

THE FEDERALIST

a political review

"I thought a continuation of 'The Federalist' a never or marginally connected enterprise, until the same organizational would be made regrettable and unproductive. I have been a part of the continuation of the Federalist since 1991."

— Harrison, The Federalist




YEAR XXXI, 1991 NUMBER 2

THE FEDERALIST

a political review

Editor: Mario Albertini

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



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Federalism and Self-determination

The risk of Yugoslavia disintegrating, and the persistence of tension between the central and republican authorities in the Soviet Union, are severely testing the new European balance that has been emerging in the wake of the cold war. It would be rash to try now and predict whether, in these two crisis regions the central power will succeed in maintaining state unity, and at what price, following the eclipse of communism and in the current state of economic collapse. What can be foreseen with a reasonable degree of certainty, however, are the consequences of the Soviet Union and Yugoslav Federation falling apart. It is true that the present levels of interdependence in political, economic and social relationships exclude the possibility of repeating the explosive situation that existed in central and western Europe in the first half of this century. Nowadays, no state can guarantee its orderly functioning and even the survival of its society, unless it forms part of a network of economic partnerships, and belongs to a security system that is of continent-wide proportions. But this does not exclude the fact that the multiplying of small or tiny sovereign states, whose only ideological basis is the myth of the nation itself, (in a region of Europe where the idea of the nation is not well established and does not identify groups having definite, or even approximately defined, borders), is destined to create a situation of permanent tension and serious instability, hence blocking the process of de-politicising borders which the European Community and CSCE (Conference for Co-operation and Security in Europe) are pushing forward.

If the secessionist urges of the Baltic states, Moldavia, and Transcaucasian states in the Soviet Union, and of Slovenia and Croatia in Yugoslavia give rise to new sovereign states, or the modification of borders between current sovereign states, it will be the beginning of a chain reaction that will undoubtedly not stop at the borders of either the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. As regards Yugoslavia, it is sufficient to recall that Bulgaria boasts territorial claims over a part of Macedonia, and

awaits the weakening of the Yugoslav Federation so as to provide an opportunity of fulfilling them; that, moreover, the Magyar population of Vojvodina and the Albanian one of Kosovo can only hope, in their turn, to profit from the power crisis in Belgrade; that in Istria the existence of an Italian minority has been rediscovered, and has begun to be pressurised with propaganda by fascists from across the border. As for the Soviet Union, the existence of a majority of Romanian speakers in Moldavia and an important Polish minority in Lithuania, risks involving both Romania and Poland in the process of diffusing nationalist tensions. A resumption of Polish nationalism would have immediate repercussions in Upper Silesia and Pomerania. As a result, certain reactionary trends that continue to thrive in Germany, but which the current situation ensures remain in the political subsoil, could be revitalised, once more giving substance to the placated, but never eradicated, distrust that West European countries have of the Federal Republic. The process of European unification itself would risk crisis, or at the very least, serious delays.

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But, many argue that whatever the consequences of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia disintegrating, it remains the inescapable duty of everyone to respect the *right of self-determination of peoples*. The claims of the secessionist republics are legitimate at all events, because they are put forward in the framework of exercising a basic democratic right. A direct choice between democracy and *raison d'Etat* is at issue here, and the former must take precedence over the latter.

In reality the situation is not so simple. This is because the right of self-determination is highly obscure. This obscurity lies essentially in uncertainty as to who should be the subject to exercise it. The common definition holds that the "people" exercise this right. But in this context, the concept of "people" itself is elusive. With regard to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, for example, it is not at all clear which peoples are entitled to the right of self-determination. A referendum on the merit of safeguarding the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union would have entirely different results depending on whether it was addressed to the "people" of the Soviet Union in its entirety; or the "people" of Lithuania, Moldavia or Georgia; or finally the "people" of the Belorussian or Polish regions of Lithuania, or those of Gagauzia or Southern Ossetia. The same is true for Yugoslavia. Why do the Croatian "people" have the right of self-determination, but not the "people" of Krajina, the region with a Serb

majority which is incorporated into the Croatian Republic?

The fact remains that decisions regarding the identity of the groups which must decide their future, are not taken by citizens exercising the right of self-determination, but are the product of power balances that have nothing at all to do with the right of self-determination. Such decisions are often imposed by unscrupulous demagogues ready to exploit crises for their own ends in the pursuit of power, taking advantage of sentiments which, if managed responsibly, would express themselves in rivalries compatible with normal political dialectic.

* * *

People's cultural identities are by nature complex, and their feelings of belonging concern a variety of territorial communities, down to the smallest which are the places most firmly etched in their affections, habits and memories. This complex structure is the basis of the spiritual richness of the human race, the root of pluralism and liberty. But when a single community, whichever it may be, becomes the exclusive focus of loyalty to its members, and to it is attributed the property of *sovereignty*, then the principle of disintegration becomes introduced into society via nationalism. It is true that the idea of the nation was used in the nineteenth century — even if in only a part of Western Europe — as an ideological justification for the enlargement of the sphere of the state, and for the creation of vast markets freed from the encumbrances of feudal society. But nowadays, in an era of the growth of interdependence to continental and global proportions, the idea of the nation remains but a reactionary myth, whose purpose is solely to divide, not unite. As a result, the legitimate aspiration of all human beings to express themselves freely in their own language and to live according to their own customs, in openness to other cultures and with respect for other peoples' customs, is instead transformed into intolerance and aggressiveness towards those who speak another language and live according to different customs. It is worth noting that intolerance and aggressiveness towards minorities tends to become more serious, the smaller the size of the "nations" that have achieved sovereign *status*. The difficulty of gaining recognition — precisely on account of their small size — makes the presence of groups that identify themselves with different symbols and rites both intolerable and threatening. It is sufficient to note the absolute refusal of the Georgian "nation" to recognise the existence in the republic of "different" communities, such as those of the Ossetians and Abkhazians; or the refusal of the

Croats to confer on the Serbs who live in their republic the same rights that they are calling on Belgrade to recognise for them.

The fact remains that as long as people maintain that the human race is naturally divided into separate nations, it will be impossible to avoid acknowledging that there exists no community, little as it may be, that does not contain minorities, each one of which can boast, with the same claim as the others, of the right of self-determination. In this light, the principle of self-determination reveals its true character as the principle for undermining civilised society, for returning to the state of nature, that of war by all against all.

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Many western newspapers, as mentioned earlier, consider the separatists of the peripheral Soviet republics, or those of Slovenia and Croatia, as democrats in a struggle against an oppressive power. And it is true that Gorbachev's Soviet Union cannot yet be considered a liberal-democratic regime (despite having made gigantic steps in that direction), just as the Serbia of Milosevic (which, however, is *not* Yugoslavia) is without doubt one of the least democratised regimes in Eastern Europe. But at the heart of the issue lies the fact that the process of democratisation is progressing all over Eastern Europe, and only men's folly can stop it. Many people tend to forget that what culminated in the events of 1989, thanks to Gorbachev's extraordinary work, was a world-wide transformation. This reawakened "national identities" in Lithuania, Georgia, Slovenia, and so on, only because, on the one hand, the Soviet Union started down the path to democracy, and because on the other hand, the nature of the world balance was radically altered, destroying the bonds of bi-polarism, and, in particular, relaxing the power situation in Western Europe. That Gorbachev's undertaking is of immense difficulty is true, as is the fact that it is far from being finished. But one thing is certain: that following the grand thaw brought about by this historic personality, the battle for democracy in the world is no longer, neither in deeds nor in the minds of men, the battle of one superpower against another in the framework of a balance of terror, but is founded on mutual security, growing understanding, and economic and technological co-operation between peoples. The democracy of the future can only be achieved through the establishment of a new, stable and peaceful European order, the mainstays of which would be a European Federation extended to the western borders of the Soviet Union, and a Soviet Union that had completed its journey towards

federalism, full recognition of civil rights and the market economy. On the contrary, the creation of new small sovereign states, that are both unstable and aggressive, represents only the road to authoritarianism and the disintegration of civilised society. The fate of democracy in Lithuania, Georgia, Slovenia and Croatia depends exclusively on the evolution of the European framework, and, without doubt, not on the purely illusory prospect of recovering national sovereignty. Serbia itself will only be able to evolve democratically if a Yugoslavia, that has maintained its territorial integrity, grows ever closer to the Community, (with which it already maintains increasingly strong relations), and undergoes the Community's political influence until it is in a position to become one of its member states. On the other hand, a Serbia separated from the two secessionist republics and constrained to look for a consensus among its own citizens on the basis of nationalistic motivations, can only worsen its expansionist and authoritarian tendencies, and thus constitute a permanent threat to its neighbours and a perennial source of instability for the Balkans and for Europe.

Hence, nowadays, only those working for unity are democratic, while those working for division are, objectively, on the side of dictatorship.

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It is often said that refusing to support the aspirations to independence that exist in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia would be blameworthy, because, in the final analysis, the separatist groups are not acting in a spirit of nationalism, but only so as to liberate their countries from the bonds that hinder the development of closer ties with the Europe of the Community. Their fundamental wish is only to leave an imperialistic multinational bloc, so as to enter another, democratic, multinational bloc (and one which is much more developed economically at that). Certainly, it is not impossible that developments of this nature may in fact occur at a certain future time. The European Community exerts a considerable power of attraction, and will continue to do so for a good many years to come, if it manages to create democratic and federal institutions. If one or the other of the western Soviet or Yugoslav republics succeeds in the unlikely attempt to assert its independence to some degree, without throwing the whole of Europe into chaos, it will be drawn sooner or later into the orbit of the Community. There remain however some important reservations. The first is that the behaviour of the secessionist groups and their leaders seems to be stamped with the most classic hallmarks of

nationalism, with its myths and rites, with violence and hatred of one's neighbour. Hence, to present them as potential federalists appears to be pure wishful thinking. The second is that the prospect of the secessionist republics entering a Community transformed into a federal Union is both uncertain and far-off, because it will be realised only if, and when, the serious internal and international political crises that their fight to achieve sovereignty will certainly provoke, have been overcome. Thus it is fanciful to draw on such an unlikely outcome to support claims that, for the foreseeable future, can only create tension and instability. The third reservation is that it is clearly understandable (from a strictly self-interested point of view) that some sections of the population of certain Soviet and Yugoslav republics, which are relatively prosperous compared to other regions in their states, should want to free themselves from the burden of having to contribute, proportionally to their own resources, to the development of the rest of the country. They are irked by the fact that the fruits of their labours are dissipated, in part, by a political class and bureaucracy which is corrupt and inefficient. But the consistent application of the principle by which any region could legitimately, and arbitrarily, leave the state to which it belonged for another, for reasons of economic advantage, would simply imply the negation, in the sphere of politics, of the dimension of *solidarity*, that represents the essence of democracy itself: the dimension which, in Italy, is negated by the false federalism of the leagues. On the contrary, real federalism intends to *widen*, reinforcing all the while pluralism, the scope of solidarity — first at a continental level, then at a global one.

* * *

All this does not compromise in the least the right of every territorial community, including the very smallest — be it village or city — to self-government. The element that distinguishes the right of self-government from the so-called right of self-determination, is the absence of links with sovereignty, in other words with the feature of exclusivity. Self-government is an essential aspect of democracy. Men have needs that are common to the entire species, as well as needs specific to the communities of differing sizes to which they belong. It is natural that government levels should be arranged and organised within the same territorial framework where needs exist, and hence problems present themselves. For fundamental requirements, that are ideally expressed in the values of liberty, equality, justice and peace, the dimension of solidarity must be global.

This means that current sovereign states themselves are arbitrary, and should be superseded within the perspective of a world Federation. Other requirements, such as those linked to culture, the quality of life, territorial planning, and the relationship between public and private spending, should be resolved in more narrow institutional environments. The plurality of government structures, which are independent in their own sphere and co-ordinated between themselves, constitutes the essence of federalism. In a federal system that gives real expression to the principle of subsidiarity, every human community, even the smallest, can assert its own individuality, thanks to the protection of its rights guaranteed by the constitution; yet without this causing communities to stop being a part of a wider people and, in perspective, of the people of the world.

Federalism gives political expression to the fact that people are the same in their moral dignity as free beings, and infinitely diverse in their cultural specificity. Diversity, in an environment of universal fraternity, is clearly not a vice of minorities, but a virtue of all. This concept cannot gain recognition in civilised society through a state structure that seeks to found its legitimacy on the tribal impulses that dwell in the worst part of everybody's soul; but rather through one based on a consensus freely entered into by individuals, who identify primarily with a sense of common membership of the human race.

* * *

The question is often asked of what we must say to Baltic, Croatian or Slovenian friends who declare they are motivated both by the federalist ideal and nationalist feelings towards their own republics. We must answer that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and civil war in Yugoslavia are the worst service that could be rendered to the cause of European and world federalism. Nowadays, the clash between federalism and nationalism is the front on which the future of humanity is being fought out. Whatever the sophistry that may be employed in an effort to reconcile the irreconcilable, and taking for granted the good faith of the majority of those who accept it, it is not possible to be both a nationalist and a federalist. This does not hinder people from loving their own, numerous small countries: but only within the framework of an institutional system that guarantees both peace and pluralism. Today, a true federalist in a Baltic country — courting unpopularity, as federalists have always done — should go in search of the thousands of citizens in other Soviet republics that also appreciate the values of solidarity and plural-

ism, and work with them to transform the Soviet Union into a true democratic federation, able to contribute decisively, within the framework of the Helsinki accords and in partnership with a European Union capable of action, towards the creation of a European and world order which is both peaceful and democratic. Similarly, a true Croatian or Slovenian federalist, likewise defying unpopularity, should seek people inside other Yugoslav republics that are driven by the same values, so as to advance the process of democratisation in the country as a whole, and to bring the country (without compromising its integrity) into the European Union. In this way, along with the Federal Republic of Germany, an example would be given of how a federal state can itself become a member of a larger federation, thereby guaranteeing its decentralisation and pluralism.

* * *

The fact remains that West Europeans cannot pretend to give lessons on federalism to East Europeans if they show themselves powerless to create, within the framework of the Community, a true federal state, which is able to use its own wealth to contribute to the creation, in Europe and in the world, of a stable and peaceful equilibrium; one that is capable of offering admission to its close neighbours without endangering its own internal cohesion and the effectiveness of its decision-making; and is able to present the world with a model of social cohabitation that is founded on tolerance, thus providing an alternative to the destructive myth of the nation. The tragedy that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are experiencing represents a permanent and serious indictment against the governments of the Twelve, which, faced with the concrete chance to achieve such a transformation, seem once again to be paralysed by the concern of defending national sovereignties. The great majority of their own citizens now perceive such sovereignties as senseless and anti-historical.

