THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

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The Federalist was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE FONDAZIONE EUROPEA LUCIANO BOLIS

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Perestroika and Communism

In the daily debates among politicians, political scientists and communists, the most serious mistake commonly made over the meaning of perestroika, *the outcome of the experience of so-called "real socialism," the historical significance of the October Revolution and the identity crisis of Western European Communist Parties, and in particular the crisis in the Italian Communist Party, is believing that the advent of Gorbachev marks not only* the end, *but also* the failure, *of the Communist experience. It is a fact that the advent of Gorbachev marks the end of the Communist experience. To be sure, the positive outcome of the Soviet leader's titanic undertaking cannot be taken for granted. But, even if perestroika should be interrupted, the situation that would arise in the Soviet Union, in Eastern European countries and in the relations between them would be qualitatively different from the situation which existed before the beginning of the Gorbachev experience.* Perestroika *has by now gone down in history, affirming the values of freedom and democracy with a clarity that no reactionary violence can ever wipe out. The Communist phase of world history has thus irreversibly come to an end. This is also true for those communist countries which refuse the* perestroika *model. And it is also prospectively true for China, a country that is not yet mature enough to start off a Liberal-democratic experience, but which has now been irreparably infected by the values which define it.*

But all this does not mean that the Communist experience can be considered a failure. On the contrary, as happens for all great political and social changes, the end of Communism is the result of its historical affirmation.

To industrialize its economy and modernize its society, the Soviet Union (things are somewhat different for non autonomous experiences like those of certain countries in Eastern Europe) has been forced by

circumstances to follow a completely different historical course from that of Western European countries. Here the foundations of the ancien régime *had been shaken by the rising industrial, financial and trading bourgeoisie with the great Liberal revolutions at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th. In the last quarter of the 19th century, Liberalism on its own after completing also its democratic phase, was unable to provide the ideological orientation and the institutional framework that were necessary to give the problems posed by historical evolution, here taken in the concrete sense of the evolution of the mode of production, an answer that would allow the process of human emancipation started by the French Revolution to continue. Thus came the Socialist phase of Western European history (a phase that has shown itself incompletely in the United States). But Socialism in Europe has certainly not eliminated, but has in fact retained, the ideas and institutions of the Liberal-democratic phase, even if, in the exasperated polarization of class-struggle, Liberalism and Socialism were mostly perceived by those who were involved in that struggle as two contrasting views of the world and history. The rise of Socialism in Western Europe at the end of the 19th century was not a sign of the failure of Liberalism, but of the fact that it had achieved its basic objectives, and had therefore completed its function and created the conditions for going beyond it, retaining its achievements in a more advanced framework.*

In the Soviet Union (and in a part of Eastern Europe), instead, the fact that the ancien régime *was questioned more than a century later and that the problem of industrial development had started with the same delay imposed a faster pace for the necessary accumulation of capital, which the market mechanism and a numerically and culturally weak bourgeoisie would not have been able to guarantee. On the other hand, this same bourgeoisie would not have been able to present itself on the scene of Soviet history as a universal class, like the French bourgeoisie had done a hundred and thirty years before, because this role had already been questioned by the Western European proletariat. It was therefore a matter of starting from Socialism. Communism, in its historically predominant expression, that of the Soviet Union, was in fact the Socialist revolution without a previous Liberal-democratic phase.*

In Russia and in some countries in Eastern Europe it overthrew the feudal régimes which had preceded it. It defeated illiteracy, it achieved the first stages of the industrialization process, it created human and modern living conditions for millions of men and women that the Tsarist régime had condemned to misery and servile work. Of course, it went far

from keeping all its initial promises, and nowadays the countries of real Socialism are full of problems and contradictions, as were Western European countries at the end of the 19th century, when the historical inadequacies of Liberalism began to seem unbearable and the Socialist movements began to spread and grow stronger. It is also true that the victories of Communism had a terrifying cost in terms of freedom and human lives, again just as terrifying as the cost of the Liberal phase of the industrialization process in Western Europe (although the atrocities of Stalinism seem more horrible to us because they are closer to us in time). History has a tragic side, and has shown it cruelly in both cases. It is probably impossible to establish which of the two processes had the highest cost, and counting the dead can only serve the purposes of party propaganda. It is equally difficult to establish how much of the cost of the two processes might have been avoided. Certainly, the fundamental direction of the course of history is rational, and if it were not there would be no sense in trying to interpret its various stages and developments. But it is acted out by human beings, who often do not understand the ends they take part in achieving, or understand them in an uncertain and confused way, and are still violent and cruel. Therefore, one cannot expect every result of a process which advances through trial and error to be achieved at the lowest cost. Even a moral judgement on figures such as Stalin cannot be given lightly, taking advantage of our privileged position of men living in a prosperous, democratic and peaceful part of the world. In reality, a gigantic task like his could only have been accomplished by a tragically ruthless man.

What is important when finding one's bearings in today's reality is to realize that in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, as happened for Liberalism in 18th century Western Europe, it was the very progress made possible by the affirmation of Communism that posed with undelayable urgency those problems which had been neglected during the phase of forced industrialization and which can be tackled successfully only with a Liberal-democratic swing.

The truth is that the human emancipation process must perforce go through both the Liberal-democratic and Socialist phase, in whatever order of succession. For this reason today the Liberal swing in the East does not have the meaning of a simple negation *of Communism, of a sheer confession of the bankruptcy of a political and social model, but it is the only way to safeguard its conquests. As it is true that a failure of* perestroika *would not bring the return of Breznev-style Communism, it is also true that its success would not involve obliterating seventy years of*

history. Only a blind man could be convinced that perestroika *will cancel the conquests of the social state in the Soviet Union and lead to the establishment of a capitalism like that of 18th-century Europe, or even simply like that of the America of today, which is more human but still brutal. Instead, both Eastern and Western Europe are moving towards a common idea of society, inspired by the values of freedom and solidarity, in which the market idea tends to be identified with that of democratic planning.*

Certainly, this ideal is still very far away, and in achieving it the USSR and Eastern Europe are still a few decades behind with respect to Western Europe. But the direction is the same.

Today, the worst mistake would be to consider Gorbachev as the grave digger of Communism and the October Revolution as a still-born. The opposite is true. Gorbachev is the saviour of Communism. His work shows that Communism has been able to create within its bosom forces that can understand its historical limits and start a process to go beyond. And the October Revolution must now be accepted by political culture (not by a partisan political sub-culture) as one of the great milestones in the process of human emancipation. Beyond all the differences in historical itineraries and the different evolution pace, all the industrialized states in the world are practically becoming Republics *in the Kantian sense of the word, in other words civil constitutions in which human society is based on the assertion of the values of freedom, equality and justice. And if they do not neglect their responsibilities, the process will inevitably end up by involving all the regions of the Earth.*

This is the necessary condition to promote the federal unification process of mankind. Moreover, the conditioning relationship between the process of asserting the values of freedom, equality and justice and the process of world unification is mutual. The perestroika *initiative could not have been conceived or have taken shape if the Soviet Union had not already been integrated into the world market and compared to the models of Western life, thanks to growing interdependence and an increasingly intense circulation of men, images and news. Nor will it be successful unless the industrialized West — and in particular Western Europe, where conditions are ripe for a federal union that can serve as example for the rest of the world — helps Gorbachev with a policy of collaboration and integration that is also institutional in the framework of the UN and of the projected "Common House."*

The Western world — and Western Europe in particular — has to face a distinct choice: either to continue, albeit in a milder form, along the road of the traditional power politics, disguised as the ideology of the conflict between Communism and Democracy, risking as a result the interruption of the democratization process in the East, a freeze in the development process of the Third World once more caught in the grip of a re-established bipolar equilibrium, and the reappearance of the nuclear threat; or to acknowledge that now the fundamental problem, on which human survival depends, is that of achieving world unification through the parallel paths of reinforcing the UN and regional unification. In this perspective the contrast between Communism and Democracy appears historically outdated and that between federalism and nationalism looms as strategic. The latter remains everywhere the enemy to be defeated because it is the reactionary response to the great transformation processes taking place in the Soviet Union, in Europe and all over the world.

Federalism in Britain and Italy: Radicals and the English Liberal Tradition

JOHN PINDER

Italy: federalist pioneers and the liberal tradition.

In 1918, two long articles appeared in the *Corriere della Sera*, in the form of letters signed by "Junius."[1] They argued that the dogma of sovereignty was the cause of war and must therefore be destroyed. Instead of the alliance or confederation that was likely to be established as the League of Nations, a federal state was required, with its own army, taxation and administration, exercising its powers in direct relation with the citizens, as in the United States of America. Junius contrasted the pangermanist literature, with its stress on protectionism and the supremacy of the state, with the anglo-saxon liberal tradition. He was a remarkable precursor of the British federalists who were before long to base their proposals on a similar critique of the League.

Junius was in fact Luigi Einaudi, the eminent liberal economist from Piedmont who was to become the first President of the Italian Republic after World War Two. When Einaudi wrote the first of the two articles, Attilio Cabiati, another liberal economist who was one of his close friends,[2] was already working with Giovanni Agnelli, the founder of Fiat, on a book that was also published in 1918, under the title *Federazione Europea o Lega delle Nazioni?*.[3] In it, they expounded the same idea as Einaudi with greater precision and depth. Whereas Einaudi was less than crystal clear about the extent of the union, they unequivocally proposed a European federation. Its institutions were to include a federal congress, government, and court to ensure the comprise foreign policy, armed forces, finance and trade, with the other powers reserved to the member states.

Agnelli and Cabiati foreshadowed much in the British federalist literature of the next two decades. This is less surprising than it may seem, for the book was inspired by the political culture on which the British were nurtured as a matter of course. It shows impressive knowledge of the literature on politics and economics in the English liberal tradition. In its list of 25 "principal works consulted," no less than 21 are British. When the authors refer to other schools of thought it is usually to criticise them for glorifying the state and thus sustaining a system that leads to war.[4] They took Bismarck, Treitschke and von Bülow to task for this; and they were likewise critical of the French concept of national unity, leading to the supremacy of the collective will, in contrast with the English concept of liberty which brings "benefits to all alike."[5]

The two authors follow John Locke in contrasting the liberal principle which establishes the citizens' rights with the legitimist principle which defends the sovereign's rights.[6] They cite Acton's proposition that the best guarantee of liberty is a multinational state.[7] When they emphasise that a league of nations is not enough because independent states are prone to go to war with each other, they cite Sidgwick's conclusion that a federal government to enforce the rule of law in Europe is required.[8] On the horrors of modern war, and hence the unviability of absolute sovereignty, they refer to an article by H. G. Wells; and they cite Robertson at length to establish the economic advantages to be derived from the division of labour within a federation.[9]

Agnelli and Cabiati found in the history of the nineteenth century the grounds for an Italian liberal and federalist tradition. In contrast with German unification, attained by a war of aggression with the aim of Prussian supremacy, Italian unity had resulted from a war of liberation, and for the Carbonari the aim of throwing off Austrian rule had been not just Italian unity, but political reform.[10] Had the two authors been less absorbed in the English liberal literature, they could have shown how Carlo Cattaneo had then given a precise exposition of the idea of federalism and of its institutional form, enhancing liberty by the limitation of power at each level of government.[11] He had applied the idea of federalism both to the relationship among the peoples that compose a nation and, beyond the nation, to an international federation, explaining that the two forms of unity are not in conflict because both follow from a single principle: liberty.[12] He sought in this way to reconcile the demands of liberty and unity both within Italy and in Europe as a whole, pointing to Switzerland and the USA as models for the United States of Europe.[13]

Mazzini, too, frequently referred to the ideal of European unity, but

he never explored it in any depth. The uniting of Italy was, for him, the all-encompassing priority.[14] Mazzinians of this century have followed him in favouring the idea of European unity, but some have remained attached to the nation-state and thus have found it hard to come to terms with the concept of a federal Europe. A case in point was the brilliant young Torinese Piero Gobetti, who saw the nations as "fraternal, but sovereign and armed,"[15] and whose review of the book of Agnelli and Cabiati criticised it on the grounds that the people would "never renounce their history ... (nor) seek Nirvana in an artificial unity."[16]

Attacks from left and right extremes.

Gramsci too attacked Agnelli and Cabiati, but on grounds that had little to do with the contents of the book, which he appeared to have misread.[17] There was, however, no chance of communist approval for federalist proposals since Lenin had pronounced that the class war and the victory of the proletariat through revolution must come first. The communists' devotion to the collective will and, as they became more stalinist, to the power of the state, also made their ideology incompatible with the liberal principle of limited government on which the federalists' proposals were based.

Liberals such as Einaudi at that time saw the marxists as the principal enemies of the liberal order, and his review of Agnelli and Cabiati "undervalued the nationalist opposition" to any such plans for safeguarding peace.[18] Soon, however, Mussolini was to show himself a deadly enemy of both liberal and federalist principles. He did not believe in the "utility of permanent peace" and proclaimed the nobility of war.[19] Giovanni Gentile, the leading academic theoretician of fascism, "endowed it with his neo-Hegelian and ethereal brand of 'actual idealism' ".[20] Even when the reality of war was proving less noble than they had hoped, and some of the fascists were attracted to the idea of European unity, their absolutist view of the state made it hard for them to absorb federalist ideas.[21]

The immediate problem after Mussolini marched on Rome in October 1922 was not, however, the incompatibility of principle between fascism and federalism, but the suppression of freedom by a violent authoritarian regime. The fascists persecuted those who strove for a democratic Italy and murdered the leaders of those political tendencies that were to produce most of the committed federalists. The pioneering works of Agnelli, Cabiati and Einaudi disappeared from view and the development of federalist thought was driven into exile and the underground.

Meanwhile, the focus must shift to Britain, where federalists remained free to develop their ideas.

British federalists and the liberal tradition.

Philip Kerr, later Lord Lothian, was private secretary to Lloyd George as Prime Minister during World War One and afterwards at the Peace Conference. This caused him to reflect deeply about the problem of peace and war; and a spell at the Institute of Politics in Williamstown soon after enabled him to articulate a federalist analysis, based on the premiss that absolute sovereignty leads to war and concluding that the safeguarding of peace requires the establishment of international, and ultimately world, federation.[22] He developed these ideas in a number of publications during the following ten years, culminating in 1935 with *Pacifism is not enough (nor patriotism either)*,[23] which many Italian federalists still regard as one of the fundamental federalist texts.[24]

Lothian's interest in federalism dated from 1905 when he joined other young contemporaries from Oxford to work in Milner's "Kindergarten," seeking to reconcile the Afrikaners in a relatively liberal South African union after the Boer war.[25] One of those contemporaries was Lionel Curtis, who was to generate and share with him a lifelong federalist commitment. The proximate cause of this was their need to think about a constitution uniting the existing four South African colonies, which led them to a close study of *The Federalist* and of the foundation of the United States.[26] After their plan for a federal constitution had been set aside in favour of a unitary state, they returned to London and founded *The Round Table* quarterly, which from 1910 on propagated the federal idea, with particular reference to the Commonwealth.

Curtis, a passionate advocate of Commonwealth federation, published a book on the subject in 1917, which was extensively quoted by Agnelli and Cabiati to underline his advocacy of responsible government and the rule of law.[27] His idea was that the mission of the Commonwealth was to increase the number of citizens fit for responsible government and to extend control of the supreme functions of government to all of them.[28] Later, in the mid-1930s, he was to write his magnum opus, *Civitas Dei*, in which he envisaged that the process of establishing a world federation would start with the states most experienced in self-government — which, he implied, pointed to the need for Anglo-American leadership.[29]

Lothian was quicker than Curtis to see that the other Commonwealth countries would not federate with Britain and to put his mind, following Versailles, to the idea of wider international federation. In *Pacifism is not enough*, his critique of the League of Nations and concept of federation were similar to those of Einaudi, Agnelli and Cabiati. Unlike them, however, he aimed his argument, as his title implied, at the pacifist tendency which had become so widespread in Britain by the mid-1930s.

Typical of the naive idealism then prevalent was the suggestion of Gilbert Murray, for many years President of the League of Nations Union, that the governments should secure world peace by acting unanimously to carry out the advice of a council of the world's wisest men.[30] Lothian argued powerfully that law, to be effective, had to be enforceable, and that, since world federation was as yet unattainable, a nucleus of democracies should federate in order to apply this principle.

Although Lothian had resigned from his post as a Liberal Minister in the National government over an economic issue when Imperial Preference was enshrined in the Ottawa Agreement in 1932, he was far from being an economist, and it fell to another distinguished liberal to expound the basic economic arguments for federation. This was Lionel (later Lord) Robbins, who had been given his chair at the London School of Economics in 1929, when he had just turned thirty. He set out his ideas in two books, again still regarded in Italy as classic federalist texts, based on lectures that Professor Rappard had invited him to give at the *Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales* at Geneva.[31]

The first book, *Economic Planning and International Order*, published in 1937, linked the case for the division of labour with the need for the framework of an enforceable legal order. Such a political structure existed within the nation-states, but not between them. The failure to understand this had been the great deficiency of nineteenth century liberalism: the international system it envisaged had been "not liberal, but anarchist."[32] He went on to stand the marxist argument for "socialism first" on its head, arguing to the contrary that socialist central planning was more likely to cause wars than capitalism, because it raised all conflicts of economic interest to the level of national policy.

That book made the economic case for federation in general, but did not indicate who should federate or when. By the summer of 1939, Robbins was quite clear about both the urgency and the membership of the federation he advocated. In *The Economic Causes of War*, whose final section, completed in the first days after World War Two began, was

entitled "The United States of Europe," he urged that "unless we destroy the sovereign state, the sovereign state will destroy us;" and he concluded that, since world federation would not be feasible for a long time to come and since, "in our generation at least," the United States would not be ready to federate with other peoples, it was necessary to create a European federation, to be established after the overthrow of Nazism and to include a democratic postwar Germany.[33]

With their three books, Lothian and Robbins brought to fruition what Einaudi, Agnelli and Cabiati had started: they provided a strong liberal structure for federalist thought. Although both Lothian and Robbins were Liberals with a capital 'L', their ideas were usable by liberals with a small 'l'. They both wrote pamphlets for the Federal Union movement which was established in 1939; and their works have been much studied, cited and reprinted by federalists in Italy to this day.[34]

The influence of Curtis's books has been less lasting, perhaps because of his concentration on the Empire which was about to pass away. He did, however, persuade the young Winston Churchill to take up the cause of a federal United Kingdom in 1912, which was taken up in turn by Lloyd George and Austen Chamberlain and placed high on the political agenda in 1918, as a means of dealing with the Irish problem.[35] This exposure to the federal idea, which Churchill had seen not just as a way of solving an internal problem but as a step towards a wider Commonwealth federation, may have influenced him when he wrote in 1930 of "federal links" in an article entitled "The United States of Europe," and when he took up the same theme in his famous speech in Zürich in September 1946, which launched the postwar movement for European unity.[36] But although Conservatives were to play their part in Federal Union, one of its early leaders being a Conservative MP who was the son of a former Prime Minister,[37] their part in developing the ideas and literature between the wars was a minor one. The credit for the most important works belongs to liberals, with significant contributions from socialists.

Reformist and marxist socialists in Britain.

British socialists, other than marxists, were predominantly favourable to the federal idea during this period. H. N. Brailsford, Kingsley Martin, Bertrand Russell, Leonard Woolf and H. G. Wells were all advocates of federation who influenced the founders of Federal Union.[38] R. H. Tawney placed national sovereignty along with capitalism as one of the two great evils of the age.[39] C. D. H. Cole was broadly in favour.[40]

Among those who were to be Labour's leaders after the war, Bevin called for a United States of Europe and Attlee wrote that "Europe must federate or perish."[41]

The federal idea was evidently part of the contemporary political culture for reformist socialists in Britain. But most of the evidence is in the form of fairly short references in works for which this was not the principal theme. Among socialists, the exception was Laski, who devoted a considerable part of his writing to the subject from 1917 onwards. In his *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, published in that year, he expressed his opposition to the monistic view of the state, and his preference for "a country where sovereignty is distributed."[42] In his *A Grammar of Politics*, first published in 1925, he included a chapter on "Authority as Federal," in which he wrote that "since society is federal, authority must be federal also."[43] This principle was to apply beyond as well as within the nation-state. He contrasted the "historical accident of separate states" with the "scientific fact of world interdependence," and declared that the "absolute and independent sovereign state" was "incompatible with the interests of humanity."[44]

In the mid-1920s, then, Laski had seemed set to precede Lothian and Robbins in the development of federalist ideas. But instead he was to espouse the marxist belief that "the class-structure of society" must be "destroyed" first. It was capitalism, not the nation-state, that was "rooted in a system which makes power the criterion of right and war the ultimate expression of power." Given the capitalist class-relations, it was "impossible to realise the ideal of an effective international community." Liberal ideology must be abandoned as the expression of this doomed economic system, and the marxian theory of the state "holds the field."[45] Like the Italian marxists, he postponed constructive thought about the international order until capitalism should be overthrown; and British socialists lost their most brilliant federalist pioneer. It was socialists such as Brailsford, Mackay and Wootton, shorter on academic lustre but longer on political judgement, who were to make the subsequent contributions to federalist thinking, working on the assumption that the worst enemy of socialism was war, and the root cause of war was not capitalism but the sovereign nation-state.[46]

The creation of Federal Union.

By 1938, then, a rich literature on federalism was available to anybody who could read English. Since World War One there had been

the books of Lothian and Curtis, Laski's earlier works and the first of the two books by Lionel Robbins, as well as frequent references in other works. This was on top of the earlier literature, some of which had been cited by Einaudi, Agnelli and Cabiati: the writings on federalism by Acton, J. S. Mill and Sidgwick; *The Federalist* of Hamilton, Jay and Madison; Bryce's monumental *The American Commonwealth*; Dicey's chapter on "Parliamentary Sovereignty and Federalism" in his classic *Introduction to the Law of the Constitution*; and works by Freeman, Seeley and others on particular federations or on the idea of the United States of Europe.[47] Thus there was no lack of knowledge and thought about federalism. What had been absent until then was the impulse to apply it to a political project in Europe or the wider world.

It was after Munich that three young men, Charles Kimber, Patrick Ransome and Derek Rawnsley, decided to found a federalist movement in Britain, which they called Federal Union.[48] They soon had the active support of Lothian and Curtis, of Wickham Steed, a former Editor of *The Times*, and of Barbara Wootton, then lecturing at London University and subsequently Leader of the Labour Party in the House of Lords. Then came leading academics such as Beveridge, Robbins, Jennings and Joad, and rising politicians such as Richard Law MP and R. W. G. Mackay. A stream of pamphlets and books followed, many by distinguished authors. The publications in March 1939 of Clarence Streit's *Union Now* [49] had given a strong boost to the idea of a federation of the democracies, including the United States. But with the onset of war in Europe alongside continued American isolation, Federal Union came to focus on the idea of a European federation launched by Britain and France, to be joined by a democratic postwar Germany after Nazism had been overthrown. There was powerful editorial support from *The Times*, *The Guardian* and the *New Statesman*. Membership grew rapidly to ten thousand. The Archbishop of York said that "The whole scheme of Federal Union has made a staggeringly effective appeal to the British mind."[50]

The enthusiasm was cut short by the fall of France. The climate of opinion in which the British government did not hesitate to offer an indissoluble union to France can be seen as its culmination. But the French government rejected the offer in favour of capitulation and Britain turned towards the United States. The federalist literature and Federal Union's early success were to be the victims of collective amnesia in Britain. It was in the unpromising ground of Mussolini's prison camps that the British federalist ideas were to take root and start their strongest growth.

ITALY: FEDERALIST IDEAS IN OPPOSITION AND EXILE

While British federalists developed and propagated their ideas with such striking success in the fertile context of the liberal tradition, the political forces that were to carry forward these ideas with yet more success in postwar Italy were meanwhile squeezed between two deadly opponents of liberal thought: the fascists, who idolised the authoritarian nation-state; and marxists, who rejected discussion of its reform, at least for the duration of the class war. Fear of a communist victory, moreover, was one of the motives that led many among the establishment to support or at least tolerate the fascists, thus further narrowing the scope for developing democratic federalism. Pius XI was among those who expressed his sympathy for the regime; and he doubtless reflected a view widely held among the clergy when he expressed his horror, not only of the socialists, but also of the liberal school, whom he described as "men to whom all laws and regulations ... were like fetishes."[51] Fortunately for the future of Italian democracy, however, there were also politically active catholics who were much more favourable to liberal constitutional principles; and they included Don Sturzo, a Sicilian aristocrat and priest who founded the Catholic *Partito Popolare Italiano* in 1919, and his lieutenant Alcide De Gasperi, a lawyer from Trento who was, as Prime Minister after World War Two, to play a decisive part in the foundation of the European Community.

Catholics: Don Sturzo, De Gasperi.

Don Sturzo was opposed to fascism, and he led the Congress of the PPI in 1923 to condemn the fascist regime.[52] A few months later, Mussolini's *squadristi* killed Don Minzoni, a politically active priest. Don Sturzo went into exile soon after, living in London until 1940, then in New York until 1946 when he returned to Italy.

