

THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

Hamilton, The Federalist




YEAR XXIX, 1987, NUMBER 2

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The Federalist was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and has been published in English, French and Italian since 1984. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



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Two Possibilities for European Defence

The negotiations between the Americans and Russians for the double zero option have once more brought the problem of European defence to the fore. The fact is that after Reykjavik the prospect of American disengagement in Europe — albeit partial and gradual — is becoming an increasingly realistic possibility. The double zero option is only the nuclear side of this process, which will eventually affect conventional weapons too.

The Europeans have thus been brought squarely face to face with their responsibilities by the train of events, and inevitably the expectation of a weakened American umbrella will give rise to the answer — albeit a merely verbal one — of European defence. The attitude of the Europeans, however, reveals a surprising degree of blindness which takes some of them down a reactionary road and condemns the others to impotence. It is a fact: a) that the requirement of European defence is particularly stressed in certain conservative quarters who do not hide their aversion to both the current process of détente between the two superpowers and the prospect of the withdrawal of medium and short range missiles from Europe and who conduct rearguard battles like that over the Pershing 1 missiles; b) that the left, even when speaking of European defence, is incapable of indicating credible and effective alternatives. The blindness lies in this: the talk is about European defence in general, overlooking the fact that there are two alternative possibilities: 1) a European defence which remains within bipolarism, 2) a European defence which, precisely because it exists, transcends bipolarism.

A European defence which remains part of bipolarism, feeding it and subjected to its hegemony, belongs to a Europe which is still not politically united (nation-states with their own military sovereignty, their weakness and incapacity to defend themselves by themselves, the need

for American protection). On the other hand, a European defence which transcends bipolarism is a European defence in the literal sense of the term, in the hands of a European government. This Europe (the Community with its 12 members), with its 320 million inhabitants and its cultural resources, needs neither American protection, nor an arms race to balance the might of the USSR.

This possibility is as yet unexplored because the problem of European defence has always been seen both by politicians and by observers in terms of a bipolar equilibrium, i.e. an international scenario in which the balance of forces and the nature of the strategic equation remain substantially unchanged. In this light, European defence only means a greater European contribution to the American defence of Europe and hence greater military expenditure for Europe and growing militarization of society. If the bipolar outlook is maintained and if European responsibility in this area is increased, Europe as the most exposed region of the Atlantic Pact will clearly become the area with the greatest interest in strengthening both nuclear and conventional theatre weapons (in the illusion that a deterrent which has now lost all credibility could be reconstructed) and hence obstructing the consolidation of détente. And this tendency, it should be noted, would be all the stronger in that the solution to the problem of security could only be seen in exclusively military terms, assuming Europe remains divided and politically weak.

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This in itself is sufficient to show the inconsistency of the reality hiding behind the image of European defence as presented in the slogans of the leaders of European governments. The fact is that without a European government a hypothetical European army would simply be a military dictatorship (i.e. de facto subservience of European armed forces to the American government). Moreover, a European executive, with the full powers of a true government, could not possibly be created from nothing from one day to the next. It follows that the formula for European defence adopted in politicians' speeches and journalists' articles only covers the more or less conscious design of a traditional alliance — probably behind the façade of the Western European Union — with all its inefficiencies and weaknesses. Such a solution would only worsen the current situation inasmuch as a) it would merely supplement American defence of Europe and would hence slip back into the logic of opposing blocks, perpetuating the current risks and tensions, b) it would be less

integrated than the current defence system because the greater degree of autonomy, however small, of European governments vis-à-vis the American government and in their reciprocal relationships would slow down the decision-making process and c) it would be forced to compensate its lesser political and organizational efficiency with greater military commitment, in particular in the conventional sector which directly affects the whole of society (with compulsory military service) and thus develops belligerence rather than pacifism in the public's soul.

* * *

The problem is therefore to modify the approach to the problem of European security radically and to tackle it primarily in its political rather than military dimension. The essence of the question lies in accelerating and giving a positive identity to the process of evolution of the world equilibrium towards multipolarism. It is a process which is already under way, but which for the time being only appears negatively as the progressive weakening of the leadership of the two superpowers. This means that today one type of equilibrium is dissolving without any concrete prospect of the birth of a new equilibrium, more consonant with real power relationships (not just political and military relationships, but industrial, commercial and cultural as well), which would thus be more peaceful and progressive than the current equilibrium. The result of this evolution is merely anarchy, the multiplication of local conflicts and an exasperated increase in military expenditure.

Europe is the only place where a reversal of trend could begin in a relatively short space of time. In the present state of affairs it is, however, unthinkable that the transfer of sovereignty — without which no true European pole can arise — could take place directly on the military plane, i.e. in the sector constituting the solidest bulwark of national sovereignty. It is much more realistic to think in terms of a gradual process: the first step would be in a sector like the economic and monetary one, in which it would be more difficult for governments and political forces to reject substantial transfer of sovereignty. Moreover, this is essential if the Common Market is to be really united by 1992. It would also be perceived as the natural development of initiatives which have already begun and of institutions that already exist.

It should be noted that, quite apart from being more realistic, the economic and monetary approach to European unification, unlike the previous approach, also falls in with the current process of détente. Europe

would no longer look like the recalcitrant ally of the United States, attempting to boycott the initiatives that the United States and the Soviet Union are taking to further disarmament. On the contrary, Europe would be seen as a great economic pole intrinsically more peace-loving since it would be militarily less developed than the two superpowers and hence interested in the creation of strategic equilibria with increasingly lower levels of weapons. It would be capable of taking on precise responsibilities in the management of areas which today are a permanent source of serious instability, such as Third World debt, the functioning of the International Monetary System, regional crises, in particular the Middle East and the Gulf, the peaceful solution to which is of immediate and vital interest to Europeans. Most commentators, moreover, agree that today the threat to Western Europe from the Soviet Union is not military but political: in the last instance, it is a question of the danger of the detachment of Germany from the rest of Europe, or the "Finlandization" of Europe. Obviously, the only response to a political rather than military danger must also be political and not military.

* * *

Only with the prospect of an ordered transition to multipolarism — regarding which the creation of an economic and monetary Union in Europe is a decisive step — would the first embryo of positive government of the world economy become possible. This is becoming increasingly vital in a world of growing interdependence like the current one. It is important to point out that today we have come to the end of a cycle in which the world economy — or rather the economy of the Western world — was in some way guaranteed by American leadership. Today, American leadership is in decline, worn out by the responsibility of having had to run world economic affairs for the last forty years. And this has caused the crisis in the management of the international economy, which can be resolved only with the creation of a new political order, based on collaboration between great poles which are equally autonomous and responsible.

This is certainly not the reality underlying the increasingly vacuous yet increasingly spectacular ceremonies of the Summits of the Heads of Governments of the world's five or seven most industrialized countries. These Summits (which like all Summits — including the ones between the US and the USSR — when they occur frequently enough act as directories and exercise some sectorial control, excluding weaker coun-

tries from their decisions) are the most typical means of expression of contemporary imperialism in the transition from bipolarism to multipolarism, which by definition creates a situation which lies half way between hegemony and international anarchy. (Summits playing an active role in processes of regional integration are a separate case). A high degree of blindness exists even here. How astonishing, for example, is the failure to appreciate how a possible monetary system based on the dollar, the yen and the Deutsche Mark would prevent the formation of a European currency by making an imperialist trend prevail over the development towards European integration which is based on the equality of the member states.

With these Summits (or Directories) a declining hegemonic power tries to compensate its own growing impotence by involving its most important satellites in the decision-making process, with the intention of furthering the image of collaboration or even integration between economic policies (and foreign policies) of the hegemonic power and its allies. The truth is that the arrogance of the Summits (and we may merely recall the acts of vandalism to which Venice was subjected) in actual fact hides the opposite of integration, by proposing the impossible task of resolving the problems of a world economy which is increasingly interdependent through the squabbling "collaboration" between a superpower — the United States — no longer able to guarantee world economic order with its own resources and its most significant satellites whose interests are different from those of the United States. By profiting from growing US weakness, they have acquired sufficient autonomy to be able to remove themselves partially from its hegemony, but do not have the necessary weight to exercise the responsibility that Americans have had to abandon.

The impotence of the Summits and their structurally imperialist character clearly emerge from the fact that they believe they can govern the world economy by systematically excluding both the Soviet Union and the entire Third World, i.e. the vast majority of the world population on whose destiny the destiny of the entire world depends, and in particular the destiny of the industrialized areas of the world. The point then is not to call for different decisions and more democratic and advanced content as the European left usually does. It is the Summit method itself which is the negation of democracy, insofar as it is identified with the quite vain attempt to resolve world problems by imposing the supremacy of a small number of states over the others and hence strengthening the appearance, if not the substance, of the former's sovereignty. We need to follow the

opposite road to the one followed in the Summits in the realization that the only way to make a start to solving the problem of world government is to create poles of regional integration, beginning with the European pole. This means strengthening the awareness that the Summit policy runs counter to European integration or any other form of regional integration.

The Federalist

Recent Developments in Federalist Theory

LUCIO LEVI

Federalism, which was born as the theory of a form of government intended to solve the problems of an isolated case, the formation of the United States of America, and subsequently other societies with a marginal role in world politics such as Switzerland, Canada and Australia, has gradually extended its reach, and has now become a movement with world dimensions. More than a third of mankind lives in states with constitutions that are defined as federal and there are movements for continental unification throughout the world. The UN is a symbol of the world trend towards unity and in old nation-states regional and local movements have arisen demanding autonomy. These processes are expressions of the tendency to go beyond the unitary state model both at a higher and lower level by creating new supranational and infranational levels of government.

In an effort to understand and guide these processes, federal theory has developed in new directions, demonstrating its ability to provide a new interpretation of contemporary history, to generate criteria on which to base thinking about the future of mankind in a new way, to inspire new political behaviour and to offer a reply both to the question of a better quality of life in the urban and natural environment, through the territorial division of power and democratic global and articulated planning, and the problems of peace and general and controlled disarmament through the transformation of the UN into a world system of federal government. These new theoretical developments have matured in line with the transformations that have arisen in contemporary society in the age of World Wars and in particular since the end of the Second World War.

Let us review some of the most significant changes, which have occurred in the contemporary world, for which federalist theory, by renewing itself, acts as an interpreter.

1. The constitutional evolution of the federations.

The need to adapt old institutional mechanisms to political, economic and social changes in contemporary society has brought to light two general trends towards which federal institutions are developing.

The first is the tendency to centralize power in federal governments which is the consequence of the concomitant pressure of two factors, one socioeconomic, and one political. The socioeconomic factor is the development of the Industrial Revolution, which has multiplied production and trade relationships beyond the confines of the member states, transforming a set of prevalently agricultural, mutually isolated communities into an economic and social system whose parts are increasingly more interdependent. Federal governments have taken up the leadership of this process everywhere, a process that requires the extension of public intervention (construction and management of major public works, such as railways, motorways, monetary policy, industrial policy, social policy, environmental protection and so on), removing vast sectors of the economy and society from member states' control.

The political factor is the increasing pressure towards centralization exerted by international relations. After the World Wars and the development of a world system of states there are no longer any isolated political areas sheltered from power relationships.

The pressures deriving from this factor (which is more critical in the United States because of the great political and military responsibilities that the US have undertaken since the end of the Second World War, but which is active in all federal states) have led to the formation of a powerful bureaucratic and military apparatus serving the security and power requirements of central governments.

When public intervention was extended to social, economic and military sectors, there was a great increase in public spending, which triggered off a harsh struggle between federal and regional governments to gain scarce financial resources. This struggle was resolved by the fact that federal governments prevailed and with a significant decline in financial independence (and hence political independence) of regional governments. The institutional and political instrument by which this centralizing tendency arose were the grants in aid or subsidies (whose concession was often subordinated to compliance with precise conditions) that regional governments received from federal governments to finance their economic and social development programmes.

The second trend which arose in the evolution of federal constitutions

was the development of co-operation between the two levels of government between which power is divided in federations. This trend is also a consequence of the Industrial Revolution, and the process of economic and social integration between the member states of the federations and the emergence of new objectives in the states' action such as the welfare state and new instruments, such as planning, with which to pursue them.

This second trend has profoundly transformed the functioning of federal states, which were originally conceived on the basis of the model of the minimal state, i.e. a state in which public powers intervened as little as possible in economic and social processes and which did not disturb the relationships among regional governments and between them and the federal government. Regional governments were intended to operate in separate spheres that were relatively isolated from each other. This situation no longer exists in any industrial society.

However, an extension of matters under the state's control does not necessarily bring about an increase only in the powers of the central government since, in federal states, this process can also affect regional governments. To prevent this increased capacity for intervention from generating potentially destructive conflicts because of the delicate constitutional equilibria in federal states, growing co-operation has arisen everywhere between federal and regional governments. In essence, a growing number of political objectives require co-ordinated intervention of both levels of government and a joint commitment to accomplish them. Precisely in those sectors in which public intervention has developed most (such as control of the economy and social policy), member states have kept a fair degree of political autonomy by participating in joint programmes with the federal government.

The rise of co-operative federalism thus marks the shift from a distribution of powers between the two levels of government reflecting the formerly prevailing criterion of exclusive jurisdiction to a model based on concurrent jurisdiction. In classic federalism the division of powers was organized according to the scheme laid down in the tenth amendment of the United States' Constitution, which states that matters not expressly attributed to federal government are conferred on the member states' governments. In practice, all jurisdiction was exclusive with the single though major exception of taxation. With co-operative federalism the trend is towards eliminating all exclusive jurisdiction. All jurisdiction must tend to become concurrent.

Among the numerous institutional innovations which are an expression of the affirmation of co-operative federalism, it is appropriate to

mention the Loan Council, an institution for compulsory co-operation which is part of the 1929 Australian Constitution. This is a body which brings together a representative of the federal government (who has two votes) and the representatives of the governments of the six states (who each have one vote). It is, however, independent of these centres of power in that the federal government has a strong but non-dominant position. It has the power to decide the size of the debt at both levels of government and is thus an exemplary instrument to co-ordinate fiscal policies. What distinguishes this body from many other co-operative bodies, which have been formed in all federations, is that it possesses real decision-making powers, while the other bodies have no constitutional relevance and only have consultative powers. This includes the conferences which bring together heads of federal and regional governments.

2. The diffusion of federal constitutions in the Third World.

One of the most significant aspects of the contemporary world is the diffusion of the principles of federalism above all in numerous Third World countries involved in the national liberation movement. Some Latin American countries were influenced by the US federal model (such as Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina), when they became independent states in the last century. They were joined in postwar years by other great states in Asia and Africa (India, Pakistan, Nigeria). Because of the great territorial dimensions and/or the profound social differences existing within their territory, many states which became independent have recently adopted a few features of the federal system in their constitutions in response to the need to maintain political unity.

The distinction between federal constitution and federal government made by Wheare is useful when judging the structure of these states, since it is an application of the distinction between federal constitution in a formal and material sense: "A country may have a federal constitution, but in practice it may work that constitution in such a way that its government is not federal. Or a country with a non-federal constitution may work it in such a way that it provides an example of federal government."¹ The federations mentioned above belong to the first category. The predominant problem is to get the state authority to prevail over the territorial communities and the social groups that make them up.

We may thus claim that federalism should be considered in these countries as the first stage in the construction of a unitary state; the same

claim was made by those who drew up the USSR's Constitution, which may rightly be considered the first in a series of federations formed in the twentieth century in underdeveloped countries. Moreover, the nature of the institutional Revolution in the USSR is instructive in giving us a better understanding of the meaning of federalism in our times. Sixty years after the October Revolution, despite the efforts of a constant centralizing policy, the USSR is a "highly decentralized state" as Wheare recently wrote² and, despite great Russian imperialism, the minor nationalities have amazing vitality.³

On the basis of this experience it may be argued that the constitution of the unitary state is dictated by the requirements of the Industrial Revolution and international security, even though the centralization of power remains an impossible objective to achieve in states with huge dimensions and a multinational character. It is therefore reasonable to presume that the seeds of federalism present in many recently formed states will germinate when the domestic and international conditions for their evolution have ripened.

3. Crisis in the nation-state and new trends in state and international organization.

The crisis in the political formula of the nation-state and the tendency to form multi-state and multinational political units (USA, USSR, China, India and so on), international world organizations (UN) and continental structures (EEC, CMEA, Arab World, South-East Asia, Latin America) are an expression of the general direction in which the construction of the state and international organization is developing in our times, a direction characterized by the emergence of federalist elements. It shows, on the one hand, how the protagonists of world politics are no longer nations, but political formations consisting of a number of nations, and, on the other hand, it shows how no state is able to assume a decisive role in the world system of states, that has grown up on the ruins of the European system, without assuming a Continental dimension.

This tendency, which has arisen because of the internationalization of the productive process and the formation of the world system of states, has contributed to the growing awareness that the nation-state is no longer a sufficient basis for guaranteeing either economic development or political independence in the contemporary world.

In particular, reflection on the process of European unification has encouraged considerable maturation as regards the deeper aspects of

federalist theory. The search for European unity represents the most consistent attempt to overcome the political formula of the nation-state, which has led to extreme consequences as regards compressing mankind into closed, uniform, hostile and belligerent communities, a principle which is radically incompatible with the deepest requirements of the contemporary world. Moreover, we need to consider the difficulties encountered by the attempt to overcome the so far insurmountable divisions between nations consolidated by centuries of independent life as states and the absolute novelty of the attempt to find a formula which ensures peaceful coexistence between nation-states, an undertaking which has no precedents in history. We may therefore conclude that the problem of European unification requires the creation of an entirely new form of state with completely new political and social contents, of which the federations of the past are only a pallid antecedent. The search for new solutions to the problem of associating independent states in a stable way is a challenge for reason and a powerful stimulus to the renewal of federalist theory.

4. Crisis in the nation-state and regional and local self-government.

The crisis in the nation-state is also apparent in the opposite direction, i.e. in movements for regional and local self-government. In other words, there is a tendency to transcend the centralizing and authoritarian aspects of the nation-state. In particular, in advanced industrial societies experiencing the scientific revolution, which is now giving a new form to society and economy, the conditions required to develop a pluralist and decentralized form of state organization and to renew the structures of classical federalism in the light of the problems of post-industrial society are beginning to emerge.

5. The crisis in the institutional model.

The old conception of federalism, taken as a purely institutional theory, has proved to be entirely inadequate in facing up to the changes sketched above.⁴ Apart from the consideration that the classic federalist model has undergone changes in those states where it developed, the fact remains that conceiving federalism simply as a technique of organization of political power means making it subservient to the values of the past (liberal, democratic or socialist) and hence considering it as subordinate to traditional political ideologies. In actual fact, federalism's develop-

ment has closely followed the transformations that have occurred in the course of contemporary history and has become enriched with new categories of analysis. Its meaning has undergone continual evolution and deepening in response to the ever-growing problems raised by the historical process. The meaning behind this development is the progressive affirmation of the theoretical autonomy of federalism with regard to other political ideologies.

The objective of this article is to examine four theoretical models which are in fact four attempts to reformulate and widen the traditional definition, which was based on a purely institutional approach to federalism.

6. New federalism.

The expression "new federalism" refers to a wide body of literature which has made a contribution to the study of the most recent constitutional developments of federal states. As we have seen, the tendencies towards centralization and co-operation represent the most significant developments in contemporary federal institutions.