The Federalist

Europe: a World Power or a Model for the World? *

FRANCESCO ROSSOLILLO

The history of the postwar period has been that of the power confrontation between the US and Soviet Union. After the phase of the Marshall Plan, during which the US spent significant resources in execution of a large-scale economic aid package to Europe, the global hegemony of the two superpowers has had an essentially military base. Today it is worth noting that the USSR risks economic collapse and dissolution of the actual framework of the state itself; and that the US, victors of the "surgical" war against Saddam Hussein, remains the sole world superpower, even if it cannot hide behind the impressive display of its war apparatus, the reality of a huge budgetary deficit, a productive system which is continually losing its competitiveness, and a society which is threatened by serious degenerative tendencies because of the uncontrolled increase of delinquency and the collapse of the education system.

In the same period the European Community, despite the insufficiency of its institutions, has shown an amazing capacity not only to survive, but to expand, and to be increasingly attractive to both neighbouring and Third World countries. Born with six countries, the EC has gradually grown to its current twelve members; and has given a spectacular boost to its members' economies and the economies of those countries closely exposed to its influence; it alone has contributed decisively to the installation of democracy in Spain and Portugal and to its restoration in Greece; it is increasingly attractive to the countries of Eastern Europe and

* The following texts are reworkings of some contributions to a wide-ranging discussion, held at Rome on the 17th March 1991, on the occasion of one of the periodical meetings organised by the Ufficio del Dibattito del Movimento Federalista Europeo (European Federalist Movement's Office for Debates). The general topic was Europe within the structure of the new international situation.

EFTA (European Free Trade Association), as well as to countries belonging to the Islamic world, such as Turkey and Morocco; after the end of colonialism, the EC has established a new set of relations, albeit considerably flawed, with countries in Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean that have agreed to the Lomé Convention. Without the presence of the Community the process of democratization and economic reform in East European countries, which began after Gorbachev's revolution, would have met obstacles even more daunting than the present ones, making progress impossible.

These are facts about which there exists a more-or-less general consensus. And all this did not happen thanks to the use of military force, but by mechanisms of collaboration and economic integration: not by means of domination, but through openness. It is often claimed that in these decades the Community has been an economic giant and a political dwarf. In a historical perspective this interpretation is false. In fact the Community — or more precisely the process of European integration, of which the Community has been the institutional superstructure — in addition to having made a war between Western European states impossible (whereas fifty years ago French and Germans considered themselves “hereditary” enemies), has profoundly changed the political map of the world. The Community has made régimes fall; it has pulled down barriers, and created new partnerships and forms of collaboration. In recent decades, apart from the great breakthroughs of Gorbachev, the Community has been the most dynamic and progressive player on the world political scene.

* * *

It is certainly true that in the events leading up to the Gulf War, and during the course of the war itself, Europe had no weight, and that this inability to assume its own responsibilities is a sign of serious political weakness. But this interpretation must be precisely clarified. Europe's weakness was displayed by its inability over recent decades to develop a policy that would have encouraged the economic and social development of the Arab world and its unification, while guaranteeing the survival of Israel within secure borders: not by the fact that it did not participate in the war on equal terms with the US, and as a result did not earn similar benefits. Rather, the opposite is true. If Europe has retained a credibility and a capacity to make proposals — that in fact should and could be much greater — in its dealings with the Arab world, this is due to the fact that

the “Community” itself did not take part in the war. Had it done so, the perception — already widespread in the Arab world, as elsewhere — of the war as a clash between the North and South of the world would have been exacerbated. The result, apart from some very short term advantages that would have accrued to Europe in the form of improved relations with certain dictatorial régimes and obscurantist dynasties in the region, would have been to further fuel Islamic fundamentalism, to frustrate definitively any prospect of promoting Arab unity and creating a Mediterranean and Middle Eastern security system, and so to block the only possible chance of developing a stable order in the region and giving a boost to the democratization of the states therein.

But for the Community to meet its full responsibilities towards the Arab world, as well as those which it has vis-à-vis Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and the Third World, it must transform itself profoundly. During the cold war Europe's power to attract was expressed in a largely static global context, which permitted it limited room for manoeuvre and responsibilities compatible with its confederal structure. The end of the cold war and the bi-polar balance, combined with increased global interdependence that has been its ultimate cause, giving political significance to the fact that the human race is becoming a *single community of fate*, have confronted the Community with more serious problems and starker responsibilities, which can no longer be delegated to others. The Community cannot allow itself to ignore what is happening outside itself and its periphery, the EFTA. Beyond the confines of this privileged region of the world there are regions where very serious crises are in progress. Thousands of millions of men, uncertain of their fate, are asking themselves, and ask the European Community, if it is their friend or their enemy. The Community must respond to this question, and urgently. If it is not able, nor courageous enough, to make the great decisions and sacrifices that the situation requires in a judicious and timely manner, the countries of Western Europe will be invaded by immense masses of men, that have been torn from their way of life and their view of the world by the whirling events of recent years, to a desperate search for a well-being that is daily both displayed to, and denied them. The response to this challenge depends today exclusively on the capacity of the Community to transform itself into a federal Union that its citizens can sense as the democratic expression of their common interest and that in the name of this interest can ask of them important things in return.

* * *

The transformation of the Community into a federal Union, if it happens, will have dual significance. On the one hand it will offer the example of a new way of organizing social life, the fundamental basis of which will be the affirmation of human solidarity over and above frontiers, and the negation of the nation as a closed and exclusive entity; on the other hand it will be the birth of a new great power. These two aspects, clearly, are not in themselves contradictory, because the power of Europe, if interpreted in the light of the new and extraordinary opportunities created by the "New era" of Gorbachev, can be only, or at least in the main, the power to diffuse federalism by peaceful means throughout the rest of the world. The fact remains, however, that the concept of power evokes the idea of its traditional use, that of domination.

The question of Europe's future role in the world is therefore placed in a totally different light and can be answered in different ways, depending on personal predictions as to how the relationship between model and power (intended in its traditional sense) will take shape in the policy of the Union, and the way in which its citizens will express their own European identity. On the one hand, it is possible to imagine that the process of increasingly interdependent relationships between men is destined to transform political attitudes and institutions in reflection of this trend, promoting, at the price of tension and crisis, ever larger and widespread forms of unity; and therefore that the federal unification of Europe should be seen as a stage in this process, destined in its turn to accelerate the process itself along the way. Alternatively, one can maintain that politics obeys a totally autonomous logic (the traditional logic of power), in deference to which increased interdependence will have no other effect than that of multiplying the reasons for conflict in the relationships between states, and thereby increasing confrontation; and that the European Union of tomorrow can do no other than become one of the centres in a new balance of power. In truth, those who intend, by their political commitment, to contribute to furthering the process of human emancipation cannot but base that commitment on the first of these two visions of the future, because the second implies that the human race is hurtling towards self-destruction regardless. Nevertheless it is necessary to highlight in a more explicit and wider sense the connection which links these interpretations of the future to the ideas of European unity that form part of the political debate, so as to make as clear as possible their significance and worth.

The first interpretation presupposes that the understanding that, by now, humanity constitutes a *single community of fate* is destined to ex-

tend gradually to all the human race and to affect ever more significantly the behaviour of states and individuals. This implies that the détente between the Soviet Union and the US introduced by the "new thinking" of Gorbachev is only the beginning of a process that — naturally not without having to overcome obstacles and difficulties — will lead, after an unforeseeable length of time, to world unification. It is worth remembering that this is in no way an "angelic" view of history. It is well known that as long as there are states, there will be *raison d'Etat*. But nowadays, thanks to the way environmental and nuclear threats have affected people's consciences, there is a trend emerging on a global level for the *raisons d'Etat* to converge, similar to that which has made Western Europe an oasis of peace during the last fifty years. From this viewpoint the Gulf War would be only a residual, tragic by-product of the old order. It is true that history proceeds dialectically, and that other episodes of violence — probably less severe — on the difficult road of transforming relationships between North and South, will not fail to occur. But they should not alter in a substantial way mankind's march towards its own unity, that will coincide with that of all peoples towards democracy. In this context the task of Europe would be to give an example of the creation of institutional formulas that allow interdependence to be organized legally through federalism, making it the foundation of peace between states. This signifies that the federal unification of Europe would put the concept of sovereignty itself in question. It would also render the federalist process irreversible, at the same time as being a powerful accelerant; and the instruments of its momentum would be the peaceable ones of self-enlargement and the promotion of other federal units (in the Soviet Union, the Arab world, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, etc.). Better still the process could be promoted with proportionally greater effect in relation to how much less weaponry were in evidence. The federal unification of Europe would thereby become the centre for the spread of federalism in the world, as two hundred years ago Europe was the centre for the dissemination of the model of the nation-state, and would create the basis for democratizing the UN and transforming it into a World government founded on large regional federations.

The second interpretation is based on the hypothesis that the foundation of the European federation will not be historically sufficient to put the very idea of sovereignty into question, but will be limited to transferring sovereignty, in a specific region of the world, to a higher level. In general, those who tend to think in this way are the same "realists" who hold that the process of democratization in the Soviet Union and global

détente will be short-lived episodes, that the Arab world will remain for an indeterminate time at the mercy of fundamentalism, and that the Third World is destined to be a permanent danger for the industrialized world, which is, above all, to be guarded against. For these people, the global equilibrium will continue to be dominated by power relationships, and the traditional concept of national interest will always prevail over the awareness of a unified destiny involving the entire human race: this will engender an international situation so much more explosive since the end of the bipolar equilibrium has undermined stability based on mutual deterrent. The European federation, in this perspective, would not have an active role as a *seed* for the spread of federalist attitudes in the world: it could do no more than react to impulses from the changing configurations of the global balance of power. Military weapons would thereby become decisive and Europe could guarantee its own security only inasmuch as it knew how to assert itself as a new superpower.

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It is important to point out that the choice between the two visions of the future of European and world history which I have set out cannot be avoided by pretending that it does not exist, since the great historic option facing Europe poses a question of alternative uses of scarce resources. The Community, confronted by the dramatic challenges posed by Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, the Arab world and the Third World, will have to make heavy sacrifices. If it wishes to survive, it will have to mobilize a great quantity of material resources and moral back-up: this involves a decision whether the Twelve are aiming to integrate, within the context of the future Union, other peoples and other economies that are very much less advanced than that of the Twelve, and to encourage through large co-operation ventures the peaceful development of aggregation in other regions of the world; or to supply the future Union with powerful, modern and sophisticated weapons, necessary to make it a superpower able to compete militarily with the US on the world stage and to react with force to the threat emanating from the destitute and over-populated Third World. Let us not try to deceive ourselves with the illusion that we can do both together. These two options are not only incompatible from an ideological point of view, because peace and democracy can not nowadays be exported with missiles; but also from an economic stand-point, because the only way Europe could mobilize the enormous resources necessary to meet its new historical responsibilities with the peaceful

means of economic collaboration, is by a drastic reduction in military spending (accompanied by a severe austerity policy). It is enough to consider, moreover, the strain the Federal Republic of Germany is experiencing in its efforts to absorb the productive system and society of the former GDR into its own economic and social fabric. The effort the European Union will have to do vis-à-vis Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, the Arab world and the Third World is immensely greater.

Faced with this alternative, those who engage in the fight for Europe must ask themselves whether a political design is morally sustainable if it proposes as its goal the creation of a European state whose foremost responsibility to its own citizens is to impede the innumerable men who would like to share in their well-being from crossing its borders. The answer can only be "no." If federalists wish to continue to base their work on the understanding that the fight for the European federation is the only struggle currently worth undertaking, they *must* choose the option of *Europe as a model* over that of *Europe as a power*.

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If there is agreement on this basic issue, the debate underway between federalists on the question of the attribution of military competences to the European Union loses a good part of its radical nature. Clearly, once it is established that the European Union will not be a superpower, and that therefore the effect of its military presence in the world will be in any case modest, the fact that its military potential is managed under a federal system or by political co-operation implies a difference of purely symbolic character (and the relevant argument will be of interest only to the extent to which symbols play a role in politics). Nor the fear that remaining small national armies could provide the basis for an autonomous *raison d'Etat* of the individual member countries of the Union, and thus allow centrifugal tendencies to prevail to the extent of placing the federal bond itself in danger can contribute to give poignancy to the issue. If we accept the presupposition that the success of European foreign policy will be measured by the ability of the initial federal centre to expand through the joining of other states, and to spread the model of federalism peacefully, it is clear that military policy — whichever be the institutional mechanism concerned with its management — would lose a large part of its autonomy and would follow the lead set by the pivotal choices of Union foreign policy that, by their very nature, would be non-militaristic. Clearly, the question will be raised of who has supreme command of the

armed forces belonging to the countries of the Union, and this cannot be circumvented by declaring the control of the armed forces a concurrent competence, because in constitutional terms regarding military matters, no more than one authority must decide in the final instance whether to go to war or not, whether to entrust, in the context of possible alliances, the armed forces to a unified command or to retain direct control, and so on. But, if time does lead down the path towards the goal of global unification, it will not be the remaining national armies, within an institutional context that will be federal in the crucial sectors of the economy and currency, that will endanger social peace and the permanency of the Union, if it is true that the process of European integration, expressed through weak and ineffective confederal institutions, has been able for the last fifty years to render a war between Europeans even unimaginable.

* * *

The fact remains that federalists cannot avoid the need to elaborate a stand-point regarding specific choices that they must face in the short or medium term. In this regard it is necessary to discuss another two matters of consideration.

a) In the current phase of the European unification process there exists a concrete possibility to push the member states of the Community into undertaking a substantial step forward on the road to ceding their sovereignty to a European Union. This step consists of the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union, and in the democratization of the institutions that will have the task of running it. As to the prosecution of these objectives, there exists an alliance of governments and other forces opposed to them, but there exists also an important grouping of governments and forces sympathetic to such developments. The outcome of the battle is not certain, but it can be won. An analogous alliance for the conferment of security and defence competences to federal European authority, on the other hand, does not exist, and however events may develop, will not exist for a long time to come. Today, if our aim, as activists of a political movement, is truly that of influencing the current process, then this involves seeing whether it is more opportune to concentrate all our energies on a single achievable objective, or dissipate them by applying them in part to a second and impossible goal. The question answers itself. In addition it is worth continually remembering that the issues of defence and security — used in their traditional

meanings — are nowadays the war-horses of those who oppose all and any cession of sovereignty. These they use to distract public attention onto an issue that can only be dealt with within an inter-governmental framework anyway, and to deflect attention from where the decisive contest is being played out.