In Don Sturzo's first speech in exile, in March 1925, he affirmed the duty to oppose the notion that the nation-state is the only God.[53] But this did not lead him directly to federalism. His commitment was, rather, like that of his social reformist friends (who included Sidney Webb), to internationalism in general and the League of Nations in particular.[54] He argued in 1929 for union as against national sovereignty; but he saw no clear distinction between a federation such as the US and an international association such as the Commonwealth.[55] By April 1940, however, he had joined the federal unionists in seeing Britain and France as the

"nucleus of a future federation," which must, he insisted, be based on ethical and political principles that excluded dictatorships of right or left.[56] Don Sturzo was certainly in close touch with leading members of Federal Union: he had worked with Wickham Steed in the late 1930s to promote the British Committee for Civil and Religious Peace in Spain.[57]

Italian Catholics were, as Spinelli observed, less attached than Mazzinian liberals to the nation-state.[58] If sympathetic, as Don Sturzo was, to liberal constitutional principles, and exposed, as he evidently was in London, to the federalist analysis of the international system, they were apt to espouse the federalist cause. After his postwar return to Italy Don Sturzo was to support the *Movimento Federalista Europeo* and to insist that "we federalists" want solid federations such as the USA or Switzerland, not loose international associations, and must hurry to make them a reality.[59]

The political scene to which Don Sturzo returned was dominated by De Gasperi. After succeeding Don Sturzo as Secretary General of the PPI, then undergoing a short spell in prison followed, from 1929 onwards, by a form of exile in the Vatican, De Gasperi was to be Prime Minister from 1945 to 1953, as leader of the Christian Democrats who have been in government ever since. When the Christian Democratic Party was founded in 1943, as the successor to the PPI, its policy programme, for which De Gasperi had the chief responsibility, called merely for a "more effective international system," with disarmament, monetary stability and less protection.[60] The federalist influence, already significant among Christian Democrats in North Italy,[61] was however soon to be reinforced by the foundation of the MFE, with, as we shall see, its roots in British federalist thought; and, surely encouraged by the example of his former mentor, Don Sturzo, De Gasperi readily made the transition to the federalist policy which gave strong support to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and was to be, with Spinelli's initiative, seminal in the drafting of the Treaty for a European Political Community, which so nearly gave birth to a European federation.[62]

Reformist socialists.

For over half a century after the Russian revolution, the contribution of Italian socialists to federalist thought and action was undermined by the maximalist dogma that war among nation-states was merely an aspect of the class war: "social transformation" must be completed before thought could be given to a reform of interstate relations. The maximalist

hard core was the Communist Party, founded in 1921. But their negative influence was extended by those socialists, led by Pietro Nenni, whose priority was unity with the Communist Party, and who therefore refused to countenance federalist ideas until the late 1950s.

The maximalists were however opposed by the revisionists, who included the socialist leader, Filippo Turati. Turati had, as a young man, been influenced by the federalist strand of *risorgimento* thought. In 1880 he had supported the idea of a United States of Europe on the pattern of the United States of America; and a decade later he was to praise Cattaneo for his faith in that idea.[63] Although he was to enter a marxist phase in the 1890s, he was always open to other currents of opinion, for example inviting Einaudi and Cabiati to contribute to his review, *Critica sociale*, during that period. This openness led him, after World War One when so many were becoming stranded on the rock of maximalist dogma, to recognise the need to revise "our outdated ideology" in the light of experience; and an important element in his revision was the recognition that capitalism was not the sole cause of war.[64]

Not long after the leading revisionist, Giacomo Matteotti, was murdered for attacking fascist violence and electoral fraud, Turati escaped to exile in Paris, helped on his way by Carlo Rosselli and Ferruccio Parri, two social-liberals who were to play a significant part in Italian federalism.[65] He was soon to return to his early advocacy of federation: a United States of Europe as the supreme aspiration for the democracies, with like the USA, enough power to keep the peace among the member states; and beyond that a federation of the USA and the USE.[66] At the Fourth Congress of the Socialist International at Vienna in 1931, he went on to explain how the experience of 1914-18 had taught him how much war damages the socialists, who must therefore regard federation as a pre-condition of socialism, not, as the maximalists insisted, the other way round.[67] He thus anticipated the position taken in Britain by federalist socialists such as Mackay and Wootton, and against Laski's increasingly marxist analysis. But in the following year Turati was to die; and Nenni led the majority of socialists into collaboration with the Communist Party.

A minority of revisionists nevertheless continued to contribute to the Italian federalist tradition. Claudio Treves, who was close to Turati and had, like him, emigrated to Paris in 1926 was one, whose influence was to be extended into the postwar period when his protégé, Giuseppe Saragat, founded the pro-European Social Democrat Party. Claudio's two sons, Paolo and Pietro, who went to London, advocated European federation, and worked with Federal Union before returning to Italy after the war.[68]

Federalists were also to be found among socialists who had worked with the social-liberals who, as we shall see, played a key part in launching the Italian federalist movement. Thus Andrea Caffi, who had been active in the social-liberals' leading organization, *Giustizia e Libertà* (GL), in Paris in the mid-1930s, and had moved over to the socialists and to Toulouse where the Italian Socialist Party had its head office, was by 1940 propagating his federalist ideas from there, linking, like the proudhonian Alexandre Marc, the ideas of European federation and local autonomy.[69] When the socialists' office was moved, after the fall of France, to Ignazio Silone's *Centro Estero Socialista* in Zürich, Silone incorporated these ideas into the socialist policy programme. Having been a clandestine communist leader in Italy and expelled from the Communist Party not long after emigrating to Switzerland in 1930, Silone had little time for Nenni's socialist-communist line. He continued to advocate federalism, using the motto *Liberare e Federare* for the weekly paper of the *Centro*; and he was to give strong support to the Italian federalist movement, and, from the vantage point of the Italian Senate, to the European Union of Federalists, of which he was elected President in 1948.[70] But his ideas then carried little weight with the Italian Socialist Party.

The most important socialist in the founding of the Italian federalist movement, Eugenio Colorni, had also been involved in *Giustizia e Libertà*. After the GL organisation inside Italy was broken by the fascist police in 1935, he too moved over to the socialists, soon becoming one of the leaders of the *Centro Interno Socialista*. Like Turati, he believed that traditional positions must be reviewed and ideologies measured against reality.[71] Like Turati and other revisionists, he was therefore open to federalist ideas. Unlike them, however, he was sent a few months after his arrest in 1938 to confinement in the island of Ventotene, where he was to become a close friend of the founders of the federalist movement. He significantly influenced their thinking and became convinced, in turn, that federation was the primary political goal after the overthrow of fascism. In his preface to their founding document, the Ventotene Manifesto, he affirmed, like Turati, Mackay and Wootton, that federation was the pre-condition for socialism.[72] After escaping from confinement in 1943, he took part in founding the federalist movement and led a group of young reformist socialists in Rome.[73] He was killed by fascist police in May 1944, just before Rome was liberated.

The reformists in the Italian Socialist Party were to remain eclipsed for some years after the war by those who gave priority to links with the Communist Party and the class war ideology. But the seeds which had been sown by Turati, Treves, Silone, Colorni and others were eventually to bear fruit, when Nenni led the socialists in the late 1950s into a pro-European and eventually a federalist stance. Meanwhile, it was the social-liberals who were to make the running for Italian federalism.

Liberals and social-liberals.

From Mussolini's installation in power in 1922 until the fall of fascism in 1943, Einaudi published nothing more on federalism. Indeed, pressure from the fascist police was to cause him to close down the review, *La riforma sociale*, that he had edited from 1908 onwards.[74] But although his liberty of expression was constrained he kept his integrity, and this enabled him to influence young people, including two who were to play crucial parts in the development of Italian federalism: Ernesto Rossi and Carlo Rosselli, the founder of *Giustizia e Libertà*, which was to bring together so many of the founding fathers of the Italian federalist movement, and who described Einaudi as one of the élite of the previous generation who had "not forfeited the trust of young people."[75]

Implicit in Rosselli's respect for Einaudi was condemnation of so many of the liberals of Einaudi's generation who had condoned fascism as a lesser evil than communism. This, together with a feeling that the old liberals did not deal with the workers' problems,[76] drove many of the younger generation towards new groups described as social-liberals. They shared a commitment to a liberal constitution and the liberties that go with it. They were against the dogma of a class war that must be fought and won as a pre-condition of liberty; but they also opposed the dogma that social justice will follow automatically from *laisser faire*.[77] They valued both justice and liberty — hence the name *Giustizia e Libertà*. The commitment to the principle of a liberal constitution combined with a determination to find the solutions to contemporary problems made them the most fertile of grounds for the growth of federalist ideas.

Giovanni Amendola, a forerunner of the social-liberals, founded a National Union of Liberal and Democratic Forces in 1924, whose adherents included both Nello Rosselli and Silvio Trentin, later to be social-liberals and federalists.[78] But the fascists saw reformist liberals, like reformist socialists, as dangerous enemies; and they set their thugs

to beat up Amendola, as they had done with Matteotti, thus causing his death in 1926. This they followed by assassinating Nello Rosselli with his brother Carlo in 1937 in France, where Carlo had been the principal founder of *Giustizia e Libertà* in 1929. The Rossellis had strong English and liberal connections. They had British forebears and Carlo was to marry an English wife. He had by 1925 become an assistant to Einaudi at the Bocconi University in Milan. He was, like Cabiati, both active there and teaching at the *Istituto Superiore di Commercio* in Genova. He was also beginning to demonstrate his talent for bold exploits which was to help make GL the most important democratic anti-fascist organisation.[79] He founded, with Nello, the review *Non mollare* which was to cause a sensation (and to be precipitately shut down) by exposing the fascists' responsibility for Matteotti's murder; one of his collaborators on the review was Rossi, also close to Einaudi and later co-founder of the Italian federalist movement.[80] After helping Turati to escape to France, Rosselli was himself sentenced to confinement, and made in 1929 a spectacular escape to Paris from the island of Lipari, where he had meanwhile written a seminal book entitled *Socialismo liberale*, advocating a liberal constitution, a mixed economy, social justice and international peace.[81]

Once in Paris, Carlo did not delay in founding GL with the help of Nello, Rossi, and Gaetano Salvemini, by then a grand old man for whom Carlo Rosselli and Rossi were "favourite disciples."[82] Their journal, *Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà*, edited by Carlo Rosselli and Caffi, contained from its first issue in 1932 a commitment to European federation, to which theme it returned at intervals. Although the federalist analysis did not compare in depth with that soon to be produced by the federal unionists in Britain, there was a specific advocacy of a European federal constitution and a European government disposing of force at the service of European law; and it appears that the proposal for a constituent assembly, later to be powerfully promoted by Spinelli, was put forward for the first time in the *Quaderni*.[83]

In addition to the Rossellis, Rossi and Caffi, GL was a focus for many of the precursors and founders of the Italian federalist movement. Trentin, who wrote for the *Quaderni*, was one; he founded in Toulouse the resistance group *Libérer et Fédérer*, of which Alexandre Marc was a member and which published a journal under the same name — from which Silone derived the motto for his publication in Zürich.[84] Another was Parri, who was to become the leader of GL's armed resistance during the war and Italy's first postwar Prime Minister. Colorni participated, as we have seen, in GL before joining the socialists, and met Carlo Rosselli

during a visit to Paris in 1937.[85] Among the many other founders of the federalist movement who were active in the GL and its successor, the *Partito d'Azione*, were Aldo Garosci, Ada Gobetti, Gustavo Malan, Mario Rollier, Manlio Rossi Doria, Leo Valiani and Franco Venturi.

Meanwhile another social-liberal group was founded by Guido Calogero, Professor of Philosophy at the *Scuola Normale Superiore* at Pisa, whose first manifesto, drawn up in the late 1930s and distributed clandestinely in 1940, called for disarmament, European federation, juridical bodies and means of enforcing international law.[86] Their policy as a whole was close to that of GL, and during the period 1940-43 the two groups and some others merged to form the *Partito d'Azione*, whose members, in addition to providing, in Parri, the first postwar Prime Minister, produced much of the best in federalist thought and action.[87] Most important of all were Rossi and Spinelli, who were to meet each other, along with Colorni, in confinement on Ventotene in 1939.[88]

THE VENTOTENE MANIFESTO

Altiero Spinelli reacted to fascism by becoming a leading young communist militant, was given a ten years prison sentence in 1927 and remained in confinement until the liberation in 1943. From 1929 onwards, however, he began to have doubts about the marxist faith for which he had gone to jail. As he was later to recall his motives, they included the need for "absolute liberty" of thought and for the right to subject everything to critical appraisal.[89] As he read his way through the literature of philosophy, historiography and economics, his marxism was undermined by his preference for Kant against Hegel and for great liberals such as Benedetto Croce and Alfred Marshall.[90] By 1937 he was expelled from the Communist Party. But his intellectual odyssey was not directed towards an academic destination. Thought, in his view, had to lead to action; "Spinelli," a fellow refugee from communism was to say, "has the stuff of a founder of movements;" and the movement he was to found was the answer that he was seeking to the problem of the collapse of Europe that was gathering pace as fascism dragged the continent into war.[91]

The intellectual content of that answer was profoundly influenced by Rossi and by the thinking of British federalists. Rossi had, on returning to Italy after helping to found GL in Paris, been sentenced in 1930 to twenty years imprisonment. He was one of the leading lights of GL,[92] seen as a "legendary hero" who, after his arrival on Ventotene, became for

Spinelli "un maestro della mente."[93] He appears to have exerted a fundamental liberal influence on the thinking of Spinelli, still in the process of developing his ideas after his escape from communist dogma, and through Spinelli on the Italian federalist movement.

All Rossi's "chosen affinities" were, according to Spinelli, with the eighteenth century enlightenment, especially that of Britain and France, of which he "loved the limpid expression, the precise reasoning, the cult of rationality."[94] His "cultural formation" was that of "a rationalist, economist, liberal, brought to see in England the inspiration in the final instance of all the European movement towards the open market economy, towards liberty, parliamentary democracy, social reform."[95] The latter point was a surprise to Spinelli, who was not among those ex-marxists who flee to the opposite pole of *laisser faire* liberalism and who had expected Rossi to be a conservative in economic and social matters. Instead Spinelli found him to be working on "innovative ideas" regarding the insertion of some collectivist elements into the market economy; and this in turn convinced Spinelli of the need for the framework of a market, not a centrally planned, economy.[96]

While the ideas of mixed economy and welfare state distinguished GL from the old liberals, Rossi's commitment to the liberal constitution and the market economy was at one with that of his master, Einaudi. Rossi had always remained in close touch with Einaudi — he is among the ten individuals most cited in Einaudi's biography. He kept up a correspondence with Einaudi from prison;[97] and it is not surprising that he and Spinelli, in their search for solutions to the problems of war, interstate relations and the League of Nations, should have found Einaudi's "Junius" letters of 1918 in a volume of his collected works.[98] Rossi wrote and asked Einaudi for more on the subject; and Einaudi sent him some works by British federalist authors.[99] These certainly included the two books by Robbins, mentioned earlier, which are the most-cited sources in the two essays that Spinelli composed following the *Ventotene Manifesto* which Spinelli and Rossi wrote together after they had digested this literature; and a book by von Hayek, then teaching like Robbins at the London School of Economics and active in the Federal Union Research Institute, was cited twice. Spinelli, indeed, translated Robbins's *Economic Causes of War* for publication by Einaudi's publishing house.[100] Federal Union had also by then published pamphlets by Beveridge, Brailsford and Lothian, which may have reached Ventotene via Einaudi; and Spinelli was to extend his reading of British and American federalist works during his stay in Switzerland in 1943-44, adding Layton, Woot-

ton, Streit, Hamilton, Jay and Madison to the list.[101] He was to recall in striking terms the effect that the English federalist writings had on him in Ventotene: " ... their analysis of the political and economic perversion that nationalism leads to, and their reasoned presentation of the federal alternative, have remained to this day impressed on my memory as a revelation. Since I was trying to obtain clarity and precision in thinking, my attention was not drawn by the foggy and contorted ideological federalism of a Proudhon or a Mazzini, but by the clean, precise thinking of these English federalists in whose writings I found a fairly good method for analysing the chaotic state of affairs into which Europe was plunging and for drawing up alternatives."[102]

When Spinelli and Rossi wrote the *Ventotene Manifesto* in 1941, its roots in British federalist thought and in the English liberal tradition from Locke onwards were very evident.[103] The first sentence affirmed "that man is not a mere instrument to be used by others but that every man must be an autonomous centre of life."[104] The *Manifesto* then observes that the absolute sovereignty of the nation-state leads to servitude rather than liberty for the citizens. The division of Europe into separate nation-states is diagnosed as the fundamental problem and European federation, with institutions and powers similar to those foreseen by Einaudi and by Federal Union, as the solution.[105] While both authors took responsibility for the whole text, the hand of Rossi is to be seen in the section on "Postwar tasks. The reform of society," with his advocacy of the mixed economy and welfare state.[106] It was Spinelli's former immersion in the Communist Party, on the other hand, that was reflected in the drawing of a sharp line between reactionaries and progressives — not, to be sure, between two sides in a class war but between those for whom the conquest of national power is the essential aim of politics and those who see the creation of a federal state as the essential task — and in the establishment of a dedicated group to accomplish the federalists' task.[107] Spinelli was later to admit that the section on the "dedicated group" was expressed in terms that were "too crudely leninist."[108] But the sharp distinction between those who were for a European federation and those who were not was to determine his political action for the rest of his life.

The *Manifesto* was distributed in duplicated form on the Italian mainland from 1941 onwards and was printed for clandestine publication by Colorni, together with Colorni's introduction and the two other essays by Spinelli in January 1944.[109] It is seen as the foundation text for the *Movimento Federalista Europeo*, launched in August 1943, and a principal source for the European Union of Federalists, established four years later.

Spinelli was to continue promoting its basic idea up to and beyond the adoption in February 1984 by the European Parliament, thanks mainly to his initiative and effort, of its Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, which would develop the Community institutions into a federal legislature, executive and court, and extend its powers to cover money and tax as well as trade, if only tentatively to security; and the Italian federalists continue with this work. An apt comment on the contribution of the British federalist writings to this explosion of intellectual and political activity was the Latin tag cited by Spinelli: "*habent sua fata libelli* " (little books have their own destiny).[110]

THE COMMON ROOTS OF BRITISH AND ITALIAN FEDERALISM

It is remarkable how swiftly and powerfully the spark crossed, as the interwar period ended and war began, from a northern to a southern pole of federalism. The aim of this essay has been to seek the reason why.

The rich body of federalist literature written in Britain between 1935 and 1940 by authors such as Beveridge, Curtis, Jennings, Lothian, Mackay, Robbins, Wheare and Wootton, and the associated political action by Federal Union, could only have flourished with its roots in a political culture that was fertile for such a growth. This, we have seen, included the liberal constitutional tradition, inherited from such great nineteenth century figures as Acton and Mill, with their normative writings on multinational federation, and Bryce and Dicey, with their scholarly evaluation of the federal system in the United States. These in turn stemmed from the achievements of the American federalists, particularly Hamilton, Jay and Madison, whose political philosophy was rooted in Locke, Hume and Montesquieu: on the liberal principle of limiting the power of the sovereign, by means of the rule of law, civil rights and representative government; and on the principle of dividing sovereignty among different levels of government, which they derived from the liberal principle of limiting sovereignty.

This liberal philosophy also embraced the empirical method, measuring ideas and ideologies against their performance in the world and adjusting them when they proved inadequate. The federalists found that national sovereignty was associated with war and economic autarky, so they adjusted their idea of sovereignty to provide for its sharing under a federal constitution.

The federalists were also rooted in a radical tradition of action against social ills, of which they saw international anarchy as the greatest.

Most of the Italians who so eagerly adopted the federal idea were rooted in the same philosophy. Einaudi was steeped in the liberal tradition, constitutional as well as economic. C. Rosselli and Rossi had been his disciples. Rosselli brought together in GL many of the radical social-liberals who were to help found the federalist movement. Rossi conveyed the liberal philosophy and the British federalist ideas to Spinelli, who established them in the federalist movement, together with his own ideas on how federation should be achieved. The approaches to liberal and federalist principles varied widely across the political spectrum. But the coherence of the hard core of federalists, themselves profoundly influenced by British liberal and federalist ideas, enabled them to exert a pervasive influence on Italian attitudes to federalism.

Both British and Italian federalists had *virtù*:: liberal constitutional principles and zeal to reform the international system in the light at them. But their *fortuna* was diverse.

In the interwar period, Italian fascism suppressed liberal principles and exalted the nation-state. Federalism could develop only clandestinely or in exile, whereas in Britain federalists were free to write and work. They felt a strong sense of their responsibility to urge Britain, as a liberal and democratic great power, to act in order to establish a durable peace; and under the pressure of impending war they made a great effort to develop federalist thought (books, pamphlets, conferences), action (Federal Union) and policy (European federation based initially on Britain and France).

After the war, however, Britain, its confidence in the British nation-state restored and that in its Continental neighbours for the time being low, turned its back on the idea of European federation which was spreading like wildfire on the Continent. The Italians, on the contrary, had lost confidence in the nation-state. Liberal democracy prevalied. Continental neighbours were moving to establish the European Community to replace the prewar European anarchy. Spinelli, having "the stuff of a founder of movements," found the circumstances in which Italian federalism could become a political force to be reckoned with: a powerful influence for developing the Community into a European Union then a European federation.

Britain remains the loser from this change of roles. Now that *fortuna* has changed again, is it too much to expect that reflection on this history will prompt efforts to restore *virtù* ?

NOTES

[1] Luigi Einaudi (Junius), "La Società delle Nazioni è un ideale possibile?," in *Corriere della Sera*, 5 January 1918, and "Il dogma della sovranità e l'idea della Società delle Nazioni," in *Corriere della Sera*, 28 December 1918; reprinted in Luigi Einaudi, *Lettere politiche*, Bari, Laterza, 1920; most recently reprinted in Luigi Einaudi, *La guerra e l'unità europea*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1986.

[2] Riccardo Faucci, *Einaudi*, Turin, UTET, 1986, pp. 12-15 and *passim*.

[3] Giovanni Agnelli and Attilio Cabiati, *Federazione Europea o Lega delle Nazioni?*, Turin, Bocca, 1918. The book was reproduced in the late 1970s (undated) under the same title and in the same form, but with a preface by Senator Giovanni Agnelli and an introduction by Sergio Pistone (publisher Edizione E.T.L., Turin). A French edition was published in Paris in 1919, entitled *Fédération européenne ou ligue des nations?*.

[4] Agnelli and Cabiati have been identified as pioneers in the critique of *raison d'état* theorists, by Dino Cofrancesco, "Il contributo della resistenza italiana al dibattito teorico sull'unificazione europea," in Sergio Pistone (ed.), *L'idea dell'unificazione europea dalla prima alla seconda guerra mondiale*, Turin, Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, 1975, pp. 151-2. This critique has been developed as an element in federalist analysis by Pistone, in for example his introduction to Sergio Pistone (ed.), *Politica di potenza e imperialismo*, Milan, Franco Angeli Editore, 1973.

[5] G. Agnelli and A. Cabiati, *op. cit.* (n. 3, *supra*), pp. 20-5, 27-9.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 11ff.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 74.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 77. The source cited is H. Sidgwick, *The Elements of Politics*.

[9] The article by Wells, cited on pp. 99-103 of Agnelli and Cabiati, *ibid.*, was from the *Rassegna Italo-Britannica*. The citation from Robertson, on pp. 103-6, was from a paper published by Cobden Club.

[10] G. Agnelli and A. Cabiati, *ibid.*, pp. 20-5.

[11] See Lucio Levi, *Federalismo e integrazione europea*, Palermo, Palumbo, 1978, pp. 21-2. Levi's references to Cattaneo's works are from C. Cattaneo (anthology edited by N. Bobbio), *Stati Uniti d'Italia*, Turin, Chiantore, 1945, pp. 31, 138, 160-1, 185. See also L. Levi, *Il federalismo*, Milan, Franco Angeli Editore, 1987, pp. 55-7.

[12] See Edmondo Paolini, *L'idea di Europa*, Florence, La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1979, pp. 31-3.

[13] See Sergio Pistone, *L'Italia e l'unità europea*, Turin, Loescher Editore, 1982, pp. 48-52.

[14] Over a score of references are given in Claudio Pavone, "Il federalismo europeo," in *Libri e riviste*, Rome, numbers XII, XIII, XIV, of February, March, April 1951. See also E. Paolini, *op. cit.* (n. 12, *supra*), pp. 33-5.

[15] Sergio Pistone, Introduction to the reprint of G. Agnelli and A. Cabiati, *op. cit.* (n. 3, *supra*), p. XIX.

[16] Piero Gobetti, "La Società delle Nazioni," in *Energie nuove*, 1-15 January 1919, pp. 65-7, cited in S. Pistone, *ibid.*, pp. XIX, XX (see also his note 22, p. XXIII).

[17] Antonio Gramsci, "Un soviet locale," in *Avanti!* (edizione torinese), 5 February 1919, cited in S. Pistone, *ibid.*, pp. XX, XXIV.

[18] R. Faucci, *op. cit.* (n. 2, *supra*), pp. 172-3. Einaudi's review is also discussed in S. Pistone, *ibid.*, pp. XII, XXI-II.

[19] Cited from Benito Mussolini's *La dottrina del fascismo*, ch. 2, in E. Paolini, *op. cit.* (n. 12 *supra*), p. 51.

[20] Charles F. Delzell, *Mussolini's Enemies: The Italian Anti-Fascist Resistance*,

Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 88.

[21] Examples from articles by Alberto De Stefani and Camillo Pellizzi are to be found in Walter Lipgens (ed.), *Documents on the History of European Integration, vol. 1: Continental Plans for European Union 1939-1945*, Berlin and New York, de Gruyter, 1985, pp. 187-93; see particularly pp. 189, 193.

[22] Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian) and Lionel Curtis, *The Prevention of War*, New Haven, Yale University Press for the Institute of Politics, Williamstown, 1923; and Philip Kerr, "World Problems of Today," in the Earl of Birkenhead, General Tasker H. Bliss and Philip Henry Kerr, *Approaches to World Problems*, New Haven, Yale University Press for the Institute of Politics, Williamstown, 1924.

