


THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.


Hamilton, The Federalist



THE FEDERALIST

a political review

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE FONDAZIONE EUROPEA LUCIANO BOLIS

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The Meaning of the European Referendum in Italy

On the occasion of the next European elections, a referendum will be held on the following issue: "Do you believe that the European Community should be transformed into a Union provided with a government which is responsible to Parliament, giving the European Parliament itself the mandate of drawing up a draft constitution to be directly ratified by the competent institutions of the Community member States?" The constitutional bill in force of which the referendum will be held was in fact definitively and unanimously passed on March 30th 1989 by the Senate, after the previous votings (all unanimous) of December 20th 1988 in the Senate, and December 14th 1988 and March 15th 1989 in the Chamber.

The Italian press has attached no importance to the event or has indeed ignored it, barring late repentance. This is a gross error. For the first time in the history of the Italian Republic a constitutional bill, the origin of which was a popular initiative promoted by the European Federalist Movement (MFE) has been unanimously passed. This is certainly not irrelevant. Nor is it irrelevant that the result was achieved by the MFE, a political avantgarde which remains outside the election game with the intention of being able to promote, at the right moment, a "popular unity" alliance on advanced European objectives.

The MFE has been supported by many regional and local administrations in this battle for the referendum and by personalities from all democratic parties. The Radical Party has marched alongside it. It is also true that the Communist Party presented a similar bill. But the fact remains that neither the Radical Party nor the Communist Party, acting on their own, without the unitary point of reference constituted by the MFE, would have been able to achieve a decision of this kind for one fundamental reason. As it involves changes to the institutions within the

national and European framework, any effective progress in the making of Europe cannot be achieved through normal government policies (with the parties competing against each other), but only through the mechanisms of constitutional policies (with wide agreement among the parties and people).

* * *

Journalists and political scientists have probably not been interested in this federalist battle for Europe because it cannot have any immediate consequences on the state of power in Italy, in the sense of improving or compromising the position of this or that national leader. But it is the very matter of the consequences—medium and long range consequences included—which clearly shows that the European referendum to be held in Italy is an extremely important event, both at the political and historical level. Let us examine the latter point first.

The word "historical" is so often wrongly used that one instinctively tries to avoid using it. But in this case it cannot be helped. The act the Italian Parliament has carried out amounts to a solemn declaration by the State that it is ready to surrender part of its sovereignty, in a context which goes beyond that foreseen by Article 11 of the Constitution. And when, in the course of history, has a State, without being forced to, declared itself ready to part with some of its sovereignty to become part of a larger State, a big federal State? The fact is that the big changes which arise from the new course of history are starting to appear. Yesterday's world is about to be washed away. Mankind is now a community linked by one destiny. The growing interdependence of human actions, and the need for worldwide control of technological development to avoid the extinction of mankind, make exclusively national policies useless, and exercise increasing pressure on the old boundaries in which in the past human groups best managed to organize their life. A new way of thinking and acting can and must assert itself. New orders of power, which allow mankind to take control of its own destiny, are necessary. Democracy must prevail at the international level too.

The new course of history has already started to upset the rules which have always regulated the relationships between great powers; and in Europe—this is what remains obscure to those who watch the world of today through yesterday's eyes—it has already amply eroded the social basis (custom as social basis) of exclusive national States, which look

more and more artificial institutions because they stop political life at the national borderline, including the absurdity of granting Europeans the right to vote, but not the right to decide with their vote what Europe should be and do.

The European referendum is a historical event because it will give the first blow to this absurdity which has no reason to exist; and because, by introducing the idea of a federal union of nations into people's common way of thinking, it will educate them about a new concept of the world. What matters is that with the federation of a first group of European countries—he historical nations par excellence—international democracy will start to live, in other words a democracy without borders, which can gradually be extended to all the big families of mankind. This is the fundamental political experience of the age which is about to take shape. The real world problems have already spread the use of the expression "to democratize international relations." Their solution will spread the use of the expression "international democracy," which constitutes its essence and truth.

* * *

The political value of the referendum lies in its relationship with the present phase of European unification, and in particular in the fact that creating a single market also requires decisions concerning monetary union and political union which are indispensable to avoid its failure, but which take shape with difficulty. It was difficult to decide on creating a single market. It is more difficult to decide on realising a monetary union. It is even more difficult to decide on setting up a political union. But it is necessary. The Italian referendum on the constituent mandate to the European Parliament is right, and it is taking place at the right moment, precisely because it will help remove this difficulty. Not only will it make European public opinion more aware of the need for political Union and the need to resort to the constituent power of the European people to establish it. It will also make the forces to be mobilized, if this end is to be achieved, more active in all countries (or in a sufficient number of them).

In fact it can already be considered that the large number of citizens in favour of European unity and the granting of a constituent mandate—who are still passive because they have never been able to transform their opinion in an act of will—will feel, after the Italian referendum, that they, too, have the right to pronounce themselves on Europe. It can also

be foreseen that in the European Parliament the parties, as the social and political problems arise from trying to create a single market without setting up a European government, will be forced to refuse acknowledge the soundness of their Italian colleagues' position, already authorized by the referendum to draw up a European Constitution.

And finally it may be noted that the governments of the other Community member States, after the solemn public demonstration that Italy is in favour of creating a European government, will no longer be able to take refuge behind the alibi of the presumable impossibility of such a decision. They will have to say "yes" or "no" clearly in a situation that, with a well-informed public and parties now well aware of the high stakes involved, will make it very difficult to say "no."

The Federalist

Federalism and the Great Ideologies

FRANCESCO ROSSOLILLO

The task in hand.

To understand the nature of federalism as a political movement, it is essential to identify its place within the tortuous and contrastive historical flow of events and ideas, and thus to examine the relationship in which it stands with regard to the great political ideologies which preceded it from the French Revolution onwards. This analysis may be seen as tending to coincide with the global analysis of the meaning of recent history, characterized by the gradual development, in Europe and the World over the last two centuries, of man's awareness as a social being; the emergence of those values which constitute the main points of reference for political thought and action in our age; and of the formation of the institutions of the modern democratic state and the categories which people today usually adopt when coming to grips with the ways in which social life is organized.

Commitment to federalism thus cannot be separated from an examination of the past, and, in particular, from an examination of the methods used to interpret it which have been handed down to us by Marxism, i.e. by the most recent of the trends of thought which view history as a meaningful process. What we have to do is go beyond the conception of history as the history of class struggle: not in the name of a philosophy which conceives the historical process as a succession of events each of which only makes sense in itself — in other words, which makes no sense at all — but by replacing the Marxist frame of thought, which is now in irreversible decline, with a new conceptual framework. This new conceptual framework would allow us to carry out a persuasive analysis of the events in our past which Marxist culture has been unable to explain, and should thus enable us to indicate a credible vision of the future and to provide criteria to direct the thoughts and actions of those people today who feel the contradiction between values and facts in the current state

of society as something which deeply affects their personal sense of responsibility.

Ideologies in today's world.

Anyone observing the political alignments in Western Europe today is faced with liberal, democratic and socialist ideologies in the diverse interpretations placed on them by the parties which refer to them, forming a synchronic panorama, in that they are all present contemporaneously on the political scene.

These same ideologies are generally seen as fragile screens, now practically devoid of any real content, whose pre-eminent function is to provide some justification for the parties' power games: a justification which is generally felt to be so tenuous and insubstantial as to lead part of the educated world to believe that ours is the era of the end of ideologies.

All this should not cause us to forget that the liberal, democratic and socialist ideologies emerged in successive historical eras, and in the periods in which each of them arose they constituted powerful motivations for human behaviour, sparking off the great revolutionary drives which marked the history of Europe in the last two centuries. In those times they gave the European peoples — or at least the active sections among them — the vision of a future worth fighting for and the fundamental categories for interpreting the past from which their struggle sprang.

It is precisely in this historical perspective that the great ideologies must be placed if their link with federalism is to be established.

Pre-industrial society.

Thus we are trying to see if there is a thread which links the great revolutionary explosions in Europe which followed each other from the end of the 18th century and the ideologies which inspired them, and which reveals their link with our contemporary political horizon and with the ideological options at our disposal.

This thread must be sought first of all in the deepest currents of the historical process, in what Braudel calls "long duration" movements. In particular these currents relate to the evolution of the basic structures of human society, those on which all others depend in the final instance. What we are talking about is the *mode of production*, that is the organi-

zation of human activity on which the reproduction of the species depends and which thus, by determining the forms in which the biological life of mankind is perpetuated, assures the foundation on which the cultural aspects of civilized society may develop.

The thread we are seeking is that gigantic and progressive acceleration of the production process — begun in Europe and soon afterwards extended throughout the world — which goes by the name of the *Industrial Revolution* and whose beginnings go back to halfway through the 18th century. Certainly the Industrial Revolution was simply a great speeding up of a process of modernization whose beginnings in Europe can roughly be located in the early 16th century (and even in the 14th century in Italy). It was in fact between the beginning of the 16th and the middle of the 18th centuries that, at least in some parts of Europe, the structural and cultural preconditions for the Industrial Revolution were laid, with the birth of the urban network, the development of an embryonic merchant and financial bourgeoisie, the birth of modern science, the first great inventions, such as the printing press and firearms, and the gradual laicization of culture.

For the purposes of this paper, however, it would be irrelevant to take up any position in the debate regarding the exact beginning of the modernization of European society. What matters is that, up to the middle of the 18th century, that process was slow and irregular, affecting only limited areas of the continent and Great Britain, while, from the mid-18th century onwards, the development and synergetic effect of each of the factors contributing to modernization imposed an ever faster rhythm on the process, caused it to spread throughout Europe and caused the emergence of a new and decisive factor in the transformation, namely the conscious action of the masses. Thus, whatever the importance of the transition period, from the point of view of this analysis there is a precise meaning in distinguishing between an industrial and a pre-industrial phase in modern European history.

Let us now schematically recall the fundamental characteristics of the mode of production in the pre-industrial phase. The survival of the great majority of the population of Europe at that time depended on subsistence farming, a system employing techniques which allowed those who worked the land to produce only the goods necessary for the bare survival of their own family (apart from the payment of any fees or subsidies payable to feudal overlords). Alongside agriculture there existed a small craft industry and a small commercial sector (whose horizons, however, were limited to the village or district of a town), and a few major

commercial streams concerning a small number of luxury goods and involving only a thin layer of society comprising aristocracy, merchants and bankers in a few large cities.

Pre-industrial European society was thus essentially devoid of vertical mobility and deeply fragmented. On the one hand, in fact, a bare subsistence economy condemned the vast majority of the population to a passive and subordinate role, taken as natural and immutable, which excluded it from any form of participation in the decision-making processes on which the collective destiny depended.

On the other hand, the spatial horizon of people's lives was defined by the very nature of their occupation. The world of peasants who consumed what they produced without obtaining a surplus to sell on the market (or obtaining a surplus of negligible size) consisted of the fields they cultivated and the village where they met the other peasant-farmers and the craftsmen in the neighbourhood.

This was the society which generated and perpetuated a feudal type of organization of political power. "Feudal" is intended not only in the strong sense, valid for the Middle Ages, meaning regimes based on the relationship of loyalty between lords and vassals, but also in the more general sense which means forms of state in which, thanks to the ideological and institutional foundation of the divine right of kings, the thin social layer consisting of aristocracy and of the growing merchant and financial bourgeoisie, held, through land-ownership, the monopoly of political and economic power and exercised it, without check, on the inert and inarticulate mass which constituted almost the entire population.

The Industrial Revolution and the growing interdependence in human relationships.

With the beginning of the Industrial Revolution an element of overpowering dynamism erupted into this immobile and pulverized society. Thanks to a series of profound transformations in manufacturing production, agriculture, commerce, finance and transport, the historical process underwent an unprecedented acceleration. The new methods of organizing work, the technological innovations, the reduction of distances brought about by the evolution of the means of communication allowed the creation of ever greater surpluses and at the same time created the conditions for their absorption. The *market* was born, no longer as a specialized phenomenon limited to a restricted number of operators and

goods, but as an integral structure in the daily life of the people. The cycle which goes from production to consumption, practically inexistent in the pre-industrial phase, tended to become increasingly longer and more complex. The productive process became an integrated phenomenon, requiring the co-operation of everyone, whether in the roles of producers, distributors, or consumers. *Human relationships became increasingly more interdependent.*

In the context of this great drive towards an increasingly intensified interdependence — which has remained a constant feature of the historical process, from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution till today — it is useful for the purposes of our analysis to distinguish two directional tendencies, each corresponding to the progressive surmounting of the two different kinds of obstacle — the social and the spatial — which segregated and almost immobilized most people's lives in the pre-industrial phase. From this point of view we can thus speak of an increasing interdependence *in depth* and *in extension*. The first of these two tendencies had the effect of progressively reducing the enormous social distances which in the previous phase had separated the narrow layer of the aristocracy and the great merchants from the passive masses, the rest of the population. Thus it is that the latter has gradually divided up into social classes, each with its own particular characteristics and a definite role of its own in the production process; here the classes have gradually entered the circle of power, taking on the responsibilities corresponding to the role they played in the production process.

The second tendency has brought about an enlargement of people's territorial horizons: thanks to the changing conditions of work, speeded-up transport and the diffusion of knowledge, people came to see themselves as members of ever-larger communities. It is thus that the modern state arose through uniform legislation and rational administration, in response to the need to regulate the production process and the functioning of the market in vast areas.

These two aspects of the process of increasing interdependence in human relations have manifested themselves with varying results in the diverse parts of Europe. In the areas which, like Italy and Germany, were divided into regional states — or indeed into city-states — the impulse towards an increased interdependence in extension encountered the obstacle of political division, with all its economic and social consequences. This meant that the problem of political unification became the principal problem in German and Italian history in the middle years of the 19th century. In this period, in these two regional areas, the problems

linked to the growth in interdependence in depth were in a certain sense overshadowed by those linked to the growth in interdependence in extension.

This was inevitable, since national unification constituted an essential presupposition for any scheme of political and social emancipation, so that it can safely be said that without that, the Italian and German areas would have been condemned to a state of backwardness similar to that found in the Balkan states. But the fact remains that the pre-eminence of the national problem over social considerations was for many decades the cause of considerable delays in political and civil growth in the two countries.

Meanwhile, in other European regions, which were already politically united when the Industrial Revolution got under way, the impulse towards interdependence in extension — which coincided with the interests of governments and most political forces — found no great institutional obstacles and was able to proceed without any violent upheavals towards the complete unification of the national market and the consolidation of the bureaucratic state. From this point of view France and Great Britain are paradigmatic cases.

But the problem was posed in different terms when it came to the process of integration in depth. The progressive subdivision of society into classes and the acquisition by each of them of social dignity and political responsibility took place through a process dramatically marked by revolutionary explosions (more violent on the Continent than in Great Britain, because of the latter's less rigidly structured organisation of power, due in turn to its insular situation).

This happened because the spontaneous movement of society towards growing integration inevitably encountered institutional obstacles from time to time. This movement, in fact, by continuously altering the economic and social balance, provided the preconditions for a parallel evolution in the structure of political power. The two processes, however, could not advance at the same pace.

This was because vested interests crystallized around the existing institutional system — in this specific case class interests — which tended to perpetuate its survival even after the historical conditions which had determined its birth no longer existed.

In the historical period which we are considering, phases in which the institutional structure of the major European countries affected by the Industrial Revolution could provide an evolutionary response to problems arising from the stage in the evolution of the production process —

and in which therefore the productive forces expressed by that process could give the maximum impetus to society's economic and social progress — were followed by phases in which the institutional structure was in opposition to the production process, and thus suffocated instead of liberating the productive forces. In these phases political power no longer expressed the values which were developing in civilized society, but held back the evolution of the latter and frustrated its aspirations.

It was precisely in these situations that there developed the numerous revolutionary explosions that marked European history from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution to the end of the 19th century. Contradictions between the mode of production and institutional structures could in fact only be resolved by the conscious uprising of the excluded masses.

It is for this reason that the most obvious political consequence — at the level of the history of events — of the impulse towards an increase in the degree of interdependence between people in Europe in the first phase of the Industrial Revolution was class struggle. And class struggle provides us with an indispensable key — though not the only one — to a reading of the history of Europe in this period, that is to say of the events which are the principal framework of our political culture, if it is true that the values which today direct the political debate in Europe — and, in the wake of Europe, in the world — have become the common heritage of mankind thanks to the great social struggles that marked the period.

The class struggle.

