# THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent uncon- nected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

Hamilton, The Federalist

THE FEDERALIST

a political review

Editor: **Mario Albertini**

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.

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Federalism and Regionalism

The aggressive regionalism which is gaining popularity in some Western European states comes in two forms: one that is essentially separatist, often displaying unequivocally racist characteristics, and accompanied by violence (of its actions and the crude nature of its propaganda); and one which is respectable, and employed with the aim of broadening the basis of consensus. These two forms are adopted by different political groups from time to time — yet on occasions the same group will use both of them in alternation, depending on what is politically expedient at any given moment.

In an effort to gain respectability many regionalist movements use parts of federalist philosophy and terminology, and declare that they pursue a strategy of transforming the present national states into federations of regions. As a result, the word "federalism" is of increasing significance in political debates (even though to a different extent from country to country), and is being simultaneously loaded down with ambiguity. Aside from this, the same term is being used on a different level altogether to signify (paradoxically) the bogey, part real, part imaginary, of the centralisation and bureaucratisation of the Community.

In light of this ambiguity it is essential to distinguish the "federalism" of these regionalists from federalism as we understand the term — that is to clarify the differences that separate the two political programmes and the values which govern them. Indeed, the need to clarify the situation is so much more important because the differences might well seem obscure to a casual observer. The potential for misunderstanding arises from the fact that we stand for multi-tier federalism, and so argue that within the framework of a European federation (and in the future a global federation) the national states will have to become federations of regions — and regions will in turn have to consist of smaller units which reach down to the lowest level based on city districts. Besides, the majority of regional movements also declare their acceptance of the

prospect of European unity.

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The main difference exists in the area of concrete political choices taken in the context of Europe's particular historical situation. The current period is characterized by the fact that the fall of Communist regimes in the East has denied Eastern European states of the very basis of their legitimacy, and has simultaneously deprived states in Western Europe of the image of an enemy (which was their main impulse to unite). In this way, the historic crisis of the national state has become an acute political crisis which can only have one of two outcomes: either a federal union between European states; or the collapse of the states themselves (the most vulnerable ones, at least) into anarchy and chaos, as demonstrated by the tragic example of Yugoslavia. For the latter scenario, there exists the sole prospect of achieving precarious equilibriums by installing the unstable hegemony of those states in the region that are able to preserve their status as middle-ranking powers.

In the context of this widespread instability, the actions of a political force in this arena must be judged by the extent to which they serve to bring about by their deeds (as opposed to the ideological screens or the hidden intentions of the key players) one outcome or the other. Examined from this point of view, there can be no doubt that the federalists, to the extent that they are struggling for the federal unification of European states above all else, reinforce the drive towards unity; while the regionalists, in so far as primarily they seek increased autonomy for the regions from national states, strengthen the push towards disintegration.

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This contrast over strategies mirrors another one on the more general level of values. The specific value of federalism is peace, which is to be brought about by substituting the rule of law for the use of force in relationships between states. The priority of every authentic federalist project is therefore the achievement of international democracy, and thereby the gradual extension of the sphere of political solidarity between peoples, which is brought about by their membership of a single political community. The aim of regional "federalism", on the other hand, is to render more tenuous this same bond of solidarity between the citizens of regions within the same state — often with the aim of enabling rich regions to escape the burden of contributing to the development of poor regions. It is indisputable that such claims are rooted in situations of real unease and a grave loss of consensus that have been brought about by inefficient governments. But this is not enough of a justification to make up for the lack of legitimacy that these claims suffer from. The process of human emancipation has progressed through the centuries by means of the gradual enlargement of the orbit of Kant's *civil constitution*: from the Greek city-state, to the national state, up to continent-wide federations such as the United States — and Europe, as we would like it to become. It is for this reason that the Federalists insist on unity above all else. And this also explains why they have nothing in common with those who insist primarily on division.

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Only federalism, which wants first and foremost to unite, places itself in opposition to nationalism. The overcoming of the national dimension, by creating wider spheres of solidarity, cannot justify itself by reference to another sort of "national" entity which is bigger. Federalism's legitimacy derives specifically from the fact that it is the overcoming of the idea of the nation as an exclusive community, and hence it can but culminate naturally in the unity of the human race. Perpetual peace will only be achieved through world federation, and through projects of federal regional unification whose legitimacy rests exclusively on the fact that they are an advance towards this wider objective.

In contrast, regional "federalism" cannot draw on cosmopolitanism as the legitimizing principle of its plans, and hence remains enclosed in the cultural sphere of nationalism. It claims the autonomy of the regional community, which is presented as the natural antithesis to the traditional nation (the latter being denounced as purely ideological and artificial). But this "natural" community is no more than a different incarnation (itself both exclusive and homogenising in nature) of the national idea — the only community which is considered as being capable of expressing the identity of those who belong to it, and of providing a demarcation line between friend and foe. It is for this reason that all forms of "internal federalism", lacking a solid ideal foundation, are destined in reality to degenerate into micronationalism — aggressive in asserting a provincial and indistinct identity, and blinkered by a reactionary attitude that rejects the vast cultural heritage bestowed on us by the historic nations of Central and Western Europe. Without doubt, therefore, the end-point of the

movement for regional "federalism" is separatism. Moreover, regional "federalism" betrays its intimately nationalistic nature by the intolerance that its adherents show towards any infra-regional communities (such as cities and city districts) which aspire to autonomy. Yet such infra-regional communities are closest to the everday lives of citizens, and should constitute the very foundation of a multi-tier federal system, since a multi-tier federal system is the only form which can provide an effective solution to the problems of our complex societies, and a just response to the demands for democratic participation which the current institutional structures of industrialised states in the West leave unsatisfied.

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A federal Europe of the future will not be able to limit the government levels to one on a pan-European scale, and one at the level of individual states. From the point at which the national states' current monopoly over power is broken, the principle of self-government will spread to all spheres of interdependence in which the lives of men and women tend naturally to be expressed. In this way, a strongly innovative model of democracy will take shape in Europe. This awareness must constitute an important part of our politico-cultural baggage. But it must not obscure another principle: that of the absolute primacy of the value of peace among peoples, and therefore of the struggle for European federal unity as a first step towards the unification of the entire human race.

The Federalist

The Security Policy of the European Union

SERGIO PISTONE

1. After signing the treaty of European Union at Maastricht, European integration has moved into the sphere of security policy, which includes defence. Of course this is only the case if we take for granted that the competent bodies of the member states will ratify the treaty. I would like to help clarify the general guidelines that should govern the application of this policy applied and the reform of the clearly inadequate institutional framework envisaged for its enactment in the new treaty.

Firstly we need to define what we generally mean by an effective security policy nowadays, and its relationship to defence. To this end we must briefly examine the evolution of the significance given to security policy. "Security policy" emerged in Western Bloc countries towards the end of the sixties and became increasingly rooted in political and diplomatic jargon through the seventies and eighties. The term meant that military defence, however important, was not the only instrument to which the external security of western democracies should be entrusted. On the contrary, non-military aspects of security gained importance with respect to purely military ones.

One of these non-military means of ensuring external security was the policy of East-West detente. A general war between these two blocs would have entailed the collective suicide of the warring parties, given the capabilities of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore the balance of terror had to be mitigated by policies such as the limitation and control of weapons, common crisis management, and scientific and economic co-operation. The objective of these policies was to lessen mutual fears and hence to modify the behaviour of the opposing blocs, so as to make wars less likely. Following this development, it was realised that weapons were not the only factors which threatened security. Other potential dangers were the demographic explosion with its associated migratory

phenomena, the ecological crisis, energy and raw material shortages and the incapacity of entire regional political systems to provide stable rule. Consequently, together with non-military aspects of security policy, increasing importance was given to North-South divergence and the ever greater instability that derived from it. At the same time emphasis was placed on global ecological policy as being a vital part of an effective security policy. As a result the terms "comprehensive security" or "global security" are becoming increasingly used to stress the fact that military defence is only one aspect, and not even the most important one, of security policy.

In light of this, I believe that if we want to bring this semantic evolution to a conclusion which includes the radical changes brought about in the international system by the end of East-West conflict and which is logically rigorous, an effective security policy should be regarded nowadays as none other than a policy of gradual but genuine unification of mankind. Such a policy would combine both foreign and defence policies, both of which are gradually becoming involved in world domestic relations and their policing, as well as with the gradual progress to world unification. To clarify this assumption I shall seek to highlight that world unification, apart from being the only way to guarantee security in all its aspects, is not a utopia despite the great obstacles it faces and its long term perspective, and that after overcoming the East-West conflict the first concrete, albeit limited, results in the process of world unification have already been achieved.

2. If it is clear that today an effective security policy must give top priority not to resisting external pressures or aggression, but to avoiding war at all costs (given its frightful destruction), the only effective way to achieve this, as Kant pointed out two centuries ago, is to eliminate war (hence, the arms race) as a means of solving international conflicts. Therefore world anarchy, which is the real cause of war, must be overcome. In other words we must create international conditions that are similar to those found within nations. National sovereignty must be subjected to a world federal authority. This body must be able to stop any country from arming itself with the aim of imposing its will on other states. It must, therefore, safeguard the independence and the legitimate interests of every state, thereby rendering self-defence both impossible and unnecessary.

Policies aimed at decreasing international conflicts and tensions, at arms limitation and at greater international economic co-operation, and

so on, must become part of a general aim to create an international government. This can only be achieved by an effective, if gradual, limitation of national sovereignty. If we do not make progress towards this objective, these minor aims are destined to produce structurally precarious results or even to be counterproductive. International conflict, like domestic conflict, cannot be eliminated, given the pluralism that characterises human society. Consequently, without progress towards a system capable of eliminating the violent resolution of international conflict (as in the case inside countries), we will forever swing between low and high intensity conflicts. This will encourage both renewed arms races and a tendency towards military pressure and aggression. On the other hand by co-operation, especially in the fields of science and technology, we risk strengthening the military capabilities of potential adversaries, hence resulting in increasingly precarious national security.

As regards the development of the Southern hemisphere, which is rightly considered to be an essential part of an effective security policy, the convergence between security policy and world unification is equally valid in this context. Since an effective policy that aims at the elimination of the North-South divide requires the mobilisation of enormous resources which only the end of the arms race and the co-ordinated and decisive efforts of advanced countries can make possible, this challenge can only be tackled effectively by the creation of a system of world government, which, apart from making weapons progressively irrelevant, would also ensure solidarity between rich and poor countries (just as national governments ensure solidarity between rich and poor regions that fall under their sovereignty).

This is also true for ecological issues. An increasing number of decisions taken by single nations can lead to catastrophe on a continental or global level, or to endangering the very survival of mankind. This challenge to security can only be met effectively by establishing strict international rule, imposing new patterns of development and consumption and along with the sacrifices that this will entail. Only by subordinating national sovereignty to a world authority can this be achieved.

Even if it makes sense to say that nowadays an effective security policy requires a policy of world unification, we need to ask whether such a policy is realistic. The basis for answering yes to this question is the reality that world union is not only necessary to govern global economic interdependence effectively, but is also vital for the survival of mankind itself. There is no need to prove that weapons of mass destruction and ecological issues represent mortal threats for mankind. It should also be clear

to everyone that the North-South divide is a serious challenge, due to the demographic explosion and its associated migratory and ecological problems. Structural international instability leads to arms proliferation and aids the growth of ideological and religious fanaticism, not to mention international terrorism. What lies before us is the risk of a catastrophic conflict between the rich and poor peoples of the world.

Mankind has essentially become a single community with a shared destiny. Hence the alternative "Unite or perish"[1] (which after 1945 has represented the basic historical spur to the process of European unification) now relates to the world as a whole. Mankind should not be politically unified simply because it is the most rational way to arrive at a better governed world, but because it is also the only way to guarantee mankind's future and hence a future for each individual. Consequently the policy of world unification has a solid foundation in *raison d'état*, in other words in the structural tendency of states to give first priority to the pursuit of their own security. In our present historical context, the search for national security produces a structural tendency to shift from an emphasis on national defence towards greater agreement between all states, because this is the only valid alternative to increasingly acute insecurity. A security policy which is not clearly placed in the perspective of world unification betrays its prime objective; in other words it becomes a policy for insecurity.

3. The fact that the alternative "Unite or perish" now relates to mankind as a whole is clearly shown by the concrete influence of this maxim on the evolution of the world system. In fact, this alternative played a vital role in overcoming East-West conflict, which was the fundamental obstacle, in my opinion, to the launching of world unification (just as the French-German confrontation blocked European Unification). Gorbachev's policy of overcoming East-West conflict (although he certainly did not anticipate the collapse of communism and the USSR itself) was clearly based on an awareness of the immediate need to overcome the limitations of the communist system and the USSR's backwardness, by moving towards political and economic pluralism. But his policy was also based on the awareness that ever closer co-operation with the West was absolutely necessary to effectively dealing with the problems of global interdependence and the very survival of mankind. While this policy was certainly tied to subjective factors (stemming from Gorbachev's judgements and his idea of reality), his success against conservative opposition is indicative of the existence of an objective

situation in which weapons of total war can no longer be used to secure the survival of a despotic empire, because of the ensuing collective suicide. World co-operation was the only option available.

If the alternative "Unite or perish" has been a very important factor in overcoming East-West conflict, then this process has made possible the first concrete, even if limited, steps towards world unification. These took the form of arms limitation treaties, the development of the CSCE and the strengthening of the role of the UN.

The arms limitation treaties, beginning with that on the elimination of short to medium range missiles signed in Washington in 1987, should be placed in the context of a policy for world unification for the following reasons:

a) a significant reduction of weapons through the dismantling of fully operational systems was achieved;

b) the principle of "on the spot" inspections was introduced, making a vitally important breach in the wall of absolute national sovereignty;

c) these treaties were placed in the context of the broader development of confidence building measures, that aimed to eliminate errors of judgement in evaluating the behaviour of other nations regarding military security and to make surprise attacks practically impossible.

In effect a transition was achieved from arms control policy, aimed at maintaining a balance of power, to a policy of common security. According to the latter policy, military security is no longer essentially based on deterrence, but on lessening the chances of war and on controlled disarmament. If this policy continues to evolve it is destined to lead to a security system that makes war structurally impossible by its own intrinsic logic; that is to a federal world system.

As regards the CSCE, this is undergoing a phase of great institutional development that will involve the establishment of a parliamentary assembly in the near future, albeit one that is indirectly elected and only consultative. This organisation could effectively furnish the means for deepening integration between North America, the European Union (which is expanding to all Western and Central-Eastern European countries) and the CIS, while it is not at all unrealistic to think of its enlargement to cover other democracies in the world (Japan in particular). To achieve this end, the merging of European and Atlantic organisations such as the Council of Europe and NATO with others such as the G7 and the OECD would need to be carried out. The CSCE could, in this way, become a type of world council of the democracies and admit democratic countries from the Southern hemisphere.

Obviously these developments are strictly dependent on the economic and democratic progress in the ex-communist countries. The end of Soviet Communism has eliminated an ideological and power conflict that made integration between east and west impossible. The disintegration of the Soviet bloc and the USSR has also opened up the possibility of the rebirth of nationalisms, which, if not stopped in time, could lead to a general "Balkanization" that compromises integration in the CSCE and the European Union itself (also because of migration in Biblical proportions).

As regards the UN in the wake of the end of East-West conflict, it has been able to take on an unprecedentedly active and effective role when facing crisis situations. This emerged, above all, during the Gulf War. When dealing with the Kurdish issue, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries (one of the cornerstones of absolute sovereignty) was set aside for the first time. Consequently a decisive strengthening of the structures and the capacity for intervention of the UN has become a concrete possibility. This new capability can now be applied to solving problems related to international economic and ecological interdependence and to the North/South divide. It can also be used to prevent violations of the international order and of fundamental human rights. In particular, the prospect of placing a strong permanent international police force at the disposal of a revised Security Council (as regards its structure and decision making procedures) is becoming more realistic.

