

# THE FEDERALIST

a political review

*To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.*


Hamilton, The Federalist



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*The Federalist* was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and has been published in English, French and Italian since 1984. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE FONDAZIONE EUROPEA LUCIANO BOLIS

Editor: Mario Albertini. Three issues a year. Subscriptions: European Community, 25 ECU or \$ 25; other countries (by air mail), 35 ECU or \$ 35. Published by EDIF, via Porta Pertusi 6, I-27100 Pavia. All payments should be made by cheque or by bank transfer directly to EDIF. English language editing: Anthony Baldry.

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YEAR XXX, 1988, NUMBER 3

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## Traditional Détente and Innovative Détente

George Bush's Presidency of the United States and the Single Market envisaged for January 1st 1993 in Europe have led many commentators to foresee a worsening in the ties between Europe and the United States and a marked shift of American policy towards the Pacific area.

Some even go so far as to argue that the idea of a privileged free trade area between the USA and Japan is gaining ground in America, which would include some Latin American countries and would provide a solution to the problem of these countries' foreign debt since their exports would be directed towards Japan and other countries in the Pacific basin with a favourable balance-of-payments position.

Moreover, the fast approaching deadline of December 31st 1992, together with the vital interest that Europeans have in reductions in conventional armaments and economic and technological co-operation mooted by Gorbachev keeps the ghost of "fortress Europe" alive i.e. a closed and protectionist Community, that concentrates exclusively on the protection of its trading interests, and in whose name it is prepared to have ambiguous ties with the United States and the Soviet Union, relying alternately on the protection of one or the other according to the circumstances. In this respect, Kissinger went so far as to say that "Europeans are too sensitive to the suggestion of a Europe which extends its borders from the Atlantic to the Urals", suggesting that they do not realize "that this would mean the Finlandization of Europe."

This scenario, it is argued, would encourage growing drives to disengage the US militarily in Europe and pressures for Europeans to agree to pay a much larger share of the expenditure required for conventional defence.

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These are fishwives' tales. The certain facts on the other hand are: a)

that the shift in the political axis of the USA from the Atlantic to the Pacific is impossible since Europe is part of the Atlantic alliance and it is particularly in Europe that the current balance of power between the USA and the USSR (which is still the primary factor in the world balance of power, even though bipolarism is slowly shifting towards multipolarism) can be maintained or modified and b) that the Atlantic policy of the USA will, however, be led with much less consistency as compared with the past since the drive towards the Pacific is, in any case, very pressing. In this respect, the basic facts are that the USA (52 per cent of world product in 1950, now down to 22 per cent) "is still the world's strongest nation, but can no longer guarantee the balance of power alone" (Kissinger). Hence the weight of Europe for strategic reasons (which predominate) and the weight of Japan for economic reasons.

\* \* \*

One point is clear. The greatest problem which — albeit in differing proportions — will decide the solution to all other problems, is that of *détente*. But precisely in this respect, we need to make a conceptual distinction between traditional *détente* and innovative *détente*. Analytically, we may consider *détente* as "traditional" when it remains, in vision and praxis, within the old context of power politics and security based on strength, albeit trying to make this strength prevail with moderation and prudence, and bearing in mind not only its military aspects, but also its economic, political, cultural and moral aspects. The practical and theoretical limits to this type of *détente* is that it cannot see, nor develop, with new political conceptions and new institutions, what is radically new in mankind's evolution as regards the power factor in the determination of political conduct. It is perfectly true that the invention of nuclear arms, as, moreover, the risk of ecological catastrophe has drastically changed the basis on which politics and law have been founded.

We may, on the other hand, consider as innovative a *détente* that, insofar as this is possible, tries to go beyond power politics by means of the replacement of traditional defence (defensive and offensive) with defensive defence (no offensive capability) and in keeping with this principle bases the security of states on the pursuance of others' security while provision is made for one's own (mutual security). What is foreseen, with this type of *détente*, is the dawn, still vague yet already well-delineated, of the greatest revolution in the history of mankind

(inasmuch as this is capable of perfecting and unifying all previous revolutions): peace based on law and equality of all human beings.

\* \* \*

Although involving two different orientations — which really can make themselves felt — this distinction does not entail two mutually excluding historical realities. Until such a time when a world government arises, it will not be possible, in actual practice, to have anything more than a sort of mixture — based on partially common objectives — between these two ways of conceiving *détente* and carrying it out. The reason is obvious. For as long as there are national armies, and hence security based also on national use of force — innovative *détente* will be able to achieve its first successes if, and only if, at the same time success is achieved in traditional *détente* (in other words, if the international climate favours the doves and not the hawks).

This is the first aspect of the question. The second aspect lies in the fact that innovative *détente*, with its rules which are very difficult to apply (defensive defence and mutual security) will be able to show itself, i.e. take hold and last, as a policy actively pursued by states, if and only if a) international politics increasingly favours economic, social and cultural development of all the peoples on the earth making the rise to power increasingly difficult for ruling classes bent on using force without scruples in domestic and foreign policy and b) if, with the development of this international policy, innovative *détente* really does acquire, in the thinking of growing masses of individuals, the status of a process which can completely and definitively overcome power politics, and hence even come to represent the road towards the final international order: the political and institutional unity of mankind. In all other cases, the world could not remain torn between security based on strength and security based on reciprocal trust, and advance towards the only objective which could eliminate power politics in relationships between states: world federation.

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If, as will certainly be necessary to achieve economic integration and maintain it over a period of time, Europe in 1992 becomes a political entity capable of acting, then the first phase of innovative *détente* — which now has a solid basis in the Soviet Union — will effectively bloom.

*In this respect three points need to be made, the first of which is that the idea of détente as an innovative force can be developed, for the time being, only in Europe, where the need is to transcend blocks, to turn armies into purely defensive armies and establish the ground rules of mutual security.*

*The second argument is equally solid because it is based on the raison d'Etat of a constituted Europe, for which the passage from the current political and military situation to that of a system of mutual security with purely defensive armies reduced to a minimum would lead to: a) the disappearance of nuclear weapons from its territory, the end of dangers and damage caused by mutual mistrust and the freeing of huge resources, which would be destined to civil ends, b) the possibility of developing a profound economic and political agreement with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, thus favouring their democratization, c) the possibility of governing the ties of interdependence between the two Europes, the Soviet Union, Africa and Arab countries with a plan for collaboration and aid which would give life to a market provided with incalculable powers of development.*

*The third argument relates to the fact that, as a federation of free nations in the same historical site in which the modern idea of a nation was formed, Europe would transform its political thinking, making the idea of an international democracy thinkable as well as that of its extension to all mankind.*

*This does not mean that Europe will hold any position of leadership. If innovative détente is carried out, one by one all the crucial problems in the process of unification of mankind will surface, and bit by bit each state will play a strategically decisive role, until such a time as all the peoples on the earth have achieved perpetual peace and equality.*

The Federalist

## The Bolshevik Revolution and Federalism

GUIDO MONTANI

### *Socialism, Democracy and the National State.*

The renewal process started in the USSR by Gorbachev, the object of which is to achieve "a step forward in the development of socialism", has been termed by Gorbachev himself as a "new revolution" with respect to the October Revolution, in which it has its roots. The continuity between the two events is quite obvious. It is not a matter of breaking all ties with the past, but rather of assessing the errors and causes lying behind the stagnation of the revolutionary process to resume the interrupted forward march. Revolution does not only mean building something new, it also means "demolishing all that is obsolete and stagnant and that hinders rapid progress."<sup>1</sup>

Thus *perestroika* will have to be combined with a process of historiographical revision. In order to advance towards democracy it is absolutely necessary to think over the past, so as to free it from the noxious leftovers of mystification. In this respect, one of the ideas that will have to be accounted for is that of "socialism in one country." It has marked a decisive turning point in the course of the revolution, allowing the Soviet Union to achieve a massive effort in industrialisation and then to successfully reject the Nazi attack. However, at the same time, the turning point of establishing socialism in one country has also marked the end of socialist internationalism, which aimed at spreading the revolutionary process, through the III International, all over the world. Since then the Soviet Union has become the "fatherland of socialism", but at the cost of denying equal dignity to the socialist experiences started off in other countries. Soviet Russia is obliged to confront China on the basis of power for hegemony in Asia. Breshnev's doctrine of "limited sovereignty" is still valid vis-à-vis the eastern European coun-

tries.

The discussion on the development of democracy within the USSR must therefore be linked to the search for those causes which have prevented the foundation of the relations between socialist countries and between these and the other countries of the world on a democratic basis. The issue is of vital importance. *Perestroika* will be able to advance within the USSR to the extent that détente and disarmament advance all over the world. It is enough to consider the enormous amount of resources the two superpowers are forced to spend in the armaments race. The perils encountered on the future path of *perestroika* will be more easily overcome if we are aware of the need to establish the old doctrine of internationalism on a new basis, in other words the relationship between socialism, democracy and nationalism. This is important not only within the context of international politics, where the nation states, including the superpowers, must recognize the need to face some decisive problems involving the whole planet together with all the other countries in the world, but also in the domestic politics of the USSR, which is rightly considered by Gorbachev as a "multinational state," where the relationship between "great Russian" nationalism and minor nationalities has still not found a satisfactory constitutional arrangement.

Gorbachev's "new thinking" on these aspects has both light and dark areas. On a worldwide level, brave proposals are made to progressively and completely eliminate all armaments, reinforcement of the UN is called for, both for security policies and for Third World and ecological safeguarding policies, but the principle of absolute sovereignty of nation states is not questioned at all. Among the socialist countries, the need for CMEA countries to progress towards a higher economic integration is recognised, but then no democratic institutions which could allow effective control of economic development are indicated. An integration process, as EEC experience shows, is impossible without bringing into existence disequilibria between member countries. The need for "harmonizing initiatives" between fellow countries is affirmed. But through what procedures will decisions finally be taken within CMEA? Lastly, the danger of arrogant claims being advanced among the various nationalities within the USSR is acknowledged, but then no institutional mechanisms are pointed out through which these disputes can be solved democratically, thus maintaining "the unity and brotherhood of the free nations."

These uncertainties and gaps in the "new thinking" actually have

roots which go back to the very foundation of the Soviet state. The elaboration of the strategy which allowed the Bolshevik party first to seize power and then keep it is tightly linked to the issue of the United States of Europe, a slogan which at that time had wide popularity within the International. This issue deserves to be reconsidered not only because of its present importance, but also because of the unjust oblivion to which it has been condemned by, on the one hand, the historians of the Bolshevik revolution and, on the other hand, the historians of the idea of European unification.<sup>2</sup> In little more than a decade of exceptional intellectual fervour, the major leaders of the Bolshevik revolution managed to give socialist ideas worldwide importance. Those events left a permanent mark on the history of mankind. But since then the issue has faded away and the history of the world and that of socialism seem to have gone in totally different directions. If the USSR wishes to take up once again the interrupted course of human emancipation, it cannot avoid re-examining the fundamental issue of the relationship between socialism, democracy and federalism.

#### *The first reactions to the failure of the II International.*

The slogan of the "United States of Europe" played a decisive role in the discussion opened within the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party just after the downfall of the II International: a new strategy had to be drawn up which would allow the proletariat to escape the hegemony of the national bourgeoisies to which it was condemned by the imperative of "defence of the fatherland" supinely accepted by all the European socialist parties on that fateful August 4th 1914. It is in this perspective that Trotsky and Lenin, who are a fundamental reference-point for the doctrine of internationalism, lay down, in the first months of the war, a theoretical platform, which was bound to be the premiss and the foundation for the action which should make it possible for the Bolshevik party to overthrow the Tzarist autocracy and establish the first socialist government in history.

In October 1914, Trotsky published in Zurich *War and the International*, in which for the first time in Marxist literature appeared the recognition of the need to historically go beyond the nation state, by then an obstacle to the development of productive forces. "The present war — this is how Trotsky begins — is essentially a revolt of the productive forces developed by capitalism against the nation state form of their exploitation. Today the whole globe ... has become the arena of

worldwide economy, the single parts of which are indissolubly interdependent ... The old nation states ... have become intolerable obstacles to the further development of the productive forces. The 1914 war is, above all, the downfall of the nation state as an independent economic arena.”<sup>3</sup> Imperialism is generated by the contradiction between the national dimension of the state and world dimension of the productive process. The European states are now obliged to find a world basis for their development. The consequence is a conflict between the great powers for supremacy in the world market. The 1914 war marks the end of the old European system and the change over to a worldwide system of power. This process is particularly evident in the conflict between Germany and England. “A full and unlimited rule over the European continent seems to Germany an indisputable necessity for the destruction of its world enemy. Therefore imperialist Germany puts first of all in its programme the creation of a league of central European states. ... This programme... is the most eloquent proof and the most striking manifestation of the fact that the limits of the nation state have become unbearably narrow for capitalism. The great national power must give way to the great world power.” Socialists must find the courage to oppose to the imperialist programme of ruling and exploiting peoples a programme of peace and development of productive forces, in other words the organization of the world economy on a rational basis. “For the proletariat, under these historical conditions, it cannot be a matter of defending an anachronistic national ‘fatherland’, by now the main obstacle to economic development, but of defending a new, more powerful and more lasting fatherland, the republican United States of Europe, as a first step towards the United States of the World.”<sup>4</sup>

To be able to fight effectively in this direction, the first task of the socialist parties is that of understanding the reasons for the collapse of the II International, in other words for the failure to oppose war on the part of the socialists. “If the socialists had merely expressed their opinions on the present war, declining all responsibility and denying their governments’ confidence and credit, there would have been nothing to find fault with... If this did not happen, if the signal for mobilization was also the signal for the defeat of the International, if the national working parties, without a protest, joined their governments and armies, there really must be deep causes common to the whole International.”<sup>5</sup> For Trotsky the explanation should be sought for in the objective conditions which allowed the European socialist parties to develop. The nineteenth century nation state constitutes the basis of every

development of productive forces and of capitalism. “The proletariat — claims Trotsky — had therefore to go through the school of self-teaching.” Thus we come to the era of possibilism or political opportunism, “that is of conscious and systematic adjustment to the economic, legal and state forms of national capitalism.”<sup>6</sup> Over the years the spirit of adjustment of the parties completely prevails over the revolutionary spirit. In some countries, such as Germany, “the party has made the cult of organization an end in itself.” Therefore what happened close to the breakout of war is not surprising. “There can be absolutely no doubt that the question of keeping up organization, banks, people’s houses, printing-houses played a very important role in the attitude towards war of the *Reichstag* parliamentary group. The first motive I heard one of the leaders of the German comrades give was: ‘If we had acted differently we would have destroyed our organizations and our press.’”<sup>7</sup>

Socialism will be able to take up its revolutionary path again only if it takes on once more an authentically internationalist dimension. “The 1914 war finishes off the breaking up of the nation states. The socialist parties of that time which no longer exist were national parties. ... The nation states drag with them in their historical collapse the national socialist parties.”<sup>8</sup> But the war also marks the beginning of a new revolutionary era, in which it will be possible to start fighting again and free oneself of the residues of the past. By siding with their own nation state the workers have also sided with world imperialism. However, it is on the very basis of this involvement that “the political fortune of the state comes to depend” on the working parties. “The proletariat, which has passed through the school of war, at the first serious obstacle it encounters in its country, will start using the language of violence...”<sup>9</sup> The European proletariat must therefore muster its forces around a “new International” and this will be possible if it becomes aware that “the real national self-defence consists in fighting for peace.” The slogans of revolutionary fighting will thus be: “Immediate end to war! No annexations! No reparations! Right of self-determination for all nations! United States of Europe, without monarchies, without standing armies, without ruling feudal castes, without secret diplomacy!”<sup>10</sup>

Lenin soon made clear his position too. Only one month after the war broke out, on September 6th 1914 a group of exiled Bolsheviks met in Berne to draw up a few theses to submit to the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party. In these theses, drawn up by Lenin, after denouncing the betrayal of the European socialist parties which had

voted for war credits, the following lines of action are proposed: a) the development of propaganda and a fight “not against their brothers, the wage slaves in other countries, but against the reactionary and bourgeois governments and parties of all countries;” b) “as an immediate slogan, propaganda for republics in Germany, Poland, Russia and other countries and for the transforming of all separate states of Europe into a Republican United States of Europe;” c) the fight against the Tzarist monarchy...“for the liberation and self-determination for nationalities oppressed by Russia, coupled with the immediate slogans of a democratic republic, the confiscation of the landed estates and an eight-hour working day.”<sup>11</sup> This position in its essence was adopted by the Central Committee of the *Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party* and published on the *Sotsial-Demokrat* on November 1st 1914. This text emphasizes the criticism of the leaders of the II International who tried to “replace socialism with nationalism” and it points out that it must be the primary task of every Social-Democratic Party to combat “chauvinism in its own country.” For this reason — it is claimed — “to us Russian Social -Democrats there cannot be the slightest doubt that...the defeat of the Tzarist monarchy would be the lesser evil.” It is also reaffirmed that “the formation of a republican United States of Europe should be the immediate political slogan of Europe’s Social-Democrats” and finally it is acknowledged that the present war gives workers the chance to turn their arms “against the government and the bourgeoisie of each country.” Therefore, “the conversion of the present imperialist war into civil war is the only correct proletarian slogan, one that follows from the experience of the Commune, and outlined in the Basle resolution (1912); it has been dictated by all the conditions of an imperialist war between highly developed bourgeois countries.”<sup>12</sup>

The positions of Lenin and Trotsky, as can be seen, converge on many points. There remains however a fundamental difference over the best strategy to be used to direct forces towards the target of revolution. Trotsky, who was in Paris at the beginning of 1915, through the publishing group *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word) was trying to realize a policy of unity between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks in view also of some action for the “New International.” In February 1915 *Nashe Slovo* launched the proposal of a conference between the two Social Democratic groups to reach a common position. Both organizations answered the invitation positively, but during the discussion were unable to find a common “internationalist” platform.

