They would thus create the conditions for the rejuvenation of dialects where these are still diffuse and for their restoration where they are dying out.

13. Linguistic behaviour and territorial equilibrium.

In a federal model of post-industrial society the political, economic and social factors which in the past have reduced the use of dialects and have contributed to their cultural degradation would disappear. On the one hand, in a federal institutional system the nation-state would lose its exclusive character and national languages would be deprived of their current function of supporting the ideology of the nation as the only reference point for feelings of group identification. Dialects would thus recuperate great freedom, as has already happened in Switzerland, where they still have communicative functions long since lost in the unitary states of the European continent. Moreover, the progressive affirmation of the scientific and technological revolution governed by the instrument of multi-tier planning would allow local communities to reacquire functions - including cultural functions - from which they have been expropriated by great cities. Culture as a non-professional fact would thus tend to become the heritage of everybody. At the same time for the same reason the incentives which have so far inspired intellectuals (taken as the professional operators of culture) to reside in capitals or at the very least major cities and abandon their territorial roots identifying themselves as a national class would be lost. Finally, as we have already seen, a balanced territorial policy would reduce emigration to the minimum and make the reciprocal ties between the members of the same community more stable. It would thus encourage the restoration of local varieties and the linguistic differentiation between different communities in proportion to their distance.

Clearly, this trend would act vigorously also in those areas where spoken varieties have a past history as literary languages. But it should be pointed out that they would be recuperated not as languages but as dialects. Moreover, the same trend would operate where dialects have been completely removed or where their cultural decay makes their restoration improbable. In these places the trend would be towards the progressive formation of new dialects, i.e. idioms reflecting the specific cultural temperament of every single community: the very

temperament which today tends to dissolve in the cauldron of national culture but to which the stability of the social composition of every compartment in the territory and the intensity of the community life would restore vigour.

14. Conclusion.

Three brief considerations remain.

I) The first is that multilingualism is a perfectly natural feature of human groups. However, the national state has tried to obliterate this simple fact which, in the absence of interference by political power, is characteristic even, and particularly, of not very highly cultured classes. Our trilinguistic model does not thus run counter to the boundaries of normal linguistic behaviour. The only indispensable prerequisite for a multilinguistic situation to become stable is, as we have seen, for every language to have a well-defined field of application which does not coincide with the field of other languages (19). In our model, the contents of the universal language are supranational politics, science, technology, economics, world cultural communication. The national language's content is national policy, literature and the theatre, as well as messages from the mass media, the legal system and the national bureaucracy. It also serves as the main vehicle for teaching in schools, while dialect relates to daily speech and local oral culture (dialectal theatre, etc.) (20).

II) The second is that multilingualism enriches each of the languages used in every point of the territory. Indeed, while each of the languages used has a distinct field of application, interference necessarily arises. Thus the powers of expression of every individual are increased while among the various linguistic levels there is a continuous interplay, comparison of meanings and exchange of words and phrases. It may be concluded that with multilingualism communication is destined to become more lively, more penetrating and capable of keeping pace with the evolution of reality in all its aspects than with monolingualism.

III) The third and final consideration is that Western Europe - even from the standpoint of the evolution of the linguistic instruments of communication, as well as from the political and institutional standpoint - is the region called upon to experiment federal solutions destined to be exported to the rest of the world. It is, in fact, the geographical area in which the greatest urgency is felt as regards the need for a universal language. The European Parliament with its army of

translators is the symbol of the chaos in which the linguistic Babel risks throwing political, economic and social ties between the citizens of the Old Continent's states. On the other hand, Western Europe is the region where national languages were born and took hold. These national languages have served as vehicles for the expression of Western culture (the culture which whether we like it or not is becoming the culture of the world). These languages are still fully alive and are a model for countries which are committed to the difficult task of linguistic planning, namely acquiring a national instrument of communication and symbolic identification. Finally, Western Europe is an area in which dialects, even though often reduced in diffusion and degraded in cultural dignity, are often spoken and may recover full vigour as soon as the appropriate conditions arise.

NOTES

(1) Cfr. JOHN EDWARDS, *Language, Society and Identity*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1985. Cfr. in particular the Chap. III: "Language Maintenance and Language Shift".

(2) See the interesting collection of case studies edited by CHRIS KENNEDY, *Language Planning and Language Education*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1983.

(3) ANDREW LARGE, *The Artificial Language Movement*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1985.

(4) New York, Holt, 1889.

(5) Cfr. for Irish and Hebrew, JOHN EDWARDS, *Op. cit.*, pp. 53ff. and 86-88.

(6) ANDREW LARGE, (*Op. cit.* pp. 94ff.) stresses the difficulty of obtaining precise estimates both as regards the diffusion of the skilled use of Esperanto and as regards the number of associates belonging to organizations which are members of the Universal Esperanto Association (UEA). As regards the first figure, estimates run between a few hundred thousands to 15 million, throughout the world (but in highly varying proportions from one country to another). Moreover, the concept of skilled use of Esperanto is not clearly definable, and certainly many people who show nothing more than sympathy for Esperanto are catalogued as Esperanto speakers when they can barely speak a word of the language. As regards the second figure estimates are below 50.000.

(7) ANDREW LARGE, *Op. cit.*, p. 201.

(8) ANDREW LARGE, *Op. cit.*, p. 126.

(9) There are grounds for arguing that learning English from the start of school life and hence mastering it from early childhood as well as one's own language would leave the young with much more time and energy to dedicate to subsequent learning of other literary languages.

(10) The problem of the relationship between language and culture is very complex and controversial and in this respect it is impossibile to make more than a passing reference. It should be remembered that from Humboldt onwards to Quine's sophisticated studies on synonyms, nobody has questioned the argument that some meanings in a language may be understood only by analyzing the language in question in the cultural context in which it is used. If, therefore, we posit the case of two profoundly different cultures, which come into contact with each other for the first time, there can be no doubt that for a certain period of time a certain number of expressions in the various languages will be untranslatable.

If, in spite of all this, we emphasize, following Sapir, the neutrality of language vis-à-vis culture, we merely wish to state that untranslatability relates only to a part of our two hypothetical languages. It is a contingent historical fact and not a structural characteristic.

History in fact shows that it is always possible, even though with varying degrees of difficulty, to learn a language with a structure very different from one's own and hence acquire the necessary competence to act as an interpreter between two speakers each of whom only speaks one of the two languages in question. This means that, after a more or less long period of learning, it will always be possible to use one's own language to express the contents of another culture and inversely use another language to express the contents of one's own culture.

This may happen because apart from the differences between cultures there is still a way of looking at the world which is roughly common to all men and which makes it possible for all to share a few common reference points and rules thanks to which it is possibile to achieve a preliminary approximative switching of the linguistic code of every speaker into that of all the others. Here we come up against something which resembles Chomsky's universal grammar. On this basis it is possible to advance towards an understanding of the most extraneous aspects of the various cultures and the translation of the attendant linguistic expressions, possibly by means of an instrument which has had a decisive role in the formation of all the European languages: loan words.

Since the contacts between cultures become more intense with the passage of time so much so that there is now practically no human group which can consider itself completely isolated from a cultural standpoint, understanding between cultures and the translatability of languages increases - even if this does not mean that the multiplicity of one or the other is lost.

The linguistic competence of men is thus destined to become increasingly similar and carry out the task of mutual comprehension more effectively thanks both to the diffusion of multilingualism, and the increased expressive and denotative possibilities of each language.

Thus, I find it correct to conclude that if it is true that the history of every single language cannot be understood without reference to a culture (or more correctly *cultures*) whose means of expression it represents, this does not detract from the substantial *neutrality* vis-à-vis culture in that language, thanks to its capacity to evolve and to acquire new and diverse meanings, has in it the power to express *any cultural content.*

(11) "The force of a language," writes Goethe (quoted by ADOLF BACH, *Geschichte der deutschen Sprache*, 9.Auflage, VMA-Verlag, Wiesbaden, p. 472), "does not lie in rejecting what is extraneous, but in assimilating it." It goes without saying that this affirmation is true only for languages with a consolidated literary tradition. It could not be extended to dialects, which are so variable and so open to external influences as to be unrecognizable in the space of a few decades. This is what happened for example in the Salento, as GERHARD ROHLFS ("Tra Latini e Greci nel Salento", in *Calabria e Salento. Saggi di Storia Linguistica*, Ravenna, Longo Editore, 1980, p. 54) emphasizes. The number of Greek-speaking communities have declined, under the influence of Italian speaking communities, from 34 in 1500, to 15 by 1700, and now number only 8.

(12) Cfr. the fine volume by ROBERT BURCHFIELD, *The English Language*, Oxford, OUP, 1985, pp. 159ff., and JOHN EDWARDS, *Op. cit.*, pp. 30ff.

(13) Cfr. JOHN EDWARDS, *Op. cit.*, pp. 27ff.

(14) For the complex history of Balkan languages see EUGEN LEMBERG, *Nationalismus*, Reinbeck bei Hamburg, Rohwolt Verlag, 1964, Vol.I, pp. 152ff.

(15) For the situation in Kenya, see L.HARRIES, "The Nationalisation of Swahili in Kenya", in CHRIS KENNEDY, *Op. cit.*, pp. 118ff. For the case of India, see M.V.NADKARNI, "Cultural Pluralism as a National Resource: Strategies for Language Education", *Ibid.*, pp. 151ff. For the case of Malaysia see J.K.P.WATSON, "Cultural Pluralism, Nation-Building and Educational Policies in Peninsular Malaysia", *Ibid.*, pp. 132ff. Finally, for the Cameroon, see L.TODD, "Language Options for Education in a Multilingual Society: Cameroon", *Ibid.*, pp. 160ff.

(16) *Op. cit.*, pp. 71ff.

(17) FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, *Cours de linguistique générale*, Paris, Payot, 1966, pp. 275-6.

(18) Cfr. JOHN EDWARDS, *Op. cit.*, pp. 99ff. See also EDMOND ORBAN, *La dynamique de la centralisation dans l'Etat fédéral: un processus irréversible?*, Montréal, Québec-Amérique, 1984, pp. 119ff.

(19) JOHN EDWARDS (*Op. cit.*, p. 177), quoting Pandit, as evidence of the fact that in certain regions multilingualism is practised daily but only on condition that every expressive instrument has its specialized use, gives the example "of a Bombay businessman whose domestic language is a Kathiawari dialect of Gujerati. He uses Marathi in the local markets and Hindustani at the railway station (this variety, notes Pandit, is used in a pan-Indian context but at a popular level: thus it is appropriate at the station, but not when addressing a hostess on an international flight). At work, the businessman is a spice merchant, the language used is Kacchi. In his free time he watches films in Hindustani or English and he probabily reads a newspaper written in a more standardized variant of his native Gujerati."

(20) This is certainly not the place to go into the complex question of the relationships between oral and written language dealt with so thoroughly by WALTER J.ONG (*Orality and Literacy. The Technologizing of the Word*, London and New York, Methuen, 1982). It is, however, interesting to recall that the prospect of recuperating dialects (i.e. almost exclusively oral languages) vis-à-vis national languages (whose birth and standardization is tied to the interiorization of writing and printing in particular) appears historically in the industrialized world at the dawn of the electronic era to be characterized by the restoration of orality albeit in a secondary form. We should also remember that the birth and

diffusion of printing coincided with the birth and strengthening of nation-states and that the uncontested domination of written communication has been matched by the breakdown of community ties that make up the indispensable framework for oral communication. On the contrary, the advent of the post-industrial mode of production creates the conditions for the restoration of lively local communities with institutionally guaranteed autonomy and the strengthening of oral communication by recuperating dialects.