[23] The Marquess of Lothian, *Pacifism is not enough (nor patriotism either)*, London, Oxford University Press, 1935 (second and third editions, July, October 1941).

[24] Translations from Lothian's principal works have been published in Mario Albertini (ed.), *Il federalismo e lo stato federale: Antologia e definizione*, Milan, Giuffré, 1963; M. Albertini (ed.), *Il federalismo: Antologia e definizione*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1979; S. Pistone (ed.), *Politica di potenza e imperialismo*, Milano, Franco Angeli Editore, 1973; and Lord Lothian, *Il pacifismo non basta*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1986. See also Giulio Guderzo (ed.), *Lord Lothian. Una vita per la pace*, Florence, La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1986, particularly the contributions by Andrea Bosco, Giulio Guderzo and Luigi Vittorio Majocchi.

[25] See J. R. M. Butler, *Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 1882-1940*, London, Macmillan, 1968, for example p. 28.

[26] Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, *The Federalist or The New Constitution*, first published 1787-8. L. Curtis and Lord Lothian were also influenced by F. S. Oliver, who wrote *Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American Union*, London, Macmillan, 1906.

[27] G. Agnelli and A. Cabiati, *op. cit.* (n. 3, *supra*), pp. 64, 111-6. The book by Lionel Curtis was *The Commonwealth of Nations*, London, Macmillan, 1917.

[28] L. Curtis, *ibid.*, pp. 702-3.

[29] Lionel Curtis, *Civitas Dei*, London, George Allen and Unwin, revised edition 1950, pp. 655, 714-5, 744 (first edition 1934-7).

[30] Gilbert Murray, *The Ordeal of this Generation: The War, The League and the Future*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1929, pp. 190-2, 197.

[31] Rappard was later to help Einaudi after his escape from Italy to Switzerland in 1943. See R. Faucci, *op. cit.* (n. 2, *supra*), pp. 316-8.

[32] Lionel Robbins, *Economic Planning and International Order*, London, Macmillan, 1937, pp. 240-1. This passage was cited with strong approval by von Hayek in "The Economic Conditions of Inter-State Federalism," *in New Commonwealth Quarterly*, September 1939, reprinted in F. A. Hayek, *Individualism and Economic Order*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949, pp. 255-72.

[33] Lionel Robbins, *The Economic Causes of War*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1939, pp. 104-9; the citations are from pp. 105-6.

[34] Their pamphlets were Lord Lothian, *The Ending of Armageddon*, Federal Union, London, 1939, and Lionel Robbins, *Economic Aspects of Federation*, Federal Tracts No 2, London, Macmillan, 1941, reprinted in Patrick Ransome (ed.), *Studies in Federal Planning*, London Macmillan, 1943. Italian translations of Lothian's writings are cited in n. 24, *supra*. For Robbins, they include Lionel Robbins, *Le cause economiche della guerra*, Turin, Einaudi, 1944; L. Robbins, "Aspetti economici della federazione," in *La Federazione europea*, Florence, La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1948; L. Robbins, *L'economia pianificata e l'ordine internazionale*, Milan, Rizzoli, 1948; L. Robbins, *La base economica dei conflitti di classe*, Florence, La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1952; extracts in M. Albertini, *op. cit.* (n. 24, *supra*), and in S. Pistone, *op. cit.* (n. 24, *supra*); and L. Robbins, *Il federalismo e l'ordine economico internazionale*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1985.

[35] See Michael Burgess, "Empire, Ireland and Europe: A Century of British Federal Ideas," in M. Burgess (ed.), *Federalism and Federation in Western Europe*, London, Croom Helm, 1986, pp. 137-8.

[36] Winston Churchill, "The United States of Europe," in *Saturday Evening Post*, New York, 15 February 1930, reprinted (in English) in Roberto Ducci and Bino Olivi (eds), *L'Europa incompiuta*, Padova, CEDAM, 1970, see particularly pp. 36-7.

[37] Richard Law, MP, the son of Bonar Law.

[38] See Sir Charles Kimber, "Federal Union," in *The Federalist*, Pavia, Year XXVI, Number 3, December 1984, p. 204.

[39] In the conclusion of R. H. Tawney, *Equality*, London, George Allen and Unwin, second edition 1938, cited in R. W. G. Mackay, *Federal Europe*, London, Michael Joseph, 1940, p. 139.

[40] See for example his *War Aims*, New Statesman pamphlet, 1939.

[41] Ernest Bevin, speech to Trades Union Congress, 1927; C. R. Attlee, *Labour's Peace Aims*, London, Peace Book Co., 1940, reprinted in C. R. Attlee, Arthur Greenwood and others, *Labour's Aims in War and Peace*, London, Lincolns-Prager, 1940.

[42] Harold J. Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, New Haven, Yale University Press, and London, Oxford University Press, 1917, p. 273.

[43] Harold J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1948 (first edition 1925), p. 271.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 64

[45] *Ibid.*, Preface to third edition, and pp. V, XIII, XX, XXIII.

[46] See for example extracts from Barbara Wootton, *Socialism and Federation*, Federal Tracts No 6, London, Macmillan, 1941, and from R. W. G. Mackay, *op. cit.* (n. 39, *supra*), in Walter Lipgens (ed.), *Documents on the History of European Integration, vol. 2: Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile 1939-1945*, Berlin and New York, de Gruyter, 1986, pp. 138-42.

[47] Lord Acton, *History of Freedom and other Essays*; J. S. Mill, "Of Federal Representative Governments," in *Considerations on Representative Government*, 1861; H. Sidgwick, *The Elements of Politics*; Hamilton, Jay and Madison, *The Federalist*, *op. cit.* (n. 26, *supra*); James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, 1888; A. V. Dicey, *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution*, 1885; E. A. Freeman, *A History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy*, 1893 (revised second edition); J. R. Seeley, "United States of Europe," in *Macmillan Magazine*, vol. 23, 1871, pp. 441-4; W. T. Stead, *The United States of Europe*, London, 1899.

[48] The foundation and early period of Federal Union are described in Kimber, *op. cit.* (n. 38, *supra*), and in John Pinder, "Federal Union 1939-41," in W. Lipgens, *op. cit.* (n. 46, *supra*), pp. 26-34.

[49] Clarence K. Streit, *Union Now: a Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic*, London, Jonathan Cape, and New York, Harper, 1939.

[50] *Federal Union News* No 14, 23 December 1939.

[51] See Luigi Salvatorelli and Giovanni Mira, *Storia del fascismo: l'Italia dal 1919 al 1945*, Rome, 1952, pp. 341, 371, cited in C. F. Delzell, *op. cit.* (n. 2 , *supra*), pp. 97, 100.

[52] See C. F. Delzell, *ibid.*, p. 6.

[53] See C. F. Delzell, *ibid.*, p. 48.

[54] Don Sturzo and the PPI had supported the League of Nations since its foundation. See Eugenio Guccione, "Il federalismo europeo in Luigi Sturzo," in *Archivio Storico*

Siciliano, Serie IV, Vol. IV, 1978, pp. 445-93.

[55] L. Sturzo, *The International Community and the Right of War*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1929, pp. 228ff and p. 277. The failure to distinguish between a federal and a Commonwealth structure was not unusual in Britain at that time, see for example Arnold Toynbee, *World Order or Downfall?*, London, BBC, 1930, pp. 34, 36.

[56] L. Sturzo, "Problemi dell'Europa futura," in *Il Mondo*, New York, April 1940, extracts reproduced (in English) in W. Lipgens, *op. cit.* (n. 46, *supra*), pp. 497-9. It is interesting that Toynbee's thought had undergone the same evolution: see his "First Thoughts on a Peace Settlement," unpublished memorandum, 26 July 1939, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs Archives 9/18f, p. 7.

[57] C. F. Delzell, *op. cit.* (n. 20, *supra*), p. 162.

[58] Altiero Spinelli, "The Growth of the European Movement since World War II," in C. Grove Haines (ed.), *European Integration*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, and London, Oxford University Press, 1937, pp. 44-5.

[59] See E. Guccione, *op. cit.* (n. 54, *supra*), and Don Sturzo in *Il Popolo*, 29 April 1948, reprinted in L.Sturzo, *Politica di questi anni*, vol. I, Bologna, Zanichelli, 1954, pp. 421-424.

[60] C. F. Delzell, *op. cit.* (n. 20, *supra*), p. 217; Sergio Pistone (ed.), *L'idea dell'unificazione europea dalla prima alla seconda guerra mondiale*, Turin, Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, 1975, p. 93; W. Lipgens, *op. cit.* (n. 21, *supra*), pp. 503-5.

[61] W. Lipgens, *ibid.*, pp. 505-6; S. Pistone, *ibid.*, p. 94, 134-5.

[62] See Mario Albertini, "La fondazione dello stato europeo," in Luigi Vittorio Majocchi and Francesco Rossolillo, *Il Parlamento europeo*, Naples, Guida Editori, 1979, pp. 163-216. See also Giulio Andreotti, *De Gasperi e il suo tempo*, Milan, Mondadori, 1956, pp. 313-4; Andreotti, who was one of De Gasperi's closest collaborators, has continued to promote the European federal idea as Foreign Minister in the 1980s, in particular supporting the European Parliament and its European Union Draft Treaty.

[63] Pier Carlo Masini, "Introduzione," in Filippo Turati, *Per gli Stati Uniti d'Europa* (Lettere, discorsi e scritti raccolti da P. Carlo Masini), Rome, Editore Armando Armando, 1980, p. 14; F. Turati, "La decadenza di un uomo illustre," in *Critica sociale*, 30 November 1891, reproduced in F. Turati, pp. 35-7.

[64] P. C. Masini, *ibid.*, pp. 14, 16; Turati, speech in Parliament on 29 April 1919, reproduced in F. Turati, *ibid.*, pp. 53-60; and Turati's speech to the Rome Congress of the PSU, 3 October 1922, cited in P. C. Masini, *ibid.*, p. 19.

[65] C. F. Delzell, *op. cit.* (n. 20, *supra*), pp. 52-4; R. Faucci, *op. cit.* (n. 2, *supra*), p. 223.

[66] Interview in *Le Quotidien*, Paris, 15 December 1929, see F. Turati, *op. cit.* (n. 63, *supra*), pp. 74-9, and S. Pistone, *op. cit.* (n. 60, *supra*), pp. 61-3.

[67] F. Turati, *ibid.*, pp. 80-8.

[68] C.F. Delzell, *op. cit.* (n. 20, *supra*), pp. 9, 22 and *passim*; W. Lipgens, *op. cit.* (n. 46, *supra*), pp. 517-9; F. L. Josephy, document on the history of Federal Union 1938-48, typescript in Josephy/Federal Union archive at London School of Economics, pp. 13, 27, 41.

[69] C. F. Delzell, *ibid.*, pp. 78-9, 136; W. Lipgens, *ibid.*, pp. 499-51.

[70] W. Lipgens, *ibid.*, pp. 521-3; S. Pistone, *op. cit.* (n. 60, *supra*), pp. 122-3; Altiero Spinelli, *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio: la goccia e la roccia* (posthumously edited by Edmondo Paolini), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1987, p. 63.

[71] Leo Solari, *Eugenio Colorni: Ieri e oggi*, Venise, Marsilio Editori, 1980, pp. 46, 189-90.

[72] Eugenio Colorni, "Prefazione" (unsigned), in A. S. and E. R., *Problemi della Federazione Europea*, Rome, Edizioni del Movimento Italiano per la Federazione Europea, 1944, reprinted at Bologna, Centro Stampa del Movimento Federalista Europeo, 1972. The Preface is on pp. 3-8 of the reprint. It has also been reprinted, among others, in L. Solari, *ibid.*, pp. 129-34 and in Altiero Spinelli, *Il progetto europeo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1985, pp. 195-9.

[73] L. Solari, *ibid.*, pp. 63-8.

[74] R. Faucci, *op. cit.* (n. 2, *supra*), pp. 284-5.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 223.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 222.

[77] Massimo Salvadori, *Breve storia della Resistenza italiana*, Florence, Vallecchi, 1974, p. 44.

[78] C.F. Delzell, *op. cit.* (n. 20, *supra*), p. 18.

[79] M. Salvadori, *op. cit.* (n. 77, *supra*), p. 55.

[80] C.F. Delzell, *op. cit.* (n. 20, *supra*), pp. 30-2.

[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 60ff. *Socialismo Liberale* was published in Paris in 1930.

[82] *Ibid.*, p. 73; S. Pistone, *op. cit.* (n. 60, *supra*), p. 77.

[83] C. F. Delzell, *ibid.*, p. 79; S. Pistone, *ibid.*, pp. 64-8.

[84] Charles F. Delzell, "The European Federalist Movement in Italy: First Phase, 1918-47," in *Journal of Modern History*, Chicago, 1960, pp. 241-50; W. Lipgens, *op. cit.* (n. 21, *supra*), p. 290; W. Lipgens, *op. cit.* (n. 46, *supra*), p. 494; L. Solari, *op. cit.* (n. 71, *supra*), p. 82.

[85] L. Solari, *ibid.*, p. 190.

[86] C. F. Delzell, *op. cit.* (n. 20, *supra*), p. 80; W. Lipgens, *op. cit.* (n. 21, *supra*), pp. 469-71.

[87] See S. Pistone, *op. cit.* (n. 60, *supra*), pp. 89-93. For a list of sources on the relationship between the political culture of the Partito d'Azione and the development of federalist thought and action in Italy, see L. Levi and S. Pistone (eds), *Trent'anni di vita del Movimento Federalista Europeo*, Milan, Franco Angeli Editore, 1973, p. 42.

[88] Altiero Spinelli, *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio: Io, Ulisse*, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 296, 301.

[89] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[90] *Ibid.*, p. 165.

[91] *Ibid.*, pp. 146, 281, 315.

[92] C. F. Delzell, *op. cit.* (n. 20, *supra*), p. 60.

[93] A. Spinelli, *op. cit.* (n. 88, *supra*), p. 301.

[94] *Ibid.*, p. 302.

[95] A. Spinelli, *op. cit.* (n. 70, *supra*), p. 40.

[96] A. Spinelli, *op. cit.* (n. 88, *supra*), p. 306.

[97] R. Faucci, *op. cit.* (n. 2, *supra*), p. 318; A. Spinelli, *ibid.*, p. 307.

[98] *Lettere politiche*, *op. cit.* (n. 1, *supra*).

[99] A. Spinelli, *op. cit.* (n. 88, *supra*), p. 307.

[100] A. Spinelli, *loc. cit.*, and *op. cit.* (n. 72, *supra*), pp. 201-3. The two books by Robbins were those cited in n. 32 and n. 33, *supra*; Spinelli's translation was *Le cause economiche della guerra*, cited in n. 34, *supra*. The book by von Hayek was *Collectivist Economic Planning*, London, Routledge, 1935; for his participation in the Federal Union Research Institute see W. Lipgens, *op. cit.* (n. 46, *supra*), pp. 27, 31-3, 113, 129-34. The two essays by A. Spinelli were "Gli Stati Uniti d'Europa e le varie tendenze politiche" and "Politica marxista e politica federalista," first printed, together with the "Progetto d'un manifesto" (Ventotene Manifesto) and the Preface by Colorni (n. 72, *supra*), in A. S. and E. R., *Problemi della Federazione Europea*; the essays have been reprinted in the edition published in Bologna in 1972 (n. 72) and in *Il progetto europeo* (n. 72); and extracts translated into English can be found in W. Lipgens, *op. cit.* (n. 21, *supra*), pp. 484-92.

[101] See "Intervista con Altiero Spinelli," in *Il progetto europeo*, *cit.* (n. 72, *supra*), pp. 201-13. The Federal Union pamphlets available by mid-1940 included Sir William Beveridge, *Peace by Federation?*; H.N. Brailsford, *The Federal Idea*; Lord Lothian, *The Ending of Armageddon.*

[102] A. Spinelli, *op. cit.* (n. 88, *supra*), pp. 307-8; the English translation of this passage comes from *The Federalist*, Year XXVI, No 2, October 1984, p. 158.

[103] *The Ventotene Manifesto* was distributed in duplicated form on the Italian mainland from 1941 onwards. The first printed edition appeared, together with Colorni's Prefac-e (n. 72, *supra*) and Spinelli's two essays (n. 100), in *Problemi della Federazione Europea* (n. 72), in Rome in January 1944, published clandestinely by E. Colorni. Reprints are to be found in the 1972 Bologna edition of the original publication (n. 72), in A. Spinelli, *Il progetto europeo* (n. 72), and (extracts in English) in W. Lipgens, *op. cit.* (n. 21, *supra*), pp. 473-89. For a note on the original sources, see A. Spinelli, *Il progetto europeo*, pp. 13-4.

[104] A.S and E.R. *Problemi della Federazione Europea* (Bologna 1972 edition cited in n. 100, *supra*), p. 9; A. Spinelli, *Il progetto europeo*, *cit.*, p. 17; W. Lipgens, *op. cit.*, p. 473.

[105] A.S and E.R. *Problemi della Federazione Europea*, *cit.*, pp. 10, 21, 27; A. Spinelli, *Il progetto europeo*, *cit.*, pp. 18, 28-9, 34; W. Lipgens, *ibid.*, pp. 474, 478-9, 481.

[106] See A. Spinelli, *Il progetto europeo*, *cit.*, pp. 203-4; A. Spinelli, *op. cit.* (n. 88, *supra*), p. 301.

[107] A.S. and E.R. *Problemi della Federazione Europea* (Bologna edition cited in n. 100, *supra*), pp. 22-3, 28-30; A. Spinelli, *Il progetto europeo*, *cit.*, pp. 30, 35-6; W. Lipgens, *op. cit.* (n. 21, *supra*), pp. 479, 482-3.

[108] A. Spinelli, *op. cit.* (n. 88, *supra*), p. 312.

[109] See n. 103, *supra*.

[110] A. Spinelli, *op. cit.* (n. 88, *supra*), p. 307.

Notes

A HISTORICAL PRECEDENT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE

The referendum held in Italy on the occasion of the June 1989 European elections once more proposes the constituent method as the appropriate means of achieving a European federation, in conferring on the European Parliament the task of drafting a Treaty-constitution which would transform the Community into a genuine European Union with a democratic and effective government answerable to the European Parliament. This Treaty-constitution should be directly transmitted to the member states for ratification and should come into force when approved by even a limited number of countries. Italy has once more taken the initiative in the political unification of Europe, just as it did so forcefully in the days of De Gasperi.

It should be recalled that, if the constituent mandate is effectively conferred on the European Parliament, it will not be the first in the history of European unification. It is a little-known fact that there was a historical precedent of great importance: the decision taken on December 10, 1952 by the member-governments of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first form of the EC.

The text of that decision reads as follows: "*Considering* that the final objective of the six governments was and remains that of achieving the constitution of the widest possible European political community; *considering* that, on the request of the Italian government, Article 38 was added to the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (signed on May 27, 1952), with the object of charging the Assembly of the Community to study the possible constitution of a new democratically-elected Assembly so that this might constitute an element in a more complex federal or confederal structure, based on the principle of separation of powers and characterized in particular by a bicameral

representative system; *bearing in mind* that, in resolution no. 14 adopted on May 30, 1952, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe asked the member states of the European Defence Community to choose, by the most expeditious procedure, an Assembly that would be charged with drafting a constitution for a supernational Political Community, open to all member states of the Council of Europe, and which would offer associate-membership to all those not belonging to this Community; *conscious* that the constitution of a European Political Community with a federal or confederal structure depends on the constitution of a common basis for the economic development and the fusion of essential interests of the member states; *the six Foreign Ministers of the Coal and Steel Community*, gathered in Luxembourg on September 10, 1952, took the following decision based on preceding considerations and their wish to speed up research into the above-mentioned project, assuring it the greatest possible authority: A) The members of the Assembly of the ECSC are invited to draw up a Draft Treaty establishing a European Political Community, inspired by the principles of Article 38 of the EDC Draft Treaty and without disregarding any provision of this Treaty ... ; B) The Assembly ... will determine the conditions under which some representatives of other countries, and in particular those belonging to the Council of Europe, can be associated with this work as observers; [...] E) The governments expressly declare their debt to the proposals of the British government towards establishing the closest possible links between the future Political Community and the Council of Europe. In view of this, the drawing up of the constitution of this Community must be undertaken and completed in permanent liaison with the bodies of the Council of Europe ..."

The situation was very different then from the one now. In the midst of the Cold War, the Americans had definitively acknowledged in the Truman doctrine (March 11, 1947) that the threat to their security and that of their sphere of influence no longer came from Germany but from the Soviet Union, and had committed themselves with the Marshall Plan (June 5, 1947) to reconstructing Western Europe, the main objective in the conflict of power and the most exposed front for American defence. Economic recovery was a prerequisite for military recovery, and was intended above all to fill the vacuum of power in the German area, the foremost bastion of the Western front. France, which had not forgotten the military defeats of 1870, the First and the Second World Wars, could not accept either of these German recoveries. It was in this situation that Monnet proposed founding the European Community, so as to devolve

control over coal and steel, the main sources of energy (and hence of economic development), and heavy industry (and hence of military power) onto a supernational authority with institutions which were to be the forerunners of a genuine "European federation." In substance this meant turning the Europeans' fundamental attitude towards their neighbours upside down. In situations of international anarchy these neighbours had been seen as real or potential enemies, but in the Community became natural and close partners. This conception, which revolutionized the course of European events and which explains why the period following the Second World War was so different from that following the First World War, led Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, to propose the foundation of the ECSC on May 9, 1950. Countries associating themselves with this proposal were Italy, the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

In the summer of 1950, the outbreak of the Korean war and the need to move troops to the Eastern front, disengaging them from the German zone, led the Americans to speed up the pace of German rearmament. The French reaction was foreseeable and was not late in showing itself. In this impasse, Monnet again proposed the formula of a community (the European Defence Community), and Pleven, on October 24, the same year, adopted it, with the support of those countries which had joined the ECSC.

To set up a common army, postponing the foundation of a European state to a later date, i. e. a democratic power capable of controlling it, was not so easy. Without a European state, two alternatives were possible: the first was a European army with a single efficient command (and thus the power, conferred on the Commander in Chief, to declare war, levy military contingents and taxes, convert a peacetime economy into a wartime economy, etc.), which would mean subordinating the civil power of the six civil powers to their common military power. This would have been an aberrant form of government with respect to the principle of democracy affirmed by the war of liberation. The second was the supremacy of civil over military power, which would mean reducing the European army to nothing more than a traditional coalition of national armies, with all the inefficiency and precariousness which have always characterized them and which seemed peculiarly ill-omened in the face of the threat of Stalinism and the Americans' reduced commitment to the European theatre. These were the considerations which the European Federalist Movement brought to De Gasperi's attention in Altiero Spinelli's memorandum of summer 1951 and which induced De Gasperi

to recognize that "the federalists were right after all," and to fight for the foundation of a European state. In a historic meeting of the six Foreign Ministers of the Community, held in Strasbourg on December 11, 1951, De Gasperi obtained the inclusion of Article 38 in the EDC Treaty, an article requiring the EDC Assembly to study how it could be elected by direct universal suffrage, what powers it should have and what institutional reforms would be necessary ("the definitive organization which will take the place of the present provisional organization must be of a federal or confederal nature"). Despite the compromise which De Gasperi was forced to accept (the "federal or confederal" nature of the institutions), the decision affirmed the democratic principle that the Political Community could not be formed except by popular consensus without ambiguity, in other words by the European vote and a constituent mandate to the representatives of the European peoples.

Since it had proved unexpectedly hard to get the EDC Treaty approved and hence Article 38 enacted, De Gasperi managed to have the Council of Ministers meet on the inaugural day of the ECSC Assembly, on September 10, 1952, and have the Council confer on the Assembly the mandate provided for in Article 38 of the EDC Treaty. Having received the mandate, the Assembly, henceforward known as the "*ad hoc* Assembly," set to work without delay and, on March 10, 1953, presented the six governments of the member states with a Draft Constitution for the European Political Community.

As is well known, this adventure came to an unhappy end. The Draft Constitution was consigned to a diplomatic conference which was protracted by one thing after another until, on August 30, 1954, the EDC was thrown out by the French Parliament, taking with it the Political Community; this resulted in German rearmament, masked by the foundation of the Union of Western Europe, a traditional coalition of national armies, at the service of the United States, which, despite those who still hope to revive it, never really got off the ground.

However, no great struggle is ever entirely futile. Thus, while the prospect of a European army and European state vanished, nevertheless progress towards unification immediately once more got under way, taking the rather less direct route of economic integration with the Common Market projet, which was openly provided for in the Constitution of the Political Community and which survived the latter's downfall.

This series of events raises some considerations beyond its material outcome. The initiative of the constituent mandate is to be ascribed to

Italy. Even then there was the problem of Great Britain, but De Gasperi did not let himself be put off by this difficulty: the Six would have continued along the path towards unification, right up to the foundation of the Political Community, keeping the door open and even explicitly inviting the other countries of the Council of Europe, the European institution which encompassed all the European countries subject to American protection, to send observers, in the hope that they would soon join in. Furthermore, De Gasperi knew that in democracy a state cannot be founded without popular participation, and he fought for the Community Assembly to be elected by direct universal suffrage and to have constituent powers. Nor was he afraid of the possibility of an intergovernmental, non-democratic confederation, emerging from the constituent proceedings: he knew that once the process of founding a democratic European state had got under way, the federal solution, linking European power to the European people, would come about sooner or later. It is wrong to see the United Kingdom's obstructive attitude, or the uncertain attitude of other member states afraid of the consequences of a possible break with the British as an insurmountable difficulty. And it is equally wrong to see Italy's policy in putting itself on a collision course with the United Kingdom by having the referendum, as wishful thinking or even quixotic. In democracy, the democratic course is never quixotic.