The strengthening of the UN is obviously a crucial issue as regards the prospects for world union, which can only come about by the transformation of this organisation into a genuine system of democratic and federal world government. This new organisation, by disarming individual nations, would be capable of eliminating at the root the violence which characterises international society. I want to emphasise here that only a federal system is capable of reconciling unity with the maximum autonomy of its component parts (from regional groupings, nations and regions down to local government bodies) and so avoiding the dangers associated with centralisation. By centralisation I mean excessive bureaucracy that inevitably undermines liberal democracy.

However, it is evident that the transformation of the UN into a democratic and federal world government cannot be other than an extremely complicated and long term procedure. It can only be achieved after the consolidation of democracy on a global scale and by the organisation of the world into a system of vast federal regions. These regions will then become the pillars of an efficient federal world system.

Regarding the first point I want to emphasise that a true federation can only be established between democratic nations, and not between totalitarian or authoritarian states which are based on unchecked power and which, therefore, cannot structurally accept limitations either to their external sovereignty (unless they are imposed by force), or to their internal sovereignty (since, to survive, a totalitarian or authoritarian régime needs to be as isolated as possible from external influences which run counter to its principles and practice). Regarding the second point, I want to stress that only if the pillars of the world federation are large regional federations, will it be possible to achieve an effective balance in world political structures and avoid both the danger of hegemony and the oppression of small states.

In view of the extremely complex and long term problems involved in world unification outlined above, a more rapid and deeper integration at the level of the CSCE (hopefully including other democracies) can be justified. This does not go against the advancement of world union but should instead be considered its vanguard (in the same way that the integration of the original six European nations within the European Community led to its further enlargement). Indeed, through increasing integration and the demilitarisation of their relationships, the strong areas of the world (generally in the North) can develop the economic resources necessary to help the economic and social growth of the Southern hemisphere (and thereby the development of democracy[2] and regional integrations). Furthermore, they will be able to face the problem of the transformation of the UN into a world government in a more united and effective manner.

4. On the basis of the above considerations, it is clear that the policy for world union is no longer simply a vital need but is already underway, even if it is in its infancy. However, this certainly does not imply that we are dealing with a linear and predictable process. As outlined above, this policy has a solid basis in the convergence of *raisons d'état* on a planetary scale; that is, in the incapacity of all states in the world to deal effectively with the fundamental problems of our times except within a prospect of supra-national unification.

Moreover, the effectiveness of this objective convergence of national interests depends on the subjective ability of statesmen and public opinion to perceive clearly and in a timely manner the true interests of their countries. As an example of the difficulty of such perception, I will use here the example of the US, the only superpower left after the collapse

of the USSR. The consolidation in this country of an adequate awareness of the alternative "Unite or perish" is being hindered by the widespread illusion (in the interests of the military-industrial complex) that America can effectively face international problems by assuming the role of the world's sole policeman. There exists the inability to understand that such a role, besides not making the world a safer place, is incompatible with economic and civil progress and, ultimately, with the very safeguarding of democracy in the US.

In practice, the historical crisis of the sovereign state is being partially observed in the US by their insular traditions and by the fact that they are the greatest world power. We can trace a certain analogy here to the British attitude towards European integration which has up to now trailed behind that of the six founding members of the Community. Insular traditions and the relatively slower decline of British power have meant the persistence of illusions regarding their international capacity for action which is based more on a special relationship with the US than on European integration.

The difficulty in developing an awareness of the convergence of *raisons d'état* seems even more evident if we consider that this awareness can only effectively condition the behaviour of states where the experience of statehood is at its most advanced level. Full awareness of this situation can only be obtained in democratic nations. In these countries, the great universal ideologies based on freedom, equality and social justice have become a structural component of statehood, favouring the awareness that mankind has a single destiny. Furthermore, in these countries the principle of limiting government powers makes the limitation of national sovereignty acceptable.

These conditions do not exist in authoritarian or totalitarian countries where power is structurally based on aggressive ideologies and/or is oriented towards isolation from external influences; nor in countries dominated by religious fundamentalism for which security problems "in this world" tend to be marginalised in favour of a fanatic emphasis on certain religious principles; nor in situations where nationalistic or tribal rivalries destroy existing states and give birth to politically unstable countries; nor in conditions of extreme poverty which feed dictatorships, religious or ideological fundamentalism, nationalism and international terrorism.

Apart from difficulties deriving from a lack of awareness of the convergence of *raisons d'état*, we need to appreciate that an effective limitation of national sovereignty goes against the interests of those who

hold political power or who gain advantage from absolute state sovereignty. The experience of European integration has clearly highlighted that national governments are both instruments for, and obstacles to, supra-national union. While on the one hand they are forced to move towards union because of the "Unite or perish" alternative, on the other they balk at limiting their power and hinder the efficiency of supra-national institutions. They are decisively supported in this by influential sectors in the diplomatic world and in the high echelons of civil and military bureaucracies that fear a lowering of their status. In addition, certain socio-economic groups gain advantage from the protectionist policies of individual states.

Finally we must take the time factor into account. There exist many mortal challenges for mankind. Apart from weapons of mass destruction, the North-South divide or the ecological question, we need to consider the instability of the ex-Soviet bloc which is also aggravating the problem of NBC weapons proliferation. All these problems, which are pushing us in the direction of world union, may also cause undreamt-of catastrophes before world institutions efficient enough to stop them can be created.

Up to now the difficulties and risks associated with possible setbacks to the struggle for world union (which in this case may involve mankind's self-annihilation) have been emphasised. Yet, if certainty of victory was the precondition for every political battle, there would be no progress in history. As one of the founding fathers of Europe, Jean Monnet, said, we must always try what at first seems impossible to make possible what is necessary.

5. From the above it is clear that the final aim of world unification must be at the base of an efficient security policy for the European Union. Despite the difficulty of this task, there is no real alternative. The great importance of this contribution needs to be clarified.

The first point is the function of role model which the European Union can perform. Clearly, this is on condition that not only the commitments of Maastricht are observed, but also that a rapid and complete transformation of Community institutions into federal forms is achieved. Given that world unificiation can only be brought about by the construction of large regional federations, which are needed to provide the pillars of the federal world structure, then it is reasonable to expect that the successful federalisation of a centrally important region such as Europe will be of great relevance for world integration. Indeed, despite its incomplete nature, European integration has already helped other regional integra-

tion processes and has also contributed significantly to the end of East-West hostility.

With respect to this last point, the Western liberal-democratic system could not have shown itself to be decisively superior to Soviet communism without the creation of the EC. Despite the EC's limitations, it has led to a lasting pacification of Western Europe as well as to great economic development which has consolidated the liberal democratic governments, that have gradually absorbed the totalitarianism of both left and right. This has convincingly shown up the inconsistency of Soviet communist ideology, according to which the liberal democracies and the market economy were bound to create incurable internal and international contradictions.[3] In this way, Western Europe progressively became a point of reference and a magnet for anyone in Eastern-Central Europe and the USSR who had access to non-manipulated information about the real state of affairs outside the Soviet bloc. All this decisively contributed to sap the legitimacy from the communist leadership, which was against any real change in the Soviet system.

Apart from being a model, the concrete political initiatives that the European Union can carry out are also decisively important.

Among the areas in which European politics could make a decisive contribution to world unification is the extension of the European Union to Central-Eastern Europe. It is evident that this is the principal means by which to achieve the economic and democratic rebirth of that region. Here the positive experience of EC enlargement to southern Europe could be repeated on a larger scale. In this way a very important part of the "Balkanization" process, which has followed the fall of communism, could be reversed. It is also clear that the European Union must quickly complete its transformation to federalism so as to be able to manage this expansion efficiently, without compromising its own capacity for integration. Only in this way would it also allow the countries of Central-Eastern Europe to enjoy the full benfits of being part of an integrated union.

At this point, it is necessary to stress that if we want to achieve an authentic federal Europe, the crucial problem of the elimination of national armies must be faced. In brief, we must, as gradually as is needed, arrive at a situation where each member state retains at its disposal only the internal police forces that are needed to maintain public order (which, except in cases of exceptional crises, must remain a national reponsibility). Hence, member states would be materially incapable of applying military pressure on each other or of resisting direct federal authority for

applying federal laws or enforcing democratic order. Although such crises may appear a remote possibility in the present Community of twelve, the situation might be quite different in Central-Eastern Europe with their fragile democracies and ethnic-territorial conflicts. Therefore an early revision of the decisions taken at Maastricht should take into account this problem, which, if the enlargement of the community were not on the agenda, would not appear so urgent. Thus an authentic common policy of internal security must be hammered out, and based on institutional instruments considerably more efficient than those conceived of at Maastricht.

A second important area of European policy for world unification concerns the CIS. I believe that in order to stabilise this area and therefore avoid a disintegrative process that could lead to civil war with the use of NBC weapons, we should aim for the federal consolidation of the CIS. This would be preferable to including the ex-Soviet republics in the European Union (with the exception of the Baltic Republics). In effect a federation from "the Atlantic to the Pacific" is not realistic in the current state of affairs. On the other hand a vast confederal community, with certain federal points of reference, would be more realistic. Its basic pillars would be North America, the European Union, the CIS and Japan.

The principal means by which the consolidation of the CIS can be helped along is clearly a policy similar to the Marshall Plan. This would provide the massive economic aid necessary for the recovery of the region, on condition that disarmament and non-proliferation of the weapons of mass distruction was continued, conflicting nationalisms are pacified, and, thus, a policy of integration rather than disintegration is carried out in the area. In this case the European Union is called upon to perform a cardinal role due to its geographic proximity, the danger of migration and so on, and also because the completion of economic and monetary union will make the EC area the strongest and most dynamic in the world. For these reasons, thought must be given to a form of association between the European Union and the CIS.

It must be equally stressed out that an indispensible conditon for a quick stabilization of the CIS is the consolidation of the CSCE and the involvement of Japan. The economic reason for this is that the financial intervention needed is more than the European Union alone can afford and requires the participation of North America and Japan. The political motive is that Russia's partners will only be persuaded to overcome their fears of Russian hegemony (which are slowing the consolidation of the CIS) if they have the support and guarantee that the CIS will be integrated

into an increasingly efficient CSCE.[4]

A third area in which the European Union can contribute greatly to world unification is the reform of the UN and specifically that of the Security Council. While the method adopted to make it more effective should be the introduction of the principle of majority voting among the permanent members, the guiding principle to make it more representative should be its regionalisation. This means that the permanent seats should be allocated to states of continental dimensions or regional groups, rather than to the victorious powers of the Second World War. It is these groupings which should make up the pillars of a future world federal system.

In effect, the representatives of the US, Russia (or the CIS as soon as it is consolidated) and China should be joined by the representatives of India, Japan and other regional organisations (e.g. Organization of African Unity, the Organization of American States, the Arab League and other potential large regional organisations including, of course, the European Union). The European Union can start this process off by sub-stituting the representatives of France and Great Britain with its own, and thus avoid the allocation of a permanent seat to Germany (which would be highly counter-productive both for European unity and strengthening of the Security Council).

6. After this brief look at the contribution of the European Union to world unification we should now consider the specifically military aspect of a European Union security policy that is primarily aimed at world uni-fication. Here we can take our cue from certain general views of military problems within the present international system. The fact that world unification is on the agenda does not mean that the time is ripe to create a democratic world system of government in which international con-flicts become totally domestic affairs, handled by the police and by political/administrative means. In light of this the European Union must have at its disposal military forces for its external security in order to be capable of participating autonomously in implementing world decisions, and thus to contribute actively in the process of world unification. These forces must be under the control of a European government, hence both eliminating national armies for the reasons given above and also fitting in with the principle of subsidiarity (i.e. greater efficiency, savings, etc.). This would entail the complete federalization of the defence policy of the European Union. In addition to this clarification, we should understand that the alternative "Unite or perish" has already produced such transfor-

mations in the international system that the military problems of today's international situation fall between policing problems and defence prob-lems as traditionally conceived.

In this context the main point to remember is the end of the East-West divide. This has led to the practical disappearance of the risk of a general war between nuclear super-powers. It has also allowed the development of controlled disarmament and integration between East and West to such a point that the possibility of military confrontation between the countries involved is becoming more and more irrelevant. Military problems in the Northern hemisphere have become essentially linked to the inter-ethnic conflicts in the ex-communist countries. That is, conflicts which should become gradually de-militarized by means of the extension of the European Union to East-Central Europe and the revitalisation and con-solidation of the CIS within the CSCE. Clearly a prerequisite of the above is that these processes are carried out with all due haste.

Undoubtedly the situation as regards the Southern hemisphere is a lot more complex. This is because the problems that are to be faced (demo-cratic social-economic development and regional integration) in order to enable this area to play an active part in world unification are both considerably more difficult and require a lot more time than the problems regarding the East. Therefore there will continue to be acute instability in the South, which is destined to produce endemic internal and interna-tional crises. This situation requires a very long term policy that seriously confronts the social-economic and political roots of instability. This should, according to the logic of the Marshall Plan, result in the subordi-nation of development aid to disarmament, regional integration and guarantees for basic human rights. Furthermore attempts should be made to try and block the international arms trade and NBC proliferation. In the context of this policy a determined military policy aimed at preventing and punishing the violation of international order will also be needed for a long time to come. However serious the military problems emerging in the North-South relationship may seem, we are nevertheless dealing also in this case with problems that are qualitatively different from those during the East-West conflict. This is due to the imbalance of forces between the Northern countries and the South.

If this is the type of military problem that characterizes the present international system, it should be evident that an effective world police force, responsible to the UN, must be gradually built up. This is the cheap-est and only effective way to involve those countries called on to take the lead in the process of world unification. On this very complex subject, I

will only give two brief outlines dealing with local crisis and nuclear proliferation.

Concerning the first point, it seems obvious that, if the Security Council in times of need had at its automatic disposal a worthwhile military force, consisting of contingents supplied by the permanent members of the Security Council in proportion to their economic weight, then this force would become increasingly efficient in preventing adventurism (like that of Saddam Hussein), and for any other intervention which may still be required in the future.

Concerning the second point, the Security Council could possibly face the problem of nuclear proliferation as follows. The permanent members of the Security Council come to an agreement which would place their nuclear capabilities under the control of a world security authority. Its role would be to dissuade other countries from using or threatening to use weapons of mass destruction. In effect we would pass from super-power deterrence to world authority deterrence directed against any country that was not willing to participate seriously in world unification. In this way we would see a return to the implementation of the Baruch Plan of 1946, which indeed foresaw United Nations' control of nuclear power, and which failed because of the Cold War.

On the basis of the above exposition, it should be recognized that the military aspect of an effective security policy of the European Union must essentially coincide with a European contribution to a world police force.

The conventional aspect of this contribution would be as follows:

a) a European army considerably smaller than the present sum total of existing national armies would be sufficient.[5] This would lead to the abolition of compulsory military service and the introduction of compulsory civic service. In certain sectors this civic service may need to be paramilitary in order to avoid the situation that tasks which involve military force are carried out exclusively by professionals;

b) such a European army should be integrated into a NATO that has been transformed into the military arm of the CSCE and is no longer subordinate to American political-military hegemony;

c) the role of the European army as an integral part of the world police force should be signified in some symbolic way. For example by a title such as "European Contingents of World Security and Peace Forces," and by the adoption of an oath of allegiance to a European constitution which explicitly aims at world unification;

d) over and above any symbolic content, the European army should have an unequivocable constitutional committment to a policy of world

unification. The European constitution should state that a European army is not only at the disposal of the UN for the development of a world police force, but also that it can only intervene outside European Union territory on the basis of UN decisions, or CSCE decisions agreed upon by the UN. This would ensure that neutral countries would no longer have valid reasons to oppose participation in a fully unified federal Europe and involvement with the military aspects of its security.