The greatest contrast concerned the pacifist slogans, which Trotsky

accepted in the attempt to get important sectors of German and French Social Democracy interested, whereas Lenin was against them so as to draw a clear and indisputable distinction between “social chauvinists” and “internationalists.” In a letter dated June 4th 1915 to *Kommunist*, a Bolshevik influenced newspaper which had invited him to collaborate, Trotsky writes: “I cannot reconcile myself to the vagueness and evasiveness of your position on the question of mobilizing the proletariat under the slogan of the struggle for peace. It is under this slogan that the working masses are now in fact coming back to their senses politically, and the forces of socialism are rallying in all countries. Under this slogan an attempt to restore the international ties of the Socialist proletariat is now being made. Furthermore, I cannot possibly agree with your view, now concretized in a resolution, that the defeat of Russia is the lesser evil. This uncalled for and unjustified position represents a concession in principle to the political methodology of social patriotism....”<sup>13</sup> Lenin’s answer was published on the *Sotsial-Demokrat* of July 26th 1915 and marks an exacerbation both of tone and substance: the strategy of transforming the imperialist war into civil war is defined as an exclusive objective. “During a reactionary war — Lenin begins — a revolutionary class cannot but desire the defeat of its government.” In his conciliatory attempts Trotsky, according to Lenin, lost sight of the essence of revolutionary action. It is true that the defeat of Russia implies the victory of Germany and that this might appear to favour German militarism. But what is really decisive is only the outburst of the socialist revolution. “A revolution in wartime means civil war; the conversion of a war between governments into a civil war is, on the one hand, made easier by military reverses (‘defeats’) of governments; on the other, one cannot actually strive for such a conversion without thereby facilitating defeat.” Only on this basis is it possible, Lenin concludes, to start “revolutionary action even in one country,” but this will also be the beginning of a “European revolution, to the permanent peace of socialism.”<sup>14</sup>

Trotsky’s position, more flexible and possibilist than Lenin’s, had a few solid justifications over the short term. By now in the whole European socialist movement a renewal of the internationalist ideals was taking place — in Germany under the influence of Rosa Luxemburg — and the conditions for a new International were ripening. In fact, from the 5th to the 8th of September 1915 at Zimmerwald, in Switzerland, forty-two delegates — including Lenin and Trotsky — of the leading European socialist parties met to discuss the renewal of the socialist



struggle on an international level. During the debates it soon became clear that a common position could be reached only on the basis of a strategy which did not clash with the demands of the most important parties on the Continent, the German and French ones. They presented a "Joint Declaration" in which they claimed that the respective parties would undertake to "hasten the ending of the war" and would act so that "...the peace movement may become strong enough to force our governments to stop this slaughter." But no hint was made of the possibility of civil war. Lenin's extremist positions were rejected and Trotsky, who was the effective architect of the conference, was entrusted to draw up the final resolution, in which however the betrayal of those socialists who voted in favour of war credits was condemned and the workers of every country were invited to renew the common struggle for peace among all peoples.<sup>15</sup>

*The strategy to seize power and the nationality question.*

During the months which preceded the Zimmerwald conference and while the controversy over the strategy was developing with Trotsky, Lenin also perfected a radical revision of the party's position concerning the slogan of the United States of Europe. Between February 27th and March 4th 1915 a conference of all the Bolshevik groups abroad met in Berne to decide on a common position on the problems of the war. The conference was totally dominated by the discussion over the slogan of the United States of Europe. Bucharin and his group had presented a resolution in which a certain unilateral approach to the strategy of "civil war for the conquest of political power and the triumph of socialism" was questioned. This strategy, the resolution claimed, "does not exclude, but on the contrary includes, other revolutionary slogans, such as for example the slogan of peace and the slogan of a United States of Europe. Our group holds that these two slogans may be of great significance for agitation and the revolution." Many of the participants to the conference objected to these theses, but they had to face Lenin, who strenuously defended the position and in the end managed to obtain unanimous favour for the party's traditional position for the United States of Europe. However, the day after Lenin made the following declaration: "Although yesterday a definite stand was taken concerning the United States of Europe, if we consider that this issue has raised different points of view amongst us, and moreover that the discussion took place unilaterally, ignoring the economic side of the problem,

which remains rather unclear, the matter cannot be considered settled."<sup>16</sup>

In fact, on August 23rd 1915 in the *Sotsial-Demokrat* Lenin's article "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe" appeared, in which the reasons for his refusal are explained. After claiming that "...if accompanied by the revolutionary overthrow of the three most reactionary monarchies in Europe, headed by the Russian, it is quite invulnerable as a political slogan, there still remains the highly important question of its economic content and significance." By economic significance Lenin means "in a capitalistic regime." It follows that "a United States of Europe, under capitalism, is either impossible or reactionary." In fact the European capitalists would make an agreement only "...for the purpose of jointly suppressing socialism in Europe, of jointly protecting colonial booty against Japan and America ... The time when the cause of democracy and socialism was associated only with Europe alone has gone for ever." The arena in which one must fight for socialism has by now taken a worldwide dimension. It is therefore senseless to limit one's sphere of action to Europe only. "The United States of the World (and not of Europe) represent the state form of unity and freedom of nations," Lenin concludes. But immediately after he limits his statement with the observation — later very cleverly exploited by Stalin — that "...the slogan of a United States of the World would hardly be a correct one, first, because it merges with socialism; second, because it may be wrongly interpreted to mean that the victory of socialism in one country is impossible, and it may also create misconceptions as to the relations of such a country to the others. Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, *the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country alone.*"<sup>17</sup>

The argument put forward by Lenin to reject the slogan of United States of Europe do not differ substantially from those of Rosa Luxemburg in her disagreement with Kautsky, and are not at all convincing in this case either. If we admit that the development of productive forces has by now created an interdependent market on a worldwide scale and that, in principle, it is right to speak of United States of the World, why should we not speak of United States of Europe (republican or socialist, it matters little) as an intermediate stage? Actually, it seems that the main reason for Lenin's change of mind lies mainly in his attempt to create a clear-cut dividing line with the by now discredited European social democracy which considered the pacifist

objective of the United States of Europe as a "postwar" task, while still supporting, even with government positions, the militarist policy of its country. Lenin's indignation at these opportunistic positions is natural and his attempt to bring European socialism back to antinationalist positions is understandable: this is why he even goes so far as to propagandize the defeat of his own government. That this actually was Lenin's main reason is indirectly confirmed by an episode which took place in preparation for the Zimmerwald conference. Lenin and Zinoviev had written a pamphlet entitled *Socialism and war* to be divulged at the international Conference, and to which was to be added the Central Committee's resolution dated 1st November 1914 which was in favour of the United States of Europe. To this resolution Lenin added the following *Post scriptum*: "The demand for a United States of Europe as it is put forward in the manifesto of the Central Committee — accompanying it with an appeal for the overthrow of the Russian, Austrian, and German monarchies — differs from the pacifist interpretation of the slogan formulated by Kautsky and others."<sup>18</sup> Any attempt at an international co-ordination of the socialist parties' political action for an improbable peace could only be considered by Lenin as sabotage of the fundamental strategic action: seizing power, in other words the destruction of Tzarist autocracy.

However, these considerations on tactics and strategy would not be sufficient to justify the refusal of the United States of Europe objective on the part of Lenin if they did not go with an actual incomprehension of federalism and the federal state, as an institutional solution to the problem of peaceful relations between states, whether capitalist or socialist. Lenin would never have abandoned a theoretic milestone of socialism simply for tactical reasons. The truth is that Lenin never fully understood the value of federalism and this is particularly evident in his writings on the issue of nationalities, in which the solutions he suggests are no different from those of the "bourgeois" Wilson, promoter of the League of Nations. According to Lenin, a socialist state should guarantee the "right to secession" for all its nationalities, because this is the only way of acknowledging equality among all nations. But at this point Lenin realizes that this would mean favouring the political fragmentation of the world and this would clash with the demand for unity and development of the productive forces. The international task of the proletariat, in the smaller states, is thus to ask to be joined to the larger states and the task of the proletariat in the larger states is to guarantee autonomy to the smaller ones. However, according to Lenin, this solution

too can only be considered as temporary. "The Marxists — he writes in 1913 — are against federation and decentralization for the simple reason that capitalism for its development requires states to be as large and centralized as possible...Until and to the extent that various nations are part of one single state, Marxists will never preach either the federal principle or decentralization. The great centralized state is an enormous historical progress..."<sup>19</sup> And in one of his writings dated March 1916 he specifies: "Acknowledging the right to self-determination is not equal to acknowledging federation as a principle. ...The aim of socialism does not consist only in abolishing the breaking up of nations into small states and every isolation of nations, not only in bringing nations closer but also in amalgamating them. ...As mankind will never achieve class abolition without going through a temporary period of dictatorship by the oppressed class, thus the inevitable fusion of nations cannot be achieved without a temporary period of total liberation of all the oppressed nations, in other words of freedom to secede."<sup>20</sup>

Lenin therefore does not see any value in the federalist solution because he thinks that the ideal of socialism consists in a centralized superstate on a worldwide level. In a temporary phase, various socialist states can even live together in view of a future unification. The problem of the relations between socialist states is not even considered and it is taken for granted that it can automatically be solved, on the basis of the goodwill to cooperate between socialist governments.

Trotsky does not let himself be trapped in the mesh of these unsatisfactory argumentations. At the beginning of 1916, in a letter to Henriette Roland-Host, who was trying to launch a new periodical (*Vorbote*) to debate the prospects of the Zimmerwald Left, Trotsky asks a crucial question. "You say" — claims Trotsky — that the right of nations to self-determination is unrealizable under capitalism and superfluous under socialism. Why it is superfluous under socialism I cannot understand. One would think that our politics now proceed from the conviction that we are entering an epoch of social revolution. Therefore we must have a program for social revolution, a program of proletarian state power in Europe. Is it really superfluous to tell the Poles, the Serbs, and the Alsatians what government the European proletariat will secure for them, once it is in power? Do you really think that national frictions and disputes will disappear from the face of the earth, once the proletariat has achieved power?"<sup>21</sup>

Trotsky tries to give an organic answer to this decisive query in a series of articles on *Nashe Slovo*.<sup>22</sup> Contrary to Lenin, Trotsky does not

think that nations should give way to a gigantic centralized state. "A national community — he writes — is the living heart of culture, as the national language is its living organ, and these will still retain their significance through indefinitely long historical periods. The Social Democracy is desirous of safeguarding and is obliged to safeguard the freedom of development (or dissolution) of the national community..." But naturally it cannot be expected that the defence of national particularism should take on a privileged and absolute value with respect to the other political and social objectives. "From the standpoint of historical development as well as from the point of view of the tasks of the Social Democracy, the tendency of the modern economy is fundamental, and it must be guaranteed the fullest opportunity of executing its truly liberationist historical mission: to construct the united world economy, independent of national frames, state and tariff barriers, subject only to the peculiarities of the soil and natural resources, to climate and the requirements of division of labour." Therefore a political solution must be sought which allows "an enlarging of the State as an organizer of the economy but not as nation." Only in this way is authentic self-determination of nations possible. "The state unification of Europe — concludes Trotsky — is clearly a prerequisite of self-determination of great and small nations of Europe. A national cultural existence, free of national economic antagonisms and based on a real self-determination, is possible only under the roof of a democratically united Europe freed from state and tariff barriers."<sup>23</sup>

At this stage Trotsky goes on to examine the objections of the opponents of the United States of Europe, with the intention of re-establishing this slogan as a revolutionary objective of the European proletariat. It is not true in fact, Trotsky maintains, that this objective must be considered reactionary if pursued under a capitalistic regime. One must distinguish between a European "half-unification" and an authentically democratic unification. The European capitalist governments will certainly be able to find the way to realize agreements (one might say a "confederation") at the top, but they will never eliminate the deep and intrinsic causes of international conflicts. "Hence, it is that *the economic unification of Europe*, which offers colossal advantages to producer and consumer alike, in general to the whole cultural development, becomes the revolutionary task of the European proletariat in its struggle against imperialist protectionism and its instrument — militarism. *The United States of Europe — without monarchies, standing armies and secret diplomacy* — is therefore the most important integral

part of the proletarian peace programme." Moreover, Trotsky continues, even if the bourgeois and reactionary governments manage to form the United States of Europe, the proletariat must still not renounce its objective. It is certainly not a question of going back to the formation of small economies closed inside customs barriers and isolated from the world. In this case the "programme of a European revolutionary movement will be: the destruction of the oppressive and anti-democratic state form", at the same time retaining the acquired political unity. It is a matter of "the conversion of the imperialist state trust into a European Republican Federation."<sup>24</sup>

Finally, Trotsky, explicitly quoting Lenin's positions, discusses the prospect of the "victory of socialism in one country." Trotsky does not question the strategic choice of seizing the opportunity to carry out a socialist revolution in one country, if the chance occurs, "without waiting for the others." The decisive point is another. "To view the perspectives of the social revolution within a national framework is to succumb to the same national narrowness that forms the content of social-patriotism." Trotsky continues: "The revolution cannot begin otherwise than on the national basis, but cannot be completed on that basis in view of the present economic and military-political independence of the European states, which has never been so forcefully revealed as in this war. The slogan of the United States of Europe gives expression to this interdependence, which will directly and immediately set the conditions for the concerted action of the European proletariat in the revolution."<sup>25</sup> If a successful revolution broke out in Russia "...we have every reason to hope that during the course of the present war a powerful revolutionary movement will be launched all over Europe. It is clear that such a movement can succeed and develop and gain victory only as a general European one...The salvation of the Russian Revolution lies in its propagation all over Europe...The state unification of Europe, to be achieved neither by force of arms nor by industrial and diplomatic agreements, would in such a case become the unpostponable task of the triumphant revolutionary proletariat. The United States of Europe is the slogan of the revolutionary epoch into which we have entered...The nation state has outlived itself — as a framework for the development of the productive forces, as a basis for the class struggle, and thereby also as a state form of dictatorship of the proletariat."<sup>26</sup>

The controversy between Lenin and Trotsky over the United States of Europe ends at this point. The respective positions are reaffirmed, but they do not represent an obstacle to the progressive approach of the

two leaders at a time when it is necessary to join all efforts to deliver the decisive blow to the Tzarist state. For both of them it is indisputable that the Russian Revolution represents the beginning of the world socialist revolution. Lenin, after the outbreak of the February revolution, ended his "Farewell letter to the Swiss workers" with the words: "Long live the proletarian revolution which starts in Europe!" And on his arrival at Petrograd he greeted the crowds surrounding him with the cry: "Long live the world socialist revolution!"<sup>27</sup> It is however evident that there are many differences between Lenin's strategy and Trotsky's. By abandoning the prospect of the United States of Europe, Lenin has objectively opened the way to the construction of "socialism in one country" and to the consequent liquidation of the worldwide and revolutionary dimension of the socialist ideology. Through the October Revolution, Lenin and Trotsky managed to break the weakest link in the chain. But the dramatic problem of what would happen to the remaining part of the chain still lay open. What would be the fate of the Russian Revolution without a rising of the European proletariat in its support? The answers of Lenin and Trotsky to this question do not converge. As the historian of socialism Rosenberg rightly wrote: "Leninism has its way out in case the world revolution should not take place: Trotskyism has not."<sup>28</sup>

*The world revolutionary party and Europe.*

The III International was founded in Moscow in March 1919. The initiative was taken by Lenin, when Soviet Russia was most isolated, both to oppose the attempts at re-establishing the Social-Democratic International, and with the hope of being able to count on the support of the European proletariat: in December 1918 the German Communist party was founded, as a result of the separation of the left wing of the SPD. This second event was decisive. The founding of the new International was in fact doubted up to the last minute by the attitude of the German delegate Eberlein, who had been instructed by his party to oppose the creation of a Third International, still considered premature. It was only during the debates, when the conviction that the revolution in Europe might break out within a few months spread among the delegates, that Eberlein's consent was obtained (actually, Eberlein abstained from voting on the founding resolution).

The primary aim of the new International was to extend the proletarian revolution from Russia to Europe and the whole world. The

weakest link in the chain had broken, but could Soviet Russia hold on for long without the support of the European proletariat? The highest Bolshevik leaders, particularly Lenin and Trotsky, were convinced that — in the short term — conditions were ripening in Europe for the seizing of power by the proletariat and that Bolshevism could become the model for the international revolution. A victory of the European proletariat would move the centre of gravity of the revolution westwards. Lenin was perfectly aware of this and for some time tried to create a *Comintern* (Communist International) office in Holland and to call a conference there. Zinoviev even went so far as to declare that "we shall be glad if we can succeed in transferring the place of residence of the III International and its executive committee as quickly as possible to another capital, for example, Paris." The influence of the western European proletariat was still decisive. The working language of the III International, at least until Stalin's power became overbearing, was German.