As regards the first tendency, this is generally recognized by researchers in federal institutions. They accept both the socioeconomic and political causes, which have brought it about. However, it is appropriate to point out that in the United States a theory formulated by Adolf A. Berle, Jr. has been successful. This theory holds that the centralizing drive promoted by the federal government is balanced out by the force applied by large multinational companies. Thus a new form of "economic federalism" develops,⁵ characterized by the emergence of strong concentrations of economic power replacing political pluralism, which is in decline because of the loss of autonomy of federated states. Against this view we must, however, object that economic power groups are not able to create constitutional equilibria, but have to adapt to already existing equilibria. They exercise their pressure on governments and parliaments to obtain decisions which are favourable to them. And if power is centralized, their interest is directed towards central power, in particular. The development of huge companies is not therefore an alternative to the centralization of federal states, but rather a factor which reinforces this tendency.⁶

Already in *The Federalist*⁷ we find the affirmation that social equilibria are not sufficient to guarantee a constitutional order. Indeed the conflict between economic and social interests tends to upset this order.

Every interest group struggles to wrest its demands from political power, though this is evidently in contrast with the general interest. The specific role of political power is to achieve mediation between demands coming from the various parts of society, making the general will prevail over particular wills.

This theory thus has the function of masking the true character of changes such as the tendency towards centralization which has profoundly changed the nature of federal institutions.

The second tendency which has changed federal institutions is the rise of co-operative federalism. Most of the authors who have studied this aspect agree that it coexists with a tendency towards centralization.⁸

The recognition of this tendency has led scholars of federal institutions to distinguish between two phases in the history of these institutions. On the one hand, classical constitutional federalism has a dualistic nature, in that federal government and the government of the states operate in two separate spheres without reciprocal interference on the basis of a rigid division in powers. Moreover, with the extension of the state's powers of intervention following the development of the Industrial Revolution, co-operative federalism has been strengthened. Its essential features have been defined in terms of the relationships between the two levels of government and the extension of concurrent jurisdiction. Researchers claim that the rise of this new form of organization of the federal state has not substantially modified the nature of federal institutions, which, according to Wheare, are defined in terms of the characteristics of independence and co-ordination between the two levels of government. If, on the one hand, the fact that no level of government is independent from the other is deeply rooted in the federal structure, on the other hand, independence is not incompatible with a strong interdependence between the two levels of government.

The experience of co-operative federalism has made us aware that it is not possible to achieve any coexistence between two levels of government territorially separated from each other within the state itself without adequate co-ordination. In an industrial society, in which the tasks of the state have increased enormously, co-operation between federal government and regional governments is indispensable in the functioning of federal institutions.

From these considerations emerges the requirement for a definition of federal institutions which includes the notions of dualistic federalism and co-operative federalism. The definition formulated by Maurice J.C. Vile provides an answer: "Federalism is a system of government in which

central and regional authorities are linked in a mutually interdependent political relationship; in this system a balance is maintained such that neither level of government becomes dominant to the extent that it can dictate the decisions of the other, but each can influence, bargain with, and persuade the other."⁹

7. Federalism as a process.

Carl J. Friedrich has developed a model of federalism construed as a process. He considers the purely institutional definition of federalism as being reductive, i.e. taken as the theory of a state form. He contrasts the institutional type of approach of classical federalism defined as "static and formalistic",¹⁰ which was interested, in particular, in problems of sovereignty, distribution of powers and the structure of the institutions, with the dynamic type of approach.

From the methodological standpoint, Friedrich constructs his federalist theory, privileging political and social change and the historical development of federal relationships at the expense of the structural and institutional aspects. Every particular variety of federal organization represents a stage in the development of a political and social reality in continuous evolution. What distinguishes federalism, according to Friedrich, is the requirement of maintaining unity in diversity in a process of continuous reciprocal adaptation of the common organization and the component parts, which avoids the opposing dangers of prevailing centralizing tendencies, (which would transform the federalist system into a unitary state), and separatist tendencies (which would split up the federation). It is necessary to add that Friedrich extends the field of application of federalism from the sphere of the state to that of non-governmental organizations, such as parties, unions, interest groups and churches.¹¹

He defines the federation as "a union of groups, united by one or more common objectives, rooted in common values, interests, or beliefs, but retaining their distinctive group character for other purposes."¹² This is a definition which may be applied both to a federal state, and to an alliance of states, a confederation or an association of groups. Federalism may be the result of two different processes: integration or differentiation. In the first, two or more political communities unite to solve common problems together, each maintaining their independence from each other. In the second, a political community with a unitary structure undergoes a process of differentiation, giving rise to a set of independent political

entities, which, however, do not question the unity of the overall political framework.

But the life of every federation is the result of the permanent tension between the unitary tendency and the pluralistic tendency. Both in the process of integration and the process of differentiation, the basic objective of federalism is to limit centralized power, by dividing it up. In this case the birth of a federal government limits the powers of the states who participate in the federative process, in the second case the formation of independent political communities within a unitary state limits the power of central government.

Friedrich's objective is to construct the notion of federalism as transcending the traditional conception of the sovereign unitary state. His dynamic approach is in fact designed to highlight the tendency of federative processes to overcome the traditional structures of the unitary state both upwards and downwards, through the creation of autonomous communities beyond and within this political formation.

Developing this reasoning, the author adds that "no sovereignty can exist in a federal system; autonomy and sovereignty exclude each other in such a political order. To speak of the transfer of a part of the sovereignty is to deny the idea of sovereignty which since Bodin has meant indivisibility. No one has the 'last word'. The idea of a compact is inherent in federalism, and the 'constituent power', which makes the compact, takes the place of the sovereign."¹³ Moreover, the distinction between federation and confederation is defined as "the quintessence of the static and formalistic approach."¹⁴ In the dynamic model proposed by Friedrich, the confederation is conceived as a precise stage in the federative process and it does not appear to be something which is qualitatively different from the federation, but simply a weaker form of political organization.¹⁵ A mistaken conclusion of this theory is the definition of the result of the process of transformation of the British Empire into the Commonwealth as an example of federation.¹⁶

Friedrich's basic theses seem to my mind to confirm the inadequacy of a purely institutional approach in the study of federalism. It is not, in fact, possible to understand federal institutions without knowing the historical and social processes which feed it. When Friedrich insists on the two directions of the federative process, he gives us categories which make it possible to capture the real processes which are transforming contemporary society: the tendency to transcend the nation-state and the formation of states or international organizations of continental and subcontinental dimensions and the tendency to decentralize power and

regional and local self-government within old unitary states.

However, he does not go so far as to identify the deep roots of these processes which consist, as Mario Albertini has pointed out, in overcoming antagonisms between nations and classes.¹⁷ This explains the marginal role of federal experiences in the past and the current topicality of federalism in the contemporary world and at the same time makes it possible to highlight the profound characteristics of federalist social behaviour: the cosmopolitan dimension and the community dimension. The first stresses the connection between the processes of political unification of continents and the tendency to unify the world and to achieve peace with the creation of a World federation. The second dimension reveals the link existing between movements for regional and local self-government and the tendency to experiment new forms of political and social organization within the grass-roots communities: direct democracy and self-management.

Once we have clarified the limits to a purely institutional approach, it is still necessary to reflect on the relationships existing between institutions and the historical process. In general terms, institutions are a product of the historical process (for example, without the Industrial Revolution representative democracy is unthinkable). Moreover, institutions are an indispensable condition for the existence of the historical process itself. Using figurative language we may say they are like the banks of a river within which the historical and social processes flow. Were it not contained within these banks, the drift of the current would be lost and history would have no sense, in the dual acceptance of this term: direction and meaning. The institutions are thus instruments by means of which men try to control history. This means that institutions have "relative autonomy" with regard to the historical process, that is they tend to channel the new processes along old riverbeds, but "in the final instance" they are forced to bend to the will of history. In other words, when the institutions are no longer suited to containing new processes, the latter burst their banks and create new ones, that fall in line with the changes in history.

Above I used a few expressions in inverted commas which are found in some letters written late in his life by Engels which have a methodological content, in which it is stated that "according to the materialistic conception of history the factor which *in the final instance* is decisive in history is the production and reproduction of real life."¹⁸ On the other hand, "the state ... according to the *relative autonomy*"¹⁹ which is inherent in it ... reacts in its turn to the conditions and the course of production."²⁰

This means that, while the rather insignificant changes in the mode of production do not have any repercussion on political institutions, the great changes in the mode of production upset political structures and force them to fall into line with the mode of production. The relationship between productive structure and political superstructure is, according to Engels' formula, a "reciprocal action between two unequal forces,"²¹ in which the role of superstructure is to accelerate the historical process (when there is a "correspondence" between the base and the superstructure) or to hamper it (when this "correspondence" does not exist).

The institutional dimension thus conserves its irreplaceable function as a criterion for assessing the nature and trends of federative processes. Defining the structure of a federation is necessary to help us learn when a federative process has produced a federation, to establish whether the process is federative in nature, and, if so, to measure the progress made as regards creating a federation. The institutional notion of a federation makes it possible to affirm, for example, that the Commonwealth is not a federation, nor is there any appreciable sign that it is becoming a federation.²² Moreover, it should be stressed that the confederation is not always a stage in a process that leads to the federation. History is littered with examples of confederations which dissolved before they reached the stage of a federation.

There can be no doubt, moreover, that federal organization is incompatible with the traditional conception of indivisible sovereignty. However, the requirement of an authority which ultimately imposes its decision on the entire territory of the state is a basic achievement for the modern state. The novelty of the federal state consists in the fact that the distribution of power is organized in such a way that certain centres of power have the last word on certain matters, others on others, without hierarchical relationships being established between the various sovereign powers. We should also remember that in all federations there is an authority with ultimate powers of decision, in the case of conflict between the independent governments among whom power is divided. The courts have the power to annul laws which do not comply with the constitution and to order all powers to comply with the constitution.

As regards the extension of the field of application of federalism from the state field and the organization of the state to non-governmental organizations, such as parties, unions, interest groups and churches, it should be noted that they are organizations subordinated to the state's sovereignty. Internally speaking, these organizations tend to be modelled on the state's structure. This is natural because the role of the parties is to

control the government and the role of pressure groups is to influence the government's decisions. Hence, these groups will take on a federal structure only in the case that the state has a federal structure. When they operate at an international level, they can only be subordinated to the *raison d'état* of the state to which they belong and they undergo the logic of power relationships which dominate international relations, as the experience of the workers' internationals and multinational corporations has shown.²³

8. Integral federalism.

In the dark years of the uncontrasted domination of nationalism, a federalist group grew up around the review *L'Ordre nouveau* published in Paris from 1931 to 1938. This group continued to be active even in the postwar years in France in particular, whose most representative exponents were Robert Aron, Arnaud Dandieu, Alexandre Marc and Denis de Rougemont. They developed an "integral" conception, i.e. not just an institutional but also a social, economic and philosophical conception of federalism.

Integral federalism is an overall response to the problems of our times and is based on an overall assessment of the contemporary world: the worldwide crisis of our civilization. This means that all the institutions which govern our society are antiquated and not in tune with the realities of today's world, which is in rapid transformation. Contemporary man is dominated and oppressed by great mass organizations (huge corporations, political parties, unions, bureaucratic apparatus, nation-states), in which social relationships are depersonalized. The breakdown of social solidarity arising from the violent clashes between the great mass organizations is matched by the anarchy created by state sovereignties at an international level. Both have contributed to the abnormal birth of centralized state power and its bureaucratic and military apparatus.

Underlying this crisis there is an individualistic culture, whose roots lie in Jacobinism and which has pulverized society, crushed all intermediate bodies and laid the bases for contemporary Fascist and Communist totalitarianism. Following Tocqueville's and Proudhon's analyses, integral federalism criticizes the centralizing character of the state which emerged from the French Revolution. By conceding no space for intermediate organizations between the individual and the state, this type of state has a potentially authoritarian character.

The federalist alternative is a complete reversal of this situation. Aron and Marc define federalism as "the political conception which makes it possible to reconcile individual freedom and the need for collective organization" which "facilitates the existence of free human communities which manage to associate without losing their individual characteristics."²⁴ In practice, federalism is a form of political organization which is capable of reconciling liberty and authority, unity and diversity.

When federalism is defined in such generic terms, traces of it can be found in every age, even "from those uncertain origins of history in which human communities ... grouped our distant forebears into units animated by the same spirit and the same faith, but divided up without effort into independent tribes and clans with free articulations."²⁵ Thus Marc finds elements of federalism in ancient Greece, Rome, among barbarian peoples, in feudalism and in the Common age.²⁶ The struggle between federalism and centralism is essentially the same as that which opposed the Celtic tribes to the Roman Empire.²⁷

In this vision, nationalism is the fruit of a "mistaken choice". European states should have had the freedom to organize themselves both as federations and as centralised units. The fact that the second trend triumphed shows that the "easier choice" prevailed.²⁸ But federalism became aware of itself in the 19th century. Only then, thanks in particular to Proudhon's contribution, did integral federalism acquire its first theoretical formulation. Federalism is a general doctrine which relates to a wider sphere than politics. According to Marc, it is a "philosophy capable of re-establishing communication between man and nature, between me, you and us, between man and his destiny, between man and his mystery. Philosophy, anthropology, sociology, law, political science: all is held and federalism reveals its capacity to rejuvenate and renew this totality."²⁹

It is not possible here to examine the philosophical principles of integral federalism: personalism, a conception of man which proposes the reconciliation between individual autonomy and the infinite diversity of personal vocations with community solidarity, or the "dialectic of unchaining",³⁰ a new conception of open dialectic which does not suppress oppositions, but promotes a synthesis of tensions and polarities. I shall leave aside these philosophical aspects of integral federalism restricting my analysis to the political, economic and social aspects. The latter can be analysed deeply with the conceptual schemes developed by social sciences, which I have used in this article for the reconstruction of federalist thought.

The proposal to build a federalist society is based, according to this school, on the application of four principles: autonomy, co-operation, subsidiariness and participation.

The application of the principle of *autonomy* to all the territorial communities (communes, regions etc.) and functional communities (grass-roots organization of political parties, trade unions, and companies' production units etc.) make it possible for these communities to achieve self-government, so that the decisions which relate to the community as a whole are taken in keeping with individuals' concrete needs. The system of autonomies thus makes it possible to overcome the centralized and authoritarian model of the unitary state.

Co-operation between these communities will make it possible for them not to remain isolated, but collaborate with each other to resolve common problems.

Thanks to the principle of *subsidiariness*, a distribution of power can be achieved which makes it possible to resolve each problem at a lower level, thus leading to decisions which are the closest possible to those of the interested parties.

Finally, the principle of *participation* makes it possible to introduce democratic principles in that plurality of autonomous communities, arranged at various levels and co-ordinated with each other, to which men belong and thus to approach the ideal of a society in which men are the masters of their destiny.

All the specific solutions are derived from these four principles. In contrast with the closed, centralized model of the unitary state, integral federalism emphasizes individuals' membership of a plurality of social groups, without anybody being privileged at the expense of others. In this respect, integral federalism's theoreticians criticize democratic centralism, as it allows people's participation in the decision-making process only through the channel of national parliaments, and the party system, which is eager to entrust a monopolistic representation of public opinion to professional politicians, who control closed, oligarchic, and bureaucratic organizations.

In the federal system, democratic participation, which occurs mainly in the independent grass-roots communities, makes it possible to reduce the central government to a secondary role. One of the most characteristic aspects of integral federalism is the fact that the road to renewal of democracy can be identified not only in the system of autonomies — whose essential features I have illustrated above — but in the organization of a new form of social and economic representation alongside

territorially based political representation and similarly organized at all levels from the local level to the European one. The reform of bicameralism, proposed by Aron and Marc in *Les Principes du fédéralisme*,³¹ gives the lower chamber elected by universal suffrage the function of controlling the executive, while the upper chamber made up of the representatives of regional and local communities and economic and social interests has legislative power.

These considerations lead us to deal with the economic and social aspects of integral federalism. Its characteristics may be defined in opposition to capitalism and collectivism. Inspired by Proudhon, integral federalists do not question the principle of private ownership of the means of production, even though they claim that the distortions should be corrected. It is not, however, possible, nor is it desirable, to abolish private ownership. If anything, this should be generalized. They support the idea of co-operatives in agriculture and workers' participation in company management in industry.

As regards planning, this should be based on the participation of regional and local bodies, unions, professional groups and companies (even financially speaking), on their contractual co-operation and on the territorial articulation in line with the federal scheme of distribution of powers. Moreover, planning operates with different instruments: in essential goods (heavy industry, agriculture, housing, basic services, clothing, health and education) it is compulsory, whereas it is optional in consumer goods and non-essential services.

Finally, we should recall two proposals designed to encourage the democratization of the economy. The "guaranteed social minimum", i.e. a minimum wage which gives everybody the chance to satisfy their basic needs, and general compulsory "civilian service" which distributes the least qualified and least gratifying jobs not removed by automation among all the population and makes it possible to feed the fund that ensures the "guaranteed social minimum" with adequate resources.

At this stage we can make an overall assessment of integral federalism. Although with the limits that we shall see, this school has the merit of having encouraged criticism of the authoritarian aspects of the structure of the nation-state, and the ideology that sustains it, and a reflection of the overall nature of federalism as an alternative to the crisis of our age.

However, the definition of federalism that it proposes is so generic and lacking in any specific historical identity that traces of it can be found in all ages and in just about any country. One of the unacceptable

consequences of this approach is that, for example, the affirmation of the political model of the nation-state is the result of an error and thus the federalist alternative could have asserted itself if men had chosen it in the age of the rise of the nation-state. In actual fact, democratic centralism was the instrument which made it possible for the supporters of the idea of the nation to free individuals from the old local political and economic institutions which gave privileges to the old classes that dominated the feudal age. Provincial autonomies in the *ancien régime* did not correspond only to the privileges of the local dignitaries jealous of their prerogatives, but also the parasitic interests of the worker members of the corporations, who constituted a surviving vestige of the feudal system. As compared with this system, democratic centralism undoubtedly represents a step forward and the premise for reconstructing regional and local autonomies in democratic terms. In such a historical context, however, the supporters of federalism (such as the Girondists during the French revolution) ended up by being confused with the defenders of particularism and feudal privileges and played an objectively counter-revolutionary role.

As regards the political and institutional model, the proposal to transform the upper chambers into economic and social assemblies representing social groups and professional interests has clear corporatistic connotations even though this definition is rejected by integral federalists. An assembly that links up the economic and social interests in a state is the sum of particular wills, each of which tends to consider its own interests in an egoistic and unilateral way. Hence, it does not constitute a remedy in the clash of corporative interests because it is not capable of achieving mediation between conflicting interests nor of generating a political synthesis adapted to bring out the general will.

In the economic field, integral federalism has formulated proposals which today seem interesting and innovative. They do in fact put forward the basic outlines of a "third model", an idea for which growing interest has recently been expressed in various quarters. But instead of being defined in relationship with the trends of contemporary history, the characteristics of the model are deduced in a doctrinaire way from the principles of federalism. Hence, the way in which they are presented prevents their innovatory aspects from being fully understood and fully received.

More generally, the fact remains that integral federalism has not revealed any major interest in developing and improving instruments for the interpretation of the objective course of history. Yet politics must

make its peace with the historical process and social, economic and political structures, taken as the set of objective conditions in which human behaviour is based, which do not depend on our aspirations, however noble they may be. A federalist commitment which does not merely wish to restrict itself to a criticism of reality (its negation) but also proposes to change the world in a very concrete way, must never detach itself from real processes, but must actively participate with the objective of knowing them and orienting them. Hence objectives must be defined, which are internal to the current historical process and compatible with the historical conditions of our times.

The same criticism that Marx and Engels made of "utopistic socialism" is true of integral federalism, which, instead of seeking the elements required to affirm the socialist alternative in the historical process and its contradictions, is simply entrusted to the force of ideas and good will. Engels wrote, with regard to the founders of socialism, "The solution of the social problem ... had to be created from the brain. Society only offered incongruencies; eliminating these incongruencies was the task of rationalizing reason. The need was to think up a new more perfect social order, and to introduce it into society from outside, with propaganda and, where possible, with the help of experiments."³²

Substantially, the limit to political orientation of integral federalism consists in conceiving the federalist alternative as the total overthrow of the social reality it fights. It is a position that is limited to simple negation, the abstract refusal of this reality, and mechanically contrasts utopia with reality. The objective of the federalist revolution, wrote Marc, "is a radical reworking of all the structures [of our society] whether they be social or political, economic or mental."³³ Thinking in terms of the overall transformation of society means dreaming up a project that has never succeeded in any revolutionary group: destroying this badly made world and reconstructing it from its bases.