It is clear, for this argument to be well-founded, that the achievable objective must represent, in effect, a resolute step forward. I am convinced that this is so. If what has been previously said is true, then the single currency represents for Europe, now, a foreign policy instrument much more important than the army. It is said by certain people that the currency issue is the symbol of a Europe of merchants. But to the extent to which this term has a derogatory connotation in the European debate (that often, moreover, is unjustified because commerce is synonymous with ever more peaceful relations between peoples), this is inasmuch as it represents a situation in which a comparable enlargement of the sphere of democracy does not correspond to economic integration, and hence the economy is not under political control for the advancement of justice. But this is just the opposite of how much would happen with the transformation of the Community into an Economic and Monetary Union run by democratic political institutions. Nowadays the army is certainly not the instrument with which to create a Europe of citizens.

b) If the above analysis is correct, the creation of the European federation with competences restricted to the economic-monetary sector would introduce into the process of integration at a European and world level a powerful element of acceleration, because, on the one hand, it would show the rest of the world a model much more effective than the community one for ensuring political control of the issues arising out of interdependence over and above national borders, and on the other hand, it would allow the European Union itself to include other countries without endangering its internal cohesion. The creation of the Union would thus initiate a phase characterised by continuous and rapid enlargements. Concurrently, the Union would be pushed to assume new and ever greater responsibilities in its dealings with other regions of the world, and, hence, to enter into increasingly wider security systems. The question then arises whether, in the face of a succession of challenges that would continually put the features of the world balance into question, extending rapidly the size of security structures, the strong political will that would anyway be necessary to transfer states' armed forces to the federal level in the course of this process, would in reality find sufficient motivation and time for it to emerge and affirm itself. It is clear that once

the initial federal centre is created, the presence of Europe in the world will be the more influential, the less it is perceived by its partners as a threat; nor is it possible to imagine in this scenario that the threat to Europe would come from abroad. It seems more likely that the needs of mutual security that would arise in the new situation would encourage the conferment of military contingents directly to structures such as the CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe), or to a future security system for the Mediterranean and the Middle East, or to a large organization that comprised both these latter ones; and along parallel lines to the UN, that with the advance of this process, would hence see its role as principal guarantor of world peace continually develop.

This trend thus faces federalists with a question, to which they should try to give an immediate answer, whether also *after* the creation of an initial federal centre within the framework of the Community, their strategy, and hence the focus of the major part of their energies, should have as a goal the transfer to a federal authority of the military potential of nation-states, or whether they had not better accelerate the process of enlarging the orbit of federalism and reinforcing reciprocal security systems, that will be formed in various regional theatres, and on a global scale at the United Nations.

The Role of Federalists in the New World Situation

STEFANO CASTAGNOLI

1. *The world is changing.*

The role which federalists can play in the present and future is closely tied to the evolution which has taken place in the world situation over the last two years, and to their capacity to adapt their thinking to the fact that the political order which was established after the Second World War, based on a rigidly bipolar balance of power, has ended. This political order constituted at the same time the major obstacle to the process of world integration on the one hand, and the guarantee of a stable equilibrium on the other, which, particularly for the members of the European Community, meant wealth and well-being. The reasons for its "sudden" collapse may be discussed at length, but I believe that two observations are shared by all: 1) There was no lack of warning signs that the two superpowers were no longer capable of maintaining world order. (There were regional crises which ended up involving all sides; at the same time the enormous problems of energy, ecology, and the demographic explosion in the Third World have materialized, problems which cannot be tackled in the present world situation.) 2) The collapse of totalitarian communism in the USSR has enormously hastened the end of a world system which already contained the seeds of crisis; in other words, it was the straw that broke the camel's back.

If we take these considerations as our starting point, it is not hard to arrive at the following: the world has for some time now been in need of a government. The bipolar equilibrium simulated world government to some extent in that it stabilized the world situation. It also prevented the delay in European unification, as of other regional unifications, from prejudicing, at least ostensibly, the world's chances of success in overcoming the challenges posed by the above-mentioned problems. The situation might be compared to a building having solid external walls (i.e. the superpowers), with interior dividing walls made of cardboard (i.e. the

nation-states): the building does not collapse for want of a proper internal structure. Thus the moment bipolarism ceased to play a positive role, (by guaranteeing peace and postwar reconstruction), the inadequacies of the political system, and its inability to cope with real human needs, began to show, but it was difficult to appreciate. The system is blocked at nation-states and (because of the existence of the external walls) their fragility and incapacity to govern the present is not immediately obvious. This slows down the process of transcending the nation-state. However, as long as the external walls hold, attempts in this direction can be made again and again, apparently without disasters, and very slow progress is made towards this goal. When however a wall collapses (the USSR), then the situation finally becomes dramatically apparent not only to federalists. It is thus that people realize just how explosive the situation can become for lack of a concrete federal model. Yet, at the same time, a new possibility opens up: that of exploiting the more fluid situation to hasten the end of the nation-state where it is possible to do it immediately, for example in Europe. It should be pointed out that the beginning of the process of German unification was a chance to give a greater impulse, in parallel fashion, to that of European unification, and the fact that this did not happen may now the US heavily.

We should also consider the fact that while collaboration between the US and the USSR is an advantage for the UN on the one hand, it is becoming increasingly evident that the emerging American pre-eminence is making existing tensions harder to govern. This situation will continue, at least until it is possible to clearly demonstrate that the wishes of the UN are those of the world, and not those of the US. In this way, people are beginning to become aware not only of the historical necessity for world government, which has certainly existed for many years now, but also of its political necessity. The end of the bipolar equilibrium is thus the first fundamental fact which we must consider.

The second fact is represented by the contrast between nationalism and federalism in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Republics. The collapse of communist regimes has brought forth situations of tremendous conflict: ethnic, religious, racial, political and so on. In this context, for the first time in the history of organized federalism, there is an area in the world faced with the dramatic alternative of nationalism or federalism. Should the former win, we can expect progress towards World federation to be held up for a long time to come.

From the analysis of these two facts, it emerges very clearly that in the current context, we cannot ignore a parameter which till now has not been

deemed of great importance (owing to the static nature of the world situation) in federalists' action: the "time factor."

2. The "time factor."

This parameter has never really been part of the schemes which have governed federalist political action. This was because at every failure federalists knew that they could and must continue to fight, and at every partial success they considered that at least another stretch of the road had been covered. Whenever, in internal debate, an endeavour was pointed out as "the decisive battle," it was easy to recall the permanent aspects of federalist action, linked to the concept of "trench warfare." Another recurring argument was that a prerequisite for successful action is the historic occasion. This idea that we need external factors in order to be able to achieve the federalist plan is hard to refute: however I believe that we must not passively submit to this concept in the future. There are many reasons for this impression: first of all, at the point which the process of European unification has reached, one can, in a certain sense, speak of a permanent occasion, that is that now the question of European integration is always present in political debate. Besides, the continual negotiations among the Twelve over new appendices to the Treaty of Rome make it necessary to take up positions, to carry on debates, and to gather information, both in the political world and in that of the media. To sum up, all the ingredients are there for thinking that in these years we are really playing the final round: in other words, the fateful "decisive battle."

Certainly this will have been said other times, but the end of the bipolar equilibrium, the context in which until now the MFE has conducted its campaigns, makes the "time factor," as I have already mentioned, essential. In the present context, in fact, the struggle between nationalism and federalism takes on all the dramatic connotations of a true dilemma. We can no longer wait for the peoples who have not yet experienced nationhood to experience it in its entirety, just as we cannot wait for the Third World to begin its own industrial revolution, or for all countries to gradually become democracies. We cannot wait because there is no time: the problems facing humanity are enormous, and it is imperative that we begin tackling them with adequate measures, namely with resources which go well beyond those of single nation-states, if we want to avoid a dismal retrogression to medieval conditions. It appears that this is beginning to become obvious not only to groups of scientists, but also to all the countries linked to the CSCE; the problem is that their

capacity to govern the events and explosive tensions present all over the planet is extremely modest, often resulting in the use of military force. If disruptive nationalist forces emerge victorious from this context, then the consequences will be disastrous: not only will world government, and thus peace, be no longer thinkable as a political objective, but the lasting incapacity to solve vital problems will lead to self-destruction. Thus we must recognize the importance of the "time factor," and find effective answers that are as immediate as possible to confound nationalism.

In this context it appears to me right and proper that the MFE ask itself two fundamental questions: the first concerns how Central and Eastern Europe can be involved as early as possible in political integration of a federal nature; while the second concerns the problem highlighted by Saddam Hussein, namely to ensure that the UN becomes an effective embryonic world government, capable of proposing federal unification to the world, but also of imposing its will (and in this connection it seems to me an interesting suggestion to put at the service of the UN the military forces of the European countries without creating a European army).

3. *The role of federalists.*

Having looked at these new facts and having examined the "time factor," it remains to identify the role of federalists. To do this we must take as our starting point not only the preceding considerations, but also two fundamental facts concerning the MFE's *raison d'être*: 1) the MFE exists because it has been up to now a politico-cultural avant-garde, that is it was able to understand the evolution of the world sooner than others, and it was aware that the course of history was leading towards the unity of mankind (without which the human race would incur the risk of self-destruction). Therefore it oriented its political action and cultural reflections around the idea of World federation as a means for achieving peace and global democracy. 2) The MFE exists because it has had a specific role in the battle for the unity of Europe; without the presence of the federalists, in fact, the battles that have brought us to the threshold of European federation would not have been fought. And if in these campaigns we have sometimes been helped by others, nevertheless no political force has ever acted having this specific objective, and has therefore never had the same determination as federalists in pursuing it.

These two elements are essential to the existence of the MFE. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, federalists have lost the capacity to be the political vanguard, because they have not concentrated on the emerging

priority of giving an answer to Eastern Europe; and they have lost the specific nature of their role in the construction of European unity, by supporting prevalently, during the period of the Italian presidency, the Economic and Monetary Union, which is today supported by other forces. This position was not wrong (with a European currency the sovereignty of the nation-state is defeated), but now, while watching out for possible obstacles to a single currency, it is necessary to assume a more "radical" role in upholding Political Union and the constituent mandate to the European Parliament. This is also important for growth in the Movement's strength and for the sections' activity; it also allows the Movement to operate in Eastern Europe.

Today, therefore, we must be more radical in maintaining our traditional constituent position, supporting campaigns all over Europe; we must enter into the debate on the relationship between the EEC and Central and Eastern European countries. We must condemn the rebirth of nationalism in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, forcefully presenting the federalist alternative, and we must work alongside world federalists for the reform of the UN.

But above all we must act quickly: the facts examined earlier necessitate a sharp acceleration in the process towards European federation, and then towards World federation. Our task is, as always, the identification of the best possible means to influence these processes, coming up with incisive campaigns which involve all the forces that believe in the possibility and necessity of participating in building a new world order.

The Gulf War, the UN and the New World Order

LUCIO LEVI

Wars are very revealing events: they reveal the real power relations between states and they bring to light deep historical trends, which would otherwise remain hidden. The Gulf War has been the occasion for evaluating the crisis of the old bipolar world order and for identifying the initial characteristics of the new world order.

The Gulf crisis has shown important new elements, with respect to the previous regional crises which took place during the Cold War.

For the first time the two superpowers, Russia and America, were not on opposing fronts, as it had been the case since the Korean war right through to the war in Afghanistan. In Russo-American relations the elements of convergence now prevail over those of conflict. This is the most evident sign of the irreversible decline of the bipolar system. Not even the United States, the most powerful state in the world, is now able to impose on its own a solution to important regional crises such as that of the Gulf.

From this comes the second novelty of the Gulf war. The superpowers have become allies and acted in agreement with an impressive international alliance which, under the aegis of the UN, forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The reconciliation between the USSR and the US has therefore stood the test of the Gulf War. However fragile its structure may be today, the UN has demonstrated that it is a potential World Government, which can play an ever-increasing role in the fight against aggression and in restoring its member states' lost rights.

The third novelty consists of the fact that the war was fought to restore international order and legality. In the announcement made at the end of the meeting held in Helsinki on September 9th 1990, one month after the invasion of Kuwait, Bush and Gorbachev affirmed: "We must prove, beyond all doubt, that aggression does not and will not pay." In actual fact, they wanted to establish such a precedent so as to discourage future aggression. If Saddam Hussein had no reason to expect the strong

reaction caused by his coup de main, from now on it will no longer be so.

But there is more to it than this. From now on there will be an even greater commitment to enforcing all UN resolutions, including those concerning Israel. The joint commitment of the two superpowers in promoting the peace conference in the Middle East is moving precisely in this direction, although the European Community's lack of supranational powers, which would allow the latter to act with a single voice, makes all attempts at creating a peaceful order in this area both weak and insufficient. The occupation of the Arab territories by Israel and the refusal to acknowledge the rights of the Palestinian people keeps alive the most dangerous source of tension in the Middle East.

Finally, the creation within Northern Iraq of a protection belt for the Kurds in an embryonic autonomous region, assumes the form of a right to intervene in the internal affairs of states, whenever human rights are violated. In this uncertain and initial transient phase towards a World Government, therefore, the need has arisen to supersede the principle of non-interference, proclaimed by Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, on which the whole structure of international law is founded.

After examining the international situation which has emerged from the Gulf War, it therefore appears that the need to establish a new world order founded on law has asserted itself. Although it is not the expression of a sovereign power, international law can be somewhat effective when a common interest asserts itself between states for the enforcement and respect of norms which ensure peaceful coexistence. In the present phase of world politics such a tendency has arisen because the international order of power is such that no state is able to impose unilaterally its will on other states. The new powers to enforce the norms of international law thus depend essentially on a favourable equilibrium in power relations within the state system, and not on the attribution of coercive powers to the UN.

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However, alongside these new elements, the Gulf War has shown signs of continuity with the old order. First of all the war, although it was fought under the aegis of the UN, was the expression of the old way of solving conflicts. Moreover, the predominant military contribution was given by the army of the US, which continues to play the role of world gendarme. Finally, it must be noted that military intervention, if it has put a stop to the hegemonic aspirations of Saddam Hussein, has not solved

any of the explosive problems of the Middle East — military imbalances, economic injustices, violation of human rights — nor has it opened the way to a solution of the Palestinian problem. It has simply had the effect of perpetuating the status quo. Two hundred years after the American Revolution, the United States has in fact committed all its resources to restoring a feudal monarchy. Respect for international law is not therefore enough to guarantee peace, which is threatened by the tensions between North and South. It is in fact a law which perpetuates resounding injustices, that offend democratic consciences. These evident deficiencies of the UN are the expression of its institutional limits. The United Nations does not have a democratic structure, but is rather an organization dominated by the big powers, which have a right of veto in the Security Council. It possess neither armed forces nor its own financial resources, but they employs those made available by member states.