The conviction of a possible victorious revolution in Europe continued despite the bloody repression of the German insurrection, with the barbarous killing of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht on January 16th 1919. Only 15 days after the closing down of the Congress for the foundation of the III International, on March 21st 1919, a Soviet republic was established in Budapest. At the beginning of April a Soviet republic was proclaimed in Munich. Strikes and insurrections were taking place everywhere, in France, in Holland and in Switzerland. Lenin then declared that "our victory on an international scale is completely secure;" on celebrating the First of May he ended his speech on the cry of "Long live the International Republic of Soviets!" and three months later he declared: "This July will be our last difficult July, and next July we shall greet the victory of the International Soviet Republic."<sup>29</sup>

All the events concerning the slogan of the United States of Europe in the III International are closely linked to the strategy for the world revolution. In the early years the problem did not present itself directly. The prospect of a rapid spreading of the revolution in Europe was so deeply rooted that no significant contrasts could arise between supporters and opposers of European unification, as happened instead later. At the foundation congress Lenin presented some Theses "on bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat" with the explicit objective of directing the European proletariat towards the establishment of communist parties, abandoning the decrepit social democratic organizations. Trotsky instead wrote the first "Manifesto of

the Communist International to the workers of the world," in which he reaffirmed that "the nation state, which gave a mighty impulse to capitalist development, has become too narrow for the further development of productive forces." For this reason it is possible to overcome imperialism and guarantee real independence to all peoples, even the smallest, only through actual forms of political unity. "The small peoples — it is claimed in the Manifesto — can be assured the opportunity of free existence only by the proletarian revolution which will free the productive forces of all countries from the tentacles of the nation states, unifying the peoples in closest economic collaboration on the basis of a common economic plan, and offering the weakest and smallest people an opportunity of freely and independently directing their national cultural affairs without any detriment to the unified and centralized European and world economy."<sup>30</sup> The formulation adopted here by Trotsky is only slightly more prudent than the one used in an article published by him in *Pravda* on January 26th 1919, in view of the convocation of the establishment Congress of the International, in which he wrote that "To turn Europe into a federation of Soviet republics is the only conceivable solution to the needs of the national development of large and small peoples without prejudicing the centralist requirements of economic union first of Europe then of the whole world."<sup>31</sup>

A radical change took place in the policy of the International with the III world Congress which was held from June 22nd to July 12th 1921. In the previous month of March an awkward attempt at an insurrection had failed in Germany. The Bolshevik government in Hungary had only lasted for a short time. In Italy the occupation of factories had never given the impression that it could turn into a serious attempt at seizing power. The Kronstadt revolt (with its repression) and the launching of the New Economic Policy (NEP) were by now directing the Soviet society towards a period of stability. All these events had to be taken into consideration and Lenin and Trotsky fought, even against some of the Russian leaders of the International such as Zinoviev and Bucharin, to impose a change in the strategy and the tactics of the International. It was necessary to alienate and make inoffensive the fanciful behaviour of those who confused revolution with the riot and political adventurism, which Lenin had already condemned in his famous 1920 essay '*Left Wing' Communism: An Infantile Disorder*'. The prospect of a world revolution was going further away in time. "Now for the first time — Trotsky stated in his report — we see and hear that we are not so immediately close to our objective,

to the conquest of power, to the world revolution. At that time, in 1919, we would tell ourselves: 'It is only a matter of months'. Now we say: 'Maybe it is a matter of years.'<sup>32</sup> The main task of the international Communist party, in this new situation, became that of "directing the defensive struggles of the proletariat, spreading them and making them take root." Essentially, it was necessary to achieve a "temporary retreat" strategy in which the organization had to be strengthened, mostly through convincing the proletariat, which still adhered massively to the socialist parties. The different national sections of the communist parties had to try to widen their basis and reinforce the cadres by means of the "united front" tactic, working in agreement with the Social-Democratic parties, to win the consensus of the majority of the working class, in view of future revolutionary occasions.

The reasons for this "temporary retreat" were ever adequately explained either by Lenin or Trotsky. Lenin affirmed that the *Comintern* had passed from the assault tactic to that of the siege, but this image did not make clear the future of the Bolshevik revolution and the prospects of the international one. Trotsky presented an ample report on the economic decline of Europe with respect to the emergent US power and the consequences for the strategy of the International. Trotsky diagnosed with precision and clear-sightedness some of the decisive tendencies of world economy and politics, such as the fact that "the Dollar has 'already' become the 'Sovereign' of the world financial market"<sup>33</sup> and that the European countries were driven by their respective difficulties to a policy of ever increasing contrasts which might even result in another war (although Trotsky wrongly thought that a war between the USA and Great Britain was more likely). But in the end the causes for the failure of the International were attributed to simple reasons of organization: the lack of preparation and the failures of the western communist parties in the struggle for national power. From the point of view of the revolution the situation remained favourable. On the contrary, the decline of Europe increased the possibilities of success for the communist parties. "Both the world situation and the future perspectives are profoundly revolutionary in character."<sup>34</sup>

Both for Lenin and for Trotsky the responsibility for the failure of the revolution were essentially to be ascribed to a subjective factor, such as the inability of the western leaders to bring their party to success. The failure to diagnose the objective conditions — the historical and political world context — in which to set the action of the International was to leave room for different and opposing orientations, which fully

appeared only in later years.

During a first phase, the prestige, authority and political ability of Trotsky managed to impose on the International a strategy favourable to the establishment of the European federation and to the struggle to extend the conquests of socialism to the whole world. The occasion was provided by the occupation of the Ruhr by the French and Belgian troupes, because of the failure of the Germans to pay war reparations. The threat of a European and World war once more loomed on the horizon. The occupation took place on January 11th 1923. On 13th January the *Comintern* executive published an Appeal in which the French and German workers were invited to "promote strikes and demonstrations" to prevent the war and to demand "the European federation of the socialist republics." The Appeal ended with the slogan "Long live the federation of socialist governments!"<sup>35</sup>

The international situation at that time seemed to Trotsky to be favourable to a renewal of the revolutionary process. Moreover, domestic political life was characterized by a moment of uncertainty over the prospects of power within the party: Lenin was by now absent from political activity and the fight for succession had already begun undercover. Trotsky made of the slogan of the United States of Europe a mainstay of his revolutionary political perspective. On June 30th 1923 he published an article in *Pravda* in which he affirmed the timeliness of taking this strategy into consideration once again. "...The occupation of the Ruhr so fatal to Europe and to mankind — wrote Trotsky — we find a distorted expression of the need for uniting the coal of the Ruhr with the iron of Lorraine. Europe cannot develop economically within the state and customs frontiers imposed at Versailles. Europe is compelled either to remove these frontiers, or to face the threat of complete economic decay." The European federation would be the only alternative to "... the very danger arising from the United States of America (which is spurring the destruction of Europe, and is ready to step in subsequently as Europe's master)." The United States of Europe represent a revolutionary perspective, because through the Soviet Union the process can extend eastwards and "consequently will open an outlet for Asia towards Europe."<sup>36</sup>

This position was kept up within the International up to 1926, when the dispute between Trotsky and Stalin had reached a point when it could no longer be settled. Trotsky was expelled from the *Politburo* of the party and Zinoviev removed from his appointment as president of the International, because of his internationalist positions in favour of

Trotsky. The 5th World Congress, which was held in summer 1924, approved the idea of a Balkan federation and a Manifesto "on the occasion of the tenth anniversary from the outbreak of the war", drawn up by Trotsky, in which it was claimed that the victory of the European proletariat will be even more certain if the European states join together in a "Soviet federation...The revolutionary movement in America would then receive an enormous impulse. The European Socialist federation will thus become the corner stone of the world socialist Republic."<sup>37</sup> Finally, in December 1926, it was Bucharin himself, by now faithful ally of Stalin against Trotsky, who presented some Theses, approved by the seventh Plenum of the *Comintern*, in which once again, even though "against Pan-Europe", the demand for "the United Socialist States of Europe" is reaffirmed and is supported "against the League of Nations, a Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics."<sup>38</sup>

*The establishment of socialism in one country and the decline of the revolutionary perspective.*

The 5th Congress was the last occasion on which the International declares itself in favour of the European federation. The struggle to assert socialism in one country was inexorably overwhelming all the opposers and of course the International had to bow its head to this new course of events too. At the beginning it was not clear even to Stalin what a decisive role this point of view might play in the struggle for the seizing of power in the USSR: Lenin died on January 21st 1924, but the tension within the party had already become particularly acute two years before. The central issues concerned the freedom of criticism within the party — defended by Trotsky — and the problem of overcoming the NEP with an effective industrialization plan. These proposals from the left were then opposed by Bucharin who, leaning on the still wide rural Russian basis, defended the hypothesis of a "snail's pace" industrialization. Stalin led the so-called Centre and his power was based on the bureaucratic structure of the state and the party. On the problem of the revolutionary prospects his point of view was so orthodox that in an article published in *Pravda* on April 30th 1924 he wrote: "To overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and establish the power of the proletariat in one country does not yet mean the complete victory of socialism. The principal task of socialism — the organization of socialist production — has still to be fulfilled. Can this task be fulfilled, can the final victory of socialism be achieved in one country, without the joint efforts

of the proletarians in several advanced countries? No, it cannot. To overthrow the bourgeoisie the efforts of one country are sufficient; this is proved by the history of our revolution. For the final victory of socialism, for the organization of socialist production, the efforts of one country, particularly a peasant country like Russia, are insufficient; for that, the efforts of the proletarians of several advanced countries are required.”<sup>39</sup>

However, before the end of 1924 Stalin's point of view was completely overturned. In the autumn, on the occasion of the victorious revolution's anniversary, Trotsky published the *October Lessons*, in which he openly attacked the old Bolshevik guard, which did not support Lenin at the decisive moment in his decision to seize power. The answer soon came and was orchestrated by Stalin with great ability. All the party press started a campaign against “trozkism”, the new doctrine which was trying to supplant leninism. In a speech given on December 13th “On the theory of permanent revolution” Bucharin condemned Trotsky's Europeanism and his lack of faith in the Russian proletariat, which would not have succeeded in its revolutionary attempt without the help of its European comrades. It was Stalin, however, with an article published in *Pravda* on December 20th, who introduced the new political perspective into the debate, which was to prove itself over the years as a decisive turning point in the history not only of Russian communism, but of the whole international socialist movement.

Stalin starts off by establishing that “the essence of the October revolution” consists “in the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat has asserted itself here as a result of the victory of socialism in one country, not very developed capitalistically, while capitalism has continued to exist in the other countries which are more developed capitalistically.” According to Trotsky the establishment of socialism cannot be completed in isolation and without the help of the proletariat of the more advanced European countries. For this reason it is necessary to pursue a strategy devoted to provoking the world revolution, wherever the chance occurs. “But what shall we do — Stalin wonders — if the world revolution is forced to arrive late? Will there be any hope left for our revolution? Trotsky does not leave us any.” Instead history teaches us that some countries have managed to make up for the delay with respect to the more advanced countries. Germany was a backward country compared to France and England. The same can be said of Japan compared to Russia. “Therefore — concludes Stalin — the victory of socialism in one country, even if this country is capitalistically less

developed and capitalism continues to exist in other countries, although capitalistically more developed, is perfectly possible and probable.” Trotsky's political programme is absolutely impracticable. The slogan of the United States of Europe would mean something if a simultaneous victory of the European proletariat in several countries were possible. But this prospect is extremely unrealistic. The establishment of socialism in one country does not at all mean abandoning the prospect of the world revolution. For Stalin: “The immense country of the Soviets...through its simple existence, stimulates the revolution in the whole world.” In conclusion, the task of all proletarians becomes that of defending the first conquests of their “socialist fatherland.” It is this meaning that must be seen in the search for the necessary support given by the European proletariat to the Russian. Trotsky, with his continuous search for external support for the Soviet revolution, actually contributes to “the lack of faith in the strength and ability of the Russian proletariat.”<sup>40</sup>

The struggle for power within the Soviet government paralysed the activity of the International. The 6th World Congress was called in Moscow only in the summer of 1928, when Trotsky was already in exile at Alma Ata and Bucharin felt that his alliance with Stalin was about to end. But perhaps for this very reason, Bucharin presented some theses and a programme which definitively sanctioned the subordination of the International to Soviet foreign policy. The “Europeanistic” strategy of Trotsky was immediately abandoned by reviving Lenin's old ideas. “In a capitalistic regime — it is claimed — the United States of Europe or the United States of the World are utopia. But even if they were achieved, they would inevitably take on reactionary characteristics...All the tendencies in this direction (for example, the Pan-european movement) are distinctly reactionary.”<sup>41</sup> This judgement is founded on the acknowledgement of a new international reality: “The world is divided into two irreducibly hostile spheres: the sphere of the imperialist states and that of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union...Two antagonistic systems now confront each other in what was once one world economy: capitalism and socialism.”<sup>42</sup> Here for the first time, although it is disguised in ideological form, the acknowledgement of the world bipolarism appears, in other words the tendential division of the world in opposing blocs. The process to bring this new reality to its maturation will be long and tormented. But the doctrine of the establishment of socialism in one country lets us clearly glimpse what the final outcome will be. The USSR will become from



now on the reference point of the world proletariat. "The Soviet Union is the real fatherland of the proletariat...This entrusts to the international proletariat the duty of accelerating the successful establishment of socialism in the Soviet Union and of defending with every means the country of the dictatorship of the proletariat from the attacks of the capitalistic powers."<sup>43</sup> The task of the communist parties of the world and of the International is thus strictly subordinated to the defence of the existing order. The world revolution is not of course repudiated, but the path which could make it possible passes through the Soviet supremacy. "The Soviet Union — it is claimed — is destined to become...the centre of the international revolution." As gradually some revolutions are successful outside the USSR, these new republics should join those already existing "to finally create the World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that will unite the whole of mankind under the hegemony of the international proletariat organized as state."<sup>44</sup>

From his faraway exile at Alma Ata, Trotsky sent the 6th World Congress a criticism of the "Programme project" which punctiliously reaffirmed all his previous positions on the absolute incompatibility between the national and autarchical theses contained in the Programme and the fundamental principles of marxism and socialism. "There now exists a theory — Trotsky wrote — according to which the complete establishment of socialism is possible in one country...If one adopts this point of view, which is fundamentally national-reformist and not revolutionary and internationalist, the need for the slogan of a United States of Europe disappears or at least diminishes. But this very slogan seems to us to be necessary and vital, because it contains the condemnation of the idea of a socialist development limited to one country."<sup>45</sup> On the whole this statement of Trotsky is perfectly right. The delegates who were present, especially the Europeans, who managed to read any rare and mutilated copy of Trotsky's criticisms found them in agreement with marxist orthodoxy. But by now everybody knew that the main issue was not so much to discuss and defend any principles of a doctrine, but rather to allow the Soviet government to deal successfully with the difficult task of forced industrialization. Thus, in the general silence, the slogan of a United States of Europe was definitively set aside from the political horizon of the communist International.

#### *Federalism in the past and in the future of the USSR.*

In the USSR, thanks to Gorbachev's *perestroika*, a process of de-

mocratization of the Soviet institutions is now taking place which will inevitably re-open the debate on the relationship between socialism and democracy started in the Twenties, but halted by the hard conditions imposed by the Stalinist policy of the establishment of socialism in one country. Naturally, an essential part of this debate will concern exactly the meaning of the Stalin experience. Was the fierce totalitarian and repressive policy which accompanied the industrialization process really necessary? No simple and univocal answer exists to such a complex historical matter. However we think some observations can be made on the subject, also on the basis of the role played by the slogan of the United States of Europe.

*First*. All the Soviet leaders, from Bucharin on the right to Trotsky on the left, agreed that after the NEP experience it was necessary to advance towards complete industrialization of the USSR. What was under discussion was only the pace of this process and the means to achieve it. *Second*. Trotsky had deluded himself over the possibility that a revolution in Europe could really break out and that from that front some decisive help could come for Soviet industrialization. Kautsky had often observed, and with reason, that the German proletariat did not need a violent revolution to seize power, because by now it could reach it, within a reasonable period of time, through democratic methods. Therefore the defence of democratic rule was the best weapon of the SPD. But the time of the ascent to power of Social-Democracy did not coincide necessarily with the needs of the USSR. *Third*. The Treaties of Versailles left the main European states deeply discontented so that very soon the rearmament process started again and the crisis of the democratic regimes became accentuated (take as an example the ascent of Fascism in Italy). The attempts to halt this crazy march of Europe towards the precipice were completely inadequate. The proposal by Briand and *Pan-europa* to create a European federation got caught up in the tight net of diplomacy, so that after 1930 the forces of nationalism set out again with renewed vigour. Certainly, if the prospect of a European federation had seriously appeared on the political horizon just after the war, Trotsky's policy would have been more credible in the eyes of his party comrades. At this point, however, there would have been the question of the relationship between the European federation, which could only have arisen on a democratic basis, and the USSR, which (at least up to the moment of Stalin's victory over Trotsky) had not yet chosen the one-way street of totalitarianism. *Fourth*. In an international climate dominated by nationalism, by the rush to rearmament and protection-



ism, the choice of an industrialization policy could only be founded on the principle of the "socialism in one country." Trotsky was right to denounce its inconsistency with the fundamental principles of marxism and internationalism. But Stalin was also right to affirm that industrialization in the USSR could take place even without outside help. And at this point socialism had to take on national colours. It would have been impossible to ask the Soviet people to make a tremendous collective effort without an adequate ideological justification. This ideology could only be the defence of the "fatherland of the proletariat", which was considered, from then on, as the supreme value not only for the Soviet people, but for all the proletarians in the world. *Fifth*. From this has resulted an increasing distance between the universal values supported by the great 1917 Revolution and the objectives pursued by Soviet power. The interests of the workers' movement outside the USSR were to be subordinated to the supreme value of the defence of the "fatherland of the proletariat." In the long run, this was to cause the disruption of the International and the decline of the role of the "Soviet model" in the international socialist movement, both in the industrialized countries and in the Third World.

The analysis of the debate over the slogan of a United States of Europe has proved that federalism has never really been part of the ideology of the Bolshevik revolutionaries, including Trotsky, who, although he had understood the historical necessity of going beyond the nation state, considered federalism only as a form of state which was indispensable to the international organization of modern production, but without ascribing any strategic value to this choice. For Trotsky the decisive front of the struggle — that is the divide between progress and reaction — remained that between capitalism and socialism, not between nationalism and federalism. For this reason he could not offer a valid political alternative to the ascent of fascism and nazism in Europe and did nothing to unite the forces of the working movement favourable to the United States of Europe to those, rather important, that in the Thirties were appearing in European bourgeois and government spheres in favour of the same objective. The fact remains that the Soviet Union often found itself facing choices which could have had a democratic course out only on a federalistic basis. As these issues — which concern the federalist aspects of the Soviet Constitution and the democratization process of international relations, including socialist countries — have not yet been solved and in fact are sure to reappear as the democratization process started by Gorbachev is consolidated, it is worthwhile to analyze

them briefly.