Notes

EUROPE AND THE ENERGY QUESTION AFTER CHERNOBYL

After the serious accident in Chernobyl and the alarmed reaction of public opinion, healthy reflection on the energy question is underway in all European countries. The decision taken by the SPD's Nuremberg Congress "to scrap nuclear energy," with a ten-year programme for gradual changeover to alternative resources, primarily coal, has triggered off quite a debate. The political resolution approved by the Nuremberg congress endorsed the document entitled "Transition towards safe energy without the use of nuclear energy," which was drawn up by a special commission appointed by the SPD leadership. Anyone assessing the political consequences of this energy programme will be struck by a number of ambiguities. Germany (and perhaps Great Britain) can certainly rely on national coal reserves. But other European countries cannot do the same, since they would have to accept increased reliance on external supply if they decided to accept the policy passively. It is also admitted that the changeover to the increased use of coal will increase sulphur dioxide and carbon dioxide pollution by at least 20 per cent over the current rate. But will this polluted air stop at Germany's borders? And what would happen if all the European countries adopted the same policy?

In actual fact, the Chernobyl accident does not seem to have taught much to European political parties. The first and most basic fact which can be the only starting point for a serious debate on the energy policies of the future is that pollution has no borders. Any national energy plan which is not an integral part of a coherent European (and in the final instance worldwide) energy plan is doomed to failure. No European state can currently guarantee its citizens a safe energy supply, adequate environmental protection and enough fuel resources for development, without the support of other countries in the Community.

But when we consider the European aspects of the SPD's energy programme the perplexities increase. The SPD questions the Euratom Treaty, which the German social democrats claim should be used only to prevent other European countries from increasing their use of nuclear energy and "to guarantee the protection of health." Nothing is, however, said about the need to reach a true Community energy policy and the means to achieve it. The future thus seems to remain vague.

It is not difficult to predict, on the basis of previous experience, what will be the result of this approach to the energy question. Given the Community's current incapacity, national energy plans will continue to override all the calls made by the European institutions: the Commission and the Parliament. In actual fact, the Chernobyl accident has shaken international public opinion which becomes aware of a new dimension to the energy question, but without a European government which manifests the will to achieve an effective European policy, national plans paradoxically regain strength. The European energy issue will continue to drift hopelessly as it has done so far.

* * *

Before considering the policies which could be developed at a European level with adequate instruments of government, it is worthwhile briefly retracing the path which has led the Community to the current stalemate. Few will recall that the Community was born precisely to resolve the problem of the common management of energy resources and strategic raw materials vital for European development and safety. In 1951 the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up with the purpose of creating a common European market in a few sectors which were crucial at the time for postwar economic recovery: at the beginning of the fifties coal represented 75 per cent of the Community's energy consumption. Moreover, in 1957, together with the Common Market, Euratom was set up for the common management of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Euratom was justified by the fact that coal had now become an excessively expensive fuel (particularly in terms of the harmful social consequences of mining), so that it was appropriate to begin the process of replacing it completely over the coming decades. The Euratom Treaty provided all the instruments needed to implement an effective European policy for nuclear energy, and had European governments so desired, could easily have been extended to all other sources of energy. Moreover, the Treaty laid down that Euratom could "exercise the law of ownership on spe-

cial fissile materials." Thus, thanks to the recognized monopoly on all nuclear products imported and circulating within the Community, Euratom had the power to decide each country's quota, the rates of growth of resources and new power stations, as well as common safety standards. In actual fact, however, the Euratom Treaty was never wholly applied, not least in those aspects which would have implied strong limitations on national sovereignty.

In those years, European states could still have illusions about their future. The abundance and the low price of oil made it possible to put off the changeover to nuclear technologies indefinitely. National energy plans were drawn up on the basis of the size of domestic natural resources and the safety requirements that they entailed. Insofar as there was a strong disparity in the decisions about energy in the different countries, the basic defect in the Community edifice also became clear: a Community without democratic legitimacy could not possibly take decisive decisions for the welfare and safety of European citizens.

The 1973 crisis showed how various structural data regarding the energy question had changed both at a European and world level. Oil had now replaced coal as the main source of energy for the Community, but unlike coal was almost entirely imported. In contrast to the ECSC years, the Community's external reliance had worsened enormously and had lost all power to control either the costs or the supply of raw energy. In this situation of increased reliance, Europe also had to meet new international challenges. The Third World was vigorously demanding a fairer world distribution of resources and income. The Third World's demands were and are understandable: industrialized countries with 22 per cent of the world's population consume about 60 per cent of the energy available in the world. And since there is a strict correlation between per-capita income and per-capita energy consumption, at least in countries undergoing different stages of development, the industrial growth of the Third World is unthinkable without greater availability of energy resources. Finally, tensions have also arisen between rich countries. The growth requirements of those countries which had the earliest industrialization, now projected towards the so-called postindustrial society in which working hours can be steadily reduced thanks to greater productivity, give rise to greater energy consumption (energy is potential work). It is well-known that post-industrial society is characterized by the size of the population actively committed to the service sector, where per-capita energy consumption is on average higher than in the rest of the economy.

In this new world, struggling to lay its hands on scarce resources, Europe has given no unitary or coherent reply. Each country has followed a different logic. France and Germany have gone for nuclear energy, Great Britain for North Sea oil, Italy for Arab countries' oil.

* * *

After these structural changes, and after the failure of the previous Community policies, it is now vital to face up to the energy question in new terms. It is no longer possible to draw up a serious energy policy for the European Community without the active participation of the political and social forces or without the European Parliament, the only legitimate representative of European citizens, acting as a watchdog over the European executive.

The Draft Treaty for European Union approved by the European Parliament on February 14, 1984, could, if accepted by the European governments, make it possible to turn the Community into a federation, with effective powers as regards currency, economy, energy and environmental safety. As regards energy policy, Art. 53, f) of the Draft Treaty runs as follows: "In the field of energy, action by the Union shall be designed to ensure security of supplies, stability on the market of the Union and, to the extent that prices are regulated, a harmonized pricing policy compatible with fair competitive practices. It shall also be designed to encourage the development of alternative and renewable energy sources, to introduce common technical standards for efficiency, safety, the protection of the environment and of the population, and to encourage the exploitation of the European sources of energy."

On this basis, a European government could have tackled the different aspects of the energy question in the following way.

a) *Safety of supply.* This is a decisive problem for Europe which relies on outside energy sources for about 45 per cent of its needs (though in some countries, such as Italy, it is as much as 85 per cent). To protect themselves from blackmail over supplies, various European states, such as France, have oriented their policies towards nuclear energy. For Europe the problem of the safety of supplies coincides essentially with its capacity to face up to the North-South dialogue, i.e. to draw up serious co-operation policies with Third World countries. In prospect, federalists cannot fail to point out that for years they have been calling on the Community to undertake a great European Marshall Plan for Africa and the Middle East, which has the priority

objective of stimulating the economic, industrial and social development of these peoples in a few decades. The European Union (which could use the ECU as an international currency) would have the financial, technological and political capacity to carry out this historical undertaking which would ensure progressive stabilization and pacification of the Mediterranean, Middle-Eastern and African regions.

b) *Research for alternative energies.* Europe is the macro-region of the world with the greatest industrial and population density. For this reason, the use of "dirty" energies such as coal-fired and nuclear fission power stations causes damage and risks of contamination for the environment to a much greater extent than countries such as the USSR and the USA where the dispersion of the population and industry is greater. The search for "clean" alternative energy sources is thus of vital significance for Europe. But in this respect the political division of Europe has played a damaging role. The member states often finance competing projects thus contributing to the waste of resources, since no national state any longer has the independent capacity to develop large scale advanced technologies. The resources dedicated by the Community to research and development in the field of solar energy and nuclear fusion, the "clean" energies of the future, are barely a third of the USSR's and the USA's research funds and employees in this field.

c) *Safety and environment.* It is now clear, as the example of Cattenom in addition to Chernobyl shows, that there is no sense in establishing safety standards in a narrow national framework. Only a European government, with effective powers responsible to the European Parliament and sustained by political forces and public opinion, will progressively be able to impose adequate and uniform measures in the entire Community even on the most reluctant countries.

d) *Energy and defence.* Any European energy programme is destined in the long term to failure unless the problem of common European defence is tackled. France abandonned Euratom when she began to build her own *force de frappe.* More generally, it should be noticed that the boundaries between civil and military nuclear uses are often imprecise and that defence of one's independence is practically impossibile without absolute control of strategic energy resources.

The choice contained in the Draft Treaty for European Union is a transitory period. Once the economic and monetary Union has been achieved, the European Parliament will assume responsibility for concrete proposals on the stages and the ways in which a common European defence policy can be achieved.

e) *Transition to "clean" energy.* Ever since the fifties, the changeover to nuclear fission energy has been conceived of as a transitional programme to suppress the growing energy needs of industrialized society in view of the adoption of "clean" energies, which it was forecast would be introduced before the year 2000. But this "transition" risks becoming a definitive choice because of the meagre human and financial resources made available throughout the world for the search for alternative energy. The superpowers have preferred to concentrate their efforts on the increase in military arsenals and Europe has proved utterly incapable of tackling the problem. The experience after the 1973 crisis has shown that industrialized countries manage to maintain a constant degree of development and welfare either at the expense of the Third World, given their greater purchasing power, or resorting to a growing brainless use of "dirty" nuclear energy. Chernobyl has definitively blown the whistle on the certainty which lay at the heart of the old energy policy.

A European government could also take the courageous decision "to scrap nuclear energy," i.e. face up to the transition to new forms of energy without resorting to nuclear fission, on three conditions: 1) making it quite clear to Europeans what the costs are in terms of pollution - in the current situation the only alternative practicable is a greater use of coal and oil - or slackening economic development; 2) drawing up an effective plan for research into "clean and renewable" energies; 3) demanding that East European countries and the USSR adopt similar policies to contain nuclear energy or common safety standards (England and the Ukraine are just as far apart as the crow flies from Rome).

f) *Europe and peace.* The programme of transition to clean and renewable energies could be enormously accelerated if more money and talent were dedicated to it than is now the case, in a world dominated by the East-West conflict. For example, in the United States 70 per cent of research funds are for military projects. The nuclear fusion programme only gets 3.5 per cent of the resources which are to be destined to the SDI. Converting these resources currently destined to new arms research towards peaceful ends would become possible only insofar as Europe is able to achieve effective policies to overcome the current political-military bipolarism.

In this respect, the European government should take on the task of operating within the UN so that the problem of transition to clean and renewable energies is seen to be of vital importance for all mankind: on its solution depends the clean development of the most prosperous countries and the poorest countries' hopes of industrialization.

The UN should thus put forward a great world research plan for renewable energy sources (solar energy and nuclear fusion), financed by all countries in proportion to their income in which scientists from every nation should take part. The results of this collective effort would be placed at the entire world's disposal.

* * *

The attempts which governments, stubbornly entrenched in defence of the national sovereignty and blind to the problems of the new postindustrial world, are making to get international agreements and co-operation policies to guarantee uniform standards of safety for power stations must be denounced for what they are: cheap tricks designed to hoodwink the public. Without a supranational power which can make governments comply with the agreements made, no government at the decisive moment will be forced to comply with them. The Euratom experience should be the touchstone when assessing the significance and effectiveness of every international agreement: any energy policy proposal will be able to become reality only on the basis of institutions which are more rather than less supranational than those of the current Community.

In conclusion, without the European Union it is impossibile to tackle the energy question appropriately in Europe and lay the foundations for a worldwide solution. Anyone who objects that the Union is still a distant objective should recall that if the European Council in Luxembourg (December 1985) had decided otherwise, at this very moment Europe, instead of recriminating on its impotence, would already be able to discuss the appropriate means of implementing an effective energy policy. After Chernobyl, there are thus further reasons for going down the road to European Union without dilly-dallying.

Guido Montani

WHAT ARE WE HEADING FOR?