This process came about through the successive emancipation of distinct social classes: first the great manufacturing, farming and financial upper bourgeoisie, then the petty bourgeoisie of the crafts and trades, and finally the proletariat. Each of these classes, in the period of its rise to emancipation, by raising the question of a transformation of the established order, forced it to adapt to the degree of evolution reached by the mode of production (thus at one point this meant replacing absolutism with constitutional monarchy; at another point the introduction of universal suffrage; at a third the construction of the welfare state). In so doing, each class in turn led the process of human emancipation, interpreting the instances of progress in the whole of society and thus setting itself up as representative of the people as a whole. But as soon as each class had won its own battle, installed itself in power and imposed a new established order, evolution in the mode of production gave rise to a new class, and

with this it also gave rise to a new set of contradictions between the needs of productive life and existing institutions. The class in power ceased, after some time, to act as a *universal class*, and allowed itself to be guided by the logic of defending the privileges it had acquired and its own power interests.

Thus the same situation reproduced itself in each succeeding period. The development of the productive forces was suffocated, the evolution of society towards a more advanced stage in its own process of emancipation was halted. Hence the conditions for a new revolutionary explosion were created, with different institutional objectives but with the same general historical meaning: that of a further step on the way to human emancipation.

It is important to be aware that what was at stake in the various stages into which the history of class struggle can be subdivided was much more than the opposition of economic interests. The great historical transformations which developed at that time presupposed the mobilization of enormous moral energy in the masses which were playing the leading role: and purely economic interests could not provide a sufficiently strong motivation to human action. In those struggles much more was at stake. What was at stake was the possibility of thinking of the future — not simply the individual's future, but the community's, and of the whole species; therefore the possibility to work out new criteria for interpreting reality and the past and hence for directing action. In the end, this is the common characteristic of all the periods of revolutionary fermentation, when the established social roles break down, motivations for action change and what had seemed impossible only a short time before suddenly becomes possible. What guides those who fight at the vanguard of renewal is not self-interest, but the awareness of being agents in the process of human emancipation.

The ideologies.

The degree of awareness of each of the classes which were protagonists in the various stages of the process were expressed in the liberal, democratic and socialist *ideologies*. Each of these contained the identification of *values* which constituted the essential motivation of the revolutionary impulse of the class emerging at one time or another; the indication of the specific *institutional bottleneck* which in each of the successive phases was holding up the process of the free development of the productive forces and that of the alternative structure to be realized;

and an analysis of the *social and historical situation* which justified and conditioned the options worth taking, the choice of objectives and the definition of strategies.

The liberal, democratic and socialist ideologies thus bear the stamp of the historical period in which each of them motivated man's struggle for emancipation. But at the same time they have transcended the immediate historical circumstances in which they were affirmed, since after all they did not disappear from the political and cultural debate with the end of their respective historical periods, but have continued, right up to the present day, to be alive in our culture and to provide political orientation: and that not only in the regions of the world which experienced the events of the class struggle later, but even in the European societies which experienced them first.

This came about because, in the French Revolution and in the other incandescent phases of transformation which punctuated the first period of the Industrial Revolution until the end of the 19th century, the values of liberty, equality and social justice, which gave the liberal, democratic and socialist movements their specific physiognomy, were not thought of, or experienced by these, as values of a single social class and limited to a single historical period, but as eternal and universal values, which as such maintain their validity even for us. They were values which expressed a hope, stirred by the illusion characteristic of all revolutionary moments, that every obstacle to progress will disappear: the hope that we are not far from a world free from every form of oppression and exploitation, in which man's creativity can be fully expressed in the context of a community based on mutual respect and solidarity. It was a hope which could not be identified with a single value, but which brought all of them into play in the idea of human emancipation itself, and whose real justification lay in the fact that, behind whichever class was at the time emerging, the real protagonist of the transformation was the people as a whole.

The same ideologies, on the other hand, showed a completely different face in the historical periods following their affirmation, after the class which had been their standard-bearer was installed in the balance of power and was beginning to be faced with the problem of looking after their own specific interests and consolidating the institutional structure that guaranteed them. These were the periods during which it clearly emerged that the affirmation of the dominant ideology of the time had only been one *step* towards human emancipation, but had not fully realized it, and thus had not fully realized itself, because the revolution

through which it had been imposed had not liberated mankind as such, but only part of it (the grand bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, the proletariat, or all the classes, but only within one country) or only one aspect of it (that specific aspect of man's being which is associated with membership of a class, and not its being in its entirety). The content of the ideology in question then appeared partial and historically determined.

At these involutionary periods of modern European history, the ideology imposed on culture through the accession to power of the class which had been its standard-bearer, gradually ceased to be the frame of reference it had been for the behaviour and hopes of almost the whole of society in the previous period of revolutionary transformation. Although in an underground, unconscious process, it gradually became the *instrumentum regni* of the ruling class. The same words which years before had been revolutionary took on a conservative or reactionary meaning: the liberalism of those who, during the Third Republic, in the name of liberty opposed the reduction of the working day to ten hours had nothing to do with that of the revolutionaries of 1789.

Thus it became the goal of the new emergent class to overcome the *limits* of the dominant ideology. This new class was gaining an increasingly important role in the production process with the evolution of the production system, whereas in the previous phase it had not yet acquired a definite profile or a clear consciousness of its own revolutionary vocation and had been shut out of the circles of power; now it was knocking on the door demanding more advanced changes in institutions and pointing the way to new prospects to come.

The great revolutions which accompanied the first phase of industrialization in Europe must thus be interpreted in a line of continuity, albeit purely dialectic, as attempts (themselves incomplete) to *complete* the design of the preceding phase. Thus the historical succession of the liberal, democratic and socialist ideologies must not be seen as the result of a series of conflicts between opposing cultures, each provided with its own historical legitimacy. On the contrary, each ideology which in turn followed on historically from the last *transcended* its predecessor in the Hegelian sense, precisely because it came after it. This was because it did not limit itself to denying it, but in denying, conserved it: that is to say, it took over its content but put it into perspective, setting it in a wider context.

So it was that the democrats were able rightly to maintain that only with equality could *true* liberty be realized, and the socialists that only with justice could *true* liberty and *true* equality be achieved. This means

that the most coherent way to be liberal in 1848 was to become involved in the battle for democracy, and the most coherent way to be both liberal and democratic at the turn of the century was to engage in the fight for socialism, since these were the fronts on which progress opposed conservatism and the struggles which involved *all* values (or at least the historically mature ones).

It is certainly true that the violent climate of class warfare has often caused features to emerge from the ideologies which, distinguishing one from the other, justified the social conflict; and overshadowed the aspect of continuity which is constituted by the fact that in negating its predecessor, each ideology nevertheless conserved what was still alive in it. But it is equally true that the dialectic continuity of this process can be seen today, beyond the superficial differences which are still maintained in political divisions, in the sediment which liberalism, democracy and socialism have left in the language, culture and institutions of contemporary Europe: that sediment which means that Europeans, and with them the whole of mankind, cannot now but call themselves at once liberal, democratic and socialist.

The birth of national peoples.

Socialism, of which communism is simply a variant, was the last ideology to emerge in Europe during the period of class struggle.¹

To assign a date to the historical affirmation of socialism in Europe would inevitably be arbitrary. It is an accepted fact that socialism continued to strongly motivate the political behaviour of the working class, and with it, one way or another, of the whole of society, right up to the first decade following the Second World War. But it is also an accepted fact that, as regards the inclusion both of the proletariat into the political process and of the principles of socialist doctrine into culture, the final episode of the historical phase of class struggle can be said to be basically concluded with the entrance into the national parliaments, due also to the introduction of universal suffrage, of socialist and then communist representatives; with the recognition of the right to strike and the workers' right to organize themselves into trade unions; and with the creation of the first social security provisions.

With these conquests, the proletariat was no longer the class which had nothing to lose but its chains, that was considered a biologically different race, by virtue of the social discrimination which had separated it from the bourgeoisie. It now became a recognized actor in the political

process. It can thus be reasonably argued that, with the first two decades of this century, *national peoples* were born out of the integration of the classes.

That clearly does not mean, to take up a point made by Albertini, that the values of liberty, equality and social justice were *completely realised* in Europe at this time. But these values had been *historically affirmed*, had become part of the common heritage, part of the culture of everyone, even of those who denied them in their actions. And in keeping with this historical affirmation was the fact that, in the national context, new institutional transformations were no longer in view which might liberate the productive forces still suffocated by the existing structure of power (considering that the objective of proletarian dictatorship had shown itself in Western Europe to be a myth) and thus mobilize new resources and enlarge the internal market by creating new purchasing power.

The European system of states and nationalism.

The fact that at the beginning of the 20th century the process of integration in depth — at least in the form of class integration — had mostly been completed does not mean that the expansive potential of the process of industrialization as such had been exhausted. On the contrary, the evolution of the production system tended to proceed at an ever faster rate. It is worth noting that this was precisely the period in which American capitalism made its overwhelming expansion in the sectors of railways, iron and steel, banking and, later, the automobile. And it was in those years that the United States began to demonstrate a more vital economy than European countries.

The reason for this historical “leap ahead” lies in the fact that in the United States the faster development of productive forces was effectively underpinned by the continental dimensions of the market, while in Europe the same tendency, clearly present here too, found its path blocked by the dimensions of the market, bounded by national borders.

In this way a contradiction began to take form in Europe — one which had already been foreshadowed in the last quarter of the 19th century — which was to have a tragic effect on European history, and hence on world history, for the entire period up to the end of the Second World War.

In order to define its terms it is necessary to add one aspect to the picture which has been left aside so far: namely the nature of the international relationships in the context of which the process of industrialization in Europe had begun and was proceeding.

This context was the *European system of states*, the logic of which, in the various forms it took on to suit the various evolutionary stages of political, economic and social conditions on the Continent as a whole and in each of its parts, had conditioned the recurrence of certain events in European history from the reign of Charles V, giving a common stamp to institutions in all the countries in the area.

The essential characteristic of the European system of states was given on the one hand by its instability, due to the presence, on a relatively restricted territorial area, of several sovereign states, each of which constituted a danger for its territorial neighbours; and on the other hand by its permanence, due to the structural incapacity of any single state — reinforced by the deliberate policy of the insular power of Great Britain — to establish definitive hegemony over all the others. There was, therefore, a balance, but a balance in which war was recurrent and the prospect of war was constantly on the horizon, both in the lives of the people and in the calculations of governments.

This situation had a deep influence on the structure of the Continental powers, determining their political, administrative and territorial centralization (a destiny which only Great Britain escaped in part, thanks to its insular position). And when the process of industrialization and modernization allowed central power to create the necessary instruments — in particular an army formed by compulsory conscription and a state school system — the bureaucratic centralized state also generated its own ideological legitimation, using the idea of the nation to effect a profound change in the relationships between citizens and power.

To ensure the survival of the state in a context characterized by the constant presence of war (whether actual or potential), it was necessary for the citizens to become soldiers, prepared even to lay down their lives for the defence of the community. This objective was realized by spreading the idea of a bond, at once natural and semi-religious, which united the members of the same nation together against other nations, “foreigners”, who were seen as the enemy whom one must be ready to fight at any moment.

From the French Revolution onwards, a tendency emerged in European history which ran counter to the class struggle expressed through the great universal values of liberty, equality and social justice. The idea of the nation divided mankind into opposing hordes, even questioning the fact that mankind belongs to a single species.

Thus hatred for the foreigner *per se* was instilled in the spirit of the people, the universal nature of the values under the banner of which

human emancipation was proceeding along its difficult path was negated and the defence of the fatherland was presented as more important than any struggle for the liberation of the classes.

The contradiction which thus became apparent continued for a long time to affect only the cultural sphere and was perceived only by a few isolated great minds, but did not have any serious effect on the collective awareness, so that for much of the 19th century the myth of national sovereignty was confused for most people with the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty. This was due to the fact that in that period, although war was continually evolving with the advance of the process of industrialization as regards both armaments, technology and strategic doctrines, and although it had, in the Napoleonic Wars, made a considerable qualitative leap, it nevertheless remained an event with a limited destructive capacity which only mobilized a relatively small proportion of the human and material resources of a country.

The contradiction between national sovereignty and the dimensions of the productive process.

The constraints dependent on the international context had thus left sufficient space within the principal European societies for the class struggle to produce its liberating impulse and for the great values of liberty, equality and social justice to take root in the collective awareness.

But in the decades around the turn of the century this changed radically.

With the affirmation of the socialist movement — as has been said above — the process of emancipation was nearing its completion, having by now eliminated the principal obstacles to social mobility within the more advanced European countries, while the process of an increasing interdependence in extension, having created national markets, continued to exert its effect, spurred on by the continual progress in the technique of labour organization (Taylorism), in the direction of growing interdependence between national economies and the creation of a market of continental dimensions. But, while it was able to exert its influence on the United States without meeting any obstacles, in Europe it was hindered by the national boundaries.

These proved an insurmountable obstacle at that time: the constant threat to their own independence and their own survival facing the European powers that arose from the structurally unstable nature of the European balance of power made economic self-sufficiency an indispen-

sable security factor for each of them. No country dependent on provisions from abroad for strategically essential goods as a result of an increased international division of labour would have had even the slightest chance of victory in the case of war.

This was the root of *protectionism*, that phenomenon which, from the early years of the century and at an ever faster pace, produced huge distortions and a progressive contraction of international trade. Thus the historical decadence of Europe began and the loss of its rôle as pivot of the political balance of power and the international economy grew steadily. This rôle went to the two continental powers, which until then had played a marginal role in the European balance of power: Russia and the United States of America.

The reasons why this contradiction assumed a dramatic importance only with the advent of World War I — after forty years of international free trade and relative peace — cannot be satisfactorily understood unless we also bring into the picture the way in which the evolution of the production system was changing the nature of war. The sophistication of the means of destruction, transport and communications was in fact making war an increasingly wider and more devastating phenomenon. It no longer affected only the military machine in the strictest sense, or those areas of the country which constituted the theatre of war. On the contrary, it was beginning to have a profound effect on production too, and on the structures of society.

The relationship between security and the production system became closer than it had ever been before.

It is now necessary to recall the way in which awareness of these changes showed itself. Gradually, as the new phase of the process began to assume a more definite form, the irreconcilable nature of the myth of the nation and the great universal ideals of liberty, equality and social justice tended to change from being a cultural contradiction into a searing political and psychological conflict, destined to leave a deep mark on the life of European society and often on individual minds. And in this conflict the national myth was destined to prevail. Since the possibility of war was beginning to be felt as a concrete threat to the independence and existence of the political community — the basis of all values — and since, on the other hand, the war effort meant an ever-vaster mobilization of the human and material resources of a country, there was less and less space in the state in which to carry out the struggle for human emancipation. Any internal division would have caused an irreparable weakening of the state, in an international balance of power which was becoming

increasingly tense and fragile. The only value had to become that of the nation, in whose name all internal conflicts were forcibly overcome in order to fight the enemy beyond the border more effectively.

Thus began a new era, in which the principal obstacle to the expansion of the forces of production, and hence of the advance of human emancipation, was no longer an institutional order (*regime*) which excluded part of the population from the exercise of power, but the actual *dimensions* of the political community, in other words the national phase in the evolution of the state. This was destined to be the most tragic period in the modern history of Europe. The evolution of the mode of production dramatically presented the problem of creating — in the economically-developed areas of the world — markets of continental proportions. On the other hand, the nation-state, even though now historically doomed, was still alive, and in the eyes of its citizens it seemed eternal and indestructible. The idea of voluntarily giving up sovereignty through a federal pact among European states thus seemed inconceivable. The only way out of the contradiction which appeared practicable at that time was to enlarge the market through the imperial expansion of the nation-state.

The first manifestation of this tendency was the colonial conquests, particularly in Africa and Asia, in the last quarter of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. For those European countries which had only recently attained the status of great powers, since they had only recently been unified, these conquests took on the meaning of conquering a “place in the sun.” Colonialism, too, was not new, and at that time Great Britain already controlled a great maritime empire of global proportions. But there is no doubt that in the imperialist period the expansionist impulse among the European countries changed in nature and underwent a sudden acceleration, employing vaster and vaster resources and provoking growing tensions. In this period Europe laid the premises for a process which was to lead to an end the European balance of power and to the establishment of a new world balance of power. Conditioned by the logic of the confrontation of power with their competitors, which obliged them to seek consensus with the local *élites* to try and draw them onto their side, the European powers exported, along with war and violence, both material resources and the very dynamism of their civilization, thus creating areas of interdependence which extended beyond Europe (and the United States) and progressively activating parts of the world which until then had been inert and isolated. At the very moment in which Europe’s supremacy over the rest of the planet seemed to be reaching its

peak, Europe began imperceptibly to lose the global monopoly of power.

The First World War.