The nuclear aspect of a European contribution to the development of a world police force involves the nuclear forces of France and Great Britain. Here it is clear that the European Union must not only persuade France and Great Britain to participate actively in nuclear disarmament (and more generally NBC disarmament), but also to place the remainder of their forces under UN control. In this way the European Union would decisively contribute to the system of UN deterrence, referred to above, and could also avoid becoming a nuclear power itself, while simultaneously overcoming the strong military imbalance between its members that exists due to the possession and non-possession of a nuclear capability (which is one of the obstacles to the completion of European unification). It remains clear, however, that the European Union will only be able to implement this policy effectively by making the fastest possible progress towards the federalisation of its foreign and security policies.

NOTES

[1] The slogan "Europe must unite or perish" was launched by Aristide Briand when he presented his proposal for European unification, in 1929.

[2] Regarding this, I want to underline the fact that the overcoming of East-West conflict has not only meant the beginning of democracy in the East, but also a significant strengthening of moves towards democracy in the Southern hemisphere. This also because it has automatically weakened communist totalitarian tendencies in this part of the world, and consequently ended the American tendency to support the worst forms of dictatorship of so long as they were anti-communist.

[3] The end of East-West conflict meant the defeat of Soviet style economic planning as a valid alternative to the market economy. However, this should not lead us to believe that the economic system of the Western democracies does not need to be radically changed in favour of guaranteeing greater social justice, greater solidarity between rich and poor peoples and the safeguarding of the environment.

[4] To appreciate what chances the European Union has of strengthening the CSCE, after equipping itself with stronger institutional instruments for the implementation of a common foreign policy and common security policy, one must keep in mind that the European Community, despite having very weak tools at its disposal to engender co-opera-

tion in foreign policy, has already played a very important role in the negotiations that gave birth to the CSCE. One of the few instances in which the EC has spoken with a single effective voice in the context of European political co-operation was its request to insert the "third basket," regarding human rights, into the Final Helsinki Act. Today we know that this aspect of the CSCE, desired by the EC above all other options, had great importance in the process that led to the disintegration of the Soviet bloc because it created important openings for dissident groups inside communist countries and allowed information channels regarding human rights violations to be set up.

⁵ The reduced size of a European army conceived as an integral part of the development of a world police force would have two advantages. Apart from the large savings involved, it would also be a solid guarantee against the danger of centralising tendencies causing the collapse of a federal Europe.

Notes

UNITED NATIONS
AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

The old order is gone. A new order is yet to emerge. The world finds itself at the cross roads. The order that existed since 1945 was characterized by the existence of a cold war between the two power systems led by the US and the Soviet Union. The power system led by the Soviet Union was revisionist and anti *status quo*. The loosely organised bipolar world provided the framework within which nearly the whole international syatem operated. But the end of the cold war (1988-91) and the collapse of the power system led by the Soviet Union abruptly terminated the parameters within which the old order operated.

This was a systemic change of historic proportions. Like any systemic change, it has led to gains for some and losses for other members of the system. But the contemporary international system is unprecedentedly global in terms of its membership and the extent of interdependence within it. Any assessment of the nature of the emerging world order must be based on a holistic view of the entire international system. It may be useful to begin by enumerating the key elements of change in the old order, before we consider the challenges that the world faces and the place that the United Nations occupies in the new world order.

Elements of change.

As stated earlier, the end of the cold war represents the most significant change in the old order. This welcome change, however, has created uncertainties of various kinds. The countries which belonged to power blocs have been deprived of old friends and allies whose support they can no longer take for granted. The greatest uncertainty, paradoxically, has been created for the non-aligned world. The non-aligned countries can no longer hope to rely on the support of one of the superpowers in case of the hostility of the other, either diplomatically or militarily. Each country

now faces the challenge, and has the opportunity, to look for friends anywhere in the world, depending on mutuality of interests.

The second significant change is the collapse of the power system led by the Soviet Union. This meant not merely the disappearance of the second most important power system in the world, thereby emptying a vast international space in military and ideological terms, but also freeing a large number of countries in Europe and elsewhere from military domination and ideological constraints. This also meant hundreds of millions of people hitherto outside the market economy now wanting to join it, and compete with the underdeveloped world for scarce capital, technology and services.

The third change that follows from the first two is the emergence of the United States as the most dominant power of the world. The resultant situation has been described as a unipolar world.[1] This development is welcome in as much as the United States stands for the values of freedom and democracy. But it becomes unacceptable when the United States sekks to achieve its strategic objectives in the name of freedom, or appropriates and misuses global institutions towards such ends.

The fourth important change is represented by the emergence of Germany and Japan as economic power centres.[2] It is as much a paradox as a miracle that the two defeated powers which were denied military capability after World War II are now threatening the peace of their former enemies through their economic might. While the root of Germany's international power lies mainly in its integration within the European Community, which, after the decisions of the Maastricht summit meeting, is evolving towards economic, monetary and political Union, a way has to be found to give greater responsibilities to powers whose influence in international structures is on the increase.

The fifth change in the old order has taken the form of a sharper polarization between the North and the South. In the old order, the Soviet Union was perceived to be sympathetic to the goals and aspirations of the countries of the South, even though Soviet aid was provided to these countries on a very selective basis. With the collapse of the Soviet led power system, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are driven to the West in search of massive aid, and have already given enough evidence of yielding to Western perceptions and demands on critical global issues. Their economic subservience to the West coupled with their cultural and geographic links puts the North as a whole in sharper contradiction with the South. The South, in the process, will be denied the billions of dollars of aid which will now flow to the East.

Challenges to world order.

In the light of the changing situation, some elements of which have been discussed above, we have to understand the challenges that the world faces.

The foremost challenge exists in the field of security. The world is not uniformly secure for all. Some are more secure than others. Despite the end of the cold war and dismantling of some strategic and technical weapons, the bloc mentality (e.g. NATO) has not disappeared. There is no foolproof mechanism of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, to which a few states have unhindered access. The security of small and weak states is particularly endangered.

The second challenge exists in the field of development. Despite the great strides made in science and technology, there are shameful and humiliating discrepancies in standards of living between different parts of the world. More than one billion people in the developing world live in poverty, i.e. struggling to survive on less than $370 a year. Nearly half of these poor live in South Asia. Life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa is just 50, as against 80 in Japan. Mortality among children under 5 in South Asia exceeds 170 deaths per thousand; in Sweden it is fewer than 10. More than 110 million children in the developing world lack access even to primary education; in the industrial countries anything less than universal enrolment would be regarded as unacceptable.[3] Mozambique, a nation of 15.3 million people lives on God's mercy with a per capita GNP of $80, while Switzerland with a population of 6.6 million enjoys the choicest of God's blessing with a per capita GNP of $29,880.[4]

There are other challenges such as democracy and human rights, the environment, drug trafficking, terrorism, most of which are transnational in character. They flow from poverty. They contribute to insecurity among nations. They require global solutions.

More than 400 million people in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are inching towards democracy. But human rights and democracy are still denied to more than half the people of the developing world. Environmental degradation has been caused by over indulgence in the Noth and poverty in the South.

But the helpless South is being asked to pay a still greater price for it. Drug trafficking is being controlled by feudalistic, authoritarian and militaristic régimes in the South in league with powerful mafias in the North. Terrorism also is a by-product of poverty and denial of human rights. All these are problems which admit solutions only through

multilateral institutions, some at the global level and others at regional levels. We have to examine the place of the United Nations in this framework.

United Nations reforms.

Thirty-six eminent leaders and thinkers of the world were strongly echoing the aspirations of mankind when in the *Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance* issued on April 22, 1991, they said: "The United Nation System was founded at the end of a world war when people clearly saw the need and opportunity to create a system that could guarantee international peace and security ... However, the United Nations is today not strong enough to deal with the tasks that face it ... The United Nations needs to be modernized, and its organization updated."[5]

The international system of today consists of 166 countries[6] which are members of the United Nations and nearly 10 which are outside it. It comprises nearly the whole human universe with a diversity of religious, cultural and ethnic identities. If life in this universe has to be made happy for everyone, some order has to be established in it; an order that takes care of the interests of the whole and not only of certain parts. Such an order, the new world order as it may be called, can be established only if the United Nations, reformed and strengthened, is made its centrepiece. The following areas of reform demand attention as a priority.

Security.

1. Security Force. So far, enforcement action has been mandated by the United Nations Security Council on two occasions: on July 7, 1950, on the occasion of the Korean war; and on November 29, 1990, on the occasion of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. On both occasions, even though action was taken in the name of the United Nations, the United Nations lacked control or influence over the course of military operations. In both cases, military operations became identified with the strategic goals of the nation or nations leading the allied effort, which were different from the goals as interpreted by other members of the Security Council. This led to divisive forces within the United Nations. In both cases, the aggressor got an opportunity to identify the struggle as being with one country, the United States, rather than with the international community as a whole.[7]

The Korean and the Gulf wars may not necessarily serve as parallels

for the future, unless the vital interests of a major military power are at stake. Besides, there are financial uncertainties involved in sustaining such operations. Therefore the need to put them on a durable basis. Member nations must be encouraged to sign special agreements with the Security Council in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter. The Military Staff Committee must be activated in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter. Some advance thinking must be done on training, co-ordination and the command structure of such a Force. Some provision must be made for putting the financial support of such a Force on a secure basis.[8]

2. International Court of Justice. It is a great pity that the International Court of Justice has not been adequately utilized for preventing conflicts. The UN General Assembly, vide its resolutions of November 17, 1989, on the Decade of International Law, adopted on the initiative of the non-aligned movement, is committed to promoting adherence to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. At present, not more than 40 countries have accepted this jurisdiction. In the opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh, a former President of the World Court, to ban the use of force and not to provide for obligatory settlement — preferably judicial settlement of disputes — is virtually to put the cart before the horse. It is inconsistent to outlaw war and yet maintain a system of voluntarism in the settlement of disputes.[9] World public opinion should be mobilised to demand expansion of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Until then, nations in dispute must be asked to resort to the advisory opinion of the Court more often.

3. Security Council. The present Security Council was constituted in an entirely different historical context. Two of the defeated powers of that time have now become economically more powerful than some of their former victors. The membership of the United Nations has expanded from 50 to 166.[10] There are countries in it which have populations constituting nearly one-fifth of humanity but a voice in decision-making structures equal to the smallest of nations. There are members with control over 25 per cent or more of the entire world's strategic resources such as oil.

The non-aligned countries' ministerial meeting in Aeera on September, 1991, called for expansion of the Security Council membership. While the size of the Security Council, the criteria of its permanent membership and members' veto power need to be reviewed, it is also necessary to expand the functions of the Security Council. The concept of security has become much wider, with the inclusion of considerations

of development and the environment. The Security Council must deal with the threat to the security of mankind in its most comprehensive sense, taking into account the views of the Brandt Commission, the Olaf Palme Commission, the Brundtland Commission and the South Commission.

4. International Criminal Court. There is a debate in international legal circles and in some NGOs that it is time to constitute an International Criminal Court to prosecute individuals charged of crimes against humanity, such as genocide, torture, apartheid, drug offences, trafficking in women and children, piracy, aircraft hijacking, hostage taking, etc. But world-wide official thonking in this respect is far behind enlightened non-official thinking. However, this is an important issue which deserves serious consideration in the context of building a better security régime.

5. Peoples' Chamber. A large number of NGOs over the years have raised the demand that a Peoples' Chamber should be constituted as a second chamber of the UN "legislative" structure to voice the aspirations of the people of the world alongside those of the states which are represented in the General Assembly. There is considerable merit in this view in as much as states, even with democratic political systems, tend to acquire an autonomous personality which quite often works at cross purposes with people. Besides, peoples across the world have common interests which are not always reflected in the deliberations of the state-oriented General Assembly. But this question also is far from the comprehension of official thinkers at the present stage.

Development.

According to the South Commission, which submitted its report in May, 1990, the United Nations should be able to give higher priority to economic and social issues as the political and military tensions subside, reducing its responsibility in respect of international peace and security. "It must be an important aim of the South to secure for the United Nations a pivotal role in the management of the international economic system."[11]

It is necessary that the United Nations, at a high political level, takes an overview of world economic issues and monitors developments in the international economy paying special attention to the implications which significant trends and movements have for development and the environment. For this purpose, a summit of a representative group of leaders from developed and developing countries should be convened periodically. A

main objective of this summit should be to explore the interrelationships of the various components of the world economy, notably the monetary system, finance and trade, their links with international political and security matters, and their impact on the development prospects of the South.

It is necessary to bring about improvements in global economic management and decision-making by reforming the voting structure of the principal multilateral financial institutions, i.e. the IMF and the World Bank. The present rules which give effective control of these institutions to the larger contributors, i.e. the developed countries, should be reviewed and modified so as to give increased weight to the South. The weighted voting system of the recently established Common Fund for Commodities should also be examined, so that it provides for a more egalitarian distribution of voting influence and is at the same time acceptable to the international community as a whole.

Environment.

The environment question was brought onto the international agenda with the submission of the Brundtland Commission's report in 1987. This Commission defined sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."[12]

In the last few years, the environment question has become a subject of serious academic concern, and also one in which world public opinion is actively involved. As the world is preparing for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development to be held in Brazil in 1992, a lot of thinking has been done by people concerned as to how to enhance the role of the United Nations in the protection of the environment.

The essence of this thinking is that the environmental challenge cannot be met by mere voluntary action by states acting severally. It requires a system for establishing rules binding for all, institutions and procedures to survey and control their execution, and the application of sanctions against offenders. The existing institution in this respect, i.e. the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) does not possess the power or the organs required for legislation and execution. Therefore, it is necessary to establish an autonomous organ of the United Nations, or a specialized agency to deal with protection of the environment. Such an organ should co-ordinate existing conventions, institutions and proce-

dures, and fill the *lacunae* in fields where adequate institutions and procedures have not yet been developed. It should really be a system comprising of a plenary assembly, an executive council, a secretariat and an environmental court. The assembly should enact binding international regulations. It may be desirable to have a system of weighted voting to enable the big powers to join the system, but they should not have the right to veto as in the present Security Council.[13]

Secretary-General.

The increasing role of the United Nations in the governance of the world has focussed world attention on the criteria used for the appointment of the UN Secretary-General, his terms of appointment, and his authority and jurisdiction. A study conducted by Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, two distinguished international civil servants, with the help of the Ford Foundation and the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, points out that parochial, national, geographical, or political considerations should cease to dominate the process of appointment. If a decision is taken to make a single-term appointment for a maximum of seven years, it would do much to energize and facilitate the search for, and appointment of, candidates. The views of non-governmental organisations and committed citizens working on the planet's major problems should also be heard on the central question of the multilateral leadership required to address those problems.[14]

While it is true that the Secretary-General functions within the realities of the existing power structures of world politics, it is also true that the Secretary-General can be instrumental in constructively modifying the existing power structures.

Finances.

The financial resource base of the United Nations is precarious. It suffers from many limitations. The total budget of the United Nations is too small to meet the increasing demands in the fields of security, development and the environment. It is overly dependent on the political whims of a few big powers. The United Nations can be held to ransom if its policies do not suit the interests of those powers. If the United Nations has to be made stronger, its finances must be based on a more durable and secure basis.

Conclusion.

The United Nations cannot be strengthened if the task is left to the governments alone. The United Nations belongs to "the Peoples", as the opening words of the Charter say. "The Peoples" must assert themselves, for their stakes are permanent, while governments come and go.

Satish Kumar

NOTES

[1] The concept is theoretically weak, although it captures the reality to a considerable extent.

[2] In 1989, the GDP of Japan ($2,818,520 million) and Federal Republic of Germany ($1,189,100 million) was next only to that of the United States ($5,156,440 million). See *World Development Report, 1991*, p. 209.

[3] See *World Development Report, 1990*, pp. 1-2.

[4] See *World Development Report, 1991*, pp. 204-205.

[5] See *Common Responsibility in the 1990s: The Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance*, April 22, 1991, pp. 37-38.

