


THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

Hamilton, The Federalist




YEAR XXXV, 1993, NUMBER 2

THE FEDERALIST

a political review

Editor: Mario Albertini

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



The Federalist is published under the auspices of the FONDAZIONE EUROPEA LUCIANO BOLIS by EDIF, via Porta Pertusi 6, 27100 Pavia, Italy. English language editing: David Riggs. Three issues a year. Subscription rates: Europe 30 ECU or 45000 lire; other countries (by air mail) 40 \$ or 60000 lire. A three-year subscription (80 ECU or 120000 lire, 100 \$ or 150000 lire respectively) is also possible. All payments should be made by cheque or Eurocheque directly to EDIF.

YEAR XXXV, 1993, NUMBER 2

CONTENTS

<i>Europe and the Crisis in Yugoslavia</i>	p.	57
FRANCESCO MAZZAFERRO, <i>European Citizenship and the New Rights for Union Citizens</i>	»	63
NOTES		
<i>European Citizenship, Cosmopolitan Citizenship and International Democracy</i> (Lucio Levi)	»	80
<i>The Formation (Elaboration?) of a Common Thought</i> (Nicoletta Mosconi)	»	87
INTERVENTIONS		
<i>Aspects of Transformation in the Russian Federation</i> (Igor Kossikov)	»	95
FEDERALIST ACTION		
<i>Movement, Party or Pressure Group?</i> (Sante Granelli)	»	106
<i>The Crisis in the EMS</i> (Mario Albertini)	»	119
FEDERALISM IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT		
<i>The Movimiento Pro Federación Americana</i> (Jean-Francis Billion)	»	123

Europe and the crisis in Yugoslavia

Unfortunately, there are no miracle solutions on offer today which would enable the atrocious events currently taking place in ex-Yugoslavia to be brought to a swift and decisive end. But this makes it no less important to try to establish the conditions and mistakes which provoked the civil war, and to sketch the outlines of a framework which can provide new cause for hope, and mobilise efforts towards the re-establishment of peace and civilised co-habitation in the region: a framework which has so far not been provided by European governments, the Community as a whole, or the United Nations.

The Yugoslav tragedy is a particularly savage and bloody episode in the confrontation which represents the great historical choice of our time: that between nationalism and federalism. It has been precisely the inability of the European Community's member-state governments, and the UN's Security Council, to view events in Yugoslavia in such terms that has deprived them of a means with which to interpret developments, and implement a policy capable of preventing the outbreak of war.

* * *

Following the death of Tito, the Yugoslav Federation was gradually weakened. The unanimity rule regarding the most important decisions in the Republican and Provincial Council (confirmed, moreover, by Art. 286 of the constitution) gave an increasingly pronounced confederal character to Yugoslavia's institutional structure. Even the League of Communists, which in the preceding period represented the effective bond which maintained the unity of the state, was transformed into a confederation of regional parties sensitive to nationalistic calls, and hence fundamentally incapable of taking decisions and gathering support in a pan-Yugoslav dimension. Nationalism made strides in the republics and provinces, emerging in a particularly acute form, initially, in the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo, and in Slovenia's separatist urges.

The situation was further exacerbated by two factors: the polarisation between the wealthy republics of the north-west and the less-developed (or outright poor) ones of the centre and south; and the religious basis of the various ethnic identities. Lastly, the old political class, committed to the concept of Yugoslav unity, was progressively replaced by a new generation which regarded nationalism as the most effective means to drum up support and increase its own power.

This trend became clearly more pronounced during the 1980's, due to a serious economic crisis and the loss of the Federation's international prestige, which it had previously enjoyed by virtue of being one of the main leaders of the group of non-aligned countries.

* * *

Nevertheless, this is but one aspect of Yugoslavia in the wake of Tito. In reality, there remained important factors working in favour of cohesion in Yugoslavia in the 1980's. There existed an internal market, which absorbed the greater part of Yugoslav industrial production. There existed in large swathes of the population, and among many politicians and intellectuals, a Yugoslav patriotism, which operated without conflict alongside that for the individual ethnic groups (it is important not to forget that nationalism made its debut in this part of Europe at the end of the 19th century in the form of Serbo-Croat nationalism). The intermingling of population groups, further enhanced by internal migration, created forms of peaceful and tolerant co-habitation which had their symbolic expression in Sarajevo, where even today "ethnic" Serb, Croat and Muslim men and women struggle side by side against the savagery of ethnic cleansing. Mixed marriages were common (47 percent in Sarajevo according to the most recent statistics available), and from these unions were born children who considered, and still consider, their Yugoslav identity as their only real one. Moreover, if a strong Yugoslav patriotism had not existed in large sections of the population, the current nationalist regimes in Serbia and Croatia would not have needed, in an effort to make their policies acceptable to public opinion, to proceed with those radical purges in the mass media which are now starting to come to light. Finally, it should not be forgotten that in Yugoslavia, before the crisis broke, democratisation, openness to the West and interest in the Community were far more advanced and well-established than in any other East European country.

* * *

Hence, when the disintegration of the communist regimes began, Yugoslavia's destiny could not be considered decided. It largely depended on the evolution of the international context, and in particular on the attitude of the countries of the European Community. Had they been more aware, and had they conducted a clear policy of close association between Yugoslavia and the Community with a view to future membership, dependent on the specific condition that the country continued down the path of democratisation and retained the unity of its state structure, then the Slovenian secession (which represents the origin of the civil war, and was motivated by the desire of the richest republic to join Europe within a short space of time, without the dead weight of its ties to the rest of the federation) would have been discouraged, and the forces for unity and democracy would have prevailed over those for division, fascism and national-communism.

But the Community proved unable to maintain a decisive and coherent stance in relation to Yugoslavia since it did not exist as a political entity. Each of its member states carried out its *own* foreign policy, supporting one or other of the republics (and hence encouraging nationalism) according to their real or supposed interests, thus causing tension to rise. Moreover, the Community lacked the authority to impose a multinational federal state model outside its own borders which so far it has been unable to achieve internally. The reality in the current confederal context is that member states continue to base their by now vanishing legitimacy on the national principle. Their governments have hence seen themselves forced to recognise the legitimacy of the secessionist republics, which called on the national idea to justify their claims to sovereignty. In this way they have allowed themselves to fall into the trap of the so-called right of peoples to self-determination, a principle which, in as much as it justifies all claims to secession, is ill-fated in any social-historical context, but which has had particularly devastating consequences in a region such as Yugoslavia that features an inextricable ethnic tangle. Hence by uncritically recognising that Yugoslavia could be legitimately dismembered by virtue of applying the principle of the conjunction of state and nation, they have given implicit endorsement to the savage practice of ethnic cleansing that they now condemn (albeit while "realistically" accepting it as a fact).

* * *

It is worth recalling that Community governments, in the name of *Realpolitik*, have evoked a spectre that risks endangering their own

stability. Nowadays, national states, overtaken by history since unable to respond to their own citizens' demands for peace, democratic participation and justice, are in irreversible decline. The national idea has for some time now ceased to be the expression of a movement to enlarge the sphere of the state and break down the last barriers left over from feudal Europe, and hence to promote human emancipation. Rather, since it has not been replaced by a more advanced principle of legitimacy, it has remained entrenched in the collective conscience as an idea legitimising tribalism, violence and disintegration. The western European states are not immune to this disease, and the weakest of them are already in their turn being undermined by the rise of new regional-size "nations." Their cynical and short-sighted policy with regard to the Yugoslav tragedy has in this way been turned against themselves.

* * *

The civil war in ex-Yugoslavia will end when the tribal hatreds which feed it are subdued and when an entirely new political class replaces the bands of assassins and gangs of profiteers who are currently prevailing. No plan to re-organise Bosnia and no outside military intervention will ever be able to achieve this goal in the absence of a far-reaching political design. Clearly this does not mean that the involvement of the blue helmets to protect peoples threatened with destruction, or the often heroic efforts of innumerable voluntary groups to alleviate the suffering of civilians through the provision of humanitarian aid does not merit the greatest respect. Nor that exhaustion, the calculations of the conflicting parties, or the efforts of international diplomacy can not gain for this tortured region periods of truce for varying lengths of time. But a new stable political order, which allows the re-establishment of peaceful co-habitation between the south-Slav populations and the regeneration of their economic and civil development in a climate of trust remains a distant and problematical aim. Anarchy brings rogues to power and corrupts the weak. It generates interests and power situations which, despite operating in a context of confusion and instability, possess an inertia that is difficult to overcome.

There remains the fact that ex-Yugoslavia is an integral part of the European context, and that hence a new peaceful and evolutionary balance will only be attainable (albeit with difficulty), if *in Europe* the movement towards unity prevails over that towards division. This responsibility falls particularly on the European Community and its

component states, since the Community is currently the subject presented with the historical opportunity of giving an initial realisation to *federalism* as a formula for the organisation of relationships between peoples on the basis of law and democracy. Only the birth of a strong federal nucleus in western Europe will provide the European Union with the capacity to act and the necessary moral weight to win the difficult battle against nationalism in the rest of the continent, particularly in ex-Yugoslavia, and to impose a new form of co-habitation, based on unity in diversity.

* * *

The Yugoslav question is not yet closed. The unity of the country has been destroyed, but its division has not yet been achieved. The Bosnian drama symbolises the larger issue of a country which has proved unable either to maintain its unity or to divide itself clearly and decisively. The existence of a European Federation that is strong and open on the borders of what used to be Yugoslavia, would breath new life and energy into that section of its people, and those of its intellectuals, who have condemned the partition of their country from the outset, and who continue to lay the blame for its ruin not on the "enemy," but on nationalism itself. The number of such men and women is impossible to calculate since they are condemned to silence by the din of war and by the persecution to which they are subjected, but they are undoubtedly much more numerous than is normally held to be the case, and, of particular significance, represent the better part of Yugoslavians. The federalists should help these men and women not to feel abandoned, should take such action as to let them know that their repugnance of nationalism and their hope to overcome it is shared by others, and that there exist people who struggle for a project with which they can identify.

This plan provides for the admission of a democratic Yugoslavia (in one step or by stages) into the European Federation, once it has re-established (or at least once consistent pressure exists for re-establishing) the country's unity on a federal basis. It is true that this project seems impossible in the current situation. But often in history the fiercest explosions of hatred have been followed by strong movements in favour of unity, due precisely to the revulsion which such experiences arouse. In any event, the fact that the accomplishment of a project seems unlikely can not, and should not, prevent us from stating and re-stating that it represents the only real solution to the problem.

There remains the fact that this plan can nevertheless only be effected

within the framework of European federal unification, and that *this* is the decisive historical stake. As long as Europe is divided, peace in Yugoslavia will remain a dream.

The Federalist

European citizenship and new rights for Union citizens

FRANCESCO MAZZAFERRO

European citizenship, a new political instrument for consolidating the Union after Maastricht.

The Maastricht Treaty introduces a new set of articles, grouped in a section entitled “Union citizenship,” into the founding charter of the European Community (and of the future Union). This section opens with Article 8, which announces the creation of Union citizenship and the fact that this citizenship is conferred on all member state nationals.

In the text itself the concepts of citizenship and nationality are overlapped and confused, revealing a traditional, and evidently not innovative, outlook as regards the attribution of political rights and duties. Under the Union’s new legal system, European citizenship is never recognised as being original, but instead derives without exception from an individual’s nationality — and automatically so. European citizenship can be acquired (or abandoned) only through the acquisition or loss of member-state nationality. The entry of a state into the Union confers European citizenship on all that state’s citizens, while the exit of a region from the Union (the Greenland referendum is a precedent) denies that region’s people their European citizenship, regardless of individual choice.

The Treaty establishes that Union citizens have the right to unrestricted movement and domicile in member states, albeit while conforming with the laws that member states must issue on this matter. The Treaty grants the right to vote in municipal elections to European citizens domiciled in a commune of a state other than the one in which they have national citizenship, but leaves the specific application of this to member states: a pan-European norm may be established, but only if member states are unanimously in favour and the European Parliament confirms it. In admittedly exceptional conditions European citizenship confers the right to diplomatic protection from any of the member states: European

citizens will be able to go to a consulate or embassy of another country of the Union, so long as their own member state is not represented in the vicinity. Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty introduces into the Treaties of Rome the right of petition to the European Parliament (already provided for in the Parliament's Rules of Procedure) and the services of an Ombudsman (a new departure). Finally it establishes that all subsequent rules regarding the judicial structure of the Union which in the future will add to the Treaty's citizenship provisions will only be decided by a unanimous verdict of the states, and will take the form of indirectly applicable directives. In this way a significant, built-in obstacle to upgrading the new legal framework is created.

A literal interpretation of the text, without attempting to assess possible developments beyond the framework of the Treaty while at the same time setting the new norms within the context of extant Community laws, makes the Treaty's articles seem at most a novelty in the sphere of announcements, but lacking immediate legal significance and political repercussions. In fact, Community law has already attributed a series of "fundamental" rights to member-state citizens — the famous four freedoms, the free movement of individuals, goods, services and capital — and the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, like those of Community legislation, can be directly applied by national judges.

But even principles have an undeniable value, presaging more important developments, and it is precisely this potential value of Union citizenship as an instrument for strengthening the existence of the Union and for furnishing it with new political content, that demands that attention (from the viewpoint of elaborating federalist thought) is given to this subject, which could otherwise be relegated — for its legal and technical aspects — to the lecture halls of law faculties. Yet the enemies of Europe in France and Great Britain have immediately attacked the rules contained in the new Treaty, claiming that the new citizenship instrument will damage the indigenous and exclusive nature of national citizenship, and will create a dangerous bridgehead for unspecified outrages against their compatriots. Most recently, Denmark, in an effort to improve the chances of its citizens voting yes in the second referendum on Maastricht, actually drew up an agreement with other member states to opt out of the obligation to grant its own citizens, and those from other countries, the benefits of Union citizenship.

Evidence that the mid-term effects of introducing European citizenship abound with more significant developments than what the letter of the Treaty provides has emerged from the fact that some member states —

for example France and Germany — have had to modify their constitutions in order to remove underlying potential contradictions which may have surfaced between domestic and Union legal practice.

European citizenship: a new type of citizenship.

If we look beyond the letter of the Treaty at the principles of federalist thought, it is reasonable to maintain that common citizenship will not be limited to offering a European version of current national legal institutions, but will be by nature innovative. Union citizenship is in fact the first model of a *democratic* and *cosmopolitan* citizenship.

In the past there have been numerous examples of citizenship with inherent cosmopolitan tendencies (consider citizenship in the Roman Empire following the edict of Caracalla, in the great 19th century multinational empires and in the Soviet Union in this century), but the attribution of democratic political rights in the full modern sense was never attached to these. Furthermore the most important examples of democratic citizenship in history are marked by their exclusively national character, which prevents foreigners from exercising political rights and even from enjoying some civil rights (consider the *citoyenneté* of the French revolution and that of the *Risorgimento* states of the 19th century, up to the modern constitutional citizenships of the post-war period in western Europe).

In comparison to traditional forms of citizenship, the European one is capable of adapting itself more comprehensively to the universal principles of modern democratic thought, to the idea that the attribution of rights should not be limited by language, religion, race or any of the other distinguishing characteristics of individuals. Indeed European citizenship has the natural, inherent vocation of not relying on an individual's national characteristics (exclusive and already existing and well-defined), nor on characteristics which are linked to the history of a single distinct community (common spiritual heritage, linguistic patrimony, settled residence of a population on a particular piece of territory). European citizenship cannot avoid being reconciled with the free exercise of an intention directed towards the future, with the firm commitment to adhere to an open model of civilised society that is characterised by common values enshrined in the European constitution.

It is precisely this aspect which makes the new union citizenship so similar to the American one, which contains (due to the large number of different ethnic groups and religions in the country, and the "immigrant"

origins of all citizens' ancestors) the most cosmopolitan content among modern democratic citizenships. North American citizenship is more an adherence to constitutional principles than an act acknowledging pre-existing characteristics; it is a declaration of intent for the future rather than a certificate of conformity with the past. Likewise European citizenship must be not simply open, but heading towards being universal. It should anticipate cosmopolitan citizenship in certain ways. As regards principles, it should even be possible for individuals who are prepared to declare their genuine adherence to the system of duties and rights (a civilised design of open society), as defined by the constitution, to acquire European citizenship.

The enormous amount of resources and space available (and the enormous moral dynamism of the pioneers) enabled the United States, until recently, to view their citizenship in unrestricted terms. The closure of American borders in recent decades has coincided with the crisis of US hegemony in the post-second World War period. Contrasting factors (limited space and resources, and the great power of nationalism) have prevented Europeans, with the exception of those states which had large imperial colonies such as France and Great Britain, from maintaining open borders and granting citizenship with similar generosity.

It is certainly difficult to imagine that with the existence of great demographic pressure throughout the world and a considerably unequal distribution of wealth between North and South, Europe can adopt an attitude as liberal as the US one was until the first half of the 20th century. The most recent developments in the citizenship debate (such as the new law recently approved by the French National Assembly) and even that relating solely to domicile rights (it is sufficient to recall the extremely long process to draw up new political asylum rules in Germany) are heading, perhaps even necessarily so, towards the introduction of controls and regulation of the access to rights that have previously been guaranteed with greater generosity. But the avoidance of Europeans becoming submerged under population flows from the world's poorest regions does not signify blocking all access to citizenship rights: it is necessary to control migratory flows, not to hinder the process of integration.

Hence at least four features should be integrated into the new European citizenship: 1) within the framework of a European immigration policy, it must be possible even for non-member state nationals to acquire European citizenship. By becoming European citizens, these people will then have the right to acquire the national citizenship of the member state in which they decide to take up residence (this turns the current system

on its head); 2) the acquisition of citizenship should be based on adherence to the constitution, that is to a system of values and organisation of social life; 3) all discrimination based on inherited citizenship should be rejected (thereby rejecting the *ius sanguinis*, which denies citizenship to immigrants' children, regardless of their birth, education and stable, settled presence in their host state); 4) acquired citizenship must in reality (and not only in principle) be compatible with the retention of other non-Community citizenships (dual citizenship).

Acquired rights and new rights under the union.

European citizenship as foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty groups together the inheritance of Community law, which does not recognise a "Community citizenship," but independently attributes to member-state citizens a series of prerogatives that increase their freedoms. Indeed without the European Community it would not be possible to explain the considerable freedom of movement which western Europeans enjoy in their continent, the equal opportunities that exist in many professional sectors and the guarantees of non-discrimination which they enjoy thanks to Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome. The new citizenship reinforces and fills out this framework, offering citizens categorically wider borders within which their equal opportunities are legally recognised.

Even nowadays, on the basis of the victories of Community law, European society can be presented as an open society, inspired by the principles of equal opportunity and considerable freedoms for its citizens. The varied nature of European society, characterised by language, traditions, legal forms, and different standards of organisation, offers Union citizens a wider choice, and presents them (at least in theory and given that they are fully aware of the opportunities available) with the option of choosing, alongside domicile, between the organisational structure of any member state or region. The mobility of human resources in the past assumed the dramatic connotation of emigration by the poor and dispossessed. Nowadays it can become a resource for all European citizens, who are offered the opportunity to organise their academic career, design their professional career, choose where to be cured or where to retire to, invest their savings, or conclude any type of contract within borders that are much larger than any single member state's.

In defence of the Union citizen (and not to the detriment of Community institutions) it is also necessary to interpret effectively the new basic principle of Community law inserted into the Maastricht Treaty,

subsidiarity: the obligation on the Union not to interfere in decisions that can be taken more effectively and with equal respect for non-discrimination at the closest level to the citizen himself, and hence in accord with the criterion of transparency.