But that is not all. It is true that that initiative, which, while born in the lap of Atlantic solidarity, objectively had the sense of a struggle for European independence, was possible in the face of the exceptional problem of German rearmament, a problem whose cogency eludes us only if we forget the tragedy of the Second World War and the horror of Nazi violence. And it is also true that the aggression of Stalinism had provoked an obsessive fear in Western Europe, as if Attila the Hun were about to descend. Finally, it is true that in that extraordinary situation the federalist initiative was able to avail itself of the extraordinary stature of Spinelli, as the governments could of the equally extraordinary stature of De Gasperi. Nor should it be forgotten that all that took place in a Europe deeply scarred by postwar poverty and above all by the bipolar balance of power which was reflected in internal political balance, aligning on the anti-European front great popular masses organized by parties like the socialists and communists, subordinated to Soviet power, or, as in the case of the SPD, fascinated by the siren-call of neutralism and national reunification. Today, we have thirty years of the Common Market behind us and powerful economic growth which has practically cancelled those social scars. We first had Eurosocialism and then Eurocommunism, the

failure of intergovernmental co-operation in the face of the oil crisis and the openly imperialistic manipulation of the dollar, the direct elections to the European Parliament, the EMS, the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, the battle to get it approved, the Single European Act committing us to achieving the Economic Union by 1993, and the work of the Delors Committee in trying to create the Monetary Union.

And above all it should not be forgotten that through the referendum the overwhelming majority of the citizens of an entire country have taken sides on what in 1952 was only the position of the federalists and De Gasperi. This should incite to action even those who, while sharing the federalists' objectives, remain irresolute about the outcome of the struggle they propose. It should be emphasized that there is no alternative for democrats.

Luigi V. Majocchi

Federalist Action

THESES FOR THE 14th MFE CONGRESS *

1. Towards a new way of thinking.

The human race is facing a historical turning point of unprecedented importance. Its very survival is in danger. Mankind may reach new heights of liberty, equality and fraternity, or may disappear off the face of the earth. To meet this challenge, we have to find a new political thinking dictated by careful examination of this radically new situation. To put it more clearly, we have to integrate traditional political thinking, which enables us to analyse established forms of social life, with thinking suited to our time, thinking that captures the new forms that public life must assume in order to halt our headlong rush towards the abyss and find the capacity for progress once more.

The need for new thinking is universally acknowledged. There is universal acknowledgement in particular about the fact that the major problems of all countries cannot be solved at the national level, but at the continental and global level. But when we move from individual problems to examining the progress and planning of political action, this supranational vision disappears: only national actions carried out by national powers and aiming, at the most, for international compromises, are taken into consideration and considered feasible. Because of this, when we actually think about taking action, these problems — including the survival of the human race — vanish from sight, or are examined under the distorting criteria of foreign policy; in other words we are locked into

* This text was presented by Mario Albertini at the 14th National Congress of the *Movimento Federalista Europeo* in Rome on March 3-5, 1989.

the mentality of power politics, which does not even permit us to understand that solutions to these problems can only be reached by common decisions of all the people involved — i. e. that what is at stake is the creation of international democracy.

Europe and the world have already known the tragic significance of failing to understand their historical situation. Fascism, Nazism, Stalinism and the Second World War were the direct consequence of having applied old, that is national, criteria to new events, which could not easily be confined to the purely national context. Now we are running an analogous risk of far greater proportions. Finally people are talking of a crisis of ideologies, or, to be more precise, of the limits of the traditional ideologies, from liberalism to Marxism; and of the impossibility of understanding the historical situation we are living in through these frames of reference. But we are only halfway there, because this critical awareness has not yet produced the necessary historical frame of reference to reconstruct political thinking starting from what is at stake today, and not from what was at stake when the old ideologies were formed.

However, in this context there is a glimmer of hope: the new wind of history, i. e. the political consequences of the technological development and growing interdependence of all human actions has finally hit the USA and the USSR, which as the major powers bear the heaviest responsibilities. Alongside the concept of traditional détente there has emerged in the thinking of Gorbachev a clear image of a new kind of détente, an organized peacemaking throughout the human race. This represents a conceptual move towards that ground which needs to be explored, and which has to be acted upon to resolve all mankind's greatest problems, starting with that of ecology. Never mind those who do not believe that politics can regain its lost greatness: let us clearly state that this ground is federalistic.

The central problem is peace. At the level Gorbachev brings it to when affirming that it is a question not of class struggle but of the unanimous action of all men and all peoples, it represents a foretaste of a political development which becomes clear only if conceived of as the struggle to unite the human race into progressive action politically, which goes as far as attributing common democratic powers to mankind, considered as a unit. This does not involve destroying existing or potential democratic powers at the national or continental level, or at any other autonomous level of social life.

Only with the idea of this path and with the constitutional science of federalism — enlarging the sphere of democratic government from the

state to a group of states — can the action of everyone be gradually directed towards the formation of the necessary new powers, at every level of society, to resolve the problems of the survival and progress of the human race. It is not a question of eliminating nations, nor of nullifying the conquests of the great developments of liberal and social thought. It is a question of uniting nations by uniting people with the only possible international democratic bond: federalism. It is a question of applying traditional ideologies to established forms of public life, of building a new world, with federalism as a criterion of knowledge and action, by fighting for international democracy and its gradual extension to the entire human race. The democratisation of international relationships means either this or nothing.

In this respect Europe has a special responsibility because it is already at the crossroads between the old world of nations armed one against the other and the new world. With the twelve nations of the Community, or with the six which founded it, together with those prepared to develop it, Europe can already experience new international democracy. Already the Community's citizens have the right to the European vote. Thus Europe has only to respect the principles of democracy and give voters the power to choose Community policy, in order to realize the first historical experience of a free government by a society of free nations, each of which can defend its interests by law rather than by force. Meanwhile, because of individual nation-states' inability to defend themselves alone, it is in Europe that the extreme consequences of the politics of the past, the politics of force, have been made manifest, have persisted and can be eliminated only by uniting the nations. It is in Europe that this policy has reached the level of madness, with strategic plans based on nuclear arms, with the prospect of assured mutual destruction, with military blocs and with the incessant race to stockpile ever more destructive weapons.

Thus the situation in Europe may give rise to a new political way of thinking and acting. But we have to avoid falling into the last trap, more common than one would think: it consists in recognizing the need for a new thought, but not that for a new kind of will. This failure leaves us confused, prisoners of old rites and formulae which the unready mind is unable to abandon or destroy. This is the situation the political parties find themselves in, despite their recognition of the crisis of ideologies. For this reason, the *Movimento Federalista Europeo* — which was founded by Altiero Spinelli during the Second World War precisely on the basis of the perceived historical limits of liberalism, national democracy and Marxism — has decided to identify, in its 14th Congress, the questions

to be examined in order to enable both thought and our will to face the challenge of our time. On these themes the *Movimento Federalista Europeo* will then develop a close dialogue with the political and social forces, starting at the grassroots, persisting until each has declared its position.

The first question concerns how the alternative is to be seen. If by this term we mean not the simple alternation of people and parties in power, but the introduction of new elements into the historical process, then what has to be clarified is the fact that in Italy, as in other EC countries, the political alternative has now assumed a European and global dimension. The second question concerns European politics and its relationship with national politics. It is a question which must be considered, and which must become central to political debate, because good government in Italy — as in other European countries — requires not only good domestic policy and good foreign policy, but also, and above all, good European policy which is able to serve the interests of the citizens in the two fundamental sectors of defence and the economy, which can no longer be governed on a national level. The third question is what must be, here and now, the European policy of Italy. If we bear in mind that Italy is the only country in which all parties are favourable to a federal development of the Community, then it becomes clear that Italy can and must oppose the rearguard battle of the British government against opening the borders, European currency and a common fiscal policy: Italy must be in the vanguard, fighting for the conferral of a constituent mandate on the European Parliament, and must maintain a strong front, ready to mobilize the European forces in other countries, by promptly passing in the second reading the constitutional bill to add a referendum on the constituent mandate to the European elections in June. The fourth question concerns how European politics fit into world politics. This position can be described by distinguishing traditional détente from the innovative détente, and must be seen for what it is: the dawn of a new era, in which the supreme task will be that of giving a global dimension to the values of liberty, equality and fraternity.

2. The European and world dimension of the political alternative.

Italy has never fully and stably known the function of the alternative in its normal democratic form, as the recurring outcome of the opposition's proposing an alternative programme to the goverment's programme. Because of this, the problem of alternative government has

raised the problem — which regularly reappears on the scene — of the alternative as an institutional matter, where it is no longer a question of comparing two government programmes, but of setting up against the current institutional system — which does not allow the normal logic of the alternative — an institutional system which does allow it. And at this point, according to current opinion, the question is defined. But in reality it is not.

In effect, what has to be considered is that the alternation of politicians and parties in power, when it is not a pathological event, is not an end in itself, a game limited to the political class, but an institutional means of making political change transparent and normal; in practical terms, it is the means of bringing to an end power situations which block the development of society by impeding the solution of problems as they arise, and replacing them by power situations which allow these problems to be solved and society to advance. But this is precisely what is missing in Italy (with the notorious consequences of immobilism, unprincipled attachment to power and people's distrust of politics) for a reason which everyone knows without drawing the logical conclusions: Italy's major problems, starting with those which question its autonomy (defence and the orientation of the economic process), cannot be solved within the national context. This is why alternatives do not succeed, and why in the disfigured forms in which they appear, they are ineffectual. This is why the nation-state is essentially obsolete. And this is why a recomposition of the parties would not be enough, and should therefore be projected, like the alternative itself, in the European context.

Now the fact we must focus on is that the European alternative, and with it the solution to the Italian institutional problem, is at stake. Italy's situation, like that of the other European states, is indeed about to change rapidly. Since the progress toward a single market is now irreversible, a sharp alternative is now posed in drastic terms: either build the monetary and political-institutional unity of Europe together with its economic unity, or accept a huge deregulation which would penalise the weakest parts of European society and would make ecological control of the economy practically impossible.

These would not be the only consequences. Without a European democratic power, Europe, and Italy with it, could not compete in civilized terms with Japan and the US, could but contribute to the reform of the international monetary system, give a powerful momentum to the emancipation process of Third World countries, fully support the development of the Arab nation in the context of reconciliation between a

Palestinian state and Israel, or finally do all it can to produce a peaceful Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, to renew Eastern Europe and to democratise the Soviet Union. Either directly or indirectly, all the great options of our times are at stake: peace, ecologic control of the Earth, economic, social and moral development of all men. But they are at stake only for a European power, not for an Italian power which, if it had to rely exclusively on itself, would not even be able to avoid the wild deregulation of the European market and its severe political and social consequences.

In any case, a conclusion is necessary. We are not merely facing a government alternative, not even a regime alternative, but a true community alternative. In order to live autonomously, and ensure the future of its citizens, Italy must cease to be an exclusive national community and become an open national community in the context of a true European community.

3. National policy and European policy.

The expression "European policy" is ambiguous. If used in relation to a country which does not belong to the European Community it is perfectly obvious: the foreign policy of that country in a particular area (Europe). If on the other hand it is used in relation to a member-state of the Community, it is anything but obvious: a policy separate from both domestic and foreign policy, which together form national policy. The sphere of action covered by European policy is well known: participation in the running of the Community, the pursuit of European unity, the institutional design for building up Europe, and so on. But the character of this policy in reality remains little known until it is known where to locate it, and what its origins, its nature and its outlets are.

In essence, the origin of European politics can be described as follows. At the end of the Second World War, when faced with the problems of economic recovery and the choice of how to re-order defence, many European countries found themselves faced with no alternative. For them there was only one way: to accept American protection and, protected by this shield, organize their economy and defence in the only suitable context, the European one. The Americans realized the situation even before the Europeans did, and immediately offered their protection. The Europeans hesitated. Their governments confusedly searched for national solutions. De Gaulle even went to Moscow to re-establish the Franco-Russian alliance as an anti-German

measure. But it was not long before the only possible order, the Euro-American one, was established. The Europeans recognized the need to take the most important decisions concerning defence, currency and economic control in the European context, or taking it into account, and so guided their common history into a new direction which still holds good today.

This had three important consequences. One is that the final seat of power for these countries was clearly shifted from the national to the European context, the value of which immediately becomes clear if we bear in mind that from then on French, Italian or other national defence in the strategic sense ceased to exist, being replaced by a single European defence. The second is that, because of this, it became necessary to have a European policy (conceived and realized in the European context, in co-operation with other countries) alongside national policy (conceived and realized in the national context). The third is that European policy, in as far as it generates a situation in which there is no longer any defence where there is a government, and where there is a defence there is no government yet (analogous considerations apply in the case of currency, etc.), creates a power vacuum — only partly covered by American hegemony — which has to be filled. The history of European unification is, objectively speaking, the history of attempts to fill this vacuum: a history imposed by events more than by the will of parties and guided in fact by the federalist vanguard.

There are (or were) only two possible ways to fill this power vacuum: by a European government of a federal nature, or by a process towards this federal goal as a concrete means of making the policies of the different countries converge. The value of these solutions, both of a federalist nature, has effectively made itself felt right from when this power vacuum first appeared and made it possible to pursue the objective of a united Europe. The first solution, for which Altiero Spinelli fought, puts federation at the beginning, in the sense that it conceives it as the goal of a constitutional struggle, and not as the result of a gradual process of building Europe, which in Spinelli's opinion is impossible because the power indispensable for the existence of a federal government cannot be transferred by degrees from the nations to Europe: either it is transferred or it is not. The second solution — which held the field for a long time — was that followed by Jean Monnet. We might designate Monnet's as weak federalism, and Spinelli's as strong federalism. These expressions are justified by the observation that Monnet's strategy, to the extent that it places federal power at the end of a gradual process and does not see a

federal government as the engine driving this process, can only be conducted by an intergovernmental mechanism (like that in fact created by Monnet, the Community) and thus only with the mobilization of national forces interested in European solutions.

The advantage of Monnet's strategy is that it can involve the active forces of the nations without asking for a constitutional precondition. Thus the European policy of the states as normally expressed is fully exploited, that is when the European objectives on the table do not require a transfer of sovereign powers; and thus the coinciding of national and European policy, inevitable because they have the same object, is found in the phases in which it is national policy that determines the objectives of European policy. The disadvantage of this strategy consists in the fact that it cannot be carried out in a democratic manner because it requires European decisions which are no longer controlled by national parliaments and not yet controlled by the European Parliament (thus there is a democratic deficit in the Community). It also consists in the fact that it is a strategy for keeping European unity on the agenda, but not for bringing it to a successful outcome. In effect it is worth nothing (as might be ascertained when an attempt was made to raise a European army to avoid the rebirth of the German army) when European objectives are such as to demand a transfer of sovereign power to Europe.

One has only to reverse this analysis to establish the advantages and disadvantages of Spinelli's strategy. The advantages derive from the fact that with federal power as the starting point it would be up to European democracy to determine ways and means, structures and deadlines for European unification. The disadvantage consists in the extreme difficulty of setting up a constituent assembly at the beginning of the process, with the parties still closely tied to the national powers. In any case there is a crucial consideration to be recalled. When the European objectives are not pursuable without a transfer of sovereign powers, and thus in cases when the battle for Europe can be won, the only valid strategy is that of Spinelli. In essence Spinelli's strategy highlights the phase in which, with national and European policy coinciding, it is European policy which determines the European objectives of national policy. At this moment, on the threshold of 1992, we are once more (after the ECD pact) in a phase of this nature.

4. Italy's European Policy.

The question of Italy's European policy has become crucial, even if

people are not yet aware of this. To return to some points previously touched on, we can say that the Italian political debate has not yet managed to come to terms with the fact that Italy is facing a turning point in her history which requires European decisions, and not merely Italian. There is a practically irreversible process towards economic unity. There is very substantial process towards the Monetary Union. Thus we have to decide what the political framework of the European market will be. But for the moment there is only one resolve, one project tenaciously promoted, which is that of the British government, who would like to entrust the control of the market to existing powers: those of the strongest nation-states and those of the large economic-financial groups organized on a European and worldwide scale.

The democratic parties, which after all are by their very nature hostile to a political market of this nature, nevertheless are not yet fighting, or are not fighting hard enough, for the only possible alternative, the constitution of a European democratic power which is indispensable when regulating the European economy. If and when this power exists, it will be possible to speak of left or right wing European governments. But as long as the executive of the Community continues not to depend on the European Parliament, i. e. on the European electors, nothing of the kind will be possible, and even less so a social Europe, a Europe of security and so on, which incredibly enough are called for from time to time, without at the same time a democratic European power being called for.

These contradictory tendencies depend on the fact that the political parties still cannot see clearly the alternatives they are faced with: that of a European government to regulate the European economy at home and represent it abroad or that of a headless, undemocratic European economy, which amounts to a serious increase in the democratic deficit of the Community, and the appalling prospect of a power vacuum in Europe and the world caused by the existence of a modern market of 320 million inhabitants neither regulated at home nor represented on the international level. It is hardly necessary to demonstrate the dangers of such madness in a world such as ours, which is faced with the problem even of its own survival.

It is for these reasons that it is necessary to provoke a major qualitative change in the European policy of individual countries towards a strong federalism. And in this respect Italy bears a special responsibility, because Italy is the only country which can take the initiative for a qualitative leap towards strong federalism in a sufficient number of countries, as it did between 1951 and 1953 when it obtained the conven-

ing of the *ad hoc* Assembly to prepare the statute of the political Community. As for the first point (a qualitative leap towards strong federalism), the need for this is sufficiently obvious if we recall that governments proposed to set up a Union as far back as 1972, but have not yet managed to do so. As for the second point — Italy's responsibility — suffice it to recall that Italy is the only country where all political parties are in favour of giving a constituent mandate to the European Parliament, and where this attitude has begun to turn into an effective political decision with the first vote in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate in favour of a constitutional act to call together with the European elections a referendum on the constituent mandate.

In almost all EC countries a large majority of citizens is in favour of a European government, the constituent mandate and a European referendum. But no government dares take the first step. With the definitive vote for the act mentioned above, Italy, by showing that a sovereign state can want the European Constituent, would release the enormous European potential which exists all over the continent, and which is now blocked by the very fact that generally people do not believe that a sovereign state can really show itself resolved to confer the constituent mandate to the European Parliament. Italy can, and must therefore, knock down this mental block by firmly and tenaciously maintaining its constitutional European position and sustaining it with the same vigour with which the United Kingdom maintains the opposite position. If a great debate of this nature is born in Europe, we will certainly reach a sufficient number of countries to confer a constituent mandate on the European Parliament.

5. The dawn of a new era.

It is hard to look into the future, but one point is clear. The major problem which, even if to varying degrees, will decide the solution of all the others, is that of détente. To give a more precise meaning to this evaluation, it is, however, necessary to make a conceptual distinction between *traditional détente* and *innovative détente*. Schematically speaking, détente may be considered "traditional" when it remains, both in vision and in practice, within the old context of power politics where security is based on strength, even if this principle is applied with moderation and prudence and takes into account not only military strength, but also economic, political, cultural, moral strength and so on. The theoretical and practical limit of this type of détente is that it cannot

see or develop, through new political conceptions and new institutions, what is radically new in human evolution as regards the factor of strength in determining political conduct. It is perfectly true, in fact, that the invention of nuclear arms — like the risk of an ecological disaster — has drastically changed the basis on which politics and law have rested until now. On the other hand, détente can be considered "innovative" when it tries to go beyond power politics as far as possible, by substituting traditional defence (defensive and offensive) with "defensive defence" (structural incapacity to attack); and, in correlation with that, trying to base the security of every country on the pursuit of others' security while providing for one's own (mutual security). What we can see in this type of détente is the dawn, as yet but faintly outlined, of the greatest revolution of human history (and as such capable of fulfilling and unifying all previous revolutions): peace based on the rule of law and on the equality of all peoples and all human beings.

To see this far we have to start from the following observation: while being clearly distinct one from the other, these two forms of détente are not mutually exclusive. In fact, until the advent of world government there must of necessity be a kind of mixture — based on partially common objectives — between these two ways of conceiving and achieving détente. The reason is obvious. As long as national armies exist — and thus security is also based on the national use of force — innovative détente can achieve its first results if, and only if, traditional détente is successful at the same time. On the basis of reasonable equilibrium therefore there will emerge the possibility of agreement on intermediate questions which serve the proponents of both tendencies.

However it must be pointed out that the development of innovative détente also requires other presuppositions. With rules so hard to apply (defensive defence and mutual security) this form of détente can only be embraced with sufficient strength, and gain acceptance with governments, if and only if: a) international politics favours the economic, social and cultural growth of all peoples on the earth in increasing measure, making it increasingly difficult for ruling classes intent on the unscrupulous use of force in domestic and foreign policy to gain power; and if: b) this politics comes to be seen, as it develops, by growing masses of individuals, as an irreversible process of overcoming power politics, and thus also as a step towards its definitive order: the political and institutional unity of the human race. Otherwise, the world could not remain balanced between security by strength and security by mutual trust, and could not advance towards the one objective which can for ever eliminate

the use of force from international relations: a World federation.

If, as it is necessary if economic unity is really to be achieved and maintained, Europe in 1992 becomes a political entity capable of taking action, then the first phase of innovative détente, which already has a solid basis in the Soviet Union and a good start in the United States, could really take place and prove its validity. In this connection there are three valid observations to be made. The first is that for the moment the web of innovative détente can be woven above all in Europe, where it is a question of gradually overcoming blocks, transforming armies into purely defensive armies and establishing the first rules of mutual security.

The second observation is equally realistic, since it is based on the very *raison d'état* of an established Europe, for which the passage from the current political and military situation to a system of mutual security with purely defensive armies reduced to the minimum would bring the following advantages: a) the disappearance of nuclear arms from its territory, the end of the dangers and damage caused by the mutual distrust between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and the release of vast resources, which could be used for more worthy causes; b) the possibility of developing a profound economic and political understanding with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, thus smoothing their path to democratization; and c) the possibility of developing interdependence between the two Europes, and between Europe, the Soviet Union, Africa and the Arab countries, with plans for collaboration and aid which could open up a market of incalculable potential for real, ecologically controlled progress. The third observation concerns the fact that, in a federation of free nations in the same historical framework where the modern idea of the nation was formed, Europe would transform political thinking by adding the concept of international democracy to that of national democracy and making the idea of its extension to the whole family of mankind conceivable.

This does not mean that Europe would exercise some kind of primacy or leadership. If *innovative détente* develops, then one by one all the knots in the process of the unification of the human race will be combed out, and each country will in turn play a strategically decisive role, until the moment when all peoples on the earth have reached, with perpetual peace in equality, the order of reason which found its highest expression in the political thinking of Kant.

Thirty Years Ago

TECNICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE *

POLITICS AND TECHNIQUE

When talking about politics, it is never quite clear what one is thinking about because people usually talk mostly about the ends and very little about the means. For this reason, politics can easily become a war of

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This series of articles, written by Mario Albertini in 1957 as a contribution to the cadres' training policy of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, was published in the second issue of volume one of *Il Federalista*, published in Italian (1959). We found it appropriate to reprint it after thirty years, because most of its content remains extraordinarily up-to-date, thus witnessing the continuity of federalist thinking from the foundation of the review. This remark is all the more significant, as these writings arose as a reflection on an action (the European People's Congress) which had great importance in the history of European Federalism, yet is clearly dated and, seen with a three decades of hindsight, appears as enticed with maximalism, as typically happens when beginning political struggles. It must also be noticed that these articles are interspersed with statements we could no longer support today, as it is the case with the assertion that federalism is not an ideology (though this term was used then in a meaning different from that we attribute to it now). All this detracts nothing from the present interest of the paper, which must not be read as a historical curiosity, but as a still valid theoretical statement about federalist action.

Notice that the Italian term "militante" has been translated with the English term "militant" in spite of the connotations, of which we are fully aware, it presents in English. The phrase "active member" seems to us to be too weak, and does not suggest the exclusive character of the political commitment that, in our opinion, federalist "militants" must be called upon now. It goes without saying that the word has to be rigorously stripped of any fanatic or violent connotation.

words behind which anything could lie. In the modern fields of human life, the stress always lies on the means, in other words on the techniques with which results can be obtained. We live in a modern world because human activity can formulate scientific ideas, create the corresponding techniques, and group men to employ them. In politics the human condition is not different. But this situation is hidden by ideologies, which are a vulgar type of philosophy applied to politics. The result is precisely that only the ends are discussed, never the means. These never-discussed means seem therefore to be "natural," almost eternal things, that men could only accept and not change. In actual fact our political means (state-nations, parties, trade unions) are very recent in history. Two hundred years ago there were neither parties nor trade unions, and the states themselves were very different. Wieland, in the 18th century, thought that the Germans more than any other people were "protected against political subjection and servitude" because they could choose between various states. Even where there were "nation" states there was no national loyalty: an Italian could be a French minister, Voltaire could advise the King of Prussia, more or less as nowadays an engineer can choose to work for one company or another without betraying anyone.