[6] When this text was written (in October 1991) the number of member states had not yet reached the current level of 175.

[7] For more discussion on this subject, see Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The UN in a New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, New York, Spring 1991, pp. 69-83.

[8] See also *Stockholm Initiative, op. cit.*, pp. 12-13, and WAWF, *A Proposal for United Nations Security Forces*, Oslo, 1989.

[9] See Nagendra Singh, *The Role and Record of the International Court of Justice*, Martinus Nijhoff, 1989, pp. 27-28.

[10] See Note 6.

[11] See *The Challenge to the South: The Report of the South Commission*, Dar-es-Salaam, 1990, p. 263.

[12] See The World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*, Oxford, 1987, p. 43.

[13] For detailed discussion, see *A Proposal for a General UN System for Protection of Environment* (by Commission of Experts of the World Association for World Federation), Oslo, 1991 (unpublished draft); see also *Effective Global Environmental Protection: World Federalist Proposal to Strengthen the Role of the United Nations* (by Pamela Leonard in collaboration with Walter Hoffman), WFA, Washington, 1990; and *Stockholm Initiative, op. cit.*, p. 29.

[14] For details, see Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, *A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations*, Dag Hammrskjold Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1990.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING EUROPEAN FEDERATION

The decision taken at Maastricht to set precise deadlines for the creation of economic and monetary Union is the outcome of a long process involving compromises, statements of intentions, proposal-making, and political struggle. This process has been led by all those forces that, confronted with the evolution of the mode of production and international relations, have been obliged to tackle the issue of European unification. Each of these forces — governments, Community institutions, political and social forces, the federalist avantgarde — has had a different role to play, and each one has fulfilled it according to its own rationale.

The process that has culminated in the executive decision to transfer monetary sovereignty has lasted more than twenty years, and it would seem useful to go over once again the main points of Mario Albertini's theoretical study — and resultant plans for action — that appeared in this review exactly twenty years ago.[1] Such an examination allows us, on the one hand, to assess the accuracy of predictions made at that time; and, on the other, provides us with strategic information for continuing the struggle towards our goal: a European Federation.

In his article, Albertini wrote: " ...A European monetary union cannot be planned for, without planning for the creation of a European federal state."[2] [...] "In formal terms, the political aspect of the problem is simple. Monetary unification is a technical problem which can be solved by creating a European state; and which, by definition, a European federal state would undoubtedly solve. The problem of the foundation of this state is also simple. Elections within a democratic framework are held in order to form a government. To form a state, a constituent assembly must be summoned. But the issue becomes confused when the expression 'political union' is used instead of 'federal state'; and when with regards to the foundation process, instead of expressions such as 'constituent assembly' and 'struggle to convene it', people use an expression that tries to name the impossible — the gradual transformation of a group of states into a new state, even if it be a federal one.

The initiated can even give the impression they understand this phenomenon. Public opinion, which simply cannot work it out, remains inert. It cannot be blamed for doing so. Such talk focuses on requirements, not on solutions; no alternatives are proposed, everything is left to the will of God. And it is curious that on this basis, which in conceptual terms is

'bad infinity' ... some dismiss as the 'doctrinairism of European mystics' what is in fact the realism of people who call a spade a spade.

It is necessary, therefore, as a start, to maintain the formal aspects of the problem against the reticence of politicians and the sophistry of the ruling class. And it does not matter if these formal aspects are simple common sense, or even touch on being banal. That is the nature of the problem. That is the starting point from which to tackle it. Of course, it should be taken into account that nobody acknowledges this need when facing action. And it is precisely for this reason that a commitment to monetary union acquires political importance. It seems to me that the decisive point is this: it is necessary to accept, and support (against all logic), the gradual introduction of a monetary unification which precedes, and does not follow on from, the creation of a European political power, since the key players in the process do not behave rationally as regards the development of such a monetary union (the initiative ... is not their business).

Obviously this is an expedient. But some expedients are useful. It is possible that there exist expedients which can lead the political forces to an inclined plane. And it is with expedients of this kind that an attempt should be made to solve the informal aspect of the creation of a European power. If one manages to commit a person to something (monetary union) which implies a presupposition (political power), it may be the case that such a person, in spite of himself, ends up by having to create the latter. This hypothesis should therefore be taken into consideration. In practice, it is a matter of ascertaining: a) whether the historical situation offers the possibility of creating a European federal state; b) whether the political situation offers any possibilities for pushing the ruling class towards an inclined plane from individual nations to a united Europe also in the political and institutional spheres.

[...] Monetary union is one possible route to the inclined plane from individual nations to a united Europe. In order to assess its effectiveness from this point of view, it should be remembered that monetary union is an option imposed by the degree to which economic integration has developed. Integration has now reached such a stage that the results achieved so far can neither be consolidated, nor built upon, without tackling the monetary issue. It is essentially a choice imposed by reality and not an avoidable issue, unless the situation changes ...

In actual fact the situation is much more complex. The extent of European integration confronts the governments not only with the monetary issue, but with other economic problems as well — and

ultimately with the problem of unifying economic policies (without taking into consideration the political problems that are linked, directly or indirectly, to this economic development). But, because of the limitations imposed by the still-intact sovereignty of the states (in other words, the fact that the public will is still formed within the confines of the national framework), what can be achieved in this area (if the circumstances are favourable) will not be characteristic of a new reality, a European reality, but simply of a greater or lesser amount of international collaboration.

In the monetary sphere, however, great progress of an institutional, tangible, European nature, can be made..."[3]

If this is a theoretical and strategic study, then, the problem to be faced is the role of the forces and subjects that are acting in the field, which, on one hand, are driven to act because a realistic appraisal of the situation demands it, and which, on the other hand, possess the will to act, considering that in this "arrangement" factors connected both to will (value judgements, personal interest, etc.) and to conditioning (that derive from the role these forces normally play) are involved.

"If it is a matter of renouncing national sovereignty, the habitual action of the political class, in other words the national leaderships, cannot be counted on ... [They are aware of the historic choice Europe faces, but for this same political class] nothing seems more unattainable or more impractical than the means of creating a European state, the European constituent assembly. This blindness does not simply depend on forms of moral and intellectual irresponsibility ... but also, and above all, ... on the contradiction between the nature of the decision to summon the European constituent assembly and the structure of the normal process of political decision-making ...

The decision to summon a European constituent assembly can clearly only be made at an international level — in other words within a framework where a public will has not yet been formed, but where only a compromise between the expressions at the summit of various public wills currently exists. Juridically, it is a feasible decision, provided that the will to take it exists in a sufficient number of countries simultaneously. But in normal politics, and even in revolutionary politics (when it aims at conquering power in the state), it is not only difficult, but even theoretically impossible, to reach a situation of this kind.

Decisions depend on power; power on the clash between forces; the clash between forces on the context of the struggle. Hence, as regards the decision to summon a constituent assembly within the scope of several

countries (different contexts of struggle), it follows that: a) the forces concerned would have no chance (except by freak accident) of achieving a simultaneous majority for the constituent assembly; b) indeed, they would not even be able to start to fight for this majority, because the various forces cannot be divided up to propose a non-decision (a single state cannot summon the European constituent assembly); c) in any case, normal power (which is acquired, lost or retained only within the context of struggle, i.e. the state) and the decision to summon a constituent assembly in different countries (which corresponds to specifically changing the context of the struggle) are incompatible, because normal power is gained only by mobilizing the historical and social opportunities for survival (whatever they be) within the framework of struggle, and not by the opposite.

Herein lies the difficulty which needs to be overcome in order to create a European Federation. States can descend to any level of cowardice or folly, but they cannot be superseded by normal politics, which, by definition, is but the administration or transformation of the state ... [Therefore,] the normal actions of politicians cannot be relied on to initiate any decisive action. However, there remains a possibility. It is feasible to rely on the action of an accidental European leadership, if, in the inclined plane towards a united Europe, there exists a slippery spot that will lead towards a situation which may be defined as a 'creeping constituent power'."[4]

But accidental leadership can be activated only if the circumstances, and the political will of forces uncompromised by power, are capable of highlighting or identifying a situation which makes possible, as Monnet wrote, "concrete and resolute action, on a limited but decisive point, which brings about a fundamental change in this point, and gradually modifies the very characteristics of all the issues."[5]

This accidental leadership revealed itself at the time of debate about the EDC, when the Italian position, and in particular that of De Gasperi (which coincided with that of the European Federalist Movement), tried to establish a democratic European Community (through the creation of a representative Assembly) with a European army. The battle for the EDC was lost, but the thinking and actions of federalists have continued to move in the direction set out by Monnet.

At the Hague summit of December 1969, the governments acknowledged the necessity of monetary union. On the basis of this, Albertini wrote: " ... The governments are committed to monetary union. We know it jeopardizes national sovereignty, but we also know that it does not

commit the national leaderships to properly overcoming it. However, with the national leaderships committed on this front, and with favourable circumstances, an accidental European leadership is acting on a 'limited point' which should be decisive, since it concerns the very source of the formation of a democratic political will.

This point is the direct unilateral election of the delegates to the European Parliament. For a few years now the most serious pro-Europeans and the most responsible federalists have been fighting for this objective ...

A European election will serve to create a public will within the European framework — a situation, whether intended to be so or not, that is virtually constitutional."[6]

During the early '70s, therefore, the federalists' strategy concentrated on this "decisive point" and met with success. The European Parliament, elected directly by the citizens of Europe, has become, on the one hand, a symbol of the contradiction which Europe is still struggling with — it is the only democratic organ of the Community, yet it remains excluded (despite a little progress at Maastricht) from the process of forming a political will. While, on the other hand, the Parliament possesses the potential to assume the constituent role, which only citizens, or their democratically elected representatives, can fulfil.

Clearly, by achieving this goal a battle, rather than a war, was won. But every step forward changes the parameters of the "European question" and in any case enables further appropriate action to be identified.

* * *

We should now ask ourselves whether the arguments re-examined above provide us with any theoretical and strategic guidelines with which to plan our activity in the novel post-Maastricht situation.

In doing so, we cannot avoid taking into account that while in the past it was possible to accept slow progress towards the ultimate objective within the context of a relatively stable international framework, the process of European unification is nowadays shaped and threatened by an unstable situation which involves the time factor. The historical crisis of the national state is being demonstrated by increasingly serious and widespread disintegration, racism and xenophobia, while at the same time the Community has to face problems connected to its widening — which is confronting Europe with a stark choice between the reinforcement of current institutions and dilution into a vast free-trade area. All this

requires an acceleration in the process of European unification and for there to be no delays to the creation of a European Federation which is able to assume its due responsibilities.

By taking this situation into account, certain factors can be examined, understood and interpreted on the basis of Albertini's above-quoted analytical study. It becomes possible to identify the forces involved, the role they have played, and the role they still need to play — as well as identifying a possible strategy for the federalists.

The facts are the decisions taken at Maastricht, and above all the deadlines specified in the Treaty with regard to economic and monetary Union. If the final obstacle of ratification is overcome, the states will have made the most advanced decision that, from their point of view, they could have made at this stage — the states tend to limit rather than encourage the transfer of sovereignty. However, by transferring part of their sovereignty in the monetary sphere, they have opened the way for necessary and more advanced decisions, and have set up that "inclined plane" that will confront the forces in the field with the political problem of creating a European federal power.

The French example is instructive: the decisions taken at Maastricht pose the French with the problem of revising their Constitution, since it only foresees the possibility of a limitation of sovereignty (according to which powers transferred to a European body are exercised through unanimous decisions). Instead, the Constitution will have to accept the principle of the transfer of sovereignty (according to which the same powers will be exercised under majority voting). The importance of the debate which has begun in France about this problem relates to the fact that it highlights the crucial aspect of the federalist alternative, and that over this point a political struggle will break out. Battle-lines will be drawn up, political power balances will alter, and political forces will challenge each other no longer in the field of internal politics, but within a European context. The relevance of this phase of constitutional revision becomes even greater when considered that it has opened up a debate on federalism that has even created the possibility that France will accept a transfer of sovereignty while the formation of a "nation of nations" (in other words a federal state) is still in progress. Such a debate will undoubtedly serve to influence the other European states as well.

Within the logic of the inclined plane, is it possible today to identify an accidental leadership that is willing to take on the responsibility of an advance towards the final objective? In fact, it seemed that Mitterrand might take on the task when, in a speech given to the European Parliament

on May 24th 1985 (therefore before Maastricht), he proclaimed the need for the Parliament itself to play a constituent role. But this was not followed by any concrete action in that direction (unlike what occurred with Italy's 1989 referendum).

What we may reasonably hope for today is that an accidental European leadership will emerge from the reinforcement of the converging interests of France and Germany within a European context that has changed since the re-unification of Germany and the disintegration in the East. In fact, only by anchoring Germany to Europe will it be possible to stop the potential return of German nationalism and Germany hegemony in Europe, which could come about through either the D-mark or the establishment of privileged relations with certain areas of Eastern Europe. It is clearly in the interests of all European states that this does not happen. But it is above all in the interests of France, which has always considered the German state a potential opponent, and of Germany itself, which is afraid of having to take on European and world responsibilities that it would be unable to cope with (the fact that Kohl has always forcefully identified himself with the policy objective of European construction is proof of this).

But accidental leadership is only one of the elements involved, and it cannot be expected to initiate decisive independent projects, for the reasons highlighted by Albertini. When such leadership has appeared, it has acted on a strategic point that was previously proposed by the federalists through their analyses and actions. And even in the present situation the federalists' role is essential: their logic, the constituent rationale, will win through. It is based on an extremely realistic analysis of the process underway: currency, economics and government are three inseparable aspects of this process and cannot but have as their outcome a state founded on a democratic constitution — in other words a constitution drawn up by the representatives of the people.

In the wake of Maastricht and the upheavals following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strategic goal of our struggle must therefore be the same as the final objective — the attribution of the constituent mandate to the European Parliament. Intermediate stages can no longer be entertained, because as far as the transfer of sovereignty in the monetary sphere is concerned, the issue of establishing a new state has by now definitely taken hold; and because the danger of increasingly widespread disorder requires Europe to become an active participant in international politics by establishing democratic instruments of government.

If it remains the task of the governments to take the executive decision

to attribute the constituent mandate to the European Parliament, it is clearly important for political subjects (institutional or otherwise) that can influence such a decision to become involved: namely, the European Parliament, in the vanguard, which must claim the constituent role; the national parliaments; the Commission (whose President, Jacques Delors, despite being a prisoner of the intergovernmental point of view, has already moved in the right direction when he asked for the 1996 Conference, that will deal with the institutional reforms needed to enable Europe to cope with enlargement, to be brought forward); and finally the political parties and social forces, through creating pan-European platforms and running electoral campaigns for the 1994 European elections that focus on constituent themes.

All the same, the federalists are set to play a vital role. They have always had the task of stressing the alternative to the crisis of the national state, and to the crisis of a framework of power which is no longer able to cope with the modern forms of social living that have been brought on by the evolution of the mode of production and international relations. But they have never limited themselves to supporting an ideal, to a simple reliance on a gradual and inevitable independent evolution towards the realization of this ideal, nor to merely making suggestions to those who currently exercise power in the hope that they will be listened to. Rather, the federalists have always taken the initiative and searched for strategies which, beginning from a particular situation, have enabled the largest possible number of forces to be engaged in the struggle for a European Federation.

In the different stages of this struggle, radical demands linked to moves to claim the final objective immediately have been alternated with actions aimed at achieving more limited objectives — but ones that are decisive if any further progress is to be made. The realism of revolutionaries consists in this ability to alternate strategies according to the historical and political moment, while keeping the final objective clearly in sight. Federalists must not be afraid of periods of obscure work in the political background; they must not favour appearances over reality; they must have the infinite patience and perseverance of those who seek to replace the old order with a new one.

Nicoletta Mosconi

NOTES

[1] Mario Albertini, "Le probème monétaire et le problème politique européen," in *Le Fédéraliste*, XIV (1972), pp. 77-108.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 91.