Colonial conquests, however, could not resolve the contradiction, above all because the European power whose economy exhibited the greatest degree of dynamism — namely Germany under William II — had been almost completely left out of the process. Meanwhile, the German leadership at that time realized the need for Germany to assume the role of a world power alongside Great Britain and — later on — the United States and Russia. If not, its development and the well-being of its citizens would have been irreparably compromised, and Germany itself would have been relegated, along with the other countries of the continent, to the status of secondary power. But, in order to achieve this objective, it was essential for Germany to achieve a position of permanent hegemony over continental Europe. This was, moreover, a credible objective by virtue of the increased fragility of the European balance of power, which now constituted a political context that was no longer sufficient to ensure full expansion of the forces of production and which, because of this, was losing the capacity it had always had for self-regulation. In a Europe which the evolution of the mode of production was causing to shrink, the position of domination attained by a new hegemonic power would probably have been irreversible. But this prospect was seen by governments and public opinion in other European countries as a serious danger. Apart from the intentions of the protagonists, the circumstances that speeded up the process (the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the weakness of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) and the occasion which sparked off the catastrophe as if by chance, it was this prospect which caused the arms race in the months preceding the beginning of World War I, and thus the explosion of the conflict.

The First World War was a turning point in the process precisely because on this occasion for the very first time the European balance of power was unable to re-establish itself on its own. The United States’ intervention was in fact decisive. This was the most eloquent demonstration that, by now, the European balance of power was to be supplanted by a new world balance between continental powers.

On the other hand, the Treaty of Versailles did not solve any problems: rather, it aggravated them. This however, apart from the admittedly serious errors of judgement committed by the negotiators of the treaty, was inevitable. In order to remove the causes of war in Europe it would

have been necessary to suppress the sovereignty of nation states: but this was unthinkable at this point. The problem therefore arose once more, but aggravated by the destruction and hatred sown by war. The contradiction between the tendency of the productive process and of the market to grow to continental proportions, and the inertia of the nation-states' institutional structures was destined to become still further aggravated. Protectionism increased. Certainly it could not entirely stem the flow of international trade, but it did cause serious upsets, making trade insecure and unpredictable. Hence the succession of economic crises which afflicted European countries in various forms until the world crisis of 1929, which decisively speeded up the advent of Nazism in Germany.

Fascism.

Fascism (and of course Nazism, as its extreme form) were the last, desperate attempt to find a national answer to the crisis, that is to solve the contradiction without questioning the sovereignty of the nation-state. It was a foolish attempt, since the nation-state was by now an outdated instrument and thus inadequate to face the challenge. But at that time, as is always the case, people's awareness lagged behind the real facts of the process, precisely because it was strongly conditioned by the very institutional context which the process was making obsolete. In the view of the governing class of that time, Europe continued to be the centre of the world, and this false perspective conditioned their strategies in foreign policy. Moreover, this was a mistake which also affected the policy of the United States, which did not know how to adapt its decisions to its new responsibilities and which withdrew from the League of Nations, leaving the Europeans to their own destiny (whereas the USA could have positively influenced events if it had used its position as creditor of the victor countries to impose a less unstable balance of power).

The same lag in consciousness explains the fact that the consensus of citizens in favour of the nation-state was still strong enough to make a change in the political and institutional system unthinkable. The nation-state still had the capacity to mobilize much energy (in a certain sense, more than it had ever done before) and to transform it into power (even though this was a fragile power no longer founded on the coincidence between the institutional context and the degree of development reached by the productive forces).

The effects of this *impasse* made themselves felt much less dramatically in countries like France and Great Britain, where the control of a vast

colonial empire offered a wider market to their domestic production and gave worldwide scope to their foreign policy. On the other hand, this was not the case in countries like Germany and Italy which had practically no colonies, and where democratic institutions generally having been held back by the struggle for unification, had not had time to develop solid roots. Here the attempt to safeguard the historical survival of the nation-state in a context of extreme tensions called for a total mobilization of resources and consensus.

This was the objective problem which gave rise to Fascism: a phenomenon which involved, to a greater or lesser extent, all the European countries, and had a strong popular base, demonstrating the fact that the madness which is habitually imputed to the leaders who made themselves its interpreters was in fact a general characteristic of the historical situation in which these regimes thrived. There were two paths which these regimes had to follow which were inseparable from each other. On the one hand the economic crisis had to be overcome, unemployment reabsorbed and an end put to social conflicts by artificially stimulating domestic demand. This in turn had, of necessity, to be based on a heavy state involvement in the economy, by means of a policy of promoting public works and above all the arms industry, to be carried out through the transfer to the public sector of a very high quota of family wealth (in other words by imposing heavy material sacrifices on the citizens).

On the other hand, this line of conduct could not help but feed the impulse, already inherent in the nature of the regime, towards an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy both in the European and in the world context.

These objectives could never have been achieved with the political apparatus of democracy. In order to obtain total mobilization of energy, totalitarian regimes were necessary, capable of conquering by force the resistance of the most heavily penalized sectors of society, of suppressing internal dissent, of taking political centralization to the extreme and of exercising an exceedingly strong ideological pressure on the citizens in order to assure consensus, at least among certain strands of the population, to the extent of unconditional dedication.

With Fascism, the incompatibility between the national ideology and the great universal values of the liberal, democratic and socialist tradition was absolute. The latter joined people across national frontiers, but at the same time opposed the oppressed and the oppressors within the same nation. Therefore, the ideologies which professed them objectively undermined the unity of the country and weakened its capacity to face

external enemies, at the very moment when the historical survival of the form of the nation-state was at stake. The nation had to be the only value, and those for whom it was not so were traitors. The suppression of civil liberties and of political democracy in the name of the nation was in effect simply the result of the greater coherence with which fascism faced a contradiction which had been present throughout the course of European history starting from the French Revolution. The barbarous Fascist interlude provided a demonstration of how the values which had guided the great revolutionary adventures from the end of the 18th and the 19th century no longer had any chance of expression in the national context.

This was the climax of a process which had already recorded a significant episode on the eve of the First World War with the betrayal of the European social democrats who, faced with the approaching catastrophe, denied, in the name of the defence of their fatherland, their internationalist and pacifist principles.

To understand the nature of Fascism it is important to remember that its crude ideology was the distorted expression of two real historical imperatives. On the one hand, the aggressive extremism of nationalism was — paradoxically — the expression of the need to go beyond the confines of the nation state. What Hitler tried to do was to build a continental empire in Europe under German hegemony by military conquest.

However, nationalism, which had provided the indispensable impulse to mobilise the energies of the country, inevitably revealed itself, just as the success of the Nazi adventure seemed imminent, to be an inadequate ideological instrument for the government of a multinational empire. Thus it was that, in the midst of German expansionism during the Second World War, the myth of the nation was supplanted by that of race. The acme of nationalism thus coincided with the beginning of its historical downfall.

On the other hand, Fascism brought to a close the historical period in which class solidarity had actually prevailed over popular unity, and affirmed itself at the moment when social conflicts, having lost their revolutionary momentum, were shrivelling up into futile internal struggles. Fascism crudely interpreted the general need for social peace and contributed — again paradoxically — to consolidating the identity of national peoples, making the citizens more equal amongst themselves in the common condition of oppression, and forcibly introducing into the production process and into the circle of political consensus, social groups and regions which had hitherto remained excluded.

The fascist regimes, with the brutality of dictatorship, broke the last traditional loyalties and the last discriminations inherited from the pre-industrial period of European history, which constituted a residual screen between the citizens and the state, and thus contributed involuntarily to preparing the way for the epoch in which the process of human emancipation, having passed the phase of class and national liberation, was to enter that of liberating the individual.

The birth of the world balance of power and the beginning of the process of European integration.

The Second World War was the inevitable conclusion to the progressive degeneration of the balance of power in Europe caused by the Nazi attempt to establish hegemony, and marked the end of both the former and the latter. From the ashes of the European equilibrium was born a new global balance of power. This, in its first stage, was markedly bipolar in nature, basing itself on the total political, military and economic hegemony exercised by the two nuclear powers — the United States and the Soviet Union — on a world in part destroyed and exhausted by the war, and in part still maintaining the passive and subordinate role of the colony.

In the years following the Second World War, Europe was the part of the world where the passage from one balance of power to another produced the most dramatic transformations. The Second World War had done away with the illusion that had led Europeans, in the preceding period of history, to believe that their continent was still the centre of the world. The destruction brought by the war clearly showed their impotence. The countries of Europe were divided between the American and Russian spheres of influence. The question of security changed its nature completely: it was no longer a question of defending each single state from the threat of its territorial neighbours, but of defending Western Europe as a whole from the threat of the Soviet Union. This new situation brought Europe to the threshold of political unification at the time of the EDC. Thus the basic reason for protectionism fell away. As soon as reconstruction had begun, the economy, or at least the more dynamic sectors, progressively reorganized themselves, thanks also to the impulse provided by the United States, onto a continental scale.

Thus began the process of European economic unification. Social integration advanced along parallel lines. The Europeans, often unconsciously, began to think of the Continent, or at least its western part, as

destined to be a true community of destiny. Apart from the various episodes in the process, the expectation, common to both politicians and citizens, of a more or less imminent European political unification, has played a decisive role in the political life of the European Community in the various forms and frameworks it has assumed since 1951, and has been the determining factor in guaranteeing Western Europe forty years of peace and progress.

Towards the unification of mankind and the liberation of the individual.

The decades following the Second World War have been characterized by another considerable speeding up of the evolution of the mode of production. Our epoch has seen the beginning of the *Scientific and Technological Revolution*, a stage in which knowledge as such is destined to become the most important of all factors of production. The world is changing under the influence of new information processing and communications technology, automation, the atom and biotechnology.

This turning point in the history of the development of the mode of production contains an immense potential for speeding up the process of human emancipation. Again, it can be analyzed in terms of an increase in interdependence of human relations both in extension and in depth. On the one hand, the radical reduction of distance is turning the image of the world as a global village into reality. Thanks to the increased mobility of production factors, to the involvement of ever wider areas in the world market, to the ever faster circulation of information and image and to the constant spreading of knowledge, new protagonists have emerged and are still emerging with an active role to play on the global political scene. The Third World, while, in part, still having to face appalling problems of economic and cultural backwardness, has nonetheless shaken the colonial yoke from its shoulders and some of its regions are making great strides in economic and technological progress. The bipolar balance of power has come to a crisis and the outlines of a new, multipolar phase are beginning to emerge. The premises for the march of the human race towards universal liberty and equality are being created.

On the other hand, the Scientific and Technological Revolution is creating the preconditions — now in the industrialized world, but in the future in the whole planet — for a *cultural* integration without precedent among the members of each single human community, and thus for

breaking down the barriers which up to the present day have divided the ruling class from the rest of the population. The introduction of new technologies in fact, on the one hand, enhances the role of creativity and individual responsibility in the production process, progressively increasing its independence from large concentrations of machinery, labour and capital and questioning the actual role of the manual worker; and, on the other hand, it increases free time, encouraging the development of the needs linked to the quality of life, and hence to culture. It is a tendency which is creating the premises for the territorial and political decentralization of advanced industrial societies and for the development of a real participatory democracy rooted in the local community. This tendency foreshadows the possibility of organizing political power according to formulas which go beyond the exclusive sovereignty of the nation-state with, among other things, the creation of independent and co-ordinated levels of local and regional government.

But at the same time the Scientific and Technological Revolution is causing the world to face the reality of the most fearsome threat ever encountered by the human race — who are all equally affected by it: that of the destruction of the planet. The introduction and the continuing development of nuclear armaments and their carriers have increased the destructive capacity of war to the point where the arsenal of each of the two superpowers is able to kill all the inhabitants of the planet not once, but several times over. On the other hand, the unbridled industrial development in the traditional sectors — which have not stopped in their advance — combined with the enormous population explosion in the Third World exposes mankind to the risk of an ecological catastrophe, the collapse of cities, the exhaustion of natural resources and the explosion of blind and uncontrolled violence, with unforeseeable consequences.

The world thus finds itself faced with a decisive choice. The crisis in the bipolar balance of power may mean either the beginning of chaos or that of the process of political unification of the human race. And it is a matter of fact that today the leaders of the superpowers, and first and foremost Gorbachev, have realized the need to put their mutual relations on a new footing, putting the requirements of collaboration before those of competition. But it is also a fact that their efforts are destined to remain halfway measures because they come up against the obstacle of *raison d'état* — which is an intrinsic aspect of sovereignty and which leads states to give priority, in international relations, to their particular interests over the general interest of mankind — however senseless it may appear, in the nuclear age, to distinguish between one and the other.

On the other hand, even the tendency towards overcoming national sovereignty downwards is blocked by the absence of an institutional model, and by the lack of consciousness of the inextricable link existing between the continental and global levels on the one hand and that of the local community on the other. So it is that the impulse (which periodically manifests itself in the industrially advanced regions) towards experimenting with new forms of democracy in the context of the local community, and towards the rebirth of loyalty to the small regional fatherlands, soon exhausts itself or degenerates into sterile forms of separatism or racist micronationalism.

In order for the impulse towards unification of the human race and the development of participatory democracy really to become the driving force of the next phase in historic development, the world must be given the example of how absolute state sovereignty can be overcome by the creation of a new federal power. This must be able, on the one hand, to relieve the United States and the Soviet Union of much of the weight of exercising responsibility for managing the world balance of power, and to indicate the path which, by a series of regional unifications, should lead to the objective of world federation; and it must show the world, on the other hand, that the territorial expansion of the government's scope through modern federal institutions does not mean the creation of a Superstate intent on levelling and negating originality, liberty and the ability of the local community to decide on its own destiny; but on the contrary, that it is the only way to promote these very values.

This example can only be given in that part of the world where the process of integration has reached its most advanced stage: Western Europe. But in order for this to come about, there must be a more widespread and positive awareness of the nature of the alternative offered to us. In other words, a new *ideology* has to be asserted, one that can identify the basic contradiction inherent to our times and show how to resolve it; one that can make conceivable a future freed from the spectres of nuclear war and of ecological catastrophe, and that can provide an orientation for human action in order to achieve this end. This ideology is federalism.

Federalism.

Federalism, as an opinion movement, was born in Great Britain in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, out of the fear of the gathering storms of war. It received new impetus,

became more widespread and took on a more clearly political aspect on the Continent during the climate and in the atmosphere of the Resistance.

Thus federalism was born as a reflection on war and as a response to it. Without the horrors of Fascism and the two world wars, in particular the second, it would probably have remained at the stage of purely theoretical reflection for a long time to come. But the catastrophe which swept Europe brought some people to the understanding that by now modern war had become the negation of all values, and thus there was no longer any sense in fighting for human emancipation unless people committed themselves first and foremost to achieving peace. For the first time in history, a political movement adopted peace as the guiding ideal for its line of action, just as liberalism, democracy and socialism had adopted the ideals of liberty, equality and social justice.

This does not mean that the liberal, democratic and socialist movements had not given great importance to the ideal of peace during the revolutionary period in their history, and did not continue to give it great weight: but they had always thought of it as an ideal whose realization would come about as a consequence of the realization of the ideals of liberty, equality and social justice. It was an inevitable error of perspective in a historical period in which war still constituted a phenomenon of limited importance compared to the urgency of social struggles.

In contrast, the main document establishing federalism as a political movement, the *Ventotene Manifesto*, clearly reversed these priorities. Peace became the ideal whose historical affirmation was the condition for any kind of progress in realizing the others. And the institutional objective by which the ideal of peace was to be affirmed became the breaking down, first in Europe and then throughout the whole world, of the absolute sovereignty of the state. "The construction of the international state" became, in the famous phrase from the *Manifesto*, the "new line" to divide progress from conservation.

As the process of European (and, in the long run, worldwide) integration has advanced, federalism has gradually taken on a wider and more complex form. With the growing threat of a nuclear conflict and an ecological catastrophe on a planetary scale, the global nature of the federal struggle and the significance of European unity as an intermediate stage along the road to world unity have assumed increasing importance and reality. The newfound awareness of the vital nature of ecological and territorial problems, in a world which by now has passed the stage of class struggle, has more firmly instilled federalism with the awareness of the inextricable link between the global and the local, between the

cosmopolitan and community polarities. The institutional objective of federalism has gradually defined itself, in opposition to the classical model of the federal state, as a structure which is subdivided into many levels of government, from the neighbourhood to the world level.

Thus federalism is presented as the awareness of that phase in human emancipation whose objective is no longer that of liberating man as member of a class or of a nation, but in his complex and global identity as *a person*, which is in fact defined in cosmopolitan terms (common membership of the human race, beyond any form of discrimination) and in terms of his belonging to the local community (in which the individual realizes himself in the concrete solidarity of a social life emancipated from bureaucratic levelling and from conflicts between classes).

Conclusion.

