

# THE FEDERALIST

a political review

*To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.*

Hamilton, The Federalist




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YEAR XXX, 1988, NUMBER 2

# THE FEDERALIST

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*The Federalist* was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and has been published in English, French and Italian since 1984. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



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*From Détente to Peace*

*It is universally known that the content of the INF Treaty is not very far-reaching: it affects only about 4 per cent of the nuclear weapons based in Europe. But it is equally certain that the historical significance of the Treaty goes far beyond its actual content. It is the first time in the history of the relationships between the United States and Soviet Russia that a treaty has foreseen not only a limitation in the arms' race, but also the actual destruction of a part of existing weapons. This has been interpreted by public opinion as a signal for the future, and this is the reason why so many hopes have been aroused all over the world.*

*Are we really witnessing the beginning of a "New era"? Two points can be made in favour of this idea:*

*One is the fact that neither of the superpowers can sustain the enormous and ever-increasing costs — both financial and political — of the arms' race. For Gorbachev the continuation of the arms' race would mean giving up perestroika. For the U.S. it would mean further aggravating its deficit and endangering the very prosperity of the country.*

*The second, and more significant point, is that the very idea of defence has lost any sense in the nuclear age, as a war would mean the destruction of both belligerents and, probably, the whole planet. Thus the idea of common security is gaining ground, supplanting the traditional conception according to which the security of a state becomes greater as its potential enemies become more insecure.*

\* \* \*

*This second argument is, however, still far from being generally accepted. Many politicians and observers keep on reasoning with traditional categories. They have learnt from history that in international relations the behaviour of states is governed by the logic of power, which*

leads each of them to strengthen itself at the expense of its competitors, and that war is the continuation of politics by other means. So, they apply this lesson to the current world balance of power and draw from their reflections the sceptical consequence that, as happened in preceding phases of US-Soviet relationships, the present *détente* will last only as long as it matches their power interests, and will be superseded by a new phase of tension as soon as their power interests change.

This would have been sound reasoning until a few years ago. But today, that the leaders of the superpowers have realized that the world as a whole has become a single community of destiny, and that it depends on them to ensure the survival of mankind, it is difficult to imagine that they will return to their previous way of thinking and behaving. This does not mean that the march will be easy. The logic of sovereignty keeps on working and fuelling mistrust between the superpowers. Pressure will continue to bear on governments from military quarters and other sectors of society. But as long as the main features of the world political context remain the same, it seems that the drive towards collaboration will be stronger than the drive towards competition, even though it should not be forgotten that, in an increasingly shrinking world, the international equilibrium would be rigid and conservative, quite incapable of adjusting the relationships between states to the changing reality of world economy and balance of power.

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This is why we are justified in feeling reasonably secure as long as the world political context remains in its current state. But the problem is to know how long the current state will last. And everything points to the conclusion that it will not last very long. The world is rapidly changing, creating problems which are increasingly difficult to solve through intergovernmental decisions. New frightening causes of tension are arising. Take for example the population explosion in the Third World in a context of increasing economic disequilibria; or the seemingly unstoppable tendency towards the exhaustion of unrenewable natural resources; or the increasingly dramatic nature of nationality conflicts, especially in Soviet Russia. These and other problems justify the fear that, in a not too distant future, the desperate conditions of enormous masses of human beings will unleash irresistible irrational forces, thus radically changing the basic data of world politics.

It is clear that the good will of the governments of the states of the

North of the world will not be sufficient to keep control over a situation in which such deep imbalances arise. In reality, no international system based on the principle of sovereignty would be able to cope with such problems in a strictly interdependent world. Collaboration between the superpowers, therefore, can prevent war in the medium term but, if it is not supplemented by a vision of the future inducing people firmly to believe that the tendency will steadily reinforce itself and eventually lead to a more perfect world union, it cannot provide the means to ensure reasonable management and better distribution of increasingly scarce resources, a comprehensive population policy, effective defence against damage to the environment threatening the survival of the world, etc. The danger of war would thus unavoidably reappear in a most frightening shape.

The goal to be achieved is the one towards which the federalists have been striving for forty-five years: world federal government. For this goal to be approached two main developments are necessary:

i) Firstly this goal needs to be adopted by the leaders of the superpowers and the largest number of other states as a final end giving the "New era" its true sense. We all know that the realization of a World Federation is not for tomorrow. But we must also recall that human behaviour is guided not only by institutions but also by expectations. The case of the European Community is telling from this point of view: its institutions are very ineffective, based as they are on the principle of inter-governmental collaboration: but the expectation that Europe will one day unite, kept alive by the permanent presence of the problem on the political arena, has been enough to make it unthinkable, in the last forty-three years, that a new war can break out between the European states. That is why one of the federalists' main tasks today is to promote and support every initiative by the major world leaders oriented towards the ultimate goal of a world government. This orientation should be demonstrated by taking concrete steps towards the strengthening of the UN in the fields in which advances are possible (resources of the seabeds, Antarctica, arms' monitoring, solution of regional crises, etc.).

ii) Secondly, an example needs to be given to the world of the institutional change by which the goal can be achieved, i.e. of how state sovereignty can be transcended. This can reasonably be expected only in a regional framework, and in particular in Western Europe, where conditions, material and spiritual, are ripe for a federal union.

A European Federation, together with the development of other regional integrations, would change the face of the world and make the

*struggle for a World Federation more credible. It is easier to conceive a world government founded on large regional poles than it is to conceive it as being founded on one-hundred and fifty-nine states ranging from a few thousand to a billion inhabitants.*

*In this way a very tight link is established between the endeavours of federalists in Europe and the world: they are indeed engaged in the same struggle, even if it is fought in partially different theatres. The former can find their beliefs strengthened by an increased awareness of the final sense of their commitment. The latter can perhaps achieve greater clarity over the intermediate steps to be accomplished in their long march.*

The Federalist

## The Posthumous Writings of Walter Lipgens on the History of European Unification

SERGIO PISTONE

Walter Lipgens, who died suddenly on April 29 1984, when he was not even 59 years old, was not just a historian of European unification. He started his career as a historian of the Church<sup>1</sup> and wrote various major articles and essays on German unification and the role played in it by Bismarck.<sup>2</sup> From the mid-sixties onwards, however, European unification became the central theme of his research and he dedicated himself to this with such commitment that, despite his premature death, he achieved outstanding results. After a profound study of the Briand Plan,<sup>3</sup> carried out with a systematic study of writings on the theme of European unity in the period between the two wars, and a rigorously scientific analysis of the documents in the archives of the German Foreign Affairs Ministry, he provided the most complete reconstruction achieved till then of the arguments for European unity, drawn up by the European anti-Fascist movement during the Second World War.<sup>4</sup> He then went on to write a mighty book on the beginnings of the process of European unification<sup>5</sup> which must be considered a classic on this theme. He also wrote numerous essays on the development of the process of European integration<sup>6</sup> taking all the major aspects, and in particular the relationship between European integration and German politics, into consideration.<sup>7</sup>

Death alas interrupted a phase of Lipgens' activity which was particularly intense and creative. This emerges from the fact that a number of works of exceptional value have been published posthumously which, at the time of his death, had just been completed or were at an advanced stage of development. In order of importance these are the first two volumes of *Documents on the History of European Integration*,<sup>8</sup> a collection of the main documents relating to European unification from

1939 to 1984,<sup>9</sup> an essay on the genesis of Art. 38 of the EDC.<sup>10</sup> Reading these works gives rise to a feeling of satisfaction, for the enrichment that they bring to historical knowledge of the process of European unification, and at the same time sadness, at the thought of further enrichment that Lipgens would certainly have given us if his life had not been interrupted so early on. Recalling his essential teachings contained in these writings is not only useful for their intrinsic value, but is also a way of keeping alive an exemplary figure of a historian of European unification in the memory of readers of this review, a master for the many federalists engaged in research on this theme and a militant in the movement for European unity.

\* \* \*

Starting from the *Documents on the History of European Integration*, we must first of all observe that they constitute the most exhaustive presentation so far achieved of the set of proposals, statements and analyses relating to European unity which appeared during the Second World War. The picture, which was already quite wide and profound in *Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen*, is enriched here in several ways. First of all, it dedicates separate chapters to almost all Western European countries with the exception of Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Norway and Finland, with regard to which however the essential information available is given. As regards Eastern Europe, even though only Poland gets a chapter to itself, the essential information regarding the other countries is given in the chapters dedicated to the exiles from Eastern Europe. In the second place, we get an extremely full and systematic treatment of the statements and proposals formulated by the exiles of all European countries. The picture is finally completed by a collection of fundamental documents relating to theses on European unity drawn up by Italian Fascists, the Nazis and those who collaborated with them.

Essentially, with these two volumes we get an almost complete idea of what important aspects of the problem of European unity were discussed during the Second World War. What then are the salient facts emerging from this very exhaustive picture? In my opinion there are basically four.

The first essential fact is the extraordinary scope of the debate on European unity in the period considered. Practically all the political, social, cultural groups, all the politicians and intellectuals of any stature,

with very few exceptions, stated their position on this matter. And it is extremely significant from this point of view that interest in it was manifested not only among the anti-Fascists, but also in the Fascist field and particularly German Fascism, which used the idea of European unity to the full as an instrument acting as an ideological mask for its policy of European hegemony, particularly after its aggression against the Soviet Union.

This, if we think about it, is a further confirmation of the lucidity of Einaudi's well-known thesis on the profound meaning of the two World Wars expressed in his speech to the Constituent Assembly on July 29 1947. On that occasion, developing in a very thorough way the thread of an argument begun in 1918 with his federalist criticism of the League of Nations, he defined the World Wars as two attempts to resolve the problem of European unification and identified the cause of these wars in the crisis of the nation state, i.e. in the contradiction between the tendentially supranational character of productive process and all the aspects of human behaviour directly or indirectly linked to it and the national dimensions of the organization of the state. This contradiction could logically only be solved in European unity (seen as a stage towards world unity), which could be achieved either with the "sword of Satan" i.e. with the hegemonic conquest that Hitler tried to achieve in the most radical and brutal way, or with the "sword of God", i.e. through peaceful union in a federation. Now, the fact that even the Nazis felt the need to resort to the idea of European unity in their propaganda poignantly shows that the need to overcome the nation state really was, as Einaudi claimed, the thread running right through the period of the two World Wars.

The second basic fact that emerges from *Documents on the History of European Integration* is just how widespread agreement with the idea of peaceful unification of Europe was. There were certainly positions which were rather different regarding the concrete ways in which to achieve this objective, but, beyond these differences, practically the entire anti-Fascist block, with the sole exception of the Communists, then strictly tied to Soviet orthodoxy, which rejected any suggestion of European unification, expressed the common conviction that it was necessary to end the international anarchy in Europe once and for all, since it had led the old continent to economic poverty, to two frighteningly destructive wars, felt by many as being no more than civil wars, to the blocking of Europe's development in a liberal, democratic and socialist direction. In essence, at the climax in the European crisis in the age of the world wars, in the light of the disasters caused by nationalism and the prospect of irreversible

decadence of European civilization, the appeal to unite to survive launched by Briand in 1929 developed into the collective awareness of the historical crisis of the system of sovereign nation-states in Europe and the need to make a serious start to their union.

This collective awareness, the true leap forward in the history of the debate on European unity, was rightly identified by Lipgens as the most decisive and long-lasting factor underlying the development of the process of European unification since 1945. Against the thesis still quite widespread in the history of the postwar years that views European unification essentially as by-product of the cold war and, hence, American policy of organization of the Western block, he rightly stressed that the American drive in favour of European unification could be successful precisely because, from the Second World War onwards, this need had become something which could no longer be eliminated in the general framework of political expectations. If American politics thus had a very important role in actively starting the process of European integration, the general trend towards this objective which emerged during the war is the deep factor without which, from the Second World War onwards, there could have been no positive response to American demands, integration would not have been able to develop even beyond the end of the cold war and the problem of the completion of integration would not have remained on the table despite the crisis situation and deadlock in which the European community had been for 15 years.

The third salient fact that emerges from *Documents on the History of European Integration* is the already well-defined presence in the Second World War of three basic tendencies, regarding the way in which European unity was to be achieved, which have subsequently had a decisive role in the struggle for this objective in these postwar years and have exerted and continue to exert, in a dialectic relationship and with varying weight, a concrete influence on the process of European integration. The confederal approach (of which Churchill was the most prestigious exponent) is present: this views European unification as a form of co-operation between sovereign states, and is therefore based on the creation of intergovernmental bodies where the principle of unanimous decisions holds sway. Also present is the functionalist approach (proposed during the war by Mitrany, but also by Monnet, who turned it into a practical reality in the wartime co-operation between the anti-Fascist powers), which advocated a sector-by-sector approach managed by supranational bodies with a technocratic nature as being the most effective way of achieving a gradual reduction of absolute state sover-

eignty. Finally, the federalist approach was also present, which advocated the rapid approval of a European federal constitution as the only way to unite Europe democratically and lastingly and thus open up the road to the unification of mankind.

This approach is undoubtedly the most massively present in the panorama of the debate on European unity during the Second World War. First and foremost, it gave rise to the first federalist movements, i.e. political organizations, such as *Federal Union* in Great Britain, the *Movimento Federalista Europeo* in Italy, the *Comité Français pour la Fédération Européenne* in France, whose single objective is European Federation. Secondly, in addition to their presence in the major anti-Fascist political organizations, federalists also gave the greatest contribution to theoretical reflection on the crisis of the nation-state as the profound cause of world wars, Fascism, and the need for a federal solution to this crisis. They also, particularly with Altiero Spinelli, drew up a strategy for the struggle for the European Federation based on the European Constituent, thus identifying the objective that would be the cornerstone of federalist action in the postwar years.

The fourth and final feature emerging from *Documents on the History of European Integration* is that the federalist trend was most pronounced in Italy, France, Germany and the Benelux countries (including the statements of exiles from these countries), i.e. in the framework of the future "little Europe" from which the European Communities sprang. It is true that the first organized federalism was manifested in a grandiose way in Great Britain with *Federal Union*, which was founded in 1939, reached twelve thousand members and 225 sections in 1940 carrying out extraordinary activities in the first years of the war, and without which no proposal for union between Britain and France put forward by Churchill in June 1940 would have been possible. But it is also certain that, when in 1941, with the extension of the war to the USSR and the USA, the danger of Britain's collapse dwindled, *Federal Union* no longer interested the political class or public opinion in Great Britain and its influence waned to the point where it became irrelevant towards the end of the war. The prospect of Britain's maintaining its role as a great power in the new balance of power alongside the USA and the USSR almost completely eclipsed a European prospect and made British federalism totally arid.

Rather different was the evolution of the future founder members of the European Communities. Here the federalist trend developed consistently only from 1941, the year in which among other things three basic

texts appeared, namely the *Ventotene Manifesto*, the document drawn up by Helmuth von Moltke of the Kreisau Circle and the appeal made by Frenay, founder of *Combat*, for a European crusade against Nazism. Despite the enormous difficulties linked to the occupation, federalist theses spread widely in the Resistance as the war dragged on and gave rise to a considerable degree of transnational activity in the final stages of the war with the federalist conventions in Geneva in 1944 and Paris in March 1945 and the agreements between Italian and French partisans in 1944.

This deeper and long-lasting development of federalism in the area of “little Europe” is not a chance occurrence. As clarified, not just by Lipgens in his general introduction, but also by John Pinder and Philip M.H. Bell in the section dedicated to Great Britain, federalism, which represents the most rigorous response to the historical crisis of the nation state in Europe, has found a more fertile terrain precisely where this crisis appeared most acutely, causing the collapse of nation states and the victory, albeit precarious, of the hegemonic and totalitarian alternative. This experience has produced a profound rethinking, of which European federalism was the most advanced expression, but which involved the great majority of anti-Fascist forces albeit at a less intense level. This rethinking which also occurred in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, but with the limits connected to the overall political, economic and social backwardness of this area, was on the other hand less profound in Great Britain, which avoided the collapse of the state, thus contributing decisively to saving Europe from Nazism, but precisely for this reason made the awareness of the historical crisis in the nation state objectively more difficult.

As may be seen, the reference framework for the discussion on European unity during the Second World War presented in *Documents on the History of European Integration* is of enormous interest not only to understand this period more fully, but also to understand the development of the process of European integration in the postwar period.

\* \* \*

If the *Documents on the History of European Integration* are indispensable to a proper understanding of the premises of the process of European integration, *45 Jahre um die Europäische Verfassung* is an indispensable instrument for a clear picture of this process, of the basic results that it achieved, but also its inadequacies and their true causes. This work is a selection of documents relating to European unification

from 1939 to the Draft Treaty of the European Union in 1984. The selected texts are, in addition to the fundamental attempts at creating a constitution for the European Union in the period considered, drawn up by individuals, non-government agencies (movements for European unity and parties), by European institutions and by diplomatic conferences, the main documents dedicated, albeit not entirely, at least in their fundamental parts, to the institutional aspects of European unification. This set of documents is backed up by a general introduction, ample introductions to each of the four chapters (1939-1944, 1945-1954, 1954-1969, 1970-1984) into which the book is divided, and by very detailed introductions to each of the 142 documents selected. Excluding the first chapter, which is a synthesis of the previous works dedicated to the Second World War, this book is in essence a synthetic history, though carefully articulated and researched, of the process of European unification until the first months of 1984. The lack of many details of this process, due to the relatively synthetic nature of its reconstruction, is more than compensated by the capacity to capture and clarify the essential features of the development of this process.