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 92 f.

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 101 f.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 105.

[6] *Op. cit.*, pp. 106 f.

Federalist Action

POLITICAL REPORT
AT THE 15th CONGRESS OF THE UNION
OF EUROPEAN FEDERALISTS

(Milan, May 15-17, 1992)

This Congress is taking place in an uncertain phase in the history of European unification. On the one hand, federal Union is now accepted as a goal by an increasingly greater proportion of the political forces throughout Western Europe. Federalism has become for the first time a word capable of arousing strong emotions. The Maastricht agreement has been an important step forward, at least as regards Monetary Union. The external influence of the European Community is impressive, as measured by its capacity to attract other states in Eastern Europe, the EFTA zone and the Mediterranean. There is widespread awareness that enlargement cannot be indefinitely delayed, and that this formidable challenge cannot be met without radically strengthening the Community's institutions.

On the other hand the political climate in almost all European countries is deteriorating to the extent that the ratification of the Maastricht agreement is under threat. In France, the resolute involvement of President Mitterrand and the result of the National Assembly's vote two days ago are encouraging; but the defeat of the Socialist Party in recent regional elections, the striking gains of the National Front and the ambiguous stance of a section of the moderate right, added to the uncertainties bound up with the constitutional problems linked to ratification, are creating tensions which justify some residual fears. The German government (in spite of recent reverses for both major parties in two important regional elections, and the political difficulties relating to the costs of unification and the recent wave of strikes) seems to be able

to ensure that the ratification procedure will reach its conclusion; but considerable objections are being raised in industrial and financial circles and by the Länder, not to mention the extreme right. The Italian elections have provoked political confusion, which does not favour quick ratification. In Ireland and Denmark the issue hangs on the results of an unpredictable referendum process, even if recent opinion polls in Denmark show that public opinion is moving in favour of ratification.

We are confident that the Maastricht agreement will be ratified. But we should keep in mind that failure to ratify it would set European history back ten years. Thus ratification should be the first European priority of the national Parliaments, and the federalists should mobilize so as to put pressure on them to facilitate and accelerate the process.

If the new Treaty is not to remain simply a piece of paper, it will cause the Community to face important new responsibilities in the fields of external economic relations, internal cohesion and the creation of an environment favourable to an increase in the competitiveness of its industrial system. Thus the national governments have the duty to endow the Community with the financial means necessary to implement the agreement, by approving the Delors package.

Ratification of the Maastricht agreement and adoption of the Delors package should be the most immediate aims of our strategy. We must denounce the scandal of those governments who solemnly declare their support for the goals of European monetary and political Union but refuse to provide the means to achieve them.

But these decisions, difficult as they may be, are but the beginning of the story. The governments of the Community must urgently go beyond Maastricht if they do not want to lose power and see the countries they rule plunge into chaos. The end of bipolarism and the fall of the Russian Empire seem to have weakened the bonds that held the national states of Western Europe together, by undermining the legitimacy of the democratic parties that traditionally represented citizens in the national institutions. Instead, new parties have arisen, and some hitherto marginal groups have gained in importance, that preach intolerance and division. More generally, the party line-up has grown more complex in many countries, creating problems for democracy and making effective government difficult. A new aggressive regionalism is on the increase everywhere, putting the very unity of the nation-states in question.

Thus Western Europe risks being caught up in the whirlwind of nationalism and micro-nationalism which has been devastating Eastern Europe since the fall of the Soviet Empire.

But this trend can be challenged. The Community possesses the material and moral resources to reverse these tendencies and make the arguments for unity win through against those for division. But it must present to the citizens of both halves of Europe a vision of the future which is capable of inspiring hope and mobilizing support. To this end, it must achieve its federal unification without further delay and begin the process of enlargement to include Central and Eastern European countries (as well as those of the European Free Trade Area).

These two problems are strictly interrelated. The goal of European Federation can no longer be viewed as something to be achieved in relative isolation from the outside world, as was the case when the Soviet-American condominium seemed to be indefinitely freezing the world balance of power. Now the world balance of power is in flux. The Eastern European countries, freed from the Soviet grip, are looking to the Community. So are the EFTA countries, since the concept of neutrality has lost all meaning. The EC is being forced to take on responsibilities towards the rest of the world, which is something that has never happened before. The problem of European unity is no longer a regional issue, but needs to be set against the background of a much wider historical movement and tackled within the context of a comprehensive strategic design.

In particular, the process of European unification should be viewed as part of the process of world unification. This is no longer an abstract ideal. The awareness of the global dimension of ecological problems is increasing; the dismemberment of the ex-Soviet Union has dramatized the problem of world-wide control of nuclear armaments; the increasingly strong sentiment of men and women to belong to a single community of destiny has shaken the ideological foundations of the principle of non-interference in states' internal affairs, thus bringing into question the concept of sovereignty itself; the United Nations is actively involved in trouble spots all round the world as never before, from Yugoslavia to Lebanon, Cambodia to Irak, Cyprus to Somalia. The problems of funding and democratic control of the organisation are becoming acute. Moreover, attempts to build up regional groups of States are being made in North and Central America, West and sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, etc. The experience of the European Community is being closely studied and used as an example throughout the world.

Decisions taken in Western Europe now affect the rest of the world and must be made with a view to the consequences they will have on the security and welfare of mankind as a whole. This relates in particular to

the problem of completing and enlarging the first federal core within the Community. Enlargement cannot be considered a step-by-step process, in which each advance should be pursued on its own terms, but as a comprehensive design requiring an overall concept and a general strategy.

One point, to start with, is clear to everybody: a substantial enlargement of the Community without a prior strengthening of its institutions will result in its being diluted into a huge free trade area and ultimately lead to its disappearance. As a result, the trend towards fragmentation in Eastern Europe would continue and extend to Western Europe, where it would find very fertile ground. On the other hand, simply arguing that enlargement be postponed until the European Federation is established would be ungenerous towards the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe who are threatened by economic slump and political chaos, and who are looking to the Community for a brighter future through unity; not to say unrealistic, because the process of enlargement has in fact already begun, and stopping it will be impossible. The only matter left to decide is the manner in which it will be carried out.

We must be clear about the two available options from which we have to choose. One is a large Deutschmark zone, with Germany wielding an imperfect hegemony over an increasingly fragmented, chaotic and powerless Europe. Very clear signs of this tendency are already visible, because of economic, and hence political, strength of unified Germany, in spite of its current difficulties. But undoubtedly, the responsibility for this development does not lie with the German government, which indeed is sincerely European and mistrusts its own power, but with the incapacity, or the unwillingness, of the other member States of the Community to renounce their sovereignty. The other option is the establishment of a democratic and federal core, which would be capable of integrating new countries on an equal footing, of giving substantial help to the ex-Soviet Union and of being an example for the many areas in the world that are striving towards new forms of unity. There is no third option, and the time is very short. This is the reason why the federalists have chosen the slogan *European Federation Now* for this Congress.

This means no less than giving the European Parliament powers both to legislate and to control the European government; with the Commission being transformed into a real government and the Council of Ministers into a democratic second Chamber, in which the member states are represented. Proposals in favour of any further intermediate goals, after the Maastricht agreement has been ratified and implemented, can

only be a pretext for slowing down or diverting this process.

What is still lacking in Europe, despite some laudable exceptions, is a sense of urgency with regard to the federal objective, and it is a paramount responsibility of federalists to convey this point to politicians and public opinion. But in order to accomplish this task, we must have an overall scheme. Asking for a European Federation now requires us to answer a number of questions.

It is probable that full awareness of the need to establish a federation immediately will not develop simultaneously in all the governments of current EC members. At the same time, it is unthinkable that those possessing such an awareness will be ready to break the Treaties of Rome in order to establish a federal Union among a group of States which comprises only a part of the Community's members. Moreover it is unlikely that the candidate states, whether because of the difficulties they will have in integrating their economic and political systems immediately into the new Federal Union (as will be the case with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) or because they are squarely against giving up their sovereignty (as will be the case with most of the EFTA states), will be ready to become members of the Federation without delay. This will oblige the Community to show considerable institutional inventiveness in thinking out a system in which Federation and Community can coexist, the former being a member of the latter. A two-tier Europe is the only possible device that enables the enlargement of the initial federal core, by immediately admitting into the outer tier all those wishing to enter, and subsequently enlarging the inner tier to include those ready and able to abide by the much more stringent rules that full membership implies.

The issue of enlargement should also be considered against the background of relationships between the European Union and the area of the ex-Soviet Union. The main imperative in this regard is that the enlargement of the European Union should not continue to encourage fragmentation and nationalism inside the CIS, which will only serve to create the conditions for a resurgence of pan-Slav tendencies in Russia and its estrangement from the rest of Europe, and to revive the temptations of militarism and imperialism; on the contrary, the Community's enlargement should reinforce the momentum towards democratic unity inside the CIS, and the establishment of close links between the CIS and the European Union: preferably through a large confederation between two federal poles (if the peoples of the CIS have the capacity to build one) or, should that not be the case, through the accession, in the long term, of

Russia and the other CIS Republics to the European Union. Whichever the path the historical process follows, the European Community must immediately abstain from any action which may widen the gulf between Russia and the other republics, and seize all initiatives that are likely to encourage CIS members to pool their resources and energies, with a view to re-establishing the institutional basis of new forms of political solidarity and economic co-operation within that region.

A European Federation stretching to the western borders of the CIS cannot be based on a high number of small and weak units, plagued more often than not by nationalistic tensions with their neighbours. Yet this will happen if the Community is enlarged, without precise institutional guarantees, to include all the internationally recognized states currently existent in Central and Eastern Europe, the ETFA area and the Mediterranean, and if the demands of the separatist groups in Scotland, Northern Italy, Catalonia, and so on, are satisfied. Such a federation, provided it came to pass, would be the legal cover for the hegemony of a few large and powerful states, principally Germany. It would in fact be the opposite of true federalism. True federalism relies on a balance between the power of the global government and that of the regional ones. The difficulties German federalism is experiencing on the wake of unification, due to the weakness of the new Länder, prove the validity of this statement. The member states of an effective federation must represent a small number of large and responsible units, capable of perceiving, and acting in favour of, the general interest; and not a multitude of small units squabbling with each other, in an effort to make their individual interests prevail. A "Europe of the Regions" would be completely ungovernable. That is why the federalists should strongly oppose any dismemberment of existing states (both in Eastern and Western Europe) into sovereign sub-units, and should, moreover, encourage with all available means the creation of regional groupings of states as potential future direct members of the European Union.

Notice that this would be the only strategy which would lead to a real measure of self-government, even in the smallest territorial communities that make up the very richness of European society, since otherwise all decisions beyond the regional dimension will be taken by the federal government, whose power would expand correspondingly and no longer be balanced by that of the member units.

In the muddled ideological times in which we live, where liberty is confused with sovereignty, and federalism interpreted by many as either centralism or separatism, the federalists need to elaborate and present a clear model of the state. They must emphasize that all people belong, by nature, to a multiplicity of territorial communities of different dimensions, ranging from the city neighbourhood to the entire planet, and that federalism provides the institutional instruments to give political expression to all these loyalties, while giving none of them the privilege of exclusiveness. At the end of the 20th century federalism can only be of a multi-tier type, through which current states will not be abolished, but stripped of the attribute of absolute sovereignty and put on the same footing as other political communities, both larger and smaller. The traditional "nation-states" have a right of citizenship in the European Federation, but they will be federations of regions, one level among the multiple levels of government which will form its institutional structure. It would be the worst of historical blunders which could be made today if the national states were to be deprived of their sovereignty only for this to be endowed to smaller units, which are culturally poor and jealous of their uncertain identity — and thus replace the nefarious traditional nationalism with a much more devastating regional nationalism, that will have all the vices of the former and none of its historical merits.

We have no more time to lose. The European Community is heading towards crisis: either it will rapidly turn into a full-fledged federation, capable of expanding and mobilizing important resources in favour of the East and the Third World (even if some of its members initially abstain from taking part in it); or it will dissolve. But its dissolution will go hand in hand with serious internal difficulties in its member states, which are currently plagued by economic crisis and immigration, and which are incapable of offering their citizens a vision of the future for which they could reasonably be asked to make substantial sacrifices. The prospect of ungovernability would become increasingly real, and the upsurge of the far right irresistible. Never has it been so evident that the political unification of Europe is the condition not only for redressing the democratic deficit in the Community, but also for salvaging the democratic institutions of each individual member state.

Yet crisis are the moments in which great historical changes have the biggest chance of being accomplished. The main brake on the process of European unification has always been the unwillingness of national governments to yield their power to a European federal state. Now some of them are threatened with the real possibility of being obliged to yield their power anyway, while at the same time appearing as those that are suffocating democracy in their own countries. Europe, for them, could become the only way to retain part of their power, by pooling it in a wider

context.

The historical leap towards a European Federation cannot be made without the involvement of the people, as represented by the European Parliament. The core of the federalist strategy must therefore be to demand that the European Council should give the European Parliament a mandate to draft a constitution for European Union in co-operation with the national Parliaments, since collectively these bodies represent the European federal people in their dual expression, European and national. Yet this should not make us forget that for the European Parliament to play such a role it has to be strengthened. Direct elections have undoubtedly increased its power. So have the Single European Act and the Maastricht agreement, in spite of their timidity on the issue of institutional reform of the Community. The right, obtained in Maastricht, to confirm or sack the Commission by a vote of confidence could prove of strategic importance in the future, if it is properly used. But on top of the fact that the formal competences of the European Parliament are still lamentably insufficient, of even more significance is the consideration that for it to be a really decisive element in the federative process, it must become the arena for real political confrontation between European political parties. Until now, with the notable exception of Great Britain, traditional democratic parties throughout Europe have shown a complete lack of interest for the European Union. European elections have mainly been an opportunity to check the parties' popular support at the national level. Yet now the trend can be reversed. The democratic parties have an urgent need to develop a new look, revitalize their activities and regain touch with a society and an economy which have for a long time now been European and which have cut all moral links with a political class that has stayed largely national. In the national context, as recent elections in Belgium, France, Germany and Italy have shown, the democratic parties are destined to lose power in the face of the rising tide of destructive protest, nationalism, separatism and racism. The increasing disablement of both national and European Parliaments, (due to the national Parliaments' powers being transferred solely to the European Council and the Council of Ministers) saps the role of the parties as places where democratic debate occurs and political will takes shape, and risks transforming them into cliques that serve only for politicking and buying votes. In a European context the traditional democratic parties would recover their capacity to harness moral dynamism and their functions as interpreters of the general interest and supporting pillars of the democratic system. Moreover, they are the only political groupings present in all, or almost all, the member states of the Community; whereas nationalism, separatism and racism are by-products of the death-throes of the nation-states, and as such will have no place in a strong and self-confident Community that is progressing towards the goal of a European Federation.

This is why the federalists should exert strong pressure on democratic parties at all levels. We must insist on the issue of a uniform electoral system for the European Parliament, which will oblige national parties to work out a joint European strategy and present common European lists. We must encourage the existing European parties and the national parties that compose them, to strengthen and democratize their European structures, by setting up European congresses. We must focus our activities also at the local and regional levels, and urge the local sections of democratic parties to address resolutions to their leaders advocating the same reforms.

The UEF is a small group of volunteers, which is permanently under-funded and weakly organized. But it has a strategic function in the European political landscape. Being the European standard-bearers of federalism we make demands, and are sensitive to issues, that are bound to have an increasingly important impact on European politics and to be of an increasing concern to politicians and public opinion throughout the continent. There are plenty of ears ready to listen to our message, provided that we are able to express it clearly. The message, not the medium, is our real force. We must be proud of being federalists and aware of our unique historical function, which is that of showing the way forward and being the active consciousness of the process of European unification. The debates in this Congress should provide each one of us with ideas and motivation, so that we can continue our work at home with increased energy and effectiveness.