Instead in our time the state is deified. In actual fact, we can argue whether Liberalism or Socialism is better, whether we want to create a national government in one way or another, but we cannot argue whether or not we want to remain politically and juridically French, Italians, Germans. And yet some centuries ago there were no nation-states, just as there will be none in a century's time because the development of technology continuously widens the space of the organization of human relations. This means that within a century our present juridical and political condition of French, Italians and Germans will be obsolete. However, when we reach this point, our thought stops. Being Italian no longer means belonging to a certain transient organization of human relations, but it becomes a matter of nature, an eternal and indisputable condition. In this way we do not reflect on men's way of organizing themselves, and a certain stage of this organization is accepted as final; men are caught up in an absurd preservation mechanism which obliges them to serve their organization, the state, and prevents them from making use of it.

What actually is a state, a nation? Bad romantic philosophy would answer that it is the revelation of God in history. With a few variations, sometimes replacing God with a surrogate entity, such as history with a capital "H," Mazzini, Herder, Michelet and all the representatives of the

so-called national thinking have constantly reiterated this nonsense. Modern thinking would reply that the state is a means for human groups to obtain certain social results. And what is a means? A means corresponds to a technique. In industry, agriculture and so on, a technique is above all material, physical, ranging from a hammer to a nuclear power station. However, there is also a technique (now in full-blown development) for grouping men to best employ these physical means. In politics, "technology" mostly consists of the way men group. Every political result is a group decision, whether this decision takes the shape of a law, the political line of a party or the leadership of a government. Every decision requires a grouping of men that is suitable to the decision to be made. From the rank and file to the top, from the town hall to the parliament and the government, all that is done in politics is the sum of the results of group decisions, each corresponding to certain necessities. Politics flows through these channels: groups.

To solve the great political problems, there are groups we call parties. Each party has an ideology. But the ideology goes far beyond each party. If it were only a matter of ideologies (in other words if the parties were, according to the traditional definitions, merely associations of men with the same ideals), all the Liberals in the world would be united, and so on. The study of ideologies actually allows us to examine how the parties organize consensus but, on its own, does not allow us to appreciate the nature of their action, which lies, more than in the ideologies, in the way individuals are grouped.

There is a convincing example: the Marxist parties. Nowadays they differ as to their doctrine. But from a historical point of view their diversity goes back to a time when all of them followed the same dogmatic and naive Marxist thought, yet they were different. What had made them different was the different way of grouping, of organizing themselves. The Socialist party was based on the section, the Communist party on the cell. In the first case, activists and sympathisers, by taking part in the meetings, could discuss party, government and municipality policy. In the second case a few ignorant workers, grouping in their own working place, could compare their life with that of their boss without realizing the complexity of social relations. For this reason the Socialist party directed the psychological attitudes of its members towards parliamentary politics, while the Communist party directed its members towards an overall vision of life and a totalitarian conception of politics. Sections and cells represented two different human environments and recruited different men; the first represented a channel of specialized,

democratic political action, the second a generic, totalitarian political action. This example has been schematically described to show that every kind of politics requires a suitable way of organizing and grouping. However, in general, all parties have in common that they are organizations suitable for making decisions in connection with state government. Therefore the parties group the divergent interests existing within a state. Finally, a state is a group in which there are both common and divergent interests. These interests become politics insofar as they become widely spread and turn into expectations. Parties are strong, and endure in the government or the opposition only if they can organize these expectations, those concerning the conduct of the national government. If they do not succeed in doing this, they become weak and disappear, whatever ideology they follow.

Since they group national expectations, and since they can only produce national decisions through the parliaments and governments of the states, the parties cannot produce any European results beyond the field of foreign policy and co-operation between states (whenever this is possible). They keep up a permanent confrontation between the various national standpoints; they do not create a European standpoint. This explains the European void, the absence of a truly European standpoint. The European standpoint, which is now virtually very widespread among public opinion, remains weak, ambiguous, lifeless, because there is no visible European group able to turn into demands, by organizing them, the pro-European interests and feelings created day by day by the weakness of our states with respect to Russia and America, and by the very evolution of modern life.

To make Europe is not to rule the existing states. For this reason the groups suitable for governing states are not suitable for making Europe. Making Europe is an all-party task. It is impossible to make the Europe of the Liberals, Socialists or of the Christian-Democrats: it is necessary to make everybody's Europe, the Europe of unity and diversity. The differences, the parties on European scale, will govern it. But to set it up, to carry out the federal constitutional compromise, they must all be present. Striving for European unity therefore involves groups which differ from parties. To this end, a single group must be created which is able to channel European interests; and to do it in such a way that there are no organizational structures left at the national level, because at that level national expectations and ideas would fatally reappear, and leaders would be chosen who are European in their words but are in actual fact devoted to the national point of view.

WHAT DIVIDES EUROPE?

The problem of European unity has been discussed for a long time, but not enough consideration has been given to the factors which divide it. We are well aware of the means that would unite it: the federation. Even outside our circles, the means to unite Europe have been discussed, although the discussion has given false results and has created the idea that Europe could be united through a confederal system of sovereign states, or through functionalism (a sufficient number of international organizations, each dedicated to a specific sector). But neither in the federalist circles nor outside them has a serious discussion been made on what divides Europe. And one cannot have a clear idea of the unity of Europe, whether one rightly thinks of it as a federation or erroneously as a confederation, until one has a clear idea of what divides it, because what divides it is the obstacle which must be overcome to unite it.

Many Europeans have heard Americans say: "Why don't you unite? Division has cost you an enormous price in human lives and in the destruction of wealth, while unity would give you enormous political and economic advantages, and the possibility of resuming an important role in the world. It is easy to unite. All you have to do is set up a federation, like we did." Nine times out of ten the European replies: "You can't understand. You haven't got a long past behind you, history. We have, and this is what divides us." It remains to be seen if this is a reasonable reply.

To find it out, one must point out to that European that it is enough to go outside Europe, to Africa, Asia or America, to feel a European. In this case a Frenchman, a German or any other European are perfectly aware that they have many things in common with one another and that these common things distinguish them as Europeans as opposed to Americans, Asians, and so on. This feeling of having things in common in this case becomes much stronger than the difference between a Frenchman and a German, which is so strongly felt in Paris or Berlin.

What is it based on, what is this feeling of something in common? It is based on history, and it is our civilization. In reality, history unites us, it does not divide us. No man in Europe would be what he is if there were only the history of France, Germany, Italy behind him. When he prays, he prays to the same God, even though the cult is not the same everywhere (but it is not so even within the single nations); when he works, he uses legislative, technical, scientific means which are quite similar, because no nation has created its own, but all nations have contributed to creating

them. The European man's philosophical culture cannot be complete unless he adds Kant to Descartes, his musical culture cannot be complete unless he adds Vivaldi to Beethoven, his artistic culture cannot be thorough unless he adds Leonardo to Cézanne, and so on.

Everything that concerns human life in its basic elements unites the Europeans even more deeply than custom unites Americans, Indians or Russians. In the United States of America there are more serious moral differences between the still racist South and the North than in Europe. To get an idea of the strength of this unity of the Europeans, it is enough to think of the fact that for over a hundred years states have tried desperately to give us the idea that we are different and have failed. Europeans have fought terrible wars with each other, and time after time some of them have thought they were absolute enemies of others (the French of the English and then of the Germans, and similarly the others) but this opinion has changed every time politics has changed. Alliances have been permanently reversed and agreements have always been recomposed, even after Hitler and Mussolini.

What, then, divides this Europe united by custom, law, religion, culture, science, technology? Only and exclusively the nation-states. In Europe there is really no other element of human conduct in which the differences are so serious as to cause a division. Not even languages, which do not prevent Swiss or Belgian unity. The only division is that of the state. Subject to separate states, the Europeans attend national schools, pay national taxes, do their national military service, observe national rites, read national papers and organize their political, economic and trade union life on a national level. The by-product of these actions, channelled into the divergent currents of the national states, is precisely the idea that the dividing elements in Europe are more important than the uniting elements; such an idea would never have developed without the betrayal of scholars who have distorted culture and history by introducing the mythical concepts of national culture and national history.

This observation is of great political importance. If we know where the division lies, let us not waste time in uniting what is already united, like those who reduce the European problem to a simple matter of cultural, psychological, propagandistic approach among the different nationalities, and let us instead try to eliminate the division where it actually exists. Concerning this, it must be noted that it is not enough to say that it is the nation-states that divide Europe. States do not exist without the men who govern and sustain them. To say states is to say a political class (members of Parliament, members of the Executive and in general those in power). Essentially, Europe is divided by its political class, which maintains the sovereign states and therefore maintains the division; which has the power to unite it because it controls the production and enforcement of laws through parliaments and governments and does nothing on the pretext that it is difficult to unite "such different peoples."

Nobody denies that there are difficulties, but the main obstacle is represented by the governments themselves. Actually, if the governments could decide, and did decide, to summon a constituent assembly, all the marginal difficulties, from Communism to established interests, would easily be overcome. This proves that only governments prevent Europeans from achieving their deep unity of civilization, in political terms too.

THE FEDERALIST OBJECTIVE AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR

Federalism is not an ideology. It does not profess, like the old ideologies, to tell us what is the driving force of history by highlighting some mystical pseudo-entity such as the nation, the proletariat, freedom with a capital "F" and so on. Federalism simply points out a type of state, the federation; in other words it proposes a precise objective for human endeavour. An agreement can be reached on this because it is a matter of choosing something definite or not. On the contrary, in the case of the old ideologies, this is not possible. When men gather around Liberalism, Socialism, and so on, an argument starts at once over what Liberalism is, what Socialism is, and everyone has his own opinion, and no one knows what to do, because ideology confuses the end with the means, and tends to move the argument outside the historical field, in which precise tasks must be faced, problems must be solved and certain challenges must be met.

Federalism clearly shows the end to be reached, and says nothing about the means to achieve it. This remains a task to be understood in the present historical reality, by realizing the situation and finding the necessary political technique. In politics, technique consists of ways of grouping men. However, it is not enough, as the old concept of a political party would point out, to put together all those who have the same creed, in our case all those who verbally accept the objective of the United States of Europe. It is necessary to organize a struggle, in other words to understand which ideas, interests and aspirations can be considered

European, and to make a type of group in which these interests are properly directed, not diverted onto a national level and re-routed towards false objectives such as the collaboration between sovereign states. Only then will interests, ideals, aspirations turn effectively into claims, that is, will enter the political balance against other claims.

In order to obtain this we have set up the European People's Congress. Let us see what it means technically. Roughly speaking, in any political experience there are three ways of behaving and therefore three corresponding groups. First of all, there are some individuals who turn a certain political objective into a personal objective, the very aim of their life, even if they do not earn their living through politics. These are the leaders, the militants. These are the people who sustain the parties and similar formations. Secondly, there are individuals who, although their aims in life are non-political, take part in politics with a certain rational interest and contribute quite actively. These are the sympathisers, present in every party or pressure group although in a less active way than the first group. Lastly, there are individuals who are not very active, participate only when there are political elections, or act only on exceptional occasions.

From the point of view of the struggle to build Europe, once we have ascertained the existence of pro-European interests and ideals, it is a matter of creating an organization that can initiatethese three ways of behaving, can link them and guide them towards the only European objective that cannot become a national objective: constituent power. Only in this way can the available political energy, which corresponds to human behaviour, be employed in the struggle to build Europe. The European People's Congress is formulated in such a way as to technically allow both these three groups to come into existence and their unity of action to take place. To become aware of this, it is enough to consider that its organized foundations lie in primary elections, which entail: a) individuals to organize them, and provide them with political claims (claiming documents); b) individuals that support them with their prestige, their ideas, with money offers, by putting themselves on the candidate lists and so on; c) individuals that vote. This means more or less involving militants, sympathisers and ordinary citizens. Insofar as the election of the European People's Congress is organized, the three types of political behaviour come into action.

This matter is worth discussing more deeply. One thing, however, is clear. Unless an action is organized which sets in motion the real behaviour of men, nothing can be accomplished. This is what happens when one merely gives a card to people who verbally say "yes" to Europe.

In this case the real political energies, that the nation-state permanently organizes according to the three levels of action, remain within the national sphere and are not transferred into the European scope. Europe then becomes purely an ideal, which never corresponds to what people really want, as states and parties continuously submit only national options, never European ones. In such a situation, the ordinary citizen, who constitutes the reserve of political energy to be mobilized in order to achieve political objectives, remains idle from the European point of view although ideally he wants a united Europe.

Every choice requires a struggle; and there is no struggle without a suitable organization, an actor keeping in sight on the political scene a kind of visible, measurable thermometer of the way the action is going. If Europe does not appear on the scene, then there is no Europe. The Europe of the day after, to be made when other things have been done, to be pursued when national problems have been solved, cannot be seen today and never will be seen, because there will always be national things to do, national tasks of foreign and economic policy to be achieved, so long as national sovereign states exist. The Europe of today is the European People's Congress. Supporting it is a task for those who wish a future for Europe.

MILITANTS: THE POLITICAL CLASS FOR THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE

During the sessions held in Salice in 1957, Spinelli analyzed the reasons why the federalist movements which had formed in the postwar period in our countries had not yet become a political force. After remarking that each of these movements had so far given itself a national organization and had restricted itself to the task of counselling the national forces, he stated: "Third, federalists have not developed a core of militants among them. In this case I am not using the term in its current meaning of a small propaganda man who performs the small tasks of the organization. Militants are required by any organization aspiring to become a political force and are men driven by political passion, by the ambition to have a significant standing among their contemporaries, and who have decided to make this passion and this ambition coincide with the aims of the organization to which they belong. Not all those who belong to an organization are militants; if a political organization were formed exclusively by militants, it would soon become a sect. But

militants, who have committed themselves fully and have staked their political future in the success of the operation, are the mainstay of any organization."

For federalists, this is a decisive problem, since their possibility of fighting for Europe is conditioned by their ability to develop and form a growing number of militants. The European People's Congress had been aware of this problem since its establishment, and resolved to deal with it firmly in its Turin session. The achievement of this task depends on the knowledge of its nature. Therefore it is necessary to discuss the manner of recruiting, selecting and training militants. Each of our groups must be able to conduct a policy for militants in order to extend and strengthen the European People's Congress.

Militants are naturally trained during the fight, not in study circles. However, one is not born a militant, and one cannot be a good militant without a well-defined political character. Consequently, we must first of all have a clear concept of two issues: the recruiting of militants and their basic personality traits.

1) Basic traits of the militant's personality. The European People's Congress is the European tool of a European policy, whereas all the other instruments of action are national. This is why it can be organized and led only by people who are able to differentiate themselves from national politicians and want to acquire a European way of seeing things and a European way of acting. This is not an easy task. Everything we see, and everything which moves us to act and judge, is national: newspapers, parties, governments and even, to a large extent, political culture itself. This is the fact which explains the inability of our political classes to build Europe, which has been repeatedly demonstrated during the last decade. If we, too, want to avoid being caught in this situation, we must by all means avoid forming our political judgement, and our political behaviour, by choosing among the points of view and political options which develop within the scope of national politics. On the contrary, we must rely most of all on our own reasoning, and exercise it patiently in any situation to eradicate from our own subconscious the national reflexes which are concealed deep within our personality; we must nourish our political judgements with the European sources which we have available and which we will have to develop; and we must decide our political conduct on the basis of the needs and trends of the European People's Congress, not on the basis of the needs and trends of the national states and their supporters, the national parties.

These are the basic remarks. Yet the various aspects of this behaviour, which we must develop ourselves and transmit to others to make them become militants, must be permanently discussed, studied and investigated to define the necessary political culture, the indispensable sources of information and the organizational work to be done in an increasingly effective manner and more fully.

2) Recruiting. Outside the European People's Congress, there are no environments in which the desire to become militants for Europe forms spontaneously. National forces have long-rooted traditions which have infiltrated in schools, in families, in society and in organized groups. Therefore the national states and parties determine the political behaviour of most people and can automatically rely upon a normal renewal of the political class. The European People's Congress has nothing of the sort. To recruit militants, it must conduct a specific policy and intervene in all those fields in which the political conscience and will is formed and changed, starting from youth circles, which are especially important since young people are not tied to states by personal interests in the same way as older people are.

In carrying out this intervention, one thing must be kept clearer in mind. The situation of our states and their recent history have led many men to consider the problem of European unity. Yet these people remain in practice militants or sympathisers of the nation-states, since the national point of view has been impressed upon them since childhood in the form of feelings and images and is constantly fostered by most of their present-day stimulations and incentives. This is why even when national awareness is subjected to the opposite thrust of the aspiration to European unity it remains predominant, until a long experience in an appropriate environment eradicates it from the subconscious. Our militant recruiting policy must therefore be able to constantly attract new people and let them be part of a deep-touching experience. Each of our groups must study and solve this problem.

THE MILITANT AS A POLITICAL LEADER

We must delve into the issue of three kinds of behaviour, i. e. the action of militants, sympathisers and ordinary citizens. This entails the definition of a set of rules of thought and action. Such rules are naturally not the same for the three kinds of behaviour. The first thing we must notice in this regard is that the behaviour of sympathisers and of voters depends on the behaviour of the militants. From many points of view, the

founding of a Committee of the European People's Congress corresponds to the founding of the rules under which the secondary behaviour of the political struggle are to be grouped and moved into play. It is therefore the militants who must found the rules of action of sympathisers and voters. However, this science of the militant, this ability to group men along a certain path, would be useless if the militant failed to practise an art alongside this science. This art is the art of the pilot. The militants will form a group and set it on its course by applying the organizational rules of the EPC with meetings and elections. Yet they may enlarge the group along the way only if at every crossing they choose the right path and give those who follow them the idea that there is a direction in which progress can be achieved.

It is not easy to discuss an art. A pilot is a person who will become one, not a person who today has fame, authority and competence. In the current situation, successful men, even when they don the European mask, follow national paths. On Europe's side are obscure people; they are those who have no current standing but will be needed in the future when all that will be left will be either our choice or fatal ruin.

How can we take the European path every day, in this Europe of national states? In every moment, we will face only national choices, since the system of parties, the leaders of great material and moral interests, and the public opinion are prisoners of the states, and the states are the instrument of national politicy decisions. If we do not open a breach in the walls of this prison, all men will follow their senseless national path at every turning, without even seeing the way out. This is what is happening today in France and Germany. France cannot solve her colonial problem on her own. Yet when the Algerian crisis became acute, the leaders of democracy, oblivious of the Europe of which they talk about on Sundays, thought exclusively of national choices. National France was faced with the dilemma of the popular front, to relinquish Algeria, or of the military coup, to keep it. Having no national democratic choices, the heads of democracy, voted by socialist, radical and Christian voters, gave the country over to the enlightened dictator who thinks France is a fairy princess. But the marvellous France which De Gaulle promises to the French youth is indeed a fairy tale, good for nothing but going to sleep amid sweet dreams, not for preparing a future. Equally, Germany cannot solve the problem of defence on its own and at the same time protect its democracy against a strong German military power. But when the military problem became acute over the issue of missile launch pads, the heads of German democracy, equally forgetful of the Europe

they talk about on Sundays, thought exclusively of national choices: either not to defend oneself or revive a strong military power.

In the tough times of choices, who will say these things to other men? This is the great problem of the militant. When the time of choice, the time of truth arrives, and the art of pilot must be practised, he must speak up. But he is alone. Everything which has the appearance of strength and importance is against him. Only other militants, obscure like him, are with him. Yet if the militants will have the courage to speak up, and if they will make a breach in the wall of the national prison, many men will follow them, since many men are waiting for Europe, and the group will constantly grow until one day one will no longer be able to summon the representatives of the cult of the past to solve a severe crisis; one will have to resort to the European People's Congress.

Those who are alone may start by talking to another person. The only principle which one may suggest corresponds to what the groups of militants who are already properly controlling the field have done: form teams of friends. Every community of friends must seriously explore the world of politics, study its problems in depth, continuously discuss and improve the rules of action of the EPC, resorting to *Popolo Europeo* and to federalist literature. I know of groups who have held weekly study meetings in which every person enriched the others by talking about the things he had read and the problems he had faced. With amazing tenacity, these groups persisted even when the initially numerous group was reduced to three or four persons. These three or four persons, however, could hold their own adequately since they had reinforced their reasoning and their character and because they were the result of a harsh and patient selection. This is the rule of the militants' group. Those groups who have followed this rule, after working in darkness, will rise one day from the shadows and will set many new sympathisers, and new European citizens, on the path towards Europe.

THE RULE AND DUTIES OF THE MILITANT

The militants have three main duties: to apply the rules of the EPC to group sympathisers and citizens on the basis of popular elections; to practice the art of the pilot to keep these persons on the European pathway; to acquire financial independence by means of a monthly self-subscription in order to rely exclusively on themselves in the current situation of national power. This is easy to say but difficult to do. At first

glance there may seem to be an imbalance between these tasks and the means required to perform them: forming teams of friends with the rule of weekly discussion of political problems and situations. We must therefore explain the reasons for this statement.

First of all, the reader must imagine what can happen when a small group of men has firmly undertaken an experience of this kind for at least one year. From a bystander's viewpoint, about thirty meetings will have been held, including twenty participants at the onset, if the enterprise has been launched competently, three or four persons after a few meetings, and about ten persons if those three or four will have held on tight, holding their meetings regularly when their feelings make them wish to abandon them. From the insider's viewpoint, these three or four persons, as well as the others, will have changed deeply. In the beginning they were probably uncertain in judging the situations and problems of politics; they were forced to take their words from the mouths of opinion-making journalists and politicians. In the end, they will be thinking with their own mind, and will evaluate other people's ideas, regardless of thei source, according to their own judgement. Their character will also have changed: undoubtedly, these persons were initially unaware of being men capable of leading other men; in the end they will be aware of their role, since they will have tempered their soul by remaining alone on the field and will have acquired the stern character of those who can lead a difficult political struggle.

In other words, a European political class will have been born, and the organizational means for recruiting, maintaining and renewing it will have been founded. This political class, with the rules of its external action, will keep a European political force active in its city by means of the elections of the EPC. In order to understand the scope of the rule of militants, one should consider the fact, clearly pointed out by Duverger, that the way in which men group together decides their political way of thinking. Suppose men group together as in the sections of parties in assemblies where motions are voted and executives are elected. These men will share the experience of the political kitchen, while their deep political thinking will form in other environments. Assume instead men group together, as in the organization of militants we must create, in order to study and discuss. Together, these men will develop their deep political way of thinking within the federalist environment, and will learn to use it, expound it and to struggle.

This is why militants can be formed only if there is, within the EPC and at the EPC's service, this special organization. It must act independently from the official meetings of the EPC's local organizations, where we, too, will use a political kitchen to keep the external world tied to the European perspective, as this external world will keep moving towards the national perspective until has been established a European political power.

It may seen strange that in order to accomplish a political enterprise one must establish, within a struggle organization, a study organization with rules and structures more resemblant of schools of thought than political associations. Yet in all revolutionary enterprises something of this sort has always existed, since the toughest task of the revolutionary is indeed to use his reasoning appropriately to direct the struggle towards a new aim in a world where habits, pre-cooked thoughts and clichés direct men towards old aims. Besides, if you want to find precedents close to us in time, think of the Fabian organization as compared to the Labour party, and consider the doctrinal passion of the Marxists who made the Russian Revolution.

After these statements, it is clear that militants can (and must, since nobody else can) practise the art of the pilot besides the science of politics. Some may object that forming three or four diehard militants and a small group of determined militants in a city is not much in comparison to the force of the parties. Yet actually behind every party, in every city, there is a small number of strong men. When the states are in difficult conditions and great changes are possible, the most important asset is to have good generals, good officers and a good political choice. If one has these things, the troops will appear at the right moment. If one does not have these assets, but there are troops, these troops will disband and be useless when the time of struggle comes. This happened to Italian and German democracy in the first postwar period; and this is what may happen to French democracy today and to the others tomorrow. Finally, in France the parties were on one side, with their numerous troops, and on the other side there was a single man. Yet that man had an iron will and a choice. This is why he won the conflict. True, he is weak with regard to the future; yet he is weak not because he is alone, but because he has a weak choice, a French choice in a world dominated by great continental states.

Drawing strength from their continental choice, militants should endeavour to establish their special organization at the service of the EPC. In the cities where a few persons expert in politics are on our side, so much the better. In those where there are none, proceed nonetheless. To begin with, there are those federalists who already have many years of experience and there are their written works, there is a federalist literature, there

is the *Popolo Europeo* through which to keep to date and there is the possibility of learning within each one of us who wishes to. Making Europe, or not making it, depends on the number of these persons.

THE PROBLEM OF SYMPATHISERS

We said that one may roughly distinguish three political kinds of behaviour: the very active one of those who make politics the purpose of their lives, the behaviour of those who devote some action and some thought to politics but essentially do something else, and the behaviour of those who tend to dedicate neither action nor thought to politics but are attracted only by great political events, such as elections, crises and the like. We also said that the technique of political action consists in the way of grouping men. A way of grouping may naturally result in cards and statutes, or may not, depending on the nature of the relationships, but mostly consists of the kind of action and dialogue which really binds men. With these criteria we have examined the problem of militants: a) it is up to the militants to stir sympathisers and voters to action with the rules of the EPC; b) it is up to them to lead Europeans towards the goal by means of political choices; c) the typical action of their special way of grouping and therefore of their upkeep and recruiting consists in the common definition of a political way of thinking.