The basic pivot for Lipgens' reconstruction is to identify the three basic approaches to European unification which had already emerged in the debate on the Second World War, and which were reposed in more precise, and certainly more operational terms after the war, and to clarify the influence exerted on the effective development of European unification. Regarding the functionalist approach, defined here as “partial supranational integration”, he rightly stresses that Monnet's interpretation effectively reduced the gap between it and the federalist approach to a much greater extent than was true in Mitrany's case. Monnet clearly identified the final objective of integration as a complete union based on a federal constitution and placed greater stress on the need for the autonomy from national governments of the supranational authorities destined to guide the integration by sectors. For this reason Lipgens distinguishes the functionalist approach from the confederal approach, and rejects the tendency to identify the two approaches found in Spinelli's 1957 essay on “The development of the drive for European unity after the Second World War”.<sup>11</sup> Spinelli in fact subsequently changed his mind in the light of subsequent experience of European integration.<sup>12</sup>

Starting from the identification of three fundamental approaches to the European unification, Lipgens showed with great clarity how the European Communities are, in their structure and their objectives, the fruit of a compromise between these approaches. The most important aspect



of the confederalist approach lies in the role attributed to the Council of Ministers. While in the ECSC this body has essentially the task of coordinating Community powers, which are managed with full autonomy by the High Authority, with those powers which have not been handed over to the Community, in the EEC the Council, quite apart from this power, also acquires exclusive legislative powers for Community matters and also a significant part of executive powers. This strongly delimits the central role that the functionalist approach wanted to attribute to the supranational body independent of the national governments. The executive Commission of the EEC is admittedly independent of governments, in that it cannot be revoked by them for the period in which it is appointed, and has the role of initiative, whereby nothing can be decided except on the basis of its proposals. Since however decision-making power remains in the final analysis in the hands of the governments, the basic body to which Monnet's functionalist approach intended to give the leadership over the process of integration ends up by having a subordinate position in the overall system of the Communities vis-à-vis confederal-type bodies.

As regards the supporters of the federalist approach, they fought hard to get the federal constituent method adopted right from the beginnings of European unification. The European Union of Federalists (UEF), under the spur of the MFE guided by Spinelli, after having in vain sought to transform the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe into a Constituent Assembly, in fact came close to success when it succeeded in getting the planned institution of a European army linked with the creation of a political Community with a federal nature, the drafting of whose constitution was entrusted to the enlarged Assembly of the ECSC, called the *ad hoc* Assembly. The rejection of the EDC in August 1954 by the French Parliament caused the attempt to construct Europe on federal lines to be defeated at the very outset. With the EEC and Euratom, approved less than three years after this defeat, an institutional system arose which was essentially characterized by the confederal and functionalist approach, with a clear prevalence of the first over the second. Not all federalist aspects, however, were eliminated from this system. The Communities in fact contained several federal embryos: first of all the provision for direct elections to the European Parliament and the strengthening of its budgetary powers (as well as the power of censure of the supranational executive body), secondly the provisions regarding the gradual transfer to majority voting on the Council of Ministers and finally the principle of direct application of Community legislation and case law.

These then are the basic characteristics of the Community system built in the fifties, which must be borne in mind according to Lipgens to understand the essential features of the development of European integration that has subsequently been achieved. Turning to the analysis of this development, the central problem that he investigates is explaining why the Community system failed to go beyond mere negative integration to a phase of positive integration, i.e. to the implementation of effective common policies designed to eliminate the territorial, sectorial and social imbalances characterizing the European economy and to face the problems raised by the world economic crisis and the transition to the post-industrial society. The basic cause of this lack of development which in its turn is the reason for the substantial deadlock and hence permanent crisis against which integration came from the beginning of the seventies onwards, is clearly identified by him in the limits of the Community institutions. His analysis in this respect squares with the analysis developed by the UEF and need not be illustrated here, except this particularly illuminating point.

He identifies the pre-eminence of the Council of Ministers and the institutionalisation, starting with the 1966 Luxemburg compromise, of the principle of national veto, as the fundamental institutional factors that have blocked the development of integration. Lipgens in this respect recalls the poignant observation of the Commission's President Thorn in 1982, who stated how nobody can seriously think of governing a State simply on the basis of the simple co-operation between the regional governments, i.e. without a central government, so that there is no reason to hold that Europe is governable through the simple co-operation of its national governments. As regards the cause of the failure to approve majority vote on the Council, Lipgens, on the one hand, heavily stresses the responsibility of De Gaulle and his nationalism, that ended up being a school favouring, in particular, the emergence of trends of the Gaullist type in Germany too, both in the *Ostpolitik*,<sup>13</sup> and European policy of Germany which is increasingly characterized by mean defence of short-term national interests, in particular as regards Community budgets and the European currency. But, on the other hand, he identifies the decisive factor in the system as being the "amphibious" nature of the Council, which at the same time acts as an intergovernmental body deciding unanimously in non-Community sectors and as a federal senate deciding on a majority basis in Community sectors and with regard to which it exercises legislative power exclusively.

In reality, since both functions are held by the same people, i.e. the

national ministers driven by their very nature of their role to privilege short-term national interests over the European ones, it is almost inevitable, despite affirmations to the contrary, that they tend to transfer the intergovernmental cooperation method and hence unanimous decisions from the non-Community sectors to the Community sectors. The only way to eradicate this situation is thus, in his opinion, the transformation of the Council into a true Federal Senate with exclusively legislative tasks shared equally with the European Parliament. This is precisely the road indicated by the Draft Treaty for the European Union that Lipgens considered the most adequate response to the crisis of European integration and whose guiding principle is a decisive development, albeit with a step-by-step implementation, of the federal embryos of the Community system.

In his synthetic historical reconstruction of the process of European integration the Draft Treaty for the European Union is considered as the most important manifestation of a well-established historical trend: the re-emergence of a growing capacity of the federalist current to influence this process. After the fall of the EDC the strength of the federalists was gravely weakened not only as a consequence of that catastrophic defeat, but also because of the division that was produced in the rank and file between those who favoured backing the European Communities, however critically, and those who decided to defend the principle of the Constituent with intransigence and on the basis of popular action. In any case there was no possibility of influencing the effective development of integration in a federalist direction until this was capable of making substantial progress despite the limits of the Community institutions. The situation changed sharply when the inability to progress in the existing institutional framework, from negative integration to positive integration and, hence, from economic unification to political unification became clear. The permanent crisis of the Communities in fact opened up real political space for the federalists, who were able to find their unity and an effective role in the struggle for the direct elections to the European Parliament, and hence, for the attribution of a constituent role to the European Parliament.

In reconstructing and documenting the essential moments of this struggle, Lipgens shows how it effectively and decisively influenced the fundamental developments that took place from the seventies onwards in the European Parliament. In a very precise and detailed way that is not found in any other historian of European unification, he describes the action of the UEF in favour of European elections. Not only does he stress

the central role of the initiative and action of Spinelli in the process that led the European Parliament to the approval of the Draft Treaty for the European Union, he also documents the influence of the European Movement, through its institutional Commission, and of the UEF on the very definition given by the European Parliament of the content of the Draft Treaty for the European Union.

Lipgens was not able to see the as yet unsatisfactory outcome of the struggle to force national governments to accept real reform of the European Communities. This lack of success, it should be noted, does not constitute a rejection of the thesis that the federalist current has once more become a real factor in the development of European integration. It is a fact that the European Parliament has not only once again taken up the struggle for the European Union, but, despite Spinelli's death, has even gone so far as setting up a federalist "intergroup" to continue Spinelli's struggle.

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One of the most significant contributions of Lipgens' history of the process of European unification is the clarification and documentation of the influence exerted by movements for European unity on this process. In this sense, he cuts himself off from the general trend among historians that tackle this matter with the methods of diplomatic history and who hence structurally privilege initiatives and action carried out by governments, by diplomats and by European institutions. From this method he consciously detached himself<sup>14</sup> because he saw European unification as the process of gradual formation of a new political community, whose deep cause is the historical crisis of nation states. Precisely for this reason he was driven to recalling attention systematically on the role of non-government "actors" made active and effective by the loss of the centrality of the nation states and their supreme bodies.

This trend which appears not just in the texts examined above, but in all of Lipgens' works, produced an exceptional result in the essay *EVG und politische Föderation* completed only a few weeks before his death. This essay illustrates and documents the role played by De Gasperi in the genesis of Art. 38 of the EDC and the decisive influence that Spinelli exercised in this respect on De Gasperi and the head of the Italian delegation to the conference on the organization of the European army, Ivan Matteo Lombardo.<sup>15</sup> The federalists already knew, on the basis of written and oral evidence given by Spinelli,<sup>16</sup> of the essential aspects of

this central episode in the history of the influence of the federalist current on the process of European integration. Moreover, the readers of this review have had the opportunity to read the synthetic reconstruction and documentation of it undertaken a few years ago by Mario Albertini.<sup>17</sup> Compared with what was known before, the basic contribution provided by Lipgens who, moreover, writes with the authority derived from being generally recognized as one of the major historians of European unification, consists in having introduced the public for the first time to two documents that fully confirm the exactness of Spinelli's and Albertini's reconstruction.

The first of these documents is the *aide mémoire* that Lombardo, appointed by De Gasperi in September 1951 as head of the Italian delegation to the conference on the European army replacing Taviani, presented to the other heads of delegation on October 6 in the same year. This document, drawn up by Ivan Matteo Lombardo in full agreement with De Gasperi, expresses a turning point in the Italian line in the negotiations regarding the EDC. For as long as Sforza was in charge of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and Taviani the head of the Italian delegation at the conference on the European army, the Italian line was characterized by affirmations of principle in favour of the European federation and by a practical behaviour orientated to the jealous defence of national sovereignty. When De Gasperi took over the Foreign Affairs portfolio and replaced Taviani with Lombardo (who moreover had been linked to the MFE for a number of years) this trend changed sharply and was sustained coherently and continuously by the need to link the creation of the European army with the creation of a political Community with federal characteristics. In the *aide mémoire* the new line appears in particular in the request to attribute control over the defence budget, which would have been removed from the control of the national Parliaments, to the EDC's assembly, in compliance with the fundamental principles of the parliamentary system. There was also the question of entrusting the assembly, which for a transitory period would have been elected from among the members of the national Parliaments, with the tasks of preparing direct elections to the European Parliament, giving the directly elected European Parliament the right to appoint the EDC *Commissaire* and to exercise overall political control on the European budget and the management of the *Commissaire's* activity.

We already knew, on the basis of information given by Spinelli and Albertini, that the change in the Italian line was due in a decisive way to the intervention of Spinelli. Spinelli learned of the existence of the

preliminary report sent on July 27, 1951 by the delegations to the conference on the European army to their governments, which did not contain any plan for a political Community based on the vote of Europeans, but simply provided for institutions similar to those of the ECSC with a *Commissaire* instead of a High Authority. He thus sent a *promemoria* to De Gasperi the following September in which, starting with a clear explanation of the contradictory nature of the plan to create a European army without a European state, he asked to proceed simultaneously with a definition of the structure of the European army and in addition the drafting of a European federal constitution by a European constituent Assembly, that should have come about with the direct vote of the citizens, but which, for reasons of speed and convenience, could also be elected by the members of the national Parliaments. De Gasperi read this *promemoria* carefully and essentially accepted the advice as regards negotiations that led to Art. 38 of the EDC and subsequently the *ad hoc* Assembly. Now, this framework which was known in its general features became more precise with the publication of the *aide mémoire* of October 9, 1951. From the comparison between its content and Spinelli's *promemoria* (of which Lipgens gives the most significant passages) it is clear that the former was influenced by the latter.<sup>18</sup>

The second document is the record, dictated by the Dutch head of delegation, of the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the conference on the European army held in Strasburg on December 11, 1951. We already knew the minutes of this meeting drawn up by Lombardo and published by Albertini (and republished by Lipgens as an appendix to the essay examined here), where the decisive role of De Gasperi as regards Art. 38 of the EDC and the fact that he was clearly inspired by federalist proposals is quite clear.

The importance of the Dutch minutes lies in the fact that they fully confirm the authenticity of the contents of the minutes written by the Italian delegation and this is a particularly significant confirmation since, while the Italian document was not inserted in the official records of the Italian Foreign Ministry (it is in fact in the private archive of Ivan Matteo Lombardo, donated, after the latter's death to the *Fondazione Bolis* and kept in the archives of the *Centro Europeo di Studi e Informazioni* in Turin), the Dutch document was kept in the official records of the Dutch Foreign Ministry. This new confirmation of the role of De Gasperi vis-à-vis Art. 38 of the EDC and its link with a more precise vision that the *aide mémoire* of October 9, 1951 gives us of the relationships between Spinelli, Lombardo and De Gasperi, led Lipgens to assert that the

negotiations for the EDC were also a highly significant example of how the federalist current (in this case the MFE led by Spinelli) intervened effectively in the development of European integration at times when the theme of European political unification was on the agenda.

In this case, Lipgens stressed somewhat bitterly in concluding his essay, the intervention was effective, but not sufficiently so. Indeed, the EDC fell in his opinion partly because De Gasperi did not completely heed the advice of the federalists. If he had proposed the Constituent Assembly immediately, instead of delaying it with the mechanism of Art. 38, from the very beginning the problem of the constitution of the European political union — and not the problem of military union, destined, by its very nature, to facilitate the propaganda of the adversaries of European unity — would have been in the full public eye. And it would perhaps have been possible to reach definitive decisions before the fatal change in the situation caused by the death of Stalin.

In concluding this analysis of the posthumous writings of Lipgens I would like to express a wish, that is also a commitment. As in the case of Spinelli, where the best way of recalling him is to pursue the federalist battle, in the case of Lipgens the best way of remembering him is to do all that is possible to continue his research into the history of European unification.<sup>19</sup>

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> His main works in this field are: *Kardinal Johannes Gropper (1503-1559) und die Anfänge der Katholischen Reform in Deutschland*, Münster, 1951; *John Henry Newman. Auswahl und Einleitung von W. Lipgens*, Frankfurt, Fischer, 1958; *Ferdinand August Graf Spiegel und das Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat 1789-1835. Die Wende von Staatskirchentum zur Kirchenfreiheit*, Historische Kommission Westfalens, Münster, 1965, 2 vols. On the life and works of Lipgens see the obituaries by Peter Robert Franke and Elisabeth Fehrenbach, published in a pamphlet in 1984 by the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of the Saar, where he held the chair in Modern history.

<sup>2</sup> See in particular his essay "Bismarck, die öffentliche Meinung und die Annexion von Elsass und Lothringen 1870", in *Historische Zeitschrift*, 199, 1964, pp. 31-112, whose basic thesis is that it was not public opinion that led Bismarck to annex Alsace Lorraine,

but rather Bismarck who massively influenced the press so as to guide and manipulate public opinion in precisely that direction. Also in *Historische Zeitschrift*, 217, 1973, pp. 529-583, Lipgens wrote the important essay "Staat und Internationalismus bei Marx und Engels. Versuch einer Systemübersicht".

<sup>3</sup> "Europäische Einigungsidee und Briands Europaplan im Urteil der Deutschen Akten", in *Historische Zeitschrift*, 203, 1966, I part, pp. 46-89, II part, pp. 316-363.

<sup>4</sup> *Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen 1940-45*, Oldenbourg, München, 1968.

<sup>5</sup> *Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik 1945-50, Erster Band: 1945-1947*, Stuttgart, Klett, 1977, (Enlarged English edition: *A History of European Integration*, vol. I: 1945-1947: *The Formation of the European Unity Movement*, with contributions by W. Loth and A. Milward, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982. Cfr. also: Sergio Pistone, "L'importanza dell'opera storiografica di Lipgens sugli inizi del processo di unificazione europea", in *Il Federalista*, XIX (1977), pp. 155-170.

<sup>6</sup> See in particular *Die Europäische Integration*, Stuttgart, Klett, 1982, a concise but incisive history of European unification, used in German high schools. We should also recall his splendid article "Erfolgreichste Friedensbewegung der neueren Geschichte. Eine Historische Bilanz", in *Das Parlament*, 12, 1983, where the European unification movement is considered as the most successful peace movement so far in modern history.

<sup>7</sup> See in particular: Richard Lowenthal and Hans-Peter Schwarz (eds.), "Europäische Integration", in *Die zweite Republik. 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine Bilanz*, Stuttgart, Seewald, 1974, pp. 519-553, (Italian translation in Sergio Pistone, *La Germania e l'unità europea*, Napoli, Guida, 1978, pp. 91-139).

<sup>8</sup> Walter Lipgens (ed.), *Documents on the History of European Integration*, vol. I: *Continental Plans for European Union 1939-1945*, Berlin-New York, W. de Gruyter, 1985; vol. II: *Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile 1939-1945*, 1986. This is a collection thought up and edited by Lipgens and on which he started working during his stay at the European University Institute (who published this work) from 1976 to 1979. The complete plan for this annotated collection of documents was for five volumes relating to the 1939-1950 period. As regards the first two volumes which, apart from a general introduction, contain numerous chapters by Lipgens and whose remaining chapters were drawn up under his direction, the first was being printed when he died and the second was ready for printing. Subsequent volumes will be published by Prof. Wilfried Loth, Lipgens' pupil and currently holding the Chair of Modern History in the University of Essen. In relation to this project the publication of a series of volumes on *The European Allied Governments and the Development of European Integration and Cooperation* is planned by the European University Institute.

<sup>9</sup> Walter Lipgens (Hrsg.), *45 Jahre Ringen um die Europäische Verfassung. Dokumente 1939-1984. Von den Schriften der Widerstandsbewegung bis zum Vertragssentwurf des Europäischen Parlaments*, Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1986.

<sup>10</sup> Walter Lipgens, "EVG und politische Föderation. Protokolle der Konferenz der Aussenminister der an den Verhandlungen über eine Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft beteiligten Länder am 11. Dezember 1951", in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 4, 1984, pp. 639-688. An obituary of Lipgens written by Hans-Peter Schwarz appears on pages 637-639 of the review.

<sup>11</sup> Altiero Spinelli, "Sviluppo del moto per l'unità europea dopo la seconda guerra mondiale", in G. Grove Haines, *L'integrazione europea*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1957, republished in Altiero Spinelli, *Il progetto europeo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1985, pp. 163-191.

<sup>12</sup> Altiero Spinelli, "Europeismo", in *Enciclopedia del Novecento*, 11, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia italiana fondato da Giovanni Treccani, 1977, pp. 857-860.

<sup>13</sup> This theme is dealt with more fully in the essay "Europäische Integration" quoted in note 7.

<sup>14</sup> Cfr. Walter Lipgens, "Der Zusammenschluss Westeuropas. Leitlinien für den historischen Unterricht" in *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 6, 1983, pp. 345-372.

<sup>15</sup> On the question of the EDC see also another contribution made by Lipgens which appeared posthumously: "Die Bedeutung des EVG-Projekts für die politische europäische Einigungsbewegung", in Hans-Erich Volkmann and Walter Schwengler (Hrsg.), *Die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft. Stand und Probleme der Forschung*, published by Militärgeschichtlicher Forschungsamt, Boppard am Rhein, Boldt, 1985, pp. 9-30.