Francesco Rossolillo

MESSAGE OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE 15th CONGRESS
OF THE UNION OF EUROPEAN FEDERALISTS

Dear Friends,

Allow me to address you by using this very term, since it seems to me that our ideas concerning the needs and the imperatives that Europe and the whole world must meet on the eve of the XXI Century are in many ways very similar. And they integrate with one another, even though they sometimes diverge. This does not frighten me at all. On the contrary, the variety of the ideas of the world is our common wealth. And as the French proverb runs "the truth come out when there's a difference of opinion."

History has left its scars on all of us. It has shown how people lack union and, above all, that their opposition, even though partly justifiable, only leads to undesirable events.

The ideas of your movement clearly show that humanity and, in particular, Europeans, can learn from their mistakes of the past.

But it is exactly because of the fact that the trend towards new democratic forms of approach, collaboration and organisations interaction between governments and peoples is an expression of the past, that this also means a new age is beginning.

We often talk about the world of the XXI Century. And we deviously mean a whole millenium, not just a century. We simply are obliged to do anything we can in order to make our civilisation begin the new millenium with an aim of renewal. I am convinced that this idea will lead to a new civilisation, to a humanistic civilisation that embodies the idea of human solidarity.

And, moreover, this idea will lead to a civilisation that can control the process of its own development. Our society has to tackle a wide range of problems concerning the whole world. A single state cannot settle them.

This is ever so much true since today's world, which is becoming more and more integrated and interdependent, is witnessing the re-awakening of national feelings, that often turn into dangerous nationalistic movements. I, on my part, refuse to accept any idea of fundamentalism, be it of ideological, of nationalist or of any other kind. This is what the past has left us, and we must grow away from it.

And I am convinced that Europe should give both an example and an impulse to the movement towards new relations between peoples and governments. Here, on our continent, we have probably deeply felt the problems of the new millenium that is approaching us. We are the first ones who are trying to settle these problems. I also include your movement among those who are trying to find new essential ideas.

The path you have chosen is very close to my observations and to the idea of a "European Common Home." The future of our peoples and, of course, of Russia, too, will be determined by whether they become one or they remain divised. Moreover, I am convinced that we must do anything we can in order to become culturally closer and intermingled, to turn a close collaboration between our countries and our peoples into a everyday routine.

The idea of setting up new institutions, sides the ones that already exist, in order to guarantee a safe and peaceful existence to our continent, is very close to my own principles. Among these I mention, for example, the idea of an active collaboration between European states within the framework of the confederation brought forward by France.

From this very point of view I support your aims.

From our part, our Foundation (Foundation for socio-economic and political research) is willing to join forces with yours, and with your help, to look for a path that may give a better future to Europe which, as you think also, must not close off but has the duty to consider itself as a part of the world's society.

I wish your Congress good luck and remain, in the hope that we will closely collaborate in future.

Mikhail Gorbachev

Federalism in the History of Thought

KARL JASPERS

Karl Jaspers, psychologist and philosopher who was born in Old-enburg, Northern Germany, in 1883 and died in Basel in 1969, is one of the major representatives of contemporary existentialist thought. After graduating in medicine, he was a professor of psychology and then of philosophy at Heidelberg University up to 1937, when he was obliged to leave his post due to his opposition to the Nazi régime. He returned to his teaching at Heidelberg in 1945.

His philosophy is a constant enquiry into the meaning of life and death, and into the relationship between man and transcendency, and it reflects a situation of deep crisis, the crisis of a man who has lived and undergone the tragic consequences of the events that have marked our century: two World Wars and the atrocious experience of Nazism.

His thinking therefore reveals a constant sense of uneasiness and precariousness, but at the same time a strong trend towards overcoming the anguish and limitations which mankind struggles against. His aware-ness of the risk threatening man's ability to think and act did not prevent him from having faith in human reason and in the value of ideas as "motivating powers." This allowed him to face the problems of humanity with a positive spirit: at the basis of every idea, of every project — he wrote — lies "an inexplicable confidence, namely the certitude of faith that everything is not null and void, not merely a senseless chaos, a passing from nothing into nothing. The ideas that guide our passage through the world are revealed to this confidence."[1]

It is on the basis of this confidence that he analyzed the situation of mankind after the Second World War, which was characterized by an ever more accentuated interdependence ("What is historically new ... is the real unity of mankind on the earth. The planet has become for man a single whole dominated by the technology of communications ... All the crucial problems have become world problems.."[2]) and conditioned by the explosion of the atomic bomb ("... it is impossible to nullify the fact that humanity has come to the point where it is able to destroy itself. Only by nullifying total violence (such as war) will a situation which avoids the ruin of humanity become possible"[3]).

His analysis of the present times was based on the awareness of the historical dimension of man: he wrote that history is open to the past and future and we are between the two, as is our present, which is not merely a "pure and simple present," enclosed within the narrow horizon of the day, but one that is tied to the historical background and "reaches fulfilment through the future latent within it, whose tendencies we make into our own, either by rejecting or accepting them."[4] Historical thought, therefore, not only interprets the past, but must also predict the future and forewarn. In effect, such predictions "open the area of the possible, they provide points of attack for plan and action, they bring us into the broadest horizons, they enhance our freedom with the consciousness of the possible"[5]: in conclusion, knowledgeable predictions of the future (based not on arbitrary whims, but on the solid foundations of the exploration of the past and the interpretation of the present) contribute to its realization. The awareness of all this — Jaspers adds — cannot be disconnected either from humility, and a recognition of the limits of knowledge and power, or from the consciousness that, while the heritage of man is almost indestructible, the acquisitions of history can be lost. And it is precisely in order to find a remedy for this danger, and to contribute to the perpetual dialogue of man with himself, with others and with history, that Jaspers turned his attention to the problem of world unity.

In the text which follows he deals with the same problems, and suggests similar answers as those which federalist thought has given to the changes and needs of the present-day world. Starting from objective global interdependence, he affirms the need to overcome the world's division into sovereign states: "Where a sovereignty remains which is not that of mankind as a whole, there also remains a source of unfreedom; for it must assert itself by force against force" in other words by the war.[6] And to nationalism, that "has already ceased to be a factor in politically decisive events,"[7] he opposes federalism, which will establish a world order based on law and "afforded by common decision in negotiation"[8] (with the exclusion of what he defines as a "world empire," in other words a peace based on enslavement to a single power).

In his book on the atomic bomb, Jaspers pitilessly attacks the conviction of being able to found universal peace on the UN: "At the heart of the United Nations Charter there is a fatal obscurity. The UN wants to eliminate from the world violence used for political ends. But it look for

assistance in the force of the member states which, when all other means have failed, are obliged to enforce the law through war ... The UN is not what it claims to be. It represents ... a falseness ... The UN is like a theatre, in which an annoying play is staged amid the real actions of the big powers."[9] These blunt statements, accompanied by a broader analysis of what he defines "the lie of the UN" remind us of Einaudi's and Lord Lothian's criticism of the Society of Nations, the international organization which preceded the UN and whose contradictions the latter has been unable to overcome. But, after denouncing its limitations (which still exist, but were even more evident in the cold war atmosphere in which the book was written), Jaspers looked to the future and tried to recover the symbolic function that the United Nations retained: "The UN shows world public opinion something more than the diplomacy of the single states. An organ of all mankind — albeit still a poor one — shows the human race to itself. It becomes more evident what the mighty idea of peace and unity between men is ...."[10] His hope was that one day the UN, by transforming itself, would be able to become an organization that could establish the rule of law in the world.

But the path to a "world order" implies at the same time both courage and patience. "Patience, obduracy, steadfastness; these are indispensable to the politically active man. This patience consists in the ethical attitude that does not succumb to personal mortifications, that keeps the objective whole always in view, that appraises and distinguishes the essential from the inessential. It consists in the watchfulness that remains undiminished in waiting and in apparent fruitlessness ..."[11]

These words seem to echo those written by Altiero Spinelli during the political struggle to create the European Federation: "... in the human condition only those who can to be faithful to their ideas in the dark hours of defeat deserve to see victory one day."[12]

NOTES

[1] Karl Jaspers, *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*, 1949; engl. transl. *The Origin and Goal of History*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 213.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 126-127.

[3] Karl Jaspers, *Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen* (1958), München, Piper, 1983 (7th ed.), p. 418.

[4] Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History*, *cit.*, Foreword.

[5] *Ibid.*, p.152.

[6] *Ibid.*, p.197.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 201.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 197.

[9] Karl Jaspers, *Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen*, *cit.*, pp. 215-216.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 218.

[11] Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History*, *cit.*, pp. 205-206.

[12] Altiero Spinelli, "La politica-ombra dell'Europa," in *Il Federalista*, I (1959), p. 15.

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WORLD UNITY *

Technology has brought about the unification of the globe by making possible a hitherto unheard of speed of communications. The history of the one humanity has begun. A single destiny governs the whole of it. Men from all parts of the world can see one another.

Since the whole sphere of the earth is more accessible to the technology of communications than in former times Eastern Asia was to the Central Empire, or the Mediterranean world to Rome, the political unity of the earth can only be a matter of time. The path seems to lead from national States, *via* the great continental areas of government, to world empire or world order. It will eventually be enforced by the will to power and dominion which, by all historical analogies, is always there, has as its more or less conscious goal the largest world empire it is possible to attain at any particular time, and then, out of the will to peace, seeks a life free from anxiety in an order of the world.

Thus, in fact, the various local histories have today already become one continental history. To begin with, the universal tendencies proceed toward the structuring of great continental areas of life, which are related to one another. The spheres of the American continent, Eastern Asia, the Russian Empire and the territories of Europe, Hither Asia and America cannot continue to live alongside each other without connexions or in mutual indifference. They do not merely observe each other's existence; they either live in *de facto* material and spiritual exchange, or in a self-enclosure that heightens the tension.

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*From Karl Jaspers, *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*, München, 1949.

Introduction. The historical analogy with the end of the Axial Period.

Man's self-consciousness developed during the Axial Period.[1] The compelling spiritual images and ideas appeared in the transition to the unmythological or at least no longer naïvely mythological ages. Endless possibilities were evolved in the free struggle of the spirit of a world rent by power politics. Every force awoke and stimulated the rest.

Through his highest upsurge, however, man first experienced all his distress, the insight into his imperfection and imperfectibility. The goal was redemption.

Rational thinking developed and, in conjunction with it discussion, in which one throws the ball to the other and a perennially creative growth and deepening of consciousness takes place through generations. To every position there was the counterposition. On the whole, everything remained open. Insecurity became conscious. An unparalleled disquiet took possession of man. The world seemed to consciousness to be growing more and more chaotic.

In the end, the collapse took place. From about 200 B.C. onwards great political and spiritual unifications and dogmatic configurations held the field. The Axial Period ended with the formation of great States, which forcibly realised this unity (the unified Chinese Empire of Tsin-Shi-Hwang-Ti, the Maurya dynasty in India, the Roman Empire). These great change-overs from the multiplicity of States to universal empires — world empires in the sense that they embraced the whole of the world process known at the time in the three regions, which at that period were almost completely ignorant of one another — took place simultaneously. The metamorphosis was everywhere remarkable: the free conflict of spirits seems to have come to a standstill. The result was a loss of consciousness. Only a few suitable intellectual possibilities and spiritual figures from the bygone Axial Period were seized upon to impart spiritual community, lustre and concordance to the new State authorities. The imperial idea was realised in forms founded on religion. There arose spiritually stable, long-enduring periods of great empires, attended by a levelling down to mass culture and by the sublime, but unfree, spirituality of conservative aristocracies. It is as though the world fell into a centuries-long sleep, accompanied by the absolute authority of great systems and mummifications.

Universal empires are widely extended empires. Such empires are, for the vast majority of their peoples foreign dominations, in contrast to the Greek City States and limited, self-governing tribal and national communities. The latter's self-government rested on active participation in political thought and action in the aristocratic form of democracy as it existed, in a different shape, in Athens and Rome. This democracy vanished with the transition to the equalling pseudo-democracy of extensive empires (to a great extent in Athens with the end of Pericles, totally in Rome with the transition to Caesarism). Where participation in political activity finally gave way to mere obedience and subjection, all sovereignty *per se* became foreign domination to the consciousness of the individual, at least for the greater part of the population of the empire.

Hence a profound transformation of man accompanied the transformation of his conditions into those of extended empires. Political impotence altered consciousness and life. Despotic forces, which seemed to be inseparable from the extended empire, threw the individual back upon himself, isolated him, levelled him down. Where no real share in responsibility and no intervention in the whole were possible, all were slaves. This slavery was veiled by figures of speech and sham contrivances from the free past. There was hardly ever so much talk of Greek liberty, which was again and again guaranteed by the victory as when it was finally destroyed in favour of an imperial régime. That which took place in men who asserted their existence in community, to the accompaniment of a continual outer and inner fight for a better order, from out of the existing *de facto* orders in the Greek City States, was now lost. Something quite different then constituted a bond between the powerless: membership of a divine kingdom, belief in resurrection and redemption (the Christians). On the other hand, there developed magnificently in the rulers (the Romans) an all-embracing consciousness of responsible guidance of the State in the universal interests of mankind, a high art of government, of the construction of a world-spanning authority.

The analogy may, perhaps, cast some light on our future, despite the fact that this will look quite different. It is, at the same time, a warning for all who desire the liberty of man.

What will unity look like? If the first termination of the present development, which may not be so very far off is the World State, this may appear either as an empire won by conquest and subject to a unified rule (perhaps in the form of a government which is in actual fact centralised, but which recognises the sham sovereignty of many States), or — the outcome of agreement and treaty — as a world government of united States which have renounced their individual sovereignty in favour of the sovereignty of mankind, that is seeking way with legal order as the sovereign authority.

Motives on this passage to world unity are, for one thing, the will to power, which is no less alive today than at any other time, and which knows no bounds until it has subjugated everything, and, for another amongst powers none of which dare risk a decision by force in view of the monstrous perils, the great planetary distress that presses toward agreement — and above both these, the idea of human solidarity.

All the phenomena of the present have the appearance of a preparatory struggle for the points of departure of the final battle for the planetary order. Contemporary world politics are seeking a basis for the ultimate settlement, whether this is to be reached by military or peaceful means. Until this has been achieved, all conditions and power relationships are temporary. Hence the present appears as a transition to this final planetary order, even if the exact opposite develops first: e.g. the radical interruption of communication on earth for the majority of people by totalitarian régimes. We shall now proceed to a more detailed analysis of the tendencies which are leading out of this transition period into the future.

World empire or world order.

The question is, along what path will the unitary world order be attained. It might take place along the desperate road of force, as, in the words of Bismarck, the unity of Germany could be achieved only by 'blood and iron'. Or it might take place through an order arising by negotiation out of maturing understanding in mutuality, in the same way as, in the eighteenth century, the States of North America found their way to union at the cost of abrogating an essential part of their particular sovereignty in favour of the sovereignty of the whole.

The shape of the order would, in the first case, be the static peace of despotism, in the second case, a peaceful community of all subject to transmutation in perennial democratic unrest and self-rectification. Reducing the possibilities to a simple antithesis, therefore, the issue is between the path to world empire or the path to world order.

World empire. This is world peace through a single power, which coerces all from one point on the earth. It maintains itself by the use of force. It moulds the levelled masses by terror and total planning. A uniform world view is forced upon all, in simple outlines, by propaganda. Censorship and direction of spiritual activity compel the latter to play its part in the plan of the moment, which may be modified at any time.

World order. This is unity without unifying force other than that afforded by common decision in negotiation. Orders agreed upon can

only be altered along the legally fixed path by new decisions. The supremacy of this procedure and of majority decisions has been accepted in common; it guarantees the common rights of all, which also protect those who are for the time being in a minority; these rights remain an order of mankind in movement and self-rectification.

The enslavement of all from one point stands in contrast to the order of all attendant upon renunciation by each single State of absolute sovereignty. Hence the road to world order leads via the voluntary renunciation of those with power as a precondition of liberty.