In the opening pages of his recent book on the consequences of the scientific and technological revolution (1), Adam Schaff asks himself the question: "What are we heading for?" Such a question indicates a clear awareness that we are faced with a series of such radical changes which put the future of all mankind at stake. Not by chance, Schaff, an authoritative scholar of Marxist inspiration, raises the problem of identifying new categories of interpretation of the current historical phase which transcend, though only dialectically, the old categories tied to traditional ideologies now incapable of providing adequate replies to the type and dimension of the problems we are facing.

The book is divided into two parts. Having briefly presented the three aspects of what Schaff defines the "technological and scientific revolution" (microelectronics, microbiology and genetic engineering), the first part discusses this revolution's economic, social, political and cultural consequences and concludes with a chapter on the problems of the Third World. The second part analyses the position and prospects of the individual in the computer age.

Each of the questions dealt with (from structural unemployment to the relationship between cities and countryside, from the new model of urbanization to the role of information, etc.) deserves full analysis. But faced with the variety and complexity of all these problems (some of which Schaff in actual fact skates over, limiting his treatment to a few suggestions), a guiding thread has been chosen that discusses the progressive disappearance of the working class with man's new condition in the computer age in which, according to the author, the meaning of life and values in which we must or may believe are questioned, as are the capacity to manage the changes and, finally, the size of the problems to face.

Schaff's starting point is that the emerging means of production in which science is becoming a productive force and in which man's repetitive work will be progressively substituted by the robot, will cause the disappearance of the working class, with a consequent upheaval and overthrow of all current social reality. This new prospect, which places the individual (albeit taken as "social individual") above his own productive role in society, lies at the basis of the creation of a new sense of life. The sense of modern life, argues Erich Weil (2), consists in the struggle with nature: this is the value on which modern society reflects and which it uses to guide itself. In modern society, the individual finds himself faced with a mechanism which he is subjected to

and which at the same time he confides in to earn a place in society: whoever fails to contribute to the success of the struggle with nature cannot expect any share in the benefits. If man wants to live and participate in the advantages of social work, he must turn himself into an object which can be used in work. Thus, until the present time, man's sense of life has always been correlated to some form of activity as the vital source of his means of subsistence and as a measure of his social *status*. But "what is to replace man's sense of life he will lose when work in the traditional sense of term withers away?", asks Schaff (p. 106).

The abolition of work, or at least of a certain type of work, raises the problem of leisure time, and can become the grounds for widespread malaise, dangerous for society that every individual wants to take part in and which he really must feel he belongs to give his life sense. For the individual leisure time cannot become empty time and still retain a meaning. Currently, leisure time is considered only as an interval, a more or less brief break from more or less gratifying working activity and, as Schaff writes, "the problem is to teach people to use their leisure time reasonably and with imagination" (p. 116), by means of sport, tourism and hobbies of various kinds. But the full statement of the scientific and technological revolution and the consequent abolition of repetitive work will change the concept of leisure time: the computer society will not be "a fool's paradise where people free from occupations rack their brains how to spend their leisure time. That would mean a specific pollution of leisure time, which would destroy people by depriving them of their sense of life" (p. 116-117). Leisure time will thus have to become one of the essential components of the self-realization of man (*homo autocreator).*

In this prospect, Schaff attributes a fundamental role to "continuous education, combining... studies proper with teaching activity" (p. 107). This project would create a new type of man (*homo studiosus* or *homo universalis*), "i.e., one who has an all-round education and is prepared for changing his occupation, and hence also his position in the social division of labour" (p. 110).

Another equally significant result of the raising of the cultural level of individuals would be the "stabilization of a democratic society" (p. 107). In this respect Schaff refers to Plato's idea according to which all men admitted to political life ought to be mature and wise, or effectively able to manage public affairs. This principle, which in the age of Plato lay at the basis of an aristocratic conception, can be turned into reality in modern democracies, in which the need for active

participation in the management of power by all citizens is becoming increasingly significant.

But the theoretical guarantee of political equality (cultural and social equality) does not coincide with the effective exercise of political equality. Within centralized political institutions the requirements and potential for active participation by citizens are necessarily frustrated. And Schaff realizes the problem when he considers the relationship between the computer revolution and the way the state is run: "Advances in computer science also work for the decentralization of public functions... This applies primarily to what is related to the local government at various levels, in the sense of its relative independence of central authorities" (p. 54). But his conclusion goes in an entirely opposite direction vis-à-vis his premises: "Computer science opens new vistas to direct democracy, that is to the self-government of the citizens in the basic sense of that term, as it makes it possible to spread the institution of popular referendum on an unprecedented scale, because previously such referenda were practically impossible from the technical point of view. This can revolutionize the political life of society in the sense of its democratization" (p. 55).

Now, while it is true that new information and communication technologies will have a great bearing on the relationship between citizens and the management of public affairs, Schaff's conclusions need to be commented on.

Firstly, the idea of a direct form of democracy on a wide scale, through the institution of referenda, does not take into account the fact that this form of participation can be effectively applied without the risk of degenerating into ideological or demagogical instrumentalization, only within a relatively restricted community. Only in this case can the citizens feel they are effectively responsible for the decisions to be taken, firstly because they directly know the problems they are asked to face, and secondly because every decision falls directly on each of them as member of the community.

In the second place, self-government in restricted territorial environments is possible only if "their outer environment is in a relative state of balance, i.e. if the problems having a wider application are tackled in their turn by democratic planning authorities of a corresponding jurisdiction" (3). Currently, many problems are taking on a world dimension.

Finally, if we want to give people the possibility of a really democratic and rational government of the community in which they live, we need to question the culture of nationalism. Schaff intuitively

feels this, where he indicates that one of the consequences of the scientific and technological revolution is "an evolution toward a supra-national culture" (p. 64) made possible by a "freeing from the encasement in national culture" (p. 57). But in reality he is not entirely aware of the fact that the culture of nationalism will continue to be fed by the persistent division of the world into sovereign national states. Moreover, he is not aware of the fact that unconditional loyalty vis-à-vis his own exclusive national community can only encourage the tendency towards the centralization and burocratization of the decision-making process.

All in all, what is missing in this analysis, which is otherwise stimulating on many counts, is the attempt to visualize the political framework that may give space to the realization of the potential emerging from the new means of production.

The same limit underlies the analysis of the problem of the Third World and also the extremely pessimistic attitude with which Schaff considers the prospects of solution. He considers two possible alternatives separately. One consists in the substantial reduction of arms in the world, creating funds for the purchase of goods needed for the creation of new infrastructure in underdeveloped countries, goods which will not be in short supply in countries with automated production. "But," he adds, "the point is that only those who are politically naive can believe that armaments would decrease during the next twenty to thirty years... On the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that they would increase dangerously thus using up a large part of the growing wealth of the nations. No rhetorics on the part of noble-minded but practically powerless humanists, pacifists, etc., can change that. I like them, but I do not believe in their realism" (p. 80). The other alternative (which cannot, however, be objectively separated from the first) consists in participation in the solution to the problem of all the richest nations, which ought to make available the funds necessary for the undertaking. On this point, Schaff argues that it would be necessary to create a true world development plan, and that this would imply the transfer of "powers to a special international organization" (p. 81). But he concludes by asserting that "that field, too, would see intricate problems of supra-national undertakings and national sovereignty" (p. 82). Hence this is an unrealistic solution and unfortunately, he writes, "one is helpless when it comes to anything more than appeals" (p. 83).

Such total and irreparable skepticism is the logical conclusion of an analysis that starts with mistaken general premises. It is not possible to identify or to try and achieve world level political objectives

(peace, creation of supra-national bodies) starting with the assumption that it is impossible to change the system of power. The division of the world into sovereign national states whose domestic and foreign policy are regulated by *raison d'état* so as not to permit the creation of true participatory democracy within the states themselves, is also the hurdle that prevents man from envisaging and achieving peace and a more equal distribution of world resources.

Schaff's pessimism certainly expresses an awareness which is more advanced vis-à-vis the superficial optimism that all too often accompanies international agreements of any kind, whose application is not guaranteed by any effective supra-national political power. But it is a negative, paralyzing awareness that contradicts his own conclusions: "the future is not a destiny determined by progress in technology, but comes out of the action of men."

Together with the awareness of the potential that emerges from the new means of production, it is therefore vital to seek political alternatives - which must necessarily be federal in nature and have a world dimension - that lay the bases for an institutional framework within which it is possible to make conscious and responsible decisions.

Nicoletta Mosconi

NOTES

(1) ADAM SCHAFF, *Wohin fuhrt der Weg? Die gesellschaftlichen Folgen der zweiten industriellen Revolution*, Club di Roma - Europa Verlag GesmbH, Vienna, 1985. (For the quotations I wish to thank Editori Riuniti, Rome, for permission to consult the English manuscript).

(2) ERICH WEIL, *Philosophie politique*, J. Vrin, Paris, 1966.

(3) FRANCESCO ROSSOLILLO, "Federalism in a Post-Industrial Society", in *The Federalist*, XXVI (1984), p. 129.

JANE JACOBS' HOME REMEDIES

Jane Jacobs is well-known for her analyses of the urban crisis starting from the observation of urban structure and its relationships with daily life(1). Disagreeing with the prevailing conceptions of town planning, Jacobs maintains that town planning is still at a rudimental stage of development, comparable to medical science in the last century. Though ignoring the problems posed by the historical evolution of urban life and the city's relationship with its surrounding territory, her approach is still an important contribution in the debate on the urban crisis. Jacobs' interest has also been directed to the economic processes of urban development and to what she calls the replacement of imports in city economies (2).

Recently Jacobs (3), faithful to a descriptive and empirical type of survey, returned to and expanded on these themes, dealing with those economic and monetary aspects which, in her opinion, have had a decisive influence in differentiating the accumulation of wealth in one city or state as opposed to another.

The spirit with which Jacobs approaches her survey is summarised in a few lines that precede the beginning of the second chapter, not by chance called *Back to Reality*: "We must find more realistic and fruitful lines of observation and thought than we have tried to use so far. Choosing among the existing schools of thought is bootless. We are on our own" (p. 28).

This harks back to the spirit of autonomous observation found in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. But, unlike her first work, the themes in her survey no longer relate to urban structure but to the interaction between urban phenomenon and the national management of the economy and, in addition, as she herself says, "the distinctions between city economies and the potpourries we call national economies." Indeed "failures to make such distinctions are directly responsible for many wildly expensive economic debacles in backward countries, debacles which have resulted from the failure to observe that the all-important function of import-replacing or import-substitution is in real life specifically a city function, rather than something a 'national economy' can be made to do" (p. 35) (4).

Jacobs concentrates on the effects produced by just one factor considered in different ways: the supply of consumer goods. This restricted field of survey does not, however, take into consideration the contribution made in this field by the German school of geography and in particular by Walter Christaller, in the first half of our century (5).

* * *

Jacobs tries to identify the hurdles which prevent any start being made to the process of replacing imports that occur, or that do not occur, even within states. From the standpoint of the development of the city, Jacobs - without clarifying whether (and how) she believes that different imports have different impacts on economic expansion - argues that whether imported products are of national origin or not makes no difference. What counts is their capacity to replace imports. "Cities that generate city regions of any significance possess that capacity, or have possessed it in the past. The very mechanism of city import-replacing automatically decrees the formation of city regions" (p. 47). On the contrary, "when a city at the nucleus of a city region stagnates and declines, it does so because it no longer experiences from time to time significant episodes of import-replacing" (p. 57). In the course of time, Jacobs recalls, we have witnessed continual transfers of wealth and welfare from one city to the other and, hence, from one empire or state to another: "So far, going back and back to Neolithic times, there seems never to have been a simultaneous deadening of cities over the entire world, and thus no period in which all economic life consisted of bypassed, subsistence life. While Addis Ababa was dying, Rome was rising. While the great cities of China were stagnating, Venice was rising. No doubt in future (provided, of course, there is a future for a world booby-trapped with nuclear weapons), people will remark that while the cities of Great Britain were dying, those of Japan were rising" (p. 134).