In a letter to Antoine Gauthier, Proudhon, an author in whom the integral federalists found considerable inspiration, wrote: "You ask me for explanations on how to reconstruct society ... You must understand that the problem is not to *imagine*, to combine in our heads a system that we will subsequently present: the world cannot be reformed in this way. Society can only correct itself by itself."³⁴ The problem therefore is placed in clear terms. No political group can claim to change society as a whole, nor, moreover, does it have the power to do so. Society changes through the change in the behaviour of all.

Nevertheless, politics is that human activity which is entrusted with

achieving self-government of society over itself by means of coercion and consensus, two ingredients both indispensable and present, albeit in differing proportions, in every society that has existed so far. In politics there is always the imposition of a few (governors) over the many (the governed). But historical experience demonstrates that political power does not last long without consensus. In other words, it is not possible to make a policy prevail if this does not correspond to the needs of the people. It may thus be affirmed that politics is the sphere in which revolutionary human action can change the course of events.

It will be a question merely of adapting political institutions to the changes that have taken place in society. This means that revolutionary action has never had the objective of radically transforming society, but of destroying the political institutions that block its development and impede historical progress. It means creating new institutions capable of freeing the trends developed in society towards higher forms of political coexistence.

Integral federalists conceived their political project because of the historical situation in which at the beginning this movement of ideas developed as a distant, ultimate goal, which had no influence on the decisions of the moment. And even when with the collapse of nation-states at the end of the Second World War, when the conditions for European unification matured, the priority political objective was identified in the affirmation of integral federalism in all its aspects rather than in the struggle for a European federation.

Certainly, a European federation has been fought for within the European Union of Federalists, but the main objective of integral federalists was the radical transformation of society in a federalist direction. As Marc states, "a good constitution could only accompany, express, and crown this necessary revolution and not precede it, or, still less, replace it."³⁵ By expressing the doubt that it was not enough to pursue the restricted objective of struggling to change the political institutions and that the European federation might not have led to a freer and more just society, this political current did not give rise to sufficient commitment in pursuing the objective of the European federation and did not achieve the commitment needed with power relationships whereas power must be changed if the federalist project is to triumph. *De facto* it ended up by championing the policy of European unification promoted by governments, which by definition does not question national sovereignties. This is still a widespread political attitude, which does not impute to the federalist organization responsibility for the construction of European

unity, but which, in practice, requires this result from the existing powers. This feature is shared with utopistic socialism.

Moreover, we need to stress that, from the point of view of political effectiveness, the definition of federalism as a philosophy has a negative role.³⁶ The fact is that those who though sharing political, economic and social objectives, did not agree either in part or in whole with its philosophical tenet, have moved away from federalist commitment. It follows that the latter ought to be abandoned to free individual decisions and not to interfere with political positions. The greatest difficulty of political groups that have adopted integral federalism has always been to define a political strategy. After all, they proved themselves incapable of giving a theoretical definition of federalism that could become the position of many people and that could transform it into a force. In other words, federalism must be capable of forming a nucleus of activists,³⁷ making up the backbone of an independent political organization, and giving them a theoretical orientation capable of guiding them in political struggle. It is the merit of Italian federalism that it has overcome these limitations.

9. Federalism as ideology.

The originality of federalist thinking in Italy is the definition of federalism as ideology.

It is appropriate, before proceeding to examine the specific characteristics of this current of federalist thinking, to outline various premises regarding the notion of ideology and crisis in traditional ideologies. Ideology is a scheme for the analysis of the historical process with a view to controlling it and guiding it. More precisely it is a political project which brings to light the sense of a new phase in history by means of the affirmation of new institutions and new values.

Ideology is therefore the form which active political thinking takes. It is the conceptual system which makes it possible to achieve a convergence between thinking which is indispensable for the cohesion of a political group and the coherence of its principles of action. It may be distinguished from philosophical and religious thinking by its active nature, i.e. its projection and its orientation towards action. This explains why people with different philosophical and religious positions can accept the same ideology.

Besides this notion there is another which is more specific, which was introduced into political culture by Marx who claimed that ideology

is self-mystifying thought. As Gustav Bergmann has clarified, mystification is produced every time a value judgement is mistaken for a statement of fact.³⁸ This is a normal phenomenon in the political field, since political power is a social relationship in whose presence the mind, instead of representing reality, often conceals or distorts it.

Thus knowledge and error have always coexisted in ideologies taken in the first sense of the word, i.e. as a form of active political thinking.

Federalism, taken as an ideology, is placed in a relationship of continuity with regard to the great revolutionary movements of the past and at the same time is a form of a development of these movements, which manages to take mankind one step further in the process of emancipation. The birth and development of liberal, democratic and socialist ideologies was accompanied by the conviction that history might be the object of rational comprehension and conscious control. It is to be stressed, however, that this was only a partially founded conviction, since, besides the technical capacities of controlling social reality, which have led man to progress towards higher forms of political coexistence, those ideologies contained elements of self-mystification.

This current crisis coincides with the crisis of the traditional categories of historical and social analysis and the political and institutional models inherited from the past, which have proved to be increasingly inadequate in understanding and dominating the basic trends of contemporary history. That there is a crisis in traditional ideologies is a generally recognized fact. However, the nature of this crisis does not become clear except in the context of federalist thinking. The latter adopts a standpoint that makes it possible to recognize the limits of traditional ideologies and propose criteria of analysis and objectives that make it possible to overcome their crisis.

The crisis in ideologies is the crisis in traditional political thinking which is unable to control destructive forces (world wars, risk of nuclear and ecological disaster, exploitation and underdevelopment of the Third World etc.) raised by these new trends in contemporary history and is not able to recognize the new character of our age in the possibility and need for European and World unification. The limit to traditional ideologies lies in their dependence on a position of power tied to a class and a state. Indeed, the cause of the mystifications that can be found in these political conceptions lies in the fact that they have based their interpretation of social reality on the need to defend specific national interests or class interests. Even the objective of peace is seen as the result of a set of independent national policies.

Mario Albertini has pointed out that, with the World government, "in the context of a policy made by all for all, that power could no longer coincide with the advantage of some and the detriment of others but must coincide with the interest of all, i.e. with something that can be ascertained only scientifically."³⁹

When the divisions of humanity into classes and nations have disappeared, it will also be possible to overcome those particular interests which distort knowledge and give rise to these mystifications, which are produced for the defence of power positions of groups who represent those parts of mankind in conflict with each other. The way it conceives the interests of mankind and the struggle for peace, i.e. the construction of a World government, able to control world history, gives federalism the character of an ideology which can reduce the theoretical errors in which the other ideologies have fallen, because of their unilateral standpoint, to a minimum.

To face up to the greatest problems of contemporary society, which have taken on dimensions which are much wider than nation-states, it is thus necessary to act in the common interest of mankind and not merely for one's own country. This means that the time is now ripe to give priority to the objective of the European Union and Union in other continents, in the prospect of world unity in contrast to the goal of renewal of individual states considered separately. Federalism is the theoretical and practical awareness of this priority.

The great merit of Altiero Spinelli is that he laid the bases for a definition of federalism as an ideology, even though he always refused to place himself in this cultural perspective.⁴⁰

These bases consist in having developed the concept of theoretical and practical autonomy of federalism more deeply than any other federalist has ever done. On the theoretical plane, Spinelli's reflection is based on the constitutional federalism of English-speaking countries, whose roots lie in *The Federalist* and which developed important analyses at the time of the First and Second World Wars firstly with Einaudi's writings and subsequently with the works of English federalists in *Federal Union*.⁴¹

The historical judgement on which the theoretical autonomy of this trend in federalist thinking is based may be summarized in the concept of the crisis in the nation-state. This form of the state, which is no longer able to control the basic trends in the course of history (internationalization of the productive process, formation of the world system of states, supremacy of states with continental dimensions), has become the main

obstacle to the renewal of society and condemns all national alternatives to failure, whether they be liberal, democratic or socialist.

The concept of crisis in the nation-state may be distinguished from the crisis in civilization, adopted by integral federalists, because it bases the federalist alternative on the analysis of trends prevailing in contemporary history and identifies a specific contradiction which political action should have exploited. Thus the idea of the priority of reform of institutions (transcending the division of Europe into nation-states and encouraging Europe uniting into a federation) conflicts with the idea of overall reform of society typical of integral federalism. This approach makes it possible to indicate a clear objective in federalist action, which is clearly well-defined, comprehensible to all: the European federation taken as a European pillar of world peace. Peace and federation are thus the end and the means of this action.

In the field of political action, Spinelli's work has a really innovative meaning and represents a turning point in the history of federalism. The *Ventotene Manifesto*⁴² ushered in a new way of conceiving federalism, taken as a theory inspiring new political behaviour and autonomous political struggle. To understand the novelty of Spinelli's position it is useful to compare it with that of his masters: Einaudi and the British federalists. For these authors, federalism never became a priority political choice, but remained an accessory to the conception of liberalism and socialism. The significance of Spinelli's political design may be condensed in a reflection that can be read on last page of his memories, where his programme is described after being freed from internment: "No political formation was waiting for me ... It was up to me to start a new and different movement for a new and different battle from scratch."⁴³

What distinguishes Spinelli's work from the *Ventotene Manifesto* onwards from preceding works, which went no further than stressing the historical crisis in the nation-state and placing the federalist alternative in some indefinite future, is the fact that Spinelli emphasized the idea of the current relevance of the European federation. I use the expression "current relevance" which Lukàcs uses⁴⁴ to define the vision of Lenin's proletarian revolution and to distinguish it from the vision of other Marxists, with the purpose of affirming that, according to Spinelli, it is not only necessary, but also now possible to reconstruct Europe on federal bases, to open up the road to the world's unification. The authors of the *Manifesto* (in the new historical context determined by the Second World War) claim that the historical crisis in the nation-state was a

political crisis opening up a space for federalist initiatives.

Again in the *Ventotene Manifesto* we find principles of action that will inspire federalist action in the struggle for European unity, to which Spinelli always remained faithful. On the one hand, the strategic priority of the objective of European federation as compared with national renewal: "The problem which must be resolved first and failing which any other progress is mere illusion is the definitive abolition of the division of Europe into sovereign states" so that "if the struggle were restricted tomorrow to the traditional national field, it would be very difficult to escape the old contradictions."⁴⁵ The novelty in federalist thinking resides in the fact that it overthrows the order of priorities inspiring the conduct of political parties, for which the priority of national objectives remains: freedom and equality must be achieved in every single country and as a result these values are developed internationally like peace itself.

In the federalist prospect, federal institutions and peace are the premise, and not the consequence, of the complete fulfilment of liberty and equality. If the international objective is the premise to a positive solution of all other institutional, political, economic and social problems, the new line of division between the forces of progress and the forces of conservation is defined as follows: "Therefore the dividing line between progressive and reactionary parties no longer coincides with the formal lines of a greater or lesser democracy, or pursuit of a greater or lesser socialism, but the division falls along the very new and substantial line, separating those who conceive the essential purpose and goal of struggle as being the ancient one, i.e. the conquest of national political power — which, although involuntarily, play into the hands of reactionary forces, letting the incandescent lava of popular passions set in the old moulds, thus allowing old absurdities to arise once again — and those who see the creation of a solid international state as the main goal and who will direct popular forces towards this goal, and even if it were to win national power, use it first and foremost as an instrument for achieving international unity."⁴⁶

In the age of the crisis in the nation-state, the main front of political struggle which discriminates the forces of progress from those of conservation is no longer identified in the conflict between the principles of socialism within the nation-states but in the conflict between nationalism and federalism. Traditional ideologies, insofar as they pursue the illusion of national renewal, remain prisoners of this political formula, and suffer its decadence and thus remain in the field of conservation.

Moreover, by giving life to new institutions corresponding in size and form to the requirements imposed by the evolution of the mode of production and organization of the state, the European federation will release the tendencies which have matured in society towards increasingly vast forms of supranational integration and freer and more open coexistence within which even the right wing could have a progressive role.

To be able to pursue their objectives independently of governments and political parties, federalists had to have their own organization. The authors of the *Ventotene Manifesto* felt that this organization should be the party. This error was soon corrected. The Italian federalist organization, whose foundation was promoted by Spinelli in Milan on August 27-28th, 1943, took the shape of a movement and an analogous structure was adopted by the federalist organizations in other countries partly because of the influence of the Italians. The struggle for national power would have strengthened this power and hence consolidated the division of Europe, whereas the organization as a movement made it possible to unite forces favourable to the European constitutional objective not only over and above party divisions, but also over and above national divisions. And indeed, in 1946 the federalist movements united to form the European Union of Federalists, which was a coalition of national movements at the beginning, but became a real supranational movement in 1973.

Spinelli also defined the strategy needed to achieve the objective of the European federation. As regards the juridical nature of this objective, he stressed this had a dual nature: on the one hand, it is a treaty with which the contracting states agree to give up part of their sovereignty in favour of a supranational government, on the other hand it is a constitution, which defines the form of the organization of the union of states.

Since the nature of the objective determines the character of the means to be used, Spinelli drew the conclusion that it is not possible to progress down the road to the construction of a European federation without the agreement of the states, even though the latter represent the main obstacle to the transfer of powers on a European level.

On this basis, Spinelli specified the characteristics of the constituent method, the only procedure possible to complete the construction of a European democratic power. On the one hand, a European Constituent Assembly, representative of all European peoples and political forces, is the only body capable of acting with the legitimacy that it receives from the vote and is thus endowed with the authority needed to draw up and

propose the constitution. Moreover, in a Parliamentary assembly the decisions are taken publicly and according to the majority rule, i.e., on the basis of procedures that make it possible to clearly identify the responsibilities and reach democratic and effective decisions: this is the reverse of the diplomatic method, which is based on the principle of defending national sovereignties and which imposes compromises that take into account the position of all states, since it requires all decisions to be taken secretly and unanimously.

This constitutional approach contrasted with the functional approach, chosen by governments, because, by means of the creation of specialized communities, it was possible to take decisions at the European level without questioning national sovereignties. Spinelli strongly criticized the illusion that it was possible to really unify partial sectors (economic, military etc.) of European society without creating a democratic European government. He dedicated all his commitment to exploiting the contradictions arising from the partial character of the solutions proposed by the governments in an attempt to force the latter to adopt constitutional solutions.⁴⁷

On the basis of these principles of action Spinelli was able, when the chance came along to lead two attempts at constructing the European state which were undertaken in the course of the postwar period.

The first matured in the early fifties, in connection with the initiatives to build a European alternative (the ECSC and the EDC) to the reconstruction of Germany. Thanks to Spinelli's intervention, these initiatives made it possible to trigger off a constituent process in which the *ad hoc* Assembly (the enlarged ECSC Assembly) was given a mandate to draw up the statute for the European Political Community, the political body needed to control the European army. The process was abruptly halted with the fall of the EDC in 1954 when the French National Assembly voted against.

The second attempt was the ratification of the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, drawn up on the initiative of Spinelli by the European Parliament on February 14th, 1984. Once again Spinelli found himself in the European Parliament, in the right place to be able to exercise his constitutional initiative. The opportunity was given by the contradiction of a Parliament elected by universal suffrage with only consultative powers which made it possible to begin the struggle to attribute the power to make laws and control the executive to the sovereign people through Parliamentary representation. This attempt failed but the contradiction revealed the permanent nature of the problem and hence also the permanent need for action to overcome it. Indeed, Spinelli himself, a few months before his death, had once more begun to

struggle for the Union within the European Parliament.

All in all, Spinelli's role in European political life was, to use a Hegelian formula, that of a "World-historical Individual". World-historical Individuals express the deepest tendencies in an age and identify themselves so much with them that the individual goal coincides with the universal goal. The end that they pursue is not thus something arbitrary, but corresponds to the needs of a phase in history and belongs to the real possibilities of their times. Hegel wrote: "Historical and universal individuals are those who first expressed what men want. It is difficult to know what we want. We may certainly want this or that, but we still remain in the field of the negative and discontent: knowledge of the affirmative may well be lacking. But those individuals also know what they want is the affirmative."⁴⁸

They have, however, an intuitive knowledge of the problems of their age. As Hegel observed, "the concept is proper to philosophy. But historical and universal individuals are not required to know this, because they are men of action. On the contrary, they know and want their work, because it corresponds to the age."⁴⁹ This quotation from Hegel is strikingly similar to an autobiographic page in Spinelli's work when he says: "The European federation did not present itself as an ideology ... it was the reply that my spirit yearning for political action was seeking."⁵⁰

The sense of Spinelli's entire work is resolved in the heroic concentration of all energies to a single end: action for the European federation. With Spinelli, for the first time in history the new features of federalism, taken as autonomous political behaviour as compared with that of other political forces, began to take shape albeit only in terms of political action. It is a position which in germ contains the idea of federalism as ideology.

The significance of Mario Albertini's political and cultural formulation lies precisely in having deepened and extended the range of the concept of federalism's political, organizational, and theoretical autonomy. Precisely this conception of federalism's autonomy, which constitutes the essential element linking Spinelli's work with Albertini's, defines the basic characteristic which makes the line of development of the Federalist Movement in Italy so distinct. To examine Albertini's contribution in the proper perspective, it must be situated in the historical context that made it possible. The context is that of a phase of European unification which began with the commencement of the Common Market after the fall of the EDC, in the course of which national governments were able to control and make European unity progress economically,

without any possibility of founding the European federation for many years. Faced with this new political cycle, the more autonomous wing of organized federalism (in practice the Federalist Movement in Italy and part of that in France) began what Spinelli called a "new course" of intransigent opposition to the Common Market and the Europeanist policy of governments, based on the demand for a European constituent. In keeping with this political choice, the need to found the organizational and cultural autonomy of federalism on new and more solid bases matured.

The difference between this political cycle and the previous one is very clearcut. For as long as the alternative between the reconstruction of the German army and the construction of the European army imposed by the Cold War remained on the carpet, so did the possibility of achieving a European state. This situation, which encouraged the convergence between the European Federalist Movement and the established powers, made it possible to mobilize the Europeanist governments, and the parties supporting them, along the lines of the Constituent Assembly. The political substance of the Movement was no more than a centre of co-ordination and direction for the Europeanism of the members of the parties and the governments. For three reasons the Movement could not be defined as a "European political force", as Spinelli pointed out in 1956: in the first place, because it was a simple "coalition of national movements"; secondly, because it only had the role of "prompter" for national political forces and, finally, because it had not "developed a nucleus of active members in its midst."⁵¹

A movement of this nature had become manifestly inadequate in facing the tasks created by the phase of European unification which began after the fall of the EDC — hence the debate which developed in the Movement on the nature and the characteristics of the organization. The choices that were then made were of great relevance for the life and development of the Movement. The form of organization is not in fact indifferent to the objectives that are to be pursued: the form is all the more effective the more it is appropriate to the ends that it is intended to pursue. Lukàcs wrote: "organization is ... the form of mediation between theory and practice."⁵² In other words, it is the vehicle by means of which principles can be turned into practice. It is a new element which carries out the function of introducing change into history.

Albertini's position, which has gained a strong following in Italy, is distinct in that it has defined the requirements that an organization must have to be autonomous more deeply than any other. The problem to be

resolved according to Albertini⁵³ is to create a movement prepared to lead a long-term struggle capable of facing up to the task even in a position of isolation from all other political and social forces, a movement not spurred on by the incentive of the struggle to conquer the traditional establishment (power or economic interests) but only motivated by the contradiction between values and facts.