Where a sovereignty remains which is not that of mankind as a whole, there also remains a source of unfreedom; for it must assert itself by force against force. The organisation of force, however, conquest and empire-building by conquest lead to dictatorship, even if the starting-point was free democracy. So it happened in Rome in the transition from the Republic to Caesarism. So the French Revolution changed into the dictatorship of Napoleon. Democracy that conquers abandons itself Democracy that lives on good terms with others lays the foundations for the union of all with equal rights. The demand for full sovereignty is rooted in the energy of self-assertion destitute of communication. In the age of absolutism, when the concept of sovereignty was defined, the consequences were ruthlessly made conscious in word and deed.

Where the right of veto remains in decision by vote taken in common by the great powers the claim to absolute sovereignty is maintained. If men assemble with peace, which is unconditionally desired by all, as their aim, they will be bound by agreement to accept the decision of the majority. There remains the possibility of further work to convince the rest that the decision was wrong and to have it rescinded by a fresh decision. Neither veto nor force is permissible however.

The motives for renouncing veto and sovereignty spring from the humaneness that desires peace — shrewd foresight that sees one's own power coming to grief unless there is unison with all the rest — the prospect of losing so much in a war, even in the event of victory, that this disaster outweighs everything else — the pleasure of mutual acceptance in spiritual conflict and the building up of the world — pleasure in life with men of equal status, and unpleasure in dominion over the vanquished and over slaves.

World order, with the abolition of absolute sovereignty, would mean the abolition of the old concept of the State in favour of mankind. The outcome would not be a World State (that would be a world empire), but an order, perennially re-established in negotiation and decision, of States

governing themselves within legally restricted domains: an all-embracing federalism.

World order would be the continuation and universalisation of internal political freedom. Both are possible only through restriction of the political order to questions of existence. On the plane of existence, the issue is not the development, moulding and fulfilment of humanity in toto, but that which is or may be common to all men by nature, that which links men together above all diversities, above divergences of faith and world view — that which is universally human.

Natural law has, since early times sought to give prominence to the common bond. It is the foundation of the rights of man, and in world order would erect an authority that would also protect the individual person from acts of violence on the part of his State, through the possibility of effective legal action under the sovereignty of mankind.

It is possible to evolve principles which are judicious for man as man (such as Kant's principle of perpetual peace). The concepts of the right of self-determination, equality of rights, the sovereignty of the State, retain their relative, but lose their absolute significance. The total State and total war can be demonstrated as contradictory to natural law; because in them the means and prerequisites of humanity become the final goal, or because through absolutisation of the means the meaning of the whole, the right of man, is destroyed.

Natural law is confined to the ordering of existence. Its end purpose is always a relative one, that of the ordering of existence, but from the motive of the absolute end-purpose of authentic and complete humanity in the world.

The age of world unity cannot be adumbrated in advance, however fervent our interest in it may be. It is perhaps possible, however, to discuss the possibilities and limits of what will be:

1) All happening will now be *from 'within'*. It will no longer be possible for any foreign powers, any barbarian peoples, such as have always existed for the universal empires of the past, to break in from outside. There will be neither *limes* nor Chinese wall (except that during the transition period the major areas will be divided off against one another). World unity will be single, all-embracing, enclosed, and hence not directly comparable to earlier empires.

If there is no further menace from without, there will no longer be a foreign policy, there will be no further need to adjust the order to the needs of defence against outside attack. The maxim of the primacy of foreign over domestic policy will have lost its meaning, as the validity of this

maxim always has diminished when the threat from without was slight (for instance in England), and in the times of the great empires, at least for short periods (in Rome and in China).

The whole of production can be for the benefit of existence, and not of military destruction.

The necessary interconnexion between military organisation (against a threat from without or for purposes of conquest), total planning, force and unfreedom will break down. There remains, however, the possibility of the same interconnexion in a State based on terror and playing the role of a world empire. In the event of a general disintegration of human life, however, and of hidden anarchy, the whole will not, as heretofore, be galvanised into activity by a threat from without.

2) A coming world order could not arise as a finished whole, but in numerous gradations of freedom. There will be stages in the evolution of the order. That which holds all men together as their common concern may be confined to a few factors, but it must under all circumstances take sovereignty away from all in favour of one comprehensive sovereignty. This sovereignty can be restricted to the elementary power-problems — the military, the police, the creation of laws — and in this sovereignty the whole of mankind can participate by voting and collaboration.

The order of human life, however would be much richer than the all-embracing legality of mankind. What it will be like in universal peace must depend upon the various orders with their origins in history; the manifold pattern of life will be determined by the remoulding imposed upon it by technological conditions.

Restricted orders on the way to this final world order will become points of departure for the formation of a public spirit of mankind based on ethical considerations.

All this will take place only in the absence of total planning — if the sole plan consists of the laws and agreements that are valid for all — in a free market economy that is still decisive in essential domains — in free competition and in the rivalry of the spirit, in free intercourse, especially in the realm of the spirit.

3) The metamorphoses that will overtake the soul and spirit of man in a *world empire*, as opposed to a world order, can be conjectured by analogy with the Roman and Chinese Empires. An unparalleled levelling down of humanity is probable, an ant's life in empty industriousness a stiffening and desiccation of the spirit, a conservation in hierarchies of power through authority that is losing all trace of spirit. Yet these perils cannot become absolute in man. In imperial world unity there will be new

modes of movement, fresh possibilities of individuation, of revolution, of the bursting apart of the whole into new parts, which will once again be in conflict with one another.

4) Is a legal world order through a political form and a binding ethos possible to mankind at all? This question can only be answered in the future, by ages of fulfilment that have enjoyed peace and creativeness for a time in great orders. To seek to anticipate it would mean to create it out of thought. That is impossible. The expectation that primordial truth will play a part in the reality of the new world order tells us nothing about the content of this new order. For the common ethos which will in the future become the public property of mankind cannot arise in the re-establishment of vanished realities, but must consist of unpredictable constructions kindled afresh from the contents of the old.

The question of whether a world order based on converse and joint decision, as the precondition and consequence of liberty, is possible must be answered by saying that it has never before existed. This is no contra-indication of its possibility, however. It is analogous to the evolution of bourgeois liberty in a democratic order, to that conquest of force by law and justice, which, although seldom and never more than imperfectly, has nonetheless in fact been successful in exceptional instances. That which happened in circumscribed States, and therefore became real at some point, is not, in principle, impossible to mankind as a whole. But even if the idea is easily grasped, its realisation is immensely difficult, so difficult that there will always be many who are disposed to consider it impossible.

In any case, the way leads historically *via* the *de facto* political powers.

The political powers.

1) The road to world order runs solely *via the sovereign States*, whose forces are organised for immediate military action in the event of conflict. The manner in which they escape from this state of tension, through negotiation or war, and find their way to one another, will decide the destiny of mankind.

A picture of the States as they actually are will give us a picture of the political situation of the world. There are the Great Powers — America and Russia — then the allied European nations, then the neutrals, and then, in stages, the vanquished. The complete powerlessness of the latter corresponds to the complete sovereignty possessed by the first alone. In between lie those who are autonomous, but yet more or less dependent

and not infrequently compelled to make their decisions at a sign from the Great Powers.

Looking at the situation as a whole, it is obvious that the day of national States is over. The world powers of today comprise several nations. The nation, in the sense of the European peoples, is too small to be a world power as such.

The issue today is the fashion in which nations come together to constitute a world power: whether they are subjugated by one nation, or whether they find their way to each other as living nations of equal status in a community of States, to which they have sacrificed their particular sovereignty. This community of States may in turn call itself a nation, out of a political principle of the life of the State and of society, in which the members of several different peoples find their way to each other. The meaning of national consciousness has been transformed from an ethnic to a political one, from something naturally given to a spiritual principle. Yet today, by virtue of the survival of spectres from the past, there is still, and even increased, talk of nationalism, whereas has already ceased to be a factor in politically decisive events.

Alongside the existing Great Powers of today, which industrial development has made mighty, there are the powers of the future; above all, China, which through its raw materials, human masses, aptitudes, cultural heritage and geographical position may perhaps become a key to political events at a not too distant date; in addition, there is India, which like a separate continent, on the fundament of a unique spiritual heritage handed down by its various peoples, presents the possibility of a power developing which, despite all movements of liberation, is still in fact slumbering there.

Seen within the totality of history, the two most powerful contemporary States, America and Russia, are historically quite young formations. It is true that the culture that took thousands of years to evolve has become theirs. But it is like something thrust upon them from without. Christianity came to Russia, Europe is spiritually present in America. Both America and Russia, however, measured against the primordial world-creating cultures, are characterised by a lack of roots and thereby, simultaneously, by a magnificent open-mindedness. To look at them is singularly instructive and liberating for us, but also frightening. It is only to us in Europe that our cultural heritage is exclusively valuable, as, in a different fashion, their heritage is to the Chinese and Indians. To us and to them, in every situation, it gives a feeling of provenance, security and demand upon ourselves. By contrast, it is astonishing how those who are

today the mighty of this earth are often oppressed by a slight feeling of inferiority, which they veil in a peculiar childishness and in the anger of their demands.

To see through the manner in which the play of political forces takes place, changes with the manoeuvres of the States in the confused maze of the chances of power, and how, nonetheless, certain great basic trends are preserved, would be of the greatest interest. For intellectual ideas of political order will come to realisation only on the road via the power that is to be won in this interplay of forces.

In the foreground of everyday life there is a great deal that looks fortuitous. Harm is wrought by everything that stands in opposition to organisation in larger contexts; such, for instance, as national claims that are made absolute, all particular artifices intended to gain special advantage for oneself, all attempts to play the Great Powers off one against the other in the hope of profiting by it.

2) The whole population of the globe, more than two thousand million people in all, is drawn into the interplay of these powers. But guidance and decision is in the hands of the peoples who, comparatively, constitute no more than an infinitesimal fraction of this total mass. The majority is passive.

There is a *primal distribution of the world* which has existed since the dawn of history. Only once since the sixteenth century has this primal distribution been changed on a grand scale in relation to large areas that were unpopulated or settled by primitive peoples incapable of resistance. The white race took possession of the regions of America, Australia and Northern Asia as far as the Pacific Ocean. This established a new distribution of the earth.

A coming world federation will have to start from this distribution of the world as a reality, if the road to a forcible world order is to be avoided. On the path of violence the extermination of peoples, deportations, the annihilation of whole races, and thereby the negation of humanity, seem possible. It will not be possible for the Europeans permanently to dominate, or even merely to guide, the great human masses of China and India, which have stood firm, nor the peoples of the Near East. The prodigious difficulty is, however, that all these population masses must first reach the political maturity which will render them capable of emerging from the estate of violence into that of mutual agreement, and of grasping the nature of political freedom as a life-form.

These mighty, but still largely passive powers give rise to the question: Will the peoples conscious of liberty, numbering at most a few hundred millions, be able to bring conviction to the spirits of more than two thousand million others and enter with them into a free, legal world community?

3) The road to world unity *from a few historical origins* and from a quantitatively infinitesimal minority of man. World order springs from the same motives as the order of bourgeois society. Since bourgeois liberty was won at only a few places on the earth in historical processes unique to each, and since these constitute, as it were, the school of political liberty, the world will have to accomplish on a large scale what was there exemplified on a small one.

The classical development of political freedom, which gives at least an orientation to all and is for many exemplary, occurred not more than seven hundred years ago in England. On this spiritual-political fundament, liberty was created afresh in America. Within a very small area Switzerland realized this freedom in its federalism, which may appear like a model of possible European and world unity.

Today political freedom has almost disappeared amongst the defeated peoples. Here it had already been destroyed when the apparatus of a terrorist order declared that it was defending it.

The road to world order leads via the awakening and self-understanding of political liberty in as many countries as possible. This situation is without analogy in the conditions of transition to earlier world empires after the Axial Period. The idea and the task were scarcely conscious at that time; the reality of free States did not exist amongst the powers that were coming to sovereignty.

World order today, if it is realised at all, will start from the federalism of the States which are already free. It will be successful only if it exercises a sufficiently strong attraction to lead others to follow it out of conviction, and peacefully to join in with the world order which brings liberty, wealth and spiritual creativeness, the potentiality of humanity in its plenitude and multiformity.

4) If the unity of the earth is forced upon us by communications, a crucial factor will be the *sense of the earth and of power* imparted by the perspectives of travel.

For centuries England, through its domination of the ocean, saw the world from the sea as coasts which all lay as though enclosed within the private empire of dominion over the waves.

Today air-traffic has been added; although it is not yet equal to sea-traffic in its performance in transporting goods and travellers, nevertheless such an important extension that, to the politically seeing eye, the

world becomes a whole from the air as well.

Power on the water and in the air seems more essential to the unity of the earth than power on land, even though in the last resort the latter must everywhere accompany the final act of decision on war.

The omnipresence of the legally directed world police would probably be most rapidly and safely implemented in the air.

The perils on the road to world order.

Before the constitution of a dependable world order, there lies the transition period, which is full of perils. To be sure, all human existence is at all times a transition. But now the very foundations of humanity are tottering, the elementary groundwork of the future must be laid down.

We should like to be able to characterise this transition period that lies before us. It is our immediate future, whereas everything that will begin with world order or world empire will take place only in succession to it.

World order cannot be realised directly. Hence the nugatoriness of the enthusiasm, the invective, the projects, which are supposed to contribute immediately to its achievement, as though they represented the philosopher's stone.

Much more clearly than world order itself, we can see the perils that threaten on the way thither. Every peril bears within itself, through the fact that it is known, an element of surmountability. In human affairs there is no intrinsically mortal danger, if man can be free in accordance with his nature.

1) *Impatience*: The road will reach its destination only if the active participants are possessed of infinite patience.

It is fatal, in the desire to force through that which one has recognised as right, to let failure cause one to refuse further collaboration, obstinately to break off converse, and to have recourse to violence or the preparation of violence.

The momentary supremacy of the one who holds the trump card, threatens force, or blackmails, proves in the long run to be weakness and is in any case to blame for the lengthening or blocking of the road. The exceptionally difficult task is, without becoming weak, not to forget force when confronted by force, but to postpone its use until the very last moment. For the responsible statesman there is no prestige reason for the use of force, no reason for a preventive war, no reason for breaking off negotiations. In every situation there remains human speech — until one party possessing sufficient force to do so, breaks off and is now a criminal

in the measure in which all the rest had, and still have, patience.

It is impossible to assess what will, in the future, aid this process and what will hinder it. Situations continually change. The attempt must not be abandoned, even in relation to the malevolent and underhand. Intolerance must be patiently led to tolerance. We must relegate to the final stage the goal of rendering all force harmless as criminality by means of the one legal force of humanity. Until then the possessor of great force (the magnitude of which alone distinguishes him from the criminal, if he makes use of it) must be treated with the circumspection and patience that may win his friendship. If this is to succeed at all, it can do so only if the rest remain calm and do not throw away the slightest opportunity for reconciliation.

An example of the fact that the craving after immediate realisation of the right may be a mistake is perhaps provided by the following: The right of veto is in itself an evil. But its abolition would presuppose that all the interested parties were ready, even in a serious instance, to bend their wills to the majority decision, that in their ethos they had really renounced sovereignty, in the same way as the citizens within a State. This calls for essential human community realised in every phase of intercourse. Before this has been attained, abolition of the right of veto would be fruitless. For if a Great Power were to oppose a majority decision and its execution, this would mean war.

It is stimulating to see how, in participation in political negotiations, in so far as they are made public, this patience finds a language, seeks paths, and evokes intercommunity again through repeated new flashes of inspiration. It is disheartening to see how, against all reason, ignoring all facts and motives, in perpetual disruption of converse, the sovereignty of the veto smashes what all the rest sought to build up.