If the analysis so far is correct, then federalism is not a rationalistic idea, worked out on the fragile foundations of an abstract reason which has, or imagines itself to have, made a clean slate of the past. On the contrary, it is the product of thought *in context*, which avoids the risk of the arbitrary by planning the future on the basis of the inheritance received from the past.

It now remains briefly to indicate, in a few concluding remarks based on the situation outlined thus far, the specific nature of the relationship of federalism with its own past, and in particular with the ideologies preceding it.

a) The first observation to make in this connection is that federalism is not in opposition to liberalism, democracy and socialism, but takes over their essential content and ideals — liberty, equality and social justice — just as these were historically affirmed, even though not completely realized, in Europe over the last two centuries. Indeed, it must be said that the historical affirmation of the ideals of liberty, equality and social justice should be considered the *precondition* for the historical affirmation of the ideal of peace through federalism, because a union of states in which those ideals had not been affirmed could not be founded on the freely-expressed consensus of the people. Such a union would thus not be federal, but imperial in nature, and as such would be destined to break up. Historically therefore, federalism necessarily comes after the liberal, democratic and socialist ideologies and preserves the living part of their content.

b) On the other hand, if it is true that the *historical affirmation* of

federalism presupposes that of liberalism, democracy and socialism, it is equally true that it is the prerequisite of their *complete realization*.

It is a fact that the further advancement of the ideals of liberty, equality and social justice — even in the new forms which they are assuming under the urgency of the problems posed by ecological and territorial imbalances, by pollution and by the exhaustion of natural resources — presupposes struggles which are no longer on a national scale, but which must comprise both the international and the community scale. At international level there are the struggles for peace, control of the major variables on which the possibility of avoiding an ecological catastrophe depends, the relationships between North and South, while at the community level the freedom of towns and regions to govern themselves in accordance with their own specific cultural identity and the particular problems related to the nature of the territory are at stake, as well as the organization of community solidarity as an answer to the crisis of the welfare state. And so these struggles presuppose the institutional framework which constitutes the structural aspect of federalism: co-existence, on the same territory, of several independent and co-ordinated levels of government.

Here the picture must be completed by mentioning the decisive role played by expectations, which can guide human action, even if less strongly, in the same direction as would an as yet non-existent institutional framework (but whose establishment is already looked forward to). It is for this reason that the beginning of the process of world unification through the foundation of the European Federation would have the effect of encouraging and speeding up the process of democratization of all those countries where authoritarian regimes are still in power.

c) It follows that to be federalist in Europe today — and eventually in the whole world — is the only correct way to carry on the heritage of the liberal, democratic and socialist struggles. Whoever identifies himself with the liberal, democratic or socialist ideologies, on the contrary, without transcending them all into the federal view, gives up the possibility of pursuing his declared ideals and aligns himself with the forces of conservatism, if it is true that today it makes no sense to commit oneself to liberty, equality and social justice except in the context of the struggle for peace and quality of life in a federal institutional framework.

d) Federalism then is an *ideology* in the same way as liberalism, democracy and socialism are (even if, coming later, it is in a favourable position to comprehend their historical limitations and to correct their

errors of perspective). It goes without saying that the term *ideology* must be rigorously stripped of any connotations that might suggest a *corpus* of indisputable and immutable dogma. Federalism is, on the contrary, a *developing* line of thought: it is a *task* rather than a result. But it is in any case an ideology in that it forces one to acquire a global consciousness of the historical process we are living through and of the nature of the institutional transformations on whose realization the destiny of mankind depends today. It is thus an exclusive political choice, and not a technical and institutional aspect of a more comprehensive political option. If anything, the opposite is true: it is liberalism, democracy and socialism, having come *before*, which constitute *parts* of federalism. The idea of the *end of ideologies* then is a conservative myth, even though it is justified by the incontestable fact of the crisis in traditional ideologies, which were born to guide the decisions of people faced with the great contradictions which marked 19th century European history and which, in consequence, — if not replaced in wider perspective — cannot provide the categories necessary to understand the problems facing the world in the last quarter of the 20th century.

e) As an ideology, federalism provides us with new criteria for historical interpretation. Thus we return to our starting point. The Marxist conception of history as the history of class struggle was fruitful in its time, but has now outgrown its usefulness. It came to a halt at Fascism and the two world wars, phenomena it was quite unable to interpret.

And, faced with this failure, official culture gave up every attempt to make sense of history, taking refuge in irrationalism or in the renunciatory philosophy of partial truths. Federalism enables us to pick up the thread of meaning in history, no longer interpreting it as the history of class struggle, but as the *history of the advent of peace*, and thus opens new horizons of research to future historiography.

NOTE

¹The formation of the Christian Democratic and Christian Social movements and their respective ideologies (which however are rather vaguely and variously formulated) is not tied to the emergence of a class, and thus cannot be explained by reference to the process of integration in depth. If anything, it marks the limits of the latter's causal efficacy, and therefore, for the historian, of its explanatory capacity. It is a limitation which must be noted, but, given the level of generality of our analysis, can be set aside.

German Reunification and European Unity. Twelve Theses

GERHARD EICKHORN

How should central Europe be politically structured? How should the Germans' life be organised in the centre of Europe?

Europe and Germany are in a state of indissoluble dialectical interaction: the European question is always necessarily a German question — and *vice versa*. A glance at history provides us with countless examples, of which I might mention the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, the political consequences of the split in the Church, which originated in Germany, the Thirty Years' War, the dualism between Prussia and Austria, the foundation of the *Reich*, the two World Wars and their aftermath, whose effect can be felt even today.

Nowadays, however, the debate has taken a different turn; this interaction is no longer, or only to an insufficient extent, acknowledged. Some — the *Deutschlandpolitiker* — confine their discussion to the German question, generally in the sense of a reunification of a German nation-state, without taking any account of the European Community or indeed without even acknowledging the prospect of the European Union. Others — the *Europapolitiker* — view the European Community and the European Union as if the German question did not exist. Thus it is essential at this point to outline the actual condition in which European integration, which is of course West European, finds itself today, and to sketch the plans for its future development.

The most remarkable result of the integration process to date is the creation through the European Community of a peaceful community in Western Europe, which has contributed substantially to the advance of peace throughout the whole of Europe. The deliberately created interdependence among the member states has made armed conflict unthinkable.

Customs duties between member states of the European Community have been completely abolished since 1968, a fact unknown to a surpris-

ing number of citizens. Since 1984 we have, moreover, had a free-trade agreement between the EC and EFTA, which means that almost the whole of Western Europe has become a duty-free zone.

Our national economies have shown a healthy and dynamic development since the establishment of the Community. Internal trade has expanded much more than world trade, and the EC is now an important partner in international economic relations.

Co-operation in the framework of the European Monetary System is coming on well. The authorisation to the private use of the ECU by the German Federal Bank in the month of June of this year is a further step in the direction of economic and monetary union.

The beginnings of a common European foreign policy in the framework of the EPC (European Political Co-operation) have made the European Community a respected negotiating partner with great political weight throughout the world. The same is true for our co-operation with developing countries, which is recognized as a model, and for the united stand we have made in the UN.

The free movement of labour has largely become a reality, and freedom of domicile is well on the way to being so.

Through its social and regional policies, the European Community has made a considerable contribution to overcoming structural weaknesses.

In 1986 the Community, after long and difficult negotiations, produced comprehensive reforms of its legal foundations, which now lie before us in the form of the Single European Act: it came into force on the 1st July 1987. In this the member states agreed to incorporate research, technology and environmental policy into the Community treaties; they accorded the European Parliament more of a say, although still within a limited area; and they committed themselves (and herein lies the crux of the reform package) to finally bring about a completely free and unlimited internal European market by 1992. The declared aim of the completion of the internal market is to enable unrestricted traffic in goods, services, capital and labour. In order to achieve this, members of the Community have declared themselves prepared to leave all essential questions concerning the realization of the internal market to majority decisions in the Council of Ministers. Finally, the Single Act contains a small but historically significant step towards a common European foreign policy: for the first time the members of the Community have bound themselves by treaty to consult their partners before deciding on their own foreign policy position.

In this the Single Act is following a definite strategy of integration which should be seen as very much in the spirit of Jean Monnet. He it was who "invented" that method of step-by-step functional development which has so far characterized the European Community. He showed in the Schuman Plan how a common problem which absolutely had to be solved by the governments concerned — in this case helping Germany recover its strength as an industrial power — is to be identified and how common institutions and instruments have to be created to solve the problem.

The Single Act offers a further example of this method: the problem consists in the international competitiveness of European industry. The completion of an unrestricted internal market should enable the solution of the problem, and majority decisions in the Council of Ministers should contribute to this.

The Draft Treaty for the foundation of the European Union, which was passed by the European Parliament with a large majority in February 1984 and whose leading exponent was Altiero Spinelli, is the result of a different strategy. Spinelli and those who shared his cause diagnosed a general crisis of the nation-state, too all-embracing to be solvable by Monnet's method of piecemeal measures. The strategy underlying the Draft Treaty consists of a comprehensive reform of Community institutions: majority decisions in the Council of Ministers and powers of co-decision by the European Parliament in all areas of legislation which concern the completion of the internal market and economic and monetary Union.

Security and foreign policy should, according to the Draft Treaty, continue to be the preserve of co-operation between governments since these represent the last citadels of national sovereignty. Apart, however, from this crucial exception, the Draft Treaty can be said to contain the structures and powers of a federation. Taking all this together then, the theory may be defensibly advanced that — at least by the declared will of the European Parliament and the forces that support it — we are on the way to a state-like formation in Western Europe.

The above should show that we cannot talk about the German question without taking into account these facts and perspectives, themselves the creation of the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany with the West. On the other hand, it is naturally our duty as Germans, when considering the further development of European integration, to take into account the consequences for the German question. It is high time the connection between the two complexes were established, not

only in fine-sounding speeches, but also in political practice; in other words, a coherent strategy has to be developed which binds the two elements together.

Once again, we can usefully turn to history, where we find a rich selection of experience for such strategies of action:

1) the road of hegemony, taken by both Napoleon and Hitler, each time ending in bloody failure;

2) division and dualism as the results of political failure; again, just a few examples: the split between the East and West Frankish Empire, the schism in the Church and its political consequences (such as the Peace of Augsburg, the Thirty Years' War, and the Treaty of Westphalia), the dualism between Prussia and Austria which led to the *kleindeutschen* solution;

3) the equilibrium solution, the balance orchestrated by the Concert of Europe, as in the Congress of Vienna and Bismarck's policy. This system was chronically unstable, and was itself the cause of further military conflicts.

4) the road peculiar to Germany, arising as a result of a German sense of mission, developing in turn out of the German sense of cultural superiority around the beginning of the 18th century. This was associated with a spiritual and cultural detachment from its West European neighbours. This German missionary zeal released its chaotic explosive effect on the Weimar Republic before the latter could firmly establish itself.

To sum up, the history of Europe emerges, as Professor Werner Weidenfeld put it, as a fundamental dialectical conflict between two basic tendencies:

— between the confrontation of nations, interests and attitudes, and their interrelationship, which is to say,

— between differentiation and unification.

Only against this historical background does it become really clear just how revolutionary a break has been achieved with traditional strategies of action since 1945 by the free part of Germany, when the founding fathers of the Federal Republic of Germany tied the German question to political freedom and the democratic constitutional state. Parallel to this, the founding fathers of European unification bound up European co-operation with freedom and with equality of all states on the basic principle of the rule of law. In this way they broke with the disastrous Treaty of Versailles, which had only served to cast down still more the defeated and thus sow the seeds of further aggression.

It is with good reason therefore that we now consider the Marshall

Plan, in this 40th anniversary of that colossal aid action, to have been not only a generous act of charity on the part of the USA, but a policy motivated by a political strategy, which has proved highly successful. The Marshall Plan furthered the equality of the countries of Europe, victors and defeated alike, through the rebuilding of economic relations, and thus created the conditions for West European unification.

Just as in 1947 the Americans, despite postwar exhaustion, withstood the temptation to take the path of isolationism, so France overcame itself (always the greatest kind of victory) when a few years later, in 1950, it adopted the Jean Monnet-inspired Schuman Plan for the European Coal and Steel Community. This apparently highly technical plan for common regulation of coal and steel was in reality a tremendous blueprint for peace, which would make future wars in Europe impossible by accepting the one-time "traditional enemy" with equal rights and duties into the family of nations.

The harmony I have described as existing since 1945 between the German and the European view of the world, with their emphasis on freedom and the rule of law as organizing political principles, is reflected in the preamble to the Constitution, in which it is stated that the German people is "inspired by the will to preserve their unity as a nation and as a state and to serve the cause of peace as an equal member of a united Europe."

It is from the starting point of the Federal Republic of Germany's inextricable links with the West that I would draw up the following twelve theses:

Thesis 1

The link with the West represents an important part of the Federal Republic of Germany's *raison d'état*. European integration is not an alternative to "national" politics but rather its essential complement in the present day. Membership of the EC is and will remain an indispensable condition for the achievement of the central goals of German policy:

— to preserve freedom, peace and security, and to facilitate good-neighbourly relations among the peoples and countries of Europe;

— to guarantee economic prosperity, social justice and forward-looking environmental planning;

— to strengthen and further develop the political order of the Federal Republic as a free democracy and a social constitutional state;

— to obtain recognition of the right to self-determination for the

German people and other peoples of Europe to whom it is denied;
— to overcome the partition of Germany and Europe.

Thesis 2

Decent human co-existence necessarily demands that people have different aims in view, of which “unity” is only one. Freedom, peace and justice are clearly of higher importance. These aims must go before all considerations of state and social organisation, and are best achieved by means of a federal structure and the fulfilment of federal principles. Among these may be cited in particular the democratic participation of all citizens, the sharing out of responsibilities and powers among local, regional, national and European levels, and a mandatory charter of human and civil rights; subordinate to these are the shaping of economic, social and political relations, but also political, social and economic solidarity, and finally self-determination and self-realisation as well as pluralism in cultural, political, social and economic life.

These basic objectives are our starting point for the planning of German and European policy.

Thesis 3

The nation-state is not a historically imperative form of organisation — on the contrary, it is a relatively young phenomenon, historically speaking, since nation-states have existed for only a few centuries as a possible functional and organisational form of human society. Germany only existed as a unified nation-state for about 75 years, with two German “part states” having developed since the Second World War. Europe was only ever unified under tyrants and occupying forces. What really matters is not primarily state or political unity, but rather the community that arises from the application of common basic values. Only this can open the way to the peaceful co-existence of nations and the development of national, regional and cultural groups.

Thesis 4

Federalism was seen as the essential means to create the conditions for peaceful European policy planning in the resistance groups in Europe who fought during the Second World War against nationalism and in particular against National Socialism in Germany as the arch-enemy of

freedom, peace and justice.

The Hertensteiner Programme, which was formed in 1946 in Switzerland, in the first postwar conference of federalist groups, sets out the foundations of a federative union of all Europe — as a necessary and substantial part of a worldwide federation of peoples. But however much the peoples of Europe wished to shape a common future, the political development of the world stood against it — an All-Europe union was unattainable. A new global power system developed, determined by the confrontation between East and West. In view of the fact that two world wars had originated in Europe, and above all in Germany, it was practically inevitable for the boundary line to be drawn right across Europe, dividing Germany in two. While the confrontation between East and West dominated world politics, the goal of a united Europe was not forgotten. In the Baden-Baden declaration of 1966, the *Europa-Union Deutschland* had this to say on the question: “Beyond the completion of West European integration, the goal of European unification politics remains an all-European federation which encompasses all the countries up to the western border of Russia and which maintains partnership relations with the United States of America and the Soviet Union.” The politics of European integration were seen from the outset by their initiators as a way to create the preconditions for overcoming the division of Europe. We know that Leipzig and Dresden, Prague and Warsaw are just as much part of Europe as the West European metropolises.

Thesis 5

Convinced of the necessity for the unification of Europe, the advocates of this idea began where it was possible: in Western Europe. An important pre-requisite for the success of the plan to bring together the West European democracies in a community was the reconciliation and close co-operation between France and Germany. Thus the European Coal and Steel Community, the germ cell of the European Community, was born. The foundation for the integration policy it ushered in was the readiness of member states to bind their fates together irrevocably. In this way they committed themselves to forming a community of values, whose hallmark would be the acknowledgement of freedom and the democratic constitutional state, equality of rights and the rule of law in the European context. Whereas only six countries were able to commit themselves to such common action at first, the number has in the meantime grown to twelve. The EC is open to every country wishing to

enter, so long as it has a democratic regime.