If European citizens are granted rights and duties deriving from the Community's legal structure, the Maastricht Treaty no longer introduces "new right and duties" but rather expressly recalls (by means of a very vague formula) the constitutional tradition of member states. Even politically advanced documents such as the Oreja report on the European constitution, currently being drawn up by the European Parliament (consulted in the April 1993 version), despite comprehensively listing and categorising fundamental rights under the Union, do not provide any new information as regards the content of rights compared to those guaranteed by member states.

If however we look once again beyond the letter of the Treaty, it can be maintained that the Union will be unable to restrict itself to a recognition at a territorial level of a broader interpretation of rights than those already acquired in the member states. Instead it will be forced (even by subsequent amendments, as under the American constitutional formula) to sanction "new rights and duties." Indeed the Union itself represents a new fact, an altered situation compared to the past; placed moreover within the context of a level of development of civilised life which is more sophisticated and elaborate than the national one. Precisely for this reason it is inevitable that the Union recognise new rights for its citizens and at the same time oblige them to commit themselves to new duties.

The union, and multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society. The right to integrate, and the right to be different.

One of the most striking aspects in recent years has been the transformation of individual national societies from predominantly homogeneous communities to multi-ethnic ones, following immigration or other demographic group dynamics.

This transformation has taken place (in contrast to what occurred in the past in the US or in the intra-European migrations following the 1st World War) completely independently of the will of the societies receiving immigrants, and often even against the will of the immigrants themselves (this is the case for refugees, be they political or economic, and those seasonal immigrants who end up settling in Europe for lack of

an alternative in their native countries or due to the new ties which they create for themselves in Europe).

The arrival in historic European communities of new peoples, characterised by extreme poverty as well as by personal habits, religious beliefs, and social behaviour that are very different (and at times incompatible) creates manifold tensions. Such tensions do not always arise solely in the moment of the immigrants' arrival (it is sufficient to recall the ships of Albanians on the coast of the Adriatic), coalescing in feelings of fear, sometimes legitimate, on both sides, but tend to remain even after the first or second generation are permanently settled in a country, which unfortunately risks becoming the basis of fixed discrimination suffered from one generation to the next. One can consider the districts of Paris and Berlin where third-generation immigrants (often educated to the same standards as most of their contemporaries) still feel rejected, and moreover away from whom the French and German populations flee, because they feel relegated to the margins of life in these districts and unable to offer their children a settled future there.

The juxtaposition in the cities and regions of the Union of heterogeneous groups will be accentuated by the obligation of "intra-Community" society openness, determined by European integration. These same historic communities will be subjected to pressures and tensions deriving from the equalling of European citizens to national ones, and from the settlement of new groups, foreign to the Union, that must nevertheless be integrated. Faced with the tensions that are already surfacing in society it would be a mistake to ignore them or settle for simplistic options. All racist attitudes need to be rejected with utmost force. Yet an attitude of general legal acceptance, an indiscriminate openness to all the habits, traditions and social behaviour that co-habit in the cities, will generate considerable disquiet among citizens. It would be naive, and in many ways dangerous, to adopt the "pantheistic" attitude of the ancient Romans, who accepted all the divinities of defeated peoples into their religious universe (provided these were not monotheistic) so as to conserve social peace. Nevertheless it is necessary that a society which is open be ready to accept all the inputs that derive from the legitimate exercise of spiritual manifestations or from original ways of coping with day-to-day issues, when there exists in these features a universal content, one that is aimed at all mankind.

The Maastricht Treaty's proposed solution to the various requirements of integration and diversity is clearly insufficient: the Treaty categorically differentiates between the status of citizens from other member states

(who are on a par with national subjects) and those of non-European nationals (who are not considered equal). It ignores the problem of integrating non-European citizens, in whose regard it automatically applies the principle of subsidiarity, leaving the member states' constitutional terms and laws untouched; these differ greatly from one state to the next and only in a limited number of countries do they provide measures designed to ease the political inclusion and effective social integration of immigrants. On the contrary the Treaty states that the Union should coordinate the states' action as regards the erection of external barriers to entering the Union (visa policy, rules governing the right to political asylum) with the clear objective of closing borders and thereby reducing the influx from abroad. The Treaty's proposed solution makes the governments' embarrassment plain for all to see; they fear losing popularity if the same level of integration is offered to non-Community nationals as to Europeans (who are considered more similar and hence easier to assimilate fully).

If such reservations are understandable from the viewpoint of political decisions taken in the heat of the moment, since they reflect, unfortunately, the opinion of an important part of the population, in the medium term they reveal the weakness of the political planning which inspires them. If the nature of open society is to be preserved, the Union will in fact have to provide some European norms which lay down objectives and common guidelines, whose execution can be left to the states. The Union will have to codify both a judicial structure of integration and a series of norms that preserve the diversity and variety of society. The right to integration will entail certain duties for individual immigrants, even in the form of prohibiting certain behaviour. The right to cultural diversity will result in the duty of the Union and the states, and also of all citizens, not to interfere in certain expressions of people's individual characteristics.

The balance between integration and diversity (homogeneity and variegation) will mark the degree of openness in multi-cultural and multi-ethnic European societies. The alternation of European and national parliamentary majorities, just as changes in public opinion, will determine the characteristics of this balance.

Economic democracy and the single market.

With the 1985 Single Act, Community law has gained a series of basic rules aimed at enlarging the sphere of opportunities available to individual

citizens. As mentioned above, these greater liberties have been confirmed by Community legislation (for example, the free circulation of capital) and the Maastricht Treaty (with comprehensive *freedom of movement* and the *right of domicile* for EC nationals).

A further step towards guaranteeing the liberties of all European citizens will be achieved by the activation, albeit only gradually and subject to economic convergence targets, of the third phase of monetary Union. In that moment the purchasing power of citizens will be guaranteed throughout the Union's territory, without danger of it being eroded by internal (inflation) or external (devaluation) currency instability. Citizens will have then acquired the right to *monetary stability*.

However, liberalisation does not result solely in greater freedoms for individuals and more opportunities to exercise rights. The reality of increasingly integrated international economies (in which the fate of industrial areas and entire cities and regions is coming to depend on the strategies of industrial élites that are frequently very removed from the problems of industrial zones) must be counterbalanced by new and more elaborate forms of *economic democracy*.

Many problems are not new to Community law, which in fact has often played an avant-garde role compared to the more traditional and less innovative national structures. Consider for example *consumer protection*, the policies of *safeguarding the market*, aimed at guaranteeing its proper functioning (overseeing mergers, competition and public subsidies) and to defend it from speculators and raiders (coordinated oversight of cross-border financial groups, harmonisation of accounting criteria); the policies of *regional resource redistribution*, the *right of joint decision-making* in the workplace, introduced into the new statutes of European limited companies; and finally the European Social Charter which, while not being entirely compulsory, is a first step towards establishing the *minimum social standards* for avoiding so-called social dumping.

Due to the now decade-long opposition of a single member state, Great Britain, the progress so far achieved in this field remains nevertheless highly unsatisfactory compared to the great changes in the structure of the European economy. The right of veto, repeatedly defended by Great Britain in the name of a misunderstood concept of democracy, is thus demonstrated to be completely at odds with the acquisition of new rights by citizens.

The impression of many people in the workforce that their professional destiny, the fate of the workplace itself and possibilities of finding

alternative employment in their own region are about to slip beyond all control of democratic institutions is often an accurate perception. If this interpretation is valid, it will be more futile than ever to speak of comprehensive European citizenship. Moreover we are living through a phase of economic development which is increasingly characterised by the necessity (and urgency) of continuous adjustments to strategies emanating from world competition and by increasingly sophisticated technological developments. It is sufficient to consider how significant the industrial progress of Japan and the so-called Far Eastern tigers has been for the European labour market to imagine what spectacular effects China and India's definitive industrial take-off will have, with the potential of billions of people working at much lower costs than European ones. Until now the response of European industry has been based more on inescapable necessities than on a comprehensive plan of European society: companies have sacked part of their workforces, stopped hiring and encouraged early retirement, as well as moving certain activities to countries outside the Community. The states and local organs have guaranteed the operation of some social stabilisation programmes. Workers made redundant by companies have been guided towards the service sector, whose capacity to absorb them is directly proportional to the state of the economic cycle.

In a demographic situation in which the pressure of new entrants to the jobs market has still not been reduced, the effects of sacking employees from companies has resulted in a steady increase in unemployment to levels currently far removed from the ideal ones of the 1950s and '60s; to the point that very large sections of the population are permanently without work, and plainly not enjoying comprehensive citizenship.

For this reason it is the primary task of economic democracy to guarantee individual citizens the right to exercise democratically all actions necessary to escape from the "minority" state caused by unemployment or solely from the danger that unemployment become a reality. This does not mean simply the right to strike and to undertake union action throughout Europe, which are already guaranteed but have not yet become significant factors in European life due to the weakness of European unions. It is also incumbent on economic democracy to realise (at a company level, at the regional economic area level, and up to the level of the Union) innovative policies which, based on the free concert of interests between social sectors, lead to a reduction in the unemployed. One can envisage a policy of permanent education which,

using all the territory's resources (removing them from the states' monopoly), will stimulate the maximum amount of available energy so as to allow the workforce to achieve a professional qualitative leap, thereby enabling Europe to specialise in technological areas of great potential for the future. In addition one can hypothesise European accords between social sectors for the reduction of the working week, coupled to Union, state and regional policies promoting the quality of life, the recovery of urban areas, and the increased provision of cultural services. To enact such policies one can imagine resorting to new forms of civilian service, aimed at employing not only young people, but also the enormous energies of unemployed workers and part-timers, not to mention those of pensioners. Furthermore, it will be necessary to find a way to guarantee that collaborative economic structures, based on consensus between social sectors, do not exclude the least-represented sectors (the unemployed and the young in search of a first job).

In short the execution of economic democracy will need to be expressed within a new and more sophisticated concept of employment; one in which employment is no longer seen simply as an obligation or as a chore which men and women are condemned to carry out, nor as a right which falls down from the sky, but as the exercise of a public duty in relation to the community.

The environmental issue and the right to protect the environment.

An assumption increasingly shared by the public is that it is the job of democratic public administrations, be they local, national or pan-European, not simply to protect citizens' traditional civil rights, but also to guarantee current and future generations the right to an environment which facilitates healthy living, procreation and the continuation of the human race. The environmental issue has by now passed on from being a subject confined to youngs' protest movements, to become one of the world's great political issues.

The Union will have to guarantee its citizens' right to preserve the environment, by which individuals, as well as groups, local communities, member states and the Union itself, are permitted to employ all the decisive instruments that will be at the disposal of the Community's and member states' judicial structures. Moreover it will be necessary to recognise the pre-eminence in the judicial system of the right to preserve the environment, which is still considered (even when national structures contemplate it in one form or another) a "subsidiary" right, whose

imperatives are therefore often subordinated to the satisfaction of other rights.

Hence the preservation of the environment must become one of the objectives of the Union, an institutional duty for all its organs. Clearly this will be the task of the European constitution and of secondary legislation, not to mention the role of the member states (according to the principle of subsidiarity) to coordinate the safeguarding of this right (and the exercise of duty) with other interests and potentially conflicting rights/duties: primarily the right to free economic initiative and to property.

The interests of regions outside the Union, and the cosmopolitan rights and duties of European citizens.

In an increasingly interdependent world it is impossible to speak of the Union as an open society with a cosmopolitan vocation if the Union does not take charge, in an institutional context, of the problems of regions outside Europe as well. Clearly in this case the need for innovative solutions is posed. Indeed a traditional interpretation of democratic systems holds that public institutions respond exclusively to the majority view of a state's internal public opinion, whether the state in question be national or multi-national, of small dimensions or continent-wide proportions. If then there exists a large section of the European electorate which calls for protectionist policies, lobbies for closure against the outside world or even for the European government to adopt an aggressive stance with respect to the aspirations and interests of other peoples, the Union government and European politicians would have to accommodate these demands.

Yet if the majority were able to force Europe into enacting a "closed fortress" policy against the entire world or even to follow hegemonic goals, European institutions would not offer any guarantee that Union policy would favour the real medium-term interests of Europeans, who need to be stably placed in a framework of global interdependence. Whatever policy Europe may conduct to the detriment of the international balance would soon be turned into a disastrous situation for Europeans themselves, who will be unable to defend either their quality of life or their liberty in the face of the will of the rest of the world, or even simply a large section of it.

Hence, it is necessary to include in the Union constitution innovative constitutional features that can guarantee that medium-term interests (the integration of Europe in the world) are protected and not subordinated to

short-term ones, which electoral logic tends to promote.

Two policies (compatible with each other) can be followed in order to guarantee this result. The first solution consists in the inclusion in the European constitution of an article enabling (on equal terms) the *transferral of Union sovereignty to the United Nations* (or in the future to other international democratic intermediary bodies). The constitution should also declare the unilateral commitment of the Union to promoting the democratic strengthening of the UN and moreover *unreservedly recognise the jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice in the Hague* (thereby subjecting the Union's entire foreign policy to the scrutiny of an international tribunal). Such a commitment would represent the clearest enactment of the right of European citizens to promote their interests without being obliged to kill (the right to live in peace and not be obliged to make war against anyone in order to lend weight to one's legitimate interests), even though, until the world federation is created, it will not be possible to abolish armies.

The second solution, more innovative than the first, takes the form of re-formulating the rights and duties of European citizens as rights and duties towards the whole of humanity: for example, the defence of the fundamental rights of every member of the human race and the right to intervene (even armed) whenever these rights are disregarded. *Innovative legal instruments* can be attached to the proclamations of principle, with the aim of allowing citizens to carry out tasks in the service of cosmopolitan institutions that are otherwise owed to the Union: the *right to fulfil military service requirements in UN rapid-response corps*, rather than in the European army; the *right to do "cosmopolitan" civilian service* (not only for young people, but also in the other forms mentioned above) in place of European or national ones; the *right to send a share of personal taxes directly to the United Nations*, rather than to European institutions.

In conclusion the Union will have to attribute to "cosmopolitan law" not the 19th century interpretation of the rights of foreigners, but rather consider it as a system of rights and duties for European citizens in relation to the UN. The task of the Union constitution (the first example of a large federation which is multi-national, of continental proportions, and with a cosmopolitan vocation) will be to co-ordinate and balance the exercise of rights which are attributed at various levels to its citizens: rights attributed by national constitutions in relation to local communities and national states; the federal rights which set down the framework of European citizenship; cosmopolitan rights which transform European citizens into citizens of the community of destiny of the whole planet.

The positive and negative aspects of citizenship obligations in a Europe undergoing a crisis of political identity.

Having outlined, albeit in a rough draft, some ideas for the form and content of European citizenship, it is worth assessing whether the citizens of the nascent Union are ready to claim their new rights and commit themselves to respecting the obligations which have been referred to: in other words whether they want to revolutionise their relationship with the political community to which they belong.

Normally such questions are posed by the enemies of Europe, in an effort to justify sceptical or superficial replies, but never for the purpose of attempting a serious analysis. Nevertheless the question is not rhetorical, not even from the viewpoint of those who believe in the possibility of founding the European federation. A positive answer cannot be taken for granted. The theme of citizenship needs to be treated with considerable attention, and avoiding the arousal of emotive responses. Citizenship encompasses such values as community identity and a feeling of loyalty towards a particular political community; any transformation into a European context must be fully discussed with the people. Arguments should be laid out clearly and a considerable willingness to discuss and explain is necessary.

But discussion of citizenship is not difficult simply because it symbolically involves the many positive connotations of the relationship between individuals and the state. The citizenship issue is also difficult to deal with because these same citizens feel increasingly betrayed: citizenship (a democratic institution) is being emptied of meaning by political corruption and the crisis of national states. Both positive and negative aspects of citizenship exist, which makes it difficult to propose a new form of citizenship. Indeed talk of "European citizenship" signifies the search to rehabilitate people to large-scale politics during a historical period in which dissatisfaction with slogans seems to be prevalent.

The relatively rich and advanced societies of western Europe are witnessing a growing number of events that demonstrate the considerable distance between states and their citizens. For example the number of those not participating in elections, or who vote for political protest groups or groups clearly incompatible with democracy, is growing. The tendency of politicians and public administration to be held in contempt is present in almost all European states, as is a manifest indifference on the part of populations to the destiny of their countries.

The "challenge" to the obligations of citizenship in western Europe clearly has several explanations: economic slow-down and the social unrest caused by this, the spread of petty delinquency in the cities, the uncertainty caused by the presence of disturbing social phenomena such as increased drug abuse among many young people, and the risk they run of being infected with fatal illnesses, which causes the ghost of the great plagues to reappear.

However a single political fact seems to connect the profound public dissatisfaction in France, Germany, Spain, Italy and other countries: the degeneration of parliamentary democracy into a "democratic regime" (where the word regime contains a negative connotation, synonymous with the German term *Demokratie* and the Italian *partitocrazia*). The "democratic regime" is a political system that is predominantly elitist, remote from the concerns of the "people" (or those who are not professionally involved in politics) and impenetrable thanks to a jargon which is hypocritical, abstract and probably devoid of meaning.

The widespread diffusion of corruption has furthermore convinced a large section of the public in European countries that politicians not only do not merit respect or sympathy, but are at the very least arrogant professionals who manipulate power, if not frequently real and proper criminals. The phrase "they're all thieves" resounds throughout Europe: and this provides little reason to cheer, given that democracy ought to empower those who are supported by at least a majority of the population.

For different reasons, in the other half of Europe (rehabilitated to democracy after the totalitarian experience of state communism) the obligations of citizenship have entered into a crisis not dissimilar to the western one. Everywhere, the civic enthusiasm of 1989 has been replaced by a more sombre, if not actually desperate tone, which reveals the public's dissatisfaction with the new order. And even in Eastern Germany, the state enjoying greater economic aid and the greatest potential resources, and which knocked the wall down, the population does no longer proudly proclaim "*Wir sind das Volk*" but is divided into *Wessis* and *Ossis*. In the multi-national states of Central and Eastern Europe the re-awakening of nationalism has actually been transformed into a mass "denunciation" (through referendums and elections) of the obligations of common citizenship. Millions of people have rejected Soviet, Czechoslovakian and Yugoslav citizenship. The communal rights of the citizens of these states (even if they were often nominal rights) have been annulled, and in this way many situations, while not becoming confrontations as fierce as Yugoslavia's, have resulted in yesterday's fellow citizens becoming

today's foreigners, deprived of political rights and treated like *Gastarbeiter*, i.e. guest workers exposed to political and economic uncertainties.

But even Union citizenship, the European citizenship on which these reflections have concentrated, has met fierce opposition by certain sections of the public. It is important that federalists pay close attention to this reaction, not to draw discouraging conclusions, but so as to identify more precisely the terms of the situation. When the first of the two referenda about the Maastricht Treaty was held in Denmark in the summer of 1992, the population chose also (and perhaps primarily so) between belonging to a small, rich, independent state and a community destined to become larger, grow more complex, and shoulder greater responsibilities, as well as having greater potential. With this first vote the Danish rejected the advantages and burdens of the new citizenship.

Even in other states the difficulty of ratification has revealed how the problem of choosing between an exclusively national citizenship (emblem of a closed society) and European citizenship (symbol of an open society) is still a subject which divides public opinion. In France, for example, the positive result of the referendum on Maastricht was extremely tight and risked interrupting the entire process of European integration. But even in Germany and Great Britain a popular vote in recent months would have involved a considerable degree of uncertainty.