The first concerns the nature of the very constitution of the USSR and in particular the coexistence in the country of different nationalities. Lenin, who in theory had rejected federalism, at the time of drawing up the first Constitution of 1918 had to face the need to accept it in practice. In fact he himself wrote a Declaration, then included in the Constitution, in which he states that: "The Russian Soviet Republic is founded on the basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of national Soviet republics." When a few years later the need arose to revise the constitutional text, Lenin apparently wanted to introduce further protection to safeguard the national minorities, partly because of the contrasts he had had with Stalin, who according to Lenin had exaggerated in his manifestation of "Great Russian chauvinism." However, although Lenin seemed sincerely tormented by the problem of the relations to establish between central government and minor nationalities — and some commentators believe that if Lenin had lived longer, the 1924 Constitution, imposed by Stalin just after his death, would have been quite different<sup>46</sup> — there are no significant signs of him overcoming his concept of federalism as a temporary phase on the way towards a centralized state. Later this concept was, of course, not disputed any more by Stalin, who in 1917 had published in *Pravda* an article significantly entitled *Against federalism*, in which he rejected as forced "the analogy made between the United States of 1776 and modern Russia."<sup>47</sup> Actually, Stalin was perfectly aware of the fact that it is practically impossible to guarantee real autonomy to the republics of a federation in a one-party regime. But, after so many decades of centralizing policy, the need for national autonomy of the various Soviet republics has revealed itself as no less tenacious than the aspiration of the Soviet people to a greater democracy and political pluralism. Federalism today can no longer be considered as a temporary fact. Rather the opposite is true. It is the administrative centralization which is in question, because it has become an obstacle to a more mature expression of the peoples of the Soviet nation, who are still not free and equal among themselves, as was written in the first 1918 Constitution.

Moreover, of decisive importance, not only for the USSR but for the whole world, will be the institutional solutions that will be proposed to guarantee to mankind a general and permanent disarmament. The tenacious and far-seeing peace policy of Gorbachev has started to give significant fruits. After the 1987 Washington agreement on the elimination of the Euromissiles, it seems reasonable to speak of a turning point

in the political relations between the two superpowers compared to the years of the cold war and the rush to armaments. But the doubt still remains whether, in the contemporary world, a peace policy based on a series of agreements and international treaties between states is sufficient, or if it might not be necessary to pass on the results achieved each time to supernational institutions with the power to make the states involved respect them. For example, Gorbachev in the article<sup>48</sup> written on the occasion of the opening of the forty-second UN session (but the same positions are taken up again in his book *Perestroika*) claims that a collective security system is possible "in agreement with the existing institutions for maintaining peace" and confiding in the "ability of the sovereign states to take on their commitments within the sphere of international security."

The decisive point here is the distinction between the process towards a situation of peace and the guarantee of a stable peace. While Gorbachev's proposals seem adequate to promote a pacification process, especially between the two superpowers, they do not seem at all sufficient to guarantee its fulfilment. Concerning this, it is enough to think over the fact that even if the USA and USSR agree to a total reduction of their atomic armaments, these good intentions cannot be put into practice unless the other atomic powers agree too, including those which can become one within a short time, such as China, Japan, India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, etc. These new emerging nuclear powers have interests which are exactly the opposite to those of the USA and USSR in terms of disarmament: they can assume a significant role in world politics only if they increase their war potential, not if they diminish it. It must be observed, as Gorbachev does, that by now the problems of collective security are tightly linked with those of Third World underdevelopment and the risk of ecological catastrophes on planetary scale. Handling these decisive problems for the future of mankind through simple cooperation between governments is becoming more and more problematic, not to say impossible. To conclude, reciprocal security guarantees and the handling of common world level policies require a real and true world government. This is the logical solution proposed by Einstein when he posed himself the problem of the future of mankind in the atomic era. The international socialist movement should not be unprepared to discuss prospects — the United States of the World — that Lenin, Trotsky and Bucharin already accepted as a point of arrival of the human emancipation process started off by the 1917 Revolution.

Finally, in the perspective of a policy which aims at progressively

overcoming military blocs, the situation of Europe, where NATO and Warsaw Pact face each other, must be considered. The Iron Curtain between Eastern and Western Europe is a historical anachronism. But while Western Europe, after the election of the European Parliament with universal suffrage, is already on the road to transforming the European Community into a federation, with its own government, its own currency and its own defence, the CMEA countries cannot even find an effective formula of economic integration, thus seriously jeopardizing their growth prospects and their competitiveness with the ever more dynamic world market. For now, the CMEA represents nothing but the most evident proof of the limits of socialist internationalism. The future of the European countries of the East does not now depend only on their historical ties to the USSR, but also on economic and social relations with Western Europe. The recent co-operation treaties between European Community and CMEA are only the beginning of a process. The USSR would have important advantages in terms of security and economic development if she favoured a greater political and economic integration between the European members of CMEA, re-examining in the event the old proposal of a Danube or Balkan federation. The dissolving of NATO and the Warsaw Pact is only possible on the basis of the transformation of the present military ties into political alliances among equals. The path of a federation between the Eastern European countries is not of course the only one feasible. It is, however, certain that in Europe the absurd frontiers of the past must fall. Only then will the Europeans, both of East and West, be able to fully contribute to building a world in which at last international justice and peace are guaranteed.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> M. Gorbachev, *Perestroika. New Thinking for Our Country and for the World*, Harper & Row, New York, 1987.

<sup>2</sup> For example, Carl H. Pegg, in his extremely well documented volume, *Evolution of the European Idea, 1914-1932*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1983, does not go into this controversy. On the other hand, a precise examination of the question can be found in L. Levi, *Il Federalismo*, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1987, chapter 14: "La componente federalistica della Rivoluzione russa e il socialismo in un solo paese."

<sup>3</sup> L.D. Trotsky, *Der Krieg und die Internationale*, Zurich, 1914 (consulted in the

edition Julian Borchardt, Berlin, 1919, p. III).

<sup>4</sup>*ibidem*, p. V. It must be remembered that these positions of Trotsky are but the natural development of the theses elaborated concerning the 1905 revolution and that they represent the core of the "permanent revolution" theory. In fact a double meaning — social and international — is to be given to the adjective "permanent" in Trotsky's vision of the revolutionary process. The first consists of the socialist character the revolution against Tzarism could have assumed, going beyond the so called bourgeois revolution, that the classical doctrine of marxism considered preliminary to the actual proletarian revolution. In this, Trotsky was in agreement with Lenin, who considered the Russian bourgeoisie unable to guide the state without the decisive contribution of the workers' parties (some of the differences between Lenin and Trotsky, particularly concerning the role of the peasants in the revolution, were later exaggerated by Stalin during the struggle for power). This is why in Russia, due to its relative economic backwardness compared to western European countries, the proletariat was able to seize power directly. But the revolutionary process started in a backward country could not have been completed, according to Trotsky, if the revolution had not spread to the industrialized countries. "Without the direct state support of the European proletariat — Trotsky writes — the working class of Russia will not be able to remain in power and transform its temporary rule into a stable and prolonged socialist dictatorship." For these reasons, the Russian working class will be forced to develop an international action, to liquidate capitalism on a world scale, if it does not want to succumb to the reactionary forces of the bourgeoisie and aristocracy. The victory of the proletariat in one country will rouse the awareness of the European proletariat and will create a favourable situation for the world revolution. "It will be precisely the fear of the proletariat rising which will force the bourgeois parties, voting prodigious sums for military expenditure, solemnly to demonstrate for peace, to dream of international chambers of conciliation and even of organization of the United States of Europe — all miserable declamation, which can neither do away with the antagonism of the powers, nor with armed conflicts. ...European war inevitably means European revolution." (The quotation is taken from I. Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed. Trotsky: 1879-1921*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979, p.158).

<sup>5</sup>L.D. Trotsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibidem*, pp. 48-49.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 153.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibidem*, p. VIII.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibidem*, pp. 60-61.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 62.

<sup>11</sup>V.I. Lenin, "The Tasks of Revolutionary Social-Democracy in the European War" in J. Riddell ed., *Lenin's Struggle for a Revolutionary International. Documents: 1907-1916. The Preparatory Years*, Monad Press, New York, 1984, pp.135-8. (From now on this collection of documents will be quoted in abbreviated form with the initials: *LSRI*).

<sup>12</sup>"The War and Russian Social Democracy", in *LSRI, cit.*, pp.156-162.

<sup>13</sup>"Open Letter to the Editorial Board of 'Kommunist'", in *LSRI, cit.*, p. 235.

<sup>14</sup>V.I. Lenin, "The Defeat of One's Own Government in the Imperialist War", in *LSRI, cit.*, pp.166-170.

<sup>15</sup>The joint Declaration and the shorthand reports of the debate are related in *LSRI, cit.*, pp. 286-322. To get a brief idea of the climate of the debate, it is worth remembering that the French delegate Merrheim won "enthusiastic applause" by speaking to Lenin in these terms: "You, comrade Lenin, are concerned with the desire to lay the

foundation of a new International, not with the demand for peace. This is what divides us. We demand a manifesto that will advance the struggle for peace. We do not want to emphasize what divides us, but what unites us" (p. 312).

<sup>16</sup>The resolution presented by Bucharin's group is in *LSRI, cit.*, pp. 249-250. Lenin's quotation is taken from the report of the delegate Shklovsky — who was against the slogan — at the Berne conference. The complete text (related on pp.251-2 of *LSRI, cit.*) of the quoted report is the following: "Our objections to the slogan of a United States of Europe can be summarized as follows: (1) Under imperialism a true democracy is impossible. Therefore, a United States of Europe is also impossible. (2) Furthermore, it is impossible in view of the conflict of interests of European capitalist countries. (3) If it is constituted, it will be formed only for the purpose of attacking the more advanced United States of America. During the discussion, Ilych (Lenin) answered us that proceeding on the basis of our reasoning it would be necessary to discard a whole series of points from our minimum program as being impossible under imperialism. While it is true that genuine democracy can be realized only under socialism, we still do not discard these points, he said. Further, he criticized us for not dealing in any way with the economic side of the question. We answered him that the formation of a United States of Europe under imperialism would not be the highest form of democracy but a reactionary union of the belligerent countries — which were unable to conquer each other in the war — for the struggle against America... Ilych completely convinced the conference and it voted unanimously for the theses. But he did not succeed in convincing himself. That evening he saw comrade Radek, who was then living in Berne but did not belong to our group, and questioned him in detail about the opinion of different European comrades on this question. When the conference convened the next morning, Vladimir Ilych took the floor and made a statement. "Although yesterday a definite stand was taken concerning the United States of Europe" he said, "if we consider that this issue has raised different points of view amongst us, and moreover that the discussion took place unilaterally, ignoring the economic side of the problem, which remains rather unclear, the matter cannot be considered settled." He also mentioned his meeting with Radek, who had told him that Rosa Luxemburg was also opposed to a United States of Europe. He therefore proposed to delete from the theses for the time being the point concerning a United States of Europe and to open a discussion on this question in the Central Organ (*Sotsial-Demokrat*), giving special attention to the economic side of the question."

<sup>17</sup>*LSRI, cit.*, pp. 257-260. The italics are mine.

<sup>18</sup>The quotation is taken from the article by C. Dale Fuller, "Lenin's Attitude Toward an International Organisation for the Maintenance of Peace, 1914-1917", in *Political Science Quarterly*, 1949, pp. 245-261.

<sup>19</sup>V.I. Lenin, "Critical Notes on the National Question", in *Collected Works*, Russian ed., Vol. XVII.

<sup>20</sup>V.I. Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-determination. Thesis," in *Selected Works*, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1936, Vol. V, pp. 267-278.

<sup>21</sup>*LSRI, cit.*, pp. 347-8.

<sup>22</sup>Now published in L.D. Trotsky, *What is a Peace Programme?*, A Lanka Samasamaja Publication, 1956.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibidem*, pp.11-12.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibidem*, pp.14-16.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibidem*, pp.17-19.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibidem*, pp.16-17.

<sup>27</sup>N. Krupskaja, *La mia vita con Lenin*, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1956, p. 294 and p. 299.

<sup>28</sup> A. Rosenberg, *Die Geschichte des Bolschewismus* (1932), (consulted in the Italian edition, *Storia del bolscevismo. Da Marx ai nostri giorni*, Edizioni Leonardo, Roma, 1945, p. 81.

<sup>29</sup> All the previous quotations are taken from E.H. Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia. The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923*, Macmillan, London, 1953 and Pelican Books, 1966, Vol. I, 3, pp. 132 and 136. According to Piero Melograni *Il mito della rivoluzione mondiale. Lenin tra ideologia e ragion di stato, 1917-1920*, Laterza, Bari, 1985, Lenin, right from the foundation of the Soviet State, did not delude himself over the possibility of a world revolution; indeed, being a good realist politician, he did all he could to quench the revolutionary whims of the European proletariat and thus allow Soviet power to live in a not too hostile world. "The socialist parties of Germany and the other industrialized countries — Melograni claims — were very different from the Bolshevik party. They were more modern and democratic. If they had seized power, they might have founded their power on much more developed and powerful States than Soviet Russia, and this power of theirs would have irremediably compromised the hegemonic role played by the Bolsheviks with the European left" (p. VIII). The III International would have been set up "not to export the revolution, but exclusively to defend a State" (p. X).

Melograni's thesis is not convincing. It is true that on the grounds of political realism Lenin acted from the very first moment to consolidate Soviet power and that this policy involved continuous compromises with the "bourgeois" governments. Melograni documents this aspect of Lenin's policy convincingly. But it is only one aspect of a much vaster political programme. That the baricentre of the world revolution might move into western Europe was a fact that Lenin accepted: but this would not have implied a weakening of his leadership on the international socialist movement. Everything would have depended on the ability of the Bolshevik leaders to remain at the head of the process started off by the formation of the European communist parties. It is no chance that Lenin speaks of International Republic of the Soviets.

It is also true that Lenin realized very soon that the possibilities of a victorious revolution in Europe were not very well-grounded and that the International would have to fall back on a long term strategy. But Trotsky also agreed to these lines of action (cfr. I. Deutscher, *The Prophet Unarmed. Trotsky 1921-1929*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982, p. 59), although a few years later he started an implacable fight against Stalin's doctrine of socialism in one country. Only at this moment did the International become a docile instrument of the Soviet State. Melograni forgets that the thoughts and action of Lenin, even before the seizing of power, were founded on the hypothesis of world revolution. The idea of a new International was conceived, both by Lenin and by Trotsky, as far back as 1914, when European social democracy ignobly betrayed the internationalist ideals of socialism. Even the strategy of seizing power in the country which was "the weakest ring of the chain" was conceived of as the shortest way to the world revolution. One should suppose therefore that Lenin has always — both before and after the seizing of power — defended the idea of a world revolution simply as an instrument to deceive his naive companions in the struggle. But at this point we would no longer be facing a realist or machiavellian politician, but a vulgar impostor, although very clever. The life and absolute dedication of Lenin to the cause of socialism instead seem to prove the contrary.

<sup>30</sup> J. Degras, *The Communist International 1919-1943. Documents*, Oxford University Press, London, 1956, vol. I.

<sup>31</sup> L.D. Trotsky, *The First Five Years of the Communist International*, New Park Publications, London, 1973, vol. I, p. 32.

<sup>32</sup> E.H. Carr, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 3, p. 383.

<sup>33</sup> L.D. Trotsky, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

<sup>34</sup> L.D. Trotsky, *ibidem*, p. 275.

<sup>35</sup> A. Agosti, *La Terza Internazionale. Storia documentaria*, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1974, vol. II, p. 699.

<sup>36</sup> L.D. Trotsky, "Is the Slogan of 'The United States of Europe' a Timely One?", in *The First Five Years of the Communist International*, *cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 341-346. The political vision of Trotsky, in the years between 1923 and 1926, is more widely explained in the collection of essays *Europa und Amerika*, Neuer Deutscher Verlag, Berlin, 1926.

<sup>37</sup> J. Degras, *op. cit.*, Vol. II.

<sup>38</sup> J. Degras, *ibidem*.

<sup>39</sup> The quotation is taken from E.H. Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia. The Interregnum, 1923-1924*, Macmillan, London, 1954 and Pelican Books, 1969, p. 365.

<sup>40</sup> All the quotations are taken from the collection of essays contained in the volume *La 'rivoluzione permanente' e il socialismo in un paese solo*, (writings by Bucharin, Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev), Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1973, pp. 184, 188, 190-195, 208.

<sup>41</sup> A. Agosti, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, 2, p. 975.

<sup>42</sup> J. Degras, *op. cit.*, Vol. II.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 549.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 548 and pp. 528-9.

<sup>45</sup> L.D. Trotsky, *The Third International after Lenin*, Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1936.

<sup>46</sup> A.L. Unger, *Constitutional Development in the USSR*, Methuen, London, 1981, p. 49.

<sup>47</sup> Reissued in Stalin's Anthology *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*, Moscow, 1925.

<sup>48</sup> "Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World", *Pravda and Izvestija*, September 17th, 1987.

## Notes

### REFERENDUM ON THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS

Many of those opposed to the proposal for a referendum on the European Union maintain that this would be incompatible with the constitutional order of one or another of the Community's member states.