Albertini defined the active federalist member as a professional politician but not as a salaried employee, as Spinelli wanted. Active members should be able to draw their means of sustenance from their own work and should dedicate all their free time to political work (which should be voluntary and free). Only these requisites could ensure complete independence for the Federalist Movement from the establishment. Moreover, to avoid any outside conditioning the activity of the sections should be based on active members' self-finance. Finally, because federalist culture does not possess the institutional channels that traditional ideologies possess for the diffusion of their ideas, the sections, to be able to survive, should permanently dedicate a part of their activity to the training of active members. All in all, the autonomy of the Federalist Movement should be based on rigorous selection criteria. It should, in other words, be based only on stimuli deriving from morality and culture, so as to form active members who involve themselves in the political struggle with a passion which outstrips that shown for their own private life. This is a hard task, on the very limits of human capacity, in a world in which power and money tend to become the dominating incentives and which are almost always exclusive in political struggle. But the survival and strengthening of the Federalist Movement are the living example in our society that there exists a reserve of moral energies and intellectual capacities willing to participate in political life in a new and different way.

The section became the basic cell in which federalist activity takes place. Here are the three basic functions of the section as defined by Albertini:⁵⁴ a centre for debating and drawing up federalist culture and matching it against other political and social groups; a centre for political agitation through the adoption of positions which make it possible for federalists to participate in the political debate, and action directed towards public opinion (such as the Congress of the European People or Voluntary Census of the European Federal People) and designed to give expression to the widespread Europeanism in the population; a centre for co-ordination of democratic forces, whose unity is needed to activate and achieve the necessary support required when taking such a difficult decision as transferring a part of the states' powers to the European

federation.

Finally, it should be remembered that the edifice of federalist organization culminates with a supranational structure on the European level. The transformation of the MFE from being an international movement into a supranational movement (1959) made it possible for federalists to have a stable European standpoint, to formulate a policy and choose the leaders with democratic decisions taken on a European level.

All in all, the Federalist Movement is distinguished from every other organization which participates in political life owing to the fact that its power is not based either on the vote or on violence, or on representation of interests. Although participating in political struggle, the Federalist Movement does not struggle like political parties to gain existing powers, nor to influence them unlike pressure groups, but struggles to construct a new power, the European power.

A political struggle which excludes national power and national institutions is an absolute novelty even as regards the experience of the revolutionary party inspired by Marxism and Leninism. The latter in fact practises opposition to the government and the regime, but does not question the state's political framework which it wishes to transform. On the other hand, the Federalist Movement practises opposition to the government, the regime and the community.⁵⁵ In other words, it proposes, in addition, the objective of changing the character of the exclusive communities which nation-states have and unifying them in a federal community thus transforming them into member states of the European Federation, in such a way that they can coexist peacefully though maintaining their autonomy.

Where they have been applied (as in the case of Italy which has so far, with rare exceptions, remained isolated), these organizational rules have contributed in creating an influential group in political life. Because of them, federalists have been able to adopt a standpoint that has permitted them to escape the practical and ideological conditioning of the nation-states, to maintain the most rigorous political autonomy with regard to political parties and governments, to exclude themselves from national political struggle and to dedicate themselves entirely to the preparation of the European democratic alternative to be proposed when the crisis inevitably strikes the states and the European community itself.

To these considerations we need to add that in the final analysis, organizational autonomy and political influence in the Federalist Movement depend on cultural autonomy, i.e. on the idea that only federalist culture is able to respond to the greatest problems facing Europe and the

world, which traditional ideologies are not capable either of understanding fully or of dominating. Both the survival and growth of the Federalist Movement depends, in fact, on the capacity to understand the basic tendencies in contemporary history and to indicate a solution to the greatest problems, which cannot be resolved on the national level.

I wish to recall, by way of example, the position that Italian federalists took as regards the decision to institute the EEC. They certainly did not ignore the effectiveness of the tendency to internationalize the productive process, which was the mainstay behind the Common Market, and indeed they recognized its progressive character. But this did not imply that they were forced to support it. In September 1957, Spinelli published an article entitled *La beffa del Mercato comune*⁵⁶ in which he sustained that the objectives of the Treaty establishing the EEC could not be achieved without a European government. Albertini subsequently deepened this analysis,⁵⁷ identifying the conditions that had made the start of a new cycle of European unification possible and, in particular, the political factors without which the Common Market would not have worked: the decline of national sovereignties and the hegemony of the United States have made the convergence between *raison d'état* in Europe and collaboration among states associated in the EEC feasible. This made it possible to identify the limits of the success of the Common Market, which by causing a relative strengthening of states would have determined a crisis both in their European collaboration and in the hegemony of the United States. Hence the forecast that governments would not have been able to complete economic unification and the Common Market would have done nothing more than delay the problem of the transfer of sovereignty to a European state: a problem that governments are not able to solve by themselves. The crisis in the Common Market would have created space for the autonomous intervention of the Federalist Movement and opened the way up for the struggle for the creation of a European government.

This crisis began to become apparent after the realization of the Customs Union and the Common Agricultural Market (1968). From this time onwards, to encourage economic unification and even to keep it up, it was necessary to attempt to create a European currency and a democratic European government. The Federalist Movement identified the action needed to achieve this objective in the struggle for direct elections to the European Parliament, on the basis of the forecast that the elected European Parliament would have had a constituent role. This is what the Strasbourg Assembly did, approving the Draft Treaty for European Union inspired by Spinelli on February 14th, 1984, and submitting it to

the ratification of the member states. Certainly, the European Union is not yet the European federation. It creates the conditions for an effective government of the European economy, but gives no reply to the problem of European foreign policy and security. However, the victory in the struggle to ratify the Treaty establishing the European Union represents the premise for carrying the clash between emerging European power and the old and falling national powers on more advanced terrain, namely the creation of a European federation.

The topicality of the federalist alternative was thus justified on the basis of the analysis of the basic trends in contemporary history. The theoretical deepening which gave the Federalist Movement the awareness of its own cultural autonomy was the result of a practical need, namely the need to assert the federalist alternative to the old regime of nation-states in a more effective way and to intervene in a much more incisive way as a factor of progress in the course of history.

The cultural development of federalists in Italy is distinguished from that of integral federalists by the fact that it developed in strict relationship with historical and social sciences. Albertini's basic line of commitment in research consists in the attempt, which must be interpreted in the prospect of the unification of social sciences, to strive towards the definition of an overall model of historical and social reality.⁵⁸ It is a programme which as yet has generally still to be achieved, at least as regards its formal development. It is essential to realize that it fixes an objective which is necessary for any revolutionary movement which proposes to develop the bases of knowledge projected towards action. "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement" wrote Lenin.⁵⁹

Albertini's work plan consists in the attempt to draw up a model which is the result of the synthesis of a set of theoretical contributions taken from various disciplines.

In the first place, he uses historical materialism, taken as the theory which considers the evolution of the mode of production as the decisive factor which in the final instance determines the course of history and social change. In particular, the theory of scientific revolution of material production highlights the fact that social integration, which develops beyond the frontiers of the states, creates the historical and social conditions to overcome the division of the world into antagonistic nations and to achieve the unification of mankind. Moreover, the fact that automation reduces the quantity of work needed to physically reproduce man while the amount of material goods tends constantly to increase

creates the conditions with which to overcome the class struggle and to bring about the affirmation of new forms of social solidarity within the grass-roots communities.

In the second place, Albertini recuperates the theory of *raison d'état*, taken as the theory which defines international politics as the area for power relationships between states not fenced in by law. It follows that not only does international anarchy force every state to privilege security as compared with every other value, but also that the World federation, by achieving perpetual peace would make it possible to eliminate violence as a means of solving conflicts and would make it possible to achieve freedom and equality fully. The theory of *raison d'état* is thus like the theory of politics of a given phase in history: namely the phase of international anarchy.

In the third place, Albertini develops the theory of ideology, taken as the form that thought takes on in politics. Ideologies indicate a value to achieve for human will and the means by which to achieve it on the basis of their projection towards the future and the never completely fulfilled attempt to achieve overall knowledge of the historical situation which produced them (ideologies have always linked theoretical knowledge and mystification). Hence in any ideology there are three elements: a value aspect, a structure aspect and a historical and social aspect. The identification of the ends corresponds to the definition of the value aspect. The structure aspect makes it possible to identify the form of the organization of power needed to achieve this end. The historical and social aspect defines the historical context in which it is possible to achieve a value through an adequate power structure.

On the basis of these theoretical instruments, Albertini developed a scientific criticism of the idea of nation, which made it possible to effect a radical negation of the nation-state system, and the construction of a theory of federalism, taken not simply as a constitutional technique, producing peaceful coexistence of a set of independent and co-ordinate governments, but as an ideology which throws light on the new sense of history. It is to Albertini that we owe the most significant contributions in both these directions. It should be stressed that these are two aspects of the same work of intellectual development.

Indeed all ideologies have progressively developed their own determinations through the experience of the negation of the existing system, which was manifestly inadequate when it tried to dominate the profound transformations which occurred in social reality. The first problem that must be resolved by any new ideology is understanding the true nature of

the old order and its institutional and conceptual limits. This becomes possible only when the old order is on the wane. As Hegel pointed out in the *Preface* to his *Philosophy of Law*, the basic lines of an order in decline are fully recognizable in the light of the dusk, announced by the flight of Minerva's owl. This knowledge makes it possible to identify the basic contradiction in an entire age and to formulate an overall historical judgement about it. As the negation of absolutism and capitalism have respectively marked the birth of liberal ideology and socialist ideology, so the negation of nationalism marks the birth of federalism.

In *Lo Stato nazionale*, Albertini defines the nation as the ideological reflection of the membership of a particular type of state: the centralized bureaucratic state. This political formation, typical of the European continent, requires integration of the citizens into the state which becomes much more powerful the more centralized power becomes, in such a way as to subject the material and ideal resources of the country to the direct control of central government. The nation's awareness, as something really diffused in the population, is thus the consequence (and not the premise) of the formation of the nation-state and a precise political programme, drawn up for the first time by the Jacobins during the French revolution, which proposed bringing unity to the language, culture and traditions throughout the state's territory. This led to the destruction of all the links with the communities which were smaller or larger than the state. Thus the fusion of state and nation became for nation-state governments the basis for demanding exclusive loyalty from the citizens and developing an aggressive foreign policy.

The method used by Albertini is to define the nation on the basis of the empirical observation of individuals' behaviour. National behaviour is a behaviour of loyalty. The objective reference of this behaviour is the state, which, however, is not viewed as such, but rather as an illusory entity, to which cultural, aesthetic and sporting experiences are tied, whose specific nature is not national. Underlying this is a power relationship. Individuals, who go to national schools, celebrate national holidays, pay national taxes, do national military service, which prepares them to live and die for the nation, express this behaviour in terms of loyalty to a mythical entity, the nation, an idealized representation of centralized bureaucratic states. This idealization of reality is the mental reflection of the power relationships between individuals and the nation-state.

It is therefore Albertini's merit if the notion of ideology has been extended, whereas Marx restricted it to class positions, to power relationships within the state. On this basis it is possible to demystify the idea of

nation, which was born as a revolutionary idea and which today has evolved into a factor of conservation. Insofar as it represents the political division between nations as just and natural and even sacred, it conflicts with the basic tendency of contemporary history, i.e. internationalization of the process of production, which requires that the state should organize itself on vast political scale along multinational and federal lines. In actual fact the struggle to overcome the exclusive nation, so topical in Europe today, makes it possible to restore a direction to political action that had been lost in the general crisis of ideologies and to define the strategic line which distinguishes federalist behaviour from the behaviour of other political forces inspired by traditional ideologies in terms of the opposition to the national community.

With this consideration we have moved on to examine the role of federalism in contemporary society, which constitutes the subject of another major book by Albertini: *Il Federalismo: Antologia e definizione*. The theoretical objective of this book is to provide a rigorous definition of federalism. First and foremost, Albertini considers the definition of federalism as the theory of the federal state as being highly reductive. It is sufficient to take into consideration the mutual conditioning between political institutions and society: if the federal state is a state with typical characteristics which distinguish it from all other forms of state, it is necessary to posit that society has specific characteristics, which make it possible to make federal institutions work.

In drawing up the definition of federalism as an ideology, Albertini formulated a valid criterion of analysis for other ideologies too (liberalism, socialism etc.), according to which in every ideology we can identify one value aspect, one structure aspect and one historical and social aspect.

The value aspect of federalism is peace. The relationship which exists between federalism and peace is the same that exists between liberalism and freedom, democracy and equality, socialism and social justice. In this prospect, Albertini recuperates the political, juridical, historical and philosophical vision of Kant, whose current topicality is stressed by the crisis in the nation-state and the growth beyond the state frontiers of the interdependence of human action, of which European unification is the most developed aspect. These phenomena should be interpreted as premises for the realization of lasting peace through the construction of the World federation. Denying the nation as a result of the European federation means denying "the culture of the political division of mankind" which legitimates the duty to kill for the defence of the nation, and at the same time means affirming the right not to kill in the prospect of

fully achieving it with the World federation. World Wars and the discovery of nuclear arms seem to suggest that Kant's prophecy is being fulfilled, whereby the experience of the destructiveness of war in itself would have led states to renounce their "wild liberty" and accept common laws.

The structural aspect of federalism is the federal state which makes it possible to go beyond the closed centralized structures of the nation-state downwards with the formation of real regional and local autonomies and upwards with the achievement of effective forms of political and social solidarity over and above the nation-states. As we have seen, it is a constituent aspect of the notion of federalism, the most widely studied aspect, but in itself insufficient for the purposes of achieving an exhaustive definition.

The historical and social aspect of federalism is federal society, articulated at various levels, from the community to the world, which makes coexistence with loyalty towards overall society possible with that towards the smaller territorial communities, so that no-one can prevail over the other. The formation of this society is made possible by overcoming the division of mankind into classes and antagonistic nations, which has already started among the European Community countries, but conceivable or foreseeable on a world scale in view of the development of the scientific mode of production. That there has been only partial development of this social pluralism in the federal societies which have existed so far depends on the fact that, on the one hand, the class struggle has caused the feeling of class membership to prevail over every other form of social solidarity thus preventing strong ties of solidarity from developing in local and regional communities and, on the other hand, on the fact that the struggle between states on an international scale has led to the strengthening of central powers to the detriment of local powers. And all this explains the marginal role of federal experiences of the past (which may be imputed to fortunate historical circumstances) and the correspondence between federalism and the crucial historical turning point in our age.

On the basis of this definition, Albertini has divided the phases of development in federalist thinking into different periods. The first phase, which runs from the French revolution to the First World War, is characterized by the affirmation, albeit only regarding principles, of the community and cosmopolitan component of federalism against the authoritarian and bellicose aspects of the nation-state. In the second phase, which runs from the First to the Second World War, the criteria

relating to federalism were used to interpret the crisis in the nation-state and the European system of power. In the third phase, which began after the Second World War and which is still underway, the use of conceptual schemes and political and institutional instruments of federalism is needed to resolve the crisis in Europe.

After the direct election of the European Parliament and the formation of an embryonic European political life, Albertini proposed theses entitled *Uniting Europe to Unite the World*,⁶⁰ which were approved on the occasion of the Tenth Congress of the Movimento Federalista Europeo (Bari, 1980). With this political and cultural turning point, the reflection and political activity of Italian federalists was projected into a world dimension and the struggle for the European Union appears as a stage on the road to full realization of international democracy. In this perspective, the construction of the European federation was presented as the crucial historical event of our times, the first affirmation of the federalist course of history, which will culminate with the achievement of peace through the World federation. Federalism in our age thus has an analogous role to liberal, democratic and socialist ideologies in the past: through the development and affirmation of peace culture, it proposes a project for society capable of providing a reply to the greatest problems of our age and reopening the possibility of thinking the future, which was overshadowed in traditional ideologies because of the exhaustion of their revolutionary force.

NOTES

¹ K.C. Wheare, *Federal Government*, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1980, p. 20.

² This assessment made in 1945 was confirmed by Wheare in 1963. See *Some Theoretical Questions About Federalism*, International Political Science Association, Oxford Round Table Meeting, 19-24 September 1963 (mimeographed).

³ On this subject see for example H. Carrère D'Encausse, *L'Empire éclaté*, Paris, Flammarion, 1978. On the nature of Soviet federalism V.M. Tchikvadze ("Soviet Federalism and the Development of the Legal System in the USSR" in *Federalism and Development of Legal Systems*, edited by the International Association of Legal Sciences, Brussels, Bruylant, 1971, p. 150) observes that "the most significant distinctive feature of the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics as a federation is the fact that it is not just a union of independent states, but a union of independent national states, a union of nations." And in the same text we read that there are "more than 130" such nations.

⁴ K.C. Wheare is the only scholar to have formulated the theory of the institutional aspects of federalism in a very rigorous way. In his book *Federal Government* he contrasts the four classic examples of federation (the USA, Switzerland, Canada and Australia). On this basis he defines the federal principle as "the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinated and independent" (p. 10).

⁵ A.A. Berle, Jr., "Evolving Capitalism and Political Federalism" in *Federalism Mature and Emergent*, edited by A.W. Macmahon, Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Co., 1955, p. 73.

⁶ M. Albertini, F. Rossolillo, "La décadence du fédéralisme aux Etats-Unis" in *Le Fédéraliste*, IV (1962), pp. 242-44.

⁷ A. Hamilton, J. Jay, J. Madison, *The Federalist*, London, J.M.Dent & Sons LTD, 1961, no. 10.

⁸ The book in which the analysis of this tendency, defined as new federalism, is developed for the first time is J.P. Clark, *The Rise of a New Federalism*, New York, London, Oxford University Press, 1938. See also M.J.C. Vile, *The Structure of American Federalism*, New York, London, Oxford University Press, 1962; D.J. Elazar, *The American Partnership*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1962; M.A. Reagan, *The New Federalism*, New York, London, Oxford University Press, 1972.

⁹ M.J.C. Vile, *op. cit.* p. 199. K.C. Wheare himself in *Some Theoretical Questions About Federalism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6, considers this definition more adequate in defining the co-operative aspects brought to light by the most recent developments in federal institutions.

¹⁰ C.J. Friedrich, *Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice*, London, Pall Mall Press, 1968, p. 82.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

¹⁷ M. Albertini, *Il federalismo. Antologia e definizione*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1979, pp. 65-67.

¹⁸ "Engels an Joseph Bloch in Königsberg" in K. Marx, F. Engels, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1974, p. 456.

¹⁹ My italics

²⁰ "Engels an Conrad Schmidt in Berlin" in K. Marx, F. Engels, *op. cit.* p. 461.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² The independence of the Commonwealth Dominions was recognized by a statute of the British Parliament in 1931, incorporating the results of the Imperial Conference which had taken place in 1926. In the concluding report to the Conference, the Dominions were defined as "autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations" (E. Barker, *Ideas and Ideals of the British Empire*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1951, pp. 94-95). E. McWhinney, a Canadian scholar on federal institutions (in *Federal Constitution-Making for a Multi-National World*, Leyden, Sijthoff, 1966, pp. 106-7), defines the transformation of the Empire into the Commonwealth

as "the extraordinary devolution of British political authority, and ultimately also surrender of British sovereignty."

²³ I have gone more fully into this in L. Levi, *Crisi dello Stato nazionale, internazionalizzazione del processo produttivo e internazionalismo operaio*, Turin, Stampatori, 1976.

²⁴ R. Aron, A. Marc, *Principes du fédéralisme*, Paris, Le Portulan, 1948, p. 19.

²⁵ *Ibid.* p. 43.

²⁶ A. Marc, *L'Europe dans le monde*, Paris, Payot, 1965, p. 4.

²⁷ R. Aron, A. Marc, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

²⁹ A. Marc, *L'Europe dans le monde*, *cit.*, p. 6.

³⁰ A. Marc, *Dialectique du déchaînement*, Paris, Colombe, 1961.