It is clear that even a new Union Treaty (already planned for 1996) which transforms the most innovative ideas on European citizenship into the best judicial formulas will not be enough to avoid these obligations of European citizenship being ignored or even rejected by the title-holders of rights and duties which derive from it. European citizenship can provide the means to confirm the Union in the hearts of Europeans, as on the other hand it can remain the never-finished wing of the European building. In order that the new obligations of European citizenship establish themselves effectively among the people and within the Union it is necessary that a large part of the population adheres to them with conviction, affirming them through their daily behaviour, and seeing in them the basis of a more advanced democratic life, of a more comprehensive relationship between rights and duties. The acquisition of European citizenship should represent for the vast majority of the population the moment of gaining greater rights, a qualitative leap in their relationship with public authority, the arrival at a better period for participation in the political and civic life of their community. At the same time, the new citizenship must have cosmopolitan features, that is it must furnish Europeans with a clearer understanding of the link which unites their

future to the futures of other peoples in the world.

Such an ambitious objective cannot be kept implicit: it must be properly explained to the public. It cannot be the product of the broad interpretation of a treaty, nor the result of a fortuitous combination of events, nor ultimately the product of the enlightened action of an individual. Civil society must support the transition from old to new citizenship. Moreover such a difficult achievement cannot be maintained over the long term if there exists no clear political mechanism enabling European citizens to maintain a dialogue with the new institutions and to conserve their identity. Hence it is necessary that the Union be founded on a sustainable federal and democratic nucleus which allows the common elaboration of innovative policies.

The new citizenship and new rights must be the basis on which new European parties are formed and old parties and movements are reformed. As regards the problem of the content and scope of new rights it is possible to evaluate a difference between those who want an open and integrated society and those who instead prefer a protected society that is closed in on itself and facing the past. The citizenship and new rights of the Union are two key concepts which new and old political forces, forming or combining at the European level, will be able to use to increase the political dimension of Europe, transforming the Community, or its federal nucleus, into a great constitutional democracy which is open to the peoples around it.

The history of these last two years has taught that Unions, even those which have great common traditions behind them, can be dissolved if they are not in step with history and prove unable to realise people's dreams. The European Union will be able to strengthen itself if it can provide innovative solutions to the democratic concern which prevails in the populations of Europe, as throughout the world. In this way it will furnish all peoples with an example of how the defence of individuals' rights is rooted in the capacity to build a civilised world based on rules of co-habitation, and not of divisiveness. It will demonstrate that the achievement of new and more advanced rights is strictly linked to the conditions of stable and institutional pacification of society, a point which Europe will have reached by renouncing the sovereignty of its individual national states.

If, on the other hand, the Union does not become a great democracy it can not ever be considered an irreversible fact, and its cohesion will always be undermined by the inability to interpret the concerns of our age.

Notes

EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

The concept of citizenship has attained an extraordinary fortune in the politico-cultural debate of the 1980's and 90's. It is commonly held that the citizenship issue contains certain crucial characteristics that facilitate the definition of an individual's political role (in particular a new code of citizens' rights and duties) in the society of the future; a society in which class struggle has ceased to be the key issue of political life.

The idea of citizenship began as a juridical concept in Roman law. The *ius civitatis* defined the political rights of the *civis romanus*, the member of the city's political order, and was considered distinct from civil rights, which guaranteed the equality of all before the law, foreigners included.

In his book *Citizenship and Social Class*¹, Marshall has reinterpreted in sociological terms the concept of citizenship in industrial societies. He has studied the growth of the content of citizenship through three progressive stages: the recognition of civil rights (which guarantee the individual's liberty against interference from the state and secure life, liberty and property, to use Locke's famous triad); political rights (which guarantee the citizen's participation in political decision-making); and social rights (which guarantee citizens a minimum wage and social security). This process spans three phases of the class struggle: the initial affirmation of bourgeois rights, followed by middle class and finally working class ones. Civil rights are an achievement of the liberal movement, and are safeguarded by the rule of law based on the principle of the division of powers. The democratic movement led to the achievement of political rights, including the principles of popular sovereignty and democratic government being based on universal suffrage. Social rights are the fruit of the struggle of the socialist movement and affirmation of the welfare state.

However it is worth clarifying that, contrary to what Marshall argues, the sphere of citizenship does not coincide with all three categories of the above-mentioned rights, but only with those of political rights. Clearly, both negative liberty, which protects the citizen from the arbitrary interference of the state in his private sphere, and social rights, which offer the individual the means to give substance to liberty, represent essential conditions for dismantling the barriers that impede free and independent participation in the democratic process. Nevertheless the sphere of political rights, as distinct from human rights, coincides with active political participation. Its specific character consists in the power attributed to citizens to take part in the law-making process and hence in the potential for mobilising the people against possible attacks on their rights as citizens and, more generally, against any possible degeneration of the democratic system.

* * *

It needs to be remarked on that democracy has so far only been established within state borders and, as long as it remains thus restricted, attitudes, policies and institutions will survive violating democratic principles.

The rights of man and citizens that are established on a national level are denied at the international level, since international politics is still based on the use of force between states, and hence is still in the state of nature. Furthermore, international anarchy hinders the full realisation of democracy even at the national level, because national governments are pushed to favour security over liberty and equality, and even to sacrifice these values, if necessary, to the requirements of defence, and to militarism and centralism. More specifically, the division of the world into sovereign states highlights three limitations to democracy.

The first limitation derives from the fact that democracy has so far only been established in a few states. As a result the division between democratic and undemocratic states represents an obstacle to the establishment of world democracy, which requires, as already pointed out by Kant in *To Perpetual Peace*, that "the constitution of every nation" be "republican."²

The second limitation is due to the fact that democracy has so far generally taken the form of national democracy. The general will of citizens has expressed itself only in a divided fashion, in national representative institutions.

If the formation of the general will is confined within national borders it thus becomes a contradictory concept: it is one individual and separate will in conflict with other national interests. In other words, the suffrage is not universal, but national. Many national suffrages co-exist simultaneously, which express numerous conflicting national wills.

This contradiction can be overcome by asserting the idea of the general will of mankind, which can take shape only within the framework of a world federation. In reality, only a democratic world government can facilitate the democratic and rational control of the clash between different and divergent national wills.

It needs to be stressed that the purpose of the destruction of nations is foreign to federalist plans. The overcoming of the exclusive sovereignty of nations involves solely the transfer of powers upwards (as well as downwards) in such a way that nations lose only those powers that can be exercised more effectively at higher (or lower) levels; but they will not lose all their powers. Great revolutionary changes have the character of a break; nevertheless they do not interrupt the evolution of history. According to the dialectic concept of history, revolutionary action is negation, but at the same time conservation, that is a transformation or, to use Hegel's term, an overcoming (*Aufhebung*) of the old order.

In other words, the conflict between national and supranational requirements, which characterises the processes of political unification, can be resolved by federal compromise, whose essence is the overcoming of exclusive national sovereignty while respecting national independence. Popular sovereignty, which legitimises power, can be expressed in accordance with a federal power distribution structure, on two or potentially many levels, spanning from local community to the entire world.

The third limitation depends on the coinciding of citizenship and nationality. On the basis of this principle, the national state recognises only the political rights of those who fulfil the nationality requirement, and excludes foreigners from participating in the democratic process. In a world in which, in the final instance, states resort to war to resolve international conflicts, the exclusion of foreigners from exercising political rights has solid foundations: in the event of war, foreigners may collude with the enemy of the state which is hosting them.

Consequently, although democracy is based on the principle of universal suffrage, in reality, due to the division of the world into sovereign states, the right to vote is only granted to the nationals of individual states. A foreigner is thereby excluded from active and passive electoral rights in the country where he resides. In this way, the democratic

principle has been interpreted to mean that only those who fulfil the nationality requirement have the right to participate in political life, and foreigners are to be excluded from exercising this right.

In connection, it is worth recalling that both the French and Russian revolutions asserted the principle of extending the right to vote to foreigners, in their initial phases before prevailing nationalism extinguished their universal momentum. Today, the question is posed once again in an even more acute form due to the crisis of the national state and developments in the process of political unification. After the extension of the right to vote to a greater number of people, thanks to the fall of barriers based on wealth and sex, and the lowering of age limits, the new goal in the struggle to extend the vote is the ending of nationality requirements.

In other words, the exercise of the right to vote and other political rights should be linked to the sole requirement of residence. The implications of this principle are explosive, since it enables the separation of what the national principle has maintained united: nationality and citizenship. In fact, the attribution of political rights on the basis of the criterion of residence, independent of nationality, is a principle which is applied in all federations of states. It is time to extend these rights throughout the world by establishing Kant's "cosmopolitan right," of which he wrote in *To Perpetual Peace*³, and the introduction of a cosmopolitan citizenship.

The overcoming of these three limitations to democracy brings us to the conditions elaborated by Kant two hundred years ago for the establishment of perpetual peace. These are the three "definitive articles for perpetual peace among nations,"⁴ whose essential elements are as follows: 1) all states must be republics; 2) world federation is the means by which to give legal weight to international law; 3) cosmopolitan law must grant foreigners the right to be protected by the state in which they reside, on condition that they do not act in a hostile way towards their host state.

These are the three principal features to Kant's proposal, which tends to give a legal solution to the problem of peace. They represent three stages in the process of extending the rule of law to all social relations: first to relationships among individuals within a single people (public law), then to relationships among the states into which the human race is divided (international law), and finally to relationships among all peoples in their capacity as a universal state (cosmopolitan law).

* * *

The crisis of the national state, which has been brought about by the internationalisation of productive processes and the international scale of major political, economic and social problems, has also been the cause of the crisis of democracy. In reality, the democratic powers, due to their national dimension, have lost control of the historical process; while at the international level, where the major problems can be solved, no democratic institutions exist. The ultimate significance of European unification consists in the overcoming of the national state and the start of international democracy.

Habermas⁵ has recently argued that European union, in its capacity as a multinational community, may be the place for testing a new principle for legitimising power: constitutional patriotism. This expression designates a new reference point around which the collective identity in post-national societies could crystallise: the universal principles of the rule of law and democracy.

It should be stressed that this principle of legitimacy concerns the political regime, while the legitimisation of the political community, which has the function of ensuring the cohesion of the people within the state, will continue to be an indispensable element in maintaining the unity of the state as long as the world remains divided into sovereign states. In fact, every state will have to justify and, if necessary, defend its borders and legitimise the membership of a population in a distinct political community.

This means that in post-national societies some form of national sentiment will survive; its reference point will be the union of nations. This sentiment will be weakened by the contradiction undermining it, which is to survive in a post-national age and to justify power in a multinational community.

The national principle will therefore be fully overcome only when the federative process among nations is extended throughout the world.

Nevertheless the European federation will start the transition process towards this goal. Indeed it will be the first example of the overcoming of Europe's historic nations, which express the idea of the natural division of mankind into hostile, warring communities, and will pave the way for the assertion of the principles of a cosmopolitan society. There are three reasons for believing this.

First, the European Community has not simply carried forward a unification process between democratic states, but has exercised influence internationally on its neighbouring states; this has conspired to bring about the fall of fascist and communist authoritarian regimes, which, in

turn, represents a prerequisite for the Community's progressive enlargement.

Second, with the European elections the process of asserting international democracy, alongside national democracy, has started. Two limitations remain: the democratic area is extended only to a part of the world; moreover the European Parliament has not yet been granted full legislative rights. As a result, the design of international democracy will not be fully realised until these limitations have been overcome.

Third, as regards more precisely European citizenship, this has been introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. European citizenship represents an important goal in the difficult process of the democratic transformation of the European Community and creation of the European state. It should be stressed that Maastricht has simply outlined the goal, which cannot be achieved until the Community's democratic deficit has been overcome; in other words, until full legislative powers are granted to the European Parliament. Without the democratic process being fully developed on European soil, European citizenship will remain an empty expression. Indeed what sense is there in exercising the right to vote in European elections with all Community citizens voting in their state of residence, if the final say in the legislative process is generally reserved for the national governments in the inner sanctum of the Council?

The fact remains however that the Maastricht Treaty, by attributing the right to vote in local and European elections to member state citizens in their country of residence, has broken the bond between nationality and citizenship, which brings the Community another step closer to the federalist pattern.

It should be added that European unification, precisely because its central feature is the overcoming of the national principle, has enabled progress to be achieved as regards the recognition of political rights even for non-Community citizens. The European Parliament's decision to extend the right to petition to non-Community citizens is the latest step in this direction. In addition, some Community countries (Denmark, Ireland and Holland), have followed Sweden and Norway's example, and recognised the active and passive right to vote in local elections for all resident citizens, non-Community ones included. The above is the expression of nascent cosmopolitan citizenship principles at the heart of European society.

The fact that electoral rights have so far only been recognised for local elections demonstrates that the conditions for extending these rights to the level of international politics do not yet exist. Nevertheless, par-

ticipation in local elections allows immigrants to influence political decisions which have a considerable impact on their living conditions, relating for example to housing, education and health issues, and encourages their effective integration in the community which is hosting them. It is worth adding that nothing is preventing the immediate extension of the right to vote in provincial and regional elections to all resident people. Moreover the prospect of national states becoming member states of the European federation creates the necessary conditions for extending recognition of these rights even at the national level. If the European federation is able to follow the spirit of previous great revolutionary changes, there exists the possibility that it may progressively assert the recognition of political rights for all persons in their country of residence, beginning with the citizens of states which have particular ties of friendship, such as the United Kingdom has done for Commonwealth citizens and Portugal for Brazilian citizens. Only by applying this principle at all levels will the European federation give due weight to its nature of a multinational political organisation, open to the rest of the world, and allow it to present itself as the first stage on the road to the unification of the human race.

Lucio Levi

NOTES

¹ T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1950.

² I. Kant, "To Perpetual Peace" (1795), in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, ed. by T. Humphrey, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1983, p. 112.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Second Section.

⁵ J. Habermas, *Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität. Überlegungen zur europäischen Zukunft*, St. Gallen, Erker Verlag, 1991.

THE FORMATION OF A COMMON THOUGHT

One of the most commonly-recognised objectives among federalists is the need to elaborate a "common thought" for theoretical problems, political analyses and choices of action. This is in some respects a "banal" requirement, being a characteristic of any group which works on a common project. Yet the actual difficulties which arise in the process of transforming this objective into reality suggest a need to analyse the concept and its various implications more deeply, with the aim of rendering "common thought" the concept of common thought itself.

For the sake of clarity I make a distinction between *common thought* and *collective thought*. The former should be understood as the result of a cognitive process, the latter as the cognitive process itself, based on the participation of many subjects who co-operate in the pursuit and elaboration of this thought. The fact that collective thought leads to common thought depends on the method and evolution of the cognitive process, both as regards its subjective and objective features.

* * *

In general, the cognitive process must be based on dialogue; on this topic it is worthwhile considering some of Karl Jaspers' comments: "To bring men to liberty means to bring them to converse with one another. This remains bound up with illusion, however, if there are mental reservations which are not put into words — reserves upon which, inwardly breaking off communication, one draws back — if converse amounts, in fact, to a concealment, a mere gesture of giving, and the exercise of cunning. Genuine dialogue between men is without restraint and holds nothing back. Only in the complete openness of both parties does truth develop in community...."

In fact, however, no one is in possession of truth as final and absolute. To seek for truth always means to be ready for communication and to expect communication from others in return. With the man who desires real truth, and therefore also communication, one can, *ipso facto*, speak openly on every subject; he can do the same himself, and in such a manner as neither to injure nor spare him who really wants to hear. The struggle for truth in liberty is a loving struggle."¹ And Jaspers continues: "It has become the decisive hallmark of the scientific man that in his researches

he seeks his antagonists, and that he seeks most ardently for those who call everything in question with concrete and clearly defined ideas. Here something apparently self-destructive becomes productive. And it is the hallmark of loss of science when discussion is avoided, even declined, when thought is confined to like-minded circles and destructive aggressivity turned outward in vague generalities.”²

The two key words in these passages on dialogue are truth and science. Indeed, those who aim at the elaboration of a common thought, in whatever field or cognitive sphere, need to tend towards the achievement of truth. Truth does not mean the absolute overlapping of thought and reality, an impossible goal for the human mind, but rather knowledge that is socially shared. In the realm of scientific thought, truth represents all the knowledge shared by the community of scientists within a given paradigm.³

* * *

This definition should hold for every field of knowledge, yet it is well known that the development of scientific methodology and its application still present gaps and shortcomings in those spheres of knowledge which are particularly influenced by ideological thought, or at least the predominance of subjective influences. Politics is one of these fields: although politics in particular requires a maximum of lucidity and “scientific” methodology in the elaboration of its analyses and in its choices (given that it is one of the factors which can create or destroy the framework within which human potential can develop), it is one of the most vulnerable sectors, since in it both the search for “truth” and the search for means (power) for its affirmation have always co-existed.

In examining the process of elaborating thought and political choices, a distinction has to be made between politics as power management and as, in Mario Albertini’s term, “active thought,” in other words innovative and revolutionary thought.

In the former, common thought derives inevitably from compromises and mediation between competing or opposed interests. And since in normal politics the struggle for power is fundamental, it is not so important to reach and speak the truth as to obtain the necessary support to accede to power, regardless of the means (naturally taking into account that there are reasonable limits beyond which it would be counter-productive to go). The Machiavellian aspects of politics, which are nevertheless associated to an ethical attitude (the ethics of responsibility,

as theorised by Max Weber⁴), are bound to remain until humanity becomes a rational global community, with a world federation. We can not know if this aim will be achieved or not, but we must believe in its possibility if we want to give significance to our federalist choice.

It is precisely by placing ourselves in this perspective (the perspective of working to exit pre-history in which irrationality still prevails, so as to enter into history, where rationality will predominate) that we can start to experiment, by means of “active thought,” with a “new way to make politics,” based on real common thought, the fruit of rational dialogue.

We cannot know in advance if this attempt is destined to succeed completely (yet nor should we underestimate the positive effects that an idea exerts, even one considered only as a regulatory idea, which is approached asymptotically). Nevertheless we know for certain that our movement’s features have always been somewhat different from those which exemplify traditional political parties; this has considerable consequences, including as regards the possibilities for knowledge. Since we do not seek to win and exercise power, but to create a new power (a new state), we are not (or at least we should not be) conditioned by the pursuit of support in the traditional sense. The federalists should aim at support not for the movement itself, but for its ideas. Clearly the political parties also elaborate ideas and formulate projects, but the need to turn support into votes often compels them to employ means of persuasion that have more in common with demagoguery than the demonstration of the truth of their ideas and the suitability of the means to achieve them. The prerequisite for elaborating common thought lies instead in the search for “truth” as the only source of strength for the success of ideas or projects: the strength of truth consists in the fact that it is potentially valid for everybody.

* * *

At this point, let us consider how to set about making practical and effective what we have defined above as the requirement to be satisfied by experiment.

First, a distinction should be made between 1) subjective aspects and 2) objective aspects of the cognitive process.

As far as 1) is concerned I make a further distinction between a) psychological problems and b) individual problems of power. By psychological problems I mean the difficulty that all of us have to “forget about ourselves” while working together to elaborate common thought

and to focus only on “things,” on the objective (in other words, on “truth”). Even disregarding narcissism (which nevertheless is often encountered in more or less hidden forms, and varying degrees of acuteness), there can be no doubt that the instincts of psychological and spiritual self-preservation can make it difficult for all of us in certain situations to renounce our personal thought, either as being our own or as the result of a difficult process, at the end of which one feels satisfied and fulfilled for having arrived at a “calm area.”

I believe that all of us are aware that this potential conditioning exists, yet it can be difficult (though not impossible) to recognise it in ourselves or, once so recognised, activate defences against it.