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These limits on the UN emphasize the fact that if the old bipolar order is dying, a new world order has not yet asserted itself.

The crisis of bipolarism leaves no room for American monopolism, as many superficial observers would expect. The United States has also come out of the Cold War exhausted. Eloquent proof of this is the tremendous balance of payments deficit.

World politics tends to evolve towards the formation of a multipolar system which, as we have seen, represents an order in power relations which is favourable to the prevalence of law in international relations. But the assertion of a new world order founded on law can be successful only if the transformation, albeit gradually, of the UN into a just and democratic World Government is started. And this requires that other powers or groupings of states should emerge from the ruins of the old order and stand side by side with the United States and the Soviet Union in a World Government. Hence, the tendency which must assert itself in world politics, if the grand design of refounding the UN is to prevail, is the redistribution of world power in a multipolar sense. The struggle which is taking place all over the world, which tends to create regional or sub-regional groupings of states, is the clearest demonstration of this trend. The regional dimension is in fact indispensable to create modern forms of economic development and to counterbalance the excessive power of the most powerful states. The important issue on which the formation of a stable world order depends, and which remains unresolved, is that of the

establishment, first in Europe and in the Arab world and then in the rest of the Third World (sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia, Latin America), of state groupings of regional dimensions. With this basis, the UN can become a guarantor and promoter of a fairer distribution of power and wealth in the world.

Regional unifications, by creating a more balanced organization of the world, represent the main premise for the democratic transformation of the UN. In actual fact, the great difference in size of the member states (the fact that China, a state with over a billion inhabitants, and Nauru, a small island in the Pacific with 8000 inhabitants, both have one vote in the general Assembly) represents the largest obstacle to the proper functioning of the UN.

The European Community, precisely because it represents the most advanced spearhead in the political unification processes taking place in the world, could become the centre for the initiative of reform of the Security Council in a regional sense. In fact, a new great power has arisen in Europe (Germany, after the unification), which, according to widespread opinion, has all the qualifications to become a permanent member of the Security Council. Instead, the Community could promote the alternative of representing the Twelve itself, thus helping to reduce the number of members in the Security Council and to simplify the functioning of this organ. The Security Council seems destined therefore to become the second branch of world legislative power, in other words to take on the role of Senate.

The reform of the Security Council is but one aspect of a wider reform programme of the UN, that is inspired by principles of international democracy. The objective of a democratic representation of peoples in the UN, however distant it may seem today, possesses a great mobilizing power. Considering that no substantial reform can come through the initiative of governments, only pressure from the peoples can push governments along the road to peace and international democracy.

The organism which is destined to embody this principle is the World Parliament, which will be the result of the democratic transformation of the general Assembly. However, the fact remains that, in spite of the great progress of democracy in Eastern Europe and in Latin America, most of the member states of the UN do not have a Parliament. The creation of a World Parliament can only be a gradual and long term process, as the institutional evolution of the European Parliament shows. At the beginning it was composed of members of the national Parliaments, then it was elected by universal suffrage, and finally it claimed constituent and

legislative powers.

The fact that democratic institutions are the heritage of only a part of humanity, allows us to identify the states that will take in hand the process of forming the World Parliament. This consideration suggests that we should follow with particular attention the institutional evolution of the Assembly of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which has lately been established. If we take into account that it has an interregional dimension, that it covers the area in which democratic institutions were born (the West), and the one where they are now spreading following the fall of the Communist system (Eastern Europe), and that the problems it has to face are of a global nature, it is not out of place to surmise that it could become the embryo of a World Parliament.

At the same time, the role of the General Secretariat as potential World Government will tend to grow gradually as the independence of the UN with respect to its member states develops. Up to now the General Secretary, from his appointment, up to the political directions which have inspired his actions, has been in fact a figure subordinate to the choices of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The convergence of interests between the great powers is the condition for the progressive emergence of the authority of a world power above states, the efforts of which will turn first of all to the assertion of legal procedures in the settlement of international conflicts.

Moreover the progressive affirmation of the binding nature of the sentences of the International Court of Justice, represents another chapter in the development programme of UN institutions aimed at reinforcing international law, and the instruments for the peaceful solution of international conflicts. The model of the European Court of Justice, which has managed to assert the supremacy of Community law, even before democratic European power was consolidated, shows what potential the International Court of Justice has in the new era of world politics. Strong economic interdependence, and the elimination of the option of war as a means for solving conflicts, represent in fact the historic conditions (which have asserted themselves within the European Community and are beginning to do so at worldwide level) for law to prevail over force in international relations.

Having illustrated the broad outline of the reform of institutions, it is now necessary to consider the problem of the powers and competences to be transferred to the UN. The area in which it is possible to achieve, in the near future, a reinforcement of the latter seems to relate to the power of directly recruiting troops for use in "operations for maintaining peace,"

so as to make the UN armed forces progressively independent from the member states.

Another promising prospect is offered by the World Conference on the Environment and Development, that will take place in Brazil next year. It could mark the birth of a World Agency for the Protection of the Environment which, to fight the greenhouse effect, might promote the institution of a tax on carbon emissions to contribute to UN finances. As a result, the action of the UN would be based on an initial form of financial independence.

Moreover, the creation of a single currency and a European federal bank would represent the preconditions for the formation of a new international monetary order of a polycentric nature, which is therefore more stable, more open to the participation of the regions of the Third World, and raises the need arise for a world currency and an instrument to govern the world economy, a need which is increasingly widely felt.

Finally, following the model of international Authority established by the Convention on the law of the Sea to control the exploitation of the resources situated on the seabed, it would be possible to extend the concept of the common heritage of mankind to other parts of the planet, such as the atmosphere or Antarctica.

These are merely a few general pointers to initiate the debate. The democratic reform of the UN, however far the prospect of its full realization may be, is starting to be a matter for discussion among political forces. It is therefore indispensable that the federalists should set out their position as soon as possible. This is necessary if they are to continue the proposing and initiative-making role they have always played.

The ECU and the Beginning of the New World Economic Order

ALFONSO JOZZO

Europe is now on the threshold of Monetary Union: if the outcome of the current intergovernmental conference is positive — as it appears it will be after the implicit approval by the United Kingdom of the results hitherto achieved — and a new Treaty is drawn up concerning the establishment, within 3 to 5 years, of a single central bank, even if a federal one, and the adoption of the ECU as a single currency, radical reform of international economic relations will be started.

We can therefore ask whether a new world economic order will begin with the ECU and try to identify the impact of this radical reform of the international monetary system, a reform which may be more important than that brought about after World War II when the International Monetary Fund was established at Bretton Woods.

The "South" and ecology: the new challenges.

At present the world economy is facing two big challenges, which call for a different use of resources compared with the situation in the last decades:

1) it is absolutely necessary to ensure the development of the "South" of the world and reduce the gap with the "North", in order to avoid the creation of two opposing blocs, to control migration, to spread democracy and, ultimately, to make possible the establishment of world institutions capable of offering safety and wealth to all people;

2) the preservation of the ecological balance calls for important changes in those institutions in charge of the functioning of the economic system, in order to avoid using land improperly, with consequent dis-economies.

The rational utilization of capital is essential, considering the large needs which should be met (development of the "South," ecological

balance) and of the economic system's limited capacity to increase the availability of capital enormously. The new situation which characterizes the world economy requires a return to the concept of capital "rarity" — which is the foundation of economics itself — and ensuring the world market works efficiently by allocating resources where they will be used most productively, thus removing the institutional limits which at present are directing them towards waste.

In particular the current trend which sends the capitals towards the "North" of the world because of the greater "political" risk for private investments in the "South" should be altered, in order to make the most of the productive potential of these areas, where the very low cost labour factor should be employed locally, instead of giving rise to unwelcome migratory flows.

On the other hand, a supranational "ecological" system of taxation should be set up soon, in order to direct investment towards those fields which allow the preservation of the environment and the ecological balance.

A new international monetary system.

The first step to achieve these targets is reform of the international monetary system and the presence of a stable "world currency" which does not seriously affect, because of inflation, the functioning of the world market.

In fact, it is a question of restoring and extending over the whole world the conditions of monetary stability set up at Bretton Woods — with the mechanisms of the International Monetary Fund and of the dollar's convertibility into gold — and of support for European reconstruction through the intervention of the World Bank according to the Marshall Plan.

The ECU will give the world a monetary system based on stability and avoid the inflationary "manipulation" of the world economy by countries or specific interests, since it will only be able to become an international currency in competition with the dollar if it shows remarkable degrees of stability, so meeting the requirements of international investors eager to avoid seeing their capital eroded by inflation.

The same institutional structure linked to the issue of the ECU — an independent central bank — will strengthen this trend, making the ECU a currency issued by a "true" federation where the power of the political authorities to affect the issue of currency is minimal.

With the establishment of European central bank the control of inflation will be strengthened, and the mechanisms of Economic and Monetary Union will prevent the formation of large public deficits both on a European and a national scale, thus increasing investment capital. Simultaneously the United States will be forced, because of ECU competition with the dollar, to stabilize its currency, curbing inflation and drastically reducing the absorption of external resources in order to finance a level of consumption inconsistent with resources produced domestically.

The fundamental reform of the international monetary system caused by the ECU will allow an increase in capital availability worldwide, and will make possible the financing of plans for ecological reconversion, and for the development of the "South", which are unthinkable at present.

A development plan for the "South".

In particular, during an initial stage, the ECU as a world currency competing with the dollar will generate a high "real" (that is to say net of inflation) interest rate, with the consequent transfer of income from users to holders of capital in all its forms, including exhaustible commodities (from oil to wood). If the purchasing power of the world currency is safeguarded against inflation, debtor countries will be compelled to transfer wealth to creditor countries and the cycle of recent decades, during which the "South" has been financing the "North," will be interrupted.

The shift will not be easy, because all economies will have to conform to the new conditions predominant on the world market. But, unlike what happened at the beginning of the Seventies, when the inflationary cycle triggered by the United States with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system concentrated the recycling of the world *surplus* there, it will be possible to use the opportunity to reform fundamentally all institutional and economic frameworks, both in the "North" and in the "South." On the other hand, it is quite natural that the aforementioned world inflationary cycle imposed itself following the failure of the Werner Plan, which was the first attempt to achieve European Monetary Union.

Capital can be directed towards those areas where its use is more productive (the "South"), only if the above-mentioned "political" risk is overcome.

As happened to western economies when the Marshall Plan came into effect, exchanges and investments in "South" countries need to be carried

out in the first place, at least within the limits of economic regional agreements with a minimum of viability and linked up — as was then Western Europe — to a driving economic pole such as the European Community, the United States or Japan. Only in this case economic activity in "South" countries will turn out to be efficient and competitive, even if technologies and production methods involving a lower supply of capital for each employee are used.

The intervention of institutions, inspired by that which enabled European reconstruction, is therefore the federalists' next target in order to proceed towards the new world economic order: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Organization for Economic Co-operation, the European Union of Payments, the European Community are the examples to refer to.

The current situation of Latin America, Africa and Asia is undoubtedly different: new ideas are needed, in order to set up new institutional models able to allow the reunification of the "North" and "South" of the world.

At the point of achieving the Economic and Monetary Union of Europe, culminating the process started half a century ago, the examination of the first stage of this undertaking might not only give us the ideal stimulus to deal with these new tasks, but also some suggestions and examples.

Federalism: the Pessimism of Intelligence and the Optimism of Will

ROSARIO PINTO

There have been at least three stages of historical development in federalist thought during the last two centuries; starting from the moment when the pinnacle of cosmopolitan culture indicated that the time was ripe to surpass state particularism with the introduction of a *brand new* socio-political combination; a historically unprecedented concept called federalism.¹

These three stages may be summed up in the following way:

— The first stage extends from Kantian philosophy up to the First World War and reveals a general *theoretical* development in federalist doctrine. This latter was characterized by extensive and wide ranging contributions of thought from various cultural sources; these were not necessarily homogeneous; in fact, they were often in antithesis. (Saint-Simon, Proudhon, Mazzini, Cattaneo, Gioberti, etc). Before this there was an enlightenment prehistory of federalist alignment (Leibniz, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, etc.).

— The second stage relates to the period between the First and Second World Wars. This stage is more *diplomatic* in character, in that it aimed to beat a political path to facilitate relations between states. Here we see people putting to use their own vast experience not in the creation of an abstract idea but in the firm foundation of a new political dimension (Lothian, Briand, Coudenhove-Kalergi, etc.).

— We can call the third stage a *political* one. It began during the Second World War, and together with the *Manifesto of Ventotene* sparked off a natural realignment towards federalism, thereby liberating it from the *theoretical* and *diplomatic* constraints of the two preceding stages; the *Manifesto of Ventotene* introduces a clear *political* tone into the third stage, prompting the participation of the people in the formation of new supranational institutions.

Not by coincidence, at this very point in time, federalism was perceived in various ways, but was always seen as a political option which might shape plans of action. Federalist theory at this time sorted itself into several groups which then formed the spearhead for three projects: *Integral Federalism* (Marc), *Institutional Renewal* (Spinelli) and the *Ideological Option* (Albertini).

Moreover, from that time on, the formation of federal institutions implied adopting the specific political aim of creating a democratic supranational power in Europe.

These projects had a common denominator: the presence, in all of them, of a culture of *opposition* to the *status quo*, which in East and West was founded on the principle of the nation-state. (At this point, we should remind ourselves of the theoretical contributions of Lenin and Trotsky, emphasizing nevertheless that Soviet historical development was characterized by national bureaucratic centralization).

It is noteworthy, however, that this federalist alignment with opposition did not imply total unity with the other traditional forces of opposition. The *Manifesto of Ventotene* had clearly shown that the difference between conservative and progressive forces was no longer a matter as simple as traditional right and left, but rather the differentiation between the ability and the will to make antagonistic political choices, either on a national or broader scale.

So, opposition consisted only in drawing up plans and not in seeking power since by denying the national legitimization of power, federalism implicitly refuted the ongoing power struggle.

* * *

In the eighteenth century and prior to these three stages (*theoretical*, *diplomatic* and *political*), cosmopolitanism flourished.

However, even before this, an urgent need for integration and mutual support between various populations had stimulated these political groups (we could even call them states; although this term is not strictly correct, it is difficult to find one which adequately fits all the historical events of ancient and modern times) to seek new forms of collaboration and union. However any such union had always been halted just before handing over *the keys of the city* to the allies; in other words, at the precise moment the states were forced to contemplate relinquishing a part of their *sovereignty* in order to encourage people to discard their misgivings about, and doubts towards, the *other states* and in order to ensure that law

was the sole governor of relationships.