The truth is that a decision involving a refoundation of the state — in other words, one that has a constituent value — can only be taken with the consent of the people, who are the holders of constituent power. This is without doubt a consensus that in certain circumstances can also be expressed in an implicit form, through a wide agreement among the political forces that represent the sovereign people. But it is equally certain that it makes no sense to question the formal conformity to the constitution of a popular consultation that has as its object the creation of a new political community, that is, the reformulation of the fundamental clauses of the social contract.

This does not mean that a referendum on the European Union is necessarily in accordance with all the constitutional charters of the member states of the Community. It means that the legitimacy of a direct consultation of the people on a theme of a constituent nature is not based on the constitution but on a more profound principle of legality, which in turn provides the foundation of the validity of the constitution.

This criterion is that of popular sovereignty, which has as its fundamental expression the constituent power of the people. Without the recognition of the latter — certainly not intended as a legal fiction, but as an effective power — the issue of the legitimacy of the constitution can be resolved only by means of a recourse to purely formal constructions, which are in any event arbitrary, such as that consisting in the search for (to the extent this is possible) the source of legitimacy of a constitution in a previous constitution, and then in another, until one arrives at that mysterious entity that Kelsen calls the "fundamental rule."

The truth is that, when the foundations themselves of civil co-existence are put in question — that is, when the state is refounded — we are no more in the field of constitutional revision; then the delegation attributed by the people, in the exercise of their constituent power, to the organs designated by the constitution as competent in this regard, must be considered to be automatically extinct. In such cases the sovereign people recover their original power to establish the fundamental clauses of the social contract, without which their constituent power would be reduced to a pure *flatus vocis*. This is particularly true in the case of the profoundest of transformations of the basic rules of civil co-existence: that which concerns the political community, and thus the very identity of those who ideally underwrite the social contract.

It is worth remembering that, consistent with these considerations, a fundamental part of legal doctrine interprets in a restrictive sense those constitutional norms, such as Article 24 of the *Grundgesetz* and Article II of the Italian Constitution, that expressly provide for the possibility of a cession of sovereignty (*Hoheitsrechte* in the terminology of the *Grundgesetz*) by the state to interstate institutions or organizations, maintaining that these refer, in fact, only to the eventuality of transfers of competence that are rigorously delimited, and which in any event would not give rise to the creation of a new state entity, even one that is imperfect.

It is also worth recalling that modern democratic legal sensibility tends to place under the direct approval of the populations concerned even changes in the jurisdictional sphere of subordinate levels of government, as long as these latter have a more or less ample degree of independence, such as the member-states of a federation, or even the administrative regions in a unitary state. It is thus that the Italian Constitution provides for the use of the referendum instrument when it is a question of creating new regions or changing the boundaries of existing ones (Art. 132), and that in the Federal Republic of Germany as well any change in the number and boundaries of the *Länder* must be approved by a referendum (Art. 29 of the *Grundgesetz*).

The fact remains, to which I have already referred, that the assumption of constituent power by the people themselves can remain in a potential state when an ample accord between the political forces makes the direct expression of popular will superfluous. But this does not take away from the fact that: a) the direct expression of popular will in relation to a decision of a constituent nature represents the most unassailable juridical way of sanctioning its legitimacy, and that, b) in particular, in a

situation such as that existing within the Community, where the proclaimed will of politicians to attain the Union is countered by the persistent absence of concrete results, recourse to a direct consultation of the people would constitute, politically, the best way to give a decisive turn to the process.

To state today that one is for the European Union but against the referendum means, therefore, to implicitly recognize that one thinks of the Union as one of the many institutional devices of which the story of the integration process is studded, and that repropose in ever differing forms a substance that never changes: the intergovernmental nature of the decision-making mechanism. Which is equivalent to admitting that one is against the Union.

*Francesco Rossolillo*

## BOLSHEVISM, NAZISM AND THE CRISIS IN THE NATION STATE

In an article written in 1986, Ernst Nolte, a historian of the Fascist era, explained his ideas on the links between Bolshevism and Nazism which still cause controversy<sup>1</sup> and on which Federalists must express their opinions, however briefly.

There are two basic theories emerging from these ideas. Firstly, Nolte thinks that Bolshevik left-wing extremism was the major factor that allowed Nazi right-wing extremism's rise to power. The practice of "class extermination" carried out by the Bolsheviks in Russia at the time of the civil war and of compulsory collective farming and the fear that the very same thing would happen in Germany, where a strong Bolshevik party had been established, favoured the decisive victory of Nazism, which seemed to be the force that would most effectively wipe out the danger, against which liberal-minded political forces were powerless. Secondly, the crimes committed by the Bolsheviks acted as a precedent for the Nazis. For the first time since the Enlightenment, the principle that a person is guilty simply because he belongs to a particular group, which is considered collectively guilty and not for his own individual actions, was applied massively in a European nation. "Race extermination"

carried out by the Nazis proceeded in this way; moreover, it was applied in a highly planned and systematic manner, unlike the case of the Bolsheviks, which was often characterized by a lack of planning and organisation.

It should be pointed out that Nolte does not have the slightest intention of clearing the Nazis of all blame for their crimes. If their reaction to the Bolshevik threat and its criminal nature was genuine up to a certain point, they ended up replying to those crimes with even worse crimes, justifying them with a barbaric ideology, which, without reason or justification, placed the blame for all the evils of the age, even for Bolshevism, on the Jews. On the other hand, if the connection that exists between Nazism and Bolshevism does not wipe out the guilt of the Nazis for their actions and beliefs, nevertheless attention must also be focused on the Bolsheviks' guilt and on the serious limitations of their ideology.

Nolte does not equate Bolshevism with Nazism. He recognises that there is a difference between the two ideologies. The first is characterised by the values of the emancipation of the oppressed and universal brotherhood. That is why many communists have seen the crimes of the Bolsheviks as a betrayal of their ideology. On the contrary, the crimes of the Nazis are consistent with their ideology, which is based on the anti-Enlightenment principles of the inequality of men and of nations, and racial supremacy. The fact remains that Bolshevism, with the idea of group guilt, introduced brutalities into the political struggle that led the way for the even more brutal ideas and practices of the Nazis. Nolte thinks that the lesson to be learnt from this century's experience of totalitarianism is to free ourselves from the "tyranny of collectivist thought" and to work for the strengthening of the liberal system.

In his opinion, both the theory of the collective guilt of the Germans for the crimes of the Nazis and the theory, normally linked with this, that the roots of the rise to power of Hitler lay in the basic nature of the German people are examples of collectivist thought. Nolte answers this first theory by saying that blame can only be attributed to individuals or groups within political classes and not to the people as a whole, who are widely manipulated by the political classes. In answer to the second theory, he says that, however, one nation reacts according to the objective circumstances and, more specifically, as Germany reacted to its own situation in the 20's and 30's, any other nation would have reacted in the same way.

Going over to an assessment of Nolte's arguments, I agree with his ideas about guilt and in particular refute the idea of the collective guilt of the Germans and the evil nature of the German people. This journal has

pointed out the inconsistency of these ideas many times and also that they are used by non-Germans as a cover for anti-German feelings and by the Germans themselves as a way of showing the failure to understand the real causes of their imperialist and totalitarian experience.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, this failure even affects a great scholar like Habermas, who, in the controversy developing around Nolte's ideas, has stated that all Germans, even the post-Nazi generations, must be deeply ashamed of the crimes of Nazi Germany.<sup>3</sup>

Having said that, I am not totally convinced by Nolte's theory on the cause-effect relation between Bolshevism and Nazism. This theory, which is by no means new, is not incorrect — no serious historian could question the fact that Bolshevism and the repercussions it had outside Russia, was a major factor in the rise to power of Fascism, first in Italy, and then in Germany and a large part of Europe — but it does not give an adequate explanation for this phenomenon until it is seen in the wider perspective conceived by Federalist thought,<sup>4</sup> i.e. until the crisis of the nation state is seen as the key to what took place during the World Wars and the Fascist era.

This refers to the contradiction, that began to become apparent at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, between the development of the mode of production, which with the growing interdependence of the world's nations encouraged the creation of state bodies on a continental scale and potentially of a united human race, and the size of the European nation states. The only sensible solution to this problem was a federal Europe, as the first step towards a united human race: a solution that the political classes of Europe, bound as they were by the idea of national sovereignty, did not seriously consider, as long as the nation states were able to maintain the status of first-rank powers. Thus the first response to the problem of nation states' decadence was an imperialist one, i.e. the attempt to create a united Europe under the leadership of the most powerful European state. The First World War was the first phase of Germany's attempt to bring Europe under her leadership, and its end did not bring a long-term solution because Germany's defeat was not followed by a policy of peacefully uniting Europe, but by a settlement that made the crisis of the European nation states worse. While the creation of new, smaller states increased by thousands of miles the length of internal European economic barriers, the break-up of Europe's economy was accelerated by the increase of protectionism in an economic crisis which was caused by the increasingly inadequate size of European nation states. Germany was worst affected by this situation,

because she had lost important territories and economic markets. However, she had conserved enough resources to try again to win power.

If we consider the position of Germany between the wars, we can see why an extremely strong communist challenge emerged which paved the way for the victory of the Fascist reaction. This did not happen in other countries with a similar level of social and economic development, such as the United States, Great Britain or France. While the size of the USA meant that it was not affected by the crisis of the nation state (and had therefore been able to emerge from the crisis of 1929 with a strengthened liberal system), this phenomenon produced a catastrophic social and economic instability in Germany, which reinforced its extremist anti-democratic tendency. The reason this did not happen in France and Great Britain is that they declined as European nation states more slowly because their colonial territories acted as a "life jacket".

Discussing the phenomenon of the crisis of the nation state, and particularly its severity in Germany, allows us, on the one hand, to understand the expansionist plan, which was the fundamental idea of Nazism, and, on the other, the link between this plan and the totalitarian system and its racist ideology. Indeed, the Nazi regime was the most radical and coherent attempt to give an expansionist-hegemonic solution to the crisis of the nation state. The totalitarian structure of the state, on the other hand, was ideal for such an attempt, because it took to their extreme consequences the tendencies towards centralisation, authoritarianism and nationalism typical of all continental European states, that were organised on a more military and centralised basis than insular states like Great Britain, because they needed to defend their land borders and were therefore more vulnerable. These tendencies grew in intensity with the sharpening of power struggles within a system of states becoming more and more interdependent, yet unable to establish an effective supranational legal system capable of coping successfully with such interdependence. The same racist ideology, which could justify genocide when carried to its extreme, justifies the plan of one European nation ruling all other European nations.

Placed in this context, Hitler should not principally be seen as an anti-Lenin, but as the most radical and coherent expression of opposition towards the extinction of the sovereign nation state and towards the peaceful unification of the human race. On the other hand, the discovery of a link between the crisis of the nation state and Nazism allows us to see, besides the guilt of this movement's backers, the great responsibility of the political classes of Western Europe's democratic countries, which

have taken the path of nationalism instead of the path of a unified Europe, especially with the increase of protectionism after the crisis of 1929. Thus they aided the victory of Fascism in the country which was most affected by the crisis of the nation state because of its objective condition. We can draw a lot more from this interpretation of Nazism than from Nolte's rather limited one. It is not enough to simply reject totalitarianism in all its guises, it is also necessary to reject the principle of the sovereign nation state, which opposes the trend towards peaceful, supranational unification and revives irrationalism.

Sergio Pistone

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Nolte's article "Vergangenheit die nicht vergehen will", appeared in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6th June 1986; it was republished together with the main contributions of the debate that followed (Habermas, Hildebrand, Fest, Kocka, H. Mommsen, W. Mommsen, Broszat, Hillgruber and others) in A. A. V. V. *Historikertreue*, Piper, Munich, 1987. Nolte has subsequently developed his theories in *Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus*, Propyläen, Frankfurt-Berlin, 1987. In reconstructing Nolte's theories I have also taken account of statements contained in this book.

<sup>2</sup> Cfr. on the subject: M. Albertini, *Lo Stato Nazionale*, Giuffrè, Milano, 1960; Id, "La colpa della Germania (a proposito del processo Eichmann)", in *Il Federalista*, III (1961), pp. 178 et seq.; S. Pistone, *La Germania e l'unità europea*, Guida, Napoli, 1978.

<sup>3</sup> In *Historikertreue*, (see above) Habermas rightly says that nation states must not consider themselves the privileged pole of collective identity; instead collective identity must have a multidimensional character in the post-nation era, i.e. referring to supranational and infranational communities. However, his essay on the collective shame of the Germans (really he would have to speak of the collective shame of all Europeans and, in short, of the whole human race for every crime ever committed) shows that he is not completely emancipated from the limits of the nationalist ideology.

<sup>4</sup> Cfr. in particular M. Albertini, *Il federalismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1979 and L. Dehio, *Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie*, Scherpe Verlag, Krefeld, 1948.

## EUROPEAN UNION AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: TWO INCOMPATIBLE INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS?\*

When the European Parliament approved the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, it decided to subordinate the enforcement of the new treaty to the ratification by a number of Community Member States whose population amounted to two thirds of the EEC population (Art. 82 of the Draft Treaty approved on February 14th 1984). The reasons for this decision are the same as those which led the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 to establish that ratification by 9 of the 13 states would be sufficient to implement the federal constitution of America: in both cases, the attempt was to avoid a small minority of States, or even a single state, from blocking the process of federal unification desired by the majority.

The 1984 Draft Treaty did not provide for the nature and the discipline of the legal ties which would develop between the States of the future European Union and the States in the Community which decided not to join the Union itself, at least immediately. It merely established that the governments of the States of the Union "will meet to decide in common agreement ... on the relationships with the member states which have not yet ratified" (Art. 82 of the Draft Treaty). The question is important, since the attitude of the States which might be contrary to the transition from the Community to the Union might be very different according to whether the latter is seen as a breach of Community commitments or as a further step in construction designed to protect these commitments.

Even in the not improbable case that some States were in any case contrary to the prospect of the Union, an institutional system of the Union and a formal commitment of its members such as not to prejudice the *acquis communautaire* vis-à-vis the member states of the EEC who are not members of the Union would remove one of the politically and juridically very strong objections of those states who are contrary to the Union.

The moment will arise, sooner or later, though precisely when can-

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\* Summary of the Colloquium held at the Faculty of Law of the University of Milan, on November 16th 1987.



not to be forecast today, when the circumstances and political will of some states will once again place the objective of the Union on the order of the day, in which there will be an institutional perspective similar to that indicated in the 1984 Draft Treaty: powers of codecision of the European Parliament in legislative matters, abolition of the veto right, strengthening of the power of government of the Commission. It is hardly necessary to recall that underlying these proposals for institutional reform there are, at one and the same time, issues relating to greater efficiency (inasmuch as the requirement for unanimity produces the inevitable effect of paralyzing every decision in controversial cases) and issues of principle (inasmuch as the current Community institutions violate both the criterion of the separation of powers and the basic canons of democracy since the body which represents the people is not endowed with legislative power).

It will thus be important to have previously explored and perfected a series of legal and institutional criteria regarding the compatibility between the European Union and the current Community, for the reasons stated above.

On this theme, which has so far been neglected, a Colloquium was organized on November 16th 1987 by the Faculty of Law of the University of Milan, in which several well-known Italian scholars in international law, constitutional law and community law took part.

The political premises, the reasons for and the prospects that induce experts to raise the problem of compatibility between Community and Union were explained by Francesco Rossolillo, Vice-President of the *Union Européenne des Fédéralistes*. Since it is unrealistic to posit an identical desire for progress in all the Community countries — he stated — it is necessary to provide for procedures and solutions which do not hold up the process, but at the same time safeguarding the interests of all. Moreover, not even the ECSC or the EEC would have been born if we had had at all cost, from the outset, insisted on the participation of, for example, the United Kingdom.

The juridical and institutional problem of the compatibility between Union and Community was raised by Antonio Padoa Schioppa (University of Milan), who suggested a solution (see the following documentation) regarding which he solicited the agreement of scholars of international and community law present in the Colloquium. The fundamental basis for this hypothesis is the principle whereby the Union would not in any case be empowered to violate Community Law and the *acquis communautaire*. The resources of the Union would appear to be different

and additional with respect to Community revenue. The institutions of the Union, although formally distinct from Community ones, are made up of the same people, limited, however, to the members of countries participating in the Union. The powers of the Union would in part be competitive (in keeping with the principle mentioned above), in part separate.

On these lines the Colloquium enjoyed an articulated and lively discussion.

In relation to the basic question of the Colloquium the speakers agreed in their reply that institutional mechanisms like those indicated in the enclosed document may be certainly conceived, with the purpose of making it possible to achieve compatibility between the Community and a possible European Union.

The difficulties are of a different nature, however, regarding the various bodies and power. As regards the bodies, a relatively simple two-tier functioning of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers may be envisaged, while it is relatively more complex to see what could happen in the Commission. As regards powers, matters not included in the Treaties of Rome (from currency to energy, and defence itself) could more easily be pursued by the Union; for other matters, it would certainly be possible to create a mechanism of concurrent powers such as to attribute primacy to Community law.

More generally, Art. 41 of the Vienna Convention on international treaties lays down the possibility of a new treaty between only some of the states which have subscribed to a previous treaty, provided that the latter does not prohibit it and provided it is not incompatible with it. The treaty of the Union could be seen in this light according to Francesco Capotorti (University of Rome), who however observed that the compactness of the Community construction could be damaged and that the European Parliament could have difficulty in following this road. Moreover, Fausto Pocar (University of Milan) pointed out that the Vienna Convention itself does not necessarily presuppose the consent of all states in order to ratify a second one.