It is easier to defend ourselves against problems connected to the will to impose our own thought for personal power reasons. This may be based on a hypertrophy of the ego and hence be linked to the above-mentioned conditioning, but, in as much as “will”, presents elements of greater awareness, due to the fact that the objective is not cognitive and its fulfilment implies strategies and tactics which inevitably make clear to us and to others the instrumental use of thought.

As far as 2) is concerned (objective aspects), we can introduce the discussion with the following assertion: “you know what you want to do.” This means that we can achieve contact with reality (i.e. elaborate a policy which is suited to the challenges to be faced and able to win unanimous approval) only if we have opted for active militancy. Hence, knowledge can not be separated from the new political behaviour, defined by Albertini as “active political thought,” which is not a technique to interpret reality, but the instrument with which to change it. This thought is *active* in as much as it comprises a value, is aware of the structures needed to achieve it, and identifies the historical moment when the value can be realised.

Starting from these concepts which integrate thought and action, it is possible to elaborate a general policy guideline in its theoretical, strategic and tactical aspects. Using these concepts as a basis, we will be able, as Albertini once again points out, “to control the direction of the course of history,” in other words to exercise the only “power” which is compatible with our revolutionary choice and which distinguishes us from those who are slaves or conditioned by the nature of the current political system, the division of the world into sovereign states.

These assertions are obviously only the prerequisite for giving substance to our thought in its theoretical, strategic and tactical expressions; nevertheless I hold that such assertions are essential if we seek to achieve

the requirement of a common thought.

As concerns the method of cognitive process, a) it must be based on the *equality* of all militants. On this point it should be noted that equality does not mean that all of us are equally equipped to face whatever problems lie ahead of us: there are individuals who by virtue of age, education or profession may have greater abilities in certain fields than others, and these should be exploited; but clearly all militants who have opted for federalism with conviction and moral determination, and who abide by the regulations of the Statute regarding the inseparability of thought and action, are qualified to participate actively in all forms of elaboration (theoretical etc.) or at least to be aware of (and by consequence to influence) possible deviations from our moral, political and historical roots.

b) In the formation of common thought we should be aware of the fact that politics is a moral choice; rather, it is *the* moral choice *par excellence*, in as much as it aims at the common good. Yet, at the same time political ethics nowadays still reveals an obscure union between good and evil, in so far as what Weber called the “ethics of responsibility” still prevails, in other words the cold calculation of means, which includes even the use of deception and violence to achieve certain goals. In this event politics is tributary of morality, since in terms of the ethics of responsibility an act is “good” if its end is good, but it is not yet *moral politics*. Morality and politics will only coincide when power belongs to everybody and the pursuit of the common good does not comprise “violence;” hence in the world federation.

What connection is there between these considerations and the problem of elaborating a common thought? The ethics of responsibility implies considering people also as a means and not only as an end, and it is precisely this malign aspect which is at issue. To achieve our goals we cannot totally avoid this aspect (despite rejecting physical violence as a tool of political struggle), hence we should analyse the world’s current power situation, take it into account and coldly exploit any opportunities which enable us to exercise hegemony over other forces in the field.

However this same mechanism must be rejected for our internal matters. Our political choice is the only one in which the struggle for power makes no sense, since we do not seek power; hence it is the only one in which it is possible to practise the so-called *ethics of principles*, according to which every person must be considered as an end and not as a means. Common thought can flow only if this principle is shared by everybody, since only on the basis of such a principle can the equality of

all be asserted and is it likewise possible to free ourselves from those self-deceiving aspects of thought which impede communication.

On the other hand, if this principle is not shared (and practised) by everybody, a perverted mechanism will inevitably be triggered off, due to the fact that our choice is not a religious one, in which bearing testimony and the example of rigid respect for values is important, regardless of the consequences of such behaviour. Our choice being a political one, the ethics of principles can not *in every case* nor *in every situation* be held to be the only moral principle, and can not be so considered above all when the survival of our organisation or its potential to act are endangered. For this reason, also on this front (as well as the cognitive one) we can but think of our experience as an experiment which may or may not succeed, depending on the awareness and responsibility of all of us.

We should avoid being unduly proud and claiming that our group has no need for a process of self-education. Rather, we should consider that whereas the process of self-education on a societal level as a whole can avail itself of the instruments of legal institutions (coercive laws), this does not apply to us. It is for this reason that our task is difficult: that which we succeed in being, in thinking and doing depends solely on our success, or otherwise, in sharing (each of us through independent, individual choice) certain principles and putting them into practice.

c) The formation of thought should be based on the *collective contribution* of militants. This does not mean that the analyses and resultant final decisions should consist of *adding up* everybody's contributions. On this point, it is worth drawing a comparison with the concept of the general will elaborated by Rousseau when examining the foundations of democracy: "There is often a great difference between the will of all and the general will; the general will studies only the common interest while the will of all studies private interest, and is indeed no more than the sum of individual desires."⁵ If during the formation of thought everybody can (and must) say everything that they think may contribute to knowledge and to its translation into action, the desire to "contain everything" inside the thought which has arrived at its final elaboration (based on the idea that only in this way is thought truly common), is entirely unrelated to the way in which science proceeds and to the aim of reaching the "truth," but even more simply this intent introduces a foreign element: the desire not to injure anyone's feelings. However, this subject is dealt with by the above comments of Jaspers and those on the subjective aspects of the cognitive process.

d) If we start from the consideration that, being a revolutionary avant-garde, our cognitive and practical task implies the introduction of "the new" into reality, we must be able to distinguish between on the one hand investigating in all directions, considering all the stimuli offered by the historical changes that take place in the course of history, and assessing their potential, leaving thought free to investigate and meet the challenge of reality, while on the other hand, "systemising" thought itself in an established cognitive system which is able to translate into policy. Not separating these two levels creates confusion and an inability to communicate.

e) It is necessary to reflect that it is easier to reach unanimous approval of the theoretical aspects of a general policy guideline than its strategic and tactical aspects. This can be explained by the fact that the latter are more subject to influences outside our common cultural heritage. Indeed, it can happen for example that disorientation conditions our strategic role when events that are out of our control seem to banish us to the sidelines and leaves us feeling powerless. It is equally possible that such a disorientation leads us to believe that the most important thing is to assert our presence and existence with the traditional instruments of political propaganda, which often condemn without proposing alternatives, criticise without being constructive, and boil down to empty squabbles or vain political showmanship. We can not allow ourselves to fall into this trap and the way to avoid this danger lies in giving a common meaning to the concept of the "role of a revolutionary avant-garde" (control of the direction of the course of history on the basis of active political thought).

* * *

In conclusion I believe that the foundation of *real unanimity* lies in clarifying to ourselves and reciprocally such concepts, which Albertini has repeatedly called to our attention and which are presented here as a contribution (without any claim to completeness) to the reciprocal "communication" of which Jaspers spoke, the foundation of liberty and truth.

Naturally, given that knowledge is an at times long and tortuous process, and having our own requirement to keep up with the pace of events, not as a mere academic exercise but in order to act, we can not envisage cutting ourselves off in isolation, like a student or scientist, even were it to be productive, until everything is clear to everybody. There may be issues, especially strategic ones, which require a choice; a decision as

to what to do, regardless of whether it is deeply and knowingly shared by all. Clearly in this event a principle outside the "law of truth" must hold, and it can be none other than the principle which lies at the heart of the "rule of democracy," which remains imperfect, but irreplaceable, in other words the rule of the majority, on the subject of which Habermas wrote: "...The majority and the truth do not necessarily coincide... But a decision taken by majority vote can be interpreted as a *conditioned* consensus of a minority that concedes its will to the majority, albeit with the reserve that the decisions of the majority are taken in conditions where opinions are both debated and public, and hence remain available for revision in the light of better arguments. In order for submission, albeit temporarily, to the will of the majority, the minority should not be expected to renounce their convictions (which they hold to be more valid). The minority simply needs to wait until it can convince the majority, in a free and public comparison of opinions, to opt for its own will... Without such a discursive procedure there exists no democratic formation of will."⁶

These assertions clearly refer to traditional political dialectic and as such interpret the rules of an imperfect democracy which has yet to manifest itself as the general will. Yet, notwithstanding this, on the one hand it is a "practical" response to the "practical" need to take decisions, according to the concept mentioned above, and on the other it contains within itself, in the concept of "discursive procedure," the rational need for truth as the fruit of an open, cognitive process that is never static, but capable of self-correction through dialogue.

Nicoletta Mosconi

NOTES

¹ Karl Jaspers, *The origin and goal of history*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 156-157.

² *Ibid.*, p. 93.

³ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The structure of scientific revolutions*, Chicago, The University of Chicago, 1962.

⁴ Max Weber, *Politik als Beruf, Wissenschaft als Beruf*, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1948.

⁵ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The social contract*, London, Penguin books, p. 72.

⁶ Jürgen Habermas, *Die Nachholende Revolution*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990.

Interventions *

ASPECTS OF TRANSFORMATION IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

IGOR KOSSIKOV

Russia is going through a complicated period of transition from its status as the largest republic in the former USSR to that of a politically and economically independent state — from a formal federation of the "socialist type" to an as yet uncertain form of nation-state structure. The process of transformation involves numerous conflicts within the system of state power and administration of Russia, in the economy and in international relations. It requires serious attention and inter-disciplinary study.

In this article, we shall consider the most essential trends in the development of the Russian Federation (RF) as a nation-state, and the key problems. We shall provide a brief analysis of the causes of these problems and offer our vision of the development prospects for Russia.

1. Main trends in the development of Russia as a nation-state after independence (June 1991). Key problems for Russia.

The declaration of sovereignty by the RF and the election of President Boris Yeltsin were the logical continuation of the process of disintegration of the USSR. Although these events also mark the beginning of transformations in Russia itself, they are subject to various interpretations. Today, much effort is expended in predicting the inevitable disintegration of the RF in the wake of the disintegration of the USSR. But what is the actual reality?

In the past, two opposing trends could be observed in the RF: on the

* This heading includes interventions which the editorial board believes readers will find interesting, but which not necessarily reflect the board's views.

one hand, there was a rising wave of separatism in the former national autonomies, a move towards self-determination as new and independent states, as well as a parallel movement for the independence and higher status of the Russian territories (*krais*, *oblasts* and their regional subunits); and on the other there was a tendency to consolidate the federal centre of power and an attempt to create a new democratic federation.

The first trend displays itself in different forms, the first of which is the emergence of separatism in the national-state members of the Federation (i.e. former autonomous republics). Initially, these movements in the former autonomies took the form of raising their political and legal status to the level of the former Union republics of the USSR. It later grew into a movement for the sovereignty of the new republics, and, subsequently, for the right to secede from the Russian Federation and to establish relations according to the principle of common international relations. As of today, two formerly autonomous units, i.e. the Republic of Tatarstan and the Chechen Republic (Chechnia) have raised their status to that of independent states and refused to sign the Federal Agreement (April 1992), thus challenging the principle of the territorial integrity of the RF.

The separatism of the other national-state members of the RF is somewhat less evident. Although they signed the Federal Agreement, some of the republics nevertheless declare the supremacy of their own laws over the RF's Constitution. Such Republics are Yakutia (Sakha), Buryatia, Tuva, Bashkortostan, Komi, Karelia and Kalmykia.

There are eighteen Basic laws operating today within the RF: the All-Russia Constitution of 1977 (with amendments), the Constitutions of Tatarstan and Chechnia and fifteen constitutional drafts ready to be ratified by the parliaments of the Republics which have signed the Federal Agreement. Article 17 of the Chechen Constitution declares the Republic to be an independent state, while Article 61 of the Constitution of Tatarstan describes Tatarstan as a "state associated with Russia." The drafts of the Constitution of Tuva (Article 8), Karelia (Article 12) and Sakha (Article 41) recognize the principle of the supremacy of republican laws over those of Russia as a whole. The same is true of the drafts of the Laws of Kalmykia, Buryatia and Bashkortostan. According to Article 64 of the draft of its Constitution, the Republic of Bashkortostan "reserves the right to leave the Russian Federation." Frequently the republics revoke acts of the Russian Parliament and pay no heed to the decrees of the RF's President. This practice has become normal in Chechnia and Tatarstan. Yakutia has independently raised the rate of revenue assignments

to its budget from the mining and processing of diamonds (from 27 percent as agreed with the RF to 35-40 percent). North Ossetia and Ingushia refused to comply with the decision to outlaw all unauthorised military units on their respective territories.

In other words, the legal space of Russia has been significantly impaired; in the larger republics parallel power structures are being established and the relevant constitutional grounds are being created to allow secession from Russia. All of this means a serious crisis for the Federation, which is being undermined by its administrative-territorial units (*krais*, *oblasts*).

Having no statehood of their own, because the Federal Agreement envisages no federal governments for them, the Russian *oblasts* and *krais* have also initiated movements to raise their status and to achieve statehood and self-determination. In the *krais* and *oblasts*, "local constitutions" have begun to appear and are meant to serve as the basis for creating a "local legal space," i.e. the right of local authorities to introduce their own laws to solve regional problems. Such constitutions are officially entitled "State Rules of *Oblast*" (or *krai*, as relevant). The first such rules were elaborated in Irkutsk *oblast*, and were adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the RF (i.e. by the Chamber of Nationalities) as a standard model. The emergence of the first local constitution in this area of Russian Siberia is significant, as the Irkutskaya *oblast* is wedged between the "independent" RF Republics of Tuva, Buryatia and Yakutia. Judging by the "Rules of *Oblast*" the most essential differences between the local and federal authorities concern property relations and the use of natural resources.

The separatism of the territories is based on growing economic regionalization begun in Russia, that was spurred by market reforms and expansion of the economic rights of both production units and territories, including foreign economic affairs, privatization of property, and foreign investments. The *krais* and *oblasts* account for 82 percent of the mostly Russian population of Russia and for more than 75 percent of Russia's economic potential. As of today, republican status is claimed by the Krasnodarskii and Stavropolskii *krais* and by the Rostovskaya *oblast* (the leading grain-producers in the RF); the city of Ekaterinenburg¹ and Sverdlovskaya *oblast* (machine-building and metallurgical industries in the Urals, valuable minerals, and the potential of the military industrial complex); Tyumenskaya *oblast* (89 percent of total Russian oil extraction); Krasnoyarskii *krai* (4 percent of timber floating); Kuzbass (27 percent of coal); Primorye *krai* in the Far East (37 percent of fish and marine

products processing).

Unlike the former autonomies, these powerful regions of Russia do not make use of any nationalist slogans, in the drive to change their status from secondary subjects of the Federation to that of fully-fledged republics. Potentially they could have served as the breeding ground for the rebirth of Great Russian chauvinism.

On the whole, an analysis of intra-Russian separatism shows that the economic and social problems of the individual parts of the Russian state turn into national ones when such a development is advantageous to political forces competing for power. When such a camouflage cannot be used (as in the case of the nationally homogenous Russian *krais* and *oblasts*), the slogans to oppose the central (federal) Russian authorities are replaced by others: as the necessity to protect regional markets and natural resources from destruction, to improve the environment, or to resolve social problems by raising the living standards of the local population.

At different levels of the Federation, the tendencies of separatism and legislative autonomization are strong and reflect the emergence of new centres of power in Russia that are opposed to the traditional centre. This process could have been stopped if a unified legal system and a unified power structure were available in this country, but at present they are not. The deepening of these processes is wrought with dangers: the undermining of the territorial integrity of Russia, potential conflicts over borders, conflicting territorial claims, and loss of control over the Federation as an integral economic territory. If the Federation disintegrates, Russians and "Russian speaking peoples," who have never had an autonomous region of their own in the RF, will become dispersed ethnic minorities.

The consolidation of Russian statehood, through the strengthening of the federal authorities, is at present the weaker trend.

Working in favour of this trend are mainly the legislative efforts of the Supreme Soviet and the Constitutional Commission of the RF. The adoption of the Federal Agreement (in March 1992) helped to save Russia from being divided into numerous independent parts. The Agreement has become a component and an independent section of the working Constitution of the RF, whilst the Russian Federation has acquired the new traits of a constitution and treaty state. The Federal Agreement has introduced a new system of power distribution. The Federation is in charge of major matters — protection of citizens' rights, defence, foreign policy, space, metrology and standards, major development programmes, juridical guarantees for the common market, federal budget, taxation,

monetary issues, common infrastructure (power and transportation systems), with the regions participating in the resolution of all the above-listed issues through their representatives in the upper chamber of the federal Parliament. This is the current Soviet of Nationalities, but according to the draft of the New Constitution, it will become the Federal Soviet. As envisaged by the Agreement, the republics of the RF are entitled to full control of their natural resources, to independent foreign economic activity, to general economic freedom, and so on.

The signing of the Federal Agreement has not resulted in the lessening of international tensions. Although the adoption of the Agreement was the only possible compromise, it has not satisfied either the supporters of the unitary state or the separatists. More importantly, the means of bringing the Agreement to its realization are yet to be formulated. In the opinion of many experts, resolving the problems of the federation in conformity with the Agreement, would require the adoption of not less than 100 new legislative acts.

In parallel with efforts to realize the Federal Agreement, the federal power structures in Russia have started preparing the draft of a new Constitution, which might be adopted in 1993 by the Congress of People's Deputies. The following article concerning the form and principles of the state-territorial structure of Russia has been proposed: "[...] it is based on the principle of federalism, secures the unity of Russian Federation, decentralizes state power and realizes the right of peoples to self-determination." While the work on the new Constitution and on the juridical mechanism for the realization of the Federal Agreement is being carried on, it is in the constitutional sphere that a complex crisis situation has developed in Russia.

There is no coherence between different but interconnected processes: i.e. between the signing of the Federal Agreement and its incorporation into the present-day Constitution, between the process of adoption of a new Constitution of the RF and the new Constitutions and rules for the members of the Federation. Given such a background the operating laws do not function and separatist trends are growing stronger at different levels.

2. What are the causes of separatism and the possible disintegration of Russia?

The causes are generally familiar, and have been described by many analysts in the media. Among the political, legal, socio-economic and

ethno-political causes the following can be described as the most important:

i. The critical decentralization of power, the weakness of the centre and its inability to resolve regional problems. Opposition between the legislative and executive authorities, and between the President and Parliament. Such a situation offers local authorities new opportunities for action and opens the way for a "parade of sovereignties." The precedent of the fast and free disintegration of the USSR acts as a catalyst in this process.

ii. The absence of any effective legal (constitutional) mechanism to prevent the unlawful decision of local authorities to separate from the RF. It is at present impossible to abrogate any of the legislative acts of the republics (i.e. their own drafts of Constitutions, the outcomes of national referendums, local amendments to Russian laws, decrees of their "own" Presidents etc.) even if they are recognized by the Constitutional Court as being in breach of the Basic Law of the RF or the Federal Agreement. There is no possibility for the use of force to ensure that the regions and republics obey the Russian Constitution.

iii. The shortcomings of the former national state structure of Russia and the imperfection of the Federal Agreement, which consolidated the unequal status of the Federation's members (87 of them) as well as the "titular" ones and other nations. Having been deprived of their proper share of rights and privileges, the mostly Russian *krais* (territories) and *oblasts* (regions), and the former autonomous republics strive to achieve independence and to expand their powers.

iv. The economic and, particularly, the financial crisis. The cash crisis from early 1992 to the mid-summer of 1992. This has stimulated the development of economic regionalism "as relying on its own resources." There is still hyperinflation in Russia, and goods remain more important than money. With no prospects for the stabilization of the rouble, there is little hope of decreasing the economic regionalism that may develop into separatism. All republics, *krais* and *oblasts* make similar demands: a one-channel tax system, higher hard-currency raw material export quotas (oil, gold, diamonds etc.) and lower federal budget assignments. The latest budgetary message from the Russian President has prompted a negative response in the regions, as it established a 67:33 expenditure ratio between the Federal budget and the budgets of the Federation's members. Such a distribution of financial resources does not provide even for the minimal needs of the regions, and hinders the extension of the reforms to the periphery. All of this indicates the prolongation and deepening of the separatist tendency.

v. Federalism is not popular amongst the vast mass of the population. Non-Russian peoples, in particular, identify federalism with an attempt to restore the empire. The move towards sovereignty becomes a means of ethnic defense against perceived imperialist ambitions.

vi. Errors in the policies of central authorities: confrontation with the republics which have not signed the Federal Agreement, absence of a sustained political dialogue, the lack of flexibility on the part of the Russian delegation in the negotiation process, and the problem of the status of newly independent republics.