³¹ A. Aron, A. Marc, *op. cit.* p. 108.

³² F. Engels, *Herrn Eugen Dürings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* in K. Marx, F. Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Glashütten in Taunus, Verlag Detlev Auvermann K.G., 1970, vol. XIII, p. 267.

³³ A. Marc, *L'Europe dans le monde*, *cit.*, p. 27.

³⁴ I quote the letter from C.-A. Sainte-Beuve, P.-J. Proudhon. *Sa vie et sa correspondance. 1838-1848*, Paris, A. Costes, 1947, p. 154. For a commentary that explains the position of this text in the general conception of society and the history of Proudhon, see M. Albertini, "Proudhon était-il fédéraliste intégral?" in *L'Europe en formation*, 1965, n. 62, pp. 18-20.

³⁵ A. Marc, *L'Europe dans le monde*, *cit.*, p. 27.

³⁶ On this theme see M. Albertini, "Pour ou contre la Charte", supplement to No. 4, V (1963) of *Le Fédéraliste*.

³⁷ The failure of integral federalism as regards recruiting and training activists is recognized by F. Kinsky, which in "Où en est la stratégie fédéraliste?" (*L'Europe en formation*, 1984, N. 258, p. 29) affirms: "In France there are ideas ... , but there are no activists."

³⁸ G. Bergmann, *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism*, New York, Longmans Green and Co., 1954, p. 310.

³⁹ M. Albertini, *Il federalismo*, *cit.*, p. 305.

⁴⁰ See in this regard an article of 1957 (A. Spinelli, "Pourquoi je suis européen" in *Preuves*, 1957, n. 81, p. 37: "My attention was not attracted by the muddled, tortuous and rather incoherent ideological federalism of the Proudhon and Mazzini type found in France and Italy, but from the clean, precise and antidogmatic thinking of English federalists who, in the ten years preceding the war, suggested that the great American political experience should be transplanted into Europe. I did not view the European federation as an ideology." Spinelli never departed from this line of thinking, as demonstrated by the fact that the whole of this passage is quoted in *L'Europa non cade dal cielo* (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1960, p. 15) and partially in *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio. Io Ulisse* (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1984, p. 309).

⁴¹ On the sources of Spinelli's federalist thinking see *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio*, *cit.*, p. 307.

⁴² A. Spinelli, E. Rossi, *Il Manifesto di Ventotene*, Naples, Guida 1982.

⁴³ A. Spinelli, *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio*, *cit.*, p. 343.

⁴⁴ G. Lukács, *Lénine*, Paris, EDI, 1961, pp. 25-31.

⁴⁵ A. Spinelli, E. Rossi *op. cit.* p. 35.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁴⁷ On the themes of constitutionalism and the criticism of functionalism see: A. Spinelli, *Dagli Stati sovrani agli Stati Uniti d'Europa*, Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1950; "Il modello costituzionale americano e i tentativi di unità europea", in *La nascita degli Stati Uniti*

d'America, edited by L. Bolis, Milan, Comunità, 1957.

⁴ G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, Leipzig, F. Meiner, 1917, vol. I, p. 77.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

⁶ A. Spinelli, "Pourquoi je suis européen", *cit.*, pp. 37-38.

⁷ A. Spinelli, *L'Europa non cade dal cielo*, *cit.* pp. 253-54.

⁸ G. Lukàcs, *History and Class Consciousness*, London, Merlin Press, 1971, p. 299.

⁹ On this point see M. Albertini's articles signed as *Publius* in the *Popolo europeo* and subsequently published as "Esame tecnico della lotta per l'Europa" in *Il Federalista*, I (1959), pp. 86-111 and also M. Albertini "Il federalismo militante. Vecchio e nuovo modo di fare politica" in *Il dibattito federalista*, I (1985), No. 1, pp. 1-3.

¹⁰ "Le Mouvement Fédéraliste Européen" in *Le Fédéraliste*, VIII (1966), p. 232.

¹¹ M. Albertini, "La stratégie de la lutte pour l'Europe" in *Le Fédéraliste*, VIII (1966), pp. 165-67.

¹² The article is published in A. Spinelli, *L'Europa non cade dal cielo*, *cit.* pp. 282-87.

¹³ See M. Albertini, "La force de dissuasion française" in *Il Federalista*, II (1960), pp. 331-37.

¹⁴ See M. Albertini, *Lo Stato nazionale*, Naples, Guida, 1980; *Il federalismo*, *cit.*, and Proudhon, Florence, Vallecchi, 1974.

¹⁵ V.I. Lenin, *What is to be done?*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 25.

¹⁶ *Il Federalista*, XXII (1980), pp. 5-9.

Notes

TOWARDS WORLD UNITY OF THE FEDERALISTS

When, twenty-five years after its first issue, *The Federalist* decided to have an English and French edition, the intention was "to work for the world unity of federalists and constitute, to this end, a point of reference and an instrument for an exchange of information." Indeed, many people are aware of the need for federalism but "without unity of organization, i.e. without the opportunity to know that what is being done in one's own region, country or city is being done in other regions, countries and cities of the world as well, nobody can gain confidence in his own action and thus maintain it, thus contributing towards making federalism into a political force."¹

The publishers of the review were aware that it was a long-term task. However, less than a year after this decision and in the light of contacts created and encouraged throughout the world in a very short space of time, what was initially nothing more than a declaration of intent, became a certainty stated with much greater vigour: "One is struck with wonder seeing how many courageous and tenacious men and women, outside Western Europe, are currently devoting their energies to the struggle for World federation, which is doomed to remain pure ideal testimony ... for a long time."²

In a recent editorial, an analysis was finally given of the possible paths towards federal unity of the world, the final objective of all federalists, i.e. all those who have turned the struggle for peace into a personal question and the moral basis for their political action.³

This note wishes to go no further than pause for a moment to take stock of the different organizations that exist and the evolution of our ties with them at a time when federalists from other continents are for the first time (or once again) becoming real partners.

* * *

The interest that has been created in federalist circles outside Europe by *The Federalist* needs to be stressed. The numerous mentions that this review has received is proof of this.⁴ It is also proof that *The Federalist* has responded to the expectations and real needs, albeit often unexpressed, of all activists throughout the world. Finally, it is proof of the quality of the cultural and political work undertaken, the best, wrote an official of the American World Federalist Association to Mario Albertini, after that of the Committee to Frame a World Constitution, or Committee of Chicago, and the publication of *Common Cause*, from July 1947 to July 1951.⁵

In other cases, the leaders of various federalist organizations have spontaneously offered to help us on the crucial issue of distribution, by centralizing requests for subscriptions coming from specific countries. This is the case with the British Federal Trust⁶ or the Association to Unite the Democracies in the United States. They are also sending us hundreds of addresses of federalist militants or organizations involved with the question of peace, intellectuals and university teachers, libraries and research institutes, as for example has been done in Australia and the North American continent.

It is interesting, moreover, to stress that the publication of the review in three languages has taken place at the same time as a reawakening of interest among federalists, outside the European Community, in the process of European integration, its significance as an example and its effects on the international balance of power, following the approval of the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union by the European Parliament in 1984.⁷

* * *

This is true for Atlantist federalists of the AUD, the organization which inherited and has continued the work of the Interdemocracy Federal Unionists Inc., which was set up in the United States in July 1939, after the publication by Clarence K. Streit of his book *Union Now*⁸ and which became the Federal Union Inc., from 1940 to recent times.⁹

Streit, who died last July in Washington, was, at the time, correspondent for the *New York Times* at the League of Nations. As a privileged observer, he denounced the weaknesses of the organization, a fragile league of sovereign states, incapable of protecting peace against the

Fascist threat and he concluded that federalism was necessary. He identified "Public Problem number one" as being the need to create a World government and indicated the only possibility of preventing war and assuring long-term victory for the democratic system in the federal union of democratic states existing in those days in a single state, whose very power would have discouraged any potential aggressor and which attracted every new state, that had become democratic, to it, thus giving life to the first nucleus of the World federation.

After the war, Streit saw the USSR, former ally in the fight against Fascism, as the new threat against which the free countries would need to build their unity and he had split away from most of the American world federalist movement, which by 1941 had already rejected the anti-Soviet and pro-Atlantic position of Streit's followers and, with the advent of the cold war, rejected his support of NATO circles and theses.¹⁰

At the same time, Streit refused the prospect of European unity as an end in itself, a unity that, on the one hand, would have simply split democratic countries between the European Union and the United States Union and which, on the other hand, would have risked being dominated by the "Marxists".¹¹

For some years now the AUD, although standing firm on the two basic principles of its action, i.e., as Streit himself recently recalled, "to start an international federation by beginning with a nucleus composed of the leading democracies, those centered mainly around the North-Atlantic Ocean and to gradually expand it as nations become ripe for this,"¹² attaches great importance to the European Union and expresses the hope that its organizational contacts with the UEF will develop rapidly.¹³

We need to recall that *The Federalist* recently defined the conditions that would avoid the idea of the union of democracies from falling in a perverse circle, and that would make it possible to create an economic and subsequently political federation between a politically united Europe and the United States at the same time as encouraging the process of formation of great federal unions in Asia, Africa and Latin America and an end to the North-South divide.¹⁴

In this respect, we need finally to stress that, although the AUD has defined the World democratic federation as its ultimate goal and has reaffirmed that "the intercontinental union of advanced democracies is the driving force of its mission," it has enlarged the sphere of its commitment, with a view to encouraging the dialogue both with the UEF and with the world federalist movement.¹⁵

* * *

In recent years, just as the contacts between European federalists and Atlantist federalists have intensified so those between the UEF and world federalists have also increased.

At the end of the war, in August 1947, both organizations, the World Movement for World Federal Government¹⁶ on the one hand and the UEF on the other, were created in Switzerland, in Montreux, but separately. Immediately, a problem arose as regards the relationships and co-ordination between those federalists who from the beginning pursued the goal of World federation and those who advocated a preliminary phase in which regional federations were created.¹⁷ The intention to collaborate, however, remained a dead letter, and the contacts between the two groups became increasingly tenuous despite certain people's efforts and those of Alexandre Marc in particular.

The WAWF, from the moment of its creation, considered the formation of regional federations as one of the roads that would have made it possible to reach a World federation, but did not give it a privileged status vis-à-vis others, such as the election of a people's constituent assembly, the registration of World Citizens or the strengthening of the UN and the revision of the San Francisco Charter. The problem of regional federations is found in numerous resolutions, in which reservations are also clearly stated. However, no concrete action was ever undertaken in this sense.¹⁸

This can apparently be explained, at least during the first years, by the blissful optimism which reigned in world federalist circles and by the widespread conviction that the World federation was not, essentially, the result of a long process of historical maturation, but could on the contrary arise from nothing, almost as if through the intervention of the "holy ghost". "One would be surprised," wrote Rolf Paul Haegler (still Secretary of the Swiss World Federalists) at the conclusion of his book, "of the extraordinarily brief time in which many world federalists seem to have hoped to be able to realize their ideal: calling of a constituent people's assembly by 1950, while the responsible groups had only been set up in 1947, revision of the Charter and complete transformation of the United Nations Organization into a World federation by 1955, i.e. two to three years after deciding to launch a campaign to this end, all this is too unrealistic ... The world federalists have for too long cherished the illusion that it would have been enough for them to present a world constitution and procedures acceptable by all to obtain the hoped-for

ratification of the proposed text."¹⁹

In all fairness, it should be pointed out that European federalists, with some exceptions, were insufficiently concerned with the World federation, apart from recognizing the simple moral and cultural demand and we must agree wholeheartedly with Ferdinand Kinsky, a member of both the UEF and the WAWF, when he stated recently: "In the past World federalists often looked upon European federalists with suspicion ('they want to create a new super-power and thus divide the world even more'). On the other hand European federalists thought themselves as being more realistic than World federalists whom they considered totally utopian."²⁰ Forty years after the end of the Second World War and the foundation of the principal federalist organizations the moment has come for both sides to convince themselves that, as Kinsky recalled, European unity and World federation are two complementary and not alternative objectives and to agree with him that "a World federalist strategy today can neither consist of simply repeating our goal ('We need a World federation'), nor be a conformist limitation to a policy of small steps ('Let's strengthen the United Nations!'). Nobody can expect the big powers and even the medium size industrialized countries to transfer their sovereignty to the United Nations in the present composition with its large majority of Third World countries. The only realistic strategy towards a World federation is the regional approach. It consists of promoting federalist solutions for European, African and Latin American unification, and of the promotion of federalist settlements in the Middle East and Indochinese conflicts."²¹ Currently, it seems reasonable to affirm that world federalists are close to recognizing that if federalism can only be a world scale matter, "it can be achieved only through a process which must begin in a precise place."²² This is, we feel, the meaning of the growing importance that they, as Atlantist federalists, have recently attributed to the process of European integration and the action of the European Parliament.²³ Finally, it should be recalled that in June 1986 the WAWF organized a new meeting in Aosta, mostly dedicated to the "European example", to which John Pinder and Francesco Rossolillo, respectively President and Vice-president of the UEF, were invited.²⁴ Also present at this meeting was Ira Straus, a leading AUD official.

* * *

Apart from the federalist organizations existing and still active today, there is potential for such organizations in other continents.

Thus, the International Student Association of Japan²⁵ has been in

contact with the European Federalist Youth, proposing to organize common seminars and asserting they will fight for the diffusion of the ideals of federalism in Asia.

In Africa, the federalist message of the fathers of independence, in particular Nkrumah, Nyerere and Senghor, has not fallen into oblivion. Currently, the bases seem to exist for the creation of an African federalist movement independent of Africa's political contingencies.

Even in Latin America federalism and the problem of continental unification have been at the centre of the political debate since the struggles for independence. Artigas, who struggled for the union of the peoples of the Rio de la Plata or Simon Bolivar, who organized the Panama Congress, are two examples that occurred at the beginning of the last century. At a time when most of the Latin American countries have returned to democracy and when the politicians of the continent, like Raul Alfonsín, want to relaunch the process of economic and political integration²⁶, there no longer exists, at least as far as we know, any organized federalist force South of the Rio Grande.²⁷ However, as in post-Fascist Europe, the conditions exist for a renewal of federalist action in this part of the world. All that is missing, as the leaders of the Argentine section of the Movimiento Federalista Europeo wrote in a recent pamphlet, is "the spark that sets the fire alight, a handful of enlightened and disinterested men that turn utopia and dreams into reality."²⁸

* * *

In recent years *The Federalist* has acted as a catalyst between the different currents quoted in this note. Their ultimate common objective is the creation of a World federation. This does not detract from the fact that these different organizations, also linked by common cultural references, each have their own originality and mid-term objectives. They have immediate possibilities of joint action, that do not necessarily mean their fusion.

The celebration of the bicentenary of the Convention of Philadelphia, that calls upon all federalists and that will be marked by the congress of the World Federalist Movement, only a few months after the UEF congress in Strasbourg, should be the opportunity to cement the rapprochement that is underway.

Jean-Francis Billon

NOTES

¹ See the editorial "Towards a World Government", in *The Federalist*, XXVI (1984), pp. 3-8.

² "A Decisive Battle", in *The Federalist*, XXVI (1984), p. 177.

³ "The Roads towards World Federation", in *The Federalist*, XXVIII (1986), pp. 73-78.

⁴ We will restrict ourselves to quoting (and without any partisan spirit) the publications of the *Registre international des Citoyens du monde* (15, rue Victor Duruy, 75015 Paris), the international secretariat of the World Association of World Federalists (*World Federalist News*, Leliegracht 21, 1016 GR Amsterdam) and its British section (AWF, 43 Wallingford Avenue, London W10 6PZ), *The Federator*, publication of the Association to Unite the Democracies (AUD, PO Box 75920, Washington, DC 20013) and *World Peace News* (777 UN Plaza, New York 10017), the review of the American Movement for World Government.

⁵ In the preface to *A Constitution for the World*, the re-edition of the *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution* (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, Calif., 1965), Elisabeth Mann Borgese, younger daughter of Thomas Mann and wife of the secretary of the Committee of Chicago, summarized the Committee's life and work: "In the autumn of 1945, some members of the Faculty of the University of Chicago proposed to Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins the creation of an Institute of World Government to parallel the Institute of Nuclear Physics already established. 'The intellectual courage that split the atom should be called to unite the world,' they wrote. Their proposal resulted in the Committee to Frame a World Constitution, under the chairmanship of the Chancellor. The Secretary-General and main author of the text, as finally adopted, was the late G. A. Borgese, an exile from Fascist Italy ... For over two years this group of legal scholars, social scientists, and political philosophers and their assistants conferred, proposed, criticized and revised. The result of their labor is embodied in the *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution*, in the four volumes of the monthly magazine *Common Cause*, and in more than 2,000 pages of mimeographed and microfilmed research documents."

Numerous European federalist activists such as Albert Camus, Andrea Chiti Batelli, Alexandre Marc, Ernesto Rossi and Altiero Spinelli were also able to write on the most varied subjects in the *Common Cause*.

In July 1947, in the editorial of the first issue of this review, Robert M. Hutchins wrote: "We do not think, of course, that our preliminary draft will be the law of the United World. We trust nevertheless that the tentative result of a collective effort of years will not be in vain ... A pattern will be available. We do not think it will be adopted; we dare to hope that it will not be ignored."

Forty years after it was drawn up, the Committee of Chicago's project, which at the time was considered maximalist, even in federalist circles, remains one of the basic texts of postwar American federalism, together with the work of Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace through World Law* (Harvard University Press, 1958).

⁶ 1A Whitehall Place, London SW1 2HA.

⁷ On the value as an example of European unification see "The Problem of Peace and the European Parliament", in *The Federalist*, XXVI (1984), pp. 95-101.

⁸ *Union Now* was first published at the author's own expense in September 1938, then by Harper & Brothers in New York in March 1939. The book was reprinted several times during the Second World War and after.

⁹ Federal Union Inc. should not be confused with the movement founded in London in the spring of 1938 by Derek Rawnsley, Charles Kimber and Patrick Ransome; cfr. Charles Kimber "Federal Union", in *The Federalist*, XXVI (1984), pp. 199-205.

¹⁰ Readers wanting further information on this issue and on the history of the federalist movement in the US from different viewpoints can refer, among others, to Stewart Ogilvy "A Brief History of the World Government Movement in the US", in *Humanity*, Glasgow, September 1949, new series, vol. I, p. 14; Clarence K. Streit, "To Unite Federalists", in *Freedom & Union*, Washington, 1949, vol. 4, n. 11, pp. 1-4. See also the five chapters in the postwar edition of *Union Now* (Federal Union Inc., Washington, pp. 251-324 in the 1976 reprint) and Clarence K. Streit, "Ten Years Progress towards Union Now", in *Freedom & Union*, 1948, vol. 3, n. 10. (The main American federalist postwar reviews, including *Common Cause*, *Freedom & Union* and *World Government News* are currently being reprinted, in microfilm form, by Joseph Preston Baratta, at Clearwater Cy., New York).

¹¹ See Clarence K. Streit, *Union Now*, postwar edition, *op. cit.*, "The Dangers in Mere European Union", pp. 277-279, and "A Marxist US of Europe", in *Freedom & Union*, 1947, vol. 2, n. 7, pp. 2-4.

¹² Clarence K. Streit, "Federate", in *The Federator*, 1984, vol. I, n. 2.

¹³ See the complete collection of *The Federator*, the AUD's mouthpiece since 1984; *The Federator* can rightly claim that its readers are the only Americans who were regularly informed of the struggle for European Union from the European Parliament's historic vote in 1984 up to the setback represented by the European Council's decision to adopt the Single Act in Luxembourg in December 1985.

¹⁴ "On the Hijacking of the Achille Lauro", in *The Federalist*, XXVII (1985), pp. 85-89.