Having settled the issue of militants, we must examine the issue of sympathisers with the same criteria. We must first of all clearly determine among which men we may have sympathisers. Obviously, we now consider people who dedicate some action and thought to politics but essentially do something else. In view of their condition, these persons have a rough knowledge of politics and a good knowledge of that "something else," which may be commerce, industry, schooling, journalism and so forth: all human activities. However, these people, who also think about politics, will have political ideas regardless of their jobs and will not restrict themselves to an exclusively corporate viewpoint in evaluating politics, i. e. they will not evaluate politics depending on its benefits to their category, but they will try also to assess it from the point of view of general interest, i. e. its benefit to all. This entails reference to certain values: freedom, justice, peace, and so on. However, because what they know well is what can be seen from the perspective of their real experience (their work) they will tend to evaluate politics from the same viewpoint: if they are producers, in terms of how politics causes expansion or stagnation of production; if they are workers, in terms of how it improves or worsens social justice; if they are men of culture, in terms of how it favours or impairs science and the establishment of certain values, and so forth.

This means that they will be most acquainted with the aspect of politics which may be termed "political problems," and will be least aware of the one we may term "political line." Political problems are those which politics must cope with: they lie along a vast scale, ranging from foreign policy (for example the liquidation of colonialism or East-West relations) to economic policy, organization of production and distribution in this or that field, to internal policy, bureaucracy, schooling, public order and so forth. For each of these problems there is either the direct interest of everyone or the interest of different groups. On the other hand, the political line is usually the government's overall orientation, or the proposal of such an orientation on the part of an opposition party. This orientation naturally involves foreign, military, economic, social and other policies, and therefore affects the individuals and groups whose interests and ideals depend on the government's action. But this orientation cannot be developed exclusively as a function of the best possible solution to the various problems within view, since this would be pointless unless it served to establish a majority, which entails compromise solutions, a minimum common denominator among many ideals and interests. Essentially, a political line consists of political problems plus the search for the best compromise, which will provide the majority without which the world's best projects would remain on paper. This search for the best compromise is the specific task of politicians and requires a particular experience.

We may indeed exemplify it by mentioning a difference between the political line of the parties and ours. The political line of a party is the line which is suitable to provide an orientation for government or for opposition (which has the aim of becoming the government). Therefore its compromise requires: a) the search for 50 per cent plus one of the voters. Beyond that, the compromise would be too diluted and therefore weak. Below that, the compromise could never be or become a government; b) this majority must be available for a long period of time, during which the government affects the immediate interests of the groups and individuals, since to govern is to choose and therefore favour some and damage the rest. Instead, our political line, which is the one suitable to define the pathway for founding a new state, must provide a compromise which can: a) keep only a small minority active for a long time; b) unite, above the

party divisions which are typical of governments (whether liberal, socialist or Christian), a sort of unity of almost all the population for a short period of time, the time of the Constituent and of its work, which does not affect the immediate interests of the population.

All the questions which arise in establishing a political line naturally affect directly only those who experience them fully (the militants), not those who do not (sympathisers and voters). Therefore sympathisers may accept and follow our constituent popular political line only to the extent to which the militants and the global action of the EPC will be able to relate it to the political problems which are or may be of interest directly to that category of persons. This observation shows the decisive importance of the protest and claim documents, which must present the European view of the great political problems. As we will see in the following article, the problem of sympathisers and that of protest and claim documents are directly linked, so much so that we can say that we have no serious action on our part with respect to sympathisers (i. e. the second kind of political behaviour) if there is no serious definition, presentation and political diffusion of the protest and claim documents.

RECRUITING SYMPATHISERS

The action which can allow us to group sympathisers is therefore founded on the development, diffusion and public discussion of the protest and claim documents. These "documents" deal with limited problems, and this is why they mean something to those who experience these problems in their own life. The "documents" show that the key to the solution is not national but European, and this is why they can tie the individuals they address to the struggle for Europe.

What kind of individuals are they? That vast group of persons which first of all seriously live their work and secondly are able to link the problems which arise in their scope to some political perspective. The persons of this kind are attracted by the political movements which proclaim the ideals of our political civilization and judge them on the basis of their ability to formulate and solve certain problems, those which they know personally. This is the degree of awareness which forms the ideas, sympathies and adhesions of the social circle which provides sympathisers to political movements. If we evaluate the situation from this point of view, we can observe the following:

1) If the EPC "produces" only the ideal call to European unity, it

cannot seriously recruit sympathisers. To a certain extent, many political movements have added "Europe" as a fourth word to the three key words of present-day political ideals: democracy, freedom and social justice. Yet the great ideals no longer divide the political class and sympathisers along the watershed of parties since they have become the common property of all the parties, and therefore the individuals judge, to the extent of their abilities, how the principles are translated into facts. The EPC must "produce" the correct formulation of individual political, economic and social problems; it must deny, with due reason, the national perspective; and illustrate the European perspective. In this manner it can seriously attract all those persons who are sensitive to the problems which can be solved only within such a perspective.

2) The national circle of parties, experts and journalists is not likely to formulate the individual problems according to the European perspective. These people owe their influence, or their power, to the nation-state within which they have acquired experience and have been successful. The following rule is true for such people: "The ideas and beliefs of the dominant groups seem to merge so closely with the interests of a given situation that any understanding of the facts which may threaten their power is ruled out." (Mannheim) This rule explains why so many politicians and writers often write that the European states will die if they unite and then assign to these moribund such grandiose tasks as liquidating colonialism, ending the cold war, achieving wealth and social justice in the age of the atom and automation, and so forth. In any case, due to this fact, if the EPC does not "produce" European standpoints for the individual problems, the social circle of virtual sympathisers is faced exclusively with national solutions. Therefore, in this case, even where there are general propensities towards Europe, the individuals remain tied to exclusively national perspectives and parties, and the conventional Europeanist movements live the life of ghosts.

3) The relation between "documents" and sympathisers highlights the fundamental action which can provide militants with all sorts of contacts with the environment of the city in which they operate. This action therefore constitutes the essential premise in order to slowly but surely achieve financial possibilities, cultural influences, political prestige and in order to fill the void which still surrounds the struggle for Europe. The effectiveness of this action also regards our organizational issues, and shows: a) the importance of the cultural work of militants, which must produce European solutions to political problems; b) the importance of the meetings preliminary to the elections of the EPC, in which these

solutions must be proposed to uniform and selected milieus.

This is why the "document"-sympathisers relation can energize all of our action: it can provide us with serious candidacies for the EPC lists; it can provide us with delegates to the Congress who are capable of truly representing the different needs of the European people; and can give our political debate the force and prestige required to conduct our struggle. Naturally, all this work must be founded on the moral and intellectual courage of militants, who must overcome the conformism in which our states have lapsed in order to show everyone the true face of Europe and the meaning it can have for everyone's life. The face of Europe will be very different from the squalid façades of our old states. Our documents will be truly European to the extent to which they will be able to oppose tomorrow's life to today's, on a problem-by-problem basis, and say every time something new with respect to the stale words of current politics.

PUBLIC OPINION

There is still the problem of the third degree of political behaviour (with respect to the EPC, the voter, the ordinary citizen). The individuals at issue are usually known as "the public opinion," "the people" and so forth. Their political character becomes clear if one takes into account the fact that they usually have an extremely superficial interest for politics, which they take part in only when they are attracted by great events. The states and the parties usually extol them to the extent of raising them to true and exclusive protagonists. Democratic ideology claims that they, as citizens and voters, are the true holders of power, the overseers of the government (ministers and parliament members being merely their representatives). Socialist ideology claims that as a working class they are the only autonomous element not only of politics but indeed of history. National ideology (which organizes the consensus of the citizens for the current states, just as party ideologies organize the consensus of the social parts) claims that they are the "nation," and therefore the substance and aim of politics, history, culture, morality and sometimes even of religion.

All this is of no use in understanding what these individuals do and think politically; yet such understanding is necessary to achieve their European grouping. Generally speaking, one knows only what one does. Accordingly, these individuals know politics superficially, since they do politics superficially, by rough approximations which ideologism

(whether fascist, democratic, socialist or national) converts into the primitive myths which are currently ruling Europe. This regards their normal mental state. However, there is an aspect of politics in which despite this confused mental state these people are aware of what is happening and act positively. To identify this aspect, we must bear in mind that politics has: a) the level of definition of the political lines, which corresponds to the behaviour of the political class which is struggling to gain or keep power; b) the level of definition and solution of the political problems (which depends on the first level for its execution, since the execution of a political program is nothing but the by-product of the fight for power, according to Schumpeter's incisive expression); c) the level of great choices, of basic alternatives, which corresponds to the behaviour of the ordinary citizen (which depends on the first and second levels since the ordinary citizen takes no part in the process of developing political lines and in the process of formulating the problems).

This does not entail a passive nature of the ordinary citizen. On the contrary, it entails his activity and his degree of political autonomy. When the problems are pointed out, and the great political choices have been formulated, the political class and the sympathisers leave the scene, so to speak, and the ordinary citizens take the stage. Their choice imposes itself. They are not active until the great choices enter the scene. In these long intervals, the ordinary citizen is passive, a subject, both in democratic regimes and in totalitarian ones. But when the great choices mature because one power is crumbling and another is forming, it is this mass of persons which decides; this mass cannot have power but can choose who will have it, and generally does not choose badly, since in these cases politics becomes very simple: either one or the other. When power is truly contended, few extremely visible forces remain on the scene.

This is the decisive datum as regards the third degree of political behaviour. In order to obtain action and participation from the ordinary citizens, we must be able to organize the autonomous aspect of their behaviour: i. e., they must be carried to the political field of great choices. Many believe that the masses can be won with simple propaganda, with slogans devoid of truth, with lies. In reality this never occurs. Truth-distorting propaganda is effective only when the masses are already tied to a stable power (they are in a state of passivity), and this power (which is normally a state power) mobilizes the great apparatus of all its information media, starting from the school, to orientate its subjects towards certain aims and towards certain states of mind (the national idea, i. e. the fact that we feel French, Italian, German, depends on this, and has

the same nature of a "lay religion" typical of communism and the like). But when changes must be achieved, and nobody has decisive power since the old one is crumbling and the new one is forming, this kind of propaganda cannot be made and is useless. In this case one must exploit the activity of the masses, not their passivity.

This is not achieved with generic propaganda, with lies or with brain-washing, but by means of the struggle for power which involves the spontaneous behaviour of the masses by making the choices evident. These are situations in which everyone wants to know what is happening and is able to understand, and in which everyone wants to participate in order to contribute to determining the choice. Making the choices evident is, in formal terms, still propaganda. But it has none of the traits of what we normally call propaganda. Its force depends on its truth.

Everyone wants to understand and take part, and knows how to do so; the consensus of the mass therefore organizes rapidly and spontaneously around those who know better and explain more truthfully the real data of the situation and of the alternatives for power, regardless of the use of strong systems of information media. In cases of this kind the slumbering mass, impervious to political argumentation, which it usually disdains, raising singers, film stars and athletes to the role of heroes, awakens. Thousands of channels for communicating ideas open spontaneously. Certain images, certain catchwords arrive everywhere, almost without or against the press, and form a mighty current of opinion which overcomes parties and ideas which had been considered absolutely stable until the day before (the last strong case is the Hungarian revolution; the last weak case is De Gaulle's rise to power). The extreme example is given by the Russian revolution. The Bolsheviks were very few in number and were practically powerless. But in its military defeat the traditional power was collapsing, and Lenin was able to coin the catchwords (the famous "Land and peace") corresponding to the state of mind of the multitudes. Trotsky comments the success in these words: "The poverty of means of the Bolshevik agitation was evident. Then how, with such a weak apparatus, and with the insignificant amount of printed matter, were the ideas and catchwords of Bolshevism able to impose themselves to the people? The secret of the enigma is very simple: the catchwords which correspond to the acute need of a class and of an age create thousands of channels by themselves. The revolutionary environment, raised to incandescence, distinguishes itself for a high conductivity of ideas."

This is the same as saying that propaganda, considered in itself as a set of conferences, manifestos, leaflets, is useless. The great masses

acquire certain ideas, make them their own, and act consequently, only when the means typical of the third political behaviour become active. If the power is stable, the masses remain in their slumber, and no propaganda can alter their behaviour (only the state can excite them). If the power is unstable, those who have an alternative for power make direct contact with the masses even if they have an extremely weak information media apparatus. In reality, true political propaganda is merely an aspect of the struggle for power: it is the decisive aspect, since it relates to the behaviour of the multitudes and therefore to the accomplishment of the great power choices. Nobody reads, nobody listens, nobody feels if there is no incentive. The political incentive cannot be created by artificial means, since the masses are autonomous in this respect. The incentive forms spontaneously when the evolution of the power situation determines great choices. In such a moment, the only strong force is the one which has the possibility of gaining power and of formulating catchwords which correspond to the real state of mind of the masses, even if the day before such a force had been ignored.

PUBLIC OPINION FROM NATIONS TO EUROPE

The problem of harnessing the third behaviour for Europe is, for the reasons described above, a problem of action, not of generic propaganda. The ordinary citizen naturally could not be grouped at the European level unless there were: a) a European virtual state of mind (one cannot organize what is not there); b) the weakness of our states. However, these data do not, at present, constitute a strong incentive for the masses, since our states are weak but are not openly in a power crisis. The political environment is therefore national and slumbering (like the states). One may therefore create a European grouping only by creating a European environment opposed to the dominating but weak national environment. An "environment" is a situation in which the incentive to act and be informed appears spontaneously. Federalists have been able to provide it with primary elections and with open-air polling stations. This explains their success. Unknown to everyone, practically without means and with no influence, they have managed to interest tens of thousands of people in the cities where they conducted their first popular experiments.

The European vote is a rule of action which presents (in virtual form) the European choice. The open-air polling station constitutes an "environment" and therefore achieves a result which no propaganda can attain:

the political interest of the population, without which propaganda talks to people who do not listen. The combination of these two elements constitutes a platform of action which must not be imposed on anyone but in which everyone can participate, and gives momentum to the process since everyone understands that his individual participation increases the importance of the fact. Those who find themselves in this environment witness the birth of a new political struggle and perceive the possibility of a European citizenship, though in a still confused manner.

The vote of the EPC does not create a parliamentary power, but counts more as a sort of protest, a claim to the European voting right. This is why it would be unlikely to produce a European "environment" if it were organized exclusively with indoor polling stations, i. e. with a procedure similar to that of national elections. In this case, the European election would risk being mistaken for an official European manifestation of the national parties and authorities, and would in any case require a preliminary information action which could only have a very limited scope in the current political situation. The open-air polling station instead provides information while offering participation; it is visible, and shows, with a living image, the real data of the European problem (the struggle of a European political class and the population's European choice); it differentiates itself from all other current political manifestations; it creates countless impromptu propaganda people; it draws out of every one's conscience things which everyone knows regarding the helplessness of national states and the need for European unity; it highlights new people, the men of the European People's Congress. The third political behaviour is impervious to propaganda and sensitive to choices, and these elections are the only European choice currently possible.

Naturally it is not just a matter of organizing European elections just once, but a matter of repeating them within a general plan aimed at increasing the number of voters. We must therefore know what to do between these elections. In this period there may arise a temptation to maintain direct organizational political contact with the thousands of people who voted. This would be a waste of effort. The dominant power is national; accordingly, after voting, the European voters return to their national slumber. In the intermediate phase, using the first popular success and the first influences gained, we must aim at the types of political behaviour which remain active regardless of the existence of an "environment" and of the imminence of great choices. After the first election, we have a greater force of attraction on these elements, and this force can be exploited both to recruit new militants and to acquire new

support, even a financial one[1], if the target of the new elections is set immediately: a number x, much greater than the previous one, of voters (the aim is ensured by the increase in the number of militants and therefore of polling stations and by the possibility of organizing the elections within a greater and more complete scope).

The general political meaning of this long-term work plan is essentially as follows: it tends towards the hegemony on diffuse Europeanism. Today, Europeanism is a zero force politically, since due to the lack of a visible European interlocutor it is channelled into a thousand national rivulets which talk about Europe and is then spent. But this situation can be overturned with the primary elections, and political contact among the European leaderships of the EPC and diffuse Europeanism can be progressively established. In the same way in which someone who has liberal, socialist, trade union reactions immediately reports them to a given party or trade union, thus tomorrow someone who has European reactions will report them to the European People's Congress and no longer to the "Europeanists" of the national parties. When this is done, Europeanism will be a political force. It will then be a matter of using this force appropriately and decisively when power crisis situations arise. In such situations choices become strong, the masses awaken from their usual slumber and acquire the power of choice. Then the EPC will be able to stage the decisive battle.

The analysis of the possibility of exploiting the third type of political behaviour is equivalent to the analysis of the possibilities of creating the United States of Europe, since great political changes occur when the people start to act. The objective data of the European popular action are present: our states are weak and their weakness creates the diffuse Europeanism which we can transform into a political force: our states will have severe power crises, as in the past, since they are helpless regarding their greatest political problems. The uncertain data regard human will. If a sufficient number of men organize Europeanism politically, and if these men do the right things in the crucial moment, Europe will be made. The crucial moment may be relatively easy to exploit if we face "Europeanist" governments which are willing to yield easily, for example to transform, under our pressure, the direct election of the Assembly of the European Communities (provided by the Treaty of Rome) into an election for an assembly with the mandate to develop European political power. But the decisive moment may also be difficult, if we face nationalistic governments turned vicious by their own cowardice; then we will have to resort to passive resistance and at the end even to a

permanent presence in the streets. If the men suffice for the task, within a decade we will have the United States of Europe.

NOTE

[1] Financing can, and should, also be popular. Probably, the only possibility of remaining organizationally in contact with most of the voters is indeed the popular fund-raising campaign for Europe. This is possible, since it has a moral, rather than political, nature; if achieved, it would considerably increase the political temperature of the struggle for Europe. Asuitable means may be the "European money-box," which would be left in the voter's home and would remind him and his visitors of the European commitment.

Federalism in the History of Thought

JOHN ROBERT SEELEY

"Few political historians have more felicitously carried out the avowed purpose of combining a lucid and connected narrative of a period of the past with a statement of conclusions bearing directly upon political problems of the present." This judgement of Sir A.W. Ward[1] establishes the general nature of Sir John Robert Seeley's contribution in the most precise terms.[2] Of liberal culture and inspired with strong civil commitment, Seeley was persuaded that "it is impossible that the history of any states can be interesting unless it exhibits some sort of development,"[3] and that "no one can long study history without being haunted by the idea of development, of progress."[4] What is being discussed is not so much the practical problem of how to capture the reader's interest more effectively or how to keep the historian's active, but rather the theoretical problem of defining the nature of historical research.

It is evident, in fact, that this statement does not merely involve rejecting the so-called "histoire événementielle," or certain extravagances of positivist historiography which tends to reduce the historian to the rank of a meticulous document collector and to consider any attempt to attribute a meaning to events as arbitrary. It also involves the persuasion that if historiograpghy, on the one hand, must obviously use a scientific method of research, on the other hand it is not ethically and politically neutral in the choice of its object (which depends on the position and set of values the historian assumes towards the world), in the choice of events (the criterion of "importance" implies a value judgement) and in attributing a meaning to them (in other words, in their interpretation, which is necessarily linked to the "result," the definition of which belongs to the field of philosophy of history). Seeley's opinion, actually, was not different. His most serious work starts significantly with this statement: "It is a favourite maxim of mine that history, while it should be scientific in its method, should pursue a practical object. That

is, it should not merely gratify the reader's curiosity about the past, but modify his view of the present and his forecast of the future."[5]

It is therefore on the basis of these opinions that the boundaries between history and politics vanish in Seeley's theory. "The ultimate object of all my teaching here," he writes in lapidary style, "is to establish this fundamental connexion, to show that politics and history are only different aspects of the same study. There is a vulgar view of politics which sinks then into a mere struggle of interests and parties, and there is a foppish kind of history which aims only at literary display, which produces delightful books hovering between poetry and prose. These perversions, according to me, come from an unnatural divorce between two subjects which belong to each other. Politics are vulgar when they are not liberalized by history, and history fades into mere literature when it loses sight of its relation to practical politics."[6] *In the presence of such assertions, it is only natural that suspicion will be aroused in anyone who remembers the historical falsifications produced by Nazi-fascism and more generally by Nationalism (not to mention the more recent ones of Stalinism). This suspicion is justified. But awareness of the aberrations to which subordinating history to politics has led—and continues to lead —does not eliminate the links uniting them. Seeley was deeply convinced of this: "If once we grant that historic truth is attainable, and attainable it is, then there can be no further dispute about its supreme importance. It deals with facts of the largest and most momentous kind, with the causes of the decay and growth of Empires, with war and peace, with the sufferings or happiness of millions. It is by this consideration that I merge history in politics. I tell you that when you study English history you study not the past of England only, but her future."*[7] *If this is how things are, the real problem which has to be faced by any historian who does not hide his own political responsibility from himself, and indeed knows he cannot set aside his own viewpoint, is simply the purely ethical one of honesty; and its solution lies simply in declaring without any pretence what side one is on. Seeley did just that.*

* * *

Like many British Liberals of his time, and equally unknown from this point of view, Seeley was a federalist.[8] *A great federalist. The essay "The United States of Europe," whose text, published here in its unabridged version, reproduces in writing a lecture given in 1871 to the members of the Peace Society, can rightly be considered among the most lucid*

contributions to federalist literature. The reader who is patient enough to look through it may agree that when Beveridge presented Lord Lothian's Pacifism is not enough *calling it— or indisputable reasons— the lecture "better worth reading than almost anything else that has been said about international problems,"*[9] *perhaps he did not know about this essay of Seeley's.*

I do not wish to deprive the reader of the pleasure of discovering the clarity of reasoning in this essay for himself, or richness of its argumentation, its extraordinary perspicacity in singling out problems and pointing out those solutions found with great effort by some federalists during their long struggle in the postwar period. I would merely like to underline the key concepts that make up the structure of this essay and which are extraordinarily up-to-date in relation to the struggle led by federalists today, both in Europe and the rest of the world.

As in Lothian's essay, here too — and it is a lesson that federalist militants should never forget — the most lashing controversy, although conducted in the moderate language of a scholar and with typically British courtesy, is directed towards pacifists: "You cannot think, when you look at the state of Europe, that your cause is making much way ... I think you must yourselves admit that, whether it be defensible or not, war will not be abolished until some other method of settling quarrels has been introduced." War in fact has a rationality of its own, because it always represents an instrument to remedy international injustice. Therefore it is useless to exorcize it. Instead, an alternative system must be identified, proposed and affirmed to achieve the same result. And there truly exists an alternative system to remedy international injustice which avoids resorting to the barbarous instrument of war. This is the federal system, the only one capable of achieving peace, as every other expedient which does not subordinate states to a supra-national power belongs to the system of absolute sovereignty, that is to the system of international anarchy or, to express it through an image, to the world of war. Seeley reminds pacifists, those beautiful souls who fight the hard facts of violence with nice words, that in diplomatic conferences, when an agreement is reached to avoid war, the settlement is an adjustment "of forces, not of rights;" that it is not enough to invoke international arbitration and the foundation of a court delegated to administer it because "a state is implied in a law-court, and, as a necessary consequence, ... an international law-court implies an international or federal state;" that to achieve peace it is not enough to establish a simple league of states like the American Confederation or the German Bund, *but it is*

necessary to create "a federation with a complete apparatus of powers, legislative, executive and judicial, and raised above all dependence upon the state governments;" that the indispensable condition for this independence is that "the power of levying troops be assigned to the federation only, and be absolutely denied to the individual states."

One might remark that, except for the effective polemic against the pacifists, these concepts, illustrated in the first part of the essay, are already present for the most part in the Federalist Papers. The remark would not be groundless. However, it would not undermine the feeling of admiring surprise aroused by Seeley's meditation because of its lively awareness of the supreme value of peace and the incomparable importance of the lesson of American federalism concerning it. And this in spite the European political culture of his time — all of it without exception: from Liberal to Democratic to Socialist — was debating which form of régime to set up within the existing states, considered the nation-state a natural, and therefore unchanging, framework of political struggle and considered peace a spontaneous by-product of the internal régime.

What is wholly original in Seeley's analysis emerges in the second part of his essay. It is not enough to merely point out the suitable institutional solution to attain peace. In the first place, peace is becoming the supreme value. This is true not only because of the increasingly destructive nature of modern warfare, but also because the national principle is destined increasingly to poison international relations. "Wars, Seeley remarks, seem growing more frightful and more gigantic; the more victories the nationality principle wins, the nearer we seem to approach a period of energetic popular states waging war upon each other with the unrelieved fierceness of national antipathy." Really, "half a century ago it might have been thought that war was merely the guilty game of kings and aristocracies, and that the introduction of popular government would make it obsolete: but I think we have seen enough to convince us that peoples can quarrel as well as kings; that scarcely any cause of war which operated in monarchical Europe will cease to operate in the popular Europe of the future; and that the wars of the peoples will be far more gigantic, more wasteful of blood and suffering, than ever were the wars of the kings." And his historian's eye that studies the past "to be wise before the event,"[10] looks so far as to see what a hegemonic attempt by Germany could mean for Europe: "The history of the last two centuries shows that the combined force of all the European states is not always clearly superior to the force of one. Louis XIV and Napoleon were humbled with the greatest possible difficulty, and we begin to doubt at the

present day whether Europe could effectively resist united Germany, if Germany should enter upon a path of ambition."

Therefore the Europeans must unite into a federation which "must have a constitution, as well as the states that compose it." A difficult, but not impossible objective. First of all, as "the federation wanted is not merely an arrangement between governments, but a real union of peoples," "it can never be attained by mere diplomatic methods, or by the mere action of governments, but only by a universal popular movement." And this movement, to be "created in each European state" will have to become "large enough in the end to impose the measure upon governments that would in many cases be from instinctive interest bitterly hostile to it." This ambitious strategic objective is not utopian either. In fact "it is a mere misconception to judge of the possibility of a work merely by considering the weight to be moved; what has to be considered is the proportion between the weight and the power." And in evaluating the possible consistency of this force one must consider the increasingly widespread awareness of the atrocity of war, of the universal values of culture, religious feelings, of oppressed peoples' hopes.