On the whole, however, the trends of separatism and regionalism in Russia are not always related to nationalism as such. The more important factors are political, socio-economic and legal as listed above. Nationalism is, however, sometimes raised up as a banner by local ethnocratic leaders in their struggle for power.

3. Possible outline of a future Russia.

In the near future, the deepening of regionalization and the growth of separatism in the former autonomies will continue against the background of general political and economic instability. There are not, however, many realistic candidates for secession from the Federation.

The complete disintegration of the Russian Federation after the disintegration of the Union is out of question, as there is not a single autonomous unit to fulfil the role that Russia played within the USSR. In spite of the fact that the idea of independence also exists in the larger *krais* and *oblasts* of Siberia, the Far East, Primorye, Sakhalin *oblast*, and in the Uralian and Yenisei republics, only geographically peripheral autonomies and *krais* are potentially able to break away from the RF completely. Even in this case, the idea of self-isolation is destructive, as the experience of "independent" Chechnia shows. For many members of the present-day Federation no real sovereignty, supported by economic independence, is yet conceivable without the traditional intra-Russian ties.

The question of an optimum form of state structure will remain open for a long time. We cannot exclude the possibility that some new, as yet unknown form of federation will gradually develop within possibly new borders, quite different from the territorial configuration of present-day Russia. The legal basis of the RF will be developed and changed. It is quite obvious that the Federal Agreement will have to be modified in due course. There may emerge a new agreement between the members of the Federation, which will take existing realities into account. Appropriate

changes will also be introduced into the Constitution of the RF.

In the near future we may witness the emergence of some new members of the Federation, i.e. of regional unions from among the unions of *krais*, *oblasts* and autonomies similar to already existing ones: the Siberian Agreement, the Great Volga association, the "Confederation of the republics and *oblasts* of the Volga area and the Urals" which unites Bashkortostan, Marii El, Tatarstan, and Chuvashia. The independent state of the Republic of Tatarstan, in association with Russia, has set a precedent, although it is not clear whether the republic is in Russia or outside it.² There is now a formula for a permeable, tolerant sovereignty for the members of the reforming Russian Federation, according to which every one of them will have a broad range of rights in the field of foreign relations with neighbouring independent states of the CIS.

By now supporters of a new (real) federation versus confederation have become quite distinct. According to the former the federal form of nation-state structure is the only one acceptable for a multinational Russia. But they stress that, up to now, we have had no experience of real federalism and the practice of federal principles has been limited. In order to realize the concept of a new federalism, it is necessary (in the opinion of the supporters of such federalism) to fulfil the following three conditions: 1) to continue decentralisation of power, to transfer many of the political, economic, social and cultural functions from the centre to the periphery, to the local organs of administrative and economic government; 2) to raise the status of *krais* and *oblasts* (administrative-territorial units) to that of the republics in the composition of the Federation, and in so doing to ensure the equality of all its members and avoid the faults of the nation-state principle of the Russian Federation; 3) to realize the principle of national-cultural autonomy and to create the conditions necessary for the functioning of the communities of the larger peoples of Russia (Russian, Tatar, Ukrainian etc.). An important feature of this concept is the recognition of the priority of the rights of citizens over that of "ethnoses" and the introduction of a single Russian citizenship and passport.

Supporters of confederation insist that Russia has already come close to confederation in its structure and functioning. Their arguments are as follows: the federal constitutional system is now made up of two levels of interrelated legal norms — the Constitution of the RF and the Federal Agreement; a complex process of transition from a constitutional system to a system based both on the constitution and bilateral agreements between the centre and the regions is going on. The federative system is being loosened and transformed into "treaty relations" including bilateral

relations between sovereign bodies. The state-forming role of the Federal Agreement (March 1992) is negated on the grounds that its function is limited to the differentiation of rights, and delegating appropriate powers. Since there is no single generally recognized constitution and no treaty on the formation of a single state, i.e. of the Russian Federation, it seems justifiable to interpret the on-going changes in the national-state system as directed towards confederation.

During the Parliamentary hearings of February 22nd, 1993, the Chairman of the Commission for the National-State System and International Relations of the Supreme Soviet of the RF, N.P. Medvedev, stated clearly that "we have actually come to a confederation of 21 republics in the composition of Russia."

The democratic supporters of the state in Russia think the transformation of the Russian Federation into a confederation is inadmissible, while the supporters of a confederative system see such a transformation as an unavoidable stage in the development of Russia. The arguments of economists are very convincing in this respect. They argue that the sphere of authority of the regions must be as broad as possible within the framework of a rigid federative system, or market reforms will not progress any further. The experience of economic relations between Russia and the former Union republics is also significant: their development is directed not towards a single economic union even within the CIS, but towards bilateral, economic treaty relations with the weak participation of some supra-state management structures.

The two opposing approaches to the process of the "renovation of Russia" are reflected in the progress of constitutional reforms. The federalist approach envisages complete conformity of the drafts of the Constitutions of the republics with the Basic Law of the Russian Federation. According to the confederative approach, the republics should not be bound by any obligations to the Constitution in force, but must have the right to elaborate their own approaches and to have them reflected in their own Constitutions. In the opinion of the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RF Nikolai Ryabov, neither of the approaches should be overly rigid in practice.

The position described above are far from indisputable. We are inclined to think, and this opinion is shared by other experts, that in the coming years the state system of Russia will inevitably be marked by transitional traits, consistent with the profound social and economic changes which characterise Russia today. The main task of the newly emerging state power structures is to eliminate national and social

conflicts, and to ensure the creation of a market economy for the stable future statehood of Russia.

As early as the beginning of 1992 Russia entered de facto into the transitional period of reforming her nation-state structure when the Federal Agreement was not signed by two of the Federation's members, Tatarstan and Chechnia.

The most important feature of the present period is the breach of the juridical integrity of the Russian Federation whilst the central authorities still retain key state functions: foreign policy, state defence, international law, and monetary-credit controls. The economic space of the Federation still retains its relative integrity: there are no customs or currency borders, a single currency is in use, there is no active division of Russian property (between the former Union republics) or of the foreign assets of Russia.

All of this creates conditions for the formation of a new relations between the Federation's members through a system of treaties, economic agreements, agreements on the division of powers and the voluntary delegation of rights.

In our view, the way to preserve the Russian state is to strengthen authority at the centre, to attain economic stability, to arrange for a permanent negotiation process, and to maintain the economic integration which is conducive to nation-state consolidation. These tasks are not easily carried out.

At the same time the experience of the disintegration of the USSR and the unsuccessful attempts of the former Union republics to become integrated into the world economic system without Russia shows that some form of internal integration is unavoidable. At the level of public opinion, there is however a growing movement towards unification with Russia. In the July 1992 survey in Chechnia, 42.8 percent of the population of Grozny city answered yes to the idea of signing a bilateral agreement "recognizing Chechnia as a free republic in the composition of the RF." The June 1992 survey conducted by the sociological service of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan showed that 64.5 percent of the respondents were in favour of "the sovereignty of the Republic within the composition of the RF."

NOTES

¹ According to the Federal Agreement only two cities in the RF enjoy republican status:

Moscow and Saint-Petersburg.

² The adoption in November 1992 of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, Article 61, which registered a new formula for relations with Russia: "Association on the basis of an agreement about mutual delegation of powers and fields of authority."

Federalist Action

MOVEMENT, PARTY OR PRESSURE GROUP?

The debate on the nature of the federalist struggle and the organisational instrument (party, movement or pressure group) through which it can best be expressed is continuous within the European Federalist Movement. The question may appear outdated nowadays in the Italian *Movimento Federalista Europeo* (MFE), but it is certainly still alive in countries crucial to the federalist battle, such as France, where the Movement has several times in its history chosen the electoral option, with the result of losing any chance of seriously influencing the process. Moreover, even in Italy, parts of the Movement are sometimes tempted to challenge the political establishment on the hustings, particularly when the European elections come round, or in situations such as the present one, when the structural crisis and the contradictions of the national political struggle and of the parties become more evident and seem to cast doubt on even the well-established choices based on federalist experience.

Organisational choices from the Movement's foundation to the Congress of the European People.

The issue of the nature of the European federal unity struggle, and hence of the nature of the organisation which has this as its objective, was first expounded at Ventotene, by Spinelli. As we know, what distinguished Spinelli from his predecessors, the great thinkers who considered the question of European unity before him, was the consciousness that this issue must be the object of a specific political struggle. Spinelli realised that the struggle for the European Federation was a revolutionary battle, which called for purposeful political action and a new political organisation. In other words, Spinelli distinguished himself (and stated this quite clearly in his writings) from those thinkers of the past who, while having identified the political unity of Europe (and of the world) as a great political goal, had limited themselves (on the question of action) to

“suggesting” to those in power the necessity of realising these goals, without considering the problem of “how” to achieve these objectives, which were considered simply the inevitable by-product of normal political struggles for democracy, socialism, etc.

In fact the idea of a “party” (a revolutionary federalist party) was raised in the *Ventotene Manifesto*. According to Spinelli, it “... cannot be improvised in a dilettante fashion at the decisive moment, but must start to be prepared right now, at least in its central political stance, its general cadres and the direction of initial action. It must not represent a heterogeneous mass of people of extremely diverse tendencies, united only negatively and transitorily, for example by their anti-fascist past and in the sole expectation of the fall of the totalitarian regime, and ready to disperse, each going their own way, once that goal is reached. The revolutionary party knows that in fact only then will its work begin: and it must therefore be composed of people who agree on the principal problems of the future...”¹ In fact, the text quoted, in which the expression “the revolutionary party” appears, does not exclude the idea of a “movement”-type organisation (in the same chapter the term “movement” is used to describe the militant nature of the federalist organisation which must recruit only those who have made the European revolution the main aim of their life; who carry out the necessary work in a disciplined fashion day by day, taking all precautions for its continued security and effectiveness, even in situations of the greatest illegality, and thus constitute the solid network which gives consistency to the more transient sphere of sympathisers.

Spinelli wrote the *Manifesto* in 1941, in the midst of the armed struggle against nazi-fascism, whose defeat could by no means be taken for granted; quite clearly, no absolute organisational choice between the “party” and the “movement” could be made at this time. Things changed after the fall of fascism. At the Milan meeting in August 1943, the “party” alternative was side-stepped in favour of the “movement” form, on the basis of arguments that are still valid today; these are published in the article “Movement or Party” attributed to Usellini, but certainly inspired by Spinelli, which appeared in the second issue of *L'Unità Europea* (August 1943).²

Spinelli and his fellow militants realised that the analysis of Ventotene had been partly dogmatic: it had assumed that Europe would suffer a serious power vacuum in the post-war period, in which a small revolutionary party could fight for and seize power, in the absence of national alternatives. What actually happened had not been foreseen by

Spinelli at Ventotene: the United States on the one hand and the USSR on the other, instead of returning to the isolationist stances which had characterised their strategic decisions at the end of the First World War, intervened directly in European political affairs and took it on themselves to fill the power vacuum created by the defeat of Nazi-fascism, by promoting the “restoration” of the old system of nation-states. The situation of an extremely weak European political system, which Spinelli had foreseen, did not come about, and therefore the very basis on which a federalist “revolutionary party” could have operated was lacking. Instead, what the situation foreshadowed was a long-term commitment which would necessitate the involvement of other forces as well (such as, for example, those of the traditional parties, which would mainly be active on the national level) without the movement being obliged, as Usellini explained, to renege on “its revolutionary conception.”

The political struggle of the MFE from then until the fall of the European Defence Community (EDC) was not however much influenced by specific organisational choices, since in fact the MFE was personified by Spinelli. It was Spinelli, thanks to his independence of thought, capacity, and will to act, who led the political battle, almost always from the front, and who was in a position to play different roles in the various situations of European politics. It was thus an atypical phase in the life of the movement, in which organisational choices were entirely secondary and functional to the initiatives of the Movement’s leader. Having re-entered the Movement at the end of the 1940’s (after a brief interlude with the *Partito d’Azione*, a party operating between 1942-47, with a programme combining liberal and socialist ideals), Spinelli was able, precisely because of his independence of thought, to deal on equal terms with the heads of parties or of governments and to modify their line of action. By contrast, the cadres of the Movement mainly consisted of good “Europeanists,” for the most part sympathisers of the mainstream political parties and pro-governmental organisations, who saw the struggle for European Union more as an aspect (albeit of not insignificant importance) of the confrontation between democratic and communist ideals, represented respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union, rather than as a valid objective per se, independent of the outcome of the confrontation between East and West.³

With the fall of the EDC (August 1954) there began a long period of transition for the Movement, which in fact lasted for more than a decade, until the Congresses of Lyons (February 1962) and Turin (November 1966). This phase, aptly if somewhat romantically termed “the long

march into the desert,” was characterised at the outset by the attempt to found outside the MFE (which had by that time become a sort of Europeanist grouping of various parties that recognised and respected the leadership and charisma of Spinelli, without fully understanding his strategic thrust) a new organisation of independent militants at the European level: the Congress of the European People. However, towards the end of the 1950’s the Congress of the European People initiative also seemed to fail (at least on the level of general strategy: basically the CEP had been a kind of new attempt to found a classic revolutionary organisation). The initiative of calling citizens to the ballot box, in a sort of “primary” election, was successful, but only in a limited geographical area (basically in North Italy, Rome and Lyons); however, the CEP had not succeeded in achieving its target of transferring the experience of an autonomous and militant struggle into a sufficient number of European towns.⁴ The capacity to expand into new towns was lacking above all because federalists (who certainly did exist) had not understood the revolutionary nature of the struggle and therefore were unable to adopt those independent and militant positions which seemed to be (and for the most part were) challenging the established powers.

Thus an impasse had been arrived at. It was clear that if a hundred towns in Europe had achieved what the five to ten active Italian towns had done, the federalists would have won by the classical revolutionary method; that had not happened. We must therefore once more promote a wide-ranging debate on strategy and organisation in order to seek out new routes and above all to attempt to transfer onto the European front the independent and militant experience of the CEP.⁵

The debate about organisational issues at the Congress of Lyons (February 1962).

The failure of the CEP engrossed the whole of the MFE: while being clear on the theoretical aspects of our struggle, we could not see how to use the forces which we had certainly been able to mobilise in those towns where the CEP had won. The debate, culminating at the Congress of Lyons in February 1962, did however clarify the alternatives as regarded the nature of the struggle, strategy and consequent type of organisation, and forced us in particular to focus on the good reasons for choosing an autonomist movement compared to those other possibilities that had in the meantime taken on new life: the “party” and the “pressure group.”

Meanwhile Spinelli had returned to an active role in the Movement

and, at the Regional Congress of Lombardy's MFE (24th September 1961), had proposed that the MFE should seek an alliance with "the democratic forces of progress" and participate in the national political elections in some European towns. Thus Spinelli opted for electoral confrontation with the national political forces (hence for a party); this was to be realised in three cities (Lyons, Turin and Antwerp) where there was a nucleus of militant federalists. Being clearly aware, however, that an electoral outlook which depended exclusively on the federalists would lose, he planned to seek to establish a "strong" association with the political groups of the democratic left, who were considered "necessary" allies, on the national level, of the federalist alternative.⁶

The Regional Committee of Lombardy's MFE rejected Spinelli's proposal: in Lombardy there was a group forming around Albertini ("Federalist Autonomy") which reasserted the full validity of the independent movement option. According to Albertini and his supporters, an alliance with national forces and participation in elections would divert the MFE from the supranational towards the national path; and with this option, Spinelli had effectively abandoned the two essential postulates of federalist autonomy — criticism of the national parties (whether of the right or left) and the refusal to participate in the national political struggle.

Thus at the Congress of February 1962, the moment of truth came; the supranational European Federalist Movement was then the combination of what are today the Italian MFE and the French MFE, along with other small offshoots in Belgium and Germany (the German, Dutch, and English organisations belonged instead to the AEF, the European Federalists' Action, of which Europa-Union Deutschland was the strongest group). The congress delegates were asked to consider the following three options. First, Spinelli's proposal for the electoral option, together with a preferential relationship with left-wing forces. Second, the "pressure group" position, which reaffirmed the traditional (pre-Spinelli) role of the federalists as uncritical "prompters" of the political class, instead of being independent actors (the position presented by Germain Desboeuf and which a large proportion of the French MFE felt comfortable with). Finally, the position of Albertini and Federalist Autonomy for a great European debate aimed at clarifying the terms of the federalist struggle as a preliminary step to the constitution of a genuinely revolutionary political force that would by definition be independent of and essentially indifferent to the national political power balances. According to Albertini and the autonomists, it was indispensable to shift the axis of action

and thought from the national to the "European context"⁷ and to re-propose, as an organisational instrument, a movement which rejected the national field, where parties and pressure groups normally operate.

It is not necessary here to go into the details of the course of events at the Congress and their consequences; it is enough to record that in the end, even though by a narrow margin, the Congress passed a motion of general policy which sought to mediate between the various positions, and which was opposed by Albertini and Federalist Autonomy. It is however worth citing a few extracts from the speech made by the leader of Federalist Autonomy to the Congress, when declaring his vote on the general policy motion. Turning to the delegates, Albertini began with a stark but realistic analysis of the situation of the MFE and of its ability to act: "Those who want to be of use to federalism and not to use it, must choose ... the route of consolidating and strengthening the MFE. In the present situation this route is obstructed by two obstacles: the co-existence of tendencies which want to act as a pressure group, as a party or as a movement, and the absence of a real European organisational dimension (a sufficient number of active sections, at least in the six EC member countries). Until the MFE reaches this size, and as long as it remains divided into three tendencies, the action of each one of them will be ineffectual, and the policy of the MFE as a whole cannot have a truly European character. In fact, the pressure group, the party and the movement tend to neutralise each other, in that they involve actions in opposite directions: fighting or courting the parties, accepting or rejecting the national context. It is indisputable that those who aim to act as a pressure group must accept, and even court the parties; those that aim to act as a party must fight all the other parties; while those who intend to act as a movement have no intention of altering party policy on any single issue, nor of taking votes away from them, but rather of transferring the political struggle onto European ground. They must therefore neither court nor combat the parties on their own ground, but on the contrary (and this is what marks them out) must reject the national contexts in which the others act..."⁸

The strategy of the federalists must therefore aim to transfer the political struggle from the national to the European context, and in order to do this they must neither "court" the parties nor put themselves in competition with them on the national (electoral) level. They must instead stand up to the parties (and to other expressions of national power: governments, parliaments, local authorities) to lead them onto European ground, forcing them (whenever the opportunity arises) to make choices which advance the European alternative and set back the national one. On

the other hand, the basis of this choice of movement (independent, militant, and with a European base, at least potentially) is justified only by the existence of a “virtuality” inherent in the very course of history. This concept was clarified very effectively by Mario Albertini again, in a note written in the autumn of 1961 in preparation for the Congress: “... in order to establish the European state, it is necessary to bring into the political struggle a new force, a European force. This attempt can only be made if this force virtually exists, i.e. if something really existing can be organised. Now, there is a direct relationship between the cause of the authoritarian decadence of the national democracies, and the attempt to make a European democratic organisation work politically, because this attempt can be none other than that of organising in the supranational dimension whatever facets of democracy escape the traditional parties in the national dimension...”⁹

Organisation and strategy: the debate at the Congress of Turin (November 1966).