¹⁵ See the resolution of the AUD Executive Committee of October 6, 1986, "Preliminary Guidelines on AUD Support of Extra-atlantic Federalism", some excerpts of which are given below, quoted in *The Federator*, 1986, vol. III, n. 6, pp. 5-6: "a) On the intercontinental level, AUD supports proposals for integration and federation of the NATO democracies, the OECD democracies, and partial groupings of these democracies, such as the Summit and the Group of Five/Group of Seven/Group of Ten. The intercontinental union of the leading industrial democracies is the core of the mission of AUD. b) On the regional level AUD supports initiatives and proposals for federation and integration of democracies in: 1) Europe; 2) Latin America, both as a whole or in parts, including efforts presently proceeding on the subregional level, such as the Draft Contadora Treaty insofar as it provides for a Central American confederation guaranteed by neighboring countries, and for free national elections; 3) The Caribbean; 4) Africa; 5) Southern Asia, such as the existing federal government of India, and the efforts of the ASEAN countries (with the reservation that democratic practices are uneven among the ASEAN countries, and any actual federal government among them should be rooted firmly in democracy); 6) The Pacific basin among compatible societies, including the recently formed Federated States of Micronesia; 7) The US and Canada, as in the proposed free trade pact."

¹⁶ The World Movement for World Federal Government became World Association of World Federalists in 1956 and subsequently World Federalist Movement in Aosta in June 1986. For clarity's sake, only WAWF will be used in this note.

¹⁷ Cfr. Rolf Paul Haegler (*Histoire et idéologie du mondialisme*, Zürich, Europa Verlag, 1972), who quotes the Movimiento pro Federación americana and the Asian Federation Movement as the organizations which, as well as the UEF, were, in the fifties, in contact with the WAWF. This book is of interest since it traces the history of the world governmental circles from its origins, which go back to the end of the thirties, up to the seventies.

¹⁸ See, among other sources and restricting ourselves merely to the first years, the political declaration of Luxembourg in 1946, the declaration of Montreux in 1947, the declaration of the 2nd Congress in Luxembourg in 1948, part of which runs as follows: "Integration at regional levels can be an approach to World Federal Government. The formation of regional federations may well hasten the establishment of World Federal

Government provided: a) that they do not become ends in themselves; b) that they may be expected to diminish existing tensions and the existing disparity between great and small nations; and c) that they remain subordinated to the over-riding objective of establishing World Federal Government. It should, however, be emphasized that regional federations cannot of themselves solve the problem of achieving enduring peace."

These quotations are taken from the work of Rolf Paul Haegler, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-164.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 131-2.

²⁰ This and the subsequent quotations from Ferdinand Kinsky are taken from his paper at the WAWF seminar "World Federalism: Contemporary Goals and Strategies" of July 1985, published in *The London Seminar*, WAWF, Amsterdam, 1985, pp. 13-16.

²¹ It is not by chance that Ron J. Rutherglen, then WAWF executive director, extensively quoted this passage from Ferdinand Kinsky's address, in the course of his speeches in the US and Canada in Spring 1986, informing that he took it for his own account, as in the internal document "Presentation North American Visit — March 16-April 6" which was distributed within the organization on his return.

²² "A Decisive Battle", in *The Federalist*, XXVI (1984), p. 177.

²³ We will give only two examples to illustrate this thesis and the growing interest of world federalists, particularly outside Europe, for the construction of the European Community. Firstly, the editorial of the *Canadian World Federalist*, August 1985, "Towards European Federation" (WFC, 46 Elgin Street, Suite 32, Ottawa — Ont. K1P 5K6); secondly, the resolution on the European Union adopted on September 14, 1985 at Newark by the Board Meeting of the WFA (418 7th Street, S.E., Washington, DC 20003) part of which is reproduced below: "... enthusiastically supports the proposed strengthening of the Community's supranational institutions by a) abolishing the national veto in the Council of Ministers, and b) strengthening the powers of the European Parliament in relation to the Council of Ministers and the European Commission; recognizes the historic importance of the European Parliament's *Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union* and looks forward to its speedy ratification. The government of European Union will be a model for the establishment of the world federation. The World Federalist Association warmly supports the work of the Union Européenne des Fédéralistes and other European organizations that are working towards this end."

²⁴ A special issue of *World Federalist News*, containing the main interventions at the Aosta seminar, was recently published.

²⁵ ISAJ, European postal address: c/o Pacific Rim Study Center, Lijnbaansgracht 347/4, 1017 XB Amsterdam, Netherlands.

²⁶ In this sense, according to *La Nación* in Buenos Aires, he stated in a seminar in April 1986 regarding "Los partidos políticos y la integración de América latina" that "there will be a fair and democratic world society or there will be only chaos, wars and a return to barbarity under the growing threat of definitive nuclear holocaust", and insisted on the "need for Latin American nations to work for their continental unity" and inviting them "to imitate the example of the European Communities."

²⁷ The Movimiento pro Federación americana in Bogotá, which was for a long time in touch with the WAWF, seems to have disappeared during the seventies and the dictatorship in Argentina got the better of the Movimiento Acción para la Unidad latinoamericana.

²⁸ *Hacia la Unidad europea*, MFE (sección en Argentina), 1986, Ayacucho 3130, 1651 San Andres.

Problems of Peace

EUROPE AND THE WORLD *

1. Historical topicality of world unification.

The starting point for any acceptable definition of Europe's role in the world is appreciating that the problem of world unification is now firmly on history's agenda. Man is faced with many challenges — the nuclear issue, underdevelopment, ecology and world economic interdependence — that question his very survival not in some distant future but right now. None of these challenges can be resolved in any valid way except with the decision to begin the construction of a world government.

The possibility that a world war will lead to a holocaust, given the destructive capacity of modern weapons, is now widely accepted. The time has come to recognize that faith in the balance of terror as a means of preventing a world war is unfounded. In the first place, the speed of scientific and technological progress makes it increasingly difficult to maintain a military balance. Think, for example, of the very severe imbalance arising when one of the superpowers manages to gain a decisive advantage over the other with the installation of an efficient space shield, a state of affairs which in all probability would cause dissuasion to fail. In the second place, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the current anarchic world can only be slowed down but not blocked and this makes it increasingly likely that the superpowers will be dragged into a nuclear war against their will.

Moreover, we should appreciate that the costs of pursuing an arms

* This document was presented to the III Commission of the XIII Congress of the MFE, in Verona, on February 20-22, 1987.

race designed to maintain the military equilibrium are incompatible with mankind's progress: the economic costs have led to enormous resources being wasted at the expense of economic and social progress in advanced countries and in particular backward countries; the political costs include the curtailment of the right to freedom owing to the growing militarization of society and the state, while the ethical costs can be measured in terms of the barbarization of the state which instead of defending life now either deliberately creates or passively suffers the risk of the destruction of mankind. Such costs seem destined to give rise to the most frightful calamities even before a world war breaks out.

In reality, war, in the nuclear age, can no longer be objectively considered the continuation of politics with other means because it would entail an end to politics along with all other human activities, which means that the problem of eliminating war (and hence the arms race) as an instrument for resolving conflicts between states has now been placed firmly on history's agenda. But this is only possible when we create a world authority which prevents any country from producing arms, an authority which has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, complete control over the military aspects of technology and which also safeguards the independence and legitimate interests of every state while making self-protection useless as well as impossible.

Quite apart from the danger of the nuclear holocaust, the historical topicality of the problem of ending the current international anarchy is closely tied to the problem, which is gaining increasingly frightening proportions, of the underdevelopment of the Southern hemisphere. This problem must be tackled seriously not just for humanitarian reasons but because it would otherwise be impossible to avoid a catastrophic clash between rich and poor peoples. The forerunner of this is international terrorism, which today only uses conventional arms but which, sooner or later, will have pocket-size nuclear arms or equally destructive chemical or biological weapons. Moreover, it is now clear that only a start to the real development of the Southern hemisphere will lead to lasting recovery in the economic development of advanced countries. Since the end to the North-South divide requires the mobilization of enormous resources which can only be achieved by stopping the arms race and by advanced countries' adoption of concrete, co-ordinated efforts, this challenge can only be tackled effectively with the construction of a world government which makes weapons useless, as well as impossible, and which imposes solidarity between rich and poor countries, just as nation-states impose solidarity between rich and poor regions that fall under their sovereignty.

The growing drama of the ecological challenge and its worldwide nature are all too obvious and it is becoming increasingly clear that such a dangerous state of affairs cannot be appropriately tackled with mankind's current political organization. Indeed a growing number of decisions which fall under individual states' sovereignty (take, for example, deforestation in tropical and equatorial regions, the installation of nuclear power stations and generally all highly dangerous types of manufacturing processes) can lead to ecological catastrophes of continental and world proportions and consequences which are more serious than those caused by the Great War and World War Two. This situation, which becomes even graver when we consider the dangers implicit in the anarchic development of biotechnologies, makes it even more imperative to bring about an effective supranational system which restricts national sovereignty to the advantage of a world authority.

Finally, faced with world economic interdependence, which prevents even the most powerful states in the world from governing their own economic development effectively, the system of absolute state sovereignty continues to survive thereby preventing effective government of overall world economic development. Without the creation of sound supranational world institutions this contradiction, which underlay the 1929 economic crisis, is destined sooner or later to produce a much more serious crisis inasmuch as economic interdependence has developed enormously since then.

Essentially, the world has now become a community of destiny and the alternative "unite or perish", brought to light by Briand in 1929 with regard to Europe and objectively the basic historical drive in the process of European unification, now relates to mankind as a whole. Hence, while the process of world unification is clearly extremely complex and its completion date a long way off, it is equally clear that making a start to it cannot be put off much longer. Moreover, in the light of past experience of European unification, it is reasonable to expect that the very fact of initiating the process of world unification would substantially change the general framework of the world's position, reversing the current trends vis-à-vis the dangers threatening mankind's survival.

Indeed, the opening in Western Europe of a historical phase characterized by the restrictions in state sovereignty has had the effect that, although political and military unity has not yet been achieved, the frontiers between the European Community countries have been demilitarized and, with the Western European Union, very advanced procedures have been established for mutual control of the level and character-

istics of armaments between member states, which make war technically impossible between them. In the same way, with the start to the process of world unification, the first forms of world policy and the attenuation of, if not the end to, military rivalry between all states could be achieved. In terms of a start to the construction of a world government it will thus become possible to achieve the first serious steps in the direction of disarmament on the basis of effective controls. These are in fact structurally excluded where no start has been made to the limitation of absolute state sovereignty and where the expectation of war as the *extrema ratio* in solving international conflicts thus remains.

2. *The transition towards world unity.*

While the fundamental problem facing the world is making a start to its unification, the fundamental role of European unity in the world is to contribute to this process. Hence, the struggle for the completion of European unification is essentially justified by the contribution it can give to world unification. To clarify this, we need to reflect on the process of reasonably predictable transition towards this objective. The starting point for this reflection is the definition of the structure of world unity in its final form, with a view to identifying the intermediate stages.

In the light of federalist theory, to be valid and effective, world unity should be based on a federation of great regional groupings, organized in their turn on a federal and democratic basis. Three points should be stressed in this connection.

Firstly, only on the basis of federalism is it possible to achieve stable unity since this makes it possible to keep the maximum degree of autonomy compatible with unity in the component parts (which run from regional groupings, through nations and regions, down to district level), thus avoiding the dangers connected with centralization. On the other hand, an imperial type unity would be unrealistic, since it could be achieved only with a war that risks destroying the planet. It would also be undemocratic and unstable (assuming, of course, that it could be achieved) and would involve the replacement of international war with endemic civil war with equally destructive consequences. In the second place, only if the pillars of the World federation are great regional federations (North America, Latin America, Europe, USSR, Black Africa, Arab countries, China, India, Japan, subregional federations in Asia etc.), will it be possible to achieve an effective balance in world political structure and avoid both the dangers of hegemony and the oppression of

small states. In the third place, it is clear that a true federation can only be achieved between democratic states and not between totalitarian or authoritarian states which are based on the principle of unchecked power and which, therefore, cannot structurally accept restrictions either to their external sovereignty, other than those imposed and maintained by force, or to their internal sovereignty, since, to survive, a totalitarian or authoritarian regime needs to be as isolated as possible from external influences which run counter to its principles and praxis.

The definition of the final form of world unity makes it clear that two fundamental premises must be established if the ultimate goal is to be reached.

On the one hand, it is vital for a series of regional unifications to be achieved which are indispensable in building, side by side with states which already have Continental dimensions, the irreplaceable pillars on which the World federation must be founded. The existence, for many decades, of processes of regional unification, the most advanced of which relates to Western Europe, is the fundamental empirical demonstration of the historical topicality of the problem of world unification, of the fact that it is no longer mere utopia, but already an element rooted in the real historical process.

Moreover, democracy must spread to the entire world, including Communist regimes and the vast majority of Third World countries. In the latter case, the need is first of all to achieve the social and economic bases for democracy and this political progress, in its turn, is the vital condition for the development of healthy regional federations. The extension of democracy throughout the world does not, of course, mean that the Western liberal democracy model must be applied *sic et simpliciter* to the rest of the world. Clearly, however, economic and social forms of pluralism and political and institutional forms must be established which allow citizens to enjoy basic civil liberties and to exercise effective control over power.

If these are the vital premises for achieving world unity in its final form, this does not necessarily mean that they must be achieved in their entirety for the process of world unification to begin, in just the same way as the existence of democratic regimes in all of Europe and the involvement of all European states were not needed from the beginning for the process of European unification to get underway. If we wish to make the debate on transition to world unity less generic, then we need to formulate reasonable hypotheses about the start to the process and the guiding idea in this context is that of partial world government formu-

lated by Einstein at the end of the Second World War, integrated by the lessons of European unification. Leaving aside the already existing starts (regional integration and overall interdependence), for world unification to really begin (in the sense in which European integration really began with the Schuman Plan), we need to create a partial world government which from a political and economic point of view is sufficiently strong to gradually involve the rest of the world in world unification (by causing the vital premises to mature), to carry out, in other words, a locomotive-type role comparable to that carried out by the Franco-German pole and by "little Europe" with regard to European integration.

In the current historical situation, which seems destined to last for quite a while, the creation of a partial world government with these characteristics can only occur in the Northern hemisphere for reasons which are so obvious we need not go into them here. Having stated this, it is possible to identify two possible platforms. The ideal platform is a convergence between all the main components of the Northern hemisphere, i.e. the USA, the USSR, Europe and Japan which obviously presupposes that in a fairly brief period of time the indispensable democratic premises will arise in the USSR for its participation in the creation of the world government and that lasting détente will also be achieved between East and West, a change comparable to the Franco-German reconciliation and its subsequent effect on European unification.

With the participation from the start of all the fundamental centres in the Northern hemisphere in the construction of a partial world government, the latter would immediately have enormous potential and could, moreover, make a decisive contribution towards economic and social development which could be fairly rapid in the Southern hemisphere, in particular with the transfer of the enormous resources used in the arms race to development aid. For this reason, in a relatively short period of time the premises could arise (economic and social progress, democratic development and regional integration) for the full participation of the entire Southern hemisphere in the construction of the world government.

If, however, the necessary premises for the full participation of the USSR, from the very beginning, in the construction of the partial world government were to be delayed excessively, the historical reality of the problem of world unification might force the choice of a more limited initial platform, including the USA, Western Europe and Japan. In this case, the problems of ending the East-West conflict and the democrati-

zation of the USSR would become the priority themes of the external action of the partial world government. The persistence, until these problems are resolved, of military rivalry within the Northern hemisphere would delay the end of the North-South divide (with all its implications), insofar as ending this divide depends decisively on the commitment of the economically most advanced countries.

Identifying the pillars of partial world government in the USA, USSR, Europe and Japan obviously does not mean excluding the participation of other democratic states in this undertaking at the outset: such states as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, or even China if it started a process of democratization in the relatively near future (for Latin American countries who are on the way to becoming democratic, regional unification should be the first goal). It should, however, be realistically recognized that this participation, however desirable, is not an indispensable condition to the creation of an effective partial world government.

As regards the institutional characteristics of the partial world government, although it is premature to draw up precise and detailed models, we still need to clarify that the start to its construction does not mean that from the outset we must achieve a federation in the full sense between the strong areas of the world. In reality, some kind of political and institutional graduality will probably be inevitable. But, in the light of the experience of European unification, it may be pointed out that the institutions of world unification, if they are to have any real evolutionary potential, must contain the seeds of federalism from birth and in particular a directly elected common parliament.

If the construction of a partial world government in the terms indicated above is to be seen as the high road towards the start of world unification, this does not mean that we must *a priori* refuse world organizations of the functionalist type with no federal embryos. In reality, the creation of structures of this type (such as the agency for the exploitation of oceanic resources) is both possible and desirable though they cannot be endowed with characteristics which are embryonically federal and democratic precisely because most of the states participating do not have democratic regimes. We must, however, be aware that functionalist organizations of this type do not constitute the start of the construction of a world government and, in particular, that they are destined to remain very weak and precarious until such a time as they find the support of a partial world government. The same is true for the reform of the UN.

3. *The role of European unity in the construction of world government.*

In the light of what has been said so far about the historical topicality of world unification and the transition in the reasonably near future towards the final goal, we may now provide an acceptable definition of the decisive role that Europe can play in this process by completing its unification rapidly. A fundamental pillar, taken in the static sense, of a partial world government, and hence of the future world federation, would not only be created in this way: in addition, a dynamic factor would be activated which would be of enormous effectiveness vis-à-vis the development of the process of world unification. In this respect we need to distinguish the function of the model which the completion of European unification would have and the political action that a European government could carry out.

The significance of the example that the European Community could give to the world by creating a European federal government is evident. By making integration an irreversible process it would be possible to exploit fully the enormous advantages that are implicit in this integration and would create ties of solidarity which are inseparable among the participating nations. The great revolutions of modern history were born in Europe: the liberal, democratic and socialist revolutions. The nation-state, which has had so many imitators throughout the world, was born in Europe. If the European states which in the first half of the century unleashed the most destructive wars in history showed that it is possible to unite definitively in a peaceful and democratic way without renouncing the effective independence of their national governments (which is possible precisely with the federal system), they would give mankind an example with exceptional power of conviction. On the one hand, it would encourage analogous processes in the other areas of the world where the problem of regional integration is already the order of the day, with weak attempts at imitating European integration arising precisely because of the weakness of the reference model. Moreover, since the system of federal government which unifies European nations in an irreversible way is the same with which it will be possible to create an effective partial world government and eventually overall world government, its affirmation in Europe would seem to indicate the road to follow with greatest strength of conviction.

Quite apart from its function as a model, the concrete political action that a European government could carry out would seem to be decisive in encouraging world unification.

If we want to understand this side of the question properly, we must first of all be aware that a European government would have a strong objective inclination towards a policy of world unification. In the first place, the European Community is the world's greatest commercial power (moreover it is an importer of essential raw materials from other countries) and, hence, has a much more immediate and pressing interest than the superpowers as regards ending East-West and North-South tensions which heavily impede the development of economic and commercial ties on a world scale. A serious policy in this sense can, moreover, only be part of a policy directed towards the construction of the world government and could be effectively carried out by the European Community only by adopting a true supranational government. In the second place, only on the basis of lasting East-West détente would it be possible to overcome the division between the two Europes and, in this framework, the division between the two Germanies. In the third place, European integration, by replacing the age-old Franco-German dispute with a lasting system of European co-operation around this reconciled central nucleus of the Old Continent, has made Western Europe the area which is relatively the most stable, most peaceful and prosperous in the world, where democracy has been consolidated and extended peacefully to Mediterranean countries which had substantially been excluded from it. From this situation a deep-rooted trend towards the moderation of world tensions has arisen which is apparent, at the public opinion level, in the existence in this region of the world of the strongest movement for peace existing today and, at the government level, in the constant inclination towards East-West détente and in the attempt to begin a more co-operative relationship with the Third World. Although this tendency is characterized by serious limitations and contradictions, closely connected with the limitations and the contradictions of the current process of integration, a qualitative leap in the direction of political Union would clearly give the Community a chance to clarify its objective propensity towards a world system of peace in an incomparably more effective way.