This kind of analysis must lead us to examine a whole series of cases. For simplicity's sake, we will begin with that of the Greek leagues. These were a union of city states which had well understood the advantages of collaboration and which saw the need to establish a powerful association; this association was not, however, stretched to the point to which each individual *polis* would have had to give up the *quid pluris* which represented the foundation stone of political individualism and which we describe today as *sovereignty*.

It is easy to recognize a similar situation when we look at the relations between municipal cities in Medieval Italy, or when we examine the struggle for a balance of power upon which political events in the Italian courts in the Renaissance period hinged, and which later became a constant feature of European politics.

It was against this background that the practice of politics as diplomacy was born and established itself whilst the importance of other aspects of politics was significantly reduced. All of this was not, however, enough to dissolve the balances of power on a *national* level in order to progress to a new *supranational* level.

It seems apt at this point to recall the words of Gramsci: "Will has always exerted greater influence in politics than in diplomacy. Diplomacy ratifies and tends to maintain situations created during state political battles. We can only call it creative in a metaphorical sense or by philosophical convention (because all human activity is creative). International relations deal with a balance of powers in which each single state can exert but a small influence. Florence could exercise some influence, if it strengthened its position for example; but even if it did, although it might well improve its standing in Italy and Europe, it could not be considered to be a key factor when it came to upsetting the balance of power of the entire system. For this very reason, diplomats, by merit of their profession, are inclined towards scepticism and conservative narrow-mindedness."²

Modern and contemporary European behaviour was to draw inspiration from the principle of equilibrium, and hegemonical conflicts, generally speaking, ended up by accepting a proposal to create a balance of powers which tended to create *a system of European states* governed by forces and counter-forces which pivoted around a *diplomatic* apparatus that, in actual fact, took control of international politics. But none of this was enough to guarantee peace in Europe where the egoism of the nation-states was to bring about the ultimate catastrophe of continental Europe

— the Second World War.

* * *

At this point, we come to federalism and to the political proposals aimed at transcending national sovereignty and the related principles of *raison d'Etat*.

It seems relevant to mention a *historical* concept which was to be absorbed into the set of federalist options which cropped up after the Second World War (Marc, Spinelli, Albertini) and which were touched upon earlier in the text.

This concept was called *functionalism*: it did not in itself have any theoretical content in its own right, nor did it offer any innovation as far as the purposes of *federalism* were concerned, but, conversely, it took on great importance if one takes into account its role in the making of the European Community policies which were to come into being from the 1950's onwards. But, its importance, to echo Gramsci's words, is of a *diplomatic* nature rather than a *political* one. In fact, at the end of the Second World War, when it seemed a good idea to develop structures which could offer a new way of doing politics between European states, and when it came to forming public supranational institutions, the principle that institutions like the ECSC, and, subsequently, the EEC, should guide politics in the direction of a true political union, became firmly established.

This principle added, however, that in the meantime, these institutions were to *function* in the best possible manner in order to move *gradually* towards an ever-approaching union of European countries. This in its turn was to have led *inevitably* to the formation of the United States of Europe, or something very similar.

This was the prediction of Jean Monnet who, in the federalist analysis of history, has always been contrasted with Altiero Spinelli. While on the subject of comparisons of a political-diplomatic nature, it would not seem too wild a comparison to match up Spinelli-Machiavelli and Monnet-Guicciardini.

Let us once more examine the words of Gramsci: "The scepticism of Guicciardini (not the pessimism of intelligence which can be linked to an optimism of will in realistic and active politicians) can be attributed to various causes: 1) The diplomat does a job which forces him into a position of subordination and dependence; he plays an executive-bureaucratic role and must bow to a will (the political will of his own government

or prince) which is alien to his own persuasions (although it is true to say that he may also, in some cases, be able to identify with this alien will: being that diplomacy has necessarily developed into a specialized profession, it has come about that the diplomat becomes isolated from the politics of ever-changing governments etc.) and this accounts for their scepticism and in scientific matters, for their non-scientific bias. 2) Guicciardini's very own convictions: these were conservative against the backdrop of Italian politics, therefore he theorized about his own opinions and his own political standpoint, etc."³

After the end of the Second World War, it was clear that only courageous political choices of a supranational character could introduce objectivity into the policies of the European states — policies which would settle on a line of action that would promote a process of steady growth and peace, and yet, when faced with the ultimate decision to eradicate national differences arising from national sovereignty, in order to create a true political union, it was thought best to hover on the brink with the European Market and the hybrid European Economic Community.⁴ In all of this, the Political Community is kept on the threshold, and is thought of, not as a guest whose company is unwanted, but as a guest, who for the time being is unwelcome, but who will be allowed in when the time is right. But when will the time be right? This is not for us to know. But in the meanwhile, let federalists take care of this guest, let them keep him in fine fettle, so that, sooner or later, he can cross over the threshold.

Whilst the federalist option remained on the outskirts, *functionalism*, throughout the community life of the ECSC, Euratom and EEC, was to be a real guiding light for European Community institutions, with its methodical approach which altogether gave *functionalism* the image (to quote Gramsci) of "a dependent, subordinated, bureaucratic-executive activity," a characteristic trait of diplomacy.

Curiously, at the end of the Second World War, just when a historical opportunity to introduce a federalist phase in the development of European politics presented itself; at that precise time, when federalism, as a practical political viewpoint, after a long probation period of about two centuries, with the *theoretical* and *diplomatic* stages, which had then led to the *political* stage, the *functional-diplomatic* approach, well-known since the early days of European politics, in fact, since the time of the Renaissance, reared its head. It was dressed in the new clothes of the supranational option, but was motivated by the need not to link the real European institutional reform (the Political Community) with the reno-

vation of the outer structures (The Single Market).

To sum up, the old principle of leaving things as they are, the worst forms of transformism and gattopardism, the prevalence of diplomacy over politics, of Guicciardini over Machiavelli, to quote Gramsci, crushed any real possibility of *innovation* in Europe.

* * *

And yet, none of this was to be without consequences: the federalist plan was to be proposed *from the bottom*, as it were, by people who felt the need to re-appropriate their political rights, and this very re-appropriation was to come about *in the face* of the conservative and/or reactionary mechanisms of the state apparatuses' policies, new national *wolves* disguised as community *lambs*. It was for this reason that intellectual forces and federalist strategies would join together to press for universal suffrage for the European Parliament and subsequently for its constituent mandate.

All of this happened with the full awareness that national governments had actively resisted any radical political changes in the Community. This was apparent at the Luxembourg Summit in December 1985, when the only real political initiative from 1957, the *Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union*, was permanently shelved; the Draft Treaty may have been approved by the European Parliament but the initiative was rejected by the national governments.

Spinelli, who had inspired and been the driving force behind the Draft Treaty, made his position crystal clear: "The referendum is a tool which we use to try and obtain popular support for those governments which might want or intend to gain constituent powers for the European Parliament. The key idea is this: never again should a constituent task for the European Union lie in the hands of diplomats. So, to start with, we should never avail ourselves of Art. 236, because this article says that this same task must be carried out by a diplomatic conference."⁵

It is from this time that Albertini's *position war* strategy necessarily became the only possible one for federalists; it is one which in the long term produced two results: first, institutional reformation in the federal sense became not only essential but inevitable and, second, the creation of a general social ethic, a federalist *Weltanschauung*, which could pick up the pieces of the collapsing traditional ideologies, which were obviously in a state of crisis; this was something that federalist culture was to understand well ahead of time, anticipating the events that were to

characterize the end of the 80's and the period of uncertainty at the beginning of the 90's.

* * *

The growing conviction that conditions in Europe apparently favourable to the development and entrenchment of the federalist ethic were, in fact, probably not as good as they appeared, gave federalist theory food for thought. State interdependence received a substantial boost with the increase of communications and relations in a world which seemed increasingly like a *big village*, but, on the other hand, the emerging differences became more and more glaringly obvious whilst those in power eloquently claimed that this historical development was nothing less than the continuation of a straight course towards justice and truth. Even the collapse of the ideology, on which some institutional structures were based, was not enough to trigger a move towards peace and order.

In fact, quite the opposite is true; the darkest, most dispiriting face of politics came into view as feelings of nationalism and war were stirred.

This is how things were when the Gulf War broke out; the second Gulf War after the 1980's Iran-Iraq war. It was to be a full-blown war, during which the *multinational* forces, fighting on two separate fronts, pursued with steely determination their objective of physically annihilating the enemy. On the military front, we saw the use of awesome weaponry for mass destruction and on the propaganda front the circulation of information was repressed and free thought was paralysed.

But what needs looking at is the fact that international affairs are taking on a politically *multinational* aspect. There is an obvious failure to make a move towards a *supranational and federal* social order, which would involve the sovereign nations (on whose shoulders international law supposedly rests) being merged into a legal entity, each having equal rights, and each state being divested of the power to declare war. But the international community appears to be incapable of doing just this and instead prefers to reinforce national powers. Thus, *supranationality* struggles painfully to make headway, but *multinationality* takes the reigns instead, and the principle of the individual nation proliferates.

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Federalism remained unperturbed by all of this and maintained its

ideological position, but nevertheless it was exposed to historical criticism and was made to readjust its political aims. Its strategy was not called into question, but rather its tactics which might possibly have benefited from modification.

It seems appropriate to recall the concept of *functionalism* to prove that the type of concept which led to the creation of the European Community has created a *spurious supranational community* in Europe of the Twelve nations; in the sense that economic integration and commercial productive and consumer interdependence have grossly distorted the general perspective. This distortion, whilst giving rise to the belief that Europe exists as a single political community in which democratic decisions are made, repeatedly fails each time national interests come to the fore and history is not made by Europe as one, but by individual European states all aligned ... in open order.

It is as if the post World War European Community had reverted to a system similar to that of the eighteenth century *République des lettres* where European intellectuals felt themselves to be part of a supranational thinking and research community despite the fact that each one of them was actually subject to his own nation, or, more properly, to his own sovereign. Something of this ilk is happening in the European Community: to be blunt, however, this Community has none of the elitism of those eighteenth century intellectuals and the object of common interest (no longer Renaissance philosophy but consumer goods) prevents people from forming a correct and realistic political view of events and processes, whilst at the same time giving the optimistic impression of belonging to a *cosmopolitan* community, as if national differences along with social, legal and economic inequalities had been eradicated. But, in the meantime, not even European citizenship, as a point of law, has been established.

If one considers this, Gramsci pointed out something similar about communal society when he said: "The medieval Italian bourgeoisie was unable to pass from the corporative stage into the political one because it could not totally shake off the medieval idea of cosmopolitanism as represented by the Pope, the clergy and even some lay intellectuals (humanists). In other words the bourgeoisie was incapable of creating an autonomous state, and instead remained transfixed in a medieval, feudal and cosmopolitan framework."⁶

Gramsci's passage has in prospect something which appears to be at variance with what we, in this text, have tried to analyse and define: in fact it seems that Gramsci was rejecting cosmopolitanism, preferring in its

place a national system since he reproaches "the Italian bourgeoisie" for being "unable to create an autonomous state." But we should remember that Gramsci himself would not have deemed the formation of communal or even regional states as being a satisfactory action: and we should also remind ourselves that the cosmopolitan *social order* he is rejecting is the same *social order* which is claimed to have been built up on behalf of the people by those two eminent institutions: the Empire and the Papacy. This is what he has to say on the subject: "We should not forget that Machiavelli felt that the state was not the borough or the republic and the municipal powers, because these lacked both vast territories and sufficient men to build the military force necessary to support independent international policies. He felt that in Italy the existence of the Papacy meant the perpetuation of a non-state situation and this would endure until religion too became state 'policy' rather than Papa policy which tried to obstruct the formation of strong states in Italy; to do this, the Pope even trespassed on the lives of populations not under his temporal rule, to gain non-state related advantages and therefore we can say that his actions caused havoc and disruption."⁷

In my opinion, the present European Community has many similarities to the case in Gramsci's study. Particularly since community economic institutions are the "non-state" and the fragmentary political nature of the European national states prevents there being any reliable "vast territory," which means a real obstacle to the birth of a European infrastructure capable of leading world politics.

But there is more. Within the European Community there are some alien political factors which change and influence European decisions that are supposed to be consistent with plans to create a European Political Community.

This sort of partial power often crops up in political Europe (which obviously, is still waiting to be born) and serves only to nip the flower in the bud. Gramsci's criticism of "Medieval cosmopolitanism" is interesting to interpret in this day and age, as an equivalent of the criticism that we seem to be moving towards the idea (and one which is widespread nowadays) that the European Community is a political course we are already on and so there is not much else left to be done, seeing that once the internal market goals have been reached, these ought to satisfy fully the requirements of European integration; therefore, any institutional reform should be unnecessary, which might create the need for constituent action that in its turn could ultimately substitute the current *international* European system with a new *supranational* system, by transferring

a part of national sovereignty from states to federal institutions.

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An easily predictable criticism of this argument is that it precludes any possibility of a worldwide federal plan, and, rather, restricts institutional federal reform to Europe. It might be interesting thus to counter these claims:

1) Albertini sees federalism not just as a political doctrine, but rather as an *ideology* — this prevents the federalist plan from being limited to Europe since it will necessarily spread elsewhere.

2) As far as strategic political choices are concerned, it would seem right to continue in the direction of creating a federal world power availing ourselves of regional federations (Asia, Africa, the Middle East, etc.). In this case, the European model of institutional reform from *nationality* to *supranationality* might serve as a guide.

3) A kind of dubious globalism is asserting itself; it intends to impose an international system without attempting to make room for an international system of democracy. This cannot fail to ring alarm bells for the federalist plan; such a blinkered attitude cannot be confused with the liberal outlook of federalism, for the latter, to the contrary, offers a system where individuality and cultural idiosyncracies would neither be eradicated in order to attain behavioural conformity nor would they constitute grounds for political or economic discrimination etc.

* * *

To investigate further this third point, we should consider some other points.

The fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of 1989 *freed* the world from a *nightmare*. But from what *nightmare*? One might well ask. The words of Marx and Engels might help us to gain a better understanding: "A spectre will wander across Europe: the spectre of communism." With these words, the compilers of the *Manifesto* meant that communism, after a long theoretical incubation period, was about to emerge in the real world of practical politics. But the opposition took the word "spectre" and translated it as "nightmare" in their propaganda material: "By now, all the European powers see communism as a real power. It is time for the whole world to meet communism, divest of secrecy; it is time to discover its opinions, aims and tendencies and to see that the latter have replaced the

spectre of communism with a *Party Manifesto*.⁸

Release from the *nightmare* of communism with the fall of the Berlin Wall was greeted with warmth and enthusiasm; people were convinced that the collapse of the so-called *true socialist régimes* would automatically bring glory to democracy and freedom.