<sup>16</sup> Cfr. in particular Altiero Spinelli, "Storia e prospettive del Movimento Federalista Europeo", in *Sei lezioni federaliste*, published by the MFE, Rome, 1954, pp. 146-184. See also his preface to Ivan Matteo Lombardo, *L'Europa che sorge*, Roma, Opere Nuove, 1952.

<sup>17</sup> Mario Albertini, "La fondazione dello Stato europeo. Esame e documentazione del tentativo intrapreso da De Gasperi nel 1951 e prospettive attuali", in *Il Federalista*, XIX (1977), pp. 5-55.

<sup>18</sup> In precisely the same period in which Lipgens essay appeared an essay was published by Pietro Pastorelli, "La politica europeistica dell'Italia negli anni Cinquanta", in *Storia contemporanea*, XVI (1984), pp. 723-743, in which reference is made to Lombardo's memorandum. Nothing is mentioned in this essay about the relationship between Lombardo's document and Spinelli's and, in general, regarding the influence Spinelli and the MFE had on De Gasperi and Lombardo. Moreover, Pastorelli, in his essay on "La politica europeistica di De Gasperi", in Umberto Corsini and Konrad Repgen (eds.), *Konrad Adenauer e Alcide De Gasperi: due esperienze di rifondazione della democrazia*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1984, pp. 295-362, denies that the federalists had any decisive influence on De Gasperi's Europeanist policy (p. 360) and further (p. 362) argues that the introduction of Art. 38 in the Draft Treaty for the EDC, i.e. passing from a "technical" solution to a more markedly "political" solution adversely affected the outcome of the battle to ratify the EDC and hence the cause of European unification. Clearly anyone who states as a principle that the federalist approach to European unification is not valid has a certain difficulty in recognizing the contribution of federalists to this process.

<sup>19</sup> This is one of the main commitments of the *Fondazione europea Luciano Bolis*. On October 3rd 1986 in Turin it organized a convention dedicated to "The contribution of Walter Lipgens to the history of European unification" in collaboration with the *Centro europeo di studi e informazioni* of Turin, the *Dipartimento di studi politici* of the University of Turin, the *Dipartimento storico geografico* of the University of Pavia, the *Goethe Institut*, and under the auspices of the European University Institute in Florence. In this convention, which was attended by Gaetano Arfé, Christian L. Baljé, Andrea Bosco, Enrico Deleva, Ennio Di Nolfo, Pierre du Bois, Giulio Guderzo, Alan Hick, Emanuele Itta, Ariane Landuyt, Madeleine and Monika Lipgens, Wilfried Loth, Umberto Morelli, Sergio Pistone, Cinzia Rognoni, Marlise Roquette Giarini, Alfonso Sabatino, Massimo L. Salvadori, Enrico Serra, it was decided to organize a series of conventions on the history of movements for European unity in the postwar years. The first of these conventions, dedicated to the 1945-1954 period will be held in Pavia in Autumn 1989.

## Notes

### PROTECTION AND VALIDATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES

#### 1. Environment means development.

The objective of socio-economic development is the rational use of all scarce resources for the welfare of society.

Resources which are subject to the right of ownership have a price which indicates their scarcity value. On the contrary, environmental resources which are common property (air, pure water and others), are not rationed by the market and therefore do not enter automatically into any evaluation of the nation's wealth, even though their value is enormous. Government intervention designed to use and ration natural resources in the most appropriate way is essential if socio-economic development is not to become inadequate. In reality, the advanced economies with their increased income and ever-growing consumption are increasingly incorporating the improvement of the environmental heritage into their development. Only blind, and consequently short-lasting, growth could neglect this requirement.

We need to be able to organize the development of our society by changing, as time goes by, the rules of its management as suggested by the evolution of culture and science. "The closed Earth of the future in fact requires economic principles that are rather different from those of the open Earth of the past" (K. Boulding).

Parliament, government and public administration are among those bodies that play a fundamental part in this new management.

\* This is the final document drawn up in November 1987 by the Commission for Environmental Protection, which reported directly to the Italian Prime Minister.

## 2. *Environment means employment.*

We now know that generally environmental policies do not reduce employment. The question should however also be considered from the reverse point of view: we should ask ourselves what the employment situation would be like in the absence of any environmental policy. Damage to health and welfare, and therefore to the workforce and productivity would surely be great. For example, how many jobs would be lost in tourist areas, and how many fishermen would be left after the year 2000 if no resource management policy existed?

We must also take into account that new technologies, especially those based on the computer, may increase present unemployment rates, at least in a transitional period.

It is therefore necessary to promote new policies and in particular to ensure the production of those goods and services which are socially useful that would not otherwise be supplied by the market. Environmental improvement needs to be considered from this point of view too; i.e. as a new sector suitable for creating new employment. This trend has already been the object of recent initiatives taken by national bodies and the EC. Thanks to the planning of public and private bodies these initiatives represent an innovative means by which the twin goals of environmental improvement and the creation of new job opportunities can be achieved jointly.

## 3. *Environment means participation.*

The survival of our planet (and in it of our countries) is the main goal of environmental policy and also the common target of all men. It also creates a general consensus as witnessed by the ever increasing number of people who give priority to the improvement of the physical and natural environment.

The governments' task is mainly to organize this participation with realistic and concrete objectives, bearing in mind that the evaluation of the environmental impact requires wide participation of citizens, whose critical contribution is needed on decisions taken by public and private bodies.

## 4. *Environment means no borders.*

"Only one World" was the motto launched by the United Nations in

Stockholm in 1972 during the conference that gave the environment an international dimension. In fact, even if there are phenomena of environmental excellence or degradation which have only a local relevance, there are, however, many problems with an international and indeed a world-wide character: the "green-house effect" for example (i.e. the rise in atmospheric temperature mainly because of the waste gases arising from the use of fossil fuels), the numerous cases of transfrontier pollution, the existence of beauty spots of world importance that need to be protected and valued (from Mont Blanc to the Grand Canyon).

The OECD, the EEC, UNEP and other international bodies cooperate to organize the common willingness to protect the environment. But the basis for this action must be to convince everyone that the ecological link-up helps us to become citizens not only of a single country but also of the planet Earth.

## 5. *Environment means culture.*

The Greek philosophy, the inspiring mother of the current conception on the role of labour and technology states through Plato's mouth that: "any cause which makes a thing pass from a non-existing state to an existing one is production." This powerful idea, according to which man is a blacksmith who gives life to things by forging matter in his work, has been passed down through the centuries to the present one. It was expressed in Genesis ("all existing things on earth and the fishes of the sea are consigned to your hands") and by Karl Marx (who shares with Plato almost photographically the idea according to which labour makes things pass from a non-existing state to an existing one).

Nature conservation, on the contrary, is based on the principle that the intact object may be even more precious than the one that is produced. In fact the untouched article or environmental wonder takes its value from naturalness, or wilderness, beyond every transformation made by man. Furthermore, the earth is like a space shuttle in which there are no infinite waste containers and where today's work must not subtract from tomorrow's by the excessive use of non-renewable resources.

The two positions which have been mentioned meet up in the new culture based on the environmental relationships for which conceptual instruments are obtained from, among other things, modern environmental economics. This economics is founded on the social value of things (and not just the value for the individual) and consequently, where necessary, goes beyond market valuations. It is based on the valuations of the interest

also of future generations.

#### 6. *Environment means future.*

“There exists much notable historical evidence to suggest that a society which loses its identity with posterity and which neglects the positive image of the future will also lose the capacity to face the current problems and will rapidly break-up” (W. Baumol). The protection of the environment not only means work for the present, but also for the future of our children and grandchildren. Through its policies for the protection of nature society identifies itself with the distant future and finds the inspiration and strength to plan welfare in the fullest meaning of the word, that is in relation to all resources for all generations.

*Emilio Gerelli*

## THE COST OF NON EUROPE

The Cecchini Report on the advantages of a single European market recently was published by the EEC Commission.

The Report estimates the cost of non-Europe at 200 billion Ecus. The construction of the single European market in 1992 will, *per se*, give rise to a 4.5 per cent increase in GDP, a 6 per cent fall in prices and the creation of two million new jobs. These advantages could be further increased if economic policy measures, designed to harness the development potential of the single European market to the full, were adopted. If this were the case, GDP would increase to 7 per cent and five million new jobs would be created.

These data simply confirm what we all knew only too well already. It is, however, important to have precise data, which clearly measure the cost of non-decisions since they cut out any chance of an alibi for those who continue to hold back the construction of the European Union. The non-fulfilment of the single market has cost, and continues to cost, European citizens billions and billions in superfluous expenditure and missed opportunities.

The Report does not merely quantify the high costs we currently pay in customs controls which divide the European economy into twelve national markets but also calculates the value of the immediate advantages a single domestic market would bring. These advantages are greater economic development, the creation of new jobs, the possibility for companies to improve productivity and profitability, greater mobility of productive factors, guarantees of price stability, and greater freedom of choice for the consumer. The direct cost of customs formalities and the administrative costs that derive from them, for both the public sector and the private sector, is about 1.8 per cent of the value of goods traded in the Community. To these costs must be added the costs industry has to bear as a result of other barriers such as technical measures and, in general, non-tariff barriers. These additional costs would appear to be in the order of 2 per cent of overall industrial costs. All in all, the cost of the barriers that divide up the European market is equal to about 3.5 per cent of the Community's industrial added value.

Even more significant are the advantages arising from the unification of the European market. In particular, the companies in the service sector which are currently subjected to controls limiting their sphere of action to the national level could benefit from the greater percentage reductions in costs and prices, for example companies that operate to meet public demand, electricity-generating companies, transport companies, companies specialized in the defence sector, etc. Other examples include holding companies, which so far have had predominantly national proportions as a direct consequence of the lack of a European market for capital. This is also true for airline and air freight companies which until now have operated with heavy restrictions and a national division of the market. The creation of a single market will bring these companies cost reductions in the order of at least 10-12 per cent, and in some cases much more.

The Report reveals that potential economies of scale which have not yet been exploited by the European companies are substantial. The creation of a single market will allow concentrations, productive rationalizations, greater specialization, a more advanced division of labour. The estimate given in the Report is that about a third of European companies will be able to achieve greater economies of scale and hence substantial reductions in production costs. These reductions will vary, from sector to sector, from between 1 and 7 per cent. Overall, the reduction of costs for the European economic system will be 2 per cent of domestic GDP.



To assess the impact of the creation of the single European market, we need to bear in mind that these figures merely consider the phenomena which are easiest to quantify in the short term. These figures will prove to be an underestimation of the real impact, since they exclude certain advantages that unification will produce in time, such as the diffusion of innovation, the development of competition, the development among companies of strategies for internationalization, the birth of European companies, etc. Without going into detail on the Report, some very basic features emerge very clearly.

1) Even if we limit ourselves to the immediate impact that 1992 will have on the economy, the cost of non-Europe that we are paying for now is absolutely absurd. This cost is equal to about 700 to 1400 ECU for every European citizen.

2) The benefits brought by the construction of the single market will help to contribute decisively to the solution of the greatest problems of the European economy, primarily unemployment.

3) For 1992 to produce these effects, it is indispensable to guarantee that Europe has monetary stability, i.e. the construction of a true monetary union is indispensable, with the creation of a European Central Bank.

4) The greatest advantages of 1992 are the faith that this goal has diffused among Europeans. European entrepreneurs believe in 1992, are betting on it and are thereby giving a decisive contribution to its realization.

When a goal is realistic, it is sufficient very often to create a goal and it will be achieved. The decision to pursue a goal is sufficient to create the energy required for its fulfilment. This is true for 1992. It is even truer for the creation of the European Union, on which depends the start of a new long-term cycle of development of the economy and society.

The true cost of the non-Europe is this: renouncing a long-term cycle of development, for Europe and the world. The fact is that the goal of 1992 marks a stage in the process of integration in Europe. Since the end of the Second World War we may say that this process has been characterized by a development which can be subdivided into three phases, with profoundly contrasting features: the years of European growth, the years of stagnation, the pre-federal union phase. The completion of the single domestic market in the 1992 may mark the start of the fourth phase: European Union.

The first cycle occurred in the fifties and sixties and came to an end in 1968, with the completion of the customs union.

The absence of any European initiative in the seventies marked a long

period of no growth condemning the economy and society to stagnation, the consequences of which we still bear.

The third phase began with the direct elections to the European Parliament and with the launching of the European Monetary System, and is still continuing. It is characterized by an attempt to transfer powers from a national to a European level and to draw up a pre-federal institutional framework which manages the economy and European society in an increasingly unitary way.

The completion of the single domestic market is destined to raise the problem of European currency and European government so strongly that it will not be possible to sweep it under the carpet. In other words it concretely raises the problem of a new phase of the process of integration, with a constituent nature.

The confines between the third and fourth phase are in part indeterminate. Their content will be defined by decisions that the Europeans will be able to take in the coming years. Even the moment marking this passage is undetermined, because the definitive decisions depend not only on the virtue of men, but also on luck. A quantum leap separates these two phases: it is on the basis of this certainty that we will be able to judge the proposals and the problems facing us today.

A transfer of powers and great advances in the process of integration are occurring. The success of the European Monetary System is before all our eyes. It has stood up to the process of industrial rationalization in the European countries, has made it possible to reconcile national economic policies and make rapid progress towards the creation of a European market for capital. The pre-federal phase that we are experiencing has so far been characterized by a series of decisions, each of which has achieved a transfer of powers to the European level; new intermediate steps in this direction are possible and desirable.

The goal of 1992 cannot be considered as the final stage in this process. The crucial decisions that need to be made — a European currency, the European Central Bank, the European government — have not yet been taken; a beginning to a constituent process based on the European Parliament's initiative is what is required.

If we are unable to achieve even this, 1992 will mark the beginning of a long crisis, like the one which began in 1968. The cost of non-Europe is much greater than that calculated in the Cecchini Report.

*Dario Velo*



## Problems of peace

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### PEACE AND DEFENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Much has been written on the consequences of total nuclear war since the end of the Second World War. In particular, studies, some with a solid scientific basis, some without, have proliferated in recent years. This is, firstly, due to the abnormal dimensions that nuclear arsenals have reached — a factor which, objectively, is fairly irrelevant, given the level of destructiveness of even a small fraction of the nuclear weapons available in the world, but which, emotionally, is highly significant. Secondly, it is due to the birth of the Peace Movement, which from the early eighties has contributed to keeping the debate alive.

But we must not be led into lowering our guard by the fact that so much has been written and that in consequence little can be added except that mankind has learned about the dangers it faces and is therefore alive to them. Nor should we become lackadaisical, encouraged by the fact that, albeit within this awareness, the world is witnessing with some optimism what seems to be a turn for the better in the relationships between the superpowers who are currently focusing on arms' control and disarmament.

The road to be followed if we are to solve the nuclear emergency definitively is still very long and though the current generations have set out on this road, the last step in what will probably be a long sequence of events will occur, if indeed it ever occurs, only after many generations. Until then, until the creation of a World Federation, the possibility of self-destruction will always be present.

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One of the directions in which scientists from all over the world are working relates to the environmental impact of total nuclear war. In this context, an important issue are the changes in the world's climate: the so-

called "nuclear winter" causing a considerable drop in both temperature and rainfall. In its October 1987 issue the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* dedicates an article to this problem (Mark A. Harwell-Christine C. Harwell, "Updating the 'nuclear winter' debate"), illustrating the conclusions of a study planned by the *International Council of Scientific Unions* (ENUWAR Project) since 1983.

Of course, the real extent of this phenomenon cannot be predicted precisely, since the forecasts are necessarily based on possible scenarios that cannot be experimented, but when the premises on which we base our thinking are real, certain consequences are unquestionable. One of these premises is that a nuclear deflagration of vast proportions produces such a quantity of smoke and particles that if they rose to the uppermost layers of the atmosphere, which are much more stable than the lower layers, they would stagnate for a long period of time, allowing only 10 per cent or 20 per cent of sunlight to filter through. Hence the temperature would fall and rainfall would be reduced. Now the natural ecosystem is much more vulnerable to major changes in climate than mankind, whose cultural traditions have led to a great capacity to adapt. One of the conclusions of this sequence of events is clear: the production of food would suffer a drastic setback, and only the great cereal producers (the United States, Canada and Australia) could feed their population for a certain period of time using their reserves. For the rest of the Earth's population (and if the new climate persisted, all the Earth's population) there would be insufficient food or indeed starvation. The emblematic image of the catastrophe that would follow a total nuclear war, say the authors of the article quoted above, would be a world of wretched, hungry human beings, replacing the image of the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

This is certainly not the most catastrophic situation possible in that it isolates various factors (and hence some of their consequences) from many others which are equally or more destructive, which, by acting concomitantly, could lead to the extinction of all living things, man included. But concentrating on the ecological consequences of a total nuclear war allows us to widen the horizons of the thinking of ecological movements, and hence all those who struggle to create conditions for a more harmonious relationship between man and his environment.

Naturally the urgency of ecological questions is beyond any doubt, given the ever accelerating pace of crisis in the world ecosystem, but we must deal with this problem by facing up to the problem of war at the same time, particularly war in the nuclear age. There are at least two good reasons for this.

The first is very simple but nevertheless most important and cogent: the fact that battles to save the environment make sense only if there is a reasonably predictable certainty that the environment will not collapse following a nuclear war, a collapse that would be hard to reverse except in the very long term, and that mankind really does have a future and *cannot* become the victim of a holocaust. The second relates to the cost of protecting the world's natural reserves: in this anarchic world the need to arm oneself or at least concentrate much energy and money on the military problem (e.g. SDI), channels funds away from highly costly environmental protection and scientific research (e.g. fusion, solar energy etc.), whose results would make it possible to tackle one of the greatest problems in terms of the environmental impact that it implies, namely the problem of "clean", renewable energy supplies (the current American research programme on nuclear fusion provides for investments which amount to 3.5 per cent of those earmarked for SDI).

But as regards the ties linking ecologists and federalists we need to consider the following essential issue relating to the fulfilment of two goals: peace and defence of the environment. In particular, we need to reflect on the dimensions of the problem: the nuclear age, by endangering the destiny of all mankind, forces us to think of peace in world terms. In the same way, ecological problems have now taken on a planetary dimension (we often hear nowadays of the world ecosystem) and only when viewed as such is it conceivably possible to tackle them.