But is it correct, historically, to impute these transfers of wealth to cities which represent after all only a very specific portion of the world?

Certainly, Jacobs adopts various historical classifications used by Fernand Braudel, acknowledging her debt with regard to various historical comments (in this respect, see note 4 on p. 236). Various formulations used by Jacobs are very similar to those used by Braudel (6), without however maintaining the methodological precision of the French historian. Braudel stresses both the rise and fall of the world-economies under urban domination and the very different political element in a city-state of the 15th century such as Venice vis-à-vis an 18th century city such as London, "the enormous city that the entire British national market has and hence the British Isles until the day

when, with the changed proportions of the world, this agglomerate of power is reduced to the small England vis-à-vis a giant, the United States" (7).

In this respect, Tokyo and the city-states of the *Pacific Rim* do not foreshadow a new model of the organization of economic and political life as Jacobs seems to believe, but are a forewarning of the umpteenth historical transfer of economic, commercial resources and political power. They are signs of the *décentrage*, as Braudel would say, taking place from the shores of the Atlantic to those of the Pacific.

* * *

Continuing to ignore the aspects of power that have historically influenced trade, in the second half of her book Jacobs concentrates on the role played by economic competition, and in particular by one of the instruments, namely currency, through which this competition occurs in the process of accumulation of the wealth of a city.

Jacobs thus tries "to argue that national or imperial currencies give faulty and destructive feedback to city economies and that this in turn leads to profound structural economic flaws, some of which cannot be overcome no matter how hard we try" (p. 158). Thus she asks by what mechanisms national monetary sovereignty causes these distorsions.

Jacobs believes that a national monetary sovereignty unifies the widest markets and is accompanied by the removal of tariff barriers between cities in the same state. This she believes is to the advantage, in particular, of cities which carry out a higher degree of international trade and which can hence benefit from the monetary manoeuvres designed to make the national economy competitive (p.172). Analogously, national tariff policies introduced to protect or encourage the development of certain national productions act in a similar way. They favour an economic flow whose effects on the territory are apparent in a diversified premium in some cities, those in which production can become competitive in international trade vis-à-vis other cities (p. 168).

Secondly, Jacobs asks why, in the long term, even currencies in the great continental states, or empires, cause structural economic flows on the territory which are just as damaging as those produced in the small states.

Jacobs believes that by reducing the number of currencies the mechanisms of automatic regulation of city markets are also reduced and competition mechanisms distorted. From all this, Jacobs draws the conclusion that the creation of only one world state, eliminating all

monetary fluctuation, would spell the death of the city.

Finally, to stress the role exerted by currency even in aid policies vis-à-vis the less developed regions Jacobs attempts to demonstrate that unceasing aid, like military production, "undermines both their capacities to generate new kinds of goods and services and to afford problem solving or other innovative exports from one another, even if these are advised" (p. 189). For Jacobs "loans, grants and subsidies sent into regions lacking vigorous cities can shape inert, unbalanced or permanently dependent regions, but are useless for creating self-generating economies - which is to say, useless for creating import-replacing cities" (p. 110).

Her conclusion is that a policy of economic aid would be much better carried out by the multiplication of currencies. For example "if the northern and southern regions of Japan had their own individualized currencies, they could automatically get equivalents of tariffs and export subsidies" (p. 205). Competition between cities, improvisation, innovation, unpredictability of the consequences connected with it, the promotion of creativity are the instruments Jacobs suggests will stimulate the development of the city.

Having criticised the function of the national economies and the absolute sovereignty of the national states Jacobs is faced with two alternatives: either accept the prospect of the end to the national state through the unification of the world, or to propose destroying the current system of national power by promoting the multiplication of local sovereignties. Jacobs chooses the latter without hesitation: "We must be grateful that world government and a world currency are still only dreams" (p. 180). So her desire not to be identified with any of the traditional economic and political schools of thought become turned into an apology for the far from new school of national monetarism.

This is how Jacobs tries to justify her choice of field: "If unhampered trade with one another were all that cities and potential cities needed to flourish, a single world government would be the economic ideal" (p. 209). But the second fundamental need of cities, Jacobs at once adds, is to enrich themselves on an individual basis, through competition, following economic cycles of expansion that do not necessarily coincide with the economic cycles of the state (p. 210). In the theoretical plan the solution "would thus be division of the single sovereignty into a family of smaller sovereignties" so as to produce a "multiplication of currencies" (pp. 214-215). The problem, as she herself admits, lies precisely in the fact that "multiplicities of curren-

cies imply multiplicities of sovereignties" and this can only take place at the expense of the current national unity.

We may note that Jacobs does not propose to tackle and resolve the problems that the crisis of the city currently creates. Rather she wishes to start the history of the city-state all over again, overlooking the fact that currencies are only one of the economic factors of sovereignty and that monetary manoeuvres are unfought wars in which what is at stake is always the transfer of wealth from one region to another. Leaving the outcome of this dispute to power relationships without bothering to submit them to a rational government would mean perpetuating the submission of the regions already at a disadvantage to the law of the strongest.

* * *

Just as Christaller's analysis helps us to understand the factors that determine the creation of a hierarchy in urban functions vis-à-vis territory (see note 5), so in the same way Lionel Robbins (8) helps us to understand the baselessness of conclusions favouring local monetarism which would in actual fact produce an increase in monetary disorder. If we may say that free trade between national sovereignties tends to benefit certain cities at the expense of others, this should not be taken as proof of the need to impoverish them by abolishing all national constraints without bothering to set up a new power structure. The problem if anything is that of eliminating the factors that privilege some cities vis-à-vis others, recalling that trade between sovereign states is never really free, and trying to clarify in what institutional context cities could achieve independence without undermining their very survival.

According to Robbins, the arbitrary fluctuations in exchange rates are the most significant disturbing element in trade. If things were as simple as the supporters of local monetarism claimed, continues Robbins, "we might push the thing to its logical conclusion and ask why each different industry should not have its own money so that, when the value of its products changed, money incomes could be kept constant and the rate of exchange varies" (9). Naturally such a system would have to be based on the good desire and on the commitment of *all* independent monetary authorities not to upset the exchange markets and to provide for the possibility of using different currencies throughout the world.

Since history, tormented by the difficult co-existence of many

national currencies, has never provided any guarantee about the possibility of encouraging the peaceful and democratic development of trade through conferences, summits and bilateral and multilateral agreements, the final word must belong to a federal authority above the national states, an authority that has final say in preventing individual states, and even more individual cities or industries, from having the power to damage other states and cities arbitrarily.

In this way, concludes Robbins, "the federal authority may decide that it is better that there should be a single money and a unified banking system; in that case none of the difficulties we have been discussing need arise. It may, however, decide that separate systems are desirable; in that case, however, it will retain control of the variations of the rates of exchange and any other regulations which are necessary; there will be the safeguard that what variations take place, take place by federal authority and not by the arbitrary decisions of independent sovereign states" (10). Robbins openly maintains his preference for the first hypothesis, which would lead to the creation of a single currency.

* * *

Jacobs puts forward one further hypothesis which needs to be challenged which she uses as justification of her rejection of a world government: the impossibility of creating the institutions that allow the city to be at the same time independent and subjected to a common government, with a single currency. If Jacobs were right, this would mean being resigned to leaving all the independent entities free, the national states today and the city-states tomorrow, to wage war for their own ends. In an era when cities such as Hong Kong and Singapore are able to produce and use nuclear weapons this would imply believing in the relentlessness of the destruction of the world. Beyond economic and monetary questions, the world must henceforth unite to eliminate war and survive the nuclear era. The road to follow was indicated two centuries ago by Hamilton and a distribution of the power between independent but co-ordinate levels of government is perfectly conceivable, as K.C. Wheare has shown (11).

The remedies proposed by Jacobs are hence the worst of all evils (the very evils that are supposed to be eliminated). They recall the pseudo-scientific 18th century cures condemned by Jacobs herself. All in all, to paraphrase an essay by Mumford which was perhaps too cri-

tical of Jacobs (12), these are "household remedies for the cancer of the city."

Franco Spoltore

NOTES

(1) JANE JACOBS, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1961.

(2) JANE JACOBS, *The economy of Cities*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1969.

(3) JANE JACOBS, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, Viking Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1985.

(4) In *Cities and the Wealth of Nations* Jacobs does not explain sufficiently what she means by replacement of city imports, taking for granted that readers understand the terminology she adopted in her previous book *The Economy of Cities*. But even in that work Jacobs did not clarify in what way replacement of imports differs from an autarkic policy (the use of the expression *import replacement* rather than *import substitution* she believes is sufficient to clarify what she means). This ambiguity hides, as emerges subsequently from the book, the *a priori* refusal to consider the fact that trade in itself has historically been the greatest factor in historical development. Only by referring to the development of trade is it possible to explain the historical changes that have taken place in the flow of imports and exports between the different areas of the world. This is, moreover, the standpoint that Henri Pirenne put forward in *Les villes du Moyen Age* (Maurice Lamertin, Bruxelles, 1927): " Only in the 12th century. .. *under the influence of trade* (the italics are mine), did the ancient Roman cities revive their fortunes and become repopulated; commercial agglomerates grew up on the outskirts of boroughs, along the seacoasts, rivers, confluences of watercourses and the crossroads of natural means of communication. Each of them constitutes a market whose attraction, proportionate to the size, exerted itself on the surrounding countryside or made itself felt a long way off. Great and small, cities are scattered everywhere, on average one every five square leagues: in effect they have become vital to society. They have introduced a division of labour which we can no longer do without. A mutual exchange of services takes place between the city and the countryside" (p. 70). It is not that Jacobs does not take these phenomena into consideration. She simply links them to a process, replacing imports, which remains undefined and not clarified except with reference to the causes of the evolution of trade. What Jacobs herself says is as follows: "The expansion that derives from the replacement of city imports consists precisely in these five forms of growth: sudden increase in the city market because of new and different imports, mainly consisting of agricultural produce and by innovations produced in other cities; sudden increase in the number and types of work in the cities capable of replacing imports; increase in the transfer of work in non-urban areas when the oldest industries no longer have the room to develop within the city; new technological applications, in particular to increase agricultural production, and productivity; growth in the city's capital" (p.42).

(5) WALTER CHRISTALLER, *Die zentralen Orte in Suddeutschland. Eine ökonomischgeographische Untersuchung über die Gesetzmassigkeit der Verbreitung und Entwiklung der Siedlungen mit städtischen Funktionen*, G.Fischer, Jena, 1933. The analysis of the German geographer deals with the effects produced on the distribution of urban functions, as well as the market, the evolution of the transport system, the choice of the administrative headquarters, and fiscal policy. Thanks to these intuitions, Christaller (unlike Jacobs, who was not able to explain, for example, why no co-ordinated development of two cities like Buenos Aires and Montevideo arose despite the fact they both overlook the River Plate) is able to explain the effects induced by the creation of artificial barriers such as national borders: "Most of the present crisis that affects Central and Southern Europe, in particular Austria and Hungary," wrote Christaller in 1933, "has been conditioned by the sudden and massive dismembering of the system of central places due to the creation of new borders. This caused a devaluation, at times grotesque, of the already existing central institutions and a contemporary need to create new central institutions - not just government institutions, but also private, cultural, commercial and industrial ones. Moreover, there was a general change in the value of costs, tariffs, and demand etc., that is perhaps even more significant than the clear transformation of central institutions" (p. 163).