The latter consideration regards the historical significance of the European federation. Unfortunately the American federation has not left any lasting mark on the course of history. "If the Americans have achieved what is here proposed for Europe, they did so in circumstances infinitely more favourable;" so much that "it may be said that the federation was given to them by Providence." There would be an altogether different meaning in yoking "together indissolubly so many rival races and rival states and rival religions, the Englishman and the Frenchman, the German and the Slav, the German and Italian." Although this might seem irreverent towards the fathers of the American federation, it is a fact that the European federation would represent the first grand construction on the road towards peace because it would arise "like a majestic temple over the tomb of war."

* * *

Because he adopted this point of view, Seeley was able to give an exceptionally valuable historiographic contribution. A brief account is sufficient.

Seeley had taken up from Leopold von Ranke the Hegelian principle that "history has to do with the state, that it investigates the growth and changes of a certain corporate society, which acts through certain

functionaries and certain assemblies ... history is not concerned with individuals;" [11] *and he had also taken from Ranke the principle that not the state but the political system is the framework of the historical process. Ranke's analysis concerning this is, however, reductively Eurocentric, although not in the same sense as certain forms of contemporary historiography and cultural anthropology which, having affirmed the indifference of civilizations, deny the very concept of historical process. It is so because his disregard of historical phenomena outside Europe and its political system had prevented him from fully understanding the very historical process that he intended to understand and describe, a historical process fully revealed in Europe but which already had a worldwide dimension.*

Seeley in fact observed that the struggles of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries "are treated by historians of the Balance of Power from a point of view much too exclusively European. This strikes me particularly in the picture they give of the career of Napoleon. They see in him simply a ruler who had the ambition to undertake the conquest of all Europe and who had the genius almost to succeed ... He intended to make great conquests, and he made great conquests, but the conquests he made were not those he intended to make ... His ambition was all directed towards the New World. He is the Titan whose dream it is to restore that Greater France which had fallen in the struggles of the eighteenth century, and to overthrow that Greater Britain which had been established on its ruins." [12] *And again: "Historians of those centuries have kept in view mainly two or perhaps three great movements, first, the Reformation and its consequences, secondly, the constitutional movements in each country leading to liberty in England and to revolution through despotism in France. They have also considered the great Ascendancies which from time to time have arisen in Europe, that of the House of Austria, that of the House of Bourbon, and again that of Napoleon. These great movements have been, as it were, the framework in which they have fitted all particular incidents. The framework is insufficient and too exclusively European. It furnishes no place for a multitude of most important occurrences, and the movement which it overlooks is perhaps greater and certainly more continuous and durable than any of those which it recognizes.*

Each view of Europe separately is true. Europe is a great Church and Empire breaking up into distinct kingdoms and national or voluntary Churches, as those say who fix their eyes on the Reformation; it is a group of monarchies in which popular freedom has been gradually developing

itself, as the constitutional lawyer says; it is a group of states which balance themselves uneasily against each other, liable therefore to be thrown off its equilibrium by the preponderance of one of them, as the international lawyer says. But all these accounts are incomplete and leave almost half the facts unexplained. We must add, 'It is a group of states, of which the five westernmost have been acted upon by a steadfast gravitation towards the New World and have dragged in their train great New World Empires.' " [13] *This is proved by the fact that "the hidden cause which made Ministers rise and fall, which convulsed Europe and led it into war and revolution was, far more than might be supposed, the standing rivalry of interests in the New World."* [14]

In this perspective a new vision of European events becomes possible for Seeley in the modern era: "In the history of the relation of the New World to the Old the three centuries, the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth, have each their marked character. The sixteenth century may be called the Spain-and-Portugal period. As yet the New World is monopolized by the two nations which discovered it, by the country of Vasco da Gama and the adopted country of Columbus, until late in the century Spain and Portugal become one state in the hands of Philip II. In the seventeenth century the other three states, France, Holland and England, enter the colonial field. The Dutch take the lead. In the course of their war with Spain they get possession of most of the Portuguese possessions, which have now become Spanish, in the East Indies; they even succeed for a time in annexing Brazil. France and England soon after establish their colonies in North America ... During the course of this century a certain change takes place in the relative colonial importance of the five states. Portugal declines; so later does Holland. Spain remains in a condition of immobility; her vast possessions are not lost, but additions are no longer made to them, and they remain secluded, like China itself, from intercourse with the rest of the world. England and France have both decidedly advanced; Colbert has placed France in the first rank of commercial countries, and she has explored the Mississippi. But the English colonies have decidedly the advantage in population. And thus it is that the eighteenth century witnesses the great duel of France and England for the New World," [15] *a duel defined by Seeley as "the second Hundred Years' War" starting with the 1688 Revolution.* [16] *It follows that von Ranke's judgement of Napoleon, who according to him had exclusively a hegemonic European plan, is limited and for this reason incorrect. Napoleon "sees in England never the island, the European state, but always the World-Empire" and "accordingly he decides and*

convinces the Directory that the best way to carry on the contest with England is by occupying Egypt, and at the same time by stirring up Tippoo Sultan to war with the Calcutta government."[17]

Together with the conflict of power between states, Seeley identified a fundamental factor of change in the development of science and technology. Thus trade, which already at the beginning of the 16th century began to spread worldwide, appeared to him as "a vast historic cause" which "had gradually the effect of bringing to an end the old medieval structure of society and introducing the industrial ages."[18] *But the development of science and technology is not only a fundamental factor of social change, it also marked the fate of political communities: " ... the same inventions which make vast political unions possible tend to make states which are on the old scale of magnitude unsafe, insignificant, second-rate."*[19] *This marvellous opening over the wide spaces of the world scene, which ever since the very beginning of the modern era have represented the actual framework of the historical process, in other words the framework of the development of productive forces and of the power conflict between states, allowed Seeley to predict something which, formulated as far back as 1883, seems simply wonderful: "If the United States and Russia hold together for another half century, they will at the end of that time completely dwarf such old European states such as France and Germany and depress them into a second class. They will do the same to England."*[20] *"Russia and the United States will surpass in power the states now called great as much as the great country-states of the sixteenth century surpassed Florence."*[21]

Let us stop here. But not without having expressed one last consideration. It is well-known that it was Seeley himself who opened new horizons for Ludwig Dehio, not only because many of the crucial opinions mentioned above can be found in his Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie,[22] *but also, and above all, because it was in actual fact Seeley's analysis that allowed him to go beyond that limit of Ranke's research that the English historian had so clearly identified and, as Seeley was able to interpret in completely new terms Napoleon's grand design, thus Dehio was able to place William II and Hitler in the right historical perspective, that of the dawning of the world system of states and of the end of the European system of states. In these two great historians, so closely linked, federalists can find precious elements to reflect on the past with new categories and from a new standpoint. "Renewal of the historical outlook is one of the great tasks of the present hour,"*[23] *said Dehio. And he was right; because, given the links between history and politics established by*

Seeley, renewing the framework to think over the past is the same thing as renewing the framework to think of the future.

NOTES

[1] *The Cambridge History of English Literature*, vol. XII, p. 92, London, 1932.

[2] Born in London in 1834, he studied at Christ's College, Cambridge, where he took classical languages and culture. From 1863 to 1869 he taught Latin at the University College in London, where he published *Ecce Homo* in 1865, a biography of Jesus that roused a storm of criticism. From 1869 he was Professor of Modern History at Cambridge, where his lessons at once found widespread favour. His concept of history, of its close ties with politics and his fondness for the European and world scenario openly contrasted with academic tradition. According to Carlo Antoni, Seeley is "the greatest English historian of this period" and "the one that is most influenced by Ranke" (*Enciclopedia Treccani*, vol. XXXII, p.788), the great German historian of the European state system, the one who promoted the historiographical trend that inspired the works of Ludwig Dehio (*The Federalist*, XXX, 1988, no.2). Seeley's most important works are *The Life and Times of Stein, or Germany and Prussia in the Napoleonic Age* (Cambridge, 1878), which considers the problem of the origin and character of early German Liberalism and its contrast with Ranke's (and Bismarck's) "supremacy of foreign policy," and *The Expansion of England* (London, 1883), which is extensively mentioned in this text. He died of cancer at Cambridge in 1895, after completing the work *The Growth of British Policy*, which was to be posthumously published that same year.

[3] J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1971, p. 96. To those who invited him to make history interesting Seeley, after stating that "interesting in the proper sense" is that "which affects our interests," answered with a touch of impertinence: "I cannot make history more interesting than it is, except by falsifying it. And therefore, when I meet a person who does not find history interesting, it does not occur to me to alter history, — I try to alter *him*." (p.243). These are the last words of his work.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 7. Of the opinion that this was a central orientation of Seeley's thought is also Sir A.W. Ward (*The Cambridge History of English Literature*, *cit.*, p.91). George Smith is of this opinion too: "In his lectures he adopted, though he did not formulate, the view that 'history is past politics and politics present history'." (*The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford, 1882, p.1175).

[6] J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, *cit.*, p. 133.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

[8] Credit must be given to John Pinder for having illustrated how lively the debate on federalist culture was in British Liberal thought in the second half of the 19th century up to the works of Robbins and Lothian. Pinder has shown how this debate, besides Lord Acton, whose theoretical contribution to the critique of Nationalism was already widely known, involved people such as J. S. Mill, W. E. Gladstone, J. Bryce, A.V. Dicey, F.A. Hayek, J. Bentham and E.A. Freeman (see "The Federal Idea and the British Liberal Tradition," report presented at the Second Lothian Memorial Conference, held at the

Royal Holloway and Bedford New College on April 3rd, 4th and 5th, 1989, through the initiative of the Lothian Foundation. The relative papers are being printed). It is John Pinder again who, in that same report, pointed out Seeley's federalist contribution and in particular the work republished on this occasion in this magazine. This text, which I obtained from John Pinder, has never been quoted, as far as I know, in other works of federalists, to whom he was probably unknown till now. As well as in this text, Seeley quite openly took up federalist positions in his volume *The Expansion of England*, *cit.*, in which he strongly hopes for the transformation of the British Empire, with the exception of India, into a federation. He was also a member of the Imperial Federation League which, from a different point of view, strove for the same goal from 1884 to 1893 (see Michael Burgess, "Imperial Federation. The Federal Plan of the Imperial Federation League: Milestone or Tombstone?," report presented at the Second Lothian Memorial Conference, *cit.*) The action of this league was very important for the formation of the Kindergarten, the circle of young people gathered around Lord Milner, to which Philip Kerr and Lionel Curtis belonged and from which came the project for the South African Federation (see A. Bosco, *Lord Lothian. Un pioniere del federalismo. 1882-1940*, Milan, 1989, p. 36. For the influence exerted by Seeley over Kerr, see *ibid.*, p. 17).

[9] Lord Lothian, *Pacifism is not enough nor patriotism either*, London, Oxford University Press, 1941, pp. 1-2.

[10] J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, *cit.*, p. 136.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85. Always disputing the historiography dominant in his country (but are his statements not true, perhaps for different reasons, also for historians of other countries?), Seeley observed: "Now it appears to me that English historians fail in the later periods of England because they have traced one great development to its completion and do not perceive that, if they would advance further, they must look out for some other development. More or less consciously they have always before their minds the idea of constitutional liberty ... It is a misrepresentation to describe England in George III's reign as mainly occupied in resisting the encroachments of a somewhat narrow-minded king ... England was then engaged in other and vaster enterprises" (pp. 96 and 97). And again: "I constantly remark both in our popular histories and in occasional allusions to the eighteenth century what a faint and confused impression that period has left upon the national memory. In a great part of it we see nothing but stagnation. The wars seem to lead to nothing, and we do not perceive the working of any new political ideas. That time seems to have created little, so that we can only think of it as prosperous, but not as memorable. Those dim figures George I and George II, the long tame administrations of Walpole and Pelham, the commercial war with Spain, the battles of Dettingen and Fontenoy, the foolish Prime Minister Newcastle, the dull brawls of the Wilkes period, the miserable American war; everywhere alike we seem to remark a want of greatness, a distressing commonness and flatness in men and affairs. But what we chiefly miss is unity ... We have an unfortunate habit of distributing historical affairs under reigns. We do this mechanically, as it were, even in periods where we recognize, nay, where we exaggerate, the insignificance of the Monarch ... For a plain example of the principle take the reign of George III. What can be more absurd than to treat this long period of sixty years as if it had any historical unity, simply because one man was king during the whole of it? What then are we to substitute for the king as a principle of division? Evidently great events." (pp. 19 and 20).

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 89.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 62

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

[22] Ludwig Dehio, *Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie*, Krefeld, Scherpe Verlag, 1948. For an interpretation of Dehio's text in the sense mentioned here see "Ludwig Dehio," in *The Federalist*, XXX, 1988, no. 2. It is worth remembering how Dehio, in the introduction to his *Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie* refers explicitly to Seeley in these terms: "He made his own a favourite thought of Ranke: that from the foreign policy of states derives the supreme principle of their actions; and guided by this principle he came to an outlook of the present tendencies of world politics that allowed him a prophetic glance at the future. We are accustomed to speaking of a Bismarck era of worldwide historical importance regarding the two decades following 1870. But Seeley does not even mention Bismarck's name and passing over Germany, indeed, the old continent, as if it were a medium-height mountain, looks straight ahead at the two towering powers: Russia and the Union" (p.17).

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

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UNITED STATES OF EUROPE *

Gentlemen, — But for the request which you made to me I should not have undertaken to treat this subject. I do not profess to be able to treat it with the fulness and precision it requires, but I cannot refuse to communicate such views as I have at a time when every hint may be valuable, and when a society such as this, prepared and specially organized to avail itself of every hint, asks for my advice.

That war ought, if possible, to be abolished, you are convinced already; and as I am convinced of it too, we might take this point for granted. But I should like very briefly to answer one or two arguments by which many people persuade themselves that war is, if not a good thing, yet a thing which has so much good in it that, considering the immense difficulty of abolishing it, it may on the whole be allowed to continue; or that war is so deeply rooted in human nature, and so closely entangled with what is best in human nature, that the abolition of it would involve the remaking of man, and possibly upon a less noble type. It is very

* This text was published in March, 1871, in *Macmillan's Magazine*, London,Vol. XXIII, pp.436-448. Notes were added by the editor for an easier reading of the passage.

common, in the first place, to hear people say that war is but the natural expression of malignant passions, and therefore that you cannot abolish it except by eradicating those passions first. We must begin, people say, at the root.

"This huckster put down war! can he tell
Whether war be a cause or a consequence?
Put down the passions that make earth hell;
Down with ambition, avarice, pride;
Jealousy, down! cut off from the mind
The bitter springs of anger and fear;
Down too, down at your own fireside
With the evil tongue and the evil ear,
For each is at war with mankind."

The poetry is good, but I cannot admit the reasoning. Is it impossible, then, to check or prevent bad actions except by eradicating the bad passions from which they spring? If so, civil society itself is based upon a mistake, for civil society has for its principal object the prevention of private war, and it does not proceed by this method. If war between individuals, between townships, between counties, can be prevented without eradicating the passions from which it springs, why not in nations? Yet war between individuals *has* been abolished. Nay, it is easy to point out instances in which war has been permanently abolished between particular nations. England and Scotland fought like cat and dog for centuries, and now they are bound together in an indissoluble concord. Here is a great political achievement. Here we have a triumph of that kind of skill which contrives the happiness of societies. And by what means was this secular feud healed? Was it by first eradicating out of the minds of Englishmen and Scotchmen their mutual dislike? No, but the political and material union came first. The sense of a common interest created a common government, by creating the habit of social intercourse, gradually obliterated hostile feelings. The mutual hatred *was* eradicated out of the hearts of the two nations, but this, instead of being the preliminary condition of union, was the last result of it. When we hear it said that Englishmen and Frenchmen, or Frenchmen and Germans, will not for hundreds of years lose their antipathies sufficiently to be united, let us remember the case of England and Scotland, and reply, But they may be united sufficiently to lose their antipathies.

Another argument is, that war, with all its horrors, has something grandly beneficent about it. It is not the mere medley of destruction and

misery that it may appear at first sight. It is not a mere appeal to physical force. On the contrary, a Providential justice constantly guides the issues of war. The weaker side, being in the right, is found unexpectedly triumphant; the arrogant and oppressive power collapses suddenly in the moment of trial. Great entanglements in human affairs are cut through by the sword of war: international disputes that have lasted for ages are decided once for all, and on the whole justly. These appearances of Providential justice, acting on a vast scale, are so elevating and awe-inspiring, that we cannot help thinking the world would be a less sacred place, and human life meaner, if they were to cease. No more Marathons, no more Morgartens! No more plays like the Persae, no more hymns like Isaiah's triumph over Sennacherib! Would not poetry and prophecy lose their highest theme, and mere comfort and vulgar prosperity reign where great conflicts of good and evil had raged, and great Divine dooms been pronounced?

It would be unjust to confound this theory with the mediaeval theory which lay at the basis of the wager by battle. Yet it is worth while to remember that our ancestors thought a Providential justice revealed itself in the conflicts of individuals as well as of nations, and yet that the wager of battle fell ultimately out of use, and no one at the present day wishes to revive it. Yet I suppose even that theory of our ancestors was not purely superstitious. The ordeal by battle was not quite simply an appeal to physical force. The consciousness of being wrong did often make one combatant weak, and the consciousness of being right make the other strong. Now and then, it is likely, there occurred some case like that of Scott's Bois-Guilbert, when the spectators unanimously acknowledged with awe the judgment of God. Only, if in such decisions there might be some justice, on the other hand there was not nearly enough of it. The feeling of a good cause went some way, but physical strength, skill, agility, accident, might decide the contest also. In the meanwhile, was it not open to adopt another course by which the case would be decided on its merits alone? In the ordeal of battle, justice could be only an ingredient; in the legal investigation there might, if sufficient pains were taken, be perfect and unmixed justice.

No doubt in a contest between nations moral forces operate far more powerfully than in a contest between individuals. What makes a nation successful in war is self-devotion and capacity of discipline, quite as much as numbers, wealth, or military science. Now self-devotion and the capacity of discipline are almost identical with virtue, so that in war it may be most truly said that virtue is power. Moreover, the just cause will

attract the sympathy of other states, while the unjust cause will alienate them. Again, the just cause will give to a nation unanimity while the war lasts, while the nation that is fighting for the wrong will be apt to grow discontented with the burdens of war, and to paralyse its government by disaffection and disunion. If, then, we may hold that the old trial by battle was not quite a simple appeal to physical force, it is certain that in the case of nations it is very far from being so, and all that poets and prophets have said about the Divine justice revealing itself in the decisions of war may very well be true.

If there were no other way of deciding international disputes, I should find consolation in this. It would be pleasant to think that in the midst of carnage and desolation justice is still, and every now and then signally, vindicated; that even where men abandon themselves to destructive passions, they cannot escape from those laws which are a curb upon destructive passions; that the spirit of order, constructiveness, harmony, broods marvellously over the very chaos of discord. This is just one of those contrasts that poetic imagination takes hold of — the dark cloud threatening to overwhelm the world, and then, while you wait in consternation, the soft rainbow suddenly and noiselessly girdling it.

But if those ancient prophets who spoke of the Lord of Hosts had lived in our day, I think they would have spoken a very different language. It is in comparison with no justice at all that the justice of war is admirable: compared with any properly organized legal system, it is surely deplorable. As in the other case, if there is some justice in war, there is not anything like enough of it. A proper legal decision is not one into which justice enters, but one into which nothing but justice enters. And unless we suppose in national affairs not merely a Providence, but such a special Providence as we consider it superstitious to suppose in the case of individuals, it is impossible to consider the decisions of war as answering that description. The virtue of a nation is one of its munitions of war: true, but only one among many. Moreover, it is distinct from the justice of the particular cause for which the nation fights. War is a judge that does not look very closely into evidence, but decides according to general testimonies to character. For instance, it may be argued that the defeat of the French in the present war[1] is due to their demoralization, and to the corruption which an immoral government had introduced into their military organization; but all these causes of defeat would have operated equally, had their case against Germany been just, and they would, to all appearance, have been equally unsuccessful.

But suppose war, instead of merely having an element of justice in it,

arrived at the just decision as securely as a judge and jury; would it be defensible? You, I believe, say it is not defensible in any case. I should say, that if there were no other way of obtaining international justice, it would be defensible. I think you must yourselves admit that, whether it be defensible or not, war will not be abolished until some other method of settling quarrels has been introduced. You cannot think, when you look at the state of Europe, that your cause is making much way. Half a century ago it might have been thought that war was merely the guilty game of kings and aristocracies, and that the introduction of popular government would make it obsolete: but I think we have seen enough to convince us that peoples can quarrel as well as kings; that scarcely any cause of war which operated in monarchical Europe will cease to operate in the popular Europe of the future; and that the wars of the peoples will be far more gigantic, more wasteful of blood and suffering, than ever were the wars of the kings. Is it not, then, time to relinquish a course of argument which has been found hitherto convincing to so few — particularly if another course of argument be open to you which all alike are prepared to listen to? So long as you say, War is not defensible in any case, and nations must be prepared to take wrong rather than have recourse to it, you may know by long experience that you preach to deaf ears. But everyone has a sufficiently strong sense of the horrors of war to listen eagerly if you suggest a practicable way of settling international quarrels peaceably. If it once became clear to a large number of people that there is a satisfactory alternative to war, they would instantly begin to look upon war as you do — that is, as the most enormous and intolerable of evils. If people knew clearly what to put in its place, be sure that you would not need any longer to complain of their indifference or coldness in the cause.

Whether rightly or wrongly, most people think the tribunal of war, with all its faults, better than no tribunal at all. You will say, No one proposes to abolish war without substituting anything for it: as a matter of course, arbitration must be substituted for it. But the mistake of all peace advocates I have met with is, that they do not enter into details on the subject of this arbitration in such a way as to convince people that it is feasible. To establish a system of international arbitration is surely not so very simple a thing. It strikes most people as a mere chimera.

The common impression about it — utterly mistaken, as I believe — is that such plans suppose human nature to be far more virtuous than it is; that it will be time enough to take them into consideration when mankind have been softened by five centuries more of civilization. So long as people think this, and as you do not force them to think otherwise, they

will never take seriously into consideration any scheme to abolish war, because they are not prepared to abolish war without an equivalent, and you propose no equivalent that they can regard as practicable. But this indifference that people show is not to be mistaken, as so many peace advocates mistake it, for an insensibility to the evils which war produces. The proper cure for it is not invectives against war or Erckmann-Chatrian novels, admirable as they are. The proper cure for it is a feasible and statesmanlike scheme of arbitration — such a scheme as should take account of details, and provide contrivances to meet practical difficulties.

If the Peace Society had such a scheme matured, and practical statesmen ready to defend it and push it, I believe the peace question would instantly pass into a new phase. It would no longer be, as it is now to most people, a question of quarrels settled by war or quarrels not settled at all, the 'wild justice of revenge' or no justice whatever, wild or civilized; it would then become a question of trial by battle or trial by law, a question to which only one answer can be returned. If it were once shown to be possible to decide international disputes by law, what argument would remain for war, and who would be so insane as to utter a word in excuse for it? You would see all the indifference you complain of pass away in the twinkling of an eye; you would find no more occasion for declamation upon the horrors of war, for computing the number of lives lost, the number of orphans made, the number of pipes of blood shed, the ruin of property, the retarding of progress, the prolonging of political servitude, and all the other consequences of this great plague of society. You would soon discover that the apathy you attribute to callousness was really due to hopelessness, and was dissipated like a mist by the first gleam of rational hope. Instead of meeting with no response, you would soon be astonished at the unanimity and the depth of the sympathy you would excite. You would find that if the work you have undertaken be greater than was ever undertaken before, there was at hand to help you a power far greater than ever politician wielded. If an opinion rising in the people and slowly gathering strength under the influence of rational argument from practical men was able to force the Emancipation of the Negro and Free Trade from cold or reluctant legislatures, be sure that the agitation then roused was an unformidable, an almost imperceptible movement, compared with that which would convulse Europe, and overawe governments, and make light of all the world-old traditions of military monarchies, if once men caught sight of the truth that war is not merely a terrible thing or a wasteful thing or an uncivilized thing — all this they have long known — but that it is an unnecessary and abolishable

thing. The war-giant, whom now we keep as we keep the hangman, and regard as a detestable but necessary drudge, with what triumphant joy would the liberated populace turn on him! He would be "slain in puny battle by wives with spits and boys with stones"!

The object of this lecture, then, is to offer some suggestions to those who may wish to find out in what way a system of international arbitration can practically be realized. It will be seen that the introduction of such a system involves a number of vast political changes. This of course will be no news to you, accustomed as you are to hear your scheme called "Utopian." But I shall venture to assert that the scheme, vast as it is, does not really deserve to be called Utopian, because a Utopian scheme is not merely a vast one, but one which proposes an end disproportioned to the means at command; while the means available here, the forces and influences that may be called in for the accomplishment of this work, are as enormous as is the difficulty of the work itself.

I shall endeavour to establish the following propositions.

1st. The international system wanted is something essentially different from, and cannot be developed out of, the already existing system by which European affairs are settled in Congresses[2] of the great Powers.

2nd. The system wanted necessarily involves a federation of all the Powers that are to reap the benefits of it.

3rd. In order to be really vigorous and effectual, such a system absolutely requires a federation of the closer kind; that is, a federation not after the model of the late German *Bund*, but after the model of the United States, — a federation with a complete apparatus of powers, legislative, executive and judicial, and raised above all dependence upon the State governments.