There is a fourth element of decisive importance which needs to be pointed out. The creation of a supranational federal government would give Western Europe an international weight which is incomparably superior to the current one, but it would have great structural difficulties in using this weight to become a third superpower competing with the USA and the USSR. A federal European government whose pillars are the great historically consolidated nations would be a real federal gov-

ernment, i.e. with powers limited to the task of maintaining unity between the parts, and, hence, it would have great difficulties in developing power politics (with all its implications in terms of weapons and centralization of power) similar to the power politics in the USA and USSR. Hence, though it is true that the dangers threatening mankind's survival mean that all states, the superpowers included, have to face up to the dilemma of uniting or perishing, it is reasonable to expect that the European government, which will have a weaker sovereignty than the Russian and American governments, will have a much greater propensity to pursue its limitation to the advantage of the construction of a world government rather than reinforce its own sovereignty.

Having stated this, it is possible to delineate the essential features of the concrete prospect of making a start to the construction of the world government which will be opened up with the completion of European integration. In this context, it is possible to distinguish three sectors: Atlantic ties in the strict sense (Europe-USA) and in the wide sense (i.e. the trilateral Europe-USA-Japan tie-up), relations with the Soviet block and relations with the Third World.

As regards the Europe-USA tie-up, the completion of European integration will make it possible to transform the Atlantic Alliance from the current American protectorate into a real partnership among equals. This would eliminate a position of uneasiness and permanent crisis characterizing Atlantic relationships, which are eternally faced with the alternative between a stiffening of American hegemony and dissolution, and would lay the bases for common action favouring the construction of a world government. Indeed not only would Western Europe have greater influence on American foreign policy, it would also have a much greater capacity to show its objective propensity towards world unification, and true partnership would *per se* favour a qualitative change for the better in American attitudes to world problems. Nationalistic, imperialistic and militaristic trends which are undoubtedly a strong element in American foreign policy and which obstruct the awareness of the need to begin world unification, in actual fact have a fairly close relationship with excessively heavy international commitments to which Americans are objectively forced owing to Europe's inability to take on responsibilities corresponding to their economic and political potential. The very heavy American worldwide commitment, with its implications in terms of enormous military expenditure, concentration of power and erosion of liberal and democratic conquests, can find support only in an ideological trend with strong nationalistic elements, which feed the vision of a

world which is irredeemably conflictual and prevents the awareness that mankind is now a community of destiny. Therefore, if Western Europe, with its much greater unity, caused a substantial reduction in American commitment to European and Third World defence, nationalism would be weakened in the USA and a much more positive attitude would appear towards détente and the ending of the East-West conflict and towards ending the gap between North and South which would also encourage détente. In other words, the conditions would arise for a strong common commitment favouring world unification. It is likely that this commitment from being a bilateral arrangement would become trilateral, with full involvement of Japan, which already today constitutes a fundamental pole in the grouping of strong areas with a democratic regime.

As regards the USSR, a really united Europe would have an incomparably greater possibility of encouraging the development of lasting détente in which real progress towards the democratization of the USSR can be achieved, with the obvious implications which this would have for a positive evolution of the Soviet block overall. Not only would joint Euro-American commitment in this direction be achieved for the reasons mentioned above, but in addition Western Europe would acquire qualitatively new influence in the field of economic co-operation with the East and as regards arms negotiations. If Western Europe became integrated, it would acquire an economic force which would enable it to deepen its co-operation and hence economic interdependence with the Soviet block, contributing in a decisive way to accelerating its economic progress, which in the long term can only have a positive influence on the progress of the USSR and its satellites towards social and political pluralism. But above all the greater political weight which Western Europe would acquire by virtue of not depending any more for its defence on the American protectorate, would make it possible to achieve a policy of economic co-operation with the East of great dimensions without the risk of falling under Soviet influence. There would be a growing capacity to subordinate, in deed and not just in words, the deepening of economic co-operation, which for the USSR is becoming an increasingly vital need, to gradual progress being made as regards civil rights.

On the military level, it is clear that a Europe freed from its American military protectorate would have a very different weight in East-West negotiations, as regards pursuing its own interests and its own propensity towards a world of peace. The presence of a strong, unitary European voice will not produce substantial results in the field of disarmament

until we are able to begin constructing a partial world government with the participation of the USSR, because only in this framework would we begin to eliminate the expectation among the great powers of war as the *extrema ratio* in solution of conflicts and for the defence of independence. Indeed the so-called negotiations on disarmament are in reality negotiations on the control and rationalization of the arms race designed above all to maintain a balance which in actual fact constantly tends to move upwards. A unified European presence could, however, heavily encourage an increasingly advanced development of so-called confidence-building measures. These, in fact, carry real weight in the current world, which is certainly still anarchic and which is thus dominated by the expectation of war as the *extrema ratio*. But the world is also dominated by the terror of a nuclear holocaust and, therefore, cannot do without attempting to seek ways of diminishing the danger that international crises will trigger off an escalation towards catastrophe. If this is true, the introduction in military East-West negotiations of a united Europe with a strong objective propensity towards the development of a peaceful world seems destined to increase the possibilities existing in the confidence-building measures in a very relevant way.

One of the issues which should be carefully studied in the context of confidence-building measures and their new qualitative development which an active European role could produce is "defensive" defence.

By this is meant a defence system based at the nuclear level on the principle of minimum deterrent and which is exclusively dissuasive vis-à-vis a nuclear attack, and, conventionally, on territorial-type defence which effectively contains a conventional attack without causing nuclear escalation but which is structurally incapable of attack. This approach to European defence would involve confidence-building measures which would be qualitatively new but would also mean an end to the principle of balance of power in which offensive and defensive capacity have to be equal, without, however, security being abandoned and without falling into unilateral disarmament.

Moreover, an option of this kind would have enormous positive advantages in terms of the politics of détente. If Western Europe were to have true defensive unity, it would be possible to withdraw American troops from Western Europe, which would also make it extremely difficult for the USSR to oppose demands for its troops to be withdrawn from its satellites in Eastern Europe. But if the defensive defence option were to be added, the USSR would also find it much harder to oppose demands for it to restructure its own defence system along the same

lines. The implications which such developments would have within the Soviet block are so evident that they do not call for detailed explanation. Essentially, political conditions would arise whereby decisive progress towards democracy in both the USSR and the Soviet block and hence towards an ending of blocks with its division of Europe into two would become possible. The prospect of involving the USSR in the construction of the world government would become extremely concrete.

In relationships with the Third World, the completion of integration would give rise in Western Europe above all to the political capacity to pass, from the current weak aid policy to the development, to realization — in strict co-operation with the USA and Japan and tendentially with the USSR — of a real Marshall Plan for the Third World, based on an organic link between aid of sufficient size and the development of regional integration. Obviously an active European role would make it possible to carry out great development in co-operation with the great areas of the Third World, such as India and China, which are already sufficiently large in demographic terms to be the pillars of the future world federation, but which must still overcome the enormous problems of economic, social and political backwardness (in the latter case in China in particular).

In conclusion, with the completion of European unification the indispensable conditions for concretely beginning a policy of world unification arise. The most immediate sector of effective development of this policy will come from the strongest regions of the world, where it will be possible to begin the construction of a partial world government. But this policy will have to become operative even in the Third World with the development of regional integration and the consolidation of already unified areas which are, however, still very backwards economically, socially and politically.

Sergio Pistone

Federalism in the History of Thought

AFRICAN FEDERALISM

As early as the 1930s, various African intellectuals had perceived and raised the question of the "Balkanisation" of Africa. Thanks to their foresight, achieving African unity has always been one of the main objectives of the African movement for nationhood and independence. The hopes for unity were almost universal among those fighting for independence, though they did not reflect in detail on the form and implications of African unity. Only Nkrumah, Nyerere and Cheik Anta Diop adopted the "African federal State" formula, but the unity they sought at that time was no more than a hope and their support for it went no further than a few arguments of a historical and cultural nature.

The political Pan-African movement, which Nkrumah developed later, when Ghana had become independent, was simply an African version of the "Negro Renaissance" movement set up by Black Americans at the beginning of the century in the course of their struggle for racial emancipation in America. The American Negro origins of Pan-Africanism is demonstrated by the fact that the most significant writings were by American negroes since, with the sole exceptions of Nkrumah and Nyerere, the main leaders (Edward Blyden, Marcus Garvey, Georges Padmore, Ras Makonnen, Harold Moody, Duse Mohamed etc.) were all American negroes. It was no coincidence that the leaders of the Pan-African movement were African English-speaking intellectuals who had lived in the United States and in London, while those who, in Paris, developed the cultural movement of négritude, were intellectuals in direct contact with French colonialism.

Thus it was that the African nationalists led the struggle for the independence of Africa in great ideological obscurity. The political idea of African unity had no organizational reference framework. There never was an African organization which established the goal of

creating and maintaining African federal institutions as its main objective. The timid efforts of Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Wallace Johnson, Peters Abrahams, Obafémi Awolowo — in organising the V Pan-African Congress in Manchester on October 15, 1945 — were never turned into any real constitution for a solid Pan-African organization. In practice, this Congress was the last political manifestation of the 1944 embryonic "Pan-Africa Federation" organization. In much the same way, Nkrumah's visit to Paris in 1947 to establish contacts with French-speaking African intellectuals who supported *négritude* (Léopold Senghor, Lamine Griéye, Apithy etc.) gave no result.

In a nutshell, the nationalists negotiated the emancipation of colonial territories without any All-African programme, that only an African federalist political organization could have defined and defended. Their demands, therefore, were limited to the territories imposed upon them by the colonial system (the current states). Thus when the European governments, who had pursued colonial politics, decided to dismember their empire in Africa, no voice was raised in these nationalist African movements to oppose this policy. On the contrary, the facts demonstrate that the African élite was the accomplice of this territorial fragmentation and that they adapted to a situation from which they hoped to draw considerable benefit. Everywhere on the African continent flags were raised, national anthems rang out, constitutions were hastily drawn up to celebrate the arrival of "independent Africa".

This independentist attitude of African nationalists, it could be argued, was justified as an extreme reaction to the politics of colonial powers of the time who seemed keen to form federations with their colonies. For the majority of African leaders, the "Euroafrican" idea was little more than a fresh attempt by the European powers to contain the wave of African nationalism and their desire for independence. The conflict between what may be called the "Republican" and "Federalist" factions was simply an expression of this contradiction within the African nationalist movement. The failure of the "Euroafrican" project as a political entity may essentially be imputed to the governments of the time still under the influence of the colonial powers. Moreover, analysis of the different constitutional arrangements reveals that behind the planned para-federal structures lay a centralized state. In all objectiveness it was historically impossible to resolve the colonial problem with federalism, because colonialism, as it appeared in history, was incompatible with the principle of liberty, affirmed and guaranteed by federalism.

The failure of the federation projected by Senghor in 1958 between Senegal, Sudan, Upper Volta and Dahomey, the collapse of the Mali federation, the failure of Nkrumah's attempts to call a Pan-African Conference in Accra in 1958, and his failed attempts to establish a rapport with Sékou Touré may all be imputed to the absence of an autonomous federalist initiative during the entire period preceding African independence. Only the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar (now Tanzania) succeeded thanks to Julius Nyerere's skill. In actual fact, no political unification of Africa was possible without the prior establishment of a solid federalist African organization, which posed all issues of unity in all its aspects with the utmost clarity and which worked to achieve the proposed objectives unswervingly. This organizational framework did not exist in Africa at a vital moment in its history.

The full implications of the requirement of African unity was never grasped by African nationalists. The unity which they called for so wholeheartedly was only an ideal which they never managed to turn into practice. They did not see it as a necessity, blinded as they were by the winds of nationalism. Most of them believed that this issue needed to be discussed "after the nation had gained its independence."

When an opportunity to achieve African unity did arise in Addis-Abeba in 1963, the Heads of State meeting at this conference adopted a charter which laid down the political principles and the legislative rules for the new African unity. After long discussion, during which opinions were very clearly divided, the principles of "respect of the state's sovereignty and territorial integrity" and the "inviolability of African frontiers inherited from colonialism" were proclaimed as a basis for the new unity. These principles were interpreted by most of the Heads of State as a charter for maintaining the territorial status quo inherited from colonialism. The conference saw the birth of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as an organization for inter-state co-operation. It definitively consecrated the failure of Pan-Africanism. The division of Africa into multiple state sovereignties was to be celebrated and codified, for the second time in history, with the great difference that, this time, the historical initiative came not from the outside but from the Africans themselves.

The constitution of the OAU marked an important turning point in the history of Africa. But it also entailed the affirmation of new African states modelled on the centralized, 19th century European nation-state. Nationalism, which has dominated in Africa for more than 25 years, has now placed the issue of federalism on the agenda in a particular sharp

way and opens up a new period in the struggle for African federalism.

For these reasons, we are publishing a few paragraphs taken from the "founding fathers" of new Africa, in the hope that we can show that independence and federalism are closely linked ideas and that we need to pick up the struggle which has been interrupted starting from new premises. Africa will unite itself only if there is a political entity capable of taking up the struggle. We are inviting all those who wish to work for the African federation to join the group of young Africans who are currently creating the African Federalist Movement by writing to the Federalist's editorial board.

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KWAME NKRUMAH. *Continental Government for Africa*. *

We have seen, in the example of the United States, how the dynamic elements within society understood the need for unity and fought their bitter civil war to maintain the political union that was threatened by the reactionary forces. We have also seen, in the example of the Soviet Union, how the forging of continental unity along with the retention of national sovereignty by the federal states, has achieved a dynamism that has lifted a most backward society into a most powerful unit within a remarkably short space of time. From the examples before us, in Europe and the United States of America, it is therefore patent that we in Africa have the resources, present and potential, for creating the kind of society that we are anxious to build. It is calculated that by the end of this century the population of Africa will probably exceed five hundred millions.

Our continent gives us the second largest land stretch in the world. The natural wealth of Africa is estimated to be greater than that of almost any other continent in the world. To draw the most from our existing and potential means for the achievement of abundance and a fine social order, we need to unify our efforts, our resources, our skills and intentions.

Europe, by way of contrast, must be a lesson to us all. Too busy hugging its exclusive nationalisms, it has descended, after centuries of wars interspersed with intervals of uneasy peace, into a state of confusion,

* Chap. 21 in *Africa Must Unite*, London, Heinemann, 1963, pp. 216-222.

simply because it failed to build a sound basis of political association and understanding. Only now, under the necessities of economic stringency and the threat of the new German industrial and military rehabilitation, is Europe trying — unsuccessfully — to find a *modus operandi* for containing the threat. It is deceptively hoped that the European Community will perform this miracle. It has taken two world wars and the break-up of empires to press home the lesson, still only partly digested, that strength lies in unity.

While we in Africa, for whom the goal of unity is paramount, are striving to concert our efforts in this direction, the neocolonialists are straining every nerve to upset them by encouraging the formation of communities based on the languages of their former colonizers. We cannot allow ourselves to be so disorganized and divided. The fact that I speak English does not make me an Englishman. Similarly, the fact that some of us speak French or Portuguese does not make us Frenchmen or Portuguese. We are Africans first and last, and as Africans our best interests can only be served by uniting within an African Community. Neither the Commonwealth nor a Franco-African Community can be a substitute.

To us, Africa with its islands is just one Africa. We reject the idea of any kind of partition. From Tangier or Cairo in the North to Capetown in the South, from Cape Guardafui in the East to Cape Verde Islands in the West, Africa is one and indivisible.

I know that when we speak of political union, our critics are quick to observe an attempt to impose leadership and to abrogate sovereignty. But we have seen from the many examples of union put forward, that equality of the states is jealously guarded in every single constitution and that sovereignty is maintained. There are differences in the powers allotted to the central government and those retained by the states, as well as in the functions of the executive, legislature and judiciary. All of them have a common trade and economic policy. All of them are secular, in order that religion might not be dragged across the many problems involved in maintaining unity and securing the greatest possible development.

We in Africa who are pressing now for unity are deeply conscious of the validity of our purpose. We need the strength of our combined numbers and resources to protect ourselves from the very positive dangers of returning colonialism in disguised forms. We need it to combat the entrenched forces dividing our continent and still holding back millions of our brothers. We need it to secure total African liberation. We need it to carry forward our construction of a socio-economic system that

will support the great mass of our steadily rising population at levels of life which will compare with those in the most advanced countries.

But we cannot mobilize our present and potential resources without concerted effort. If we developed our potentialities in men and natural resources in separate isolated groups, our energies would soon be dissipated in the struggle to outbid one another. Economic friction among us would certainly lead to bitter political rivalry, such as for many years hampered the pace of growth and development in Europe.

At present most of the independent African states are moving in directions which expose us to the dangers of imperialism and neo-colonialism. We therefore need a common political basis for the integration of our policies in economic planning, defence, foreign and diplomatic relations. That basis for political action need not infringe the essential sovereignty of the separate African states. These states would continue to exercise independent authority, except in the fields defined and reserved for common action in the interests of the security and orderly development of the whole continent.

In my view, therefore, a united Africa — that is, the political and economic unification of the African Continent — should seek three objectives.

Firstly, we should have an over-all economic planning on a continental basis. This would increase the industrial and economic power of Africa. So long as we remain balkanized, regionally or territorially, we shall be at the mercy of colonialism and imperialism. The lesson of the South American Republics vis-à-vis the strength and solidarity of the United States of America is there for all to see.

The resources of Africa can be used to the best advantage and the maximum benefit to all only if they are set within an over-all framework of a continentally planned development. An over-all economic plan, covering an Africa united on a continental basis, would increase our total industrial and economic power. We should therefore be thinking seriously now of ways and means of building up a Common Market of a United Africa and not allow ourselves to be lured by the dubious advantages of association with the so-called European Common Market. We in Africa have looked outwards too long for the development of our economy and transportation. Let us begin to look inwards into the African Continent for all aspects of its development. Our communications were devised under colonial rule to stretch outwards towards Europe and elsewhere, instead of developing internally between our cities and states. Political unity should give us the power and will to change all this. We in

Africa have untold agricultural, mineral and water-power resources. These almost fabulous resources can be fully exploited and utilized in the interest of Africa and the African people, only if we develop them within a Union Government of African states. Such a government will need to maintain a common currency, a monetary zone and a central bank of issue. The advantages of these financial and monetary arrangements would be inestimable, since monetary transactions between our several states would be facilitated and the pace of financial activity generally quickened. A central bank of issue is an inescapable necessity, in view of the need to re-orientate the economy of Africa and place it beyond the reach of foreign control.

Secondly, we should aim at the establishment of a unified military and defence strategy. I do not see much virtue or wisdom in our separate efforts to build up or maintain vast military forces for self-defence which, in any case, would be ineffective in any major attack upon our separate states. If we examine this problem realistically, we should be able to ask ourselves this pertinent question: which single state in Africa today can protect its sovereignty against an imperialist aggressor? In this connection, it should be mentioned that anti-apartheid leaders have alleged that South Africa is building a great military force with all the latest weapons of destruction, in order to crush nationalism in Africa. Nor is this all. There are grave indications that certain settler governments in Africa have already been caught in the dangerous arms race and are now arming themselves to the teeth. Their military activities constitute a serious threat not only to the security of Africa, but also to the peace of the world. If these reports are true, only the unity of Africa can prevent South Africa and these other governments from achieving their diabolical aims.

If we do not unite and combine our military resources for common defence, the individual states, out of a sense of insecurity, may be drawn into making defence pacts with foreign powers which may endanger the security of us all.