(6) FERNAND BRAUDEL, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme (XV-XVIII siècle). Le temps du monde*, Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1979. In expounding the tendential regulations that "specify and define even their relationships with space," Braudel writes: "There is no world-economy without its own space and for the most significant reasons: it has its own borders, and the line which surrounds it gives it a particular sense much as the coasts define the sea. It implies a centre, favouring a particular city and an already dominating capitalism, whatever the form may be. The multiplication of centres constitutes a witness of youth, or a form of degeneration or of mutation. Under the drive of external and internal forces, forms of decentralisation can in fact arise and hence be achieved: cities with an international vocation, 'world cities', are in continual competition with each other, and go on replacing each other; ordered hierarchically, this space is the sum of particular economies, some poor, some modest, only one relatively rich in its own nucleus. Inequalities arise, differences in the voltage that ensure the functioning of the whole. The result is 'the international division of labour,' regarding which Sweezy explains how Marx failed to forecast that it 'would be turned into a (spatial) model of development and underdevelopment such as to divide mankind into two fields, the *haves* and *haves not*, separated by an even more deeper gulf than the one which opposes bourgeoisie and proletariat in advanced capitalist countries.' This is not, however, a 'new' separation, but an old wound, one which probably cannot be healed. A wound that existed long before the times of Marx" (p. 7).

(7) *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

(8) LIONEL ROBBINS, "Economic Aspects of Federation," in *Federal Union. A Symposium*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1940.

(9) *Op. cit.*, p. 178.
(10) *Op. cit.*, p. 179.
(11) K.C. WHEARE, *Federal Government*, Oxford University Press, Ely House, 1967.
(12) LEWIS MUMFORD, *The Urban Prospect*, 1956, cfr. the essay on Jacobs taken from *The New Yorker* of December 1st, 1962.

Problems of Peace

REYKJAVIK

The Reykjavik meeting has ended in stalemate. But the willingness to hold negotiations has not disappeared. Two possibilities remain open: a long-term possibility, the abolition of nuclear arms before the year 2000, and a short-term possibility, the zero option for European-based missiles and a 50 per cent reduction in ICBMs. Are they serious possibilities? Is there really a chance of abolishing nuclear arms? Would it mean ending the nuclear nightmare?

The issue which is hard enough to assess in itself becomes impossible to judge if incorrect criteria of analysis are used. Such criteria merely empty the facts of their true meaning, particularly when we fail to keep all the various aspects of the problem with their different possible developments in mind. So, first of all, we need to reflect a little and establish a list of criteria and facts as a guide to our reflection.

1. Very often the problems in question are tackled by asking which of the parties is right and which is wrong (as if in international politics, law and morals held sway). Alternatively, the question asked is who has won or who has lost at the negotiating table (as if winning or losing depended on the choice of astute negotiating tactics), or even who has sprung a trap for the other, etc. All this is nonsense. Underlying this line of thinking is the idea that international politics depends only on the free choice of the parties, i.e. is merely a matter of their wishes.

This mythical opinion is closely related to the distortion of the notion of *raison d'état* which should, instead, be taken for what it is: a need to which states must bend by arming themselves and observing the laws of power politics. On the contrary, it is used as an expression indicating a despicable preference as for example implied in the choice of a "morally reproachable action justified by the advantage of one's own country" (Giuliano Toraldo di Francia, "Quando scoppia la pace",

La Repubblica, January 2, 1987).

2. In the political sphere, whatever may be right or wrong is filtered through the fact that interest and duty must coincide. Every "right" solution, which does not fit in with the interests of the protagonists, is by definition off-limits. In international politics this interest is the protection of one's own power (for the USA and the USSR, the refusal to be placed in a position of military inferiority, of having to undergo threats, blackmail, etc.). This implies that only solutions which permit full expression of the resources of each country's power are possible. If this is not immediately visible, it is only because people often equate power with a mere quantity of arms at this or that moment without considering that power also depends on the context in which it occurs, economic and technological development, people's way of life, the degree of attachment of citizens to their state, the faith in its future, etc. (Kant noted the relationship existing between "the force of the state in its external relationships" and development of culture, trade, and so on, and hence also of "civil liberty" itself).

3. In this classic conception of international politics (full expression of every state's power resources) nuclear arms have introduced a radically new state of affairs. Arms have always been conceived of in relation to war, and war, in its turn, in relation to politics. This made it possible to make a precise calculation: given a certain policy, i.e. given a set of relationships with other states, within certain limits the quantity of the arms necessary was known. This depended, naturally, on the fact that states were always ready to use arms and go to war with any state that, having made an error in calculation, manifested claims not justified by its real force. Thus, war still depended on errors in calculation, and had the function of correcting them; thus, wars were, and still are, inevitable since errors are always possible.

Now, nuclear arms have altered this picture, and undermined the (instrumental) rationale of foreign policy, because their quantity, quality and evolution is no longer an easily calculated means for the old purposes (war as a correction of errors of calculation). Rather they are a means (which is hard to calculate and has no precise relationship with any political plan) for an entirely new purpose: reducing the risk of nuclear war to the minimum, and thus of all the wars that could end in a war of this kind. Since the rational link with politics has now disappeared, the possibility of fixing precise limits for the quantity and quality of the arms needed also disappears, with adverse consequences as regards the way in which the arms race needs to be conducted and as regards establishing a balance between expenditure on arms and expenditure on economic and social development. This state of affairs has not changed power politics' old character. It is still a means by which to govern the world and solve the political, economic and social problems that interfere with the international equilibrium. But it has given rise to a new logic that is developing side by side with the old one and making it both more complicated and less effective (simultaneous presence of a maximum degree of force and weakness in the true powers: the USA and the USSR). It even turns the situation into sheer madness (stocks of nuclear arms sufficient to destroy the entire human race many times over).

4. The nuclear logic. We often forget that when the problem of nuclear arms first arose there was an immmediate understanding, at least by some people (including Einstein), that the only effective solution lies in a world government able to control the military aspects of the technological evolution and deterrence was conceived of only as a means for reducing the risk of nuclear war to the minimum, and gaining time whilst waiting for a solution which ensured that it would be certainly impossible. This issue, the lack of certainty, soon came to the fore with the first form of deterrence, mutual assured destruction (MAD, which certainly lives up to its name in its lack of wisdom).

The plain fact is this: it is true that you can build many arms guaranteeing one's capacity to launch a *second strike* after having suffered a nuclear attack (deterrence), but it is equally true that, by its very nature, the *second strike* is an uncertain reality because it entails not only the destruction of the adversary, but one's own. For this reason there is no absolute certainty about the functioning of deterrence. In the last analysis things always reach this point. And this can only cause an infinite repetition of the attempt to reduce uncertainty, also because the mechanism of foreign policy, war and the generals' plans is constantly at work.

This is, in actual fact, what has happened. This tendency which has developed very rapidly in the USA due to extended deterrence (nuclear guarantee for Western Europe, made, however, absurd by the fact that the USA would, with its commitment to a *second strike*, decree its own self-destruction to protect Europe from a nuclear attack) has become apparent in the sequence known to all: a flexible reply, tactical nuclear arms, limited nuclear war, space defence (which would give back a nuclear monopoly to the USA in the form of a monopoly of their effective use). It is at this point that the idea of victory in a limited nuclear war could take shape. But an absolutely perfect space defence would be necessary and this is impossible by definition because of the

unceasing evolution of science and technology. We must therefore note that none of these phases in the strategy of deterrence has been able to remove its radical and intrinsic defect: the lack of certainty. The process thus still remains open and comes back to the two starting positions (world government and deterrence).

5. As regards the abolition of the nuclear arms, which both entails the impossibility of creating new nuclear arms, and non-proliferation, it should be said that it will be impossible until we are able to govern the world with law (world federal system) instead of force (system of states with exclusive sovereignty, and no effective legislative means for the recognition of the rights of the peoples). Nevertheless, the fact that Gorbachev has made a proposal to abolish nuclear arms, and a presentation by Reagan of the space defence initiative as a means for making them useless, shows that the superpowers can no longer refrain from holding out to world public opinion the vision of a world freed from the nightmare of extinction of the human race. These are the first signs of the development of a power that will become decisive in the future.

6. What the world now needs is an orderly transition from bipolarism to multipolarism. Only in this case will US-Soviet *détente* be lasting and gradually spread to all countries, and make a lesser commitment possible as regards arms and a greater commitment as regards the development of Third World countries. We thus need to bear in mind that this orderly transition is impossible without regional integration (the first of which ought to be European integration, which, being the most advanced, constitutes an example). Such an orderly transition will have no chance of succeeding without strengthening the first world policies within the UN and, in the final analysis, without the formation of a world awareness of the unity of the human race, that is already taking place, albeit at the present only objectively and not yet subjectively.

Mario Albertini

Discussions

REYKJAVIK. A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE NATIONAL STATES OF EUROPE

1. The reaction of European governments to Reykjavik is eye-opening. They have sabotaged the prospects of drastic disarmament. After two weeks of inter-allied haggling, they got the US to withdraw its proposals on elimination of medium-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. They have revealed themselves as among the most serious obstacles to disarmament.

One's first impulse might be to rub one's eyes. What is this that we are hearing? After years of telling the US government it must prove to the European peoples its dedication to nuclear disarmament, now the European governments are saying the US shouldn't be going so far in discussing disarmament.

Britain and Germany are demanding that big conventional force reductions be agreed upon simultaneous with any broad nuclear disarmament. They are fully aware that this would postpone agreement indefinitely.

2. In fact there is nothing new in this. Something like it happens almost every time the US and the Soviet Union warm up toward an agreement, although not always with such tragic effect as it has had this time for the hopes of humanity. It is only the thickness of the hypocrisy in the intervening periods that makes one rub one's eyes when it happens again.

Indeed, without batting an eye, European leaders are already announcing that they are lecturing the US privately on the need to be more accomodating with the Soviets and reach an agreement. They have openly raised the specter of an uproar in the streets of Europe if America does not satisfy them on all of their (somewhat contradictory) points.

The one thing constant in all these turnabouts is that European governments have been expressing their "doubts" about the adequacy

of US leadership, and none-too-subtly encouraging the anti-American elements who put these "doubts" into the form of extreme conclusions, hysterical accusations and heated protests.

3. The immediate reason for this hypocrisy is that European governments want to escape responsibility before their own peoples for the fact that they are pro-nuclear, and have no scruples about palming off the blame for nukes on America. That they are pro-nuclear in fact is known to anyone who has spent any time following NATO debates.

Americans want, and always have wanted, Europeans to integrate their forces and establish an effective conventional defence. European governments cling to the shadows of their once-proud sovereignty and refuse to integrate their forces. The result: they cannot defend their peoples except by threatening to blow up the world. They rationalize this by saying that any war in Europe would be intolerable, so better to threaten to call in the nukes and annihilate megapeople in order absolutely to deter aggression.

4. This sabotages efforts at nuclear disarmament. It is argued that, if NATO has not been able to develop a persuasive conventional defence after nearly forty years, it surely will not be able to do it in a mere ten years' transition from nukes. This argument obscures the fact that the main obstacle to a conventional defense is the lack of will to unite. The argument is actually circular to the extent that the lack of will is rooted in the theory that it will always be possible and, indeed, preferable to rely on the threat of nuclear annihilation.

Agreement on nuclear disarmament should no longer be held hostage to the plodding, ahistorical pace of integration that is proposed by European national establishments. Rather, it should be consummated now since humanity requires it now. Then it would pin the national establishments to the wall and hold their fate hostage to the achievement of union during the transition period.

This would be the way to break directly out of the circle of Alliance hysterics and deal with the pressing problems of the world. Absent the will to do this, the world remains a hostage to the European nation-states. Which means that it is now obligatory to undertake the same thing anyway, but in the reverse order: since the European states have once again sabotaged major disarmament on the ground (however well disguised) that they are not yet integrated enough for it, they must move directly toward military and political integration or stand condemned as enemies of the survival of humanity.

In the meantime, Americans are expected to act as willing guinea pigs in the experiment of deterrence, cheerfully guaranteeing mutual annihilation if Soviet troops cross the line: so, the states of Europe can go on evading their responsibilities for political and military integration. Whenever Americans start looking for a better way, they must face - as the foreign offices shamelessly warn them - hysterical accusations (from the foreign offices themselves) of being an unreliable ally, and (from the protestors) of trying to start a nuclear war in Europe and then leave the Europeans to suffer annihilation alone.