The concept of world interdependence has now become deeply-rooted in all interpretations of the current historical period. The political leaders responsible for the future of nation-states are compelled to introduce this into their speeches. As regards statements of principle, for example, there is now not much difference between what the European federalists and World federalists have been saying for some time and Gorbachev's position: "And we have not only read anew the reality of a multi-colored and multi-dimensional world. We have assessed not only the difference in the interests of individual states. We have seen the main issue — the growing tendency towards interdependence of the states of the world community. Such are the dialectics of present-day development" (M. Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, New York, Harper & Row, 1987, p. 137).

But what distinguishes us, and what distinguishes all those who do not have positions of power to defend, from these affirmations? What needs to characterize our thinking and analysis is objectiveness, the capacity of removing ourselves from the ideological conditionings of nationalism,

the main obstacle to the identification of means which are adequate to the ends. "Reasoning" in terms of interdependence is not enough: from this concept we need to draw the inevitable political consequences and express forcefully the problem of ending the political division of mankind into sovereign nation states. If we do not set out in this direction, the requirements of the democratic control of the new course of history will remain a dead letter and any attempt to intervene runs the risk of being wishful thinking. Today, citizens of a state can certainly protest if they are subjected to ecologically destructive decisions taken by another state, but they cannot use the only instrument of effective democratic control, namely withholding consent.

If we see that the common value for ecologists and federalists (the defence of life) and that the specific goals towards which the two movements are struggling are simply two aspects of the same battle (the battle against self-destruction), then we must reflect on the possible strategic decisions which could solve the problem of the institutions that are able to manage the complexity of the world in which we live. We need to go beyond the anachronistic national battles, and prospectively, also go beyond the concept of international co-operation (which all too often hides the defence of egoistic interests), to turn a need aroused by the new supranational direction in history into a concrete political plan.

Nicoletta Mosconi

## Interventions \*

### HAMILTONIAN AND PROUDHONIAN FEDERALISTS: SYNERGY NOT CONFLICT \*\*

The European Federalist movement was established, soon after the end of World War Two, because its founders were united in their determination to replace the system of absolute state sovereignty, which had brought so much suffering and destruction to Europe, by a European federation. But behind that common aim lay a variety of approaches, which were to crystallise into the two main schools of thought that

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\*This heading includes interventions which the editorial board believes readers will find interesting, but which do not necessarily reflect the board's views.

\*\* We are publishing this essay by John Pinder because it deals with a major issue, the various developments of federalism in the various attempts to make it the rule of a new political behaviour. We may observe, however, that he analyzes the theoretical and strategic trends of a "school" of which he thinks the editorial board of this review belongs to. So we should make it clear that we do not consider our identity properly defined by the label "Hamiltonian federalism". We refer to Hamilton (together with Jay and Madison) because their thinking reflects the invention of federal institutions which occurred — *de facto* and not intentionally — in the Philadelphia Convention in a very clear way. For this reason Hamilton marks a watershed in the history of federalism, which came to be defined only then. Otherwise, our references are obviously to the entire history of political thinking, our standpoint being one that uses historical materialism and, primarily, Kant's writings on politics and the philosophy of history (and it goes without saying that we also studied Proudhon's thinking). We wish to further underline that the conception of federalism which we have pursued in our review since 1959 has assumed various expressions, despite the constant reference to the Ventotene Manifesto (for a brief outline see the essay by Lucio Levi "Recent Developments in Federalist Theory" published in the second issue of *The Federalist* in 1987).

We are in any case in complete agreement with Pinder regarding the need to face up to the problems of mutual awareness and knowledge of the various theoretical formulations of federalism which tries to become a political force, even though it is still not possible to find all the literature and all the sources necessary to achieve this end.

became known as the hamiltonian and the proudhonian. Relations between them have not always been easy; and it may be useful to consider, after forty years' experience, whether the differences could lead to synergy or whether they must be the cause of conflict.

The hamiltonians concentrated their action on the endeavour to secure a federal constitution for Europe. Altiero Spinelli was the leading exponent of the hamiltonian school, and the European Parliament's Draft Treaty establishing the European Union was the culmination of his life's work. The Draft Treaty diverged, to be sure, from the hamiltonian ideal. Defence was, in the light of the bitter lesson learned by federalists when the project for a European Defence Community failed in 1954, to remain for the time being subject to intergovernmental co-operation; and the legislature was, following the example of the Federal Republic, to take the form of a *Bundesrat* rather than a Senate. But the hamiltonians see the European Union as a great step towards their goal.

Following Spinelli, the hamiltonian school has been particularly strong in Italy. It was also strong in the British federalist movement, whose literature of the late 1930s served as an inspiration for Spinelli's ideas.<sup>1</sup> In Germany and the Netherlands, hamiltonians have likewise predominated. There were at times sharp conflicts between these federalist movements and Spinelli over tactics, and in particular over the usefulness of developing the Community in order to take steps towards federation. But the Union of European Federalists has been united about the aim of a European federal constitution.

The inspiration for the proudhonian school has come from France, starting with the works of P.-J. Proudhon and in particular his *Du principe fédératif*.<sup>2</sup> Its leader in the postwar period has been Alexandre Marc (whose eightieth birthday was the occasion of the reflections on which this article is based).<sup>3</sup> This school views federalism as the "conception politique qui permet de concilier les libertés particulières et les nécessités d'une organisation collective."<sup>4</sup> This concept is to be applied not only to political institutions but more generally to the organisation of the economy and society; and with respect to political institutions, the uniting of nation-states into a federation is seen as but one example of securing an appropriate distribution of power among different levels of government, from the commune at the base right up to an eventual world federal government. The whole scheme is based on a personalist philosophy, developed mainly in Paris in the 1930s, which rejects both individualism and collectivism.<sup>5</sup> The term integral federalism, and more recently global federalism, has often been applied to this school, underlining the all-

embracing extent of its scope. But here the adjective proudhonian, marking a neat contrast with hamiltonian, is employed.

The two leaders have each expressed their annoyance with the other school. Thus Spinelli wrote that, in his political action, he had had "no few difficulties with the followers of integral federalism of proudhonian or catholic inspiration."<sup>6</sup> Marc, for his part, has written of "le rôle paralysant, voire négatif, pour ne pas dire néfaste, joué par les adeptes du fédéralisme hamiltonien, ... du 'politique d'abord'."<sup>7</sup> Differences of temperament are to be expected between those who concentrate on a political campaign to achieve a constitutional structure, and those who are more interested in a wide-ranging approach to federalism based on a comprehensive philosophy. But has the controversy between the two schools reflected mainly differences of temperament, and hence of priorities, or is there a more fundamental incompatibility? Could a better understanding of both lead to synergy between them? This article seeks to throw light on these questions by considering the relevance of proudhonian ideas to those who seek to achieve a European federal constitution, under four main headings: infranational federalism, or autonomy for regions and communes; the distribution of economic powers; world federation; and proudhonian federalism as a whole.

#### *European federation and infranational federation.*

The fear of jacobin centralisation is one cause of resistance to the idea of a European constitution.

The entrenchment of local, regional and member-states' autonomies is the most convincing antidote to this fear. Many of those who live in centralised, unitary states, such as France or the United Kingdom, have particular difficulty in understanding this federal principle. They focus on the sovereignty of the nation-state, or, in the British case, often on the sovereignty of the nation-state's parliament. But as Jean Buchmann has explained, whereas sovereignty conceived as the *summa potestas* is indivisible, the *puissance étatique* is divisible and needs to be divided.<sup>8</sup>

Some hamiltonian federalists have shown impatience about the fears of the *Länder* of the German Federal Republic that the Single European Act may infringe their competences. But if the constitution of the Federal Republic gives competences to the *Länder* on the grounds that the matters in question are more suitably managed at that level than at the level of the Federal Republic, it must at least be legitimate to doubt whether these competences should be taken over by a yet higher and more

remote level such as that of the European Community. To belittle the doubts of the *Länder* about accepting such a loss of autonomy is hardly the best way to mobilise public support for transferring from the member-states to the Community these competences that really do have a predominantly continental dimension.

The European Parliament's Draft Treaty for European Union, which designed the institutional reforms that Europeans so much need, unfortunately went much farther in the wrong direction, giving the Union "concurrent competence in the field of social, health, consumer protection, regional, environmental, education and research, cultural and information policies" (Article 55), and thus raising the possibility of Union legislation across virtually the whole field of social policy. There are certainly some aspects of social policy, such as social security or the mutual recognition of educational qualifications, where a legislative role for the Union can be justified. The principle of subsidiarity was affirmed in the Draft Treaty, in order to discourage excessive centralisation. But it may be doubted whether this would be a sufficient safeguard.<sup>9</sup> There is a strong case for emending the Draft Treaty in order to limit the role of the Union in this field; and this should help to attract the support of people who have a reasonable concern about local autonomy.

Marc has claimed, on the other hand, that proudhonian federalists have worked successfully to prevent regional autonomists from becoming separatists, and has suggested that if hamiltonians had understood the importance of ethnic and regional movements, the "poussée fédéraliste, en Europe, eût été multipliée par dix ou par cent."<sup>10</sup> While even a sympathetic hamiltonian may regard Marc's quantitative estimate as somewhat exaggerated, and while the spinellist cause has in fact received powerful support from the *Conseil des Communes et Régions d'Europe*,<sup>11</sup> it is to be regretted that so many autonomists have remained indifferent or even hostile to the struggle for a European constitution.

There were some promising beginnings. In 1943 in the Valli Valdesi, for example, Gustavo Malan recalls going to see Mario Rollier, one of the founders of the *Movimento Federalista Europeo*, to discuss the idea of an autonomous status for these Alpine valleys after the war. Rollier, after a moment's reflection, agreed with the proposal provided that it was placed within the framework of a European federation.<sup>12</sup> Not long after, in December 1943, representatives of the Valli Valdesi, including Malan and Rollier, met representatives of the Val d'Aosta, including the resistance hero Emilio Chanoux, at Chivasso, and expressed their demand for local autonomy within a European and federalist context in a

document that became known as the Chivasso declaration, which gave rise to a significant literature.<sup>13</sup> The political resolution adopted by the founding Congress of the UEF at Montreux in 1947 called for "a pyramid of solidarities from bottom to top" and called for federalists to work "simultaneously ... on all planes: inside each country, between neighbouring peoples, between nations of the same continent, between regional federations."<sup>14</sup> But the principal drafter of that resolution was Marc; and for the subsequent decade and a half, local autonomy was given less emphasis in the resolutions of the UEF. The *Charte Fédéraliste*, adopted at the federalist Congress of 1964, again in Montreux, brought the hamiltonian and proudhonian streams together again, at least as far as doctrine was concerned.<sup>15</sup> But during the following two decades the hamiltonians still did not take the infranational aspect of federalism really seriously. It is only in the last few years that hamiltonians in Pavia have begun earnestly to develop their doctrine in this direction.<sup>16</sup>

To take the confluence of hamiltonian and proudhonian traditions beyond the realm of doctrine and into that of political action will not be easy. Yet recent evidence shows the importance of doing so, at least as far as the local and regional autonomist aspect of the proudhonian tradition is concerned. For the reactions of the German *Länder* to the Single European Act have demonstrated that those who value regional autonomy can see even small steps towards European integration as a danger to their cause: and how much more could they see European Union or Federation as their enemy if the protection of local and regional autonomies is not seen as a basic principle of the unification plans. Given that principle, however, the eagerness of many local and regional authorities for direct links with the Community, by-passing the often heavy hands of the governments of their member-states, indicates the potential support for a link between local autonomy and European federation.

#### *European federation and the distribution of economic power.*

Can political democracy coexist with an economy in which autocracy is the predominant form of organisation? A conventional marxism, assuming that political institutions are a superstructure determined solely by the character of the economic base, would assert that it cannot. But, having performed the service of drawing attention to the influence of economic structures on political forms, Marx led his followers to pervert that insight into a crude and simplistic dogma. Even in the Soviet Union, recent works have accepted that dialectical materialism can be more

subtle: that one form of economic structure can coexist for a long time with a political form that does not appear to be determined by it; and that a range of political forms, not just one specific model, may correspond adequately with a given economic structure.<sup>17</sup> Common sense can only applaud the rejection of a marxist one-way street, down which a rigidly defined economic structure determines a rigidly defined political model. But common sense may equally approve the proudhonian vision of a relationship between the economic and political forms.

Gorbachev's difficulties in promoting his ideas for economic decentralisation within the Soviet party apparatus and bureaucracy demonstrate the close connexion between economic and political centralisation. In the 1930s, Marc and his friends were rejecting American capitalism and Soviet socialism "equally". Both were seen, whether under the influence of Ford or of stakhanovism, to reduce the worker to the role of an instrument or a tool.<sup>18</sup> In 1977, Marc was still defining capitalism as a system within which "la propriété, ou la possession, ou la gestion du capital ... détermine une centralisation abusive des pouvoirs, tendant à la limite vers leur concentration maximale et incline vers leur monopolisation."<sup>19</sup> Yet Ford's assembly line typified a phase of industrial development in a capitalism which has shown a large capacity for evolution, no less in the United States than elsewhere. For all its abuses, the economic forms and the distribution of power within American capitalism are pluralist, giving much greater diversity in the influence of the economy on politics and in the development of economic forms than is to be found in the Soviet Union.

With automation through microelectronics and information technology, the employment of large masses of people on the assembly line may soon be a thing of the past, and the tendency towards an abusive concentration of power may be counterbalanced by an opposite tendency towards decentralisation and demassification. Here again, Italian hamiltonians have been adapting proudhonian ideas for the development of their doctrine. The argument is that the new technologies, requiring co-operation among groups of skilled people rather than iron discipline over workers treated as robots, are friendly to more co-operative forms of organisation in the enterprise; and this is seen as a part of a general trend towards federal democracy.<sup>20</sup> It would be dangerous to take a deterministic view of this process; the new technologies have a centralising potential as well. Big Brother could find ways to use them; and it will be harder for the Soviet Union than for the pluralist West to avoid this danger. But Marc has spent much of his life elaborating a theory which

is precisely designed to deal with a process that has both centralising and decentralising elements. Economic development based on technologies that require both local autogestion and a European or worldwide dimension is a federalising development in this very sense; and, without succumbing to any facile determinism, it is reasonable to conclude that this offers federalists an opportunity to harness economic and social forces to the construction of a federal polity.

One of the motives for combining nation-states into a federation is to create an economic space big enough for the specialisation and scale required for the development of modern technology and hence for economic health and strength. This has been understood by the more progressive leaders of European industries, who have supported steps in a federal direction, such as the establishment of a customs union by the EEC Treaty and, now, the completion of the internal market. Such support can be important for the hamiltonian project of the European constitution. But many at the grass roots are indifferent to this, or even hostile, because they feel that the economic forces which shape their lives are slipping farther and farther away from their own sphere of influence. This can be the reaction not only of the workers in the factory and of the local leaders of local organisations, but also of young technologists and managers who see in the new technologies a chance to be creative individuals rather than cogs in a great hierarchical machine. Such people have a legitimate desire for autonomy. Hamiltonians may with equal justice consider that the European constitution is the first priority, offering a framework within which such problems as autonomy for small production units can be readily solved. But hamiltonians may also find that the support of those with an interest in the large market is not enough, and that the bureaucratic and nationalist resistances to the European constitution will not be overcome unless it attracts also those whose main interest is in the autonomy of small units, in the economy as well as in the structure of government. If it is true that the new technologies have both centralising and decentralising elements, it may follow that a great political reform such as the establishment of a European federation should, in order to have the most chance of success, recognise both poles of the antinomy. In juridical terms, this could be done by federal (meanwhile, Community or Union) laws that facilitate not only economic integration, but also decentralisation, participation, and co-operative forms of organisation in enterprises. In terms of political action, it points towards an effort by hamiltonians to forge an alliance not only with those whose main interest lies in the big market but also with autonomist

economic forces, which may become an equally powerful part of the wave of the future, particularly in the growing sector of production based on the new technologies.

While the progress of science and technology has been breaking down the frontiers within Western Europe, it is also a force for integration of the wider world economy. Here, however, the political resistance is greater, sharpened as it is by divergences among cultures, economic levels, and economic, social and political systems. Yet a world federation is becoming ever more necessary, not only in order to manage the integrating world economy but also to secure the survival of life on this planet. Scholars who have studied the conditions that favour the creation of federations often include among them a similarity of economic and political systems.<sup>21</sup> Thus a form of economic organisation that responds to the needs of the new technologies is important not only for the Europeans themselves in their internal affairs, but also for creating the conditions which will favour the development of a federal system for the world as a whole. The new technologies will be applied throughout the world. We Europeans will help the rest of the world as well as ourselves if we show how the conventional forms of economic organisation, rooted in nineteenth century European conditions and ideologies, can be reformed to suit the circumstances of the world in the twenty-first century; and we will at the same time help to pave the way towards world federation.

#### *European and world federation.*

"... we no more want a hermetically sealed Europe than a divided Europe. Our motto is and remains: One Europe in One World."<sup>22</sup> These final words of the political resolution approved by the first UEF Congress forty years ago are very typical of Marc's eloquence and generosity of spirit. But they also reflected a general awareness among European federalists at that time that, in the nuclear age which Hiroshima and Nagasaki had just introduced, only a world federation could offer a full safeguard against nuclear catastrophe. When the Movement for World Federal Government held its own founding Congress, also at Montreux and immediately before the Congress of the UEF, one-third of the members elected to its Council and two-thirds of its Executive Committee were among those elected to the Central Committee of the UEF.<sup>23</sup> But the European hamiltonians and the world federalists drifted apart and it is only recently that the connexion between European and world federa-

tion has begun to be appreciated again.