4th. The indispensable condition of success in such a system is that the power of levying troops be assigned to the federation only, and be absolutely denied to the individual States.

I do not think it can be necessary to be very minute or prolix in explaining that the present system of Congresses is not at all the thing we are in search of. That system is useful for a particular purpose, but our purpose is altogether different. We want something in the nature of a law-court for international differences. Now a European Congress has nothing of the nature of a law-court, and when people call it an Areopagus, or apply to it other appellatives proper to judicial assemblies, they are surely guilty of an inadvertence which needs only to be very briefly indicated. A law-court may of course have many defects, and yet not cease to be a law-court; but the defect of the European Congress is not an incidental

and venial but a radical, and therefore fatal defect. What should we think of a judicial bench every member of which was closely connected by interest with the litigants, and on which in the most important cases the litigants themselves invariably sat? There are cases where the European Congress has worn, perhaps, some superficial appearance of impartiality. When the kingdom of Belgium was constituted, it might be represented that the King of Holland was convened before a European Court, and judgment given against him in the name of the general sense of justice. Who does not know, however, how utterly untrue this description would be? Who does not know that the principal agents in that settlement were thinking of quite other things than the general sense of justice, that a diplomatic contest was waged between England and France, and that the question was not even of the interests, much less of the rights of the parties before the Court, but of reconciling the interests of two of the judges on the bench in such a way as to hinder them from fighting. The judges, in short, so far from being, as judges should be, personally indifferent to the issue of the process, felt the keenest possible interest in it, and never concealed that they did so. The settlement then made was an adjustment of forces, not of rights; it has proved a most important and beneficial settlement, but it does not at all the more on that account deserve to be called judicial.

But it is not principally for such cases that an international court is wanted. The world is in danger not so much from petty differences between Dutch and Belgians as from prodigious outbreaks of national jealousy between France and Germany, England and Russia. Now in these most important cases the European Congress ceases to wear even the superficial appearance of a law-court that it has in the less important ones. That the judges should be avowedly partial is quite enough to strip them of all judicial character; but when the litigants are among the great European Powers, they are *judges in their own cause*. Surely I need not say a word more on this head.

In short, an ambassador cannot possibly be at the same time a judge, and a congress of plenipotentiaries cannot possibly be a law-court. There ought to be no representation of interests on a judicial bench. You have a good court, not where both parties are represented, but where neither.

We are so accustomed to see law-courts which are admirably efficient for private litigation, that it does not at first strike us as a difficult thing to create a satisfactory court for international litigation. We think nothing but the will is wanting. Several new courts have been constituted in our own time in England, and they have worked well enough. What difficulty

can there be in constituting one more? A very obvious difficulty! To establish a court within a State is one thing, and how to do it has long been well understood; but it is quite another thing, and a thing which hitherto has never been satisfactorily accomplished, to constitute a court outside the range of any political organization. It must be evident as soon as it is stated that the judicial system of a State is closely connected with its other institutions; that it grows with the growth of the whole, and is modified in its development. Can we imagine the law-courts at Westminster existing in an isolated condition, severed from their vital connection with the other organs of the State? Yet this is analogous to what is proposed when an international court is recommended. Because law-courts thrive under the shelter of a State, it is proposed to set up a law-court, as it were, in the open air — a law-court unconnected with any executive and with any legislative power.

I do not assert that such a court can never be established, simply because there has not yet been any example of it. But I point out that no presumption of its success can be drawn from the success of existing courts, since these courts have succeeded under widely different conditions. Because apples are easily and abundantly produced upon trees, you cannot presume — at least you cannot count confidently — upon producing them without trees.

But now I go further, and point out that the law-court is not only historically found invariably within the State, but also that it takes all its character and efficiency from the State. For judges cannot constitute themselves, nor can they regulate for themselves all the details of their procedure; and again, judges cease to be judges, and become something essentially different, if their decisions are not enforced. A judge is not simply a person who pleases himself with weighing evidence and pronouncing decisions; he is a person who has been invested with his office by a power recognized to be competent to confer office, and he is also a person whose decisions are regularly enforced by a power recognized to be competent to enforce them. A judge, therefore, or bench of judges, cannot exist in isolation, but stands necessarily connected with other powers — a nominating power, a regulating power, and an enforcing power. But where all these powers meet — a power of nominating officers, a regulating or legislative power, a judicial power, and a power of executing sentences — there you have the complete organization of a State, and thus it is matter of demonstration that a State is implied in a law-court, and, as a necessary consequence, that an international law-court implies an international or federal State.

Perhaps it will be answered, "A State, if you like to call it so, or something almost equivalent to a State, will no doubt be required, but there will be no occasion for anything half so cumbrous or elaborate as the organization of a State generally is. Some federal apparatus must be arranged to regulate and sustain the international court, but the machinery requisite will be of the slightest and most inexpensive kind." Is this so certain? But even if it be certain, still we have a problem of federation before us, and not merely of constituting a law-court. The nations of Europe must constitute themselves into some sort of federation, or the international court can never come into existence. The judicial assembly is inconceivable without a legislative assembly of some kind, however limited in competence, however rarely summoned; it is inconceivable without officers of some kind executing its sentences.

When once we understand that the question is of forming a confederation[3] of the States of Europe, we naturally refer to the various experiments in federation that history commemorates. What we want to discover, is the slightest bond of federation that will be effectual, for it is evident that the closer the federal bond the more complicated will be the organization required, and the greater the sacrifice demanded of each individual State. Federation, but the slightest possible federation, will be our maxim: the work will be difficult enough in any case; let us reduce the difficulties to the lowest amount.

Now history will suggest to us — this is the most important thing I have to say to you — that we must abandon this plan, which it is so natural to conceive, of a slight but effectual federation. As we were driven by the very conditions of the problem to the notion of a federation, we shall find ourselves driven by history to the notion of a close federation as the only one which can possibly be effectual. Federation appears in history as a problem often undertaken but seldom successfully solved. We cannot pick from history a number of different types of federation all equally satisfactory and each suited to some particular exigency. On the contrary, what we find is one or two federations which have been successful, and several which have failed helplessly and ignominiously. This may show us that to say that the establishment of an international court involves federation, is to say that it involves the solving of one of the most difficult of problems; and that, so far from making light of the federal apparatus required as something easily arranged, we ought to bestow the most careful attention upon it as being the part of our task which is most delicate, and in which failure is most to be feared.

I need not go back for instances of unsuccessful federation to the

helpless Amphictyonic league of ancient Greece, which afforded a most convenient weapon for the ambition of Philip, nor even to that Holy Roman Empire which was baffled and mocked by Frederick of Prussia. I shall refer to two more modern instances, the German *Bund* which fell to pieces in 1866, and that old American Confederation which gave way in 1789 to the American Union. Here you have two federations, both of which failed because they were not close enough. The American Confederation ought to be particularly instructive to us, because the causes of its failure were so clearly seen at the time, that it was found possible to replace it by an amended institution which has verified the calculations of its authors by displaying itself to mankind as the one pre-eminently successful federation of history. The German *Bund* is instructive in another way, as having embraced some of the very nations for whom our proposed federation is intended. Most of the schemes of international arbitration which I have heard broached since the calamities of the last half-year have forced the subject upon our attention, were realized, it seems to me, in the German *Bund*, and stand condemned in the history of its inefficiency and its fall.

As these two examples show us what to avoid in federation, the American Union shows us what to imitate. When I call this the successful federation *par excellence*, I do not mean to commit myself to a general eulogy of American institutions. The Americans are a nation absorbed in production, a nation, therefore, among whom the higher culture has had to contend with great difficulties: their political life is dragged down by the miscellaneous swarm of emigrants to whom they give power too easily and too soon. Their system may fail in a hundred points, but this does not prevent it from being gloriously successful as a federation. They have found a higher political unit for mankind; they have found a name greater than that of State; they have created a virtue beyond patriotism. That union of nations, which here is a wish, a Utopia, a religion, has advanced a great step towards practical reality on the other side of the Atlantic. There you have already what seems so chimerical here — States subsisting side by side as amicably as departments or counties; to protect frontiers like that of France no more need for a Metz or a Strasburg than on the boundary of Middlesex and Hertfordshire; and in the budget of States as large as England no grant for a war establishment. No doubt their circumstances were far more fortunate than ours in Europe, but what they accomplished was an unprecedented thing, while Europe has now the advantage of America's example. But it will be said, If you would abolish war, look anywhere but in that direction. The United States have not long

emerged from one of the most gigantic wars in history. True, their peace was interrupted, but they have recovered it: veritable American peace, a peace unknown in Europe, a peace without war establishments. And if their war was gigantic, it must not be confounded with the wars of Europe. No, remember that it was a war against war. It was a war for the principle of union, a war against the principle of division, no more like the wars of Europe than the violence used by a policeman is like criminal violence, or the homicide of the executioner is like murder. Had the Secessionists had their will, two standing armies, or perhaps more, would probably at this moment be confronting each other in America, and the miserable, ruinous system of Europe would be in full operation there. But because the Americans went through one gigantic war, they were able to disarm at the end of it, and may cherish a reasonable hope of never being obliged — at least, within the Union — tc wage war again. Well did President Lincoln say that he fought to preserve the Union, and not to abolish slavery. The preservation of the Union was by much the more important object, for it was the greatest step mankind have yet taken towards the abolition of war.

In spite of their one internal war, then, I say the American Union may be said to have solved the problem of the abolition of war, and we may see there the model which Europe, far superior to America in perfection of culture and in literary and artistic wealth, should imitate in her international relations. Now, this great triumph of the Union was achieved on the very ground upon which an earlier confederation[4] had conspicuously failed in the same undertaking. The two federations may be compared; somewhere among their differences evidently lies the secret of success. Now, they differ mainly in the degree of force and independence given to the federal organization. Where the federal organization was lax, and not decisively disentangled from the State organization, the federation failed: it succeeded when the federal bond was strengthened.

The special lesson which is taught by the experience of the Americans is that the decrees of the federation must not be handed over for execution to the officials of the separate States, but that the federation must have an independent and separate executive, through which its authority must be brought to bear directly upon individuals. The individual must be distinctly conscious of his obligations to the federation, and of his membership in it: all federations are mockeries that are mere understandings between governments.

I infer that we shall never abolish war in Europe unless we can make up our minds to take up a completely new citizenship. We must cease to

be mere Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, and must begin to take as much pride in calling ourselves Europeans. Europe must have a constitution, as well as the States that compose it. There must be a European legislature and executive as strong and as important as those that meet and act at Washington. Nor will all this succeed unless the discrepancies of language, race, culture, and religion can be so far overcome, that by slow degrees the members of the new State may come to value their new citizenship as much, and at last more, than their old; so that when any great trial comes, when State membership draws one way, and Federal membership another, they may, as the Americans did in their trial, deliberately prefer the Union to the State.

I infer, at the same time, that all schemes will fail which propose to unite Europe merely by adding together the States that compose it. The individual, and not merely the State, must enter into a distinct relation to the Federation. In the Federal Legislature of Europe, as in the American Congress, there must be representation by population as well as representation by States.

But still more necessary is it that the federation should have an executive force greater than that of any of its component States. I am at a loss to understand what people mean, who would establish an international court without giving it sufficient power to enforce its decrees, or even without the right of enforcing its decrees. Good advice! Is it by good advice that you think to put down war? If so, remember that you enter a path upon which you have no precedents and no analogies to guide you. If war had never been abolished in any case up to this time, I should not think it worth while to speculate upon the means of abolishing it. But I see that it has been abolished over and over again; that private war has been abolished, that small States constantly at war with each other have become provinces of large ones, and so have lost the right of making war; that England and Scotland, after centuries of war, have attained to a perpetual peace in relation to each other; lastly, that across the Atlantic a number of large States have succeeded, apparently for good, in destroying the possibility of war between each other. In all these cases the same result has been attained in the same way. And it has not been attained by good advice. Do not say, "This is a cynical view; human nature is better than you think; people will often take good advice if it is honestly offered." When people's minds are calm, I think they are generally very ready to take advice; but when a man's passions are roused, or personal interests threatened, and still more when this happens to a nation, I do not think, I know, that good advice is thrown away. How can we talk of the

efficacy of good advice, when we know that six months ago France impatiently refused it, and that Germany refuses it as impatiently now? And what is the use of quoting cases where good advice has averted war, so long as a number of cases can be quoted where it has not? Mankind will be glad to hear how war may be abolished and made obsolete, but you will scarcely get them to take a warm interest in schemes by which it may *perhaps sometimes* be averted.

There has been found hitherto but one substitute for war. It has succeeded over and over again; it succeeds regularly in the long run wherever it can be introduced. This is to take the disputed question out of the hands of the disputants, to refer it to a third party, whose intelligence, impartiality, and diligence have been secured, and to impose his decision upon the parties with overwhelming force. The last step in this process is just as essential as the earlier ones, and if you omit it you may just as well omit them too. This is the lesson we may learn from the fall of the German *Bund*. To expect that military Powers like Prussia and Austria could be coerced by the *Bund*, was to put the nurse under the orders of the baby on her lap. Accordingly the *Bund* existed just so long as Prussia and Austria shrank from a decided quarrel, and fell to pieces at the moment when the emergency arrived which it existed to meet.

For precluding war it is not sufficient that the power of justice should be a little greater than the power of the disputing parties. Justice must be so overwhelmingly superior that resistance may be out of the question. Therefore it was found impossible to tolerate the armies of retainers that the feudal lords of the Middle Ages kept on foot. Now, how to make the federal force of Europe superior to the force of any one State, say France or Prussia? The history of the last two centuries shows that the combined force of all the European States is not always clearly superior to the force of one. Louis XIV and Napoleon were humbled with the greatest possible difficulty, and we begin to doubt at the present day whether Europe could effectively resist united Germany, if Germany should enter upon a path of ambition. It is evident that the course of international justice can never be irresistible so long as States have standing armies. The right of levying troops must belong to the Federation, and it must be denied to the States. The State is the feudal lord of modern Europe; the reign of anarchy will never be brought to a close until the State is forbidden to keep armed retainers.

I am fortunate in having an audience that is bound to listen to speculations which perhaps most English audiences would find insufferably fanciful. Europe constituted into a single State, with a Federal

executive and legislature, located in some central Washington! Famous States like England and France forbidden to levy soldiers, and slowly shrinking into counties beside the Federation, which steadily grows in majesty, and constantly absorbs by its gravitation the genius and ambition that were attached before to the different national governments! Such a revolution in human affairs, I am perfectly well aware, has scarcely ever been witnessed.

But it has not been my purpose hitherto to discuss whether these changes are practicable or impracticable; I am addressing those who have decide for themselves that war both must and can be abolished. Whether you are right or not in thinking so is a separate question. What I have attempted to show is that the abolition of war absolutely requires and involves certain vast political changes in Europe, and that it is only possible if they are possible. If I have thought it worth while to go into some detail about these changes, it is not in order that we may instantly set about the task, but that we may count the cost of it; it is that both you who are members of the Peace Society, and we who are not, may have some just measure of the work that is either to be undertaken or to be abandoned in despair. Nevertheless it will be worth while, in conclusion, briefly to review the difficulties of the task on the one side, and on the other the forces, instruments, and appliances which a party undertaking it would command.

First, then, it is to be noted that if the Americans have achieved what is here proposed for Europe, they did so in circumstances infinitely more favourable. In fact, it may be said that the Federation was given to them by Providence, and that their achievement consisted in preventing it from falling to pieces. The problem proposed to them was, not to bring together different nations that had before been separate and mutually hostile, but to arrest a tendency to separation and dissolution which was beginning to show itself in a population homogeneous and united by language, institutions and religion. If it is a masterpiece to have solved even this problem, what would it be to yoke together indissolubly so many rival races and rival States and rival religions, the Englishman and the Frenchman, the German and the Slave, the German and the Italian! What would it be to find a federal name which should fall like a covering upon so many secular discords, and hide at once so many inveterate wounds; to reconcile in one act all the most rooted antipathies, to unite in common political action the subjects of a Czar, of a Kaiser, of a Constitutional Queen, and of a Swiss Republic; to accustom to familiar intercourse those whom difference of speech has so long made barbarians to each other?

Nations that were united have before now been sundered by differences of religion; it has been hard to hold together nations that were in different stages of development; bitter jealousies have sprung out of different economical conditions; rival languages have caused the greatest embarrassments to governments; and the Federation of Europe is a work which must be accomplished, and when accomplished maintained, in spite not of one of these obstacles, but of all of them together.

Beside this intrinsic difficulty, the mere magnitude of the undertaking is an unimportant consideration. Yet how vast an enterprise merely to persuade so many populations of the desirableness of federation! — to create in each European State a federal party large enough to procure a hearing for the scheme, large enough in process of time to enlist the nation in its cause, large enough in the end to impose the measure upon governments that would in many cases be from instinctive interest bitterly hostile to it! But, in fact, it is hardly worth while to insist upon difficulties which no one can overlook. The difficulties we all of us see only too clearly, or rather too exclusively. The question rather is, why should they not at once be voted insurmountable?

In the first place, then, there is no question of realizing such a scheme at once or soon. If only it be true that the scheme would be infinitely beneficial to an infinite number of people, it may be assumed that the lapse of time will remove most of the difficulties that are caused by the mere multitude and inertia or indifference of those who are to be convinced. It is but to spread a new conviction over Europe. Such a thing has been done more than once before, and that when circumstances seemed even less favourable. New religious convictions passed with inconceivable rapidity over Europe in the sixteenth century; popular principles of government have spread over the greater part of Europe since 1789; who does not believe that federation too will have its day? Who doubts that this idea will some time or other come home to every heart, and be universally accepted — *sic volvere Parcas*? And if so, it depends surely in a great degree upon human zeal and energy how near that time is. It may be a long voyage with wind and tide, the steady wind and irresistible tide of manifest destiny. In the next place, it is a mere misconception to judge of the possibility of a work merely by considering the weight to be moved; what has to be considered, is the proportion between the weight and the power. If a vast work is an impossible work, then the federation of Europe is of course impossible, and so were the cutting of the Suez Canal and the laying down of the Atlantic Cable. But if vast works may be reasonably expected from vast powers, then those

who have vast powers at command may attempt schemes more astonishing than that of Columbus, without a particle of that visionary and romantic enthusiasm which in Columbus was only justified by success. The projectors of the Atlantic Cable never, as far as I remember, endangered their characters for discretion and sober-mindedness. Such a scheme as the federation of Europe might perhaps be worth a little of the enthusiasm that refuses to see difficulties, and will see nothing but the infinite desirableness of the end to be attained. Such enthusiasm it would no doubt have required in past times; but are not the conditions changed? When we suffer ourselves to be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the weight to be moved, do we sufficiently consider the leverage that is at hand to move it?

As I have explained that the federation wanted is not merely an arrangement between governments, but a real union of peoples, so I think it can never be attained by mere diplomatic methods, or by the mere action of governments, but only by a universal popular movement. Now a hundred years ago such a popular movement, extending over Europe, was barely conceivable, but in the present day nothing is more easy to conceive. Such popular movements are just what the age understands. Scarcely any country in Europe but has been, sometime in this century, the scene of some great agitation, where some political reform, that was afterwards carried out by statesmen, was preached by great popular orators, and welcomed by the multitude. Over almost all the space between the scenes of O'Connell's and of Kossuth's triumphs the popular agitator has been abroad, and the people have learned the art of expressing their wishes, and in many countries also of expressing them with moderation. They have learnt how to agitate for definite changes, and to do so successfully, even when the changes they called for required in the execution machinery quite beyond the comprehension of most of the agitators. What is required, therefore, is not anything new in kind; it is but a movement such as every population in Europe has had experience of; a movement new only in being extensive beyond precedent, in including many nations at once, and therefore in demanding more careful guidance. And for an unprecedented movement you can surely furnish unprecedented motives. The evil you attack is no doubtful one, no partial one, no small one. It is the greatest evil of evils that we can conceive to be remedied; it attacks all classes of society, and all ages; it attacks them with no insidious weapons, and under no disguise, but with open massacre, starvation, and ruin. It calls the more urgently to be remedied, because it seems to be growing worse. Wars seem growing more frightful and more

gigantic; the more victories the nationality principle wins, the nearer we seem to approach a period of energetic popular states waging war upon each other with the unrelieved fierceness of national antipathy. Had ever popular orators a better subject for their speeches? What was Catholic Emancipation, what were the Corn-laws, nay, what was the Slave-trade, compared to this? Would it be hard to excite a European movement against a mischief from which no one is safe, which threatens every man's life, and every man's children's lives, and which brings in its train not only death but a host of other evils, some of them, perhaps, worse than death?

Again, there have been in this age great political movements and great religious movements. Countries in which the political consciousness has remained undeveloped, often have the religious consciousness in full vigour; and in individuals, too, the one is often to be found where the other is wanting. Now, there is just one question in which politics and religion absolutely merge, and are confounded. Religious feelings and political feelings are equally outraged by war. War tramples on the sense of right and wrong, and on the precepts of Christianity, as mercilessly as it crushes the physical happiness of individuals. And on this matter there are no sectarian divisions among Christians. One sect of Christians may denounce war more energetically than another; some sects may pronounce it justifiable for Christians to engage in it; but all alike regard war as an evil, all alike regard it as among the greatest of the future triumphs of the faith to exterminate war out of the world. In this matter all the great divisions of Christianity have something to boast of. The Greek Church protested vehemently against it, even in the darkest ages; the Latin Church furnished the first example of that federation of Europe, and that international court, by which the appeal to arms must be superseded; it was a Protestant sect that first made Peace the first of Christian dogmas, it was in the bosom of Protestantism that the great Republic of the West[5] grew up and prospered. If Christianity did in a manner reconcile itself to war, it was mainly for want of a machinery which could ensure peace: had the politicians been able to devise such machinery, religion would long ago have made an end of war within Christendom. In considering, then, the leverage which is at your command, you are to add the engine of religious agitation to that of political, and, besides appealing to the plainest interests of men, may reckon also among your resources the religion and the conscience of humanity.

Might you not also enlist in your cause the aggrieved races of Europe? All the grievances of races spring out of war, are perpetuated by it, and

would perish with it. In the American Union, not only does one State not wage war with another, but no State holds a neighbour State in unjust dependence. There is no Poland in the Union, no Alsace and Lorraine. If any State there feels itself aggrieved, the injury came from the whole Federation, and can never be felt so keenly as an injustice. No State can reasonably complain of having to submit to the Federation, any more than a township or county resents the superiority of the State. Russia has no right to Poland, yet Russia cannot and will not yield Poland unless Poland can procure some unlooked-for ally. Europe has many of these chronic and incurable wrongs, and is just now increasing the number of them. They are incidents of the abusive system which nourishes the ambition and keeps alive the fears of States; they are results of war. In a federated Europe Poland and Russia might lie side by side like Maryland and Virginia, and the old international feud would come to seem an inexplicable and inconceivable feeling. Meanwhile, the prospect of a federation seems to offer to the Poles a solution of their difficulty. They might cease to claim their old independence — an independence which they forfeited by their own divisions, and which Russia can never grant — and they might become instead the apostles of a federation of Europe, in the attainment of which, along with all the traces of the old European anarchy, their own sufferings and wrongs would pass away.

It is evident, I think, that the forces at command are greater than were ever before invoked to achieve political change. Universal and pressing interest, religious feeling, the hopes of aggrieved races — these are great powers. And is not that which calls itself the Revolution in Europe bound also to promote the cause? Popular principles are nothing, without European principles; the liberty of peoples is nothing without their solidarity. Popular States fight more terrible wars than monarchical or aristocratical ones; it is therefore doubly necessary that they should federate themselves. The Republican party says much of its devotion to peace; it is bound, therefore, to do its part towards confirming peace by solid guarantees.

Such powers may be found more than a match for the centrifugal forces, the differences of language, of institutions, of economical condition, of religions. All these discrepancies have somewhere been overcome. Prussia has a Protestant region and a Catholic region. Different languages are united in Switzerland; different nationalities and even different governments in Austria-Hungary. The difficulties, in short, are unprecedented only in number and degree; they would certainly be insurmountable if the advantages of union were only moderate; it remains to

be seen whether they would be insurmountable to a European public opinion gradually educated to see before it a new Federation rising like a majestic temple over the tomb of war, emulating the transatlantic Federation in prosperity and unity but surpassing it far in all the riches of culture, manners and science, and consecrated with all the traditions and reliques of the ancient world.

(Prefaced and edited by Luigi V. Majocchi)

NOTES

[1] Seeley clearly refers to the Franco-Prussian conflit and the French defeat at Sedan on September 4, 1870.

[2] The term "Congress" was commonly used in the 19th century to denote international Conferences. Take for exemple the 1855 Paris Congress which ended the Crimea war and the 1875 Berlin Congress which thanks to Bismarck initiative led to a new political set-up in the Balcans.

[3] The concepts of federation and confederation were defined rigorously for the first time in *The Federalist Papers*. Even Hamilton, however, while consistently using the terms "Confederacy" or "Articles of Confederation"to refer to the latter, i.e. the form of government that existed before Philadelphia, nevertheless uses the terms "federation" and "confederation" interchangeably every time he speaks of the Union, i.e. the new constitution. It is thus not surprising that this lexical ambiguity (but not the conceptual ambiguity, as is clearly demonstated by the following passages and which relate to the American Confederation, its failure and the birth of the Federation) is also present in Seeley's passage, as is demonstrated by the use of "federation" and "federal" in the following lines to denote both the "Articles of Confederation" (a federation with loose links) and the Union (a federation with strong ties).

[4] See note 3.

[5] The question is about the United States of America.

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