The symbiosis between foreign offices and protest movements often verges on a conscious relation. It once forced NATO's then-Secretary General, J.M. Luns, to take European governments publicly to task for letting myths spread about America imposing missiles that the European governments had in fact requested.

5. The underlying reason for the hypocrisy of European governments is that Europeans are in a prolonged and unaccustomed state of dependence on American power. Dependence breeds irresponsibility and hysteria.

What democratic people ever trusts a power that is beyond its control? The American people did not in 1776. The hysterical slogans they used then - about England as a den of corruption, dragging the peace-loving American people into the incessant petty quarrels of the warmongering monarchs of Europe - are neatly replicated in the slogans used today about a crude America dragging Europeans into the quarrels of the two superpowers.

Today, unlike the period when America's Allies were genuine world powers, the only significant role Europeans can play in the Alliance is the role of critic. When America tries to move, they can only sit back and wonder if she isn't getting out of hand or moving the wrong way, and try to "moderate" her policies. This inevitably backfires; it makes Americans feel like shaking off the Lilliputian ties of Europeans, and thus discourages the development of a moderate positive will.

The only solution for this is a union of peoples, so Americans and Europeans will be able to meet one another as equals - either as equal citizens of an Atlantic Union, or as equal representatives of the US of America and a US of Europe.

6. Luigi Einaudi, President of the Italian Republic from 1948 to 1955, described the reality without mincing words: "Existing states are dust without substance. None of them is able to bear the costs of independent defense" (1). Prof. Mario Albertini recently drew out the implications of this: "To understand and judge European states all we need to appreciate is the kind of 'raison d'état' existing in states inca-.

pable of independent defense. We need only wonder what kind of training and selection the political class undergoes in states of this kind" (2).

Reykjavik constitutes a judgment on the states of Europe. They are the worst nukophiles in the industrial world. Their independent nuclear forces are useful mainly as obstacles to disarmament. They have been the world's most irresponsible proliferators of nuclear technologies and conventional armaments. Their moralizing is false, their worldly wisdom is not of this world. They constitute a standing threat to humanity and have lost all right to exist as separate sovereign entities.

7. The states of Europe are pseudo-states, burlesques on sovereign self-government. They, already well into overtime on their decadence after two world wars, use their Community and Alliance mainly as means to sustain the burlesque, not to trascend it or recapture authenticity.

These pseudo-states cannot help but be false friends to America, and false friends to their own peoples. Their structural situation as inadequate sovereign entities condemns them to work against the interests of their own and allied peoples in a thousand ways, even as their moral roots in democracy condemn them to pretend to be the best of friends. This is why they feel an instinctive need to play their peoples off against America in ever-more-bitter rounds; otherwise, they sense, their petty game would fall apart.

8. The real quarrel is not between America and the people of Europe; quite the opposite, on this level there is a deep natural harmony of interests and ideals. The real quarrel on both sides is with the pseudo-governments of Europe. The only government of Europe that would be a true friend to its own people and to America would be a true Government of Europe, i.e. a European federation. The only true ally of America in Europe, as Jean Monnet said, is Europe itself.

When this is understood by Americans, they will cease to rely on the pseudo-governments to mediate all their relations with the people of Europe, and will instead establish a full political mission also with the true embryonic Government of the people of Europe: the European Parliament. Then and only then will it be possible to have a fruitful dialogue between the free peoples of the two continents on their relations with each other and with the rest of the world.

Ira L. Straus

NOTES

(1) LUIGI EINAUDI, *Lo scrittoio del presidente (1948-1955)*, Einaudi, Turin, 1956, p. 89.

(2) MARIO ALBERTINI, "The Mediterranean Crisis and Europe's Responsibility", in *The Federalist*, XXVIII (1986), p. 39.

Federalism in the History of Thought

CLARENCE K. STREIT

We are publishing a few previously unpublished pages written by Clarence K. Streit relating to the foundation of the American federation. The pages in question are from Chapter 14 of the third version of Union now *(1), which together with other sections were not published in the 1939 edition, owing to publishing economies.*

The reason for this choice is twofold. In the first place, this year is the two-hundredth anniversary of the Constitution of Philadelphia, which gave rise to the United States of America. Many myths still abound on the way the foundation of the first federation in history came about. In general, historians have imposed their own national ideological self-deceits, even to the reconstruction of facts that had nothing to do with national life because the age of nationalism had not yet begun. It is not very surprising that wholesale historiographic falsification occurred during the course of 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century, in Europe, where national cultures grew up and flowered. Nor is it surprising that this happened in the United States, too, since culture there grew up on the basis of a European model with its centralization of powers that has unbalanced the federal system in the United States. What is surprising, on the other hand, is the fact that Philadelphia is virtually ignored in Europe today, where the problem of founding a federation is very much alive (a federation beginning with a first group of countries, but with the prospect of extending it to all Europe and achieving, anyhow, a model which could replace the national state and which is valid for the entire world).

It is a fact that Europeans insist on considering the American historical precedent not so relevant because its basic ingredients are allegedly too different. We need, therefore, to begin by recalling that even the Americans were not at all or, at least, not completely, linked by language, religion, or customs, nor even by their way of thinking and acting which was determined by the everyday course of events at that time in America much more fragmented than nowadays in Europe. Indeed, despite the differences, there are so many analogies between the 18th century American situation and the current European situation that we can even try to describe the foundation of the American federation in terms similar to those used when attempting to understand the struggle for the European federation. In those days, American society had features which are entirely analogous to those currently taken as the social basis (in the broad sense of the term) needed for the foundation of the European federation: the reference both to one's own nation, and also to Europe as an entity which should exist; in other words, at least embryonically a territorial division of loyalty between Europe and the individual nations.

Then as now, the confederation proved incapable of solving the problems that arose and the federation was, objectively, the only means of resolving them. Likewise, the objective forces which led to the replacement of a confederation with a federation would not have had any chance of succeeding had it not been for Hamilton's initiative which fell outside the confines of the normal political process, and had it not been for the fact that this initiative, which would otherwise have been doomed to failure, chanced to cross the path of Washington's "occasional" leadership which had developed in the confederal political process and which was applied only on that occasion to the problem of the federal transformation of the confederation. Nor should we overlook the fact that, once the constituent assembly had been established in Philadelphia (which also fell outside normal political procedures), the battle was fought and won in the first place on a procedural issue (the text was submitted for states' ratification without any diplomatic conference being called upon to settle the matter) and, in the second place, within the individual states where, among other things, once again the role played by the federalist avant-garde, i.e. Hamilton, was crucial. Hamilton managed to obtain ratification in a decisive state, the state of New York. This is what Streit, more or less explicitly, recalls in these pages. It is, in our opinion, sufficient to justify the choice as the best way of commemorating the two-hundredth anniversary of the first federation in history. Those currently fighting for federalism in Europe and in other parts of the world in an effort to bring countries together through federal ties and build the pillars of the world government of the future will find much food for thought here.

But there is a second reason which is no less convincing: Streit died only recently, unjustly forgotten by the media and, despite his

pioneering action in contemporary federalism, only vaguely known even by many federalists who, in the context of the tragedy of the Second World War and the incumbent nuclear and ecological catastrophe, have decided to fight for the replacement of national sovereignty and the foundation of a world federation, by developing organized struggle in different parts of the world. Yet although Streit wrote in the early years of this contradictory age unceasingly balanced precariously on the divide separating catastrophe from safety, he understood these issues lucidly and indicated the road towards world government as the only rational alternative.

* * *

Clarence K. Streit (21 January 1896 - 6 July 1986) was born in Missouri, in California. From his youth he was an American sui generis. *A volunteer in the First World War, a member of the American delegation at the conference of Versailles, a Rhodes student at Oxford in 1920, he married Jeanne Defrance in Paris in 1921 and began a long career as a reporter in every corner of the world: from the Middle East to Latin America. In 1929 he became the* New York Times *correspondent at the League of Nations, whose slow and unremitting crisis he followed. Streit was not a ritual journalist who believed his task to be exhausted with relating - perhaps with a sort of hidden satisfaction - the perverse course of events. The crisis in the League of Nations did not leave him at all indifferent. He was concerned with identifying the reasons for the crisis and trying to find the remedy. In the words of Ira Straus, the Secretary-General of the AUD (Association to Unite the Democracies) which is continuing Streit's political action: "Following closely the disintegration of the League, he concluded that successful institutions for world order would have to penetrate national sovereignty and reach to the core of citizen loyalty. To do this, he deduced, they would have to be based on democratic federal principles like those of the US Constitution. Thus he called for a union of peoples, not a mere league of states." This is in fact the central theme of his most well-known volume,* Union now, *which appeared in 1939. There is no point here in recalling the extraordinary editorial success that led to 300,000 copies being printed. Nor need we dwell on the influence his work had on both the young founders of Federal Union in the United Kingdom and Lord Lothian (who corresponded with Streit frequently, recognizing his extraordinary intellectual and moral fibre). It is worthwhile, on the other hand, highlighting the two basic theses of this book (which should in every case figure in the library of every active federalist). As far as possible, we will do this in Streit's own words.*

The first thesis is that the primary objective is world government. The second chapter of Union now *in actual fact has the following title: "Public Problem no 1: World government." This is how it begins: "The proposition we begin with is this: The most urgent problem of civilized mankind is to constitute effective means of governing itself where its civilization has already made its world practically one" (p. 31). Who says this is true? Common sense. "Common sense tells us that it is in our individual interest to make the world safe for our individual selves, and that we cannot do this while we lack effective means of governing our world... Common sense tells us that some of the causes of depression, dictatorship, war, lie inside the nation and that others lie outside it. It tells us that our existing political machinery has let us govern strongly the conditions of life within the nation but not outside it; and all each people has done to overcome the dangers inside it has been blighted by its failure to reach the dangers outside it, or remains at the mercy of these ungoverned forces. Common sense advises us to turn our attention to finding means of governing the forces still beyond our control, to constituting effective world government. It warns us that no matter how strong and perfect we each make our national government, it can never end those outside dangers, and that we individuals cannot know how long we can wait to end those dangers before they end us" (p. 24).*

The second thesis is that, since the federation - as a form of democratic government of international relationships - presupposes democracy, the historical responsibility for promoting the foundation of the world government belongs to democratic states. "These few democracies suffice to provide the nucleus of world government with the financial, monetary, economic and political power necessary both to assure peace to its members peacefully from the outset by sheer overwhelming preponderance and invulnerability, and practically to end monetary insecurity and economic warfare now ravaging the whole world. These few divide among them such wealth and power that the so-called world political, economic and monetary anarchy is at bottom nothing but their own anarchy - since they can end it by uniting to establish law and order among them" (p. 10). Indeed, "dictators are right when they blame the democracies for the world's condition, but they are wrong when they blame it on democracy. The anarchy comes from the refusal of the democracies to renounce enough of their national sov-

ereignty to let effective world law and order be set up" (p. 11).

* * *

Despite the great publishing success, mentioned above, Streit's plan to respond to the arrogance of autocracies with the federal unity of democracies did not exert any appreciable influence on the political world . Even in his country - where his theses were well known and even in circles close to the Department of State - the concern to gain Soviet help in the Second World War prevented Streit's plan, which was quite more ambitious, from taking shape. But, as always happens, good seeds once sown leave some trace. It was not by chance that William Clayton, who never hid his debt to Streit's ideas, played a fundamental role in the construction of the Atlantic order and, particularly, on the occasion of the Marshall and European Recovery Plans in promoting European federal unity.

In 1949, together with William Clayton and Owen Roberts, Streit founded the Atlantic Union Committee with the objective of reforming the Atlantic Alliance so as to reflect the principles of democracy and federalism. This then became the chief objective of his political commitment which in 1962 led him to propose a True Atlantic Community, a first step towards a true Atlantic federation between democracies and, eventually, a world federation. The project found favour in Europe, too. Streit constantly fought for it and in the United States he set up the Association to Unite the Democracies, which is still active today and has a sizeable number of active members, thus constituting a basic reference point in the United States for all those fighting for world government.