The hamiltonians of Pavia have, once more, had the intellectual energy to incorporate this connexion in their theoretical work.<sup>24</sup> Politically, their idea has been to harness the energies of the peace movements to the concept that offers a solid institutional structure for the securing of permanent peace. From Britain, where the Federal Union organisation long propagated the causes of both European and world federation, Christopher Layton has recently shown how the European Community could contribute to the construction of a world order.<sup>25</sup> From the perspective of European federalists, the political logic of this thinking is that it is becoming increasingly clear to many people that the aims of peace and prosperity, which have provided much of the driving force for movement towards European federation, cannot be realised without progress towards a federal order in the world as well as in Europe. The idealism which motivated so many people to work for European federation after World War Two is not likely to revive now, therefore, unless the European Community/Union/Federation is seen as playing an important part in the promotion of world peace and prosperity: hence, in the building of a world federation.

There is also a structural link between the processes of creating a European and a world federation. Domination of world politics by two rival superpowers is an unpromising basis for movement towards a federal world. The two rivals are almost bound to concentrate on their mutual rivalry and on the balance of power that conditions it, rather than on transcending their struggle through replacing the strategic balance and the rule of force by civilian politics and the rule of law. Nor is the possibility of their mutual agreement so reassuring for the rest of the world. "It is undesirable," as Wheare put it in his classic work on federal government, "that one or two units should be so powerful that they can overrule the others and bend the will of the federal government to themselves."<sup>26</sup> Such a prospect is likely to deter other peoples from pressing for a closer union in which two superpowers seem likely to predominate.

The European Community, with its population greater than that of the United States or the Soviet Union and with its high level of economic development, is best placed to move the international system beyond its present phase of duopoly, provided that it consolidates its political strength by reforming the Community into a Union, and the Union into a Federation. The Europeans would then be able to influence an increasingly polycentric world, whose centres of power would include not only

the United States and the Soviet Union but also states such as Brazil, China, India and Japan, as well as Western Europe, in the direction of a federal system in which there would be the prospect of a wide distribution of power across the different continents.

*European federation and proudhonian federalism as a whole.*

Two of the strongest forces in the world economy and polity today are the advance of the new technologies and the desire for democratic liberties. No political system can succeed unless it is designed to accommodate these two forces: unless, to use Marc's words, it reconciles "les nécessités d'une organisation collective" with "les libertés particulières." This is why the essential political tasks of our time are to replace absolute nation-state sovereignty by political federalism, and the maldistribution of economic power by economic federalism.

Such federalism has to be applied at numerous levels. There is the need for autonomy for local and regional governments within the nation-states as well as the federating of nation-states at sub-continental, continental and eventually world level. There is the need for autonomy of small production units, whether independently or within large firms with federal or co-operative structures, as well as the creation of multinational enterprises of continental or world-wide dimensions. For the purpose of political action within this vast framework of proudhonian federalism, it is necessary to set priorities. It is normal that different people will have different preferences. My own priorities are to create a European federation and to work towards a world federal system, in order to safeguard peace as well as to enhance welfare through the common management of the increasingly interdependent economy.

Instead of seeking to maximise synergy from the different elements of global federalism, however, federalists with one priority have too often wasted energy fighting against federalists with another priority. Since respect for diversity is a basic principle of federalism, and since ends are influenced by means, such exclusive attitudes are an unpromising starting point for the application of federalist principles. Internecine conflicts between different groups of federalists are moreover a gratuitous impediment to the federalist endeavour, which faces quite enough resistance from anti-federalist forces. Ferdinand Kinsky has drawn attention to the rapprochement between hamiltonians and proudhonians in recent years, and to the widespread acceptance among all federalist tendencies of the urgent need for a federal constitution for Europe.<sup>27</sup> I have tried, in the

preceding pages, to demonstrate some reasons why the struggle for a European constitution and other elements of global federalism should be seen as complementary.

Any such thinking must benefit from the life's work of Alexandre Marc. From the application of federalism in the most diverse fields of politics, economics and society, to the psychological, philosophical and religious basis for a just relationship between the person and society,<sup>28</sup> Marc has for well over half a century never ceased to think, rethink, write, rewrite and above all to teach, to "atteindre les hommes, un à un, et les former."<sup>29</sup> The antinomial pole of his combative instinct has been his cordial, magnanimous urge to see all these diverse elements as a whole and to understand their complementarity. The corpus of his work challenges us all to adopt a broad and generous intellectual framework within which to relate the political strategies of the various tendencies among the federalists. We owe it to him to respond by thinking and acting in complementary ways to achieve our various federalist ends.

John Pinder

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See Altiero Spinelli, *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio: Io, Ulisse*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1984, pp. 307-308.

<sup>2</sup> Reprinted in the series *Oeuvres complètes* de P.-J. Proudhon, "Du princip fédératif et oeuvres diverses sur les problèmes politiques européens", Paris, Librairie Marcel Rivière, 1959.

<sup>3</sup> The original paper has been prepared for publication in César E. Diaz - Carrera (eds.), *El federalismo global*, Madrid, 1987. The editors are grateful to Professor Diaz for permission to publish this text in *The Federalist*.

<sup>4</sup> Robert Aron et Alexandre Marc, *Principes du fédéralisme*, Paris, Le Portulan, 1948, p. 19.

<sup>5</sup> Ferdinand Kinsky, "Fédéralisme et personnalisme", in *Repères pour un fédéralisme révolutionnaire: l'Europe en formation*, 190-192, Jan.-March 1976.

<sup>6</sup> Altiero Spinelli, *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio: la goccia e la roccia*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1987, p. 63.

<sup>7</sup> Alexandre Marc, "Taisez-vous, bavards!", in *Repères...*, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>8</sup> Jean Buchmann, "Du fédéralisme comme technique générale du pouvoir", in Henri Rieben (ed.), *Le fédéralisme et Alexandre Marc*, Lausanne, Centre de Recherches Européennes, 1974, p. 116.

<sup>9</sup> See John Pinder, "Economic and Social Powers of the European Union and the Member States: Subordinate or Coordinate Relationship?", in Ronald Bieber, Jean-Paul Jacqué, Joseph H.H. Weiler (eds.), *An Ever Closer Union*, Brussels, Commission of the EC for the European University Institute, 1985.

<sup>10</sup> Alexandre Marc, "Taisez-vous, bavards!", in *Repères...*, op. cit., p. 18.

<sup>11</sup> The monthly journal of the Associazione Italiana del CCRE, *Comuni d'Europa*, repeatedly expresses the particularly strong support from local and regional governments in Italy.

<sup>12</sup> Personal communication from Gustavo Malan.

<sup>13</sup> See O.C. (Osvaldo Coisson), "Nota bibliografica", in "Chivasso — 19 dicembre 1943: La Dichiarazione dei rappresentanti delle popolazioni alpine", *Novel Temp*, No. 23, Sampeyre, Piedmont, Sept.-Dec. 1983, pp. 5-11, in which are also printed the Declaration and an article by Gustavo Malan entitled "Quarant'anni dopo". See also Emilio Chanoux, "Federalismo e autonomie", *Quaderni dell'Italia Libera*, 26, undated (1944); L.R. (Giorgio Peyronel), "Federalismo, autonomie locali, autogoverno", *L'Unità Europea*, No. 4, Milan, May-June 1944, p. 3, and "Federalismo e autonomie", *L'Unità Europea*, No. 5, July-Aug. 1944, pp. 2-3; Giorgio Peyronel, "La Dichiarazione dei rappresentanti delle popolazioni al Convegno di Chivasso il 19 dicembre 1943", in *Il movimento di liberazione in Italia*, No. 2, Milan, Sept. 1949, pp. 16-26. The paper by Chanoux and the second of Peyronel's articles in *L'Unità Europea* are cited, in English, in Walter Lipgens, *Documents on the History of European Integration*, Vol. 1: *Continental Plans for European Union 1939-1945*, Berlin and New York, de Gruyter, 1985, pp. 534-6.

<sup>14</sup> General Political Resolution, UEF Congress at Montreux, 27-31 August 1947, reproduced in Jean-Pierre Gouzy, *Les pionniers de l'Europe Communautaire*, Lausanne, Centre de Recherches Européennes, 1968, pp. 156-8, and in part in Aron and Marc, op. cit., pp. 144-5. The passages cited above are reproduced in English in Lipgens, *A History of European Integration 1945-1947*, pp. 575, 590; the whole text of the resolution is reproduced in Andrew and Frances Boyd, *Western Union*, London, Hutchinson, undated (1948 or 1949), pp. 141-8.

<sup>15</sup> See Gouzy, *ibid.*, p. 150. The "Charte Fédéraliste" was printed in the collection *Réalités du présent, textes et documents*, Paris, Presses d'Europe, 1963.

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Francesco Rossolillo, *Città, territorio, istituzioni nella società post-industriale*, Naples, Guida editori, 1983, and various articles in recent numbers of *The Federalist*.

<sup>17</sup> See Ermo Loone, *Sovremennaya Filosofiya Istorii*, Tallin, 1980.

<sup>18</sup> Robert Aron, "Précurseur: Arnaud Dandieu (1897-1933)", in Rieben, op. cit., pp. 44-5.

<sup>19</sup> Alexandre Marc, "Monnaie et socialisme", in *Les cahiers du fédéralisme*, supplément au numéro 212 de *L'Europe en formation*, Dec. 1977, p. 43.

<sup>20</sup> See Lucio Levi and Sergio Pistone, "L'alternativa federalista alla crisi dello Stato nazionale e della società industriale", in *Il Federalista*, XXIII (1981), pp. 80-102, reworked and amplified in Lucio Levi, *Crisi della Comunità europea e riforma delle istituzioni*, Milan, Franco Angeli Editore, 1983; and Francesco Rossolillo, "Federalism in a Post-Industrial Society", in *The Federalist*, XXVI (1984), pp. 120-133.

<sup>21</sup> See, for example, Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, 1965; K.C. Wheare, *Federal Government*, London, Oxford University Press, 1946.



<sup>22</sup> General Political Resolution, UEF Congress, 27-31 August 1947, reproduced in Gouzy, *op. cit.* and Lipgens, *op. cit.*

<sup>23</sup> See Lipgens, *op. cit.*, p. 588.

<sup>24</sup> See Mario Albertini, *Lo Stato nazionale*, Naples, Guida editori, 1980, p. 158, and various articles and editorials in *The Federalist*, for example "Towards a World Government", in the first number of the review to appear in the three languages in July 1984.

<sup>25</sup> Christopher Layton, *One Europe: One World*, Special Supplement No. 4 to the *Journal of World Trade Law*, Geneva, in association with the Federal Trust, London, 1986; republished as *Europe and the Global Crisis: A First Exploration of Europe's Potential Contribution to World Order*, London, Federal Trust and International Institute for Environment and Development, 1986.

<sup>26</sup> Wheare, *op. cit.*, p. 52 (of second edition, 1951).

<sup>27</sup> Ferdinand Kinsky, "Où en est la stratégie fédéraliste?", *L'Europe en formation*, 258, Nov.-Dec. 1984, p. 37.

<sup>28</sup> See, for example, Denis de Rougemont, "Alexandre Marc et l'invention du personnalisme", in Rieben, *op. cit.*, and Ferdinand Kinsky, "Fédéralisme et personnalisme", *op. cit.*

<sup>29</sup> Jean-Pierre Gouzy, "L'apport d'Alexandre Marc à la pensée et l'action fédéralistes", in Rieben, *ibid.*, p. 6.

## Discussions

### CLARENCE STREIT AND THE IDEA OF THE UNION OF DEMOCRACIES

Clarence Streit certainly deserves a place in history as the founder of the modern world federalist movement, which arose as the League of Nations collapsed. If ever a book made a movement, *Union Now* (1939) was that book. It remains a classic of federalist political and constitutional thought. It had direct influence on Churchill's offer of British union with France on June 16, 1940, and, with Emery Reves' *Anatomy of Peace* (1945), it was the most widely read of all books on world government. It profoundly brought out the implications of American revolutionary experience for European and world federation. It deserves to be studied to this day for exploring the analogy between the United States and other federations.

Streit rightly saw that the primary international problem in the mid-twentieth century was world government (thesis 1 — see Chapter 2 of *Union Now*). But there has been much dispute about the need, since federation presupposes democracy or popular self-government, to begin with the "democratic" states (thesis 2). When one looks at Streit's definitions of democracy or at his lists of democratic states to be included in the initial union, one finds that he could only conceive of political, or liberal, democracy, as dominant at the time in the West. He could not admit that economic, or social, democracy, then being developed in the Soviet Union or the "East," was valid. Streit's changed attitude toward the Soviet Union is instructive. In the 1939 edition, when the Axis powers were regarded as the enemy to be overwhelmed by the union's "preponderance of power," he granted that Soviet theory and practice did not recognize the divine right of the monarchy or the supremacy of race or nation over the individual, he acknowledged that communism did not discriminate among men except on the basis of their work, and he said it

was a mistake to identify democracy with either capitalist or socialist economics (pp. 109-111). In the 1949 edition, however, Streit edited the book so that Russia took the place of Hitler, and generally the new line was anti-communist (pp. 226-227, 281, 313-320). In *Hearings on world federation in the US House of Representatives in 1949*, Grenville Clark criticized such an anti-communist union as such a threat to the Soviet Union as likely to precipitate the very war that world government was intended to prevent. United World Federalists, in the Senate hearings in 1950, expended all their efforts to defeat such a partial proposal.

Atlantic Union thus became one of the ideological props, in the very beginning, of the Cold War against Soviet communism. Most of the World Federalist movement has rejected any approach that is less than universal, lest they be coopted by unconscious nationalists or by the proponents of empire, American or Soviet. A world republic recognizing both liberal and economic democracy, both political and civil rights and social, economic and cultural rights, is, they say, the truly revolutionary response to the challenge of war in our times. Peace has a price — which is justice, which means changing some of our ways, no less than demanding change of others.

Why did Streit change his mind? An experienced man of the world, an influential journalist, and (for once) the author of a best-selling book about peace, he no doubt sincerely wished to see his ideas put into practice. He moved from New York to Washington in 1943, and there, in retrospect, he seems to have come under the influence of the almost irresistible sense of American power and ability to remake the postwar world. His 1943 edition of *Union Now* began to take the new, tougher line against Russia (even after the Battle of Stalingrad). In November 1945, after US use of the atomic bomb against Japan, Streit was unable to keep his popular organization, Federal Union, together, and the decision was taken for the members to join various World Federalist organizations (which maintained that the atomic bomb really proved that a universal world government was necessary), while Streit became editor of a new magazine, *Freedom & Union*. He continued to boldly and effectively argue in favour of a "union of the free," which lent itself to the designs of the architects of the North Atlantic Treaty. Owen Roberts, former Supreme Court Justice, Will Clayton, former Under-Secretary of State, and Robert H. Patterson, former Secretary of War (and former partner in Grenville Clark's law firm), formed the Atlantic Union Committee in 1949, dedicated to going beyond a military alliance to a true political union with Western Europe. These were realistic men to turn any

idealist's head. Streit even was featured on the cover of *Time* magazine on March 27, 1950. A critical view would be that Streit was captured by the rising national security establishment, perverting his ideas. A more sympathetic view would be that he consciously allied himself with the new political forces, particularly the demand for military security against what appeared to be an expanding Soviet threat, in order to achieve, as he said, a practical regional federal union of countries sharing at least liberal democracy.

History moves by events, not by reason, and perhaps an Atlantic union will be the way by which the world arrives at the necessary government of the whole. Certainly any effective Atlantic or European federation must have powers of defence. The European Defence Community was an attempt to establish this power even before a true European federation. Proposals to transform NATO into a European federation, as argued most persuasively by Alan K. Henrikson, might be the only historically available way. Henrikson reminds us that NATO was originally conceived not as a military alliance against the Soviet Union, but as a regional security organization to contain Germany; Art. 2 of the treaty provides for greater economic and social integration, as well as for co-operation with the United Nations. Legally, membership could be extended to Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union. (See "The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance," in Reichart and Strum, *American Defense Policy*, Baltimore, 1982, pp. 296-320). Henrikson has argued the larger consequences for the world in his *Negotiating World Order: the Artisanry and Architecture of Global Diplomacy* (Wilmington, 1986). Historically, it seems to me, all such schemes of Atlantic Union or European Union flounder on the uncertain position of the United States and the Soviet Union. Everyone senses more or less clearly that a union of Europe with one or the other is not the way to peace.

When considering the analogy of the formation of the United States for European federation, it is important to bear in mind both the similarities and the differences. It is true that the United States was the first modern federal union of sovereign states. One of the reasons for its influence is no doubt the *Federalist Papers*, which contain the most eloquent and sustained argument against the anarchy of a confederation of sovereign states, particularly Nos. 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 39, 46 and 51. While we must give credit to Hamilton and Washington, we must not neglect Madison, who also was an architect of the Constitution, an author of the *Federalist Papers* and an advocate of ratification. Hamilton, at Philadelphia, went so far as to propose an elective monarch and a Senate

for life, on the model of the British constitution (Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, I, pp. 282-290). And Washington, according to Madison's notes, did not speak at the convention until the very end; that wonderful quotation, "Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair," may be apocryphal, for its only source is Gouverneur Morris's funeral oration on Washington's death in 1799 (Farrand, *Records*, III, pp. 381-382).

But the thirteen states, which existed for at almost eleven years dating from the Declaration of Independence of 1776, did not exhibit the same degree of national difference that still keeps Europe divided to this day. It is instructive to list the actual grievances against the states that were mentioned by the framers of the Constitution in Philadelphia. They included schemes of paper money to defraud debtors in Rhode Island and South Carolina, refusals to pay the requisitions of Congress by Connecticut and New Jersey, the venality of the governor of Pennsylvania, rebellion in western Massachusetts, Delaware's threat to invite in foreign powers, Georgia's unilateral war with the Indians, the commercial alliances contrary to law made by Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and in general state contempt for Congress, which was unable to assert a common authority, defend the country, regulate commerce and pay its bills.

More comparable are some of the other seventeen federal national systems that have been established since the United States. They are often cited, too, as "models" by their citizens in the federalist literature. In chronological order of their first federal constitution, they are: Mexico (1824), Switzerland (1848), Argentina (1853), Venezuela (1864), Canada (1867), Austria-Hungary (1867), Germany (1871), Australia (1901), Austria (1920), Czechoslovakia (1920), USSR (1924), Yugoslavia (1946), India (1949), Pakistan (1956), Nigeria (1960) and Malaysia (1963). It is evident that Europe is a far more diverse community than any of the above that has yet been united by a federal government. Hence, Europe itself is the model for future regional unions and for world union. If Europe can unite, then the whole world can. We look now to Europe.