The reference to a virtually existing force at the European level (therefore “non-existent,” still to be established) highlights another crucial aspect which must characterise federalist organisation: that of an avant-garde movement which, finding itself operating in enemy territory (the nation-states) manages to constitute a reference and catalyst for all those who understand (or intuit) the need to work towards a new front, a new field of struggle (in other words a new *situation of power*) where it is possible to effectively fight to establish the European state.

The issue of the Movement as a “federalist avant-garde” and of its capacity for initiative (the movement’s strategy) to transform the “virtuality” of the process into effective political successes (changing the existing balance of power), was once more the object of lively internal debate, coming to a climax at the MFE Congress in Turin (30th October — 1st November 1966). On that occasion Albertini, in his introductory address, began by recalling the factors (of an “ideological” and “historical” nature) conditioning the process of establishing federal unity in Europe. He noted briefly that all the great ideologies active in the European political scene were unquestionably favourable to the European federation. “I am in no doubt about this. Their values cannot be limited to a single country without being degraded, nor be properly extended beyond their own country without the federalist principle. For these reasons, such forces have always professed federalist principles, even if in a confused

way (the principal confusion being that of federalism with internationalism) and albeit with ups and downs determined by historical events.”¹⁰ This meant that such a great historic objective could gather enormous support (its opponents being limited to small nationalistic minorities); however (and this must be emphasised) this favourable attitude, which involves governments, parties and public opinion “...will not translate into political action until the proper historical circumstances present themselves... In concrete terms, this ideological support only means that *there are no insurmountable obstacles.*”¹¹

In his analysis of the other “factor” (of a historical nature), Albertini highlighted, in a very effective outline of the situation, the by then structural aspects of the balance (or rather imbalance) of power reached by the European states system after the Second World War. To summarise: even if nations have remained formally sovereign, the historical reality is that we are in a situation where national sovereignty is in decline and a “de facto European unity” is developing. The course of history itself has started a process which is gradually making the contradiction between the dimensions of problems (both economic and political) and the institutional structures (the system of sovereign nation-states) increasingly obvious. These structures operate as a sort of Nessus’s shirt, i.e. they have a strangulating effect, in the sense that they prevent those politicians and citizens who would like to solve such problems from tackling them at the level at which they arise: continental and, in future, global. The states (their governments, parliaments, and traditional political forces organised at national level) attempt to overcome this contradiction by “inventing” pseudo-European solutions, which essentially come under the umbrella of intergovernmental cooperation. These allow them to propose at most temporary solutions, using instruments which do not call into question the very foundations of national sovereignty.

Albertini’s analysis systematically and rigorously investigated concepts that were already present in the texts of the first federalist authors.¹² Until then, however, no author had clearly posed the theoretical problem of the contradiction between ends (solution of problems) and means (institutions) *in the context* of contemporary European history with the intention of obtaining “scientific” indications as regards the strategy to follow in the federalist struggle for European unity. With respect to this, Albertini’s address at Turin concluded the analysis of the “historical factor” with these considerations: “The major problems can no longer be solved within the context of the nation-states, since these problems belong to a greater dimension. In theory, they can only be

resolved in a European context. In practice, due to the absence of European political power, they end up finding only inadequate solutions in the context of the imperfect unity which is compatible with maintaining the formal sovereignty of the states. But each of their unitary solutions, however imperfect, changes the situation in such a way that *solving the new problems which arise requires an even greater degree of unity ...* This logic of events ... has so far found its most important and advanced expression in the Common Market.”¹³

Thus it is possible (in the sense that, as was said, there are no “insurmountable obstacles”) to achieve the objective of the European federation, but *there is no reference framework* (a European framework) in whose context the favourable forces (the vast majority) and contrary ones can divide and be measured according to the normal dialectic of democracy. In this situation, the principal obstacle lies in the fact that (as long as the life of the nation-states remains sufficiently stable, mainly thanks to the successes of European integration) the national political struggle is carried out exclusively within the states. This limitation prevents the subjects of normal political struggle (the parties, the groups organised on a national basis) from seeing the concrete possibility of realising a European alternative and thus from fighting to achieve definitive and effective transfers of sovereignty from the states to Europe. As regards the condition and role of the parties, Albertini noted that “... the political process, election by election, pushes them to say what their own nation ought to do in the field of foreign, military and economic policy ... The idea of a *European power*, being extraneous to the habits and acquired positions of the parties, cannot form itself spontaneously among them, but it is also true that they could easily accept it if it were proposed to them *from outside*, because a European power would be stronger, more democratic and less subversive than whatever [alternative] power might form itself in the national context.”¹⁴

In this apparently hopeless context (the political process within the states cannot help but perpetuate itself), what role and what effective possibilities of action remain available to the MFE? In brief: to be the proposers, *from outside*, of the alternative of a European power. In other words, to act as an avant-garde which is able to exploit every occasion offered by the contradictions of the historical process (“the new problems which arise require an even greater degree of unity”) and preconstitutes an as yet fictitious European reference framework, through initiatives that highlight the European nature of issues and oblige political forces to line up on one side or the other.

This will mean working, whenever the opportunity arises, on the specific objectives that the process itself brings into focus (the monetary crisis, the Community’s democratic deficit, etc.) and that allow a realignment of the forces that, in general, are in any event favourable (do not represent “insurmountable obstacles”) to a pro-European choice.¹⁵

In this context, it was inevitable that Turin should see the reconfirmation of the organisational choices made at Lyons regarding federalist autonomy: the federalists must become a political force entirely independent of national power, both from a theoretical and practical point of view. During the congress, Albertini stressed that, from a theoretical point of view one should, using the theory of federalism, demystify the idea of the nation and its ideology, which is at times hidden behind apparently progressive arguments. From a practical point of view it was necessary to develop a “community opposition,” which entailed the rejection not so much of this or that government or regime, but rather of the national community as the exclusive political community. This last aspect was, and is, particularly difficult to bring about. Basically it means abandoning the viewpoint of those who operate “in the frame of the exclusive national powers and therefore, even though they are sincerely committed to European unity can only visualise the events which keep national powers in place.” We must instead rise to the point of being able to act to bring these powers down, putting ourselves “in a position to focus also on the events of European integration which undermine them, creating ... a *de facto European power*.” In this way they can effectively fight to “... transform a *de facto European power* into a constitutional one.”

He who has made this choice (the choice of being the “theoretical and practical conscience of the European nature of the basic political alternative”) can and must have a very particular relationship with national power and with normal politics. In periods when major political and economic problems arise which find no solution in the nation-states, “... he can *enter the field* and side with those who seek a real solution, whereas at those times when, in order to resolve such problems with their own imperfect means (those of national governments and European collaboration), normal politics is content with imperfect and precarious solutions, he must *leave the field*, denounce compromises, and await the discomfiture of those who remain in the national context.”¹⁶ The implicit corollary of these choices is that both the party option (participation in elections) and that of the pressure group (a busybody buzzing around the established powers) must be rejected even more emphatically (because we have to be outside the national political dialectic and because of the

need to bring *the whole* of “the diffuse Europeanism” onto European ground). Rather, there should be a reconfirmation of the “autonomist movement with a European-wide basis,” which will have to take upon itself the task, as Albertini postulated shortly before Lyons, of “organising in the supranational dimension whatever facets of democracy escape the traditional parties in the national dimension.”

Some considerations in conclusion.

Have we succeeded in this task? From a strictly formal (bureaucratic) point of view, the answer has to be a negative one: it appears that the MFE has been unsuccessful in organising on a supranational level (even at the level of the six original countries of the Community) the entire potential of organisable Europeanism. The MFE has remained formally an Italian organisation and its “sister” organisations (linked to the MFE through the Union of European Federalists) have maintained a substantially non-autonomous and non-militant structure and strategy.

However, if we study the facts, it must be recognised that the MFE has been able, at crucial moments, to influence both Italian politicians active in Europe, and the European political class at large. It has succeeded in exercising a stimulating role, which has been effective in all the decisive moments of the struggle, towards the more traditional European federalist organisations (UEF, Young European Federalists, and their national branches), as well as over those of the so-called “federalist force,” such as the *Association Européenne des Enseignants* (AEDE) and the *Associazione Italiana del Consiglio dei Comuni e delle Regioni d'Europa* (AICCRE). These latter organisations have been able to give both political and operational support to the more advanced positions in the struggle (for example collecting signatures on petitions for the direct election of the European Parliament and for the single currency), thanks to the commitment of the not so few federalist friends who were *also* active in these organisations (having so-called “dual membership”) which it is perhaps rather belittling to call “collateral.”

Indeed, if we focus on the results attained in the years of struggle from Turin until the present (direct elections for the European Parliament, the start of the constituent process, the near-achievement of the single currency), one cannot help concluding that what was written in *Il Federalista* in December 1983 (when it was already possible to make an initial assessment of the results achieved by the policy which the Movement had decided on and put into effect after the debates of the

Lyons/Turin period) was perfectly valid. “...The MFE is thus a movement in the full sense of the word, since it has been able (by exploiting its capacity for dialogue with all democratic forces) to take whatever initiatives were necessary whenever the occasion arose to put the national governments and states onto the *slippery slope* towards the European Federation... Certainly, the European Federation has not been achieved yet, but no-one can, in good faith, deny that all these initiatives, even though they have achieved only partial success, have been effective (and thus the federalists have been engaged in political activity), at least in the sense that today it is infinitely more difficult than in the 1950's for any European government, including the British, to criticise either the existence of the Community or the necessity of its democratic progress.”¹⁷

These observations (of about 10 years ago) are still valid today. They demonstrate that the choice of the militant and independent movement which we know today as the MFE, and in which we operate, was the winning option, even if it has been decidedly the most difficult to follow. Militants often feel they have a secondary role, whose usefulness and effectiveness is in doubt; there are moments in which one has the impression that nothing can be done to intervene in the process. But this, as Albertini noted, is inherent in that same revolutionary choice which postulates a capacity to intervene in the process, *if a process exists*. It is thus a clearly difficult choice, which calls for the ability (perhaps more moral than political) to take the field at any given moment, knowing that one can only have a partial influence on the final result of the process.

Sante Granelli

NOTES

¹ Altiero Spinelli, *Il progetto europeo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1985, p. 35.

² “...Federalism is thus a need which can be felt, as indeed it is, by men of every party, class, nation, race and religion, and as such does not fit the traditional mould of political parties in the strict sense of the word. At the moment, when the seeds of federalism are still being sown, the name “political movement” is more suitable than that of “party,” in that it presents this federation requirement to the parties themselves as one of primary importance and the greatest urgency, and allows its members, as indeed is already happening, to belong to any party so long as the latter's goals are not contrary to the Movement's fundamental premise ... movement, and not party, because, given its revolutionary conception and unifying requirement, federalism carries out its activities on a different level, not in contrast to, but parallel with, those of the various parties which, by tradition and structure, conduct

their struggle in the national context.

Thus, the discipline which federalism imposes on its members is no less demanding than that of a real party. Its character is exquisitely political because it aims to mobilise all forces capable of working for its vast and complex objective, wherever they are to be found, under whatever progressive flag they militate. It aims to create its own organisation, able to spread the federalist idea and to act resolutely in revolutionary fashion in the illegal political struggle of today. It aims to avoid missing, in the legal political life of tomorrow, any chance to operate on the same level as political parties and in collaboration with all those who, having reflected on the fatal interdependence of the cultures, economies and life itself of the European peoples, are aware that no solution can be valid and lasting until a political structure emerges at the international level which can demolish the remaining obstacles, eliminate resistance, overcome distrust, guarantee its own function, harmonise the requirements of all and protect from the inevitable reactions the truest and deepest outcome of today's suffering and injuries..." (*L'Unità europea*, n.2, August 1943, p. 3).

³ With respect to the influence exercised by Spinelli (and by the Movement) on De Gasperi in 1951 regarding the EDC, and more specifically his capacity to exploit strategically this historic chance to transform an essentially biased initiative (anti-Soviet, pro-Atlantic) into a battle for the affirmation of democracy on the European level, with the institution of the *ad hoc* assembly (in reality a Constituent Assembly), see Mario Albertini, "La fondazione dello Stato europeo," in *Il Federalista*, XIX (1977), pp. 5-55.

⁴ In fact, in the towns where the small nucleus of local federalists had succeeded in organising the primary elections, these had a remarkably good rate of public participation, not only where the local organisation was led by independent militants, but also in cities such as Darmstadt, Maastricht, Strasbourg and Berlin, where the militants were closer to traditional pro-governmental Europeanism.

⁵ These concepts are taken up again in *Le Fédéraliste*, IV (1962), p. 31, where, commenting on the outcome of the IX MFE Congress (Lyons, 9th — 11th, February 1962), Albertini recalls the experiment of the CEP: "... the attempt to make the people vote for Europe succeeded because it gained favour in public opinion, and because it was supported on the organisational and political level by the 'autonomist' cadres who had formed in the course of the struggle for control of the Italian section of the UEF (which at that time was an independent movement, the Italian MFE). But the attempt to extend the elections to a significant proportion of Western Europe did not succeed. The success proved enough to consolidate the CPE as an independent organisation, but not to give it an effective European dimension ..."

⁶ Spinelli himself, in presenting this plan of action to the Congress of Lyons, identified the democratic left wing as the natural ally of federalists. In the Italian case in particular, according to Spinelli, the federalists would have to fight for "the participation of socialists in the democratic life of the country; to free the catholic forces of the left from their dependence on conservative clerical and economic influences; to create autonomous regions against the monopolies; to have the problems of the South of Italy encompassed in a European economic 'plan'; and for a policy of genuine European initiative." Cf. *Le Fédéraliste*, IV (1962), pp. 93-94.

⁷ The European context was defined by Albertini as "... a purely rational context without centres of power, instruments of struggle, means of information; an *invisible context* in which human action has not yet left specific political signs and where almost everyone naturally feels the horror of the void." Cf. *Le Fédéraliste*, IV (1962), p. 34.

⁸ Cf. *Le Fédéraliste*, IV (1962), pp. 95-96.

⁹ Cf. *Il Federalista*, III (1961), p. 271.

¹⁰ Cf. L. Levi and S. Pistone (edited by), *Trent'anni di vita del Movimento Federalista*

Europeo, Milan, Franco Angeli, 1973, p. 307.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 307-308.

¹² Cf. for example the "Manifesto to Europeans" drawn up in October 1914 by Georg Friedrich Nicolai and signed by Albert Einstein: "Technology has shrunk the world. Indeed, today the nations of the great European peninsula seem to jostle one another much as once did the city-states that were crowded into those smaller peninsulas jutting out into the Mediterranean. Travel is so widespread, international supply and demand are so interwoven, that Europe — one could almost say the whole world — is even now a single unit.... This is not the place to discuss how this new order in Europe may be brought about. Our sole purpose is to affirm our profound conviction that the time has come when Europe must unite to guard its soil, its people, and its culture. We are stating publicly our faith in European unity, a faith which we believe is shared by many; we hope that this public affirmation of our faith may contribute to the growth of a powerful movement toward such unity." (From Otto Nathan and Heinz Norden (edited by), *Einstein on Peace*, NYC, Simon & Shuster, 1960).

¹³ Cf. L. Levi and S. Pistone (edited by), *Trent'anni di vita del Movimento Federalista Europeo*, cit., p. 309.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 313, 314.

¹⁵ This is the theoretical basis for the initiatives which were activated towards the end of the 1960's and in early 1970's for direct elections to the European Parliament and for the creation of the single currency. It meant conducting "framework actions" which would allow the European alternative to be kept in the field until the moment when, in a situation where the states reached a power crisis, the governments and the political parties would be carried *almost automatically* onto the decisive ground, i.e. Europe. Here we first find for the first time the concept which was later to be fully developed by Albertini and other federalist authors, of the "slippery slope", which is simply an effective metaphor to illustrate the course of history which itself pushes the nations towards European solutions, with the possibility for militant federalists of increasing the angle of the slope, even by the smallest degree (and hence commensurate to their forces), favouring in every specific instance the European option.

¹⁶ L. Levi and S. Pistone (edited by), *Trent'anni di vita del Movimento Federalista Europeo*, cit., pp. 316, 317, 318.

¹⁷ Cf. Guido Montani, "Militanza federalista e nuovo modo di fare politica", in *Il Federalista*, XXV (1983), p.135.

THE CRISIS IN THE EMS *

With the decision of the Community's finance ministers to widen fluctuation bands to 15 percent either side of central parities, the EMS has been reduced to pure and simple European camouflage for national

* Declaration by the President of the *Movimento Federalista Europeo*, Mario Albertini, issued on August 2, 1993.

policies. These fluctuation bands have in effect removed the features which gave the EMS its distinctive character as a system of fixed exchange rates, compared to the Bretton Woods agreements. The main advantages of the EMS were that it made devaluation decisions collective (and no longer unilateral); that through the ECU it mobilised private interests; and that it made public and sensational the unilateral breaking of the common rules by any individual state.

It is thanks to these features that the EMS had practically become the basis for the new attempt to abolish national currencies and create a European currency; Europe would undoubtedly have achieved this, had the arrival of recession been delayed by a few years. It therefore needs to be recognised that the emptying of the EMS's potential means that there no longer exists a strategic plan for the continuation of European unification and for the creation of a real and effective political union. If the governments and political forces in general do not admit their mistake, Europe, as a consequence of the enlargement of the Community, will set off towards the creation of a vast free-trade area which, without any political power underscoring it, will clearly not last long.

The arguments which have been used against the EMS as a fixed-rate currency system, especially as regards unemployment and growth, are false since, even granted (although we do not accept this to be the case) that the EMS was not a good mechanism for provisionally regulating currencies, it remains true that, by abolishing it, this control is entrusted to international speculation, which is increasing enormously. This observation is sufficient to establish that by de-stabilising the EMS (and hence, in turn, the greater part of the Maastricht Treaty) the governments were not motivated by the problem of unemployment, but rather by pure and simple electoral considerations. In reality, in the Community's Council of Finance Ministers the choice was not between a national policy and a European policy, or between a reactionary policy and a progressive one, but between two different national policies: one with a beneficial European effect, the other with a damaging one. Moreover, it is conceivable that there no longer exist any good national policies that at the same time are not good European and world policies.

The time has come to state clearly that the European currency can be established immediately. There already exists: a) the European Parliament elected by the citizens; b) a form of government, the Commission, which would already be able to effect real policies were it not impeded by the Council of Ministers which, contrary to all democratic principles, assumes control of both legislative and executive power; c) an economy whose

integration is already well-advanced, to the extent that it renders the national instruments of economic governance practically useless. Hence it is sufficient to take the European vote seriously and re-establish the principle according to which the choice of the government falls to the citizens, in order to assert that it is entirely possible, right now, to establish a European economic policy, and in particular, to create a European currency forthwith if, at the same time, a European plan for unemployment, economic growth and all other related factors (not solely economic), is adopted. The problem, then, should be tackled in this fashion: there can be no European policies without dealing with the currency issue; the currency can not be created without dealing seriously with the problems of unemployment and economic growth.

Italy has a particular responsibility as regards these issues, even if it is no more the same Italy of De Gasperi and Spinelli. Italy, thus placing herself on the same level as the United Kingdom, opened the crisis in the EMS by violating the substance of the Community treaty in the sly hope of being able to base its fortunes on what is in reality an extremely fragile basis — competitive devaluation. Such a policy can encourage growth, but only that of nationalism, and certainly not that of the economy in an increasingly united world.