As mentioned above this unpublished passage belongs to the 1936 manuscript. The title of the chapter from which it is drawn is "the Washington-Hamilton-Lincoln Plan". The text published here is exclusively the first part of the chapter. These passages were not subsequently reviewed by the author. This explains the rather numerous mistakes to be found in the text. The second part - omitted here - was published in the January-February 1972 issue of Freedom and Union *(2).*

* * *

"It is too probable that no plan we propose will be adopted. Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. If, to please the people, we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterward defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair."

This is Washington's appeal that turned the tide in the Constitutional Convention against mere revision of the Articles of Confederation and led to the Constitution of the American Union.

"Tell them that the Convention shall never rise until the Constitution is adopted" said Hamilton, before converting a two-thirds rejection of it by New York into a favorable majority of three.

We have checked the isolation of the germ of our ills by the American experience with the League of Friendship. We have found the germ, *nationalism*, produced then precisely the same disease among the thirteen American peoples that the fifteen peoples (3) suffer now. We have seen how elimination of this germ through union of the free brings recovery. This proof, too, we need not base on logic and commonsense alone. We can check it against experiment, successfully made in that same American laboratory. We can study profitably how that experiment came to be made in 1787 and the results achieved. The great profit such study brings us now lies in the fact that the American Union was not the product of free or royal marriage or accident. To see what the fifteen free peoples can do today and gain tomorrow by boldly taking thought and courageously applying their own principles, we need to see how voluntary and deliberate a rational experiment American Union was. We need to see how human reason brought that Union out of economic depression after war failed to unite and how by still clearer human reason that Union met the acid test with almost unbelievable success. We need to see what men have done by reason to know whether men can do it again.

The political, economic, financial, monetary and social ills the thirteen suffered in 1787 were not cured by the many costly attempts to treat them separately. Nor were they cured by leaving Nature to take her course. They were cured by men discovering by reason that these ills formed one single, common political disease and then discovering by reason the unionist cure for them. There were many of these men. We are not concerned here with considering the part each played. We shall group them all under the names of two men whose forethought led in bringing the American Union out of the chaos of the League of

Friendship. These two men were George Washington and Alexander Hamilton.

Attempts have been made to judge which of these two was most responsible for the Union. All we need to say on that is this: if Hamilton had the clearness of mind, and if it was his mind that was behind the Farewell Address and other statements of Washington, yet was Washington who had - if only by virtue of his unique popularity and position - the responsibility of power, and Washington had both the vision of Union, and the wisdom to put the great power of his personality behind the ideas of the young man whom he had named at 20 his aide-de-camp.

We can agree with Oliver who, in his *Life of Alexander Hamilton*, says: "It is not beyond the truth to say that Hamilton alone fully understood the hears of Washington upon this issue; that he alone fully realized the grandeur of the policy of union. For between the aims of these two men and the aims of the rest of the national party there was something more than a difference of degree. The majority supported the constitutional movement out of fear, these two from hope...In a sense, the leadership passes into the hands of Hamilton. It is his thought which ever presses forward, blinding and constructing and preparing the way. He is the interpreter of the federal idea, and his main support is Washington's instinct which approves, Washington's character which upholds him at every crisis of the struggle. Without diminishing his dignity or self-respect, without any abdication or surrender of his personal convictions, Washington places the whole force of his great influence at the disposal of Hamilton, recognizing in him a genius for statecraft, and without a grudge of afterthought for his own glory. Such alliances are rare, but out of their conjunction great events are apt to be begotten" (4).

Before Washington disbanded the army in 1783 there was much correspondence between him and Hamilton on the need for union. Already, as Oliver notes, "their minds were clear both as to the malady and the means to a cure."

"Unless Congress have powers competent to all general purposes," Washington wrote, "the distresses we have encountered, the expense we have incurred, and the blood we have spilt, will avail us nothing." Hamilton replied: "It now only remains to make solid establishments within, to perpetuate our Union...This, it is to be lamented, will be an arduous work; for, to borrow a figure from mechanics, the centrifugal is much stronger than the centripetal force in these states - the seed of disunion much more numerous than those of union. I will add that

your Excellency's exertions are as essential to accomplish this end as they have been to establish independence."

What Washington did to establish American independence is still far better known than the no less decisive role he then played in establishing the American Union. As commander-in-chief of a ragged army he had more occasions than any one to see how much states' rights cost in the lives of their own citizens. He early and boldly took the lead of those who urged union. Before resigning his command he sent a circular letter to the heads of the thirteen states as his legacy to the American people. In it he insisted on four essentials, and he made union the first and the last essential. His first essential was "an indissoluble union of the states under one federal head." His fourth essential was "the prevalence of that pacific and friendly disposition among the people of the united states that will induce them to forget their local prejudices and policies; to make those material concessions which are requisite to the general prosperity; and in some instances, to sacrifice their individual advantages to the interest of the community."

From then on we find Washington leading at every step in the road, six years long, that led painfully from League to Union. We find him next in 1785 accepting the Presidency of a company formed for extending West the navigation of the Potomac. His interest in it was primarily political. He had dreamed in youth of grandeur that would be America's, and as young man he had recognized both the importance to it of the West, and the importance to politics of transport that was why he had played so influential a part in driving the French from the West. By thus making the colonies less dependent on England for protection, Washington laid the foundation for American independence while at the same time gaining the fame that made him commander of the American army - and making possible, too, its decisive French alliance.

The Father of his Country who had used the English army to drive out the French, and the French army then to drive out the English, never forgot the West over which the struggle had begun. In a very real sense it was the West that through him brought about the Union. In Washington's first expeditions into the wilderness he had studied the possibilities of connecting the West with the Atlantic by water transport. This question was never far from his mind. In 1770 he was urging means of transit with the West as essential. Before retiring from the army he had explored the Mohawk Valley and predicted the importance of this route, which the Erie Canal and the New York Central Railroad later followed. He had hardly retired to Mount Vernon be-

fore his thoughts turned Westward up the Potomac that flowed before his door. Mental habits as well as merchandise flow downstream, he mused, thinking of the settlers beyond the Alleghenies whose rivers all flowed the other way - West and South to New Orleans held by a foreign power. "Let us bind these people to us by a chain that can never be broken," Washington said, and he began work developing the line of communications that grew eventually into the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. It was in this work that he was most engaged while chaos was spreading through the League of Friendship, it was thus that he became president of the Potomac Company in 1785, and it was this that led directly to Union. The company offered him a gift of 150 shares of stock. He refused this, and all pay, explaining that his aim was to arouse the people to the political importance of the enterprise. Personal financial interest might detract from his only purpose, which, he said repeatedly, was to promote the spirit of union.

Others had used the Potomac to divide the states of Virginia and Maryland. Washington used it to bring them, and all the thirteen states, together. Both Virginia and Maryland needed to extend the navigation of the Potomac, neither could do it without the other. The president of the company invited commissioners from both to meet his house at Mount Vernon to talk it over, and the two states there agreed to cooperate. But Washington's eye was on the West; his plan was to connect the Potomac with the upper Ohio, and to do this, as he pointed out, Pennsylvania's adherence to the agreement was indispensable. He used the meeting to point out, too, that navigation was only a means to trade and to suggest that Maryland and Virginia consider agreeing also on uniform tariffs, commercial regulations and money. These suggestions were submitted with the agreement to the two legislatures. Both ratified the agreement. Maryland then proposed that her neighbor, Delaware, should be brought into the scheme as well as Pennsylvania, and that all four states should meet to consider Washington's suggestions for uniform duties. As a postscript, Maryland asked why not, after all, invite all thirteen to confer on this question of trade. This was done, and the two states invited all the others to send delegates to Annapolis, Maryland, in September, 1786.

The state of disunion at that time is clearly reflected by the fact that only five of the thirteen states bothered to send delegates to this meeting - and these did not include even Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey and New York. But New York sent Hamilton, and Hamilton, who never was so good as when the odds were overwhelmingly against

him, saved the day. Four of the delegations had been empowered to discuss only a uniform commercial system, but New Jersey had instructed her delegation to discuss "how far a uniform system in their commercial regulations *and other important matters* might be necessary to the common interest and permanent harmony of the several states."

Hamilton seized upon this added phrase. Analyzing the economic ills the members of the League of Friendship were then suffering (this was on the eve of Shays's rebellion when monetary madness was at its worst) Hamilton held there was no possible monetary or commercial or economic remedy for them. He declared that the only real remedy was a political one, and that they could do nothing about that for only New Jersey had authorized her delegates to consider the "other important matters" - the radical constitutional changes in the relationships of the states that they needed to consider.

With a stroke of genius he changed lack of delegates and lack of instructions into a dramatic and eloquent plea for all the thirteen to follow New Jersey's example - as improved by him. He persuaded the delegates unanimously to adopt and send to all the states an address he had written. In it the delegates, after telling the states that "the idea of extending the powers of their deputies to other subjects than those of commerce...was an improvement on the original plan," said: "The power of regulating trade is of such comprehensive extent, and will enter so far into the general system of the Federal Government, that to give it efficacy, and to obviate questions and doubts concerning its precise nature and limits, may require a correspondent adjustment of other parts of the federal system." Hamilton's address then boldly concluded by asking the states to send delegates to a convention in Philadelphia May 14, 1787, "to take into consideration the situation of the United States, to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the Federal Government *adequate to the exigencies of the Union.*"

That convention was the convention that drafted the Constitution that still governs the United States. Thus did the small seed Washington had planted at Mount Vernon in 1785 grow with the help of Hamilton.

But such was the disunion that Congress balked at this "usurpation" to its rights, while at the same time the chaos in the country worsened to the point where Congress was powerless to raise any revenue. The fear of anarchy, however, made men everywhere less afraid of union and, under Madison's lead, Virginia, without waiting longer for

Congress to approve, announced she would send George Washington as one of her delegates to the Convention. That move proved decisive. All at once the people began everywhere to feel an interest in the proposed Convention. One after another all the states, except Rhode Island, then named delegates, and Congress approved the Convention. But it was not until May 25 - eleven days after the meeting had been called - that even a quorum of seven state delegations had assembled in Philadelphia and the meeting could begin. Such patriots as Patrick Henry, Samuel Adams and Richard Henry Lee so opposed union that they stayed home and would have nothing to do with the Convention.

At its outset informal discussion showed a tendency to attempt nothing more than revision of the Articles of Confederation. Delegates argued that there was no hope of getting all the states to ratify anything more than half-measures. The question they raised was the one every international conference faces: whether to seek success in reducing agreement to the lowest common denominator or in placing it on a level high and sound enough to attract and support a majority in the end. On this basic question Washington, whom the Convention elected as its President, once more intervened decisively.

He changed the debate at the start from whether or not there should be union to what kind of union there should be. There was no more talk of avoiding the basic political issue of sovereignty, no more time-wasting attempts to cure a political disease by economic and monetary palliatives, after his solemn appeal: "If, to please the people, we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterward defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair; the event is in the hands of God."

Then Edmund Randolph laid the Virginia Plan before the Convention. It was drafted mainly by Madison, but substitution of a union of men for a league of states was the essential Washington and Hamilton sought. Randolph seemed to be describing the present situation among the fifteen free peoples under the League of Nations when in his opening words he thus described the situation then of the thirteen states under the League of Friendship: "The confederation was made in the infancy of the science of constitutions, when the inefficiency of requisitions was unknown; when no commercial discord had arisen among states; when treaties had not been conceded by states jealous of the sovereignty. But it offered no security against foreign invasion, for Congress could neither prevent nor conduct a war, nor punish infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, nor control particular states from provoking war. The confederal government has no constitutional power to check a quarrel between separate states; nor to suppress a rebellion in any one of them; nor to establish a productive impost; nor to counteract the commercial regulations of other nations; nor to defend itself against the encroachments of the states. From the manner in which it has been ratified in many of the states, it cannot be claimed to be paramount to the state constitutions; so that there is a prospect of anarchy from the inherent laxity of the government. As the remedy, the government to be established must have for its basis the republican principle."