Other speaker stressed the positive potential of the current Community institutions, in their opinion not fully developed so far. Antonio Tizzano (University of Naples) reconstructed the events that led to the approval of the Single Act, in the course of which one country (Italy) for the first time subordinated its agreement to the agreement of the European Parliament — stressing the aspects which involve a more active role of the European Parliament and holding that the time has not yet come for further progress in the institutional field to be achieved. The creative role

of Community law was stressed by Alberto Santa Maria (University of Milan), with reference to the deeply innovative results that derived from the principle of the direct application of Community law within the legal systems of the individual member states.

Alberto Predieri (University of Florence) also pointed out the major obstacles that the prospect of Union presents in this phase although the inadequacy of current Community institutions, particularly as regards democratic legitimation, is clear. A constituent mandate attributed to the European Parliament could be decisive, and to this end a referendum carried out in the individual states (or even at Community level) could constitute a strong thrust. A consultative referendum for Europe could be arranged in Italy even without the need for constitutional legislation.

It will not be impossible or inappropriate in future to carry out the procedure provided for under Art. 236 for the revision of the Treaties of Rome, Franco Mosconi pointed out (University of Pavia), concretely verifying the prospects of involvement of all the states in the current Community in the further steps towards the Union. If then it should emerge that some states are not in any way disposed to this proceeding and do not even consent to other proceedings, it would be necessary to ask, as Riccardo Luzzatto (University of Milan) pointed out, if it is not inevitable that we will have to pay (or at least be prepared to pay) the price of break-up.

This is a central issue regarding which the Colloquium was designed to stimulate debate. It is precisely the question of consensus of all — a consensus which is obviously required and desired, but equally indispensable to proceed — which makes the question of the compatibility between Community and Union even more pregnant. A positive reply to the question of compatibility would have the result of placing the states which want the Union in a strong position, even as regards negotiations, vis-à-vis other states in the Community. Thus it is not at all impossible that all would end up joining the Union. If this did not happen, not only would the entry of the Union be always possible but the commitment not to violate Community law should be scrupulously observed by the Union, making the Community Court of Justice its guarantor.

Antonio Padoa Schioppa

## APPENDIX \*

Let us assume that a group of member states in the European Community (e.g. the six founder states plus Spain and Ireland) manifested the political will to proceed towards a European Union by adopting institutional reforms corresponding to those envisaged by the Draft Treaty of the European Parliament of February 14th 1984: attribution of Community legislative power to the European Parliament itself, to be exercised in agreement with the Council of Ministers deciding on a majority basis; reinforcement of the powers of government of the Commission.

The question on which we wish to begin reflection is the following: is it possible to imagine an institutional system of the Union which does not prejudice the working of Community institutions, so that it protects the member states of the Community who do not belong to the Union itself? If the reply were to be affirmative, it would be conceivable that the new treaty on the European Union could be drawn up with the agreement of all member states, even with those who at least at the beginning — but the door would naturally be always open — did not agree to join the Union. Certainly the alibi of opposing the Union in the name of the Community would thus be removed.

Let us try to outline schematically some principles of a positive reply (in the sense that is of compatibility) on the question that we have formulated: on the practicability and coherence of which — in addition to other aspects of the theme which interests here — the speakers and the participants will express their position.

We may consider the problem of compatibility between Union and Community from four standpoints: the principles, resources, institutions and powers.

### 1. The principles.

a) The Union should not be allowed to make any decision which conflicts with Community law and with the *acquis communautaire*;

b) the legal limits which should be placed on the Union are the same that hold for the member states vis-à-vis the Community: where a state

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\*This is a document presented at the Colloquium by Antonio Padoa Schioppa. The document is the result of discussions with Franco Mosconi and Francesco Rossolillo.

can decide independently without violating the Treaties of Rome and Community law, the Union should be able to do the same;

c) the Union should therefore be able to decide — with the procedures and with the bodies that are proper to it — *secundum legem* and *praeter legem* not *contra legem* (where *lex* is Community law);

d) if the Union decided on a matter not yet dealt with by the Community, but belonging to its powers, the bodies of the Community should be able to decide as such, according to Community procedures at any time;

e) the member states of the Union could be allowed to adopt — in view of Community decisions — preliminary procedures in keeping with the principles of the Union, which with regard to the Community would be worthwhile as simple *interna corporis* (e.g. preliminary vote of the European Parliament);

f) guarantor of all this would be the Court of Justice.

## 2. The resources.

The financial means and the budget of the Union should be distinguished from those of the Community. The initiatives of the Union would be financed with additional resources as compared with Community resources, e.g. by earmarking an additional share of national VAT to the Union budget.

## 3. The institutions.

The European Union could adopt the same bodies as the Community (European Parliament, Council of Ministers, Commission, Court of Justice), which in the Union would be made up of the same people who belong to the Community but without the participation of the representatives of the states which do not belong to the Union. The powers and ties between the bodies of the Union would be defined in the Union treaty.

European Parliamentarians, ministers, commissioners and judges coming from the states in the Union would thus act in two ways, as officials of the Community in Community affairs, and as officials of the Union in Union affairs. If from the standpoint of legal identity and powers, the institutions were naturally distinguished, the unitary nature of the procedure of appointment and the identity of the persons would greatly simplify matters. Days of meetings and presidents would be distinguished. The administrative structures of the Community, duly

strengthened and subsidized to cover the cost of the additional labour, could also serve the Union.

## 4. Powers.

The problems arising from the compatibility of the two structures (the Community's and the Union's) deserve careful examination to be carried out sector by sector. In this paper, we only go so far as to stress the fact that there are certainly sectors in which compatibility will be lesser or least and others in which it will be greater or greatest.

Agriculture: since this is the sector which is most fully covered by the EEC, it could stay outside the sphere of Union intervention.

Single market: the states in the Union could — when respecting the principles mentioned above — give the process a further push e.g. proceeding with greater rapidity to the adoption of measures suggested by the White paper. On this it should be necessary to carry out a specific study of compatibility.

Social and regional policy: the states in the Union could earmark a considerable amount of the Union budget to these two sectors;

Currency: the example of the EMS has shown the practicability of wide-reaching agreements, assumed by a group of states in the Community. Further institutional progress — including the creation of a central Union Bank — could be achieved without raising problems of legal compatibility with the principles of Community law.

In conclusion we must stress that what has been formulated above is only some of the possible means of solving the problems mentioned at the outset, means that could be adopted only by virtue of political will whose entity and breadth cannot be foreseen now. It will be the authoritative specialists who have agreed to take part in the Colloquium — and for this I wish to thank them in the name of the Faculty — who will give the first assessment of this set of problems.

For once, we will carry out here an intellectual exercise on the grounds of *ius condendum*, starting from the basis of Community *ius conditum*. For all, and in particular for the students who I see are many, it will be an interesting experience.

## Interventions \*

### NATION STATES AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

In recent years several structural changes have emerged in the world economy, so that nation states have found themselves in a decisively new situation. These changes have become especially evident and influential since the 1970s, affecting every aspect of social and economic life.

Post-war structural changes in the productive forces and production relations have been accompanied by an *extremely rapid internationalization* of the world economy. Never before had such a high degree of internationalization been experienced, affecting every sector of the world economy and characterized by the emergence of various *world economic problems*.

This large scale internationalization first became apparent in the very rapid expansion of world trade. International co-operation has become especially strong in manufacturing and has led to substantial changes in the structure of international trade. Internationalization has extended to every sphere of the reproduction process. The expansion of international production has been achieved especially since the 1960s, thanks mainly to multinational corporations. International scientific and technological co-operation has been intensified as a result of the scientific and technical revolution. The international flow of capital has accelerated, and internationalizing of capital, especially among industrialized capitalist countries, has become one of the main features of the process. International trade and capital flows have been accompanied by the large-scale expansion and integration of international financial markets. The international exchange of services has become a significant factor in international relations.

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\*This heading includes interventions which the editorial board believes readers will find interesting, but which do not necessarily reflect the board's views.

In the 1970s *world economic problems* intensified sharply. New threats arose: exhaustion of traditional energy resources, especially hydrocarbons, long-term shortages of food production, pollution of the environment and the growth of the world's population beyond the capacity of economic expansion in the developing countries. The problems connected with the use of space and oceans should also be mentioned.

Common features of the world problems are that their causes, consequences and solutions are mainly international in character, arising on a world scale, and countries, whether small and large, cannot afford to ignore them. As far as causes are concerned, studies generally share the view that the major responsibility for the world growing problems lies with the social, economic and technological development, based on national, group or individual interests and mainly irresponsible to the long-term interests of mankind.

The process of internationalization has been uneven, varying considerably from region to region. Since World War II, various attempts have been made to form *organizations of regional integration*, like CMEA and the EEC. They play a vitally important role mainly in the economic development of smaller states.

In the 1970s *multilateral adjustment* to the conditions of internationalization and interdependence began. No country could avoid taking steps towards adjustment and many collective steps were made in this direction. Adjustment to the world economy began on both a national and an international level. The crisis of the 1970s is often compared with developments in the 1930s. One of the main differences between the two can be found in internationalization. Inward orientation has not occurred in the present crisis. Moreover, many facts show that the process of internationalization has become even more rapid. Though the roots of the crisis can be found in internationalization and in its unsatisfactory regulation, the majority of countries has responded to it with a *fuite en avant* and have reacted to the difficulties with a *more intensive and efficient adhesion and adjustment to the international division of labour*. In some spheres international efforts towards regulation have increased.

However, it can be said of every sphere of the world economy that *the harmony between the given level of internationalization and interdependence on the one hand and the regulating system of international economic relations on the other has been broken* and the existing world economic system is *neither able to maintain the necessary level of co-ordination among nations nor able to handle world economic problems*

or to solve them. It is widely accepted that a new system of international connections is required.

Some experts express the view that the internationalized world economy could be managed by an *international supreme body vested with political and economic authority*. It could be given sufficient powers and, where necessary, it could give orders to nation states and other parties involved in international relations. From time to time influential figures on the world's political and economic stage suggest the establishment of a *world government* or a significant increase in UN powers. However, others remain sceptical about the reality of any supranational institutions in the future. It is argued that in recent years we have experienced growing nationalism and the nation states are still the best means of regulating economies and coping with the most serious problems.

The EEC in particular had ambitious plans for supranational political integration and many people considered the economic integration initiated in 1950s as the basis for a United States of Europe. In the 1940s the Western European federative idea was a defensive programme fighting for consolidation based on the cold war. Later on, in the 1960s, when détente was emerging, arguments in favour of supranationality were linked mainly with the efficient functioning of the economic union. To underpin its monetary and economic union, the EEC formulated the goal of the European Union at the beginning of the 1970s. It should have been achieved by 1980, but views concerning the exact shape of the political union differed from the start and, due to the crisis in the 1970s, plans for political union were shelved. Since the end of the 1970s, however, renewed efforts have been made in the EEC to extend integration. The EMS was launched in 1979, which led to intensive monetary co-ordination among the national banks for stabilization of exchange rates, and the ECU emerged as a real collective currency. Co-ordination also increased in the spheres of stabilization, energy and structural policies, and a full common market is envisaged for 1992. Several steps have been made towards political co-operation. It is commonly thought that a new stage of integration calls for federative institutions and structures and a political integration based on federal institutions has gained increasing public support.

In these circumstances a new system of institutions and regulation of international relations seems to be slowly emerging in the world. It goes far beyond the traditional international institutions and mechanisms but its perspectives are to achieve the "breakthrough" into supranationality in some areas only. I call this new system a *co-national structure*.

I use "co-national" to describe a new system of international relations that, besides maintaining national sovereignty, brings intensive co-operation and widespread co-ordination on the different levels (individual, corporate, government bodies, etc.) of economic, social and political life. In this system there is the possibility and a willingness to reach compromise on the basis of differing or conflicting interests, and nation states enter the stage of collective behaviour and activity in the fields in which it is rational and necessary.<sup>1</sup>

Regional economic integration, co-ordination of economic policies, direct co-operation in production have appeared already in the post-war years. However, co-nationalism based on mutual dependence only came to the fore in the 1970s. A *co-national system* is in the process of being developed and can be considered as the trend for the future. The co-national system is a *stage of transition between traditional and supranational type of international co-operation*. In some areas it gives a long-term perspective and solution, in others it may be a starting point and foundation for supranational and federative structures.

The *essential characteristics of co-nationalism* in my opinion are as follows:

1) When *national economic policies* are formulated and implemented, *international factors are to be taken into account*. In recent years the national economic policy's autonomy has been declining, but interdependence has not always been taken into consideration. The failure to reckon with interdependence has led to tensions within the nation state. From the late 1970s, however, a number of countries had to adjust to changing conditions dictated by the world economy. Adjustment calls for specific means, as the establishment of special institutions (modification of planning due to uncertainty within the economy). This is natural, because the nation state adjustment is not only a question of good perception and taking appropriate measures, but it also requires bilateral or multilateral consultations and leads to a certain type of co-ordinated economic policy, especially with the main economic partners (planning of foreign trade is important and the whole economic system has to be able to cope with entirely new conditions). From the late 70s, for the sake of more efficient adjustment, quite a number of countries opened up and let themselves be influenced by the world economy. This was the case even when world economic processes led to political and social tensions. The more efficient national adjustment to the world economy has far-reaching consequences in internal politics.

2) *Adjustment* to the new terms dictated by the world economy calls

*for an intensive and complex development of international economic relations.* Due to the permanent development, the significance in particular of regional integrational institutions will increase. This question is of great importance to smaller countries; however we should not rule out the increasing interests of larger countries towards integration. The CMEA and the EEC are expected to support more schemes for integration in the future and closer co-operation in production, for the sake of industrial adjustment, along with the improvement in the co-ordination of macro-economic processes and policies. In capitalist Europe, on the basis of economic and political interests, the integration process will gradually incorporate the whole of western Europe (new adhesions, the increasing dependence of the rest of EFTA), even if expansion slows down integration and causes internal tensions within the EEC. In regional integration, social and political interests are going to have priority, and the possibility of strengthening economic relations will depend on them. Besides the two European integrations, the process is gaining ground in other regions as well (for example in developing countries). In spite of the dilemma whether to choose intensive collaboration among themselves or traditional links with the developed capitalist countries, the developing countries will find the extension of South-South relations increasingly possible and necessary. Regional integration does not conflict with the world development of economic relations, and regional autarky is becoming redundant.

3) In the future, the significance of *international co-operation in production* will increase. The term "international co-operation" involves every sphere of reproduction, from research to marketing. Due to pressures brought about by up-to-date technology and structural changes, companies from both large and small countries will be forced to co-operate, and, in the wave of structural change, in the future, international co-operation will become even more intensive. International co-operation in production is one of the important sources of increasing efficiency. Making the most of the advantages offered by the co-operation in production is not just in the individual producer's interest, but also in the interest of the national economies as well. Co-operation in production is an important factor in integration processes.

As far as western industrialized economies are concerned, their co-operation in production is expected to develop within the framework of *transnational corporations*. Transnational corporations play an important role in shaping international power relations; and dualism in their power relations (state vs. TNCs) will persist in the future. There is no

doubt that transnational corporations stepping over national borders point in the direction of a co-national economic system. The claims to regulate and control them in a supranational framework may increase, though I do not expect a breakthrough in this respect. On the one hand, transnational corporations enjoy the support and protection of the nation state (industrialized countries) and, on the other, they are exposed to growing control. They will increasingly have to adjust in order to conform to the norms of international regulations (UN norms of behaviour, etc.).

4) Handling and solving global economic problems is one of the fields of co-national co-operation we have to work on. In our present structure it is generally acknowledged that only by increasing international co-operation can we put into effect the changes made necessary by higher energy prices and growing spending on environmental protection (transition to energy-sparing technologies and new products and capital-intensive complex technological development projects). Smaller countries cannot take a leading role in co-operation: they can either follow the methods applied by the developed countries or "participate" in their work. If radical structural changes are carried out (introducing alternative energy sources, new technologies, products and infrastructures) co-operation will be essential. Of course, in some fields it is possible to handle and solve world problems within the framework of traditional international co-operation (co-operation in production among enterprises, intergovernmental programmes). In other fields, however, a solution is offered only by the establishment of *new international institutions* by the introduction of *new forms and mechanisms of co-operation*. Most of the global problems can in fact be defined as *global externalities* in the functioning of the world economy and a solution to them would require global financing, for which there is as yet little enthusiasm. As to the solution and handling of world problems, so far only some common goals and tasks have been set down and *collective policies and actions* have not yet taken form.

Our present world economic institutions and mechanisms are unable to regulate and control world-scale or regional economic processes. In the future we can act collectively only if the interests of the parties concerned coincide. We must emphasize this, since *one of the decisive criteria for the efficiency of the co-national system is the realistic assessment and rational compromise of interests*. But we must find solutions for the problem even in those spheres in which interests are hard to harmonize, and even sacrifices without any compensation can be made in cases of

severe distortions (recovery programmes for environmental protection on a world scale).

When speaking about conflicting interests, we cannot dismiss the question of *economic security*. The balance of security gains particular importance in the co-national system. None of the Superpowers wants to become dependent on another country for strategic war materials or territories of strategic importance or encounter unexpected problems. Rational co-operation or the joint development of technologies or energy sources might, however, call for it, and solutions can be produced by the "balancing" of interdependence and security. As to co-national co-operation it can be expected that a joint policy for the solution of global problems will remain a weak point in the long run: progress in this respect can be expected only through crises.

5) In given circumstances, differences in the level of development, social differences, different historical and cultural traditions and values might become the source of grave conflicts. Our greatest concern in the world economy today is *the widening gap between the developing and developed countries*. Internal and external factors are equally important as far as the problems of the developing world are concerned. It would be difficult to say which of the two factors is more important. Rapid progress in the developing world depends on successful trade relations and it is in the political and economic interest of the whole world to help these countries catch up with developed economies.