Italy is, rightly, trying to resolve its crisis by adopting more democratic and effective decision-making mechanisms as regards the representativeness and form of her government. However, such reform will make no sense if Europe falls apart in the meantime.

The European Federalist Movement has for a while now been pointing out that Italy is evolving increasingly towards a pre-fascist power situation. This depends, ultimately, on the corruption caused by the fact that the political struggle and the actual life of the parties come to a halt at the national borders, while the number of problems which can only be solved on a European or world level is continuously growing. Hence Italy's introduction of a new decision-making system which is more democratic and effective, is a positive step. But it should never be forgotten that this holds true on one condition: that at the same time a satisfactory decision-making system is also created at the European level. Otherwise there will be good government where there are no large problems to face, and no government where such problems exist.

Due to the governments, which, having worked for years to plan the gradual creation of a European currency, have halted the process when faced with the first real difficulty, the battle for Europe has become more difficult. But this simply means that we need to commit ourselves further,

since without European unity there is no salvation. In this light, the European Federalist Movement will commit itself all the more, and confirms herewith that it will do what is possible to persuade all citizens, also in the context of the 1994 elections, that we are facing a choice between giving in to international speculation and to American great power policy, and European redemption.

Federalism in the History of Thought

THE MOVIMIENTO PRO FEDERACION AMERICANA (MPFA)

It was in Bogotá, in 1948, that the Colombian Santiago Gutiérrez Varela, a longtime mondialist activist in the United States, established the *Movimiento Pro Federación Americana* (MPFA) on the occasion of the 9th American intergovernmental conference, which witnessed the birth of the Organization of American States (OAS).

At that time, according to what the movement's magazine, *Nuevo Mundo*, later reported, he published "the first pamphlet on American federalism analysed from the perspective of continental unity in its fullest sense." After the first edition of the initial programme of the MPFA was rapidly exhausted by distribution to the conference delegates, a summary was published in English, initially of 12,000, then of 50,000 copies, under the title *A plan for peace*. Having achieved this initial success, Gutiérrez Varela decided to make the MPFA's organisation more formal: its statutes were adopted in 1953 "by an important group of citizens belonging to different American countries."¹

This text remaining up-to-date, it is interesting to reproduce below some extracts from the introduction, and the declarations that were attached to these statutes.

"Introduction: 1. The liberators and founding fathers of our American Republics foresaw a great democratic political organisation based on *American unity*, and able to give all Americans as much freedom, progress and happiness as possible. 2. This feeling of American union and solidarity is shared by all our peoples. 3. An American federation could bring about enormous progress for all our countries, which, combined with a suitable policy of social justice, would translate into an extraordinary benefit for each and every one of us Americans. Moreover, it will be possible to achieve a situation of orderly progress and stable world peace through continental federations under the control of a suitably strengthened United Nations...

We declare that: 1. We will create an association that will implement

a concrete programme for an American federation which includes all the nations and countries of America. To this end we consider the Organization of American States as a fundamental step in this direction, and will support its initiatives and actions and promote its evolution towards a real federal government of America. 2. We will encourage and support other movements for regional federations, such as the European movement and the movement for Asian union. 3. We consider the UN to be a great achievement of humanity, and will strive to improve it and give it all the necessary authority so that it may be effective as a world co-ordinating authority, and have sufficient powers to prevent or resolve all conflicts and avoid any possibility of war between the regional federations.”²

The MPFA published its above-mentioned magazine *Nuevo Mundo* in Bogotá and then in Buenos Aires, from 1953 to the beginning of the 1970s; it also published some basic texts and two pamphlets on theoretical issues, generically entitled *Temas Americanos*. The movement was present, or represented, in the majority of Latin American countries and also had contacts in the United States and Canada under the direction of its *Junta Continental*.³

The MPFA kept in regular contact with the World Movement for World Federal Government (WMWFG), being for some years its “Latin American section,” and established relations with a certain Asian Federation Movement founded in India. During that period it published, either in *Nuevo Mundo* or as annexes to its pamphlets on theoretical issues, some assessments of the international activities of the WMWFG, the Italian *Movimento Federalista Europeo*, the international European Movement and the *Mouvement socialiste pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe*; it also published various articles on European unification by Max Richard, who was a member of the French group *La Fédération*. From April 1954 onwards, *Nuevo Mundo* provided information about the contacts between the MPFA and WMWFG, publishing an exchange of letters between Santiago Gutiérrez Varela and the Secretary General of the WMWFG, Maclean W. Maclean. The Colombian stressed his enthusiasm for regional federations, writing: “We place a particular emphasis on the regional federal governments and foresee a world government in the form of a supreme council made up of the representatives of the regional federations; this supreme council will leave most economic and administrative functions to the regional governments.” However, he concluded with the hope that his movement would “join” or “become a member” of the World Movement. Four years later this hope finally became reality when Santiago Gutiérrez Varela and/or Jorge M. Baño

seem to have taken part in the Paris Congress of the WMWFG in 1955.⁴ At the same time the MPFA developed intermittent contacts with certain other Latin American groups, such as the *Unión Federalista Mundial de Puerto Rico* (UFMPR) and the Chilean *Movimiento de Integración Latinoamericana* (MILA).⁵

The MPFA often emphasised its attachment to the principle of “federalist autonomy,” stressing the sharp distinction between the federalist struggle and that of the political parties for national power. It clearly stated this position in July 1956: “Certainly, as mentioned above, the *Movimiento Pro-Federación Americana* is not a substitute for political parties... Rather, with full awareness of the limits and role which falls to us, we understand that in the future we will be able to concentrate our efforts on the more specific goals of collaboration with national political parties, intra-American organisations (the OAS in particular), the UN itself, or national governments, which need our disinterested help as a non-governmental organisation. With these criteria we wish to emphasise that our function cannot in any way be compared to that of the existing political parties; to these we entrust, without preference, domestic political programmes, and we will give support to individual parties only if and when they match our ideals.

The *Movimiento Pro-Federación Americana* has supporters in all circles, political as well as religious, and in the American scene in general manages not to interfere in the sphere of action of the political parties. Our members, as far as decisions inside the movement are concerned, are apolitical, but free to act individually according to their personal preferences. This does not represent dualism, but a necessary discipline to achieve the disinterested and specific function we aim at.”⁶

In one of its basic texts, part of which we publish below, *An American Federation, a European Federation and an Asiatic Federation coordinated in one World Organization (a Modified UNO)*, published in Bogotá probably at the end of the 1940s and endorsed by its founder, the MPFA announced the main features of its political philosophy.⁷ Like European federalists, it favoured the creation of large continental federations which might, one day, be brought together in the framework of a modified and strengthened UN in order to guarantee universal peace through a world federal government. These large regional federations should number three in total, since the MPFA considered Africa as part of a vast Euro-African federation, freed from the legacy of colonialism.⁸

Unlike many Latin Americans, the MPFA always declared itself in favour of an American federation and not only a Latin American one; as

a result it tried to establish itself both in the United States and Canada and played an active role in many OAS conferences, calling for the democratisation of this intergovernmental organisation.

As far as the economy is concerned, in a bipolar world dominated by the confrontation of the cold war, the MPFA opted unequivocally for the western model in the struggle against communism. The oft-expressed belief of the movement was in a "programme for free enterprise for the Americas," which required above all, "freedom of enterprise and guarantees for industry, freedom to trade throughout the continent, a common citizenship for all Americans, common monetary standards for the American continent ..." Nevertheless the MPFA accepted that the state must have a role in the re-distribution of wealth, which only private initiative is able to create, and did not reject social justice as a value aspect of socialism.⁹

According to the documents we have been able to examine, the MPFA seems to have been best organised and most active in Argentina, although news about other national sections and committees was regularly published in *Nuevo Mundo*. Yet it was in Argentina that various national or international federalist congresses took place, either organised by the MPFA or with its participation, in November 1956 and October 1960.¹⁰ On the other hand, we have only found some incomplete records relating to the attempts to organise other international federalist congresses in Mexico, Brazil and Uruguay from the beginning of the 1960s until 1964. In a commentary on the *Primero Congreso Internacional sobre Federalismo Americano*, published in *Nuevo Mundo* in October 1960, the Ecuadorian federalist Cyrano Tama Paz stressed the difficulties of the struggle when "used to thinking in traditional terms, shaped by old-fashioned ideas and out-dated habits, at times we do not appreciate that there now exists a completely new international reality, an unavoidable necessity, which is linked to the technological progress, of irreversible development. It is more necessary than ever to unite, to organise the overwhelming growth of the world's population in continent-wide federal states.

Given that the system of small separate nations (with anachronistic governmental regimes, tribal nationalism and other barbaric leftovers) is already demonstrating its failure, ... the economic integration of the American nations is the only formula by which to bring an end to underdevelopment and achieve prosperity," while "extremist forces are working night and day to destroy the American union."

But the MPFA, like other militant unionist or federalist groups that

were active in politics and established all over Latin America, disappeared at the beginning of the 1970s, after losing over the years most of its idealism and progressively jumping on the bandwagon of intergovernmental integration. This change is evident from reading *Nuevo Mundo*. The general tone and the subjects dealt with in the magazine at the beginning of the 1970s (at least, as far as it is possible to work out, given a gap of about 10 years in the collections available for our consultation) are not the same as those of the preceding decades.

Along with the wave of military dictatorships which smothered democracy, the enthusiasm waned and the idealistic, pacifist and mondialist beliefs were for the most part replaced by reports on official unionist demonstrations.

As reported in *Nuevo Mundo*, Dr. Santiago Gutiérrez Varela, the founder of the movement, resigned the presidency in the early 1970s to concentrate on a more mondialist, and less regionalist, militant role.¹¹

It is however clear that in that period the MPFA maintained contacts with the UN as a non-governmental organisation, from the occasion when the Director of the UN's information centre in Buenos Aires gave the MPFA's Argentinian secretary the task of organising the celebrations for the 25th anniversary of the international organisation.¹²

NOTES

¹ For the creation of the MPFA see "Como se organizó el Movimiento pro Federación Americana - Habla el Dr. Santiago Gutiérrez V.", in *Nuevo Mundo*, vol. 1, no. 2, July 1953; "Quién es Quién en el federalismo, Santiago Gutiérrez?", in *Nuevo Mundo*, vol. 6, no. 49, and other notices in federalist magazines such as *World Government News*, New York, vol. 10, no. 105, February, March, April 1952 and *WMWFG (World Movement for World Federal Government) Newsletter* (March 1952?).

² Cf. *Nuevo Mundo*, no. 61, September 1962.

³ As reported in the same issue of *Nuevo Mundo*, the MPFA in 1962 was directed by a general secretariat made up of a secretary general ("programme co-ordinator"), who was for a long time its founder Santiago Gutiérrez Varela, and subsequently the Argentinian Jorge M. Baño, when the former became president of the MPFA, an additional secretary general (Jorge M. Baño, who was also editor of the movement's magazine), a further secretary general ("financial promoter"), at that time the Mexican Esteban Espejel G., and three general delegates. Other of the movement's international bodies were the General Continental Assembly, which represented the different sections and national committees, and its extension, the *Junta Continental* (in 1962 this had 13 members from 9 nations). In 1960 the MPFA had created other committees within its structure: in addition to an honorary committee, there were *pro Mercado Común Latinoamericano*, *pro Cultura Americana* and

pro Universidad Continental committees (for their membership list, see *Nuevo Mundo*, vol. VIII, no. 50, December 1960).

⁴ See *WMWFG Newsletter*, March 1952 (?), which cites two Colombian groups as being in contact with the WMWFG at that time: the first (of which this quotation is the only trace) is that of Dr. M. Bartenstein de Medellín, who was "interested in developing a Spanish-language section of the World Movement;" the latter is the MPFA. Subsequently, the *News-Digest-WMWFG* returned to the question of links with the MPFA: in May 1952 in order to note that the MPFA's secretary general Jorge M. Baño had made a request for his movement to be affiliated to the WMWFG; and in September/October of the same year to confirm that the World Movement's Executive Council had accepted this request.

See also "Ahora es miembro asociado de la Asociación Universal de Federalistas Mundiales el MPFA", in *Nuevo Mundo*, vol. 5, no. 36, June 1958. For many years *Nuevo Mundo* published a regular column entitled "Federalismo mundial en marcha." For their part the world federalists wrote in February 1958 in "The World Federalist" that the MPFA aimed at the federation of the Americas and regarded world government as a secondary and more distant aim, contenting themselves with the fact that the movement had branches in most American states, as well as enjoying parliamentary support in some of them.

⁵ The UFMPR was the WMWFG's Puerto Rican section, and was independent of the MPFA. It is mentioned many times, particularly in relation to its sporadic contacts with the MPFA, in *The Federalist Newsletter* published by the North American "United World Federalists," vol. 6, no. 7, March 1960, in *The World Federalist*, one of the WMWFG's international publications, The Hague, vol. 7, no. 4, November 1961 and in *Nuevo Mundo*, Buenos Aires, vol. 10, no. 61, December 1962 and vol. 16, no. 76, 1969.

As far as MILA is concerned, see *Nuevo Mundo*, June 1961, "Movimiento de integración latinoamericana, en Valparaíso, Chile."

⁶ "El éxito logrado por la reunión de Panamá impone una nueva actitud al Movimiento pro Federación Americana," in *Nuevo Mundo*, July 1956, no. 25.

⁷ In order to examine the ideas of the MPFA in more depth it is necessary to study, apart from its initial programme, parts of which are reported here in the English-language version, several texts which elaborated it over the years, such as: "Ya es urgente un plan de paz permanente!", in *Nuevo Mundo*, vol. 4, no. 27, November/December 1956 and "Nuevo Plan de paz para el programa del MPFA," in *Nuevo Mundo*, vol. 5, no. 33, December 1957; as well as the two remaining brochures of the series *Temas Americanos* which we were able to find, *El colonialismo y América*, published in 1954 on the occasion of the OAS's conference on colonialism in Caracas, and *La Libre Empresa (promotoria insustituible de producción y abundancia para los pueblos. Un alegato en su favor)*; and, finally, the English-language "A progressive Plan - Do you know the American Federation Movement's Programme?", in *Nuevo Mundo*, vol. 10, no. 59, July 1962.

⁸ In the fifth part of *El colonialismo y América*, following an introductory note by the editor, a resolution of the *Mouvement socialiste pour les États-Unis d'Europe* and a contribution by Leopold S. Senghor, who was at that time still a member of the French Parliament and of the European Council Assembly, on the subject of integrating African colonies into the European community are reported. As far as colonialism on the American continent is concerned, the MPFA often declared itself in favour of its total eradication and proposed a plan of resolution at the above-mentioned OAS assembly in Caracas, which however was not considered by the delegates of the American states.

As far as world federalism is concerned, two observations need to be made. On the one hand, the MPFA's evolutionary theory, which foresaw the achievement of a world federation through large regional federations which would progressively delegate a part of their powers to a strengthened UN, confirmed the minimalist trend of the WMWFG, which

was against those who wanted to ignore inter-state organisation and proceed with elections for a world constituent assembly. On the other hand, three large regional federations seem too few, even if one excludes Africa. In contrast the "Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution" published in 1948 by the Chicago committee and widely diffused in world federalist circles, and so in all likelihood known about in the MPFA, as witness an article in *Nuevo Mundo* written on the occasion of Giuseppe A. Borgese's death, tried a more precise approach and foresaw nine regions: the European continent with its dependent islands, the United States of America (and the United Kingdom if it preferred to join it), European and Asiatic Russia (and the countries of Central and Baltic Europe which preferred to join this region), "Afrasia," which included the Near and Middle East (and the Maghreb and Pakistan if they so wished), "the Indias" (and Pakistan if it preferred), Asia (China, Korea and Japan with some of the Pacific archipelagos), "Australasia" (Indonesia and Indochina with or without Pakistan and the territories of the Southern and Central Pacific which asked to join this region), and finally Colombia, comprising "the western hemisphere to the south of the United States" (re-published in *A Constitution for the World*, Santa Barbara, California, edited by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1965).

⁹ "We are supporters of free enterprise, so long as it is directed to the common good. We believe that free enterprise is the best way to produce efficiently, and to obtain plenty. When appropriate, the state has the duty to regulate free enterprise with the aim to achieve social justice or distribute the fruits of production as fairly as possible... If socialism means wishing to achieve more justice and a better distribution of wealth, without prejudicing production, in that case we are socialists. But if socialism means state management of business to make it inefficient, because it is subjected to the damaging effect of political games and intrigues, then we are thoroughly anti-socialist, since we are well aware of the fact that with the bureaucratisation of business there can be no wealth and no production," in *La Libre Empresa*, op. cit., p. 9.

The MPFA's obsession with production can be found at the end of the same pamphlet, when the editors recall the motto of the movement: "Freedom-Productivity-Justice. Bases of World Peace" (*ibid.*, p. 63), or in the movement's symbol which over the years retained the sole words "Freedom-Productivity-Justice."

¹⁰ On the subject of the "First Congress of Federalism," which was an exclusively Argentinian event, organised by the *Asociación Cultural Argentina para Defensa y Superación de Mayo* (ASCUA) in September 1956, see the report published by *Nuevo Mundo*, vol. 4, no. 26, September 1956. The editorial of the same issue discusses the ideas which arose in the congress (attended by more than 200 delegates) and states that federalism is "the antithesis not only of centralism, but of colonialism as well," and furthermore that "only federalism, which has its origins in man as an individual, is able to achieve true democracy." The congress was divided into six commissions which studied the following matters: structural issues, the role of local autonomies in the federal system, institutional measures, economic measures, financial measures and regional planning. Various Argentinian leaders of the MPFA took part in this congress, in particular Juan Esteban Serchio (son), who was at that time the secretary of the Argentinian section and with whom we are once again in contact after so many years, Professor Jorge M. Baño, and a member of the Uruguayan section, Francisco Reboledo, who attended as an observer.

Even more important, in as much as it was directly organised by the MPFA and gathered together in October 1960 several hundreds of federalists from many Latin American countries, was the *Primer Congreso Internacional sobre Federalismo Americano* (see *Nuevo Mundo*, vol. 8, no. 49, October 1960), which also took place in Buenos Aires. The Congress attracted 98 delegates representing 61 organisations, among which, apart from the MPFA, was the *República de los Ciudadanos del Mundo* with 6 representatives,

including David Victor Btsh who sat at the presidential table, and 200 individual participants. *Nuevo Mundo* emphasised the quality of the support received by the Congress, such as that from the President of the Argentinian Republic, Arturo Frondizi, and the Secretary General of the OAS, José A. Mora, as well as the depth and variety of the issues dealt with; it published a summary of the six main resolutions adopted, which we report below, as well as the titles of the 63 proposed resolutions, which were examined on the suggestion of the MPFA or various participants.

"Summary of the resolutions approved: 1. Increased intra-American relations through pan-continental universities, general education and culture, *indigenismo*, tourism and sport. 2. A common American citizenship, a continental Supreme Court of Justice and an Intra-American Legislative Congress, as the first steps towards American federal government. 3. Better distribution of the population throughout the continent with internal migration to promote better regional development. Private insurance. Economic integration and common markets. Modernisation of state administrative systems. Reduction of the bureaucracy. A single currency and standardised weights and measures. 4. Complete eradication of colonialism in America and the restoration of the previously existing sovereignties in occupied territories. 5. Moral recovery. Permanent peace. A Military Security Council with an attached general staff to provide against external attacks. Consultations with the OAS as regards the possibility of electing representatives by universal suffrage. 6. American federal government and support for other regional federations. Encouragement to the MPFA so that it may carry forward the initiatives of the *Primer Congreso Internacional sobre Federalismo Americano*. Institution of a Day of Brotherhood and Universal Freedom, and support for a conference of heads of state on the issue of world peace."