Thesis 6

There was never a realistic chance of an isolated German reunification. Even under the flag of neutrality a reunified Germany — in view of the past and considering Germany's economic potential — would have been unacceptable both to our immediate neighbours and to the super-powers. For this reason the solution found for Austria cannot hold water as an argument. In addition, in view of the totalitarian development begun in the eastern part of Germany, any attempt at reunification without the possibility of backing from the western democracies was seen as endangering the not yet stabilised democratic structure of the western half of Germany. It was therefore right to give temporal priority to European unification before an uncertain policy of reunification.

Thesis 7

To tie the continuation of European integration to progress in the German question is simply to hand the Soviet Union a lever to prevent the unification of West European countries by refusing to allow German reunification. The integration of the Federal Republic of Germany with the West on the other hand has contributed positively to keeping the German question open, by causing the western neighbours to adopt the German point of view. At the same time, the Federal Republic of Germany has been able to rehabilitate itself by virtue of its position in Europe and plausibly to show itself to have renounced the nationalistic tradition.

Thesis 8

The *Europa-Union* draws the consequences of the foregoing and calls for a federal European Union, imbued with the principles of freedom, self-determination, the rule of law and social justice.

The fathers of the Constitution also endorsed such a perspective when they called for the co-existence of all Germans in unity and freedom, while at the same time, however, they opened the way for the renunciation of national sovereignty rights in favour of the creation of a European community. It is in this context that we must see the German question, now and in the future. The sovereign nation-state, as develop-

ed in the 19th century, is at stake.

Thesis 9

The German question is and must remain open, as ordained in the Federal Republic of Germany's Constitution. This was also confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court in its ruling on the Basic Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR: "The first consequence of the reunification rule is that no constitutional organ of the Federal Republic of Germany may renounce the restoration of a unified state as their political goal; all constitutional institutions are obliged to direct all their policies towards the achievement of this goal — which includes the requirement to keep the claim to reunification alive in one's heart and outwardly to plead its cause with steadfastness — and to abstain from anything that may prevent reunification." This order is perfectly compatible with a resolute policy of European unification, and is also in harmony with the Treaty of Germany, in which it is stated that "the Federal Republic of Germany and the Three Powers" remain, in the future as in the past, bound by the terms of the treaty to work together "in order to achieve by peaceful means their common goal, which is a reunified Germany governed by a free democratic Constitution similar to that of the Federal Republic of Germany, and fully integrated into the European Community."

Thesis 10

By questioning the absolute priority of a sovereign unified German nation-state with a view to a solution in a European context by the exercise of the right to self-determination, we are keeping open the German question as part of a far greater European question.

When a nation is divided into several states, there arise two possible solutions: either to reach a solution by a plebiscite through the exercise of the nation's right to self-determination, or to take the road of unification between states, which may range from a partial agreement to a full federal treaty. The developmental process of the open German question demonstrates that so far both alternatives have been sought — in vain. As against the classic instrument of unification between states with the aim of achieving national unity — as practised in Germany and Italy in the last century — the principle of self-determination has acquired particular importance since the First World War, as set out in the UN

Charter.

The right of self-determination is one of the basic requirements of European-federalist unification policy. By overcoming inherited and often artificial borders, it provides for the free co-existence of peoples in a European framework. This is equally valid for the realisation of the right to self-determination for the German people in the context of a European solution. There are various possibilities for this, including that of "two states in Germany." This formula appeared for the first time in the then Chancellor Brandt's Government statement in October 1969.

In the Constitutional Court's decision regarding the Basic Treaty, it is stated that "it is thus quite wrong to say that any 'Two-State-Model' is incompatible with the constitutional order." Elsewhere we find the following reference: "There are various legal categories of border: administrative borders, demarcation borders, the borders between spheres of interest, the border marking the area governed by the Constitution, the borders of the German Empire according to the position of 31st December 1937, state boundaries, and among these those that enclose a federal state, and those that, within that state, divide member states from each other (as with the states of the Federal Republic of Germany)." It is clear that, in the process of West European integration and all-European cooperation, the borders in Europe have changed in quality and will continue to do so. This is most obvious for the inner borders of the European Community, which have to a very great extent lost their divisive character. Under such changed circumstances "two states in Germany" under a European roof would be acceptable, were the Germans in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the GDR to opt for this in a vote for self-determination. This European roof cannot, however, be that of Mikhail Gorbachev's much-vaunted "European house." It is not enough to give an old house a coat of fresh paint and make a few cosmetic repairs. Europeans must build a new house of freedom, in which human rights and self-determination have some value; it must be built with federative bricks and mortar.

There is a historical example for the road outlined here: when the *status* of the French-occupied Saarland was being finally settled, the Federal Republic of Germany gave priority to the Saarlanders' right to self-determination before state unity. The people of the Saar decided for the Federal Republic of Germany; however, they could have opted just as easily for the European *status* of the Saarland, which we could have endorsed whole-heartedly, since this would have made a clearly visible start to the devaluation of borders and would have demonstrated the

interlacing possibility of European economies. Of course one cannot simply carry this "miniature reunification" over into future situations.

Thesis 11

The application of the right to self-determination in the member-states of the East Bloc is not to be expected in the short term. Nevertheless one must not on this account cling to an "all-or-nothing" position and persist in expecting miracles.

So our first priority should be to change the nature of the inner German border, which is particularly painful as it coincides with the line of junction between East and West, by a policy of pragmatic steps: to make it more permeable and more human, and finally to do away with it altogether. This is the goal of all policy connected to the Basic Treaty and pursued by each government of the *Bundesrepublik*.

Every encounter with people from beyond the Wall and the barbed wire is therefore as much to be encouraged as co-operation with COMECON countries in every area and on all levels. Every new contact, every further treaty, every additional commercial exchange helps to thicken and strengthen the web that binds us together, until we reach a point where attempts to tear this web apart would merely inflict damage on both sides. Over the last twenty years, a new web of links has been woven between East and West in general and between the two Germanies in particular. The more comprehensive the co-operation between East and West, the more effective it will be. Policy concerning the East Bloc and the relationships between the *Bundesrepublik* and the GDR is no longer carried out primarily in bilateral agreements; this level is increasingly replaced by multilateral talks — in the CSCE, the MBFR and in the talks between the EC and COMECON. The Federal Republic of Germany can only pursue such a policy however if it remains inextricably linked with the countries of Western Europe which are part of the EC. Thus all-European co-operation can offer no substitute for West European integration; West European integration is rather an indispensable condition for successful all-European co-operation.

Thesis 12

What we have to guard against is overplaying our attempts at a German-German solution. This would immediately arouse distrust in East and West alike; faced with the alternative, our neighbours would

prefer the *status quo* to a unilateral German-German breakaway. This would therefore shatter all hope not only of an all-European policy but also of reunification of Germany. This is true not least for the speculative plans for a "confederation" between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR.

We must also guard against the vision of an imaginary "Central Europe" between the blocs, which under German hegemony would be bound to reawaken old difficulties.

The assumption that any historical state of affairs may be re-established, is unhistorical. History — and not least that of West European integration — teaches us that the development of new forms of co-operation and integration does not always keep to the blueprints of documents and treaties. Just as with the EC a *sui generis* image has emerged which was unforeseeable 40 years ago, so we may expect a solution to the German question which interlinks elements of the historically developed states together with West European integration and all-European co-operation. I am convinced that this Continent, in which the ideas of freedom and justice were born, will in the 21st century no longer endure an order which shows scant respect for the right of nations to self-determination.

The speaker, as a member of the executive committee of the *Europa-Union Deutschland*, laid these theses open to discussion among the association. The *Europa-Union* had not yet reached a conclusion on them at the time of the address.

Notes

ON THE JENNINGER CASE

When one becomes acquainted with the whole text of the speech given by Jenninger on the 50th anniversary of the "Kristallnacht," the charges made against him of being ambiguous about the Nazi regime's responsibilities, or even almost justifying them, seem to be absolutely disgraceful. And Jenninger's instant resignation, more than just a graceful gesture, of an elegance which is hard to find, becomes a slap in the face for a press with an inclination towards libellous slander and for a confused political class. For this reason the Federalists not only wish to express their solidarity to Jenninger, but also to congratulate him as a winner, not as a loser.

Our judgement of the press does not require any explanation. But why should the political class be "confused?" The answer is not difficult. There is an idol in Germany that is not only *legibus solutus*, but escapes even historical judgement. It is the German nation-state. The fact that the Germans, in practising this cult which is actually pagan, keep good company with all those who identify nationality with the state, does not modify the essence of the problem. Whoever besmirches the image of the nation-state incurs the most serious of crimes, treason, if not in fact the most abominable of sins, blaspheming God's name, as if the ethics of the *polis* still existed and Nazism had not openly shown what consequences are brought on by denying the ethical system of the West.

Jenninger has committed this crime and sin. Here is some evidence: "Our history cannot be shared between the good and the bad, and the responsibilities of the past cannot be divided according to an arbitrary geographical definition of borders created after the War...Everybody could see what was going on, but most people looked the other way and kept quiet. Even the Church kept quiet...It is true that everybody knew the Nuremberg laws, that everybody could see what was happening in Germany fifty years ago and that deportations took place in daylight."

And, as “to the end of time mankind will remember Auschwitz as part of our history, of German history, it is pointless to ask to ‘definitely shut away’ the past. Our past will never find peace nor will it ever go. And this regardless of the fact that the younger generations are not guilty... Only by keeping our memories and past alive as part of our identity as Germans will we, both old and young, be able to free ourselves from the burden of history.”

However, these extremely clear words also mark the limit of Jenninger’s analysis. It is right, in fact, to say that not only Hitler and his cronies carry the responsibility for Nazism; but it is also right to conclude that Auschwitz is an unforgettable part of German history, a part that contributes to defining its identity? Obviously this is not true. If it were, we would have to admit that Nazism is also part of the identity of those who, like Dietrich Bonhöfer, were executed by the SS or who, like Thomas Mann, chose exile. And that it is also part of the identity of the inhabitants of Zürich, even of those who offered hospitality to the victims of Nazi-fascism. To admit this is clearly contrary to common sense, even though common sense is usually powerless against ideological myths, however anachronistic they may be. Among these ideological myths, the anachronistic myth par excellence is that of the nation, arbitrarily identified with the political community, or even better, as the boundaries of political communities change in time, with that particular political community which is the “nation-state.” In Jenninger’s analysis this is very clear. So the Germans, those Germans who according to Jenninger should forever bear the responsibility of Nazism, are supposed to be those who lived, live and will live within that territory which more or less coincides with that of the state founded by Bismarck at the end of the 1870 Franco-Prussian conflict. The fact is that these are not the “Germans”; they are simply “some Germans” with different experiences from those of other German-speaking groups. Supposing there is only one “German history,” that which according to Jenninger defines the Germans’ identity, in any case it would be different. It is a statement which can be denied only on condition that we deny that the German nation, as *Kulturnation*, existed before Bismarck’s state and had much wider dimensions and very different characteristics.

The truth is that at Versailles, in January 1871, a state was born, the German “nation-state,” a state which founded its legitimacy on the German nation (a cultural, linguistic, ethnic fact, in other words not political in itself), instead arbitrarily identified with the people of that particular German state (a political fact, the citizens of that state) and

thought of as natural, as if races existed. It is this ideological representation which induces Jenninger to consider that there is a German history to be imputed only to the Germans (as if it were possible to understand Kant without Rousseau), and that there is only one history of only one Germany (as if it were possible to find any continuity not only between Prussian and Second *Reich* politics — continuity which is undeniable — but also between the politics of Bavaria, Rhineland, the Palatinate and the over three hundred states which made up the First *Reich* after the Westphalia peace and that of the Germany of Bismarck, William II, Weimar and Hitler; and as if it were possible to explain Frederick the Great or William II without considering the European system of states). And it is always this representation that leads Jenninger to believe that the boundaries of the first history (that of the *Kulturnation*) coincide with those of the second (the history of the state founded by Bismarck).

This non-existent history is founded on the nationalism of which Jenninger too is a victim. It is an obstinate but fragile ideological veil. To fully realize this, it is enough to consider that that representation of the German nation, born with the German nation-state, is bound to die the very day that the Germans become aware that the national political formula belongs to the past and found its historical death at the end of the Second World War, with the internationalization of the productive and social process, and the birth of the world system of states. That day, which will mark the end of the ruinous myth of the nation-state, in other words of the myth which has tied nation to state (and therefore to power politics), the Germans will understand that the state, and not the nation, is the subject of power politics and its atrocities, that their national identity, outside the crazy age of nationalism, has never been defined exclusively by membership in the political community, and that in fact this identification with the political community is marginal with respect to other identifications with a very different significance, such as those which would bring them to trace their roots in a language and culture expressed by Cranach and Holbein, Bach and Beethoven, Hölderlin and Goethe, Kant and Marx, Mommsen and Ranke, and even Kafka and Lukács.

This does not at all mean that the “question of the blame” for what was done has been liquidated. On the contrary. This means simply refusing to judge an awful past with the national prejudices which caused it. When this is done, it will be clear that it was not Germany, but the European system of States that was the driving force behind the European historical process in the modern age. This system has been cleverly

described by Ludwig Dehio as a situation characterized not only by recurring hegemonic attempts always contrasted by the forces of the system itself trying to redress the balance, but which has shown also the demonic nature of power every time the hegemonic force has abandoned the cautious path of *raison d'état* and has fallen into the abyss of the lust for power. From the first point of view, Hitler's hegemonic attempt was not different from those of Philip II, Louis XIV, Napoleon and William II. If its demonic aspects were so evident as to seem of a different nature, it is only because Hitler was able to avail himself of the explosive mixture of nationalism and modern destructive technology and because, as the European system of states was by then on its knees, he had to face the new great powers of the world system of states. And it was this very interlacing of elements which exalted the lust for power to reach a demoniac folly that mankind had never known before then. According to Dehio, therefore, Germany can be compared to a tragic Magdalene, victim of a fate which was mostly predestined and which led her, more and more obstinate and blinded, to final destruction.

Dehio's is a great lesson, a lesson that, by rightly ascribing the European catastrophe to nationalism, redeems the Germans not personally involved in Nazism from a sin which is not theirs and instead makes them share a responsibility which is common to all Europeans: that of not having done, and of still not doing, all that is necessary to put an end to the fateful interval of nationalism and to open the way to the new course of federalism, transcending — here and now — the political formula of the nation-state and founding the European federation: substantially, the responsibility — which also concerns Jennings — of not having done, and of not doing, all that is necessary to defeat, with the culture of the nation-state, the culture of war and to start off the culture of peace, a culture which involves both the future to be built and the past to be understood.

Luigi V. Majocchi

THIRD WORLD DEBT AND A RENEWAL OF THE WORLD'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORDER

1. The debt crisis in which the Third World has been wallowing for years is not merely a liquidity crisis, but a generalized insolvency crisis. As such, it needs brave decisions to contain its effects and above all to remove its causes.

The next most urgent task consists in allowing the growth process in developing countries to resume. In the recent past a decade (or even two, in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa) has been lost for the take-off and the development of these countries. In macro-economic terms, these are the consequences of the crisis: the fall in imports, the freeze on new funding by banks, the draining of resources towards creditor countries have caused a decline in investment and low growth rates, which in many cases means that populations already barely at subsistence level have seen a reduction in their per capita income.

The strategy adopted by creditor countries, transnational banks and international credit institutions has managed to avoid a collapse in the world's financial system, but it has not been able to revive growth in the debtor countries. In this way, the necessary resources to service the debt are simply not produced. Hence, the real premise to overcome the insolvency crisis is absent. The rescheduling of loans, which is the instrument used to tackle the crisis, together with the deflation of debtors' economies, makes the situation even worse and conceals its fundamental nature, simply delaying in time its most serious manifestations.

A new approach merely designed to remedy the consequences of the debt crisis would however be insufficient. If the mechanisms which have led to the present situation remained unchanged, some time later the same problems would reappear. For this reason it is necessary to intervene with reforms to set up the economic and power relations between advanced countries and developing countries on a less unfair and unbalanced basis than at present, taking into account their increasing interdependence in an increasingly integrated world economy.

2. At the root of the difficulties of the Third World due to foreign debt, is in the first place the choice of developed Western countries to consolidate the ties of financial, economic and political subordination with the individual developing countries, by resorting to the expansion

of private bank loans. On the one hand, it was a matter of using the objective tendency towards the formation of a world market of goods and capitals to induce Third World countries to integrate in increasingly accentuated forms into this market and the production circuits run by transnational corporations. Their evolution in this direction would be favoured by the ample financial resources made available to them for the creation of purchasing power for the developed West's products. This made it possible to increase the outlets of the goods produced at the centre of the world economy, opposing the fall in the profit rate which was taking place during those years. On the other hand, within this general process, by using the loans granted by the various countries rather than multilateral loans, each Western country was able to maintain a particular power relationship with the developing countries within its specific sphere of influence, thus giving rise to a series of tendentially distinct hegemonic relations.