But little heeded are warnings that democracy and freedom do not necessarily go hand in hand, and that on more than one historical occasion any relationship between the two was not direct but inverse:⁹ these words, however, fall on deaf ears. People are simply glad that the *nightmare* is over. But what has taken its place? People know full well that the current system of growth does not take into account men's needs; they realize that the *democratization of the East* has coincided, for those Eastern block countries, with a historical period of deep economic recession, unemployment and breakdown of established social structures and characteristics of security. But none of this apparently matters. Freedom at any price, even if the price to be paid is high. It remains to be seen what will become of this regained freedom.

Perhaps we are confusing an absence of constraint with the possibility of real, complete expression of thought and action.

In institutional terms, all of this is not without its consequences: the European Community needs to provide political, institutional and economic support. In this, at the moment, they seem to be competing with the US. But worse still is the fact that relations with the Third World have been neglected and resources meant for those parts of the world will have to be diverted to the East. The ideological crisis of the East has given way to an *abhorrence of a vacuum* since communism has stepped out of its *well-known* guise of *true socialism* and now risks turning back into "the spectre wandering across Europe." This does appear likely to happen if we consider that the *crisis* of the *true socialist* system did not coincide with the entrenchment of perfect democracy or with the appeasement of basic social needs. In other words, should we interpret the crisis of this system as the irreversible fall of the solidarity example of a planned economy or as the result of a series of theoretical planning mistakes? Likewise, was the victory of the *opposition* due to its own intrinsic merits and the undeniable value of its ideas, or to the internal *crisis* of its adversary?

At any rate, a new need for social justice is taking root both in Europe and in the Third World and along with it is a desire for a new sort of unification and this increasingly highlights the limits of a growth system entirely dependent on the success ethic, and on unrestrained social and

economic *Darwinism*.¹⁰

People are starting to realize that convincing answers are needed to certain questions: there is a need for radical reformation of social, political and economic relations. We need to go to much deeper and more complex levels than the apparently efficient system would suggest that the skimpy political shortcuts would like to imply with their impromptu solutions of constitutional engineering. It is no coincidence that the Church is becoming aware of the situation, that it is pushing for peace at a time when the international community was unable to resolve the Gulf crisis in any other way except by a declaration of war (which did not, in fact, solve anything at all). In contrast the Church is finding solutions in other areas too and is, in fact, drawing up a new version of its social doctrine.

Just as at the time of the fall of the Roman Empire, the Church is stepping into the shoes of political institutions by creating a social ethic which satisfies the increasing desire of the populace (which seeks concrete, ethical and behavioural guidelines). Thus, it paves its own *neo-eschatological* way to a *third alternative* somewhere between socialism and capitalism, and all of this might serve to grant the Church readmittance into the big game of politics from which it had departed.

The Church's scheme to redefine reasons to act on a finalistic rather than a historical plane, tends to place the Church on the historical centre-stage; a position which events had denied it since the time of the Enlightenment when human beings discovered that they did not need a metaphysical justification for their actions. The Church is acting on the basis of a quite specific political instinct which is that of filling, with its doctrines, a vacuum which had arisen through the fall of an ideology and the collapse of the example of true socialism, along with the internal deterioration, veering on implosion, of a system which had always been totally opposed to the Soviet world. To use the words of the Church, it is, in fact, the *materialistic consumption* and spiritual indifference which lies at the heart of what the Church deems intolerable in the capitalist world.

Inevitably, therefore, it appears that Western unification, which seems to be the logical historical development of the near future, will clash with a new eschatological scheme: a new Papal-Imperial conflict is on the horizon.

Here we should re-examine Gramsci's point about the *cosmopolitan* and *feudal* aspect of Medieval power on the basis of which a thinker cannot perceive any possibility of political success for political and

municipal structures etc., which are incapable of moving away from the laws of the system which surrounds them. The Woytilian role concentrates on the retrieval of the pre-Enlightenment conduct of a world in which the dictates of faith kept a tight rein on (as far as society was concerned) the regulation of economic, political and personal affairs. These are the reasons behind the Holy See's *interest* in Christianizing Europe and in promoting the development of the Third World. Therefore, the *third alternative* does not have institutional implications but moral ones, or, more correctly, the former take a back seat to the latter.

* * *

This is how I see the overall situation and a theoretical and political federalist solution must take all of this into account. And yet, in a certain way, federalism had foreseen the way events would turn out.

A thorough examination of the facts should not lead us in the direction of change or a sudden turnabout: quite to the contrary, federalism substantiated its theoretical studies in the worldwide political scene. That is to say that what really starts to take shape are the tactical choices, or the political stances adopted as action guidelines.

Above all, I believe that we can say that the federalist campaign should reassert itself as a *longterm* campaign. While on the subject, perhaps it is worth remembering — even if it is not to our honour — that we heralded the arrival of the European Union all too soon, when in actual fact the destruction of national power is still a hard task, and that too many obstacles were put along the path by various interested parties — both from within individual European states and from outside Europe altogether.

There is a need to groom federalism to act as an objective observer so that it can take on the role of the selective conscience of society and its political-economical set-up; rather than getting it to participate directly in affairs which might make it run the risk of appearing to be what it is not, that is, a political option at someone else's beck and call.

Within the outlook of a long trek into a desert, the struggle for World federation can be the guidelines for the federalist campaign to build a federal Europe.

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In the long term, if we think of the hard trek ahead, federalism

probably needs to find a means of sustenance which will support it while it continues to unfold its historical plan. Nowadays we can clearly see the strong political sentiment that federalism offers by marrying ethics and politics.

A superficial and inaccurate study of Machiavelli's writing would probably emphasize *amorality* in politics. But if politics is equivalent to the expression of "will" as Gramsci would suggest, then we come back necessarily to morality since thought forms action and the end shapes the means; we modify the way we do things to obtain the best we can, taking into account the conditions surrounding us. In effect, if we did not try to gain advantage from our actions, it would be madness. Machiavelli's ethic, therefore, consisted in creating a perfect relationship between the end and the means. In doing so, according to Gramsci, Machiavelli distinguishes between the *creativity* of politics and the conservative *rigidity* of diplomacy; it is clear that the ethical implications of religious doctrine are quite different: here, the very fact that the end transcends history itself, means that people undergo the conditioning of faith, and so the religious ethic becomes a value and human action is relieved of responsibility. An ideal example to demonstrate this concept is the idea of peace: to the Christian, peace is a *value* whereas for the politician it is a state of *non-war* or, at the most, the achievement of a balance of power (I am thinking, for example, of the post Second World War period and its bipolarism and nuclear solution for peace).

Federalism introduces a new concept: peace is an institution.¹¹ Kant demonstrates, in fact, that peace can only be said to be peace if it can prove that war is not legally feasible; if the legal conditions have been created *to prevent* war. Creating these conditions implies the creation of institutions which only have the right to deliver justice if they receive permission to do so by the states; in the same way that individuals learnt to live in civilized society only on the understanding that they *did not have the right* to take justice in their own hands against those who had wronged them. This should form the basis of federal institutions.

This example of peace shows the need to change *values* in *institutions*. Of course, seeing peace as a value expresses a need, a hope, a yearning, a commitment, all of which, to a great extent, are fired by emotions. The prospect of peace as an *institution* in no way detracts from these emotions; but rather the concept of a value would anchor itself in the foundations of institutional life.

* * *

At this historical turning point for federalism — according to organizational theory¹² — when there is a choice between reorganization or demise, after having produced results of a certain nature and with the thought that restructuralization will involve accepting ethics into politics, it is worthwhile discussing whether it is possible to establish and create an *institutional* ethic to counter the traditional *axiological* aspect. Of course, the implications of all this are significant: in political terms, for example, it could clear up the relationship between freedom and democracy, or between quality and quantity in the choice of courses of action and in the management of common property.

And yet, we feel fully the weight of the problem posed by Gramsci when he talked of the “pessimism of intelligence” stifling “the optimism of will.”

NOTES

¹ Here we should remember that at the end of the 18th century, the world had its first political experience of federalism, through the creation of the United States of America and its federal constitution.

² A. Gramsci, *Quaderni del carcere. Note sul Machiavelli*, Roma, 1975, pp. 116-7 (my translation).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁴ We should bear in mind that in the early 1950's, there was an attempt to create a Community for European Defence (CED). Potentially this would have clarified a course of action and speeded up Political Union since a European Army without a European Government would have been inconceivable. However, the CED initiative was thwarted in the French National Assembly, where it was blocked by political forces opposed to the idea.

⁵ A Spinelli's Speech to the Central Committee of the MFE on the 12th March 1986. The recording was made by Radical Radio. On the subject of the European Parliament, see: L. V. Majocchi-F. Rossolillo, *Il Parlamento Europeo*, Naples, Guida, 1979.

⁶ A. Gramsci, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 122-3.

⁸ K. Marx-F. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, Harmondsworth-New York, Penguin Books, 1967.

⁹ A. Capizzi, “Liberalismo o democrazia,” in *SENZA LICENZA de' superiori*, n. 7, 1989, pp. 6-9.

¹⁰ A. Majocchi, “Federalismo fiscale e rafforzamento del Welfare state,” in *SENZA LICENZA de' superiori*, n. 5, 1989, pp. 3-5.

¹¹ See I. Kant, *La pace, la ragione, la storia*, ed. by M. Albertini, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1985; Lord Lothian, *Pacifism is not enough* (ed. by J. Pinder and A. Bosco), London-New York, Lothian Foundation Press, 1990; E. Reves, *Anatomy of Peace*, London, Penguin

Books, 1947; AA.VV., *Democrazia, rischio nucleare, movimenti per la pace*, Naples, 1988; R. Pinto, “La pace come istituzione,” in *Quaderni di SENZA LICENZA de' superiori*, n. 13, Napoli, 1991.

¹² D. Velo, “La svolta del federalismo,” in *SENZA LICENZA de' superiori*, n. 14, pp. 7-8, 1991.

Europe and the Policy of World Unification

SERGIO PISTONE

Ever since the editorial "Europe and the first governmental forms of international democracy" (*The Federalist*, 1990, n. 2), federalists have been asked to discuss, in the framework of a debate which for now remains purely theoretical, the theory that a federal European Community should pursue a foreign policy based exclusively on the instruments of adherence and association, and hence be without military capability. What was suggested, then, was not simply putting aside the question of military competence and concentrating on seeking economic and monetary federation for reasons of political realism (not expecting everything at once), but a refusal on principle of a federation possessing military capability. At the root of this theory is the fundamental concern that a European federation with military power, instead of proving a decisive factor in favour of the policy of World federation, would end up producing a closed and nationalistic Europe, tending to speed the world on its course towards final catastrophe.

I too feel that European unification has to be pursued not to serve the egoistic interests of Europe, but to meet the very pressing need to launch a policy of world unification. On the other hand, I feel that the EC cannot do without military competence if it wants to become an effective federation internally, and to play an effective role in furthering World federation. Thus, the real problem is not whether the European federation which we want should or should not have military capability, but the use to which this capability should and can be put. In this connection it seems to me that there are two fundamental considerations, one from the perspective of world unification policy, the other related to the danger of European nationalism.

Regarding the first point, we must concentrate our intellectual energies increasingly on making clear to ourselves and to others that a policy for world unification is not only a matter of urgent necessity, it is also concretely possible. It is necessary because, as we have been saying

for some years now, mankind as a whole is now faced with an ultimatum: "unite or perish." And it is concretely possible because the end of the East-West conflict, besides making it possible for the EC to expand, taking in all of Central and Eastern Europe, has opened up a glorious prospect: the institutionalization and strengthening of the Helsinki process. This means it has become politically possible to achieve greater and more institutionalized co-operation between North America, Europe and the USSR, with the desirable prospect of expanding this to include other industrial democracies, starting with Japan.

In internal relations, such a system of co-operation should lead to increasingly substantial progress towards arms reduction and common security, the economic recovery and thus consolidation of new democratic experiments in Central-Eastern Europe and the USSR, and growing co-operation and integration on an economic level between the large communities of the Northern hemisphere. In foreign relations this system of co-operation should constitute the basic platform on which the Northern hemisphere could tackle, harmoniously and effectively, the great challenges facing the world: the huge North-South divide and the task of strengthening the UN. It could, in other words, play a leading role in the world unification process, analogous to that played by the Franco-German axis and by "little Europe" with regard to European integration.

On the other hand, if we want to be convincing and not seem to be abstract visionaries, we must highlight quite frankly the difficulties and complexities. In particular we must emphasize the fact that the advancement of the Helsinki process is subordinate to the achievement of real progress in the process of democratic and federal reform, and economic recovery of the USSR. This means that the most immediate requirement is that of helping the USSR by every means in its effort for change.¹ Above all we must recognize the reality that the creation of federal institutions is not on the agenda for world unification. It is not possible at world level, where it is obvious that the huge discrepancies in socio-economic and democratic progress mean that only intergovernmental co-operation can be developed. However, even in the context of the Helsinki agreements only confederal-functional developments will be possible for a long time to come, without any substantial federal progress; this is because the US is not inclined to concede any sovereignty to supranational organs, the USSR neither wishes to nor is able to, given its state of extreme instability, and Europe, which might be more favourably inclined, does not yet have a supranational government capable of promoting an effective policy for world unification.

If these are the realistic prospects for world unification, it seems to me very unlikely that the EC can become an effective federation on an internal level, and able to play an effective international role in furthering world unification unless it grants itself military competence.

Let us turn now to the problems facing the internal consolidation of European integration. An effective European federation, extending through all of Europe excluding the USSR, will have to be created, and during this period, the situation will not yet be ripe for the transfer of military sovereignty to world federal institutions. The task of disarming the European nations will therefore fall to European supranational institutions. Until this task has been completed, we will not have an effective federation because there will be a strong imbalance between disarmed supranational institutions and armed nations. In consequence, the community juridical order will remain structurally weak, and, if there are serious crises, it will not be possible for supranational authority to intervene effectively to restore the democratic order violated in a member state, or to prevent effectively violent conflicts between member states. Crises of this nature appear fairly unlikely of course, in the present Community of Twelve, but the situation will be very different in a Community comprising the countries of Eastern Europe, with very fragile democracies and serious ethnic problems.²

As regards the policy of world unification, Europe's fundamental contribution will be the enormous economic strength of the Economic and Monetary Union, once it has been achieved. In this way it will be able (in collaboration with the US, Japan, and other industrial democracies, but with a leading role, since it will be well on the way to becoming the strongest of the industrial democracies) to mobilize the economic resources indispensable for the economic recovery of the East (with expansion towards Eastern-Central Europe and association with the USSR), and for the ransom of the South (with regional integrations and UN agencies for the development of the South). For this the EC must above all endow itself with the federal powers necessary for the realization of EMU, and for the implementation of the foreign economic policies necessary to tackle effectively world economic problems. However, since the policy of world unification also has an aspect of military co-operation, and since this cannot yet be translated into the transfer of military sovereignty to worldwide institutions, the EC must also endow itself with military competence to be able to manage this aspect effectively.