¹¹ See "Renuncia el Doctor Santiago Gutiérrez", in *Nuevo Mundo*, no. 81, January/February 1970. The organ of the MPFA commented on Gutiérrez Varela's decision as follows: "His behaviour can be explained by his desire to concentrate more fully on his programme for world peace, which needs to be developed by means of a special committee. As we already know, Dr. Gutiérrez is a great idealist and staunch pacifist who wants to work within a broader perspective and not a regional one." So far we have not been able to find out more about the success, or otherwise, of his militant activities.

¹² "El movimiento pro Federación Americana y las Naciones Unidas," in *Nuevo Mundo*, vol. 17, no. 85, 1970.

* * *

AN AMERICAN FEDERATION, A EUROPEAN FEDERATION AND AN ASIATIC FEDERATION CO-ORDINATED IN ONE WORLD ORGANIZATION (A MODIFIED UNO)

Summary.

This program calls for the establishment of an American Federation

which, in co-operation with similar European and Asiatic Unions, all united in one World Organization (a modified UNO), could assure permanent world stability and peace.

The first step should be the promotion of total production in the three continents, profiting from the creative initiative of a Free Enterprise or Capitalistic system which enjoys freedoms and guarantees. Once production has been fully developed on a continental basis, industry should be co-ordinated under a skillful and modest supervision of each Federal Government, in order to avoid crises of overproduction, correct the inequalities of Capitalism and create a social organization which offers the greatest possible security and happiness for the members of society.

From an individualistic Capitalistic system whose principal virtue is production, toward a co-ordinated Capitalism by the state to complement this production with economic stability and social justice. Everything within democracy and liberty.

Freedom — Productivity — Justice: Bases of World Peace.

PART I

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF A WORLD REORGANIZATION

Fundamental Principles of Justice in a Social Organization.

No one doubts that the world is in urgent need of a complete reorganization to surpass this period of confusion, economic instability and wars.

This reorganization must be a world-wide co-ordination for better living conditions for all peoples, which will bring about a state of stability and peace.

To establish this condition, people should have the necessary freedom to develop without restrictions their intellectual and moral personality, being able at the same time to satisfy their material needs.

This implies a legal order that guarantees human rights, an economic machinery capable of large scale production and a system of distribution to avoid excessive luxury on one side and misery on the other.

Guarantees and individual liberties to develop the personality without restrictions, large scale production, just distribution. These must be the

basic principles of a system pursuing the happiness of man and lasting peace.

To achieve this aim a world reorganization is necessary which will permit the realization of the fundamental principles above cited: freedom, productivity, fair distribution.

Fair distribution and equality without wealth would simply be distribution of misery for all, which would not leave anyone satisfied. Large scale production and wealth without fair distribution would be opulence on one side in contrast to misery on the other, something that this century would not tolerate. And abundance for all without freedom would annihilate the spirit of civilization.

The only thing that can disarm the people of all countries and conduct them toward an area of peace and stability is recognition of a minimum of human rights, abundant production and fair distribution, capable of providing a reasonable status of welfare and security for all citizens.

This means the fulfilment of the fundamental ideals of our civilization: Christianity that seeks justice and love among men; freedom of investigation, freedom of thought, freedom of expression that seeks the truth; complete extension of technology, throughout the world, to reach material wellbeing.

In a society with possibilities of abundant production, freedom as well as just distribution is a matter of juridical organization that depends upon the intelligence and goodwill of the associates. However, in order to have abundant production, it is imperative to have sufficient natural resources to make possible its development. Therefore, it is necessary to provide all people with the essential resources.

There is no doubt that the world, as a whole, has the necessary natural riches for the comfortable welfare of its inhabitants. What is needed is the establishment of a World Organization in which all people have the possibility of participating of these riches.

Theory of World Federation.

In order to have abundant production for all it would be necessary that the world be a common patrimony of mankind in which each man would have identical opportunities. Besides this common possession, an essential requirement would be the establishment of a social order in which man has the opportunity to develop his personality, satisfy his material needs and obtain justice.

In this case, the ideal would be a World Federation under an effective

charter of human rights; with an economic organization capable of producing all products necessary for humanity; to be distributed in such a way that they will satisfy the necessities and reasonable aspirations of men.

To carry out this unity, it is indispensable to have freedom of commerce, freedom of migration, uniform monetary system, an extended language for mutual understanding and a federal government co-ordinating the relations of the different states of the world and guaranteeing the fundamental human rights of men. Otherwise, world unity would not exist.

Should this unity or World Federation be attained, undoubtedly there would be a sure and effective peace, in the same manner as in the United States, where an appropriate federalistic organization exists, a war between the states that make up the federation is incomprehensible.

But it is very difficult to attain this aim. Despite the facility of communications, the world is still too large and diverse to be organised under a unity controlled by a Federal World Government. There are many different races, customs, ideologies, beliefs and living standards. If freedom of migration existed, for example, the Asiatic people, with their systems of uncontrolled population growth, would flood America and Europe with inhabitants and lower the living standard for all.

Theory of Three Federations: Europe, Asia and America.

World Federation is not the only solution to attain abundant production for all men. Three groups could be formed: America, Europe-Africa and Asia-Oceania. Each one of these groups have such large territories and such great economic resources that within their frontiers possess all that is needed for a perfect and complete economic organization, with enough area to create a great civilization in all phases of human activity and with sufficient wealth to provide for the necessities of their inhabitants.

America can form a great federation which would have all the natural resources to establish a perfect economy completely supplied with all kinds of products to satisfy its population's needs. The same can be said of Europe and Asia.

From this grows the other idea of world reorganization which consists in forming Three Federations: Europe, Asia and America, autosufficient, autonomous and non-competitive in commerce and industry, and co-ordinated in one World Organization (a modified UNO) that will regulate the relations amongst the Three Federations.

The accomplishment of the Three Federations is a difficult task. However, it is more feasible than a World Federation. Furthermore, the establishment of the Three Federations will not be an obstacle for the creation, at a later date, of a World Federation. On the contrary, the realization of the Three Federations would be a great step toward world unity.

America has many similitudes and can approach a unity by means of a large and well chosen European immigration to Latin America and with greater facilities for movements of population within the continent. If to this is added freedom of commerce, a continental currency, extended guarantees for capitals and other sound reforms directed toward American unity, we would soon have a very great, rich and powerful Federation capable of providing for the welfare of its citizens and of being a decisive factor in the organization of the world.

On the other hand, the best statesmen of Europe are working for the European Union, since each day it becomes more evident that the only alternative against the complete destruction of Europe is its unification.

With respect to Asia, there are many voices in favor of the Union and several Pan-Asiatic Congresses have been held, with the idea of developing its formation. In brief, throughout the world one notices many tendencies and appeals favoring the organization of the world in Three Federations.

Arguments Against Three Federations and its Refutation.

The principal arguments against the world organization in Three Federations arise from the possibility that there could be conflicts among these three blocks which would impede the world peace sought.

The following are the arguments against such a plan:

First: The population of the world is badly distributed and as soon as one continent has insufficient resources in relation to its population, it will seek to expand or conquer other territories for its surplus peoples.

Solution: Since America requires additional inhabitants, immigration to this hemisphere must be encouraged until there is a population large enough to develop its resources. Furthermore, by practicing moderation in procreation, as is the case in the United States and other European countries, it is possible to maintain an adequate balance between population and natural resources. Under a system of voluntary birth control the three main continents can live independently, without having to seek other regions to dump their surplus population. If one continent should permit the disproportionate growth of its population, this continent would bear

sole responsibility for its resulting low standard of living. Since the obvious solution would be the education of its inhabitants in moderation in procreation, there would not be the slightest justification for dumping its excess population on other continents and endangering the proper balance in all.

Second: The continents do not have sufficient resources to be self-sufficient and provide abundance for their population.

Solution: The three continental groups do possess all the resources necessary for building up self-sufficient economies capable of providing abundance for all. If, during the war, countries such as Germany were able to organize relatively self-sufficient economies with the assistance of synthetic industries, there is no reason why a continent cannot accomplish much more. Even if self-sufficiency should not be entirely attainable, there is no reason why a barter system cannot be adopted in order to exchange necessary materials and services. Neither does the system of the Three Federations oppose the interchange of students, scientific connections, tourist and many other relations that will maintain the world in very close co-operation. Such relations would not unbalance the co-ordination of the autonomous economies of the Three Federations.

Third: Men, in spite of having the necessary resources which make possible their high standard of living and welfare, nevertheless, owing to their whims and folly, can seek conflicts and wars.

Solution: It is highly improbable that a self-sufficient, democratic federation capable of bringing prosperity and happiness to its inhabitants would seek conflicts that could only result in mutual destruction. Besides, the Three Federations would be co-ordinated in one World Organization which would have the monopoly on armaments and would maintain the tribunals necessary for mediating any conflict or dispute that might arise. Finally, if the organization of the world in Three Federations should not prove fully satisfactory, the people could strive for a World Federation. The material and cultural development which the establishment of the Three Federations would bring to the entire world would surely produce such an extremely high level of culture and living standards for all mankind that world unity would be facilitated.

For these reasons, world reorganization could be planned upon the basis of Three Continental Federations co-ordinated in one World Organization, which would surely offer positive perspectives of stability, peace and abundance for mankind. This objective is both feasible and practical and is, at least, less difficult to realize than the creation of a World Federation, the other alternative.

PART II

A PROGRAM OF FREE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS

"We shall hasten with the keenest interest to establish for ourselves the American pact which, by forming one political entity from all our republics, will give to America an aspect of majesty and greatness unprecedented in ancient nations."

Bolivar

After exposing the fundamental ideas, it is necessary to present a concrete program of Free Enterprise to define the general principles. This plan is for America, but similar programs, with the necessary modifications for meeting different conditions, may be encouraged in Europe and Asia to establish a world-wide action of Free Enterprise.

I. Establishment of an American Federal Government and support of a European Union and Asiatic Union. Co-ordination of these political spheres within one World Organization (a modified UNO) to assure permanent world stability and peace.

II. Freedom of enterprise in every state in the hemisphere and full guarantees for the industry and capital that contribute to progress. Abolition of laws that obstruct the normal development of Capitalism. Once Capitalism has been developed to its limit, a logical co-ordination of the economy under a skillful and modest supervision of the state, in order to avoid crisis and distribute income more equitably.

III. Freedom of trade in the hemisphere. Elimination of all barriers that interfere with free exchange of goods.

IV. Enactment of a law in each American state by means of which any citizen of any other American nation will be considered its own citizen, with the same rights and obligations and with the prerogatives of entering, residing and leaving freely. This law can be extended on a reciprocal basis.

V. Promotion on a large scale of carefully chosen European immigration in order to develop and industrialize the entire hemisphere and unify the population of the two Americas, thus preparing the way for an American Federation.

VI. Establishment of a sound and stable uniform monetary system in the hemisphere, to be directed by an International Monetary Board.

VII. Formation of a continental army to protect the hemisphere against the possibility of attacks from third parties and to back up the international and internal policies of the Federation.

VIII. Freedom of religion, speech, press and meeting.

IX. Equality before the law of every human being, regardless of race, nationality, religion or sex.

X. Universal education which would enable every citizen to assume his social and democratic responsibilities.

XI. The best possible standard of living for the worker, without endangering the capitalization necessary for industrial development.

XII. A program of social insurance that would control the risks that make life uncertain, such as sickness, unemployment, old age and childhood.

XIII. Adoption of a uniform metric system and other standardizations of rules, codes, etc.

XIV. Complete elimination of colonial systems in America, and efforts to abolish them in the rest of the world.

XV. Democratic governments expertly organized to render the best possible service to their citizens and respecting the human rights.

XVI. Establishment of a Continental University of Social Philosophy and Administration with branches in the different countries of the hemisphere. Here the future leaders of America would not only receive a thorough education in the social sciences, but would be taught how to apply their knowledge in an administrative capacity, so as to help solve the problems of society.

XVII. Promotion of a language to be used as means of communication for the different countries of America and also in their relations with other continents. The political, social, cultural and commercial relations would become easier if a great part of men, besides their own language, spoke a universal one understandable to all. The most appropriate would be English, because it is the most extended in the world.

* * *

*I. American Federal Government. **

For a long time the Pan-American Union has been working for American Unity and now the Organization of the American States continues doing the same in a more practical way. But due to the

* Each of the points listed above is more fully explained in the original version. We publish below only the explanation of the first one.

tremendous crisis the world is living, it is urgent to intensify the campaign of co-operation more vigorously and intensely, inasmuch as the present problems require an immediate solution, if we do not want new wars, each time more violent.

The ideal for America would be the establishment of a Federation, but to achieve this great aim it is necessary to prepare for its fulfillment by means of freer commercial interchange, facility for the movement of population within the continent, uniform monetary system, greater European immigration to Latin America, legal guarantees for capital and industries, cultural interchange, etc., so as to have appropriate bases for the establishment of an American Federation.

But in a world so solidary as this, in which a nation or continent, notwithstanding how united and powerful it might be, is threatened by the events in other parts of the world, to form an American Federation is not sufficient: it is necessary to support, with a definite plan, the establishment of a European Union and an Asiatic Union whose policies would not be a threat to the American Federation.

Even if these Three Federations were established completely independent and balanced, there would always exist international relations of world order such as armaments, control of atomic power, cultural interchange, tourism and others, which necessarily would have to be co-ordinated in a World Organization (a modified UNO) to assure permanent world stability and peace.

This modified UNO could be organized to co-ordinate the Three Federations in such a way that through the intervention of this organization the mutual relations of the Three Federations would be regulated and the conflicts which might arise solved. It would not be wise to establish an organization more complicated than necessary. A simple organization would be more effective. As for example, a Supreme Council made up of the heads of the Three Federations or their representatives; a Permanent Secretariat with the proper technical organization to execute the decisions of the Council; a Supreme Court to solve the conflicts which might arise; and an international army to support the policies of the World Organization.

The Organization of the American states, as we said before, is a great step forward in the Pan-American movement and through this organization it will be necessary to work a long time to promote the Continental Union. But only until this Organization derives its authority from the public vote, will an effective principle of American Federal Government be initiated. An organization based on popular vote, although in the beginning undoubtedly would have very restricted powers, because of world

evolution trends, it would gradually acquire extraordinary importance and would soon be a truly American Federal Government, capable of orienting the American Continent toward tremendous prosperity and to serve as example and guide to the other two Federations.

The American Federal Government could be organized in different forms, but it should have as its fundamental basis the popular vote, since democracy is an essential principle in every American political organization.

One of these forms could be the appointment of a Constitutional and Electoral Assembly elected by popular vote with the task of drafting and perfecting the Constitution of the Federation and to elect the Legislative, the Executive, the Judicial and the Attorney General empowered to execute their respective functions within the limits of the Constitution [...]

The Assembly would be the supreme director of the Federal Government as direct representative of the people. From this Assembly the other powers would originate and depend and to this Assembly they would render accounts of their functionings.

The Assembly could reserve the right to establish new taxes and, since it is the Supreme Constitutional Body, it may change the organization of the Government when it so deems necessary, subjecting itself obviously to the rules established in the Constitution for cases of reformation.

The Assembly could appoint a Legislative Council or Board of Directors that would establish the laws within the constitutional standard; a President that would appoint his Vice-Presidents or Secretaries and would exercise the executive functions; a Supreme Court as arbitrator or umpire to interpret and enforce the constitutional and legal order; and an Attorney General that would administrate a Fiscal Office with two sections: one to control the proper fulfillment of the Constitution and Laws of the Federation; the other to control budget expenditures.

The criterion which should predominate in the organization of a Government ought to be similar to that of an efficient business enterprise in order to render the best service to the public without neglecting, at the same time, the democratic principles. This could be achieved with a governmental organization simple, stable and with ample authority, but duly controlled by public vote. Democracy and efficiency should go united for the best social service. [...]

(Prefaced and edited by Jean-Francis Billion)

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

MARIO ALBERTINI, President of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Honorary President of the European Union of Federalists, Professor in the Philosophy of Politics, University of Pavia.

JEAN-FRANCIS BILLION, Member of the Comité Régional Rhône-Alpes of the Mouvement Fédéraliste Européen.

SANTE GRANELLI, Vice-President of the Movimento Federalista Europeo.

IGOR KOSSIKOV, Director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences.

LUCIO LEVI, Member of the National Executive of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Member of the Executive Committee of the World Federalist Association, Professor in Comparative Political Institutions, University of Turin.

FRANCESCO MAZZAFERRO, Member of the National Council of the Movimento Federalista Europeo.

NICOLETTA MOSCONI, Movimento Federalista Europeo, Pavia.

Some articles from recent numbers:

1989

Editorials

The Meaning of the European Referendum in Italy.

Perestroika and Communism.

Europe and the World after 1989.

Essays

Francesco Rossolillo, Federalism and the Great Ideologies.

Gerhard Eickorn, German Reunification and European Unity. Twelve Theses.

John Pinder, Federalism in Britain and Italy. Radicals and English Liberal Tradition.

Guido Montani, Robert Triffin and the Economic Problem of the 20th Century.

Notes

Third World Debt and a Renewal of the World's Economic and Political Order.

Political Aspects of the Ecological Emergency.

Interventions

Dmitry Smyslov, The Rouble, the Transferable Rouble, the Ecu and the International Monetary System.

Thirty Years Ago

Technical Analysis of the Struggle for Europe.

Federalism in the History of Thought

Giovanni Agnelli - Attilio Cabiati.

John Robert Seeley.

1990

Editorials

The Revival of Nationalism.

Europe and the Gulf Crisis.

Essays

John Pinder, The Federal Idea and the British Liberal Tradition.

Guido Montani, European Currency, Reform of the Welfare State and Economic Democracy.

Notes

Reflections on the European Common Home.

Can Federalism Be a Model for Africa?

Towards a Supranational Government of the Ecological Emergency.

The Principle of Self-determination.

Thirty Years Ago

The Nation, Ideological Fetish of Our Time.

Federalism in the History of Thought

Bertrand Russel.

Lewis Mumford.

1991

Editorials

A just War?

Federalism and Self-determination.

The European Summit at Maastricht.

Essays

Lucio Levi, Considerations on the European Community and the New World Order.

Jean-Francis Billion, The World Federalist Movement from 1945 to 1954 and European Integration.

Francesco Rossolillo, Europe: A World Power or a Model for the World?

Sergio Pistone, Europe and the Policy of World Unification.

Notes

Europe and the United States: Lessons of the Gulf.

The Centralisation of the European Community.

Federalist Action

History Will not Wait for Europe.

Thirty Years Ago

Four Commonplaces and a Conclusion on the European Summit.

Federalism in the History of Thought

Kenneth C. Wheare.

Edward H. Carr.

1992

Editorials

Europe after Gorbachev's Downfall.

Federalism and Regionalism.

From Common Rules to a World Environmental Government.

Essays

Sergio Pistone, The Security Policy of the European Union.

Hilary F. French, From Discord to Accord.

Alberto Majocchi, The European Community's Proposal for a Carbon Tax.

Pape Amadou Sow, International Economy, Poverty and Desertification.

Notes

Realism, Opportunism and Innovative Thinking.

The World Community after the Collapse of the Soviet Union.

Some Considerations on the Strategy for Achieving European Federation.

Thirty Years Ago

A Draft Manifesto for European Federalism.

Federalism in the History of Thought

Karl Jaspers.

Direttore responsabile: Mario Albertini - Editrice EDIF - Autorizzazione
Tribunale di Pavia n. 265 del 13-12-1981 - Tipografia Pi-Me, Pavia - Spedizione
in abbonamento postale - Gruppo IV (70%).