6) Though interdependence has been increasing, only very little progress has been made among countries in acting together and working out co-ordinated, common policies. Measures to be taken in order to co-ordinate economic policies among the industrialized countries (at EEC and OECD level, at summit meetings of the leading countries) have either been insufficiently effective or went little beyond simply outlining what needed to be done. Though in the 70s measures were taken to improve the co-ordination of the plans of the socialist countries, they do not yet meet all the requirements of a complex and effective economic policy. I consider *extensive co-ordination of economic policies* among nations as *one of the most important factors in the co-national system*.

Even some co-ordination of economic policies among the socialist and capitalist countries or among the developed and developing countries — based on mutual recognition of each other's interests — is not completely out of the question. Though the few plans for such a co-operation seem to be little more than dreams, they might be welcome in some spheres in the near future. International co-ordination of economic

policies involves a number of problems.

7) The co-national system is linked to a *further development of the international system of international relations*. In the co-national system the *participants in economic relations* (institutions of nation states, enterprises, international organs, etc.) are taking a more active role. Their functions are adapted to changing circumstances (reform of the international monetary system). Participation in international organizations is becoming more comprehensive (even with socialist countries) and this affects the character and function of the organizations in question. It is thought that in the near future the enterprises of the socialist countries —

both national and international — will increase their importance in foreign economic relations. New international organizations will be needed (particularly in connection with the so-called global problems of the world economy) disposing of efficient instruments able to counter-balance harmful influences in the world markets (e.g. by helping solve the problem of food supply, or limiting extreme price fluctuations).

It is a predominant feature in the co-national system that *all its subjects are endeavouring separately and collectively to realistically assess, explain and analyse the processes of the world economy*. A co-national system begins with *the realization and understanding of interdependence*. After World War II several international institutions were vested with wide *information and analysis functions*. Under the pressure of the crisis of the 1970s, there was a tendency to increase their efficiency (as in the cases of IMF, EEC, OECD, etc.). They investigated the causes of processes, alternative actions and means and the consistency of national economic policies. In our rapidly changing world the importance of economic foresight has increased, and the various "reports" and conferences of the last decade (Club of Rome, Trilateral Committee, Brandt Committee) have served as a basis for orientation of policy and the activity of governments and international organizations.

*A reform of world economic mechanisms in several directions, the acceptance of new principles and norms of collaboration* are postulated by the co-national system. There are several grave problems which cannot be solved through the present mechanisms of the world economy (putting an end to world famine) in spite of the fact that their solution is in the long-term political and economic interest of mankind. The practical application of certain new *humanitarian and moral principles and norms* (equality and solidarity) is increasingly desirable.

Depending on the social, economic and political conditions, *the co-national system* will reach *different levels of process control*.

Co-ordination and collective regulation of economic relations can be expected to reach the most intensive level *in relatively homogeneous regions with basically similar or harmonizing interests*. Special emphasis can be placed on *integrational organizations, which, in some cases, may take supranational forms* (EC). Nevertheless, I think that co-national relations have to be treated as *a comprehensive system for the whole world economy*. The co-national system does not contradict regional federalism and it may be the basis for supranational structures in the future. Internationalization is a worldwide process which has transcended the borders of social and political systems and of groups of countries of various levels of development. The role of "global solutions" for the problems of the developing world can hardly be contested, but *co-national collaboration in inter-system relations* is also needed in several fields and promises great advantages. It is not in conflict with a *comprehensive system approach* that in the latter spheres interdependence and regulation may be less intense. Naturally in certain spheres the explosion of world economic problems can fundamentally modify the scene. Therefore the evolution of the co-national system is hard to forecast.

*In the sphere of economic management* the co-national system means, first of all, *the modification of the relations of production in the world economy*, and in close connection with the deep-rooted changes in the production structure, *fulfils the real tasks of the new era of the world economy* in the future. In my view, co-national co-operation is an absolute necessity in spite of the present differences in socio-economic relations and levels of development in the world.

The 1970s have demonstrated that political agreement and co-operation can advance very slowly even among countries that have the same social system and belong to the same political, economic and military alliances. From a historical point of view it was extraordinarily unfortunate that détente came to a halt; moreover, in certain fields there was a retreat in spite of the fact that the truth of the Marxist thesis that *peaceful coexistence is an objective necessity of our age* is increasingly being demonstrated. This is supported by the evolutionary requirements of the co-national system. Therefore, in many respects, politics and the requirements of the economy in the 1970s were moving in opposite directions.

In the middle of the 1980s hopes have risen that the previous tendencies can be reversed and a co-national type of co-operation will emerge.

Tibor Palánkai

## NOTES

I suggest the prefix "co" to denote the above-mentioned phenomena, and do not limit its use to the original latin meaning. I do not wish to create new words by any means or force new concepts on anyone. I think, however, that in the case of new and important phenomena, one must unequivocally define the words used to describe them. The use of categories or words having many other interpretations can be misleading. The name "transnational corporations" caused many problems when it entered common use. Also now we often use confusing terminology, that does not convey the idea of the phenomena they refer to being totally new (for example "international corporation" or "super-monopoly"). The word "international", in my opinion, is too general and includes the meaning "co-national". We could also say "transnational interstate relations", but this is easily associated with transnational corporations. Besides, the new regulatory system *not only passes the borders, but also involves collective action*. On the other hand, also the term "supranationalism" should be excluded. Hence, I think, the introduction of a new term is to be recommended.



## Discussions

### CONCRETIZING THE PATH TOWARD WORLD GOVERNMENT

One cannot help but be struck by the increasingly serious tone of the discussion in *The Federalist* about the construction of a partial world government as a task for this era. In 1984 it posited in general terms the necessity of world government in the opening editorial of its English-language edition. In 1986 it offered a magisterial editorial survey of possible "Roads towards World Federation." In 1987 it published an incisive discussion of the problematic and the main way forward by Sergio Pistone under the title "Europe and the World." Without covering all this ground again, I should like to add several comments by way of extension and supplementation of what has been said already.

#### *Establishing a Link Between World Government and Existing Political Reality.*

The key passage of the article of Prof. Pistone comes after he has shown that a stable world federation must also be a world democracy, yet humanity cannot wait for the logical precondition of national democracy to be realized everywhere before the project gets underway: "If we wish to make the debate on transition to world unity less generic, then we need to formulate reasonable hypotheses about the start to the process and the guiding idea in this context is that of partial world government formulated by Einstein... a partial world government which from a political and economic point of view is sufficiently strong to gradually involve the rest of the world in world unification (by causing the vital premises to mature), to carry out, in other words, a locomotive-type role comparable to that carried out by the Franco-German pole and by 'little Europe' with regard to European integration... In the current historical situation, which seems destined to last for quite a while, the creation of a partial world gov-

ernment with these characteristics can only occur in the Northern hemisphere... It is possible to identify two possible platforms. The ideal platform is a convergence between all the main components of the Northern hemisphere, i.e. the USA, the USSR, Europe and Japan... If, however, the necessary (democratic) premises for the full participation of the USSR, from the very beginning, in the construction of the partial world government were to be delayed excessively, the historical reality of the problem of world unification might force the choice of a more limited initial platform, including the USA, Western Europe and Japan. In this case, the problems of ending the East-West conflict and the democratization of the USSR would become the priority themes of the external action of the partial world government."

These formulations bespeak the essence of seriousness: the readiness to bring the ultimate ideal down from the lofty pinnacle of perfect dreams where it is unsullied by any trace of reality, to the level of the most practical proposition for realizing what is essential in it. This is a welcome addition to the discussion of world government; too often the very difficulty of the task has induced a total disjunction between the rhetorical idealism of its proponents and the rhetorical realism of its opponents.

It is possible to carry the reasoning one step further, and thereby to establish the concrete links of the goal with present actuality. It is not only a matter for the future that it might happen that the immaturity of the political premises in the USSR will force a more limited choice. This has been the situation — the contradiction — that the world has been living under since the explosion of the atomic bomb first announced the necessity of world government in some historically proximate period of time. It is the situation that the world still faces, although the changes in Russia bespeak a possibility of rapid transformation of this situation. How best to encourage the transformation of that possibility into actuality will be considered further on.

Under the circumstances of blockage at the global level, the development of arrangements linking the three remaining pillars of the North — Europe, America and Japan — has proceeded. It has not yet proceeded in the sense in which Prof. Pistone speaks of a consciously federative construction of an embryo of a partial European government in the Schuman Plan. But it has proceeded along lines of development of interrelations and commitments which, while they all formally proclaim themselves merely intergovernmental, nevertheless in the totality of their significance go far beyond traditional intergovernmental cooperation.

OECD, G-7, NATO, the North Atlantic Assembly, in a sense also the EC (which bears a relation to this wider unity somewhat as Benelux once bore to the EC), and in the opposite direction GATT, IMF and the World Bank (which have illustrated already, despite the power politics distortions that are guaranteed by their intergovernmental forms, some of the broader potential role of the OECD grouping for partial world governance): through this alphabet soup of institutional relations, through with the mutual commitments for defense, the deep economic interpenetration, the common cultural and political heritage of Europe and America (and to a lesser extent Japan), through the symbolic impression made by the regular meetings of the heads of state in the Economic Summit — through all of this, the Trilateral region has come to be felt as a genuine region of the world. It is the world's first actual intercontinental "region". Further, this region has come to feel itself as a community of destiny; a badly flawed community of destiny, to be sure — flawed by reliance on American hegemony for any motion, by feebleness of common institutional authority, by European incoherence, by trade disputes, by sharp fluctuation in national currencies and national politics — but a community of destiny nonetheless, and in all the major spheres of public life: political regime, defense, culture and economy.

This means that it is not a matter entirely for future choice, weather to begin from an ideal platform or from a smaller platform. The beginning has already occurred. Let us not forget that European integration did not begin *ex nihilo* with the ECSC. Before the Schuman Plan the stage had been set by a build-up of institutions and commitments (Brussels Pact, Marshall Plan, Council of Europe, NATO) to which the build-up of Atlantic and Trilateral institutions bears close comparison. The question is not weather at some future date to choose among platforms, but how to endeavor to develop within the existing Trilateral platform the will to include in those bonds a federal embryo.

#### *The Propelling Role of European Federalism.*

In developing this will, the concluding remarks of Prof. Pistone about the propelling role of European unification assume redoubled importance. If many objective factors and relations have matured for the foundation of a partial world government from within the OECD platform, the subjective factors have decayed since 1945 with the fading of the memories of total war and the routinization of nuclear terror. Where in Europe in the late 1940s there was a strong build-up in the European

Federalist Movement, the Hague Congress and the European Movement toward the building of an embryo of a European government, in the subsequent decades there has been a build-down of federalist influence on all levels. Only in Europe has the project of federation retained any existential link with public political life; thus the struggle of European federalism has become the existential struggle of all international federalism. If it succeeds in establishing a European government, it will, through the mere fact of that success — and also we may hope through the actions of that government — propel to renewed life all other projects of international federalism. It follows that the first and greatest responsibility in building toward a world federation is to redouble the effort for European federation and to rescue European integration from the ahistorical pace of its gradualism.

Having said this, it is necessary to add that this task, which is the first and foremost task of European federalists in this period, is not and cannot be the only task of European federalists in this period. We must be wary of overly simplistic formulations, which can lead to the negation of vital opportunities, every bit as much as we must be wary of fuzziness of will or orientation.

#### *Three Parallel Overlapping Staircases, not Disjoint Consecutive Steps.*

In this context, it is necessary to amend and refine the popular image that international unification proceeds in discrete stages, moving stepwise from the regional (European) level to the intercontinental (Atlantic, Trilateral) level and then the global level, with each step to be completed before the next has begun. Already decades ago, steps were taken on all three of these levels. The movement on these three levels is not a movement in three discrete consecutive steps but might be more accurately visualized as a movement along three parallel staircases. The movement proceeds at different paces on the several staircases, and on all three there has been too much shuffling sideways and not enough movement upward, but movement proceeds on all three at the same time, on all three it is possible and necessary in the present period to take further steps upward. They will reach their respective top landings in three consecutive stages, but the movement up them is parallel as well as consecutive, that is, it is overlapping.

The movement up the European staircase has been fastest and strongest. Its goal remains formally avowed by European institutions,

and informally by the people of Europe as a destiny to which they expect someday to arrive if history gives them the time. Its progress has slowed substantially in comparison with the early years, yet progress there still is, and if speeded up, Europe would soon arrive at a landing on the staircase from which it could announce the formation of a European government. European government is not, as we have seen, in any logically meaningful sense "the first step", but it is overwhelmingly probable that it will be the first international federation and as such a crucial step, a moment of renewed hope and vibrancy, in the long tortuous march toward world government.

The movement up the Atlantic/Trilateral staircase has been slower. As with Europe, its best period was in the decade and a half beginning in 1947; indeed, the European and Atlantic construction proceeded so much more vigorously in those years because they proceeded hand-in-hand as mutually supportive endeavors. Since the formation of OECD in 1962, there has been much sideways shuffling and a few small steps upward — mainly the Summits and G-7, which have added some living political significance to the OECD grouping and may be portents of greater future steps. The recurrent crises in Atlantic defense relations and Trilateral trade and currency relations give a recurrent impetus to searchings for more effective means of policy integration. The weakness of federalist influence, however, has enabled Deutsch's consultative-pluralistic approach to integration, i.e. confederalism, to play the predominant role in these searchings, fading occasionally into a functionalism without federalist embryos. Only the North Atlantic Assembly — the interparliamentary body which Atlantic federalists did so much to establish, and in which Japan and Australia now participate as observers — provides the weak image of a possible federalist embryo in the sense in which Prof. Pistone has written on the need particularly for "a directly elected common parliament." Unfortunately it as yet is purely interparliamentary, and bereft even of the consultative rights which the European Parliament had in its weakest inter-parliamentary days. The reinforcement of the North Atlantic Assembly, by the establishment of actual functions for it, the renewal of its internal political courage, and the addition of a directly elected element to it — and through it the reform of Atlantic and Trilateral relations from intergovernmental relations based on the people and democratic aggregation through parties rather than nations — is the indicated line for federative progress on this staircase.

The movement up the global staircase has been the slowest of all. Indeed, it might be said that, while in 1945 there were one or two major

steps upward, in the next two years there was a step back down, leaving the UN in existence but as a formal shell. Since then there have been only small steps upward (and downward), and much shuffling around. The functionalist regimes of the UN system have shown the most potential. Even the Bretton Woods institutions are counted within this group, and while it cannot be said that they have progressed in recent decades, nevertheless their relative importance and effectiveness, derived from their close ties with the inter-democracy OECD core group and their sometimes use of weighted voting, suggests some of the reforms needed to enhance the UN's relevance. In particular, the proposal for triad voting — requiring a majority of the world's states, the world's population and the world's wealth for a resolution to pass — would give UN voting an immediately plausible and popularly comprehensible relation to most of the major interests in the world. It would thereby not only make the UN immediately more relevant, but would reveal the extent of world community that exists already or potentially in this period. On this ground, there would be fairer hope of proceeding with the functional and possibly even federal initiatives that would be needed to realize the existing potential for global community. Here too, however, the weakness of federalist influence stands in the way: first in the way of getting such a major overhaul as triad voting would represent, then in the way of carrying through on the potential this would reveal for global community.

The weakness of federalist influence on these broader levels will be greatly ameliorated, possibly completely transformed, by the establishment of a European federal government. Meanwhile it can already be ameliorated by the favorable attitude of European federalists toward the broader projects and their participation in them, not as their main task in this era, nor as a distraction from their main task of European federation, but as a supplement to that main task which helps provide a favorable context for it and guards against the pitfalls of sectarianism. In this regard, the turn of *The Federalist* toward timely, constructive regard for these broader questions of broader international integration is a cultural fact of potentially historic importance.

#### *Relations Among the Staircases.*

The relation between the steps on these several levels is complex and multifarious, but is in main part and on balance direct, in the sense that progress on each level tends to redound directly to the progress of all, rather than dialectical. Movement on any level can fill in when movement

on the others has stalled, and provide inspiration for a relance. The faster movement in the narrower regions can provide inspiration, impetus and political and structural support for acceleration of movement on the slower, broader levels. Conversely, movement on the broader levels can provide context, inspiration and impetus for movement on the narrower levels. The latter has already happened: the first major steps toward European unification were Atlantic steps — the Marshall Plan, NATO — and the first institutional steps toward Atlantic unification were global steps — the League of Nations, the United Nations.

However, the narrower institutions have not yet been able to play a constructive active role within the broader institutions, because they remained plagued by a unit-veto intergovernmental system of decision-making which renders them inflexible and backward-looking. Indeed, in their explicit external diplomatic functions they have often played a negative role, as the EC has within GATT, or NATO within the context of East-West negotiations. This negative role is not enough to undo the positive good the EC and NATO do simply by being there. The situation of world trade would be much worse in the absence of the EC and the presence of trade wars, dictatorships and world wars growing out of Europe; the situation for East-West relations would be much worse if there were no Atlantic Alliance and the West remained rent, as it had been in the interwar period, by diplomatic, political and economic feuds and contradictory military preparations. But it does mean that the reform of the narrower institutions through a reliable system of majority rule — the mission of the federalists — has become their most pressing responsibility to the broader levels.

#### *The "First Step" and the Sectarian Temptation.*

It has been popular, among activists on each of the three levels, to write and argue that a preferred step on the activist's preferred level is "the next step in history," before which all other steps and actions in politics anywhere and everywhere are either impossible or worthless, but after which all else will become possible and will be realized in relatively short order. As Joseph Baratta has put it in his bibliography of international federalism, "World Federalists have argued that European federation could follow, but not precede, a world federation, which would provide the military security and economic coordination necessary for all regional federations... European unionists have claimed that their union was the key to world union." In this standoff the World Federalists come

out worse, since European integration has made some progress while world federation has stood still, but both arguments err in their exclusivity and their neglect of the valid points in the opposite argument. They have both — along with all isomorphic arguments — been superseded by history, since some steps have already been taken on all three levels.