In concrete terms, there should be increasingly substantial progress

towards arms reduction and common security in the area of the CSCE. The EC could contribute to this process very effectively if it spoke with a single voice. This can only happen if it has federal competence in foreign policy and security, which would have the function not of increasing its military strength, but essentially of stopping European nation states boycotting or delaying the creation of common security structures at the level of the CSCE.³ In this connection it is important to remember that if military responsibility remains in the hands of the nation states they will, because of their structural weakness, place crucial importance on the exclusively military aspects of security, and hence resist any prospect of arms reduction. If, on the other hand, military responsibility is transferred into the hands of an EC which was in the process of achieving full economic and monetary integration, its enormous strength in this field would make it much more favourable to arms reduction.⁴

Regarding military co-operation at world level, the fundamental task at this stage is the creation of a strong, permanent UN military force, which should have a policing function (repression of transnational crime), supervision of arms reduction, elimination of international arms trafficking, and intervention in local crises in extreme cases (obviously a serious policy of socio-economic ransom for the South, combined with the deterrent function of a substantial permanent UN military force, should provide less incentive for adventurism such as Saddam's). Europe should provide its own contingents to the permanent UN military force and could do it effectively only if they were under the direct responsibility of a European government, in other words if they were federal. If not, (as has been shown by the experience of European participation in the Gulf War) there will be constant conflicts between European nation-states, because some countries will avoid their responsibility, while others who fulfil it will claim economic compensation. These conflicts, together with the related questions of national prestige, will have a disruptive influence within the EC.

It is clear, in the light of these considerations, that the EC cannot do other than endow itself with federal military competence,⁵ and that the real problem is thus the use of such competence for world unification. Having decided that issue, we must now at this point consider the concern that a federation with military competence could produce a closed and nationalist Europe.

It seems to me that this concern is contradictory to our view of the current evolution of the world. We highlight quite rightly a growing

convergence of the *raisons d'Etat* of the greatest world powers. This is due in part to the worldwide significance of the ultimatum "unite or perish"; and in part to the end of the East-West conflict which brought down the fundamental obstacle that had kept mankind from recognizing its common destiny. And we observe that this convergence of interests has put in motion a process of progressive attenuation of power politics, and the beginning of a policy of world unification. If this view is well-founded, it is reasonable to suppose that a Europe capable of acting as a single unit on a world level should become actively involved in this trend, and thus be spurred to use its own powers, in economic, monetary, foreign and military policy, in order to promote world unification, and not for selfish and disruptive nationalism. This supposition appears all the more well-founded if we bear in mind the specific characteristics of European *raison d'Etat*. In this respect, two considerations seem to me decisive.

In the first place, the EC is heavily dependent on world trade, and thus it is in its own interest to help Eastern Europe and the Southern hemisphere (by transferring ever larger amounts of resources from arms spending to development co-operation), in order to consolidate its own economic prospects. Not only that, however: it has also got a vital interest in promoting the development of Eastern Europe and the Southern hemisphere to keep in check the migratory phenomenon that otherwise threatens to compromise even the democratic basis of Western Europe itself. In the second place, a real federal structure, such as the EC will have if it completes the process of integration, represents for a certain period a very strong constitutional obstacle to the affirmation of European nationalism, and thus to the option in favour of a fortress Europe, which would, rather, require a centralized and authoritarian system. The decisive progress in the policy of world unification, which the European federation would be impelled to favour, should therefore create, in the meantime, a situation in which the emergence of a closed and nationalistic Europe would gradually become structurally impossible.

The belief that, objectively speaking, the convergence of interests of the greatest world powers, and the specific nature of Europe's *raison d'Etat*, together constitute a powerful factor favourable to the affirmation of a strong world unification policy on the part of the European federation, clearly does not mean that this policy will become inevitable automatically. In reality, the opportunities for progress which the historical situation offers can be exploited to a greater or lesser extent depending on the level of awareness, ability and will in the political class. Federalists have an important role to play here, in fighting the resistance, which there

will certainly be, against a coherent European policy for world unification. They will have to exercise all their influence to get this policy firmly enshrined in the European constitution, so that it becomes the central tenet of the European Government's international policy.

Concerning the first of these aims, the following points should be borne in mind:

1) in the European constitution the commitment to the creation of a World Government and to the concomitant transference of sovereignty has to be explicitly stated;

2) there must also be an explicit commitment to a ban on the international arms trade (as in the Japanese constitution) and a commitment to put European troops at the permanent disposal of the UN to constitute an effective international police force; 3) the competences of defence and foreign policy must be concurrent and must be distributed among the European, national and local levels on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. The purpose is to achieve an effective federation, but at the same time to constitute an important constitutional obstacle to Europe becoming closed and nationalist.

As regards the international policy of the European federation, the fundamental objective which must be pursued is co-ordination and parallelism between the federalization of foreign policy and European defence on the one hand, and the strengthening of the CSCE and the UN on the other. In this general framework two objectives of particular importance are the substitution of the EC for France and Great Britain in the UN Security Council, and the transfer of the French and British nuclear capability not to the European government, but to the UN.

The fact that the European policy of world unification depends also on political will (and thus also on the influence which federalists can bring to bear) does not mean however that it can go against the basic tendency of the historical process. If therefore our vision of this process is wrong, and what the future holds in store for us is an aggravation rather than an attenuation of power politics, the EC will not be able to carry out any policy of world unification, independently of whether it acquires federal competence in military matters or not, and will not be able to impede an evolution towards a new Middle Ages, or even to the final holocaust. If, on the other hand, our vision of the course of history is distorted not by excessive optimism but by excessive pessimism, and thus possibilities emerge of important developments in world federalism, either at a global or partial level, long before it seems realistic to hypothesise now, the existence of an EC which possesses federal compe-

tence in the military field, within the limits that we have seen, will certainly not impede the establishment of political will determined to seize these possibilities fully and immediately. This is also because federalization at a European level of the armed forces cannot but be gradual, and thus there will be no particular difficulties in extending it to federalization at world level.

In conclusion, let me stress that, in my view, thinking it necessary to give the EC military competence is not the same thing as thinking, as some commentators and political representatives seem to do, that the creation of a European army has now become the primary objective of the European unification process. In reality, the primary objective still remains economic and monetary union. At the same time, however, increasing importance lies in Europe's new responsibilities in the world: its commitment to solidarity with Eastern Europe and with the Southern hemisphere, and its contribution to the reform and strengthening of the UN.⁶ With the situation deteriorating dramatically in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, while conditions in the developing world and the ecological state of the planet continue to worsen, it is in fact increasingly difficult to involve new forces in the struggle for European unification. This can only be done by making very clear the link between this struggle and the struggle to find an effective way of tackling the fundamental problems facing the world.

If this is the case, then having concentrated attention on the alternative "European federation with or without military competence" has, in my view, introduced more confusion than clarification to the question of the role of a Europe in favour of world unification. That is, it has given rise to the suspicion in many sincere Europeanists that federalists were moving from a realistic pacifism to an abstract and wishful-thinking type of pacifism. This has in some cases weakened our struggle in favour of European federation, and for a European policy of world unification.

NOTES

¹ Today it makes no sense to propose extending the EC to include the USSR; it is more realistic to think of a close association between the EC and a USSR that is reformed and capable of being one of the pillars of a reformed CSCE. In the long term prospect of World federation, on the other hand, it is entirely legitimate to consider the objective of a European federation including not the USSR but its republics (probably with Russia divided into two or three states, given its excessive size). This is because among the

components of a World federation, there will be countries the size of China and India, alongside which there will be large regional federations, such as Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific, a Pan-American Union, a Pan-African Union, and so on. The prospect of a European federation including the republics of the USSR could obviously be dramatically brought forward by the USSR breaking up in the near future, always provided that such a process did not produce a civil war, with catastrophic consequences for the whole world.

² By "disarmament of member states of a European federation" we mean a situation in which they have at their disposal sufficient armed forces for maintaining internal public order (which, except in exceptionally critical cases, must remain a matter for national competence), but not large enough to constitute a danger for neighbouring states and an obstacle to the establishment of federal authority. The requirement for this kind of disarmament of the member states of a European federation, thereby rendering the federal juridical order more effective, is not irrelevant. This is shown by the fact that in federalist circles no-one thinks, as far as I know, of a World federation whose World Government is disarmed, and the member states armed.

³ With regard to this, we should examine the idea of a new NATO with three central pillars: North America, Europe, and the USSR. Some interesting proposals along these lines are developed by W. Loth, "Das Ende der Nachkriegsordnung," in B. Schoch (Hrsg.), *Friedensanalysen*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp-Verlag, 1991.

⁴ See my article "Implicazioni istituzionali della difesa europea," in *Uni-Europa*, XVIII, 1988, n.11-12.

⁵ These competences should basically be concerned with the UN army contingents, disarmament, the arms trade, and the arms industry.

⁶ The theory supported in the editorial of *The Federalist* quoted at the beginning, according to which a European federation without military competence would have great value as a model for the rest of the world, because it would anticipate a fundamental aspect of World federation, namely the disappearance of armies, is not convincing. This is not only because of the considerations made above (a European federation incapable of disarming its own nations would be a bad example for the rest of the world), but also because it does not clearly acknowledge the current importance of the policy for world unification, and the enormous responsibilities that Europe is called upon to take on in that respect. As long as the policy of world unification was not on the political agenda, it was right to insist essentially on the role of the European federation as a model for other regional integrations and for world unification. Today, however, what is expected of Europe is not a symbolic gesture, and an empty one at that, like the renunciation of federal military power, leaving nations armed however, but an extraordinary commitment, of active solidarity, to solving the economic, ecological and security problems of the world.

Thirty Years Ago

FOUR COMMONPLACES AND A CONCLUSION ON THE EUROPEAN SUMMIT *

After the first summit conference of the Six on the European problem, and while waiting for the second, it is worthwhile to note a few details. They are mere commonplaces, but one must be patient enough to repeat them because nobody knows them or remembers them. From a certain point of view the situation is so clear that even the Italian Socialist leader Pietro Nenni, in other words a novice to the European problem, has been able to describe it correctly: "The great absentee in the dialogue [of international politics] is Europe. The Europe of the Six, the Europe of the Seven, the Western European Union, the European Economic Union, the Council of Europe, etc., too many abbreviations for little substance,

* With this article, published in 1961 (n.2 pp.63-71), *The Federalist* had, among other things, taken a position against the direct election of an Assembly of the Community (the present European Parliament), lacking real powers. It might seem strange today that a group of federalists, which included the compilers of this review, could have been against the direct election of the European Parliament (then simply an "Assembly"). And it is true that later on these same federalists fought for direct elections before the attribution of powers. It is worth remembering therefore: a) that the federalists in question had tried from 1957 to 1966 (first with Spinelli, then without him), to obtain directly, i.e. only by means of their action, the convocation of a constituent assembly. They could not but be hostile to summoning the people of Europe to the ballot-box without simultaneously recognising their constituent power; b) that even after the failure of this attempt, they continued to regard the constituent development as the prime target, but also included in this sphere of action the intermediate objectives capable to lead the states close to a European Constituent Assembly by their call for sovereign powers to be exercised on the brink of an *inclined plane* leading from the nations to Europe; c) that exactly because a Parliament lacking the power to legislate and control the executive is absurd, they felt a European Parliament mishandled in this way would give rise to the idea of a democratic deficit in the Community and the necessity of bridging the gap — which is what has happened.

setting aside the remarkable developments of economic integration which have their foundation and their drive in technical progress and in the ever wider dimensions of production. Europeanism, in its political essence, is at zero point today. The Common Market is not enough to develop a common political will in Europe; the confederation proposed by De Gaulle is the negation of the federation of European peoples [European peoples? European people: the European electorate], the campaign for the summoning of a European Constituent Assembly directly elected by the people [correct, in the singular, therefore the European people] starts off with healthy presuppositions but does not consider very much that new constitutional structures, new legal institutions are valid if they ratify a *de facto* state, but they do not create one by themselves."¹ Apart from the considerations of the political basis of the Constituent Assembly, of the Common Market and so on, the picture is correct. We can sum it up like this: we are facing the problem of European unity and it is a matter of choosing among: a) the confederation proposed by De Gaulle, in other words the Europe of fatherlands, b) the Communities, in other words the Europe of officials, c) the Constituent Assembly, in other words the Europe of the people. What should be done? From this point of view everything turns into darkness. So we present our commonplaces.

First commonplace.

Is the European problem real or imaginary? What is it, how is it different from the social problem, or from those of democracy in France, of national unity in Germany, of the development of the *apertura a sinistra* in Italy, and so on? This is simply the situation we are living in. Regardless, France cannot have, to the extent to which it would make sense, a French foreign and economic policy (for this reason, being in power, the nationalist De Gaulle has become a "Europeanist"); and neither can Germany, Italy and so on. This is our fortune. If France, Germany and Italy could do this sort of thing, as in the past, each of them would have to try to strengthen themselves and diminish their neighbours. They would rally allies against them, protect their own borders, control economic exchanges aiming at their own power and others' weakness. But they cannot. It no longer makes sense to choose between the friendship or enmity of France for Germany, of Germany for Italy and so on. From a constitutional aspect governments should carry out a national policy but they cannot: they have to carry out, regardless, at least

concerning fundamental questions, a common European one. This is the political basis of the Common Market (there is no market without a political basis), this is the political basis of Europeanism. This is how the elusive nature of European unity can be explained: it exists, but as a situation of power at an elementary state, without political institutions, without any will, without any awareness (rulers think they themselves have chosen, as a national policy, European collaboration). And thus Europe's political void can be explained, the sense of uselessness that its governments, its parliaments and the congresses of its parties evoke: there is no government, no parliament, no party which can elaborate, and carry out, a true political strategy because in the face of a European situation of power, it can only make national decisions. These are purely tactical decisions, and in any case subordinate to the disorderly clash of European interests, because they are made in relation to a single part (national) of the data which shape the power process.

Second commonplace.