Within this framework it must be stressed that industrialized countries dealt with the disequilibrium created by the two oil shocks by choosing to take away from international credit institutions the task of recycling the producer countries' capitals towards the Third World countries which do not produce energy resources, putting it in the hands of the private banks. Within a short time this led to the privatization of the debt, in other words to the predominance of a debt structure in which the private part widely exceeds the part granted by governments and official institutions.¹

With the rapid adjustment to the second oil shock decided on by the main industrialized countries of the Western world, the debt burden soon became unbearable. The restrictive monetary policy adopted by US authorities caused an upward surge in the whole structure of world rates and interest rates applied to loans grew both in nominal terms and in real terms, thanks to the mechanism of variable rate financing, often reaching levels which were higher than the growth rates of the debtor countries' gross product. Also, the progressive appreciation of the dollar, up to the first quarter of 1985, was reflected in an increase in the burden of the debt, as this currency largely constitutes the denomination currency of the private financing granted, while the presence of vast flights of capital out of Third World countries makes the continuation of the loan servicing more problematic.

Together with monetary and financial factors, other important factors which push debtor countries to the verge of insolvency concern the commercial relationships among the two groups of countries. On the one

hand a heavy deterioration of developing countries' terms of trade becomes evident because of the fall in the price of basic products, with higher peaks for oil products. On the other hand the adjustment of the debtor countries' balance of payments is impeded by the proliferation of protectionist measures towards their exports, in the context of a generalized resumption of commercial tensions between the most important poles of the Western economy.²

3. When, through the interruption of payments by Mexico in 1982, the debt crisis became evident, the banks, the creditor countries and international financial institutions put an articulated strategy into effect, which aimed at avoiding the repudiation of the debt, dividing the debtor countries' front and forcing them to a confrontation with the creditor countries' associations (Paris and London Club) using a case by case policy. On the one hand the credit institutes demanded and obtained a guarantee of political intervention, at the same time reinforcing the soundness of their budgets and setting aside substantial provisions for the credits granted to developing countries.³ On the other hand, mostly due to the International Monetary Fund's policies, the debtor countries were obliged to heavily deflate their economies and to make available trade surpluses, with which to repay at least the interest on their loans.

In this way it was possible to prevent the debt crisis from turning into a credit crisis, which would threaten the stability of the international financial system, and a situation of apparent stability was reached which disguised the deepness and pervasiveness of the insolvency state. Thanks to the adjustment imposed on the debtor countries and thanks to the financial devices of the creditor countries, banks and multilateral institutions, the maturities were delayed through the successive rescheduling of the loans, the episodes of payment suspension were avoided or at least circumscribed, thus fostering the illusion that the Third World is more in a condition of illiquidity rather than insolvency, and finally the absolute amount of the debt was frozen, in the expectation that the expansion of international trade would reduce its relative weight and lay the foundations for a renewal of the credit flows towards the indebted countries.

After a first phase, in which the debt problem was dealt with through an overkill policy towards the debtor countries, that is with a massive deflation of their economies,⁴ the Baker Plan was launched in 1985 to try and combine the stabilization of the debtor economies with a resumption of their growth, through the concession of new loans by the banks.

However, the latter did not respond to the appeal and denied credit, trying in fact in every way to reduce their exposure by disinvesting. This second phase also ended in failure.

At present a third phase is under way, in which there is an attempt at diminishing indebtedness through a series of pragmatic options (menu approach), that go from debt-equity swaps to buying back the loans on the part of the debtors according to the discounted prices of the parallel market. Among these, the most widespread are the operations of securitisation of loans, namely their transformation into marketable securities that are then handed over by the creditor banks to third parties.

Not even this approach seems suitable to solve the debt problem. From a technical point of view these operations can concern only part of the loans; from a political point of view the most well-known of them, the debt-equity swap, has the disadvantage of transferring to Northern transnational corporations control over the most efficient Southern firms.

The difficulties in which even those debtor countries that have obediently accepted Fund policies and are unable to service their debt continue to founder, in spite of rescheduling agreements, prove that the debt problem is nowhere near being solved. The inability of the various strategies to relieve the Third World from insolvency conditions is reflected in the risk indicators relative to the loans granted.

In fact, on the whole the main indicators of the worsening of the developing countries' debt situation are at decidedly higher levels than in 1982 (the year in which the international community became aware of the seriousness of the crisis), with particularly high peaks for Latin American countries.⁵

4. For the Third World the consequences of the debt crisis are serious and in some cases dramatic. The stabilization programs imposed by the IMF or autonomously adopted by governments have involved the launching of deflationary measures to reduce domestic absorption and to free current account surpluses to enable them to service their loans and have originated a whole series of accompanying measures designed to liberalize prices and increase the integration of Third World economies within the framework of the world economy.

Thus whole industrial sectors which had sprung up thanks to previous import-substituting policies have been liquidated, making it easier for transnational corporations to settle and reinforce their control over developing economies, while the extension of debt capitalization operations

with the transformation of the debt into shares in local companies makes the danger of a recolonization of Third World countries more and more concrete.

The desperate search for foreign currencies, moreover, drives debtor countries to launch grand projects aimed at keeping the export flow alive, with increasing perils for the protection of environmental equilibrium not only in the Third World but on the whole planet. At the same time the fall in investments combined with the stabilization programs, an interruption of financing by the creditor countries, the net outflow of resources through the debt servicing channel, the flights of capital, at the same time cause and effect of the debt crisis, interrupt the growth process of Third World countries, undermining their development prospects in the medium-to-long run.⁶

After years of deflation and consumption reduction, the per capita income of many debtor countries is lower than it was in the 1970s, while the standard of living of wide strata of the population is getting worse.⁷

Within the individual countries, because of the high level of unemployment and inflation and following the reduction and abolition of subsidies for essential commodities and the dismantling of many public services, the lower classes are particularly affected, whereas the nations' bourgeoisies manage to defend their wealth and privileges, in many cases siding with the banks and creditor countries and deriving direct benefits from the debt crisis.

5. The multilateral financial organizations, the IMF and the World Bank, actively intervene in this process, playing an important role in imposing on debtor countries the banks' and creditor countries' conditions for the loan servicing to continue.

Their actions in defence of the industrialized countries' interests are the reflection both of the reasons at their origin and of the relationship of power between countries of the North and countries of the South, as they appear within them, in the structures of their decisional organs. It is well-known that the Bretton Woods institutions did not arise specifically to deal with the financial problems connected with the presence of underdevelopment, but to rebuild and reinforce the capitalist market and the international monetary system after the Second World War; it is also well-known that the industrialized countries, unlike what happens in other international institutions under the United Nations system, have solid voting majorities within the two organizations, while the United States have an actual right of veto within the IMF.

It must also be added that the tendency of the IMF and the World Bank to favour the interests of the countries of the North in every circumstance has a solid basis in the organization of the international monetary system and in the hegemonic role of the US currency within it, both in the old Gold-Exchange Standard version and in the present Paper Dollar Standard version, in the presence of flexible exchanges. The discrimination, to the detriment of developing countries, derives both from the privileges of the dollar as an international currency and from the double asymmetry of written and unwritten rules on which the system of payments between countries is based. On the one hand, in fact, in the case of any imbalance in the balance of payments, the burden of the adjustment is laid on the countries with a deficit and not on those who manage their surpluses in a parallel way; on the other hand stabilization is imposed only on the debtors of the South, while the debtor countries of the North obtain less pressing conditions or are even spared adjustment, as is shown by the clamorous case of the United States, which for years has faced large deficits and has the highest foreign debt in the world, thanks to the privileges enjoyed by the dollar as a reserve currency.⁸

In this context, the IMF and the World Bank have continued in their traditional function as instruments for the perpetuation of the old international economic order, contributing with their interventions to accelerating the integration of developing countries in the international financial and commercial system dominated by the countries of the North and by the transnational corporations; to eliminating self-centered development experiences by removing the restrictions which allowed the infant industries in the South to reinforce their structures sheltered from foreign competition; to integrating the bilateral aid of the Western industrialized countries, as a vehicle of political and commercial penetration; to supporting the commercial interests of the North by supplying resources tied to the expansion of purchasing in the markets of the developed countries.

In connection with the debt crisis, the IMF and the World Bank have acted basically as debt collection agencies for the Western banks, adopting a case-by-case policy, breaking down the debtor countries' front and imposing a confrontation with all the creditor countries forming a coalition. A role of guarantee towards the credit institutes has been played mostly by the Fund, whose stabilization programmes have been considered by the creditor countries as the necessary and sufficient condition to start off the debt renegotiations which have followed with ever-increasing frequency since summer 1982.

The Fund has also been the main agent in inducing debtor countries to carry out heavy deflations in order to make resources available for debt servicing. The conditionality of the Fund was strengthened after the second oil shock and has inspired measures of conditional credit concessions also on the part of the World Bank, strongly reducing the independence margins for the policies adopted by debtor countries, with serious effects on the exertion of their economic sovereignty.

The conditionality content has contributed in a decisive way to the reduction of the productive basis of developing countries, to the increase of unemployment to intolerable levels, and to a general aggravation of the living conditions of the lower classes. Local industries have been specifically hit by the elimination of the impediments to trade and the control over exchange rates, while the measures for reducing the purchasing power of the populations have mainly concerned the imposition of wage freezes or reductions, the devaluation of the currency with a consequent increase in the cost of imported goods and a reduction of public expenditure by diminishing public intervention in the social sectors, the elimination of subsidies for basic consumer goods, the reduction of civil service employment.

The conditional nature of the credits granted by multilateral institutions in this way reveals itself as an instrument to keep up the dependency relations between Western developed countries and the Third World and to weaken the position of the lower classes in developing countries.

In conclusion, while in the immediate future they place themselves at the disposal of the Western industrialized countries for the collection of debts, in the long run, the IMF and the World Bank share the responsibility of reinforcing the present economic and power relations on a worldwide scale, worsening rather than improving the growth prospects of the Third World. This is because their stabilization programmes have the effect of reducing accumulation, impeding the industrialization of underdeveloped countries and making it easier for the transnational corporations to control their economies, thus preventing a more balanced international division of labour.

6. A deep reform of the financial and real accumulation mechanisms which rule the world economy is required to solve the debt problem.

While waiting for the necessary political conditions for this reform to mature, an emergency intervention is needed to avoid the situation from deteriorating any further and deteriorating to the point where there is no way out. At present, the widespread awareness of the structural

character of the crisis have already driven a certain number of countries and institutions to propose forms of debt relief, which involve the creditors renouncing various degrees of repayment of loans, as has often happened in the past, and markedly after the Second World War between the US and the European countries.

The UNCTAD is asking for the remission of 30 per cent of the debts, the Group of the Seven is willing to grant forms of partial remission only to the least developed countries, and some banks go so far as to envisage forms of generalized cancellation of the loans granted.

If the European Community created a privileged relationship on the subject with the Third World within the UN, it would be possible to launch an emergency initiative, which might take the form of an immediate moratorium and of the summoning of an international conference on debt, during which the forms of generalized remission which are feasible at present could be discussed.

On that occasion, too, the premises would be given for the launching of a world plan for employment and development, similar in importance and meaning to the Marshall Plan in the aftermath of Second World War.⁹ Thus, by reviving the growth process in the Third World, the conditions would be created to proceed towards the most radical reforms which are necessary to overcome the phase of unequal relations and exchanges between the North and the South of our planet.

In this new context the reform of the IMF and the World Bank will be considered along lines that also ensure the safeguarding of the South's interests, and the need to replace the dollar as an international currency with a number of currencies that reflect the multipolar organization of the world.

The developing countries, by suitably reinforcing their experiences of regional economic integration, beyond the defence of the sovereignty of the individual states which is impossible nowadays, could take the option of launching a currency of their own, possibly tied to the ECU, at least at the start.

This is the concrete content which could be taken on in the running of the world economy by the creation of forms of world government whose regulating criteria are not the interests of one group of countries or another, but of mankind as a whole.

Franco Praussello

NOTES

¹ Cfr. S. Griffith-Jones, "The Growth of Multinational Banking, the Euro-Currency Market and their Effects on Developing Countries", in *The Journal of Development Studies*, January 1980.

² On this topic cfr. F. Praussello, *Le interdipendenze economiche fra il Nord e il Sud del mondo*, Genova, Ecig, 1986.

³ Following the policies of rapid capitalization and increase of provisions for credits granted to Third World countries, the ratio between the debt exposure towards Latin America and their own capital for the hundred largest transnational banks in the world declined from 125 to 57 per cent between 1982 and 1987. Cfr. R. Monro-Davies, "Third World Debt: There is no Alternative to Forgiveness," in *The Financial Times*, January 5th 1989.

⁴ Cfr. S. Dell, "Stabilization: The Political Economy of Overkill," in J. Williamson (ed.), *IMF Conditionality*, Washington, Institute for International Economics, 1983.

⁵ Between 1982 and 1988 the overall Third World outstanding debt has risen from 831 to 1320 billion dollars. The ratio between debt and exports over the period 1982-1987 has risen from 120 to 157 per cent for the whole of the developing countries and from 271 to 332 per cent for Latin American countries.

⁶ It is particularly outrageous that for some years now the Third World has been exporting resources in net terms, financing the countries of the North. Over the last few years net transfers towards creditor countries have amounted to over \$ 100 billion. According to Gunder Frank, with respect to the reparations paid by Germany after the First World War, which amounted to 25 per cent of the value of its exports and to an average of 2 per cent of its GNP, Latin American countries have transferred abroad to service their loans after 1983 between 60 and 100 per cent of the takings from their exports, with an average of 6-10 per cent of their GNP. Cfr. A. Gunder Frank, *Causes and Consequences of the World Debt Crisis*, document presented at the session of the permanent peoples' Court on IMF and World Bank policies, West Berlin, 26th-29th September 1988, mimeo.

⁷ According to World Bank data, over the period 1980-1987 the per capita income in the most indebted countries has fallen by about 10 per cent, while in the countries of Subsaharian Africa the fall has been over 20 per cent. On the dangers, even political ones, that the debt crisis involves for the democratic regimes of many developing countries cfr. S. George, "The Impact of the Debt on Production, Income and Democratic System," in AA.VV., *The External Debt, Development and International Cooperation*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1988.

⁸ Following the substantial disequilibrium of its current account, after 1983 the US became the country with the highest external debt, higher than that of the most indebted Third World countries. At the end of 1987 its debt amounted to \$ 678 billion, in net currency terms. In that same year the US absorbed from other countries a quantity of goods and services much larger than that exported, financing the difference with \$ 160 billion of net capital imports, equal to about \$ 660 for every American citizen. If one considers that this sum is higher than the total income that is available for the three and a half billion people living in the Third World, it is easy to understand why the privileges enjoyed by the dollar as international currency are defined by Triffin as a real world monetary scandal. Cfr. R. Triffin, *The Intermixture of Politics and Economics in the World Monetary Scandal*, Acceptance Speech, Seidman Award, 15th September 1988, Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee, mimeo.

⁹ On the possible content of a Marshall Plan for the Third World, cfr. F. Praussello, "Keynesianism and Welfare on an International Scale: Remarks on a World Plan for Employment and Development," in *The Federalist*, XXVIII (1986), pp. 131-135.

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE ECOLOGICAL EMERGENCY

The ecological emergency is more and more linked to the climatic changes that could take place, with consequences that cannot yet be accurately localized and quantified, due to the continuous introduction into the atmosphere of substances — above all carbon dioxide and chlorfluorcarbons (CFC) — which are modifying the equilibrium of the biosphere. Together with these dangers there is the difficulty of conceiving, within a short time, some worldwide institutions able to handle the transition towards mass consumption and production that are compatible both with the ecological constraints of our planet and with the need to guarantee dignified living conditions for everybody, including the future generations. The urgency of these problems is such that the states have been induced to take an interest in them.¹ Their importance is proved both by Gorbachev's declarations on the need to deal with the problem of world ecological security within the framework of the new phase of collaboration between the USA and the USSR and the UN and, more recently, the statements made by Bush and of the new American Secretary of State Baker who, after launching an appeal in favour of an international initiative to stop the global warming caused by pollutants and fossil fuels, has declared that "political ecology is now ripe for action." In March this year finally the international conference at The Hague has explicitly posed the question of the creation of a high authority within the UN to handle the problem of the greenhouse effect.²

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Science has already defined the scenarios which describe the possible stages of the ecological emergency that mankind will have to deal with over the next decades if no substantial changes take place in world ecological policy. The consumption of fossil fuels and the release into the air of substances such as chlorfluorcarbons are at the centre of all scientific reports ordered by governments, private foundations and UN agencies, and are pointed out as the main causes of a probable accentuation over the next decades of the greenhouse effect — the consequence of which could be an increase in the average temperature on the planet and the impossibility to foresee the migrations of rains and of dry areas — and of the depletion of the ozone layer, which would reduce the filtering action

of the ultraviolet rays so far carried out by the atmosphere, with adverse effects on the health of mankind. These reports say that, even if humanity were able to stop the emission of these substances at once, a change in the global climatic evolution is bound to take place during the next few decades. Among all the states, the superpowers are the most interested in the possible evolution of these changes, which might cause reversals in the force ratio in certain productive sectors, such as agriculture, for example. This is also why the US Congress has asked the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) to draw up a report on the possible effects of global warming, from which, among other things, states that "how quickly climate may change is elusive, because scientists are uncertain both about how rapidly heat will be taken up by the Oceans and about some climate feedback. Generally scientists assume that current trends in emission will continue and that climate will change gradually over the next century, although at a much faster pace than historically. Some scientists have indicated that the impact of global warming may be felt as soon as the next decade, but the full effect of the equivalent doubling of CO₂ probably would not be enhanced until after 2050. Other scientists suggest that the current structure of the general circulation models, which are based on a surprise-free Ocean-atmosphere system, could be wrong and that abrupt changes are possible... For natural ecosystems (forests, wetlands, barrier islands, national parks) these changes may continue for decades once the process of change is set into motion. As a result, the landscape of North America will change in ways that cannot be fully predicted. The ultimate effects will last for centuries and will be irreversible. Strategies to reverse such impacts on natural ecosystems are not currently available" (October 1988).