Joseph Preston Baratta

## Federalism in the History of Thought

### LUDWIG DEHIO

*Though forty years have already passed since the Second World War, there is still a widespread conviction that Germans are a very special race. It was on their land that extermination camps were built and it was there that the satanic genius of Hitler incarnated the demon of total hegemonic war and it was also there that the nihilistic will of power drew up the plan to destroy the ethical system of the West. All this should not be forgotten. We should, however, discuss whether these forms of brutality are the natural manifestation of what has been called Deutschtum.*

*Obviously, this is not true. We need merely recall that Germans have included Beethoven and Bach, Hoelderlin and Goethe, Kant and Marx, Holbein and Cranach and that since the times of the renovatio imperii German territory has witnessed the most grandiose supranational legal and political experience that Europe has ever known since the fall of the Roman Empire. It should also be added that among the great sovereign states, Germany arrived last, together with Italy, and that, together with Italy, Germany has had—for better or for worse—to follow models which have already been used by other nation states to set up their legal and political institutions.*

*It is a fact, however, that when we speak of Germany, these facts tend to get overlooked, in just the same way that when we speak of English-speaking countries as the great countries of freedom and the "rule of law", we tend to gloss over the pressgang in 18th century England, the slave trade, children working in mines, the massacre of the redskins, Chicago in the 1920's, let alone Dresden and Hiroshima. Clearly, in these cases, we are faced with genuine "repression" of historical facts. In truth, when Renan argued, not without justification, that the idea of nation (as a representation of the natural and not historical unity of a*

group with a common language, tradition, religion and so on) is due to an ignorance of history, we could retort with equal justification that ignorance of history is largely due to the idea of nation, an idea that predetermines the framework for selecting facts and the criterion for their interpretation.<sup>1</sup> The crude falsifications rife in national histories are ample evidence of this.

It goes without saying that the most direct means by which mankind could learn about the poverty and wretchedness of its own nation's past and thereby face up to it squarely, coincides with what Kant suggested in his *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*, a point of view which in fact sees mankind as the subject of history, the entire world as the field of mankind's action, its march down the road to self-realization and perpetual peace as a thread in matters which would otherwise be meaningless.

If this point of view surfaces only with great difficulty, this depends not just on the obvious explanation that ideas never succeed by themselves, but also on the fact that refusing to accept the nation as a category of historical knowledge implies a refusal to accept the nation as a category of political action. It is not a question of opposing attitudes. Apart from any consideration on the by no means marginal question of the links between theoretical reason and practical reason, it is difficult not to agree with Lord Acton when he mentioned that "universal history is distinct from the history of various countries"<sup>2</sup> and above all, when he argued that the historian is only "a politician with his face turned backward,"<sup>3</sup> almost as if research on things of the past cannot be separated from attitudes expressed vis-à-vis things of the present. From this standpoint, then, any serious historical innovation in the sense indicated by Kant implies a sharp break with national behaviour.<sup>4</sup>

Ludwig Dehio's historical analysis is proof of this.<sup>5</sup> Dehio was not a federalist militant. But he broke with Germany. When in 1955 he wrote the essay *German Politics at the Crossroads*, he had no doubts about the fact that when faced with a choice between the value of unity or the value of freedom, which in turn implied a rigorous and firm choice in favour of European and Western solidarity, it was necessary to plump for freedom without any second thoughts.<sup>6</sup> But this aspect of the German problem as it appeared in the postwar period was no more than a secondary aspect as compared with the question that was the focal point in his historical and political reflection, a reflection which led him to a decisive break with national historiography. The issue which led him after the end of the Second World War, when he was already middle-aged,

to deal with "great history" was "Germany's guilt". Although Dehio was never compromised by Nazism, he categorically refused to recognize this guilt. The tragedy of Germany may certainly be ascribed to peculiar traits of Germany's past, to that society or that culture etc. But Germany, like the other states belonging to the European system of states, was never an exclusive framework for the historical process, not even for the political and social process. This concept had already been dealt with by Leopold von Ranke who stressed how the external ties between states give rise to the basic aspects of the internal constitution rather than the latter causing the former. It follows that the lesser or greater concentration of power, the greater or lesser militarization of society, the more autocratic or liberal nature of the political institutions and law and even the conditions of the class struggle are decided by the greater or lesser tension in international relationships. This principle is based on the theory of *raison d'état*, i.e. the primacy that every state must attribute to security, and overthrows the Aristotelian principle that states that government (and hence foreign policy) is nothing more than a mirror of society, a principle that has substantially been accepted by liberal, democratic and socialist ideologies when they have, in the final instance, attributed the aggressive or peaceful attitudes adopted by states in their international relationships to the various régimes. If German policy did continue Prussian policy and was authoritarian internally and aggressive externally to the point of all-out war, this is due primarily to the fact that, like Prussia, from its birth the Second Reich had to operate in an area surrounded by the Great Powers (France to the West, the Habsburg Empire to the South and Russia to the East) and therefore just to survive it was forced to implement Frederick William I's principles about the "barrack state" to the full. This was even truer of the Third Reich. Conversely, the United Kingdom and, to a certain extent, the USA were able to implement a liberal régime with constitutionalism, the "rule of law," a system of local autonomies, voluntary conscription and so on, simply because, as political islands, they could entrust their security entirely to the navy and its primacy on the seas.

The history of Germany is thus nothing more for Dehio than one aspect of the history of the European system of states. The life of this system, which grew up from the ashes of the Italian system of states after the Turkish advance and the discovery of America had shifted the political baricentre from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, is not governed by chance. The first and fundamental law is that of equilibrium and hegemony. "The free and sovereign states competing within the

European system have in fact always agreed on one point only, the prevention of the unification of the West under one of themselves, to which the others would lose their sovereignty. Whether this state was Spain, France or Germany—that is, at different times the most powerful nation on the continent—grand coalitions were always formed to compass its defeat. What is the most important reason why, for four centuries, these coalitions were always successful? It was that the grand coalitions always got invincible support from the powers on the western and eastern wings of Europe, first and foremost in the maritime powers in the west, and secondly in the great peripheral continental powers in the east. These were powers which made the growing resources of the territories outside Europe available for the fight against a supreme power within Europe—in the first case, the resources of overseas territories and, in the second, those of the Eurasian continent. The secret of the modern history of our nations is that new weights, taken from the fringes of Europe and from the world beyond, could always be thrown into the scales on the side of the coalitions, until the critical attack had been overcome and the tottering balance restored once more to equilibrium.”<sup>7</sup>

The first major revision of history deriving from this observation is that Germany's hegemonic thirst was no greater than that of Charles V, Philip II, Louis XIV or Napoleon. Its demoniac nature depended entirely on two, absolutely new factors. The first related to the development of productive forces which, with the growth in the extension of the social process, detached the historical process from the increasingly narrow confines of Western Europe to the much wider surface of the seas and the Euroasiatic offshoots of the Old Continent and which gave German might far more destructive power. The second related to the Titanic nature of the struggle that the growth of forces external to the system placed on those who wanted to undertake hegemonic adventures, adventures which, precisely because of that growth, no longer concerned only the European Continent. These are not marginal factors: but factors which marked the passage from the European system to the world system of states. As regards the first factor, Dehio comparing the strong character of the order instituted in Vienna with the transient one emerging from Versailles, after noting that “the treaties could more easily be made to last in the age of the stage-coach, and even of the steam-engine, than in the age of the internal combustion engine” observed that what “we encounter is the dynamism of modern civilization, trying with explosive force to wreck the delicate network of Europe's old political frontiers.”<sup>8</sup> But of even greater significance is the second factor, a factor which

certainly depends on the first but which is also autonomous. Dehio describes the process of its maturation in succinct and precise terms. We have already spoken of the two typical figures of the European system of states: on the one hand, the drive to hegemony, which was manifested by states which in turn became stronger than the others, the counterbalancing drive to equilibrium that was re-established thanks to coalitions and in particular the contribution of powers with lateral positions in the system. But this contribution of the lateral powers was not without a price. It was in fact in the nature of things that they exploited the situation and expanded increasingly powerfully in the outside world, without, that is, Europe losing its predominant position. The growth of the United Kingdom to a world power, and in its wake the USA, and the significant development of Russia were indeed the price paid by the Continent for preserving the freedom of its individual sovereign states and the freedom of the whole system. This did not emerge clearly in the first two centuries of the life of the system, when, that is, external forces, fed by European disagreement, appeared exclusively as guarantors of the system itself. Around that time, the struggle against hegemony was the high point in European history. “From the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, when Russia began to grow in power, a second main factor began slowly to emerge in the troughs between the waves representing the wars for hegemony, and from time to time to oust the first. This factor was the rivalry of the powers on the wings among themselves, both outside and within Europe. In general both these powers were primarily concerned to prevent any of the old continental European powers from achieving hegemony, so that they might meanwhile expand in the world outside; but Russia was simultaneously trying to expand in Europe too. By nature alien to the West, although forming part of its political system, she broke piece after piece off the eastern edge of western Europe and grafted them on to herself. Compressed into a few sentences, these were the basic outlines of European development from the sixteenth century to 1945. Even these bare outlines, however, are enough to identify the moment when this development was bound to come to an end. The inevitable end came when the Russians and the Anglo-American world had grown so powerful in the world that the European powers, still to all intents and purposes, and despite the most appalling struggles, confined within their old frontiers, were by comparison exhausted and dwarfed. As the world powers absorbed the spirit of modern expansionist civilization more and more quickly, this moment approached faster and faster. It was reached in 1945. The turning-point came suddenly, although it had long

been in preparation. The European side of the scales became too light and shot upwards, while that of the world powers fell. The relative positions of the two were completely reversed. Events in Europe ceased to be the centre of world events: on the contrary, the latter began to determine the former. The first main factor in modern European history lost its force: the struggle for hegemony waged by the old continental powers had quite obviously been fought to a finish. The second main factor, the conflict between the Anglo-American world and the Russians, has undeniably become the most important, both in Europe and in the world beyond. In the process, part of the house of Europe has been reduced to a heap of rubble; the rest stands in ruins, more or less shattered. Neither part has any need at all of the common roof provided by the old system of the balance of power."<sup>9</sup>

In all fairness, we ought to mention in passing that Dehio, as the essay reproduced here in extenso clearly shows, correctly noted the nature—which was completely new in certain brutal ways and corresponded to the new character of the political system in which it was created—of the second German attempt at hegemony. This nature had already been announced with Kaiser Wilhelm's innovations (e.g. the law of the Navy in 1900), had already appeared very clearly in the course of the First World War with the American intervention in 1917, and had been grasped with no ambiguity, in the course of peace negotiations, by Wilson when he formulated the plan for the League of Nations. And, in truth, if the paradox was not, as often happens, on the side of facts, the solution to a conflict of world extension should have consisted in the creation of a new order of world extension as well. This is not what happened and, on the one hand, the lack of American commitment vis-à-vis the League of Nations and on the other hand Russia's inability, involved as she was in a revolution, to carry out the world function that she should have carried out, generated the mad illusion in Europeans that matters could still be decided in Europe. And we should not forget that this mad illusion first affected France which—almost as if it was merely a question of changing the terms of the 1870 "match"—thought she could guarantee the order of Versailles with exclusively military measures (firstly heavy war reparations and secondly the Maginot line); then it contaminated Italy, the first to set out on the road to Caesarism; and finally it affected Germany in the person of Hitler, the most suitable person to interpret it down to its most hidden depths. It was not thus the folly of Hitler that led Germany to folly, nor the folly of Germany that led Europe to its self-destruction. The order of cause and effect was simply

the reverse. It was the folly of the European system—which reposed old situations as well as old ideas to understand and cope with them in a world that had completely changed—which led Germany to a folly whose demoniac characteristics are ruthlessly denounced in the essay published below. And Germany did no more than put the right man in the right place.

The reference to old situations and old ideas is also certainly valid for Germany too, even though here awareness of the new (the world dimension of the political system) and antiquated replies (the mechanical application of Ranke's model of equilibrium and hegemony to this situation) combined tragically. This combination is found over and over again with fairly sharp outlines in German historiography which in the first two decades of the twentieth century, ended up by giving power strong ideological justifications to the Kaiser's policy and subsequently Hitler's. Precisely in this analogical use of Ranke's scheme lies the root of a fatal error. Once the role of the United Kingdom had been shaped as a hegemonic role and hence as such no different from Napoleon's France in the European system, the problem of freedom of states within the world system simply implied the struggle to create the balance at that level. This struggle was thought up as the mission of Germany and in this light historians interpreted the experience of Frederick the Great at the time of the Seven Years' War. Otto Hintze wrote in this respect that "we need to see whether we will manage now to impose ourselves as one of the world powers, as it was then a question of becoming a European power." It was a shared hope that whoever took the leadership of this struggle would have had the solidarity of all oppressed countries in the most disparate parts of the world. The clearest expression of this hallucination is found in Hintze's writings when he stated: "We hope that before or after other peoples who are now under the yoke of British supremacy on the seas, will decide to shake off this yoke. In addition to the equilibrium on dryland, we need to add a balance on the seas." Or alternatively, "The effects on German naval armament are found first on the edges of the Pacific. Japan is developing its power and shortly we may hear the cry 'Asia for the Asians'. The revolt of Islam goes in the same direction. The dream of world domination of the white race is about to end." These judgements regarding the mission of Germany were generally common to those like Hans Delbrück, Max Lenz, Hermann Oncken, Erich Marcks, and even Admiral Von Tirpitz and Friedrich Meinecke.

It is clear that what made the analogy with the European system of states inefficient and the use of Ranke's model deviant was underestimat-

ing the decisive role that lateral powers have had in re-establishing the equilibrium in the sphere of the European system. The proof of this was not slow to arise. The II Reich, in its attempt to challenge Great Britain, was forced once more to seek Continental Unity, a unity which was indispensable if land forces were to be entirely shifted to the seas. The result was that the first steps in this liberating mission were the opening of hostilities with France and the invasion of Belgium! But neither these facts, which crudely reposed a tragically well-known script in the history of the European system of states, nor the persistent isolation in the course of the conflict, nor finally military defeat were enough to impose a profound revision of the basic terms of the German problem within the European and by now World problem. Rather, this conception of the mission of Germany survived Versailles precisely because German historians refused to identify the deep causes of its defeat preferring, with the theory of repairable and unrepeatable errors, the persistence in their function of legitimization of German nationalism and its hegemonic and imperialist aspirations.<sup>10</sup> It should also be noticed that, if on the one hand, these tragic errors in German history are the seedbeds of such "sinister" statements as those of Max Weber and Otto Hintze which are reported in Dehio's essay reproduced here, on the other hand, Germany, together with Wilson, was able to express an awareness of the new world dimension of the political system and the consequently world dimension of the solutions that had to be given to tackling these new problems. The German solution was an illusion and Wilson's was inadequate. But it is a fact that federalists from Luigi Einaudi to Lord Lothian and Lionel Robbins, all alone in the inter-war period, argued that a European Federation was the only objective capable of pacifying Europe, creating an articulated equilibrium and opening the road to the establishment of a world government and, in so doing, referred precisely to these two solutions. The rest was no more than gossip, tragic hot air of yesterday's men.

Germany is thus the centre of the European tragedy. It made mistakes and was defeated. But a similar fate has been experienced by other European states, even by those which though formally victors were effectively equally losers.<sup>11</sup> And Dehio remarks perspicaciously "A loser is far too prone to thrust all his responsibilities upon the shoulders of the victors."<sup>12</sup> And again: "He tends too easily to an arrogant, indolent nihilism, to a combination of defiant pride and crippling scepticism. He is tempted to stand aside passively while his own fate is being decided."<sup>13</sup> Finally, with words that proved to be sadly only too prophetic: ".....shel-

tered by American power, European policy is beginning to follow positively parasitical lines. Exploiting the cover offered by American efforts, it is either avoiding efforts of its own, or else directing any efforts it might make towards a purely egocentric particularism—in the vague hope that these puny particularisms may together amount to a third force in the world, between two giants."<sup>14</sup>

"All these complex phenomena can be included within a single concept: the concept of the dying European system. That system is lying in ruins, but its spirit lives on.... It is like the pieces of a damaged bridge lying in a river, which obstruct traffic on the water without assisting traffic from one bank to the other."<sup>15</sup>

The conclusions Dehio reaches are very precise. The first regards Europe which must not delay the creation of a political unity which corresponds to the cultural unity forged by the common imprint of classical and Christian inheritance. Only in this way can we definitively free ourselves from "the concept of a dying system of states whose spirit survives and whose obsolete conditions threaten to poison the creation of new ones."<sup>16</sup> The second concerns historians: "Our opening statement that political history still has an important function in the old continent of Europe meant simply this: its function is no longer to demonstrate the continuity of history, but rather to show the break that has occurred - to knock down what must fall."<sup>17</sup> The third concerns the world. When this last reflection was made the Cold War was at its height, the phase that characterized the birth of the new — bipolar — world system of states. Dehio warned that it was necessary to be very careful not to deduce from the results of the past struggle between two principles (hegemony and equilibrium), what will be the outcome of a possible future struggle and above all not to prolong into the future those lines which stand out at the moment. This means that Dehio's task ends here and leaves the field to hope, faith and, possibly, political commitment: "It would be daunting to predict in what direct and indirect ways the tendency to unite the globe, which every day becomes smaller, could reach its goal; only one thing is certain: that this tendency will not cease to function unless mankind miraculously experiences everywhere and at the same time a change in the way of thinking and abandons the road to civilization and the struggle for power, on which, whipped on by the unleashed demon of the will to live, it advances furiously despite the horror by which in doing so it is agitated."<sup>18</sup>



## NOTES

<sup>14</sup>"L'oubli et je dirai même l'erreur historique sont un facteur essentiel de la création d'une nation, et c'est ainsi que le progrès des études historiques est souvent pour la nationalité un danger." Cfr. Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce-qu'une nation?", in *Discours et conférences*, Calmann Levy, Paris, 1887, p. 284.

<sup>2</sup>Cfr. Lord Acton, *Cambridge Modern History: its Origin, Authorship and Production*, Cambridge, 1907, p. 14.

<sup>3</sup>Cfr. Lord Acton, "Inaugural Lecture on the Study of History", in *Essays on Freedom and Power*, New York, N.Y., 1960, p. 25.