There is also the expenditure aspect of this problem. The maintenance of large military forces imposes a heavy financial burden on even the most wealthy states. For young African states, who are in great need of capital for internal development, it is ridiculous — indeed suicidal — for each state separately and individually to assume such a heavy burden of self-defence, when the weight of this burden could be easily lightened by sharing it among themselves. Some attempt has already been made by the Casablanca Powers and the Afro-Malagasy Union in the matter of common defence, but how much better and stronger it would be if, instead

of two such ventures, there was one over-all (land, sea and air) Defence Command for Africa.

The third objective which we should have in Africa stems from the first two which I have just described. If we in Africa set up a unified economic planning organization and a unified military and defence strategy, it will be necessary for us to adopt a unified foreign policy and diplomacy to give political direction to our joint efforts for the protection and economic development of our continent. Moreover, there are some sixty odd states in Africa, about thirty-two of which are at present independent. The burden of separate diplomatic representation by each state on the Continent of Africa alone would be crushing, not to mention representation outside Africa. The desirability of a common foreign policy which will enable us to speak with one voice in the councils of the world, is so obvious, vital and imperative that comment is hardly necessary.

I am confident that it should be possible to devise a constitutional structure applicable to our special conditions in Africa and not necessarily framed in terms of the existing constitutions of Europe, America or elsewhere, which will enable us to secure the objectives I have defined and yet preserve to some extent the sovereignty of each state within a Union of African states.

We might erect for the time being a constitutional form that could start with those states willing to create a nucleus, and leave the door open for the attachment of others as they desire to join or reach the freedom which would allow them to do so. The form could be made amenable to adjustment and amendment at any time the consensus of opinion is for it. It may be that concrete expression can be given to our present ideas within a continental parliament that would provide a lower and an upper house, the one to permit the discussion of the many problems facing Africa by a representation based on population; the other, ensuring the equality of the associated states, regardless of size and population, by a similar, limited representation from each of them, to formulate a common policy in all matters affecting the security, defence and development of Africa. It might, through a committee selected for the purpose, examine likely solutions to the problems of union and draft a more conclusive form of constitution that will be acceptable to all the independent states.

The survival of free Africa, the extending independence of this continent, and the development towards that bright future on which our hopes and endeavours are pinned, depend upon political unity.

Under a major political union of Africa there could emerge a United

Africa, great and powerful, in which the territorial boundaries which are the relics of colonialism will become obsolete and superfluous, working for the complete and total mobilization of the economic planning organization under a unified political direction. The forces that unite us are far greater than the difficulties that divide us at present, and our goal must be the establishment of Africa's dignity, progress and prosperity.

Proof is therefore positive that the continental union of Africa is an inescapable desideratum if we are determined to move forward to a realization of our hopes and plans for creating a modern society which will give our peoples the opportunity to enjoy a full and satisfying life. The forces that unite us are intrinsic and greater than the superimposed influences that keep us apart. These are the forces that we must enlist and cement for the sake of the trusting millions who look to us, their leaders, to take them out of the poverty, ignorance and disorder left by colonialism into an ordered unity in which freedom and amity can flourish amidst plenty.

Here is a challenge which destiny has thrown out to the leaders of Africa. It is for us to grasp what is a golden opportunity to prove that the genius of the African people can surmount the separatist tendencies in sovereign nationhood by coming together speedily, for the sake of Africa's greater glory and infinite well-being, into a Union of African States.

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JULIUS K. NYERERE. *The nature and Requirements of African Unity*.*

A new state.

The requirements of African Unity — the purposes of it — necessitate the establishment of a new international entity to replace the present small international entities which now exist in our continent. Until we have achieved that we shall not be in a position to utilize the resources of Africa for the people of Africa, and we shall not be free from fear of the rest of

* Essay excerpted from *Freedom and Unity*, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp.334-350.

the world. A continent-wide state, single and indivisible, must be established, which cannot be broken up again because it is one unit and not a collection of units.

This does not mean that it has to be a unitary state, with a single all-powerful government. It must have one united government which has over-riding and exclusive power in certain basic fields. In addition, there may well be other authorities, other governments, with lesser powers which might indeed also be exclusive and derived from a constitution, not from the central government at all. This is simply to say that the new Africa can be a federal state, with the division of powers between the centre and the constituent parts determined according to the wishes of the founders and future generations.

But there are certain things which must be exclusive to the central government. They include Foreign Affairs, Defence, Citizenship, Currency, Customs, Foreign Trade and Mineral Resources, as a minimum. There are certain other things in which the central government must have concurrent and over-riding powers in case of conflict, and these include other questions central to economic development as well as police, communications, health, education and so on. The stronger the central government, the greater the potential of Africa; for powers can be devolved in practice as necessary, but they are only with difficulty surrendered by a lesser authority to a greater one. It is also important to realize that, once the decision to unify has been taken, it is the smaller and poorer nation-states which have most reason to support a strong centre; only in such a case is it possible to equalize benefits and burdens over the whole continent. This does not mean that the small states will find it easier to make the decision for unity in the first place. On the contrary, their fear of domination by the stronger and bigger powers may make them more suspicious and more difficult during the negotiations.

The constitution of the new unit will inevitably be an outgrowth of the political attitudes and the economic and social conditions now operative in all the different parts of Africa. There are only two things which are vital to its success.

Firstly, the new continental state must be able to attract and hold the direct loyalty of the people. It must therefore be based not just on the constituent states, but on the people themselves. In no other way can it hope to withstand the strains of its early years, and to develop the whole of Africa to its full potential. This does not exclude national loyalty too, but nation-state loyalty must be secondary to the identification with Africa. This means a reversal of the present trend in Africa; ten years ago

an African asked for his nationality wrote "African, Tanganyika"; now he writes "Tanzania, Africa" — if he adds the continent at all.

Secondly, the executive of the continental state must have a feeling of responsibility to the whole of Africa, and not just to one part of it. And it must have the power to act and to fulfil the responsibilities involved. Individual liberty is not in Africa regarded as the opposite of communal authority; we shall never achieve the international political and economic breakthrough to which we aspire by surrounding our executive with "checks and balances" at the centre which paralyse all action.

The establishment of unity.

But all this is the goal. There is not likely to be a great deal of controversy about it as an objective; the practical problem arises in relation to the path which has to be followed, and the urgency of treading that path.

The first thing which has to be accepted is our present position. We have in Africa now thirty-six independent nation-states, varying in population from 300,000 to 40,000,000. Not only do these nations have different official languages and different inherited forms of administration, they have also adopted incompatible relationships with non-African powers. They have economies which are more competitive than complementary; their constitutions vary in form and in complexity; some have adopted a state religion while others are self-consciously secular. All these and many other conflicting differences come on top of deliberate and intensive national efforts to build up national loyalties centred on individual leaders, or on flags or other emblems of sovereignty. These are the nations which have to be incorporated in a United Africa.

This imposing list of difficulties and obstacles to unity is counterbalanced by the logic of Africa's need for unity and by Africa's united determination to free itself from colonialism and racial oppression. There is an emotion of "African-ness" which is a positive force. It has already enabled the establishment of the Organization of African Unity; it has already enabled many specialized commissions to begin work, and a Development Bank to be established. Africa has achieved more in the direction of unity than any other continent; its difficulties and its stumbling only serve to emphasize the path which is being trodden. But where do we go from here?

The ideal proceeding would be for each of the appropriate authorities in the thirty-six independent states to take the decision for unity, and then

to send to a convention representatives authorized to work out the constitution for the United States of Africa. When they had done so a period for ratification, and then for continent-wide elections, would lead to the inauguration of the new state.

Ultimately, something of this procedure will have to be followed, for the decision for unity is a political decision which has to be taken. No alternative methods of economic co-operation or integration can replace that political act. They may lead towards it, but they cannot do more. Because power has to be surrendered by sovereign bodies, and surrendered finally with no possibility of recall and no time limit. This is in very essence a political action.

The government of the United Republic of Tanzania is ready to initiate this process in regard to our own country, and it is more than likely that the people of the Union would heartily endorse such action.

It would, however, be stupidity to pretend that every country or every government in this continent is at the present moment in a similar position. Discussions at All-Africa meetings, and the statements of different African leaders have made it quite clear that this is not the case. And there is no virtue in being ready, nor shame in being unready. We are all to a large extent the product of our own societies and our own histories. What we have to do is to accept this fact as well as the others; some African states are not at present willing to take this final step.

This does not mean, however, that the objective must be cast out. Certainly it becomes in some respects more difficult to attain the longer the delay in inaugurating it. But if the goal is lost it will be quite as much the fault of those who are now ready to plunge as it will be of those who wish to get nearer to it by functional co-operation or other means before taking the vital step.

In the meantime it is not necessary to drift backwards and away from each other. Instead we have to move more gradually in the direction of final unity. One way in which we can do this is by All-African co-operation up to the limit of agreement; the Organization of African Unity is an expression of such action in progress, and its importance lies in the principles it lays down and the machinery which has been established to facilitate further co-operation.

In addition, joint meetings of representatives of all the different states can, at international conferences, sometimes effect practical unity of approach. This is not always possible, but usually the differences are at least reduced. And more limited co-operation on specific problems which affect directly a smaller number of nation-states is very often

effective; a serious examination of the procedures and treaties operating in the different regions would reveal the existence of a great amount of such functional co-operation.

The grave danger of limited functional co-operation is that it may adversely affect other parts of Africa, and complicate still further the final task of unification. This is particularly true as regards arrangements with non-African countries or groups, and the most obvious example, though not the only one, is the special relationship which some countries of Africa have with the European Common Market.

In some areas of Africa, however, a step can be taken which simplifies ultimate unity. There is no reason why the present nation-states should be regarded as the necessary units of unity. The merger or federation of any two or more of them into one new sovereign entity will have two effects. First, it will enable the area concerned to achieve quickly at least the benefits of greater unity, and greater strength. Secondly, it will reduce the number of states which have to sit down together and agree on the final forms of African unification. If it were possible for different areas of Africa, by voluntary agreement of all their people, to merge themselves into new federal states, the final unification conference might take place between ten or twelve representatives instead of between thirty and forty. If this were possible the final conference would certainly find it easier to reach agreement.

This was our objective in East Africa when Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika decided to federate. But the negotiations broke down and for the last eighteen months the three countries have continued in their endeavours to have a high degree of economic co-operation without taking the political step necessary to secure it. In consequence we have run into one difficulty after another, and in certain important respects we have less economic integration now than we had in 1963. This is not because any of the three states has begun to oppose unity; it is because the governments have each a first responsibility to achieve development for their own area and they have to take the steps necessary for that. In the absence of an authority which is responsible to the people of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, and which can therefore act to ensure the development of all three, it is necessary for each of the governments concerned to take those actions which it believes to be essential to its own development. The result has already been an extension of the limitation on the free movement of goods between the three countries, and a large amount of blatant horse-trading in relation to necessary decisions — with many essential services suffering in the process.

For Africa the lesson of East African experience is that economic co-operation can go a long way without political integration, but that there comes a point when movement must be either forward or backward — forward into the political decision, or backward into reduced economic co-operation. This is inevitable when governments — like all those in Africa — have a purpose which demands their active participation in the economic life of the country.

The Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar shows a contrary development. Despite our proximity and ancient links, the two countries had developed different forms of government and administration, and different taxation and customs levels. Yet a political decision to merge has resulted in the ability to move towards uniformity in these respects in so far as the international sovereignty of the new unit is concerned. And while these administrative steps are being taken the dangers of divisive actions by neocolonialists have been obviated. Zanzibar cannot be used as a base for those hostile to Tanganyika, nor Tanganyika for those who oppose the revolution in Zanzibar. We are one people now; and as such we are ready and able to enter into further unity talks in Africa.

Arguments are advanced against the development of new federations in Africa. It is said, for one thing, that new local loyalties will be built up which will militate against loyalty to Africa. Yet it is hard to take this argument seriously. Over the past ten years our people have had to expand their tribal loyalties to encompass the nation. It will be much easier for them to feel a loyalty to "Africa" which does not divide their tribe, and which, in the sense of their own experience, is little more immense than their own nations frequently are. The introduction, through a federation, of another interim step to unity is no great complication; it might indeed prevent the growth of an insular nationalism which would later prevent a wider loyalty.

The suggestion that it would be impossible for a United Africa to be constructed on federations, because of making a "three tier federalism", is equally facile. There are already federations in Africa; the problem has existed since Nigeria's independence. But it is not beyond the wit of man to deal with this constitutional problem. There are many alternative methods which spring to mind.

The only argument against progress to unity through further political federations which has any validity at all is that federation will establish population groups and areas large enough to develop viable economies on their own, but which prevent the continent as a whole reaching its full

potential. This possibility does exist; whether it becomes a real danger in practice depends upon the leaders of the new units, and upon the willingness of the other states to make definite steps in the direction of All-Africa Unity. But it is in any case rather peculiar to argue that African Unity will be served by the continued weakness of Africa. Our experience has already shown us that this is not the case. A country which is weak and small has to take succour where and when it can; if this involves, as it has done up to now, entering into economic and other relationships with non-African states, then the small country will do so. In consequence it will be carried along and tied ever tighter to groups outside our continent and it will not dare to cut or endanger the strings which bind it because of its knowledge that it cannot exist alone. If a federation can reduce this need for outside dependence, then it will make a great contribution to the possibility of ultimate unity.

Unity must be achieved.

The whole argument about whether unity is achieved through a "step by step" process or through political decision is in fact a futile one. Ultimately a political decision is necessary; without it unity cannot be achieved. But in the meantime, do we merely wait and hope for a miracle, leaving our development and independence for ever in jeopardy, or do we make what progress we can? Surely the answer must be clear; the African states must co-operate, and undertake common activities wherever they can, and for as many practical purposes as possible. Most of all they must each do everything which can be done to safeguard and build up the spirit and emotion of unity.

Because we finish where we started; it is only by agreement that a United Africa can be achieved. The twentieth century is littered with the wrecks of federations which have failed because they were not based on the will of the people involved, or because they were not strong enough to stand against the prevailing winds of international politics and economics.

And it must be quite clear to everyone that the achievement of unity will not itself solve the problems of Africa. It will merely enable them to be solved by Africa. At the beginning, the effectiveness of the All-African government will be limited; it will have more responsibility than power. It will have to inch forward, organizing and arguing every step of the way, and gradually growing in stature — just as the federal government of the United States is still growing in relation to the states'

governments because of the necessities of the people and the world. For the inauguration of the United States of Africa will not usher in the millenium for Africa's people; we shall not on that day become as wealthy and powerful as the United States of America. But we shall be able to begin work, knowing that such a future is possible.

Yet, despite all these difficulties — indeed because of them — Africa must unite. And it must move forward as swiftly as is consistent with safety on this rocky mountain path. The people of Africa today, and particularly its leaders, have a duty to their ancestors and to their descendants which they must not fail to carry out. The man whose contribution merits a footnote in the history of United Africa will deserve more of the future, than he whose obstinacy, fear or pride, prevents or delays the day when that history can be written. I believe that the people of Africa will be worthy of their great opportunity.

* * *

JULIUS K. NYERERE. *African Unity and World Government*. *

... It is essential, therefore, that we in Tanzania, as a society, should recognize the need to take special steps to make our present situation a temporary one, and that we should deliberately fight the intensification of that attitude which would eventually nullify our social need for human dignity and equality. We have to work towards a position where each person realizes that his rights in society — above the basic needs of every human being — must come second to the overriding need of human dignity for all; and we have to establish the kind of social organization which reduces personal temptations above that level to a minimum.

The spreading of such attitudes and the introduction of such institutions must be an important purpose of the policies of the government of Tanzania. It is described as a socialist purpose, for the deliberate regulation of society for the purposes of equality and human well-being is a socialist doctrine. But we are "African Socialists"; we operate in Africa and the road to our goal will be determined in large part by the economic

* From the Introduction to *Freedom and Unity*, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 17-20.

and social conditions which now exist in this continent. This is not to claim a special virtue in "African Socialism"; we adopt it because we have to move towards the socialist goal of human equality and dignity along the road which is appropriate to us. It is simply a recognition that if two people are going to India, one from Africa and the other from Japan, the former will move east and the latter will move south-west. The destination of all true socialists is probably the same, but the path will be largely determined by the starting point.

The need for international unity.

Indeed, even to talk of "African" socialism is something of a misnomer. As Africa has been organized into nation-states, and because these nation-states have been differently developed, there will even be variations of African socialism. For, although African nations are very artificial creations of man (indeed, of European men) sixty years of history means that they are the basic societies from which our development must now start. We have to recognize the existence of about forty separate sovereign states, separate societies which are linked together geographically, economically and — at the moment — psychologically, but are still separate. Each of these nations is, at present, the "society" within which these transformations have to take place.

This has very serious implications. For although there is no rationality in nation-states, they are the grouping within which society organizes itself and protects itself. Social rules of behaviour operate only inside these boundaries; only within them can it be enforced. This means that relations between these "societies", and between individuals who are members of different societies, are regulated only by the self-interest of the respective groups. Each nation therefore feels it to be necessary to build a system of self-defence — by which it means defence of its own interests — and to spend time and money protecting itself from being used by other nations more powerful than itself.

Frequently indeed nation-states build their own internal unity by fabricating, or exaggerating, their division from other nations.

Thus we have in the world now a situation where a large number of different little societies are trying to pursue their own kind of social organization separate from, and even in opposition to, other social groups, while there is no universally accepted code of behaviour between groups. Internally each state tries to harmonize, or at least control, relations between its citizens and residents. Externally the law of the

jungle operates, ameliorated only by considerations of long-term, as against immediate, benefit.

This is obviously absurd. The technology of the twentieth century straddles the world and yet we try to operate social relations as if national boundaries created impenetrable barriers between different peoples. It is essential that our concept of society be adapted to the present day; only then will any of our present social groupings really be free to pursue their own policies. Nations are now acting like individuals who have not formed a society; they resist the suggestion because they realize that to form a society means surrendering certain freedoms in order to gain others. Yet year by year the need for an organized society becomes clearer; the question which remains is whether it will be formed before disaster occurs.

At the moment the talk of a "World Government" — which is what a world society implies — is day-dreaming. It is very logical dreaming and very necessary. But it is not likely to become a reality soon. Throughout the world nation-states have been so successful in creating concepts of an exclusive internal unity that almost all peoples are now terrified by the thought that someone from "outside" will have power over them; they do not seem able to realize that they will also have power over others. This means that, necessary as it is, we are just not going to create a world government in this century — unless, of course, some unforeseeable event transforms present-day human attitudes.

We have therefore in this respect, as in others, to work up to the goal, starting from the present position. We have to rejoice in the very imperfect United Nations and have to work to strengthen it. At present it is faltering because of the inequalities between its members and because there has been no agreement by the members to give it independent strength. Yet it is an institution which can even now be built up, and just as it is the weaker men who in the short run gain most from the organization of human society, so too, in the short run, it is the small and weak nations who most urgently need the organization of a world society. It is therefore countries like Tanzania which must put in the extra effort which is necessary to make the United Nations succeed in its present endeavours, so that it can grow or be replaced later by a stronger body, as circumstances demand.

Yet there is more than one way in which the present-day African societies can reduce the dangers to themselves which come from the proliferation of nation-states. While we work towards world unity, we can create unity in our continent. Or, if African unity is still too big a step

to take at once, then we can create greater African unity by unions, federations or mergers of the present nation-states, so that the number of sovereign societies in Africa is reduced.

These preliminary steps need not be day-dreaming. If we have courage and intelligence they can become reality in the immediate future. And certainly they are essential if the ordinary African citizen is ever really to overcome the poverty which at present grips him and if he is to increase his degree of personal safety. For this is, and must be, the purpose of greater unity in Africa as elsewhere. Not size for its own sake, but strength and power used to defend the real freedoms of the ordinary man and to help him progress in his freedom.

(Prefaced and edited by Fall Cheikh Bamba)

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