We have seen how the Convention made this great change from league to union. There is no need of recounting here how the details of the Virginia Plan were modified by the New Jersey Plan and the Hamilton Plan. Nor need we more than note how as soon as this New Jersey proposal for conservation of state sovereignty was offered as an alternative to the Right of the Virginia Plan the astute Hamilton (who believed in asking more than he hoped to get in order to get that little) promptly proposed in a powerful speech a unionist plan still more radical than Virginia's, and thus by offering an alternative to the Left kept the essential of the Virginia Plan the centre and basis of discussion.

It is immaterial here that the Convention wisely rejected some of the favorite ideas with which Washington, Hamilton and Madison entered it. It needs only be noted that despite this no one worked harder than they for ratification of the Constitution by the states, and no one did so much as Hamilton to win this difficult victory for union. It was Hamilton - of whom Lord Acton said "his merits can hardly be overstated," and Talleyrand declared he had never known his equal - who then gave the American people and the world *The Federalist*. He wrote most of its papers championing the Constitution against the formidable attacks made on it in the name of liberty by the man who had proposed the Declaration of Independence, Richard Henry Lee, and by Patrick Henry, and other patriots - to whom Hamilton and Madison were "visionary young men."

How much the Constitution needed *The Federalist* one may measure by the fact that Massachusetts ratified by only 187 to 168 - after Washington's decisive intervention leading to the device of meeting through the first ten amendments the widespread objection to the Constitution's lack of a Bill of Rights. After Virginia had ratified 89 to 79 (again thanks to Washington's influence), it was Hamilton who single-handed won New York state to the Union. In no other state (except Rhode Island) was the opposition more bitter against this "triple-

headed monster," the Constitution, which was also called "as deep and wicked a conspiracy as ever was invented in the darkest ages against the liberties of a free people." And New York's strategic importance to the Union was from every viewpoint such that people said that if New York rejected union, it would have to be conquered and forced in. The New York Convention began by rejecting the Constitution 46 to 19, but Hamilton refused to accept no and no and no. He managed to keep the Convention in session despite several adverse votes while he argued week after week, until finally his eloquence persuaded the chief opposing debater, and New York ratified 30 to 27.

Thus the American Union was brought. Thus depression did what war had failed to do: by no economic or monetary tinkering, by no opportunism, by no dodging of the real issue, no lip service in public to what one denounced in private, no refusal to face facts, no taking the defensive toward evil because it was strong, no attempting to overcome with childish snares. Thus, by no accident, by no *laissez-faire*, but by the Washington-Hamilton Plan for union. Thus, by rational cool endeavour, by undaunted persistence against hopeless odds over a period of six years, by frontal attack on the root of evil, by thinking through clearly and by expressing them clearly, by raising a standard to which the wise and the honest could repair, by going through the gates, by preparing the way of the people, by lifting up a standard for the people, by remembering that "where there is no vision the people perish," and that where there is clear vision nothing can withstand man long. Thus was the American Union wrought.

The remedy had been found. The remedy had been prescribed. The remedy had been taken. In 1789 the new Union government began to function. And the recovery? The recovery was far beyond the wildest hopes of Washington, Hamilton, of all the founders of the Union. It was such that none of them could believe it real even when it came about; they all despaired of its continuing. The recovery that Union brought the Thirteen peoples would be still beyond belief, were it at all possible longer to doubt or deny. Never was there so swift and great a recovery, or so enduring a success in applied political science. The American Union of today speaks for itself. But one may note some of the immediate results in prosperity, peace and freedom that came from adoption of the Constitution.

The mere convocation of the Constitutional Convention sufficed, by the hope it gave, to turn the tide. Anarchy reached its highest point in Shays's rebellion, three months before the Convention met, though it was two years before the new government came into being. That

fact shows how the healing power of constructive effort begins the moment serious attempt at remedy begins.

The danger of war over Vermont was ended at once and forever: Vermont was admitted into the Union in 1790 as the fourteenth state. All the other territorial quarrels among the states were now settled peacefully. The danger of war with Spain over the Mississippi also vanished.

Freedom spread through the world, as we have seen, and brought new rights to man. One of them we may pause to note. America was the freest place on earth when the Constitution was adopted - but everywhere even in it the vote was then sharply restricted by property and other qualifications. It was not through the sovereignty of Virginia, whose maintenance Patrick Henry demanded in the name of the rights of man, that even the white men of Virginia all gained the right to vote. It was through the Union he condemned, and from that West to which Washington had looked. The very first state West of the Alleghenies to enter the Union, Kentucky, which entered in 1792 as the fifteenth state, brought in with it manhood suffrage in its constitution looked.

In 1790 there were only 109,000 white people living West of the Alleghenies. In 1815 there were ten times as many, in 1830 these ten times had more than doubled and ten states had been carved from the wilderness and admitted to the Union. To the frontier "all men are created equal" meant all free men had an equal right to vote. Manhood suffrage was not peculiar to Kentucky, it was native to all these new western states. From them it spread east to the original states, especially after the West in 1828 gained its first control of the Union with the election of Andrew Jackson. Virginia, which had given Kentucky to the Union, did not grant manhood suffrage until 1850.

Of all the results of the Washington-Hamilton Plan, the most easily measured is the economic recovery it brought. It is hard to estimate how low conditions had sunk in the chaos of the League of Friendship, but one can get an idea from the solid ground that begins to appear with Union. One year after Union, in 1790, the foreign trade of the Union totalled: Imports $23,000,000 - Exports $20,295,000. Only five years later, the figures were: Imports $69,756,000 - Exports $47,990,000. Fifty years after the Americans changed from League to Union (1840), the figures were: Imports $98,259,000 - Exports $123,669,000.

In those same fifty years the Thirteen had become Twenty-six states. The Union's territory had more than doubled by the peaceful ces-

sion to it of Louisiana and Florida respectively by France and Spain with whom the League had exhausted even its credit in 1787. When the Union took its first census in 1790 the population was 3,929,214 including 697,674 slaves. In only fifty years the number of men to whom the Union assured freedom had quadrupled, the population totalled 17,069,453 and immigrants who were too few to note in 1790 were pouring in at rate of 84,000 a year. Was free land the reason? The League had had plenty of land, too, but it exerted no such magnetism on mankind everywhere.

The public debts under the League were past calculation. Two years after Union Hamilton consolidated and funded all the debts of the League and of its member states and had the Union shoulder the whole load. The national debt then in 1791 totalled $75,463,000. In less than fifty years, in 1835, the whole debt had been paid off, together with all the cost of the war of 1812, the $15,000,000 that Louisiana cost in 1803, and the $5,000,000 for Florida, and a $28,000,000 surplus, gained largely from the sale of public land, had been distributed to the various state banks. Cheap land? In the great Northwest territory the League had owned land that had cost it nothing, yet it could no longer borrow a penny anywhere. Under Union that same Nothwest territory not only helped pay off the debt but became the five rich states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin.

All this is, of course, only a hint of the early results of the Washington-Hamilton Plan. We need not mention here the even more phenomenal development since 1840, for the later results are evident in the American Union of today.

(Prefaced and edited by Luigi V. Majocchi)

NOTES

(1) CLARENCE K. STREIT, *Union now*, Postwar edition, Washington, Federal Union, 1976.

(2) On that occasion Streit explained the story behind this part of the manuscript and why it remained unpublished: "I wrote the first MS of the book in the winter of 1933-34, and sent it that Spring to my previous publisher, the Viking Press. My good friends there begged off but offered to recommend it to Harpers. I sent it there and got another no. Disturbed, I decided to re-examine the project.

If the basic idea, I reasoned, was sound (as I still felt it was), then I needed to clarify my exposition, make it as clear to others as it was to me. But there could be a catch in it that wishful thinking had hidden from me. I knew many plausible proposals had proved to be phonies; why identify myself with another? Newspaper work had already led me to Acton's truth: 'Experience is of first importance in politics, because political calculations are so complex that we cannot trust theory if we cannot support it by experience.'

The toughest test that experience offered of the proposed Atlantic Federal Union was obviously that of the USA. *It dawned on me then that I had only a teenager's knowledge of it - a fault I've since found is appallingly widespread here. My formal education, from the grades through college, included only one year (in high school) in US history. My outside reading was fairly wide, but I wrote that first MS of the book without having read* The Federalist, *or even dipped into* Madison's journal of the Federal Convention. I was then *New York Times* correspondent assigned to the League of Nations; its library was well supplied with US history documents. I began with the first colonial charters and went on up through 300 years. This greatly clarified my thinking and strengthened my belief in the book's proposal.

I rewrote the book, twice; it grew to two volumes, mainly because of the fresh analysis I added of the alternating clarity and confusion in American political thought from 1620 to 1936 - notably in the periods of 1750-1789, the Civil War and the Wilsonian League. The "Washington-Hamilton-Lincoln Plan" was Chapter 14 in this third MS edition, which I finished in 1936. No one would publish so long a work. I decided to omit all the proof the US experiment gave (hoping to publish it later as another book), and rewrote the rest.

This 1938 or fourth MS was also rejected by all publishers who saw it - until the Czech crisis that September led Harper in New York and Cape in London to agree to publish it - or rather, the MS I had then rewritten a fifth time and given a new title: *Union now.* It was published in early 1939. Since then nearly 300,000 copies have been sold. Its readers began the organization that publishes this magazine.

I have not tried to publish those US history chapters as a separate book; this would have required more time in re-writing much of it than I wanted to divert from tasks I thought more urgent."

(The italics are ours. We wish to draw the readers' attention to the fact that, even in the USA, federalism developed in an adequate way only theoretically and juridically. It still has not reached the stage where it has become a line of thinking capable of interpreting the sense of our age and the meaning of federal institutions for the destiny of the human race. This cultural limitation has repercussions on all issues - from peace to European unity and all other regional unity - that cannot be tackled in an effective way without a federalist-type struggle.)

(3) Streit is referring to the fifteen democracies which were facing the threat of the autocracies in 1936 and were urged to unite by this book.

(4) OLIVER, *Life of Alexander Hamilton*, Nelson, pp. 110.0, (incomplete quotation in the MS).

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

MARIO ALBERTINI, President of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Honorary President of the European Union of Federalists, Professor in the Philosophy of Politics, University of Pavia.

JOSEPH PRESTON BARATTA, Ph. D., UN Office Coordinator, World Association of World Federalists.

LUIGI V. MAJOCCHI, Member of the Central Committee of the Movimento Federalista Europeo.

GUIDO MONTANI, Member of the Secretariat of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Professor in the Theory of Economic Development, University of Pavia.

NICOLETTA MOSCONI, Movimento Federalista Europeo, Pavia.

FRANCESCO ROSSOLILLO, Vice-President of the European Union of Federalists.

FRANCO SPOLTORE, Member of the Central Committee of the Movimento Federalista Europeo.

IRA L. STRAUS, Secretary-General of the Association to Unite the Democracies.

Direttore responsabile: Mario Albertini - Editrice EDIF - Autorizzazione Tribunale di Pavia n. 265 del 13-12-1981 - Tiprografia Pi-Me, Pavia - Spedizione in abbonamento postale - Gruppo IV (70%).

Dear Sir,

The Fe
has been
theoretical
and philos

The re
structure b

We su
issue with
means of t

SUBSCRIPT

Three issues
25 $. Other
tion (75 EC
costs of inte
tariff for the

Payments m
sending a c
I-27100 Pav
Trust, White
to: AUD, P
the beneficia

The Federalist
EDIF
Via Porta Pertusi 6
I-27100 Pavia (Italy)