The psychological use of such an argument is obvious in focusing the will, but the cost is excessive: a false perception of history, a distorted and implausible perspective on the present and the future, a musty monomaniacal style of analysis, an attitude toward other worthy initiatives that ranges from stand-offish to downright hostility, replete with self-fulfilling speculation on the failure of the other initiatives out of fear that they might confute the activist's faith and dogmas. All this is more useful for sectarian consolidation of a declining movement than for building a growing movement. Surely the will can be focused by slightly more subtle conceptions, without the drawbacks of sectarianism and unpersuasiveness to outsiders!

The sectarian temptation is one to which all minorities are prone in circumstances of protracted waiting, especially minorities that have developed a political culture which stands head and shoulders — and several dialectical turns — above the ordinary political culture. Here the role of *The Federalist*, which is unmistakably the highest pinnacle of federalist culture in the world, is again of supreme importance. *The Federalist* promotes a Eurocentric focus of the will, and with several qualifications I agree with it in advocating this for European Federalists. The question follows to what extent *The Federalist* must promote a Eurocentric deformation of analysis. I would argue that this is little needed if at all. Fortunately the trend in *The Federalist* has been away from an exclusive or deformative Eurocentrism, and toward a more simply accurate assessment of the Eurocentric element in wider problems. European federation is a nodal point in the solution of many wider problems, and analysis of and action on those problems is, as *The Federalist* has often demonstrated, incomplete and self-deceiving if it proceeds without reference to the European nodal point; but it is not a nodal point in all of them, nor the main nodal point in many of them, nor the only nodal point in most of them, nor is its completion the prerequisite of any and all progress on the other nodal points, and analysis of and action on the broader problems would be no less incomplete and self-deceiving if it proceeded in an overwhelmingly Eurocentric way. Indeed, it is necessary to make progress on some of the wider nodal points in order to reinforce European unity, just as it is necessary to complete European

integration in order to reinforce wider solutions. It is enough to be a vital nodal point, without fancying oneself to be the centre of the universe through which all else must pass directly. European federation is Europe's first responsibility in the sense of her foremost responsibility in this era, but, given the unfortunate circumstance that it is caught up in an ahistorical gradualism and is not going to be completed overnight, its completion is not and cannot be Europe's first task in the sense of her only responsibility in this era, nor the prior condition for beginning to face all her other responsibilities.

*Ira Straus*

## Federalist Action

### A JOINT WAWF-UEF APPEAL TO GORBACHEV AND REAGAN

*Relationships between the UEF, WAWF and the AUD have increasingly led to meetings and common initiatives, demonstrating the need for greater cultural exchanges and strong links between the actions of European Federalists and World Federalists.*

*A Convention promoted by the Department of Political Studies of the University of Turin on the thinking and works of Altiero Spinelli (Turin, July 1st and 2nd 1988) gave the members of the three organizations the opportunity for a full debate on federalism and ended in a common initiative. A letter was drawn up and signed by the Presidents of the UEF (John Pinder) and the WAWF (Francis Leddy) and sent to Gorbachev and Reagan, which we publish below. On the same occasion, the text of a joint declaration by the WAWF, UEF and AUD, initially proposed by Mario Albertini, was drawn up and submitted to the approval of the respective decision-making bodies. The UEF ratified the text in a meeting on October 22nd 1988.*

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### LETTER TO GORBACHEV AND REAGAN

Your Excellencies:

The beginning of a new era in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States has raised a large wave of hope among people all over the world. On behalf of the World Association for World Federation and the Union of European Federalists, which have completed two days of productive meetings in Turin, Italy, we wish to extend to both of you our

sincere gratitude.

We have much admiration for your tenacious efforts to create a new international climate based on cooperation and mutual trust. And we share with millions worldwide the hope that your efforts will be sustained. For humanity is now confronted with an array of global threats, such as uncontrolled population growth, growing economic inequalities, overexploitation of natural resources, degradation of our ecological heritage and national tensions in many areas.

Clearly, if the forces of reason and justice are to prevail, we must face squarely our precarious international situation. Today the pursuit of narrow national interest often impedes common efforts to bring about solutions which can serve all of humanity.

We are convinced that your efforts toward a durable peace can be strengthened by a commitment to work toward a new world order, one in which war is made impossible.

Therefore we urge you to galvanize public support for this new era in international relations by stating your intention to work toward the unification of all the world's citizens under world federation.

We are, of course, aware that world federation must be framed as a long-range ideal. It is a goal which could be approached in stages. One avenue of progress toward this goal involves gradual strengthening of the United Nations, particularly in the sphere of disarmament and international security. Regional federal unions are also intermediate steps which serve this overall goal.

We recognize that the part of the world where political relations have most fruitfully matured beyond national sovereignties is the European Community. Europe also can be the locus of great progress in the future through a transnational democracy in which the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union might eventually participate.

Only political cooperation and integration can eventually eliminate the possibility of war and enable us to solve our other global problems. It is for this reason we appeal to you to continue to provide constructive, responsible leadership to help unite the world's peoples and nations in meeting the challenges and opportunities ahead.

\* \* \*

#### PROPOSITION OF WAWF-UEF-AUD COMMON DECLARATION

The WAWF, the UEF and the AUD, with the intent of ensuring the democratic unity of the efforts of all federalists who are active in different

regions of the world and within different organisations,

declare

their support for the following principles:

— peace in the world is the primary political problem of our time. The survival of humankind depends on its achievement;

— peace requires the establishment of a world federation based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law with institutions having limited yet effective powers;

— such institutions are also necessary to promote economic and social justice, human rights and the preservation of the environment.

They declare

their intent to pursue with other federalists the acceptance by the maximum number of nations of a democratic federal world government through:

1. The development of federal integration in the regions of the world and among other groupings of states;

2. Restructuring and strengthening the United Nations according to federal principles.

## Federalism in the History of Thought

### JEAN MONNET

*The centenary of Jean Monnet's birth was solemnly celebrated in Paris with the transfer of his earthly remains to the Pantheon. Never before had a person, so closely identified with the battle for European Unity, been accepted in the temple in which the glories of France rest. In the course of a moving ceremony which took place in the square outside the Pantheon, Jean Monnet's voice, which boomed out from an old recording, recalled how "The United States of Europe are the only inheritance which we can leave to our children."*

*For Monnet, this was no ceremonial phrase. In his memoirs, published in 1976, he stressed how nobody can transmit his own wisdom to others. The only asset that can be left to later generations are good institutions. This is a rule that Monnet never foresook.*

*Born in Cognac in 1888, he came up against the harsh reality of politics at the beginning of the First World War. Exempted from military service for health reasons, Monnet felt unable to remain indifferent to the fate of so many of his contemporaries cut down by war. His impatience became greater as soon as he realized that 19th century institutions were completely inadequate in facing up to a conflict of infinitely greater proportions than those of the past ("the conditions of war had changed, the war machine was called on to squeeze all the resources of a nation, and it was necessary to invent unprecedented forms of organization.")*

*Thanks to a family friend Monnet managed to meet the French Prime Minister Viviani who accepted his suggestions. From that time onwards, he actively participated in solving Europe's and the world's greatest problems. He contributed to organizing links between the allies during the First World War, took part in the economic and financial reconstruction of many countries affected by the postwar crisis, encouraged unity among the French Resistance in Algiers, led the French Commissariat in this plan, invented the European Communities formula (starting with the ECSC), promoted the creation of the European Council when he realized*

*that the EEC was languishing through the lack of initiative and, finally in the last years of his life, vigorously supported the need to elect the European Parliament by universal suffrage.*

*Jean Monnet reached the highest point of creative activity when, faced with the blind alley in which the European states had ended up following the end of the Second World War, he realized that the only way out of the impasse would be the construction of a strong European Unity, which would have restored Germany's dignity, offered solid guarantees of peace to France, and ensured Europe's independence vis-à-vis the US. From this intuition was born the European Coal and Steel Community. Its origins lay in a clear awareness that the problem to be solved was Franco-German rivalry. But although the objective was clearly identified, the means to achieving it were far from clear. Little by little, the idea that the problem could not be tackled in its entirety grew up in Monnet's mind. On the contrary what was required was "concrete and resolute action on a limited but decisive point, which progressively changed the terms of the entire set of problems."*

*This approach inspired the memorandum written on May 3rd 1950, which was published for the first time by Le Monde on May 9th 1970 with the following explanatory note: "On April 28th 1950 Jean Monnet sent Georges Bidault, the French Prime Minister, a typewritten text of little more than three pages, in which he expressed the famous proposal to 'put French and German production of coal and steel together under one common High Authority, in an organization open to the participation of other European countries'. Monnet saw this as 'the first basis for a European Federation which is indispensable for the protection of peace'. This text was sent on the same day to Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, through the good offices of Bernard Clappier who acted as an intermediary. It was a Friday. On the Monday morning, May 1st, on his return from a trip to his constituency in Metz, Schuman simply told Clappier: 'I'll see to it'. On May 4th, Jean Monnet sent a new memorandum to Bidault and Schuman dated May 3rd, which explained the reasons that had led him to propose the coal and steel community."*

*Le Monde rightly stresses that Monnet saw the ECSC as the "first step towards a European Federation which was indispensable for peace." Monnet had with great lucidity understood the nature of the problem to be solved, had clearly identified the final objective (federation), but had ingenuously believed that the functionalist method would have been enough to achieve it. The history of European unification has demonstrated that the blind faith shown by Jean Monnet in the spontaneous*

*evolution of the Community towards federation was unfounded. But despite this, his work is no less significant: thanks to it the terms of the European problem have radically changed. The Communities have eliminated the remaining tensions between European countries, have guaranteed a period of prosperity without precedence and have opened up the road in the battle for the construction of the United States of Europe. And the fact remains that Jean Monnet's intuition of the importance of "concrete and resolute action on a limited but decisive point" continues to be a basic teaching for federalist struggle.*

\* \* \*

#### THE MONNET MEMORANDUM OF MAY 3 1950

Anywhere we wish to turn in the current world situation we find blind alleys, whether it be the growing resignation that war is inevitable or the problem of Germany, or the continuation of French resurrection and European organization or the place of France in Europe and the World.

We can escape from this situation only in one way: with a concrete resolute action on a limited but decisive point, which leads to a basic change on this point and progressively modifies the terms of the problems as a whole.

This is the spirit in which the proposal in the appendix was formulated.<sup>1</sup> The reflections which follow summarize the thinking that has led to this proposal.

1. Minds are concentrated on a simple and dangerous objective: the cold war.

All proposals, all actions are interpreted by public opinion as a contribution to the cold war.

The cold war, whose essential objective is to make the adversary give in, is the first stage in war proper.

This prospect creates a rigidity in political leaders that arises from the pursuance of a single objective. The search for the solution of problems disappears. This rigidity of objectives and thinking inevitably proceeds, in all kinds of ways, towards the conflict which is in the inevitable logic of this perspective. From this conflict war will be born.

Indeed, we are still at war.

We need to change the course of events. To do this we need to change the spirit of men. Words are not enough. Only immediate action on an

essential point can break out of the current situation of stasis. Profound, real, rapid and dramatic action needs to be undertaken which changes things and makes them enter the reality of hopes in which the peoples are beginning not to believe any more. Thus they will be able to give the peoples of "free" countries a cause for hope even for the most remote objectives which will be entrusted to them, and active determination in pursuing them.

2. The German situation will rapidly become a dangerous cancer for peace in the near future, and immediately for France, unless its development is directed — for the Germans — towards hope and collaboration with free peoples.

This situation cannot be achieved with the unification of Germany since this would require a USA-USSR agreement which is impossible to conceive of at the present time.

It cannot be achieved with the integration of West Germany into the West,

— because as a result of this West Germans would be in a situation where they accepted separation vis-à-vis the East whereas unity must be their constant objective;

— because integration raises the problem of Germany's rearmament and would lead to war constituting a provocation for the Russians;

— for insoluble political reasons.

And yet Americans will insist that integration should take place,

— because they want something to be done and they have no other ideas which can be implemented immediately;

— because they doubt French solidity and dynamism. Some think that they must promote the creation of a replacement for France.

We should not attempt to resolve the German problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of current data. We must change the data by transforming the German problem.

We must undertake dynamic action to change the German situation guiding the German spirit, and not seeking a static solution on the basis of current data.

3. The continuation of the resurrection of France will become impossible if the question of German industrial production and its competitive capacity is not resolved rapidly.

The basis for the superiority that French industrialists traditionally recognize Germany is the latter's production of steel at a price which France cannot compete with. The disadvantage of the entire French production, they say, derives from this.



Germany is already demanding to increase its production from 11 to 14 million tons. We refuse, but the Americans will insist. At the end we will make reservations but we will give in. Meanwhile French production is not increasing but is in fact decreasing.

We need only mention these facts, even without illustrating them to realize their consequences: an expanding Germany; German dumping in exports; calls to protect French industries; blocking or counterfeiting of trade liberalization; reconstitution of prewar cartels; possible development of German expansion towards the East, prelude to political agreements; France falls back into the routine of limited, protected production.

The decisions which will lead to this situation are about to be discussed, if not taken, at the London conference, because of American pressure.

Now, the USA does not want things to work out in this way. They will accept a different solution provided that it is dynamic and constructive, particularly if it is proposed by France.

With the solution proposed the question of the domination of German production disappears, which, if it arose, would provoke a constant disturbance, and finally, would impede the European Union and would cause a new loss in Germany itself. This solution creates for German, just as much as French and European industry, the conditions for common expansion in competition but without anybody's domination.

From the French point of view, this solution places the domestic industry on an equal footing as compared with German industry, eliminates dumping in exports which would otherwise be practised by the German steel industry, allows French industry to participate in European expansion without any fear of dumping and without the temptations of a cartel. Thus the fear will be eliminated which drives industrialists towards Malthusianism, the blocking of "liberalization", and, finally, towards the return of past practices. The greatest obstacle to the continuation of French industrial progress will thus be removed.

4. We have so far been involved in an effort to organize the West economically, militarily and politically: OECD, the Brussels pact, Strasbourg.

The experience of two years, the discussion of the OECD on agreements for payment, the liberalization of trade etc., the rearmament program submitted at the last meeting in Brussels, the discussions in Strasbourg, the efforts — which remain without any concrete results — to reach a customs union between France and Italy show that we are not making any real progress towards the goal we set out to achieve, which

is the organization of Europe, its economic development, its collective situation.

Britain, however much it desires to collaborate with Europe, will do nothing that will lead to a slackening of its ties with the Dominions or which will commit it to Europe beyond the agreements made by America herself.

Germany, an essential element in Europe, cannot be committed to European organization at the current stage of things for the reasons given above.

Certainly, the continuation of action undertaken on the roads we are currently committed to leads us down a blind alley, and also risks our missing the period of time during which this organization of Europe would still be possible.

Indeed, European peoples hate to hear only words. Very soon they will no longer believe in the ideal that governments will persist in offering them without, however, going beyond the vain discussions of futile meetings.

Public opinion in America will no longer support common action and American participation if Europe shows no dynamism.

For future peace, the creation of a dynamic Europe is essential. An association of "free" peoples, in which the USA participates, does not in fact exclude the creation of one Europe; on the contrary — since this association will be based on freedom, and hence on diversity — Europe, provided that it is adapted to the world's new conditions, will develop its creative faculties and become a kind of balancing force.

We thus need to abandon the forms of the past and go down the road of change either with the creation of common basic economic conditions, and, at the same time, with the creation of new authorities accepted by national sovereignties.

Europe has never existed. It is not the sum of sovereignties brought together in councils that creates an entity. We really must create Europe; it really must manifest itself to itself and American opinion. Europe must have faith in its future.

This creation, when the problem arises of an association with an America which is very strong, is indispensable to show that European countries do not follow the road of facility, do not give way to fear, believe in themselves and create without delay the primary instrument in the creation of a Europe within the community of free and peaceful countries, to which Europe will bring equilibrium, and the continuation of its creative thinking.

5. At the current time, Europe can only be born from France. Only France can speak and act. But if France does not speak and does not act now what will happen?

A grouping will take place around the USA but only to carry out the cold war with greater strength. The obvious reason for this lies in the fact that European countries are afraid and are seeking help. Britain will come closer to the USA; Germany will develop rapidly and we will not be able to avoid its rearmament. France will fall back into Malthusianism and this development will fatally end up with its decline.

6. After the Liberation the French, far from being downtrodden by their difficulties, gave evidence of their vitality and faith in the future: development of production, modernization, transformation of agriculture, promotion of the French Union, etc.

Now, during these years the French have forgotten Germany and its competition. They believed in peace. They suddenly found Germany and war.

The growth of German production and the organization of the cold war resuscitate in their soul the feelings of fear typical of the past, and would cause Malthusian reflexes to be born again. They would thus fall into their psychological condition of fear precisely at a time when boldness would allow them to eliminate these twin dangers, and would allow French spirit to achieve that progress for which they are prepared.

In this economic situation, France is marked by its destiny. If we take the initiative which will eliminate fear, which will allow hope to be renewed in the future, which will make it possible to create a peace force, it will have freed Europe. And in a freed Europe the spirit of men born on French soil, living in freedom and in material and social conditions which are constantly in progress, will continue to make its essential contribution.

(Prefaced and edited by Giovanni Vigo)

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> This relates to the proposal for a European Coal and Steel Community.

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Direttore responsabile: Mario Albertini - Editrice EDIF - Autorizzazione  
Tribunale di Pavia n. 265 del 13-12-1981 - Tipografia Pi-Me, Pavia - Spedizione  
in abbonamento postale - Gruppo IV (70%).

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YEAR XXX, 1988, NUMBER 3