<sup>4</sup>Cfr. Mario Albertini, "Per un uso controllato della terminologia nazionale e sovranazionale", in *Il Federalista*, Year III, p. 18; and "Il mito della Nazione", in *Il Federalista*, Year I, pp. 21-38.

<sup>5</sup>Ludwig Dehio was born in Königsberg in 1888. In the period between the two world wars he worked in the archives of the Prussian state in Berlin and Charlottenburg. After 1945 he directed the Marburg State Archive and the related archive school, and was honorary professor of Modern and Medieval History in the University of Marburg and director of the *Historische Zeitschrift*, the most authoritative German historical review. He died in Marburg in 1963. His greatest work was *Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie*, Scherpe-Verlag, Krefeld 1948. On the basic issues of this work, Dehio returned in a series of essays published between 1950 and 1955 and collected in the volume *Deutschland und die Welt-politik im 20. Jahrhundert*, Verlag R. Oldenbourg, München, 1955. English edition: *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, N.Y., 1960. The Federalist judgement on this volume was formulated by Alessandro Cavalli in his review which appeared in *Il Federalista*, Year III, pp. 175-177. Among the essays in this volume, we find "The Agony of the European System of States", which this review reproduced in full in the Italian edition (cfr. Year III, pp. 152-163). This review also published a full version in its French edition of the essay "La continuité de l'histoire germano-prussienne de 1640 à 1945" (cfr. Year IV, pp. 162-179) and the review of Hans Kohn' volume of *Wege und Irrwege* (cfr. Year V, pp. 72-74). Our review has widely dealt with Ludwig Dehio's contribution in an essay by Sergio Pistone, *Les classiques du federalisme: Ludwig Dehio* (cfr. Year VI, pp. 171-205). Sergio Pistone is without a shadow of a doubt the person who has most deeply dealt with Dehio. See his monograph, *Ludwig Dehio*, Guida, Naples, 1977.

<sup>6</sup>Cfr. "German History at the Crossroads", in *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, op. cit., passim.

<sup>7</sup>Cfr. "The Agony of the European System of States", in *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, op. cit., pp. 127-128.

<sup>8</sup>Cfr. "Versailles 35 years after", in *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, op. cit., pp. 110 and 112.

<sup>9</sup>Cfr. "The Agony of the European System of States", in *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, op. cit., pp. 127-128.

<sup>10</sup>These opinions were expressed very crudely and peremptorily by Dehio in two essays "Ranke and German Imperialism" and "Thoughts on Germany's Mission: 1900-1918", in *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, op. cit. pp. 38-108.

<sup>11</sup>Cfr. "The Agony of the European System of States", in *Germany and the World Politics in the Twentieth century*, op. cit., p. 140.

<sup>12</sup>Cfr. *ibid.*, p. 138.

<sup>13</sup>Cfr. *ibid.*, pp. 138-140.

<sup>14</sup>Cfr. *ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>15</sup>Cfr. *ibid.*, pp. 140-141.

<sup>16</sup>Cfr. *ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>17</sup>Cfr. *ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>18</sup>Cfr. *Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie*, op. cit., p. 232.

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## GERMANY AND THE PERIOD OF THE TWO WORLD WARS \*

After years of political passivity, Germany is now returning to a position of independent responsibility.<sup>1</sup> More than ever before she now needs a clear understanding of the period preceding her exclusion from responsibility — that is, the period of the two World Wars. If we are to discuss this period in the limited space available here, we must do so with the brevity of aphorism. I shall merely emphasize a number of points which, if linked together, may give us a rough outline of events.

Let us begin by advancing a guiding concept — one which seems to me well-suited to serve as the central point of this discussion, or indeed of any discussion that tries to be something more than a mere indictment or defence of events and become an integrated historical account. The concept I have in mind is that of the struggle for hegemony: for the two World Wars, like two consecutive acts of the same drama, both display in their most exaggerated form the familiar generic traits of the great European wars associated with the names of Charles V, Philip II, Louis XIV and Napoleon I.

It would take too much time to support this thesis by a comparative analysis of external events over the whole field of relations between the great European powers. Let us none the less try to turn this method to advantage in considering the history of Germany, and her internal affairs in particular, in our own age. Here we may profitably advance another concept whose connection with the first can easily be demonstrated — that of the daemonic nature of power. It was no coincidence that this

\*This essay is the first in the volume *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, New York, N.Y., Alfred A. Knopf, 1960, pp. 11-37.



concept impressed itself so forcibly upon our consciousness during the Second World War — the last struggle for European hegemony.

In attaching such overwhelming importance to my guiding concept, I depart at the outset from other interpretations which reject that concept, especially those which regard the history of Germany in this period as growing, like a tree, out of purely German roots and which overlook the extent to which German history has been entangled with the history of other nations. I am also departing from those interpretations that take a broader view of events and emphasize contemporary analogies. There is some truth in both these views, but both require amplification. This is especially true of the interpretation (more popular abroad) that isolates Germany. This view tends to over-emphasize Germany's peculiar characteristics, whereas the second view tends to disregard them. Those who acknowledge that Germany has in our time exercised supreme power will avoid both these errors. They will see that, in her role of supremacy, Germany was essentially different from her fellows in the family of nations, but they will not regard this as proof that Germany has always possessed this distinct personality. A consideration of events from a broader point of view will make us cautious in passing judgement; and we can gain that broader point of view by looking back over the history of older powers that have exercised hegemony over Europe. We shall then realize that many of the characteristics of modern Germany which, seen in terms of the twentieth century, impress us as specifically German, have appeared, to some extent at least, among earlier supreme powers. Seen in terms of earlier centuries, these characteristics emerge as typical of all supreme powers, and this comparison with the past also makes us realize how far Germany's two wars have unique significance within the whole series of the wars for hegemony. In the last analysis any comparison, whether with past or present phenomena, only makes this unique significance emerge even more clearly and objectively.

The daemonic nature of power, which drives its victim to an exaggerated desire for self-assertion and to an amoral lust for battle, inevitably appears in its most violent form in the most comprehensive and embittered of all European struggles — the struggles for hegemony. Moreover, since the supreme power stands in the solitude of its supremacy, it must face daemonic temptations of a special kind.

These introductory considerations should suffice. Let us now briefly describe how Germany entered the select circle of European supreme powers. We find that the central factor in all the struggles for European hegemony (which are our sole concern) is the conflict which develops

each time between the strongest power on the Old Continent (excluding its eastern fringes) and the reigning maritime power. Before the beginning of German naval armament there was never any trace of a conflict of this nature in the history of Prussia and Germany. Both of them displayed all the most distinctive characteristics of the purely continental type of power — though enhanced perhaps by a vehemence and a youthful vigour equalled by no other power at the time. The westward expansion of Prussia thoroughly reinvigorated the flagging nation, while from her eastern fringes, so poor in history and culture, she gained the violent and infectious intensity that evoked and moulded a new vitality — biological, spiritual, economic and, above all, political. At this point we observe that trinity — exceptionally bold leadership, systematic arming and disciplined manpower — which was to make an indelible mark on the thinking of the young German nation. The tradition of the Prussian power state, more attractive than anything which Western civilization had to offer, taught the triumph of the will and the lesson that will-power could carry one with giant strides from the smallest beginnings into the circle of the Great Powers.

The period during which German history was purely continental ended abruptly at the beginning of the present century. We suddenly entered the arena where the most important European and global decisions are made — decisions which, no matter how tremendous the struggle on the Continent, are always made at sea, not on land. Let us ask ourselves not what caused the First World War, but what made it possible. The answer is that, as a World War, it was undoubtedly the expansionist pressure of the rejuvenated German nation that made it possible, for Russian expansionist ambitions alone could not at that time have provoked it. But the fact that the war assumed the classic form of a struggle for European hegemony was due to the reactions of Britain.

Just as Prussia had once broken into the ranks of the great European powers, so did we Germans hope to break out the narrow confines of Europe and join the ranks of the world powers, and we tried to do so by typically Prussian methods; that is, by systematic arming — in this case naval arming. But this was impossible without, as it were, forcing the European system into retirement. Nor was it possible without forcing Britain into retirement — without forcing her out of her role of guarantor of the existing balance of power in Europe and out of her position of maritime supremacy in the world beyond. What was the inevitable result of our efforts? We found ourselves embarked upon the road to World War. We, and we only, threatened the vital nerve centres of British world

power. Though otherwise true to type, our imperialism was unique in this respect — despite the fact that the imperialism of other nations produced much more extensive friction with Britain in colonial areas than did our own.

We turned our uncertain gaze on to the wide world, but instead of keeping our eyes firmly on the acquisition of particular territories, we gambled on general changes in the entire *status quo* at the expense of our rival. Meanwhile England sought to maintain herself by defending the traditional European balance of power, which we regarded as almost obsolete because of the position of semi-supremacy occupied on the Continent by Bismarck's *Reich*. By her policy of encirclement England gradually forced us into the isolated position of a potential aspirant for European hegemony in the full sense of the term. At the same time, the aim of German imperialism was still to become one of a circle of world powers, without necessarily destroying English maritime supremacy. Thus each of the rivals was fighting against the position of hegemony occupied by the other and appealing for a balance of power; but each attached a totally different sense to the term "hegemony" and "balance of power."

Even before 1914 the pressure of encirclement made us doubt whether the optimistic calculations we had made at the turn of the century would prove right. We had thought that England would be held in check by our naval armament and would allow herself to be peacefully manoeuvred out of her key positions. But the decisive fact was that, in our youthful exuberance, we failed to draw the logical conclusions from our own ideas. In 1915 Plehn could write: "It is an almost universal belief throughout the country that we shall only win our freedom to participate in world politics through a major European war."<sup>2</sup>

So this major European war, which was to become a World War, took place. Now our transformation, hitherto only an impending danger, became a terrible reality. We assumed the role of a power in pursuit of European hegemony. Any attempt by the strongest state on the continent to discard the old balance of power must logically involve an attempt to win European hegemony, however much we might try to disguise the fact from ourselves and others. Now, under the impact of the changed situation, certain entirely new traits appeared in our character. These traits cannot be said to date from an earlier period, though they naturally pre-suppose our earlier history — as a storey added to a house pre-supposes the lower storeys.

We shall understand the course of events more easily if we stand aside

for a moment and try to consider the typical fate of earlier supreme powers. Each of them played a lonely role of a tragic grandeur. Their efforts, deliberate or otherwise, to establish their own predominance touched off all the momentous happenings of the great European wars. In every case these efforts inevitably assumed extreme forms as the other imperilled states united in grand coalitions under the leadership of the island power on the wing. Every time the supreme power was finally forced to fight alone against all the rest. But it dared to fight such a battle, for it was inflated with the self-confidence born of the knowledge that it had reached the supreme moment of its destiny, that it stood head and shoulders above all its neighbours. No care or danger could restrain it; these only stimulated its exuberant sense of power into seizing the hour of greatness before it passed. It was lured on to win the prize of a new level of self-fulfilment and power far higher than that of all its enemies, who at first simply struggled to maintain the positions that they already held. But as soon as the supreme power reached the point where it came into conflict with the island power and faced a grand coalition, the solid ground of its continental experience and its *raison d'état* disappeared from under its feet. At this point the first characteristic feature — power — is joined by a second — blindness in the use of power. The combination of the two characteristics finally produces the daemonic nature to which, as we have noted, any supreme power is prone. Not that the intensity of the struggle does not also unleash among the other powers daemonic forces varying according to their different traditions and situations. In them, however, these daemonic forces are to some extent mere reactions; they lack the two characteristic factors which would intensify them to their ultimate degree. This is especially clear in the case of the island power. Its *raison d'état* has specially strong foundations in wars for hegemony, and its resources, carefully controlled by its traditional wisdom, only grow to full strength in the course of the conflict. Its adversary across the channel always has the characteristics of a new-comer, neither inheriting the experience of a predecessor nor passing on his own to succeeding generations. In spite of well-planned military preparations, his giant strength is sapped by hurried improvisation, because he lacks any well-prepared political plans wherewith to control it. Naturally his aim is complete and final victory in order to give his achievements all possible permanence; but as this victory slips from his grasp, he sees his work reduced to ruins before it is even finished.

Thus, in spite of variations, a single pattern of events has been repeated more and more clearly over the centuries. At the beginning of the

struggle the supreme power reaches the culmination of its previous history, and its initial successes form a magnificent, triumphant, clear-cut crystallization of its nature. But as the struggle drags wearily on intense euphoria turns into daemonic excess. The screws are turned too tight. Finally, the rulers, like gamblers with no real understanding of the game they are playing, stake their fundamental material and moral values. Their hopes flare up until the last moment, only to lure them on to their ultimate fall.

This typical course, which each supreme power altered and exaggerated in its own peculiar fashion, characterized Germany's development during the First World War — with this difference that, threatening and threatened by all and sundry, the essentially unprepared Central Powers played their role on a contracting and sinking continent and in the explosive atmosphere of a more advanced civilization; and that the whole development was thus swifter, more violent and more destructive than ever before. This time, all the heights and all the depths were touched, not in the course of decades but in a matter of years. In 1914, confronted with the hatred of "a whole world of enemies," we experienced an intoxicating intensification of our whole being; but this sudden spiritual isolation, which was the result of our political isolation, contained the seeds of excess. This development, foreseen only by a few thoughtful men, was hastened by the accumulated emotions of the majority. It shattered the spiritual balance of the nation. Encircled by hatred, the people replied with its own hatred. Society and the machinery of state were overstrained by the lonely and glorious, but ill-fated struggle, and traditions were distorted. Extremist and monomaniac ideas, which might have remained mere marginal phenomena in a calmer context, began to spread.

It is arresting to observe how the more clear-sighted tried to break this vicious circle by consulting the oracle of the *raison d'état* governing our internal policies; but the oracle's obscure replies only increased the confusion. The Seven Years War had not been a war for hegemony, and the strategy of attrition on land lost its meaning as soon as our opponent began to gain the upper hand with his policy of attrition at sea. In spite of their admirable restraint, even those who favoured a negotiated peace could not tear one last veil from their eyes. Even they underestimated their island foe. Moreover, they occasionally let slip some extremely sinister ideas: for example, Max Weber's words: "Let them hate us, as long as they fear us;" or Otto Hintze's threat: "If the worst comes to the worst, we shall let ourselves be buried beneath the ruins of European civilization."

Words like these pointed to the future; but on the whole it is true to say

that the daemonic nature of German aspirations to supremacy only reached its first stage in the First World War. Although it had begun to undermine the whole structure of existing society, of morality, and of the historic state and its traditions, it had not as yet shattered that structure; but the normal forces of civilization were eroding its foundations in any case. These daemonic forces were still loyalist, not revolutionary; and to that extent they recalled the struggles of the Spanish and French monarchs, rather than those of the French Revolution and Napoleon.

There was a complete change in the first years of the peace. The daemonic nature of German aspirations to hegemony reached its second stage. How could this unexpected development come about? Why did the catastrophe of 1918 not, on the contrary, have a sedative effect? To answer these questions we must consider both what happened to Germany as a nation, and what happened inside Germany.

The end of every earlier war for hegemony had established peace for generations. But how could the victors of 1919 possibly establish a lasting peace with the old prescriptions? This had still been possible in 1815 when a peace was made that was severe yet reconciliatory. This time, however, the very foundation underlying earlier peace treaties — the European system — had been severely damaged. On the one hand, Russia had been forced out of the system, becoming at the same time a graver danger to the West than ever; on the other hand, America had been drawn in, for Europe had, for the first time, proved unable to master the threat of hegemony by its own efforts. How could anything lasting be created in so confused situation? To start with, a solution might only be possible in the West; and even then not without the participation of America, the decisive military power of the West, nor without some new creative idea. Wilson was the bearer of such an idea. What he proposed was not a renewal of the European system with its wars for hegemony, nor the establishment of a world system with its corresponding dangers. Instead he proposed the total abolition of foreign policy in the old sense of the term: that is, the total abolition of a multitude of sovereign states, each ready to wage war; and he proposed in their place the peaceful unification of the nations into a worldwide commonwealth under Anglo-Saxon leadership. What a fantastic transformation! Or was it to remain in the realm of fantasy? Hitherto the insular way of life, represented by England, had been the traditional opponent of any new-comer on the Continent. This insular attitude was now represented by America, herself a new-comer. At the time, her ideas seemed almost absurdly simple-minded to European statesmen; but to the people they seemed like a new

gospel, and to the German people, in particular, they meant a release from their constriction by means of the peaceful neutralization of the old suffocating system, and so a miraculous solution of the whole German problem.

But the danger to our shattered spiritual balance became even greater, for the miracle remained a dream. On the heels of the catastrophe of the war came the catastrophe of the peace. Old Europe had its way against the new-comer America, and the obsolete European system was roughly patched up. Europe stood on the threshold of a new age, but it stepped back, not forward. This in itself is the most significant explanation of the disaster to come. Within the narrow framework of the weakened European system, the great German problem could be solved neither by severity nor by kindness. There were no powers on the Continent to provide the kind of natural counter-balance to the defeated supreme power that had been the basis of the great peace settlements of the past. Instead, even severer conditions were to be imposed, far exceeding any made before, and Germany was to be artificially shackled. But the political and psychological situation underwent a rapid change. The solid front of the Western victors crumbled away. Public opinion in the world shamefacedly turned its back on the hard conditions that it had only just demanded, and now condemned France, who found herself isolated and tried in vain to make up for the Anglo-Saxon guarantee, out of which she had been cheated by the withdrawal of America, by violently exploiting the terms of the Treaty. France was dominated by an instinctive fear of a German counter-attack as strong as Bismarck's fear of a French counter-attack after 1871.

The peace treaty was a strange and contradictory concoction of idealistic principles and highly realistic clauses. It did not conciliate the defeated nations by the opportunities it offered or at least permitted, nor, for lack of a united front among the victors, was it really severe. If Germany retained any will to resist, how could such a treaty have anything but a provocative effect on her? By reverting to the obsolete European system, the victors were bound to create at least a danger that the defeated power might revert to the obsolete spirit of the struggle for hegemony.