In spite of the international agreements already stipulated, the situation is no better concerning the protection of the ozone layer, the reduction of which has been observed mostly, but now not only, at the South Pole, thanks to the surveys carried out by NASA. To solve this problem a conference was called in 1985 on behalf of the UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). It adopted a Convention (Vienna Convention) and a resolution, following which in September 1987 a Protocol was signed, in Montreal, by 24 countries to abolish chlorfluorcarbons, which came into force on January 1st 1989. This was undoubtedly a first important step towards the adoption of common policies at worldwide level in the field of ecology and a significant example of the growing importance assumed by the initiatives of the environmentalists. But was it enough? The OTA, (Office of Technology Assessment) a non-

partisan agency of the American Congress, had already carried out a first analysis of the Montreal Protocol in 1987, pointing out some limits and shadowy areas.³ For example, it highlighted the adoption of a principle which can hardly be ignored in future agreements on the limitation of the use of other substances: the recognition of the need to differentiate the progressive elimination of the production and consumption of CFC according to whether the country is developed or not. On the basis of this principle the developed countries will have to bear the greatest responsibilities of every ecological policy. A first conclusion reached by the OTA is the following: "The Montreal Protocol can significantly inhibit the worldwide growth in the consumption of the compounds that deplete the layer of stratospheric ozone around the earth... However, the general perception that the Protocol will achieve a 50 per cent reduction in the production of controlled compounds by the year 1999 appears incorrect."

To justify its perplexities the OTA has studied four possible settings. The first setting contemplates the immediate ratification of the Protocol on the part of all the states: this would have as consequence a reduction of 40-45 per cent in the production of CFC by the year 2009. The second setting foresees the ratification of the Protocol by all states except China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Iran, South Korea, with the consequent reduction, by the year 2009, of at the most 30 per cent of the production. The third setting foresees the ratification of the Protocol by all the states which signed it initially, plus the USSR and Australia — but for the USSR the Protocol foresees the possibility of increasing its production by two thirds before starting the reduction —; in this case, by the year 2009, it might be possible to see an increase of up to 20 per cent in the production of CFC. The fourth setting provides, for demonstrative purposes, what would happen if the Protocol had never been ratified: a 40 to 60 per cent increase in the production of CFC by 2009. The OTA thus concluded: "Even with world co-operation through the treaty, OTA's analyses suggest that total reduction of ozone-depleting compounds would be somewhat smaller and slower than previously estimated. Greater reductions in consumption of ozone-depleting substances could occur if: 1) the provisions in the Protocol are tightened; 2) consumption drops more than is required by the Protocol, which may occur if countries take unilateral actions directed towards that end or if widespread changes in consumer preferences occur; 3) CFC and halon consumption in developing countries grows more slowly than the ranges assumed by EPA or OTA."

The first two recommendations of OTA have already been accepted

by the USA, the EEC — the biggest producers and consumers of CFC — and Canada, which on the eve of the international conference on the protection of the ozone layer held in London announced that they wanted to go beyond the Montreal Protocol, committing themselves to replace the entire production of CFC with other substances that do not damage the ozone layer. As for the third recommendation the London Conference has instead proved how difficult it still is to reconcile the interests of the industrialized countries with those of the developing ones. The USSR, China and India in fact have indicated their intention not only of wanting to go beyond the limits set by the Montreal Protocol, but also of wanting to delay a reduction in the production of CFC as long as possible and, as Mustafa Tolba, the director of the UN Environment Programme, has declared, "it is obvious from the statements of developing countries that specific commitments are required. There is a need for international mechanisms to compensate them for foregoing the uses of CFCs and some of their natural resources in the interest of environmental safety. We need an internationally agreed plan to raise extra resources for the 1990s and beyond. Such a plan could include debt remission favouring environmental protection, deflection of resources liberated by disarmament, and innovative taxation incentives."

* * *

As the case of the Montreal Protocol and the successive international initiatives show, international agreements are necessary to start getting out of the ecological emergency, but they are not sufficient, on their own, to guarantee effective transition towards an ecologically safer world. The greenhouse effect is emblematic, because to cope with it, it is not enough to agree to limit the production and use of certain substances, what is needed is a real and true world planning of energy consumption as well as the exploitation of important reservoirs of natural resources, such as the Oceans and tropical forests. So far, the market has been unable to reconcile, on a worldwide scale, the growing demand for energy in the world with the need to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. It is enough to consider that after 1973, the year of the oil shock, in the consumption of energy resources the conventional ones — oil, natural gas, coal and nuclear power — still dominate the world energy supply, with an 88 per cent quota in 1985, and that in Berlin, last September, the World Bank confirmed that the destruction of tropical forests in 1987 took place at a pace four times faster than in 1986. On the basis of the present world

trend, and without an articulated planning of energy consumption from the national to the worldwide level, it is difficult to foresee a significant increase in the use of non-traditional renewable resources — from solar to wind energy, etc. — in a shorter time (40-50 years) with respect to that required by coal, oil or methane to become popular. In such a length of time, it is certain that the amount of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere will double, and its consequence would be an inevitable appearance of the greenhouse effect. Moreover it must not be forgotten that a high percentage of the energy consumption based on the use of fossil fuels concerns a sector, that of transport (public, private and commercial) — in the USA about 70 per cent of the oil consumed is absorbed by this sector — that may of course undergo further improvements as regards reducing the consumption and pollutants released into the atmosphere, but which is still extremely backward in a large part of the world, and its development can certainly be foreseen in future years. It is enough to think that the USSR is still now not even fiftieth in the world for the number of cars per thousand inhabitants.

In this situation there is still a lot of uncertainty about the paths to follow. Two tendencies are worth quoting as they represent quite a widespread way of thinking and acting. The first is exemplified by the report *The Rollercoaster Oil: A Call for Action*, published in 1987 by the Fund for Renewable Energy and the Environment (FREE), and by the testimony given in March 1989 by the Public Citizen, a non-profit research and advocacy organization before the Subcommittee on Energy Research & Development of the US Congress. The first report presents a strategy to favour the transition of the USA towards a post-petroleum world and a renewable energy based system, but, although keeping in mind the need for a worldwide strategy to cope with global warming, it simply proposes a national strategy that, due to the worldwide dimension of the problem, cannot be enough to effectively cope with the problem. The testimony of the Public Citizen, instead, underlines the need to increase that part of the US budget allocated for the research and development of alternative energies so as to bring the energy consumption for these technologies up to 15-20 per cent by the turn of the century.

The second tendency is instead exemplified by some initiatives promoted by FOE (Friends of Earth). These initiatives underline the need to preserve part of the common inheritance of mankind such as the Amazon forest. The FOE claims, for example, and rightly so, that the construction of dams foreseen by the Brazilian energy Plan (*Plano*

2010) would deal a further blow to the deforestation of Amazonia, but as an alternative proposes a policy of reducing electricity consumption through the optimization of the performance of electrical equipment, which is difficult to achieve for a developing country in less than twenty years.

These tendencies have in common an element which makes them not very credible: the idea that it is possible to convince states to spontaneously adopt good ecological policies without submitting them to world legislation that limits their sovereignty.

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How, then, can the transition towards an ecologically safer-world be directed? A first answer has been given by the Brundtland Report through the definition of the concept of sustainable development. "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs." As can be seen, these are key concepts which now underpin the action not only of the ecological movements, but, as the Montreal Protocol and the Hague Conference show, also of many states. The fact is, as we have already said, that to be effective an international ecological policy requires the collaboration of all states.

As to this, two considerations, one concerning energy policy, the other of an institutional nature, can contribute to freeing minds from the illusion that the planet can be saved — a new problem for mankind — with old medicines — national policies and the exploitation of only natural and renewable energy sources to guarantee the survival and development of a planet with over five billion inhabitants.

At the energy level, if the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions is indispensable to stop the greenhouse effect, it is necessary to plan how to overcome the use of fossil fuels both in the electric power production sector and in that of public and private consumption — the transport sector. In other words it is a matter of really achieving the electrification era in the means of production and consumption, an objective which, it must not be forgotten, was the dream of numerous ecologists and town-planners, such as Lewis Mumford, already in the 1930s. This is impos-

sible unless it is seen within the framework of starting off a new cycle of worldwide land and town-planning transformations, based on the development of high-speed railway lines, the ramification of electrified public transport, the progressive conversion of fuel-powered into electrical-powered vehicles — starting from those circulating in the cities. In this perspective electrical consumption, although with due attention to possible improvements in terms of efficiency and consumption reduction, would however be destined to reach much higher dimensions than the current estimates. But to pursue this objective mankind could not avoid using all the currently available resources which represent alternatives to fuel fossils, including nuclear energy, the use of which would have to be strictly limited to the time required to develop the technology of nuclear fusion and the development programme for which would have to be submitted to a worldwide authority that sets rules for the safety and transfer of the fissile material. The creation of such an authority is now necessary to cope with a situation in which there are countries like France and Japan whose energy supply system at present largely depends on nuclear energy — France has even become indispensable to the electrical power distributive network of part of the European Community — and others, like the USSR, who, despite the Chernobyl accident, have decided to increase the amount of electrical power produced by the year 2000 by using nuclear fuel. Moreover, the problem consists in providing this authority with the necessary financial resources to promote research and development into all alternative energies because, if it is true, as most ecological movements claim, that funds to promote the development of the production of alternative energy are currently much lower than those granted to research for the use of nuclear fusion — in the US the ratio is about 1 to 3 — it is also true that the latter represents a wholly negligible sum compared to what is spent for defence purposes — in the US the ratio is about 1 to one thousand.

The hypothesis of creating a world authority with these duties was supported by Einstein himself just after the Second World War. This authority, moreover, could collect an international climate tax (Climate protection tax) on the use of fossil fuels in order to: a) finance the transition phase to complete electrification and to the civil use of fusion; b) organize the conversion of Third World debts into ecological investments, financing re-forestation. Concerning the first point, it must be stressed, as The Rollercoaster Study mentioned above pointed out, that a tax of only 4.60 dollars per barrel of oil (with a burden of only 11 cents per gallon for car-drivers), would make it possible to collect every year,

in the USA alone, 53 billion dollars. Instead, as for the second point, it is enough to note that it is unthinkable to save the tropical forests, which still represent more than 7 per cent of the Earth's surface, without giving them the status of mankind's heritage by submitting them to world protection. It is an objective which is not easy to achieve without strong international collaboration, if we think that currently only 1 per cent of the Earth's surface, with the exception of Antarctica and Greenland, is in some way protected through national legislations.

Within this perspective the détente and the process of transforming the UN into a true democratic world government are bound to become two indispensable conditions to cope with the ecological emergency.

Finally, at the institutional level, The World Commission on Environment and Development has already drawn up some Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development which define the action of the individual states in the ecological field, as well as their responsibilities and some mechanisms for solving disputes. But what authority will oblige them to respect these principles? What authority will be able to collect the necessary financial resources to start off world-wide reconversion plans of energy production and consumption? And what authority will be given the power of deciding when and if the conservation is treated as an integral part of planning by the various states? The UN agencies, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank could become the pillars of a first nucleus of world government in the ecological field. But on the one hand, for this to be credible, it must be demonstrated that it is possible and necessary to start off a process of transferring part of the sovereignty of states from the national and continental level to the world level within the UN framework. Concerning this, any further delay in transforming the European Community into a true Union would be actual sabotage of the democratizing process of international relationships and hence the development of an effective world ecological policy. On the other hand, the USSR must be involved as soon as possible in the running of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as it is impossible to develop an effective international ecological initiative without including the socialist world which increasingly represents, for the kind of political and economical problems it has to face, the link between developed countries and those of the Third World.

In conclusion, we can say that to affirm that "political ecology is ripe for action" now has some meaning only insofar as one admits that the transformation of the UN into a true world-wide democratic government is also "ripe for action." In this perspective it is necessary to reinforce

collaboration not only between federalists in Europe and in the world, but also between federalists and ecologist movements in general.

Franco Spoltore

NOTES

¹ Concerning this see: *Our Common Future*, The World Commission on Environment and Development, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987; *State of the World*, A World Watch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, W.W. Norton & Company, New York-London, 1988.

² The international conference which took place in Turin in January, organized by the San Paolo Foundation, instead proposed the establishment of a world fund for the protection of our planet's climate.

³ The two international conferences which took place in London and the Hague in the first half of March 1989 within a few days of each other confirmed the suggestions made by the OTA.

Federalism in the History of Thought

GIOVANNI AGNELLI

ATTILIO CABIATI

In 1918, towards the end of World War I, Giovanni Agnelli, founder of the automobile company FIAT, and Attilio Cabiati, economist and teacher at the Royal High School of Commerce in Genoa, decided to make public the considerations they had been discussing among themselves for some time, concerning the horrors of war and the European Federation: the only solution which could guarantee security for future generations. Thus a book entitled Federazione Europea o Società delle Nazioni? (European Federation or League of Nations?) was published, in which the two authors, besides analyzing the concepts of nationality and nationalism, also criticize the League of Nations. Their arguments, similar to those expressed by Luigi Einaudi that same year, were a turning-point in the idea of European unification. For the first time crucial aspects of the problems connected with European unification were singled out and clarified with theoretical accuracy and the idea of a European federation as the only suitable solution to the basic problems which caused the First World War was convincingly underlined.

The fact that these clarifications appeared within the context of a critique of the League of Nations, at that time still at the stage of a project, is not accidental. Actually, the emergence of such a project was clearly a sign that the First World War, with its unheard-of destructiveness, had concretely shown the danger that the European civilization itself might disappear, had forced the political classes of the great powers to face the problem (on which the very survival of the European state system depended) of making any future war impossible and, therefore, of changing the structure of international relations. On the other hand, the projected new international organization represented a wholly insufficient and inappropriate answer to such a problem (as historical experience has amply shown), because it did not eliminate the real causes of

war. The very need to confront a concrete and clearly defined political proposal allowed these authors not only to lucidly point out its structural inadequacies, but also to demonstrate in a non-abstract way that the European federation represented a suitable solution to the problems posed by the First World War.

Hence the usefulness of reappraising Agnelli's and Cabiati's criticism of the League of Nations, which, apart from revealing how it is not only of historiographical interest, also clarifies some aspects of the current problems of European integration and the debate on UN reform. Three points in particular are worth mentioning. The first two are already present in the works of Einaudi, to whom the two authors explicitly refer, and they are the conceptual explanation of the opposition between interstate collaboration and unification, and the indication of the federal solution as an answer to increasing interdependence on a continental and worldwide scale. The third, on which the two authors express the most original ideas, more specifically concerns the critique of the League of Nations.

Agnelli and Cabiati maintain, with wide-reaching and articulated arguments, that this international organization will not prevent new wars, but on the contrary will favour their outbreak. Going deeply into Einaudi's critique, which identifies the absence of any real limit to sovereignty as a structural defect of the project, the two authors criticize the idea of a supreme court, which is of crucial importance in the project. Historical experience, in fact, shows that an arbitration court is unable to get its decisions accepted by states which retain their formal sovereignty and the capacity to enforce it with arms, in all those cases in which these states consider that their vital interests have been damaged. Any attempt to impose the court's decisions would in fact require military intervention or the enforcement of economic sanctions. In the first case a renewal of the rush for armaments would be inevitable and it would fatally result in another war. In the second case the rebel power might get round sanctions, either by preparing in advance for such a possibility or making agreements with other states to counterbalance the economic bloc. On the other hand, the idea of being able to guarantee peace by disarming is untenable, since adequate means of controlling the military organization of states are missing.