What is it, what does it count for, how long will this *de facto* unity last? In the present situation the governments of the Six, due to their inability to control completely the processes of defence and production, have given free rein to interests which can no longer be constricted within national dimensions. Their common European policy is substantially a *laissez-faire, laissez-passer* approach due to *force majeure*, as far as the economy is concerned; as for defence it consists of subjection to the USA. European unity is therefore a kind of anarchy based on the *de facto* eclipse of national sovereignty, on American protection and, finally, on the atomic bomb, which prevents Russia from letting its power overflow into the political void of Western Europe. What does this unity count for? From an economic point of view it counts for a lot, because it has broken down the anachronistic national dimensions of the economy which stopped the development of mass production in Europe; from a political point of view it counts for nothing, because it does not correspond to a struggle for power, and therefore does not mobilize either a European political class or a European consensus, it does not determine either European will or responsibility. How long will it last? This depends on factors outside the will of Europeans. It will last as long as these outside factors — national interests in Europe (with De Gaulle as the prime example), American interests in the world, Russian interests in the world, and pressure on the part of Afro-Asians — combine to maintain the *status*

quo of Western Europe. The internal factors (a small recovery of power due to economic expansion, and consequently more chances for the actual exercise of sovereignty) and the external ones (less power for the USA, more power for the USSR and Afro-Asians) are changing direction. In relation to Western Europe they were centripetal but are becoming, very slowly for the moment, centrifugal. When this centrifugal direction makes itself felt and endangers European unity *de facto*, the fusion of economic interests will not be able to defend the precarious political unity. As Lüthy brilliantly wrote, after putting forward the hypothesis of a political crisis (he quotes as an example: "an experiment of Pangerman confederation, a military *coup d'Etat* in France, a popular front in Italy"): "It is ridiculous even to suppose that against frontiers closed instantly after such a crisis there would be an assault by travelling salesmen, board directors, tourists and agencies used to travelling without passports and customs; an assault to open a breach to European unity: *allons enfants du marché commun ...*"²

Third commonplace.

How could this *de facto* unity, which left to itself is bound to disappear, be turned into an irreversible unity? Only by creating a federal power. There is nothing else to do. It is unpleasant, but there is nothing else to do. The governments of states are of no use. The fact that so far they have carried out a common policy must not delude us of the possibilities of maintaining European unity through the "harmonization" of foreign policies. This fact conflicting with nature — a state exists to make its own policy not that of others — did not depend on the European "goodwill" of those in power, but on *force majeure*, on the impossibility of doing anything else. If and when they are free to choose, each government will carry out its own foreign and economic policy, dividing Europe as in the past. As in Hamilton's lucid sentence: "To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages." On the other hand there is no intermediate body between national governments and the necessary federal government. This is the point from which all difficulties arise. But to hide it from oneself and from others is of no use, it merely avoids the problem.

There is no intermediate station between a system of sovereign states and a federation. Either power is maintained at the national level, and in

this case the mobilization of forces and decision procedures remain national. Or it is transferred to the European level, and in this case, regarding the transferred competences, the mobilization of forces and the decision procedures become European. There is nothing in-between. There are empty words, more means for carrying out the policies of the sovereign states: such, in this particular case, are the so-called Economic Communities; such, generally speaking, are confederations, and all organs without any power of their own (proof is the fact that, in spite of ECSC, EEC and EAEC, the fight is always for national power).

Fourth commonplace.

How can federal power be founded? Not little by little, evidently. Either it is established, by summoning a Constituent Assembly, or it is not established. Either everything is done with a single decision or nothing is done at all. Who should one act upon? On the population? Whether one calls them "the masses," or "public opinion," the outright majority has been favourable for a long time, yet, according to Nenni and to all national politicians, the "*de facto* state" is missing, the one without which it would be abstract to think of the Constituent Assembly. Therefore it is not a matter of the population. Maybe one should act upon economic interests? Those of the "ruling class" have already been for a long time, with liberalization, on the European road; those of the trade unions would like to turn onto it both to face the "ruling class" and because the more integration advances, the more workers' incomes increase.³ Yet, as mentioned above, the "*de facto* state" is missing. Therefore it is not even a question of economic interests. Could it be that traditions, something deeply rooted in each of us represents an obstacle? No, the prevailing political values are Christian, Liberal, Democratic, Socialist, supra-national or international by origin and absolutely antithetical, in their bare essence, to national exclusiveness. Thus there remains only the political class. The creation of the "*de facto* state" thus depends on politicians. But they do not know this, they are expecting it from outside. The engine does not move, everything is still. The politicians do not understand that "outside" (people, interests, values of this Europe which has been of "nations" only for about eighty years), everything has been ready since 1945, and they even forget, as regards Europe, that the task of initiative and choices is theirs. How does this happen? It is simple. They fight for national power, they see the national government as something which depends on them, the rest as something depending on others. And it is

impossible to convince them they are making a mistake, that they are bringing Europeans to ruin. "The concept 'ideology' — Mannheim writes — reflects the one discovery which emerged from political conflict, namely, that ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination. There is implicit in the word 'ideology' the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it."⁴ For this reason nations, that are shaky concerns, become thicker in the minds of politicians. For this reason the trivial facts we are illustrating are not generally understood by politicians: in fact they are such as to threaten their powers, both of opposition and of government (Europe can be made "from one day to the next": "from one day to the next" Six foreign ministers, Six ministers of defence would be swept away, all the positions of power in the parties would have to be reconquered ...).⁵ Therefore to create the "*de facto* state" what is needed is politicians who fight for European power — preferably for the constituent power of the European people — and not for national power. It is not easy to find them. To gain power one must take part in politics. But the visible framework of the struggle for power is the national one. What follows is a contradiction: it is necessary to gain power, but if it is gained in the normal way, in the visible framework, it is useless for European ends because one becomes nationalized (objectively: control of exclusively national decision-making procedures; subjectively: ideological thickening of the "nation"). For this reason it is necessary to act within a framework that cannot be seen, the European one,⁶ refusing any power (the intermediate pseudostations are positions of national power) until all of it can be obtained (Constituent Assembly): therefore politicians that are "technically" revolutionary are required. Politicians that do not aim, both for themselves and for the others, at immediate interests but only at values, that do not appeal to the contradictions between immediate ambitions and interests, but to the general contradiction between our civilization's system of values and the actual course of political life (a policy which is analogous to the one carried out by all revolutionary minorities, according to the period, liberal, national, or socialist).

Conclusion.

Having said this, we are facing a deadline. On May 19th in Bonn there

will be the second European "summit." De Gaulle proposes the confederation: periodical meetings between the holders of national power, plus the secretariats, plus a solemn popular European referendum to start it off. The *Communities* propose: in conformity with the Rome Treaties, direct election of the Assembly of the Communities (without legislative powers and control of a government that does not exist) and fusion of the "executives" (without "executive powers") of coal-steel, common market, and atomic energy. The federalists propose: giving constituent power to the European people. What is to be done? Let everyone play their role. Some have managed to demystify the "nation" in their minds, in other words the ideological justification of the existing states. They must stick to the opposition of régime, call for the Constituent Assembly, and not give in. They can understand, they have this responsibility. If they dodge it, Europe will never be made. For them, what counts is the rule that corresponds to the nature of the problem: all or nothing. There are also those who have today, or would like to have tomorrow, some power. The powers of today and tomorrow are national, whoever has them or wants them remains a captive of national ideology. Unless they are enlightened and renounce, unless their national conscience is "self-demystified," they obscure to themselves the real condition of society, in other words they do not understand the ultimate facts of the political process and can only act superficially. However, they can understand the following observations (and should act consequently):

1) It does not make sense — it is a trick — to fight De Gaulle's confederation wielding the same kind of weapon: periodical meetings of national ministers (the so-called *Council of Ministers of the Community*) against ... periodical meetings of national ministers, secretariats to prepare the material for the ministers' decisions (the so-called *Executives of the Communities*) against secretariats of the same kind; weapons of the same type, but less effective because De Gaulle's confederation has a political content, that of the *Communities* only an economic one; because in the first, words correspond to things, in the second they serve only to conceal them.

2) It does not make sense — it is a dirty trick — to propose starting off the mechanism of European sovereignty, to suggest electing the representatives of the "European people," and to give them only the "power" of addressing prayers to the national governments. This "Europeanist" project is even more absurd than the one, itself monstrously absurd, with which Schuman and Adenauer deluded themselves they would be able to solve the problem of the European army (before De

Gasperi's *aut-aut*: either with European political power or nothing). May God forgive them, they wanted to place this army at the disposal of an organization similar to that of the ECSC: they wanted to make a European army, not a European state; they did not want to touch the sovereignty of the states, but they were willing to deprive them of their armies. Just as that kind of European *Foreign Legion* could not be established, neither can these extraordinary elections be held. If they were held, they would give way to farce; an election campaign in which the candidates would have to promise the electorate: "If you elect me, I will say this or that to whoever has the power to do it." Quite frankly, De Gaulle's referendum is better. A referendum is held also to find out what people want. Elections are held to decide who will be in charge. After the referendum we will know officially what we already know: the population is in favour of European unity. After elections like those proposed by the "Europeanists," and the experience of the fact that national governments would continue to be in charge, Europe would sink into ridicule.

3) It is necessary not to waste time in idle talk and to be concerned with real issues. If one does not think of establishing a federation then one must be concerned with international politics. Outside the federation the only substantial thing, in fact, is the behaviour of the states. This, and not "integration," must be considered. It is a matter of asking if, from this point of view, the choice between De Gaulle's confederation and that of the *Communities* is the choice between two different policies or between two different ways of designating the same policy. Now there is a difference. Whoever thinks of keeping the platform of the Six with the confederation of the *Communities* has nothing to defend with against those — and they are many, the followers of Erhard — who wish to make it fall. To get rid of the *Communities* — which do not have any power of their own — it is sufficient not to bother with them; while the division between the EEC and EFTA, which is really absurd if one thinks only in economic terms, will always arouse interest. Along this path it becomes easy, almost natural, to slide from the platform of the Six to that of the Six plus Great Britain and others. De Gaulle's confederation would be another thing altogether. It would bring to the fore the protagonists, the holders of national power, now conveniently hidden behind the *Communities* and *integration*; and the stake: the platform of the Six.⁷ It would emphasize the fact that the platform of the Six is a political enterprise, not an economic one: it is the continental Western European entente based at last on peaceful Franco-German relations, in other words the political fact on which all the postwar miracles rest, both economic and otherwise. It

would not be easy for anyone, and even less so for people like Erhard, Brandt, Fanfani, and so on, to refuse it. Europeanism remains a necessity; Europeanism in Six, which was a necessity, has become a choice. It is a matter of establishing it or not, assuming the responsibilities for it or not.

Mario Albertini

NOTES

¹ Pietro Nenni's report to the 34th Congress of the Italian Socialist Party (see *Avanti!*, March 16, 1961).

² See Herbert Lüthy, "Quando Giove si decide a voler bene ad Europa," *Nord e Sud*, VII, 11-12, p. 73.

³ They want to but they cannot. The "bosses" can, within certain limits, act independently of the states, the workers cannot. The "bosses" can carry out by themselves, with their own administrative apparatuses, their own decisions. The workers, instead, have to avail themselves of organizations such as trade unions and parties to achieve their purposes, and these organizations cannot, either juridically or politically, "jump" the states. Politically, and as members of a trade-union, the workers have to face this *aut-aut*: either they renounce any effective action at the European level (fighting with their weak national bargaining power against the "continental" power of the "bosses"), or they have at their disposal a European parliament and government, in other words a juridical, political and social framework which allows the European organization of their fighting forces: the parties and the trade unions.

⁴ See Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1936; p. 36 of the paperback edition, 1966.

⁵ From a "pure" political standpoint the "enemy" of Europe is the ruling political class (government and national opposition). Politicians have the possibility of maintaining division (absolute sovereignty of states) and of creating unity (summoning the Constituent Assembly by means of an international treaty). The political class is the only one with anything substantial to lose by European unity: the positions of power acquired through the national political struggle. When the Americans changed from the confederal (in which the Europe of the Six is in practical terms living now) to the federal regime, they had to overcome precisely the obstacle represented by a great part of the political class that was in power in the states. In the first essay of *The Federalist*, Hamilton wrote: "... Happy will it be if our choice [between confederation and federation] should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favourable to the discovery of truth. Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every state to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power ..." On the basis of the cheap Marxism universally practised by Christians, Liberals and Democrats, once it was said that "monopolies" were against Europe, and now that they are

marching it is said that Europe is made, while the politicians, free from duties and therefore from responsibilities, maintain division to maintain their powers.

⁶ Concerning this nothing clearer can be written than what Machiavelli wrote in chapter VI of *The Prince* (Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 21-22): "And one should bear in mind that there is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious to succeed nor more dangerous to administer than to take the lead for introducing a new order of things; for he who introduces it has all those who profit from the old order as his enemies, and he has only lukewarm allies in all those who might profit from the new. This lukewarmness partly stems from fear of their adversaries, who have the law on their side, and partly from the scepticism of men, who do not truly believe in new things unless they have actually had personal experience of them. Therefore, it happens that whenever those who are enemies have the chance to attack, they do so factiously, whereas those others defend hesitantly, so that relying on them is dangerous. It is necessary, however, if we desire to examine this subject thoroughly, to observe whether these innovators act on their own or are dependent on others: that is, if they are forced to beg or are able to use power in conducting their affairs. In the first case, they always come to a bad end and never accomplish anything; but when they depend on their own resources and can use power, then only seldom do they find themselves in peril." The reader will notice how every word of this text refers precisely to all that is at stake in the European problem: the behaviour of politicians, the behaviour of social forces, the weight of institutions.

⁷ The Europe that can be established in a predictable future is that of the Six (those who want it to be of the Seven etc. do not know that federations widen peacefully; that establishing it with the Six means to establish the federal nucleus that would then become of Seven, Eight, etc.). What is this Europe? The platform of the Six did not arise from the imagination of men but from the nature of things. When it was a matter of defining who the two main (traditional) elements of German power should belong to: the Rhine industry and the soldiers, it was impossible simply to return them to Germany, and "supra-national" solutions had to be devised (ECSC and EDC). The solution implied that what had been deducted from Germany should also be deducted from the other states, and conferred on "Europe". The United Kingdom, that had adhered to the OEEC and to the Council of Europe, did not adhere to the ECSC nor to the EDC. The solution, inspired by so-called "functionalism" (the ingenious idea of making Europe piece by piece: one today, one the day after ... so as to feel no pain) was not good, and in a short time Germany regained possession of its soldiers and industries. But politicians really believed the "integration" process of Europe had truly started, and those on continental Europe actually thought they were transferring coal, steel and soldiers to "Europe". In this manner — misleading in reality but true in imagination — the historical occasion transferred to men's conscience a *de facto* state: only in Western Europe is the eclipse of national sovereignties (in relation to the problems to be tackled) so advanced as to make possible — if the virtue of men is sufficient — the transition of the powers of foreign and economic policy from the states to a federal government.

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