Whether or not Germany were to revert depended on the interplay of all the external influences upon the domestic life of our nation. If we recall the condition of previous supreme powers during the humiliation that followed their defeat, we find that they remained relatively calm for some time, partly because of their exhaustion after decades of war and partly

because they appreciated and developed the considerable opportunities still available to them. The delusions that are part of the daemonic desire for hegemony remained and bred pretensions, resentments and dreams of revenge; but a society that survives defeat has no energy left for a serious resumption of the great struggle, nor any need to make daring leaps in the dark. None of this, however, was true of Germany after 1918. In her case both elements in the daemonic desire for supremacy remained effective — both the delusions and the sense of power. Resentment and dreams of revenge therefore found fruitful soil in Germany; and in addition there was the notable stimulus of misery and the resulting progressive dissolution of traditional social conditions.

Delusions kept us from any sober recognition of the true causes of our failure, exactly as they had kept France in 1815. In spite of the flood of criticism of details, no critical analysis was made during the postwar years of our limited possibilities in the realm of power politics, just as none had been made during the war or in the period of encirclement before the war. We refused to tear the last bandage from our eyes. We refused to allow the glorious memory of the heroic climax of our modern history to be dulled, or to abandon our hopes of re-establishing our position. It was felt that the catastrophe must have had some unnatural cause. The defeat was ascribed to the seductions and deceits of our enemies, and to errors and treason at home. Public opinion still did not appreciate the illuminating analogies with earlier wars for hegemony, nor the role of sea power, nor the peculiar resources of our island foe. The intervention of America was completely misunderstood; and no wonder, for before long the Americans themselves treated their entry into the war as the effect of mere propaganda and a scramble for gain. Few people realized that a genuine *raison d'état* — America's interest in preventing the unification of Europe under a single power because of the possible threat to areas overseas — contributed to this development. So, paradoxically, when we thought back on the war, our main reaction was a greater, not a lessened, self-confidence. We became increasingly aware of our strength as a nation and we found, almost as much to our own surprise as to the world's, that we had preserved this strength. What could not have been achieved under leaders certain of their aims? We brooded over our defeat, but in order to prove to ourselves that it was undeserved, not to understand why it was deserved. Our aim was to prove that it was the result of a number of avoidable errors, not of fundamental ideas that had been exaggerated.

Meanwhile the postwar years proved that, in spite of all that had happened, our strength as a nation was still much greater than that of the

other nations of the Old Continent of Europe. A glance at previous centuries shows quite clearly that French power had been far more profoundly shattered at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and Spanish power at the beginning of the seventeenth, than had ours at the beginning of the twentieth. Although this fact was a measure of the opportunities open to us despite the magnitude of our disaster, the speed of our recovery to the point where we could start a new struggle for hegemony would nevertheless be incomprehensible in the absence of the stimulus of our economic misery.

At first the people's real determination to fight inevitably gave way to total exhaustion; but small, scattered, illegal groups rekindled the spirit in preparation for infiltration and counter-attack. In our nation of soldiers it found support in the memory of the heroic tragedy of the war, as it had in France after 1815. Now, as then, the disillusioned heroism of "the despised" and of the uprooted turned into burning hatred not only of enemies abroad, but also of those at home. It has been said that after 1815 France was split into two nations looking up to two flags — the victors and the vanquished of Waterloo — and one could maintain that Germany was in a similar state after 1919. The only difference was that, in our case, and because of the different rhythm of our history, our national vitality tended towards Restoration, not Revolution. Not that this made us reject revolutionary methods, or indeed any other methods. Idealism and crime joined forces and the nihilistic will to power prepared the way for the ruthless destruction of the ethical system of the West.

At first the full consequences of this trend were grasped only by small bands of pioneers. But given the chaotic instability of the masses, even small groups of fanatics could achieve a great deal. The pendulum of public opinion began to swing back with a vengeance. The origins of the German Republic were quite different from those of the Third Republic in France and the new Russian Republic. The German Republic was born of the momentary exhaustion of old energies, not from an upsurge of new ones; not of resistance to the foreigner, but of surrender to him. In this it resembled the Bourbon restoration of 1815, with its lack of any contemporary nationalist aura, even though — unlike the Bourbons — it could not point proudly to a great past. Moreover, while the Bourbon régime had been supported by the victors' moderation, the Weimar régime was hampered by the inhumanity of Versailles and clearly displayed the impurity of its birth. Soon a third, extremely dangerous factor — the social disintegration that resulted from misery in its many forms — was added to the two already mentioned. With the loss of national status went

a loss of social status. In their competition with Communism, the nationalist activists profited from the influx of desperate men and, like the Communists, gambled on the collapse of the entire Western order established in 1919. Their ideas were a blend between the attractive Prussian (and then German) tradition of power, torn out of its native sociological soil, and formless, revolutionary violence. Thus the new dynamism of Fascism came into being. A further factor, reinforcing this dynamism, was the racial irredentism which now flowed in from beyond the frontiers of Germany — a great flood of popular passions, and one which could never have occurred under the authoritarian Prussian, and later German, state.

Might the final disaster have been averted by splitting up heavy industry and the great landed estates into smaller units, as so many present-day critics of the Germany of that time believe? Whatever the answer, the result would have been an increase in the number of *déclassés* and even greater economic instability. Property tends to act as a sedative, while those without property have everything to gain and nothing to lose. Furthermore, the nationalist spirit had long since ceased to be a prerogative of the propertied class. Nationalism can inflame a disorganized society more dangerously than it can a solid, settled one; indeed it may be that nationalism cannot really grip the middle and lower classes until the moment when it begins to lose its hold on the upper class. Even the abolition of the monarchy had been a two-edged measure, for it had resulted in a loss of focus. So the rise of the new Caesarism in Italy, which oscillated between Restoration and Revolution and undertook to fill the vacuum with a new authority, stirred up even greater turmoil in Germany. But in Germany its hour had not yet come. Nevertheless, our activists could console themselves with the knowledge that in the long run they had greater opportunities to spread their ideas in Germany than in any other country. In Germany everyone, especially the ex-soldiers, longed to see the stain of the catastrophe expunged — a catastrophe such as our nation with its aspirations to hegemony, and no other, had ever experienced.

Of course, it was no longer any use seeking revenge at sea. However, in the balkanization of some of our neighbours, in the isolation of France, and especially in the bolshevization of that fateful and enigmatic land, Russia, the catastrophe itself had opened up promising prospects close at hand on the continent. Russia could serve Germany's recovery either as a friend (as Seeckt believed) or (as Ludendorff thought) as an enemy.

This programme of recovery was supported almost unanimously by

all the parties. Its points were the restoration of our Eastern frontiers and the *Anschluss* with Austria. Its aims were not merely to re-establish what had existed before, but to follow the failure of *kleindeutsch* maritime expansion with *grossdeutsch* expansion on the Continent; to complete the national unification of which the youthful nation had dreamed in 1813 and 1848, when it was still on the threshold of its terrible destiny; to meet a mortal threat by vigorous expansion, and, finally, to rise to a degree of greatness such as no other nation in Europe, least of all France in her senility, could achieve. In other words, the aim was to achieve the firm continental basis that, according to the critics of the time, Wilhelm II should somehow have secured before launching into world politics.

How could this programme be realized? With England's help against France? With the help of the East against the West? Or by wavering between East and West? In any case, it could hardly be realized except through the complete destruction of the order established in 1919.

Within the restricted framework of the moribund system of Versailles, the largest and most vigorous people in Europe could only be temporarily shackled, never permanently pacified.

Yet Europe was still granted the ray of sunshine of Locarno. But she owed this to the return of America more than to her own insight or strength. America's comings and goings had already begun to exercise enormous influence on the ebb and flow of events in Europe. The happy interlude of these years seemed like an antithesis to the years after 1919, when America had left Europe. Then there had followed five years of disorganization: now there was a promising basis for reorganization, even though the return of the United States was perhaps due to economic rather than political reasons. Stresemann's successes must be understood in terms of the solid gold foundations of American loans. But the effect of these loans was strictly limited. The German daemons only retreated a little way. They had no thanks for the liberator of the Rhineland. Moreover, the Americans for their part were careful not to opt clearly for the West, for this would have lent support to the irredentist programme. Instead, they sought freedom of movement between East and West. All the wonderful plans for a European union remained a beautiful dream. The nations of Europe have been brought up to mutual mistrust and violence by their modern system — and this is what was restored in 1919. They seem able to hold together only in one event: when a member of their own circle tries to achieve hegemony.

This one event was soon to occur again. For the French it was a terrible confirmation of their prophecies, but to most Anglo-Saxons it was

unexpected. As late as the time of Locarno, T.E. Lawrence, an observer who knew the world so well, had ventured the prediction that, after Spain, France and Germany, it might now be Russia's turn to try to dominate the world from the Continent. He could not know that Germany would once more summon up the strength and determination to move into the centre of the stage of world affairs in her old role of a power seeking European hegemony, before Russia stepped on to the same stage to create the new role of a power seeking world hegemony.

Characteristically, the great turning-point in Germany was the result of a new turn of events in America. During the world economic crisis, America withdrew across the sea a second time and thus left the entire Western world in even profounder disorganization than after her first withdrawal. This was the signal that started Germany on her impatient race for revenge. In the confusion Germany saw that the road was clear, as though an earthquake had broken down all barriers. The first German war for hegemony had grown organically out of a period of wealth and prosperity. The second was born of misery and fear. The first had been a mere opening skirmish: the second came to be a well-directed counter-attack from deep in the rear. The great gamble on the disintegration of the Western bourgeois world — the secret aim of both the Fascist and the Communist storm troops — now paid magnificent dividends, both in international and national politics. In international politics Germany's warders, the large and small powers of the shrunken European system, turned out to be cowardly or irresponsible, helpless or short-sighted, France, eager for peace, seemed crippled in the face of the very real danger — one which had long occupied her imagination and which had been accelerated by her own earlier policy. At the same time she was inhibited by her awful experience in the Ruhr and by the attitude of her English ally. Should she have used the rifle in her hand to avoid disaster by resorting to force — in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty which, by now, had been criticized so much? The effects of intervention in national troubles are incalculable. Alternatively, would Churchill's proposal to maintain the unilateral disarmament of Germany as a precautionary measure have created a really healthy situation? Even to raise the question is to show that the answer is not necessarily affirmative. But it was in national politics that the gamble really paid. Even the phenomena of social dissolution that had appeared ten years before had strengthened the activists. This dissolution now drove millions from every class into their arms. If the international guarantees and alliances of the democratic world failed, then only a return to the old, well-worn path of national

success could bring salvation — the path to a policy of authority at home and power abroad. Under this magical sign the miraculous transformation of fear into confidence, of social dissonance into social harmony, was successfully achieved. The fact that Germany's recovery took the form of Caesarism rather than legitimism was due to the general atmosphere. Outside Germany, Caesarism had already proved its capacity to rally national feelings in times of crisis and provide a third form of government between predatory Communism and the confused bourgeoisie.

Let us be quite clear at this point that, just as imperialism had acquired the additional character of a movement for hegemony when adopted by Germany before 1914, so Caesarism was now deliberately and logically transformed. The German dictator, for whose charismatic leadership the imperialists had themselves secretly hoped, grew into an infinitely larger figure than his peers in other European countries (except Russia). His methods, though possibly modelled on methods practised elsewhere in the West, reached unprecedented heights of horror. The "movement" of those infused with daemonic aspirations to hegemony won every position of power and authority; but the seizure of power did not sober it, as had been expected by so many of those who cheered it on. On the contrary, success raised this daemonic nature to a still higher pitch and forced it violently through the fevered nation's bloodstream. The daemonic was concentrated in Hitler, and through him it spread as it had never done before. He was the very incarnation of the daemon of the total struggle for hegemony. Indeed, so far as can be judged, he was the essential prerequisite for the final outbreak of that struggle. Germany could not conceivably have raised herself to such dizzy heights yet again without the aid of some Satanic genius. Hitler felt himself carried along by the dark wave of the crisis and by the expanding forces of civilization, which threatened to shatter the narrow, obsolete system of states. Moreover, he was continually spurred on by the world-wide aspirations of the Bolsheviks, his much admired rivals. His almost Jacobin reliance on his totalitarian power at home led him to believe that there was nothing he could not achieve outside Germany too. Like a sleep-walker, he clambered between chasms along paths that nobody else could have found, using the conflict between East and West as cover until the moment when he emerged as a third force endangering both, and so united them against him. Thus the same abyss opened that had swallowed both the French Emperor and the German Kaiser. The events of earlier wars for hegemony were repeated, but on a higher level. Once again, victories on the Old Continent were followed by collapse when Germany was faced with the moral and material

resources of the islanders, which she could not understand. Moreover this time, by subordinating their differences to the struggle for survival, the islanders were able to keep the Russian sword in the battle. In 1945 the daemon of the wars for European hegemony claimed its final victim. Germany suffered a catastrophe as total and as terrible as the extent and exercise of her power had been until the very last moment; for, anticipating his own downfall, the nihilistic daemon sent as many into the abyss before him as his last reserves of strength allowed.

This is a brief and hurried survey, but we must not stop here. We must add some closing thoughts and so complete the train of ideas that we foreshadowed in our introductory remarks.

We have seen how Germany's vitality has always driven her beyond the typical in any situation — first in the age of imperialism and then in the age of Caesarism — and how, both times, she met the isolated fate of a supreme power. We have also observed how her role, though unique in terms of the present, displayed certain typical traits when seen within the broader framework of the past. It remains for us to ask what special significance the two links of Germany's wars for supremacy had in the whole chain of the wars for European hegemony. The answer can be reduced to a single sentence. The German struggle was the last of the series. We cannot imagine that it will ever be resumed from the territory of the Old Continent of Europe. For those who accept this prognosis, the special significance of the two World Wars emerges with absolute precision and compelling logic, even if they are examined within the broader framework of the recent history of Europe. When they are seen in this light, it becomes impossible to classify them as mere individual variations of the previous wars, though they are this too. This is because they also served as the catalyst for a new alignment of forces in the world, and although this situation had been developing gradually since the eighteenth century, it was new for all that. Indeed, the rivalry between the Russians and the Anglo-Saxons in the struggle for world hegemony could not become a reality until 1945, when the final struggle for European hegemony had been decided. Then it was as if their rivalry was given the right of way. The unification of Europe under German hegemony threatened the world powers in their territories overseas and forced them to shelve their differences and unite to defeat Germany (and, for related reasons, Japan). Once they had successfully achieved this end, the modern history of Europe in its old form was finished and the old continent ceased to be the all-important centre of world events. The road was clear for a new phase in history — world history.



The significance of the German struggle for hegemony may be expressed in the following terms. It developed both the material and the spiritual forces of destruction to a higher degree than had any of its predecessors. In the final stages of the struggle, these forces not only turned against the supreme power, the sinking aggressor, as they had always done before; to an unprecedented extent their effects were also felt in every corner of the world. Thanks to the technological powers of our civilization, they wrought unparalleled destruction in human life and achievement, and thanks to terrorism and propaganda, which our civilization has made ubiquitous, they corroded and poisoned the soul of Western man. In this way these forces so weakened the resources of the Old Continent that, since then, the world powers have completely overshadowed it. The European system, like the power that had pitted itself against it, split in two. The fall of Germany liberated the peoples of Western Europe from the danger of totalitarianism; but, on the other hand, the peoples of Eastern Europe were now exposed to it with a vengeance. This, too, was ultimately a result of the German urge to achieve power, whatever the more specific reasons may have been. Furthermore, it undid the results of the First World War. In 1918 Max Weber had tried to console himself with the outcome of that war by remarking that, in spite of everything, Germany could boast that she had saved Europe from the Russian knout. Even this boast was robbed of all force by the events of 1939. Finally, the Second World War accelerated the fall of the West from its tottering position of mastery over the coloured peoples — with unpredictable consequences.

But we must press on. The great wars of the past had all had a fruitful as well as a frightful aspect. They were fought in periods of vigorous civilizations. The supreme powers developed positive intellectual missions — as champions of the Counter-Reformation, as living examples of the aristocratic way of life, or as heralds of the achievements of the Revolution. Even the fight against them produced a spiritual revival. But can we find any trace of this redeeming feature in the German struggle, especially in its last phase? Our exaggerated daemonic drive for power — our desperate protest against the course of events in the world outside, which we did not understand — could not evolve any mission with which to win over other nations. Our ideology of national Caesarism could not be exported. It began to lose its appeal as it became increasingly obvious that the freedom of other nations was being threatened in its name, and as it began increasingly to use Bolshevik methods. When it reached agreement with Bolshevism in 1939, it finally lost all its appeal: that was

suicide.

But — to ask a further question — did we not lack any idea capable of winning others over to our side, even in the First World War? No argument can alter the fact that in the youthful German nation the spread of Prussianism resulted in a profounder split between the sphere of power and the sphere of the spirit than existed in the older nations. Even our imperialists had been embarrassed when they had tried to provide some spiritual justification for the expansion of German power. They turned for help to our age of spiritual fulfilment and to its glorification of the individual. They declared that our real mission was to protect the individuality and diversity of the nations against the uniformity of Anglo-Saxon society and Russian bureaucracy. However, this mission automatically ceased to be convincing when in the First World War we were obviously forced into Napoleon's footsteps, whereas the ideals that we were invoking were the ideals of Napoleon's adversaries. Our attempts to use these ideas to justify our expansion towards European hegemony involved an inner contradiction.

On two occasions, Germany has produced ideas that have spread: the Reformation and Marxism. But neither contributed anything to German politics.

To sum up, these two wars were not only infinitely more destructive than previous wars; they were also without their beneficent redeeming features. At least, that is how we see them today. But what will be the verdict of future generations? One day they will perhaps be able to find redeeming feature in a renaissance of the spirit of the West and in the establishment of a new political order in the greater West. Will our nation too play a part in such a creative resistance to the corrosive forces of destruction? Many Germans will not cease to hope so. But even though others may have different hopes for the future, the prerequisite for any really creative German response after the period of the two World Wars is the unconditional recognition of the terrible role that we have played in this period. We were the last, and the most daemonic, power to exercise hegemony over the declining Old Continent of Europe.

*(Prefaced and edited by Luigi V. Majocchi)*



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> This essay is a slightly expanded version of a lecture delivered at the Twenty-first Congress of German Historians in September 1951.

<sup>2</sup> In *Deutsche Weltpolitik und kein Krieg*, p. 1.

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