Another fundamental criticism examined by the two authors is the one which underlines how an international organization, implying the transfer of important state powers to interstate organisms which escape any democratic control by the citizens of the member states, can only favour

the economic and social forces that most benefit from a weakening of democratic controls over the action of the state. The validity of this concept can be generalised and extended, in its core, to integrating structures of a confederalist-functional nature, implying precisely the absence of democratic controls over interstate organs. At that time, not only the nationalists and conservatives, as would have seemed obvious, but even the most progressive political forces failed to take up the issues introduced by Agnelli and Cabiati. It was only after the Fascist experience, when the Resistance appeared, that their anticipations were taken up by the federalist culture.

* * *

from : FEDERAZIONE EUROPEA O LEGA DELLE NAZIONI?*

28. League of nations or federal Europe?

Without hesitation we believe that, if we really want to make war in Europe a phenomenon which cannot be repeated, there is only one way to do so and we must be outspoken enough to consider it: *a federation of European states under a central power which governs them*. Any other milder vision is but a delusion.

The most precise comment on this requirement can be found in the book by Curtis, *The Commonwealth of Nations*, which has already been quoted many times. Historical experience, that famous experience which should be, but is not, our guide in life, proves: 1) the fruitless end of all the attempts made, in spite of their lasting in some cases quite a long time, to set up those kinds of "League of Nations" which consisted of confederations of sovereign states; 2) instead, the ever better outcome of the other type of union of nations consisting in the transforming of sovereign states into provinces of a single confederate state.

Let us say that, on this subject, historical experience confirms our beliefs with the univocal response of centuries. We see the first Confederation of states dissolve miserably; it was that of the Greek cities in 470 B.C., for which they contributed to the common treasure of Delo and which saved Europe from Asian civilization. But the lack of a central

* Fratelli Bocca Editori, Turin, 1918.

authority to exercise a common will over the individual states caused the decadence and dissolution of the Confederation, civil war, the hegemony first of Athens and then Sparta, and finally the fall of the republics under the Macedonian Empire. Through almost identical reasons and mistakes, in the 18th century we see the decline of Holland, which had created a league of nations in the United Provinces, but not a federal nation. So the Holy Roman Empire from 800 to 1806 represented the widest dream of uniting a league of nations under one Emperor. But the Emperor's power was established by the will of princes, bishops, free cities, Electors. For the ten centuries it lasted, it wasted the forces of the Papacy and the Empire, of Germany and Italy, in a vain struggle for a vain power, and all historians, from Bryce to Treitschke, have noted how Germany and Italy owe their belated national unity to this struggle.

We have already mentioned how, as soon as Europe emerged from the twenty years of bloody Napoleonic wars, there was an attempt to create a League of Nations with the Holy Alliance, which committed the member states to "staying united with the ties of a true and indissoluble fraternity, considering all subjects as fellow-citizens and offering on every occasion mutual aid and assistance." We have seen the results!

The classic example. But the typical example, which shows how one community, for its very survival, has had to change from a league of sovereign and independent states to a more complex form of a union of states ruled by a central power, is given with unsurpassable clarity and evidence by the history of the United States of America. As is well-known, they went through two constitutions: the first, drawn up by a Congress of 13 states in 1776 and approved by these same states in February 1781; the second, approved by the national Convention of September 17th 1787 and which came into force in 1788.

A comparison between the two documents explains why the first failed, threatening the independence and freedom itself of the young Union, while the second has created the Republic, which we now all admire.

The 1781 constitution started by affirming the sovereignty of the individual states. Article II states: "Each State retains its Sovereignty, Freedom and Independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and Right..." It is true that Article XIII decreed that the states must "abide by the Determinations of the United States in Congress assembled": but, as Curtis observes, Article XIII was in constant conflict with Article II. The essence of sovereignty is legal omnipotence and it cannot acknowledge a higher sovereignty without destroying itself. Hamilton, Washington, all

the most important men of the Confederation saw the danger and pointed it out. The events which followed were of greater impact and eloquence than any comment. As a brilliant scholar wrote on the *Corriere della Sera*: "Those seven years of life, from 1781 to 1787, of the 'league' of the 13 American nations, were years of such disorder, anarchy, and selfishness that many patriots regretted the British rule and not a few wished for the advent of a strong monarchy, which was actually offered to Washington and was rejected by him with sad words, which betrayed the fear that his strenuous work of years might be wasted. The root of all ills was precisely in the sovereignty and independence of the 13 states. The Confederation, just because it was a simple 'league' of nations, did not have its own independent sovereignty, it could not directly impose taxes on the citizens. Therefore it depended on the consent of the 13 sovereign states for the army's pay and for the payment of the debts incurred during the War of Independence. The national Congress voted for expenses, pledged the word of the Confederation and to obtain the necessary means directed requests for money to the individual states. But the latter either neglected to answer or none of them wanted to be the first to pay the contributions into the common fund.

Summarizing the desperate and repeated appeals and complaints which are sprinkled by the hundreds through the letters of the great general and statesman, judge Marshall, in his classic *Life of Washington*, wrote that, after brief efforts made to put the federal system in a position to achieve the great goals for which it had been established, every attempt seemed desperate and American affairs evolved rapidly towards a crisis, on which the existence of the United States as a nation depended. A government authorized to declare war, but dependent on sovereign states for the means to carry it out, able to incur debts and commit public faith to their payment, but dependent on thirteen separate sovereign legislations to keep this faith, could only save itself from disgrace and contempt if these countries were run by people who were absolutely free and superior to human passions. This was expecting the impossible. Men with power do not like delegating it to others; and it is therefore almost impossible, the biographer concludes, to achieve anything, albeit of extreme importance, that depends on the consent of many distinct sovereign governments. And another great writer and statesman, one of the authors of the 1787 Constitution, Alexander Hamilton, thus summed up in a vivid phrase the reasons for the failure of the first union of American nations: 'Power, without the right to levy taxes, in political societies is but a name.'

The sad events of those sorrowful years, the solemn letters of Washington, in which the evils were revealed as far back as 1783 and which daily history confirmed continuously, led to the 1788 Constitution.

In it a "union of sovereign states" is no longer mentioned. It is the whole people of the United States that places the milestone and realizes the indispensable conditions of the Commonwealth. The preface of the 1788 Constitution — which is basically the one currently in force — states solemnly: "We, the Peoples of the United States, in Order to found a more perfect Union, establish Justice, ensure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common Defence, promote the general Welfare and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

And in fact it sets up a central government, with legislative and executive power; this government has the necessary powers to "provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;" to "declare War;" to "raise and support Armies;" to "provide and maintain a Navy;" to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay Debts and provide for common Defence and the general Welfare of the United States;" to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations." And finally determines (art. III) the central judicial power and establishes its jurisdiction.

From that moment the United States really existed, and was able to successfully overcome formidable crises, such as that of the Civil War. [...]

32. *League of Nations and balance of powers.*

In conclusion, what is this concept of a league of nations, which preserves full sovereignty for each of them? If we think it over, it is nothing but a wider concept of the "balance of powers;" that is, a body which tries to create a stable equilibrium in European politics.

But what history has precisely demonstrated is the vanity of this concept and the dangers it brings with it. It is impossible to balance live forces. Nations and states are not inert masses which can be kept in suspense within a system; but on the contrary living organisms, that expand with different energy one from the other, according to natural laws which are unknown to us. Human conventions cannot stop natural development and if they try to do so, they simply add one more cause for conflict to those already existing.

Until the interests of Germany do not merge with those of France,

England, etc., the international treaty which links nations will become, at every stage of historical development, a Procrustean bed, against the torments of which nations will naturally be driven to react, either by modifying regularly and periodically the international pact, or by breaking it.

In such conditions the league of nations becomes a workshop of suspicion and deception, which might hasten another European war instead of eliminating it. There is nothing better than a broken treaty for creating new and more menacing sources of disagreement.

The truth is that peace in Europe remains a dream, unless we first create those democratic conditions of freedom thanks to which all that is competitive in the very concept of nation-state is eliminated by the energies of a healthy and liberal democracy. These egocentric forces must be broken down, an atmosphere must be created which prevents the reproduction of the internal germs of militarism, oligarchy, protected industrialism, "political" agriculture, to achieve an effective, secure and stable pacific constitution.

33. *The Supreme Court.*

Once this fundamental point has been admitted, concerning the potential incompatibility between the persistence of sovereign states and the formation of a stable league of nations, all the means devised to achieve the league automatically fail, means that Wilson, as already mentioned, summarizes in the famous supreme Court, to whose deliberations all nations must bow.

To be able to enforce its rulings, a court must be provided with coercive force. But what will be the coercive force created by the united nations?

That of arms? But that is precisely what should be excluded, because otherwise we would be forced to continue the rush for armaments on ever rising scale, which is fatally bound to result in war. Moreover it would be a dangerous system, because if Germany, learning from the past, should manage to find an accomplice in the future conflict, the judgement of the international court would run the risk of being torn up by the dissidents, with the forced consent of the other free nations.

Therefore some suggest that the league of nations be set up on the basis of an agreement establishing proportional disarmament by land and sea and the opening of European markets. But what means can be devised to prevent a state from preparing at least potentially a military organiza-

tion superior to that which appears outwardly and on paper? Will not the most industrialized and less democratic peoples always be superior to the others in the rapid organization of armies?

Due to the possibility and the ease of mass production of submarines and the rapid perfecting of this new weapon, how will it be possible to guarantee absolute freedom of navigation over the seas in wartime, especially when the nation that has prepared the submarines has secretly made agreements with others to carry out a quick raid? And if such a guarantee is not absolute, how can it be expected that England should submit to the enormous sacrifice of renouncing its supremacy on the seas, the only pledge of security for its Empire, of safety in the case of a conflict?

And finally, for as long as independent states continue to exist, how will it be possible to apply the suppression of customs barriers, of every other form of protection and the consequent division of productive labour in Europe? What and how many ways exist of indirectly rewarding domestic industries and striking those of other countries? Are people aware of the vastness of interests that in Western Europe surround protectionism, of the attitudes it encourages, of the incalculable passive resistances it is able to keep up? [...]

34. There is another strong argument against the illusion of the power of an arbitration Court among states, which are independent of any federal tie.

What will be the areas to be entrusted to the decisions of such a body? Will we expect to leave to it everything concerning the life, the honour, the future of the individual states, with a generic declaration on its powers? How could this tally with the acknowledgement of the full, absolute sovereignty left to the states themselves? In this case Treitschke is right when he declares: *"War will never be banished from the world thanks to arbitration courts between nations."* In the big issues involving the vital interests of a nation, the impartiality of the other members of the Society of states is absolutely impossible. The latter cannot avoid being a party, precisely because they form a living community. If the folly of Germany submitting the issue of Alsace-Lorraine for arbitration were feasible, what European power could be impartial? It absolutely does not exist. Hence the well-known phenomenon that international Congresses are able to formulate the results of a war, of juridically putting them in order, but that they are unable to avert the threat of a war."

This assertion of the German historian is more than correct. Two or

more states can establish among themselves some conventions on one or more common points and convene that in case of any disagreement over their interpretation, they will submit it to arbitration. It is absurd and anti-juridical for a state to generally entrust the solution of all the problems which closely concern it to the judgement of its peers: and it becomes even more so if this generic convention exist for an indefinite length of time. Because, again according to Treitschke, the meaning of international treaties undersigned for ever by two states is this: *"while the conditions of the two states do not change completely."*

But, it can be objected, if at the peace table one Power does not want to underwrite compulsory and perpetual arbitration, we will oblige it with armed force, or with economic weapons. Of course: but if it is a treaty which has been imposed, not freely accepted; and if we leave this state its free sovereignty and army, in due time we shall realize the practical value of this other "piece of paper!" [...]

40. *The European market and the advantages for producers.*

We also wish to dwell for a moment on another of the great benefits that only the creation of a federal Europe can bring with it: the setting up of the whole European Continent into one production market.

A league of nations that left each state the right to raise customs barriers and other obstacles to free trade would mean that those great particularistic and egocentric economic forces would persist which, as everyone acknowledges, bear a considerable part of the responsibility in the breaking out of the present conflict. [...]

In Europe we had reached this level of absurdity, that every factory that arose in one state was a thorn in the side for every other state: that, while the superb inventions of steam applied to land and sea transport, of electricity as motive power, of the telegraph and telephone had by then cancelled distance and made the world one single large centre and international market, little men strove with all their might to cancel the immense benefits of the big discoveries, artificially creating isolated markets and small production and consumption centres.

And they did not seem to realize that the protectionist system had ended up destroying itself and making work a torment not a joy. As each state had the same objectives in mind, i.e. to produce everything, to produce it on a large scale, never before as in those last twenty years had the competition which everyone wished to avoid, become more acute, more convulsive, more refined and violent. Work was carried out on an

ever larger scale, in teams and without interruption, with an ever reduced profit margin, with the constant preoccupation of what other countries were doing, thinking, inventing.

Only federal Europe will be able to give us a more economic realization of the division of labour, with the elimination of all customs barriers. It is enough to think of the weight of the artificial paraphernalia which nowadays burden almost all of continental Europe; of the industrial "duplicates" created by protection and of the daily destruction of wealth deriving from it; of the obstacles to the rapidity of exchanges and the circulation of goods; of the muddled economic legislation that all this involves, with a no less muddled and expensive bureaucracy, to understand how it would be sufficient to extirpate this cancer from Europe to compensate us in a very short time for the strain to which the war has subjected us. What reasonable person can, without any fear, envisage the possibility that, after such a gigantic conflict, an economic policy of preferences, exclusiveness, localization be taken up once again, loading its burden on exhausted consumers?

A European economy which, replacing with cautious and gradual adjustments the particularistic economies of the present individual states, fully achieves the division of labour, will give us, with the maximum benefit of the producers, the reduction in prices that will allow consumers to bear the financial burdens of war without exhausting their own physical and creative forces.

The problems of the distribution of raw materials, of transport, that of foodstuffs, which worry all European committees for postwar studies, will automatically be solved.

And the gigantic widening of the market from a national to a continental size will have the effect that manufacturers, after a period of adaptation, will see before them such unsuspected capacities of absorption that industries will derive from it the same enormous impulse shown by American industry after the Civil War.

41. *The benefits for poorer classes and countries.*

It is worth pointing out that the constitution of Europe into a Confederation would bring most benefits to the states which are most backwards in civilization and wealth.[...]

And of course, just as it is in the interest of every state that the poorest and most backward of its regions reach the level of the richer regions as quickly as possible, because otherwise the whole social set-up would be

weakened, so it would be necessary for the richest parts of Europe to promptly bring the less favoured areas to a higher level; building roads and railways, intensifying education, improving the economy, promoting banks, elevating social standards with cautious progression.

The working class would benefit immensely from this: because how would it be possible in a European state that, for example, the French, the Germans, the English should enjoy old-age and disability pensions, while the Italian workers had no such thing?

And this series of reforms would regenerate the entire spirit of the old Continent. They would do away with fanatically patriotic prejudices, the feelings of jealousy and rivalry, the need to maintain industries and — as in Germany — social classes, which are useful only because they keep alive the ideas of power and conquest; they would leave open the way for the rise of the lower classes and would educate them to an increasingly wider participation to political life. And finally, as in all areas the European Federation would have to choose the most advanced models, and not the most backward ones, it would mean applying the best systems to those countries where the culture of the masses is less advanced and therefore a rapid and intensive development of education. Buckle has written eloquent pages to show all the fruitful effects that perfecting means of communication, and the freedom of movement deriving from it, brought due to a greater knowledge of the french character in England. This demonstration should be repeated a hundredfold, if all the present states merged into a Federation which unified their aims, directed their efforts towards common ideals, amalgamated their interests. [...]

(Prefaced and edited by Luisa Trumellini)

NOTE

¹ *La Società delle Nazioni è un ideale possibile?*, by Junius, n. 5, 1918. (Junius was the pseudonym of Luigi Einaudi)

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

GERHARD EICKORN, Secretary-General of the German Council of the European Movement.

LUIGI V. MAJOCCHI, Member of the Federal Committee of the European Union of Federalists.

FRANCO PRAUSSELLO, Member of the National Executive of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Professor in International Economics, University of Genoa.

FRANCESCO ROSSOLILLO, Vice-President of the European Union of Federalists.

FRANCO SPOLTRE, Member of the National Executive of the Movimento Federalista Europeo.

LUISA TRUMELLINI, Member of the Central Committee of the Movimento Federalista Europeo.

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