And it is magnificent to see from a study of history — particularly the history of the English, Americans and Swiss — how man had patience, overcame himself and even in hatred, came to terms .with his opponent at the dictate of reason — and how ways were found of carrying out peaceably the revolutionary changes for which the times were ripe.

Patience, obduracy, steadfastness: these are indispensable to the politically active man. This patience consists in the ethical attitude that does not succumb to personal mortifications, that keeps the objective whole always in view, that appraises and distinguishes the essential from the inessential. It consists in the watchfulness that remains undiminished in waiting and in apparent fruitlessness: comparable to the huntsman at his station, who waits for hours but at the instant when the fox leaps across

the woodland path, has to raise his gun, take aim, and fire in the fraction of a second. This untiring alertness that misses nothing and is watchful, not for one single thing, as for a wild animal, but for all unforeseeable favourable opportunities, is indispensable to the active statesman. The great danger to human activity lies in impatience, exhaustion and the climate of fruitlessness.

2) *Once a dictatorship has been set up it cannot be got rid of again from within*: Germany and Italy were set free from without. All attempts from within came to grief. This might be a coincidence. But if we call to mind the way in which a terrorist régime operates with the means of total planning and bureaucracy, it becomes evident how fundamentally insurmountable is he machine that maintains itself almost automatically, and in which everything that appears to oppose it from within is obliterated. The means of modern technology give the *de facto* ruler a tremendous preponderance of power, if he makes ruthless use of all the means at his disposal. There is just as little chance of overthrowing such a régime as there is of the inmates of a penitentiary overthrowing the governor and his staff. The machine reaches the peak of impregnability when the terror includes all, in such a manner that those who do not wish it become terrorised terrorists, killing in order not to be killed themselves.

Hitherto such despotic terrorist régimes were local. Thus they could be annihilated from without, if not from within. If, however, the peoples should fail to absorb this into their consciousness and into their concern for the future, if they should all slip unawares into such a dictatorship in the shape of a world dictatorship, there would be no further prospect of liberation. The danger of this state of affairs coming about is all the more acute when people feel safe from it and suppose, for example, that only the servile Germans could find themselves in such a situation. If the same fate befills the rest of the world, there will be no more outside. The rigidification of the whole in total planning, stabilised by terror, would annihilate liberty and mean the road to increasing ruin for all.

3) *The danger of absolute destruction*: On the road to the order of the World State events might take place which, before the goal had been reached, might inflict such destruction upon mankind that we can hardly imagine the continuation of history. A miserable remnant would be left living scattered over the surface of the earth, to start all over again as thousands of years ago. The links between men would have been torn apart, technology would be at an end and life dependent upon the local possibilities of the moment, which would just suffice to maintain it in extreme want to the accompaniment of exhausting effort demanding vital

force and youthfulness. This end would arise if a war resulted in the demolition of the structure of technology, if raw materials were used up without the discovery of a substitute, if war did not cease but crumbled, as it were, into more and more circumscribed local hostilities — a state of perpetual warfare such as existed prior to history.

The meaning of warfare has undergone a metamorphosis in the course of history. There were wars that were the chivalrous sport of aristocrats and conducted according to the rules of the game. There were wars whose purpose was the decision of a question, and which came to a timely end before all organisable forces had been thrown in. There were wars of extermination.

There were civil wars and ministerial wars between nations, which nevertheless retained some sort of solidarity, through the fact that both parties were European. There were more pitiless wars between cultures and religions alien to one another.

Today war seems transformed by the extent of its means the magnitude of its consequences. It has acquired a different meaning:

1. All the most extreme elements foreshadowed during historical epochs seem to have combined to such a degree that there are absolutely no moderating tendencies left in war. Hitler Germany was the first country in the Age of Technology to embark in principle on the path which the rest then followed of necessity. Now we are threatened by a war which the Age of Technology and the abolition of all restraints will make so different that extermination and deportations, which to a certain extent also occurred in earlier times — with the Assyrians and the Mongols — do not suffice to characterise the disaster.

This uncontrolled totality of war, with no moderation of its means, is due in part to the interrelationship between total planning and war. The one lends impetus to the other. Power that seeks to reach absolute ascendancy is bound to tend toward total planning. Since, however, this reduces economic prosperity, there comes a point at which the optimum of armament has been reached. War is forced on the country by its inner development, which, with the continuance of peace, would lead to its growing weaker.

In the long run wealth, progress and vigour are attendant upon liberty; for a short time, however, and transitorily, supremacy comes with total planning and terrorist force, with its organisation of all the energies of a population for the destructive gamble, into which everything is thrown without reservation.

The way of the world seems to lead to such catastrophes, whose

consequences in anarchy and misery beggar description. The only salvation is a world order based on the rule of law and possessing the power to preserve peace, by meeting every act of violence with superior force that robs it of all chance of success, and by punishing it as a crime.

2. If war cannot be avoided, the crucial thing for world history is what manner of men emerge victorious; whether they are the representatives of naked force, or a human type that lives by the spirit and by the principle of freedom. The factor that will decide the issue of war is technology. And here we come face to face with an ominous fact: Technology can be used by everyone. Not everyone can discover it but once it has been discovered even primitive peoples can learn its ways, can learn to serve machines, to fly aeroplanes and drive tanks. Hence technology in the hands of the peoples which did not invent it, becomes an immense danger to the spiritually creative peoples. If it comes to war, the only chance is that the inventive peoples will gain the military advantage by means of new inventions.

It is true that decisions on the nature of the new world order will not be wrested from the struggle of spirits alone. If, however, decisions are reached on the way to this new order through the agency of technology, which, at the last moment, is carried to fresh heights by free, creative spirits, its victory might be of spiritual significance also. What will to free order prevails in the warring powers might, through this new order, lead simultaneously to liberation for the world, if the sense of freedom is assimilated by men who are becoming more and more awakened, while, at the same time, it is fostered by the victors themselves.

3. In the shape of the atom bomb as a means of destruction, technology opens up a completely different vista. Today everyone is aware of the threat to human life represented by the atom bomb. On its account there must be no more war. It becomes a motive — though up to now only a weak one — for the preservation of peace, because of the immense danger with which this kind of war threatens everyone.

In very truth, technology may cause destruction on a scale which it is still impossible to predict. If it is reproached with having set free the elemental and brought it to destructive effectiveness, this has been its nature since the beginning, then man learnt to kindle fire. Today the Promethean idea does not bring with it anything new in principle, but quantitatively it increases the peril beyond all measure, to the point at which we contemplate the possibility of pulverising the globe in space — with which the Promethean idea becomes something qualitatively different as well.

With the atom bomb, a piece of solar substance has been brought to the earth. The same thing happens to it on the surface of the earth which has hitherto happened only in the sun.

Up to the present, the application of nuclear chain reactions has been confined to those substances extracted with great difficulty from uranium ores. The fear that this type of atomic fission might spread to other elements, to matter itself as fire spreads to all inflammable material, is stated by physicists to be groundless. Nevertheless, there is no certain limit valid for all time.

Giving oneself up to the play of fantasy it is possible to imagine: it is uncertain beyond what dividing-line the explosion will lay hold on further elements and terrestrial matter as a whole, like a conflagration. The whole globe would explode, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Then our solar system would be temporarily lit up, a *nova* would have appeared in space.

We can pose a singular question. Our history has lasted some six thousand years only. Why should this history occur just now, after the immeasurable ages of the universe and of the earth that have preceded it? Do not humans, or at all events, rational beings, exist anywhere else in the universe? Is it not the natural development of the spirit to extend its operations into the universe? Why have we not long since had news, through radiations, from the universe? Communications from rational beings infinitely further advanced in technology than ourselves? Can it be because all high technological development has so far led to the point at which the beings have brought about the destruction of their planet with the atomic bomb? Can some of the novae be end-effects of the activities of technological rational beings?

Is the prodigious task then to recognise the gravity of this danger, to take it really seriously, and to introduce a self-education of mankind which, despite the constant danger, will avert such an end? The peril can be overcome only if it is consciously seen, if its menace is consciously prevented and rendered impossible. This will only happen if the ethos of man is equal to the task. It is not to be accomplished technologically: man as such must become trustworthy in the preservation and effctiveness of the institutions he has created.

Or are we confronted by a necessity before which there is nothing left but capitulation — where sentimental visions and unreal demands become unworthy of man, because they deprive him of his veracity? No, and even if it had happened in the world a thousand times — which is in any case pure fantasy — each fresh instance would present afresh the task

of preventing the catastrophe, and that by means of every conceivable direct measure. Since, however, all such measures are unreliable in themselves, they require to be founded in the ethos and religion of all. In this way alone can the unconditional no to the atom bomb provide support for those measures which will be effectual only if they apply to everyone.

Anyone who regards the terrestrial catastrophe, whatever its nature, as inescapable, must see his life against this background. What is a life that must come to such an end?

All this is the play of ideas, however; its only meaning is to bring the factual danger into consciousness and to call up a vision of a world order based on the rule of law, which, in its all-decisive significance, evokes the whole earnestness of man.

Ideas opposed to the possibility of world order.

The idea of world order, this European idea, is disputed. It is supposed to be Utopian.

Men are supposed to be incapable of communal order. World order is supposed to be possible only through the power of an ordering dictator. The national-socialists' plan of subjugating Europe and then, with the combined force of Europe, of conquering the world, in order to Europeanise it, is supposed to have been good and workable as an ideal; only the bearers of the idea were evil.

This is not so. These basic ideas of contempt for man and of force, which, in the last resort, is always terrorist, are inseparably bound up with men of just this type.

But, the thesis goes on, the world dominion which will naturally arise out of the quantitative preponderance in territory, population and raw materials will, in the last analysis, be just as much a rule of force, as far as the less fortunate peoples are concerned, as a dictatorship. Along a seemingly peaceful road, certain men will enforce their will on all the rest through economic expansion.

This is an exaggeration if the situation is compared to the ruin of war. And it is a mistake to forget that there are, in principle, peaceful means of redressing injustices arising out of economic power. There is here, however, a real question for the success of true world order. Economic power must also be prepared to accept self-limitation under laws, and to subject itself to conditions; it too will have to serve the idea of world order, if the idea is to become a reality.

World order — the thesis continues — is not a goal at all. If it were

once stabilised, it would probably result in a totality of knowledge and valuation for all, a complacency, and an end of humanity, a new sleep of the spirit in the tranquillity of recollection that understands less and less, a state of fulfilment, a universality of that desired by all, while their consciousness diminishes and they undergo a metamorphosis into creatures that are hardly human any more.

All this might apply to the subjects of a world empire, if it lasted for hundreds and thousands of years. It certainly does not apply to world order. In the latter the elements of unrest remain. For it is never perfected; it is always in mutation. New decisions and enterprises are called for. The manner in which the position reached will give birth to fresh situations requiring mastery cannot be foretold. Discontent and insufficiency will seek a new break-through and upsurge.

World order — this thesis finally states — is impossible because of what man is and because of the situations in which, by the nature of the matter, agreement is out of the question, and decision by war — the 'appeal to heaven' — is inescapable. Man is inadequate. He falls short of what is required of him in possessiveness — in disregard of others — in the flight from order into confusion, and then into the spiritless struggle for power — in self-assertion through the breaking-off of communication with 'irreducible' demands — in the urge to destruction.

The idea of world order.

In opposition to all denials of the possibility of a just and legal world order of peace, observation of history and our own wills again and again gives rise to the question: Will this new order not one day become possible, this convergence of all into a realm of peace? The trail toward it was blazed at the very beginning, when men founded State communities for the creation of order among themselves. The only question was the size to be attained by these communities of peace, within which the settlement of conflicts by force became a crime and hence punishable. In such large communities there already prevailed, even if only for limited periods and under a constant threat, dependability and the outlook that sustains legal order. There is, in principle, no boundary to the endeavour to expand such a community, till it becomes the community of all men.

Hence the readiness to renunciation and compromise, to mutual sacrifice, to the self-limitation of power not only from considerations of advantage, but also from the recognition of justice, has been as perennial a feature of history as the urge to force. The greatest proclivity to such an

attitude was perhaps to be found in aristocratic, moderate, inwardly cultured men (like Solon); less in the average man, who is always disposed to consider himself right and the other in the wrong; none whatever in men of violence, who are not prepared to come to terms at all, but want to hit out.

In view of this human diversity, doubt will be justified: In world unity — whether it is a unity of world order or world empire — there will be no permanent calm, any more than within the State formations we have seen up to now. Jubilation at the attainment of *pax aeterna* will prove illusory. The forces of remoulding will assume fresh shapes.

In his finitude, man is left with basic instincts and resistances which render it improbable that we can expect a condition of the world in which the liberty of all is so integrated as to become an absolute power capable of finally exorcising everything that threatens freedom, including finite aspiration to power, finite interests, and self-will. We have rather to reckon that the wild passions will be re-established in new forms.

Above all however, there is an essential difference between what the individual can at any time become through his own agency, and what the community of political order can become in the course of history. The individual can become existence that is capable of finding its own eternal meaning in the manifestation of the epoch; the human group and mankind, however, can become an order that is a communal product of history only through generations and that gives scope to the potentialities and limitations of all individuals. But order only exists through the spirit with which individuals animate it and which gives individuals their stamp in the sequence of generations. All institutions are dependent upon men, who are individuals. The individual is here the crucial factor — in so far as it takes many or the majority of individuals to sustain the order — and yet, at the same time, as an individual, he is powerless.

The singular fragility of all orders, with the spirit that bears them, is reason enough to regard the future with uncertainty. Illusions and Utopias are certainly powerful factors in history, but not of the kind that create order for liberty and humanity. Rather it is of crucial importance to liberty that, in thinking out the possibility or impossibility of a world order, we should not lay down any picture of the future, any devised reality, as the goal toward which history is of necessity steering, which we ourselves assimilate as such into our fundamental wills and with the attainment of which history would be consummated. Never shall we find a fulfilment of history, save in every present as this presentness itself.

The limit of historical possibilities has its deep foundation in human-

ity. No perfect end-state can ever be attained in the human world, because man is a creature that constantly strives to thrust out beyond itself, and is not only imperfect, but imperfectible. A mankind which desired only to be itself would, in restricting itself to itself lose humanity.

In history, however, we may and must lay hold of ideas, if we want to gain a meaning for our life in community. Projects of perpetual peace, or of the prerequisites for perpetual peace, remain true, even if the idea is incapable of realisation as a concrete ideal, but remains rather an infinite task beyond the possibility of being fashioned into a reality. An idea can be brought into congruence neither with the anticipated image of a possible reality, nor with the reality itself, even though it is the meaning implicit in planning of it.

Its basis, however, is an inexplicable confidence, namely the certitude of faith that everything is not null and void, not merely a senseless chaos, a passing from nothing into nothing. The ideas that guide our passage through the world are revealed to this confidence. For this confidence, truth consists in the vision of Isaiah, in which the idea becomes a symbolic image, this vision of universal concord: 'And they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more'.

(Prefaced and edited by Nicoletta Mosconi)

NOTE

[1] At the beginning of the book from which this text is taken, Jaspers declares the necessity of replacing the Christian version of the history of the universe (which considers the coming of the Son of God as the axis of world history) with a less specific vision — one which could have a meaning for all men and women, and not simply for Christian worshippers. The research which he carried out to this end led him to propose as a new axis of world history the period around 500 B.C. — the central phase of a spiritual process unfolding between 800 and 200 B.C., during which mankind gained an awareness of himself, of his limitations and of his capabilities through speculative thought. This awareness developed simultaneously in China, India and the west. The period was termed 'Axial Period.' (NdC)

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

SATISH KUMAR, Chairperson of the Council of the World Federalist Movement, Professor in Diplomacy in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University of New Delhi (India).

NICOLETTA MOSCONI, Movimento Federalista Europeo, Pavia.

SERGIO PISTONE, Member of the Executive Bureau of the European Union of Federalists, Professor in History of European Integration, University of Turin.

FRANCESCO ROSSOLILLO, President of the European Union of Federalists.

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