THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

Hamilton, The Federalist



YEAR XXXVI, 1994, NUMBER 2

ISSN 0393-1358

THE FEDERALIST

a political review

Editor: Mario Albertini

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.

The Federalist is published under the auspices of the FONDAZIONE EUROPEA LUCIANO BOLIS by EDIF, via Porta Pertusi 6, 27100 Pavia, Italy. English language editing: David Riggs. Three issues a year. Subscription rates: Europe 55000 lire or 35 $; other countries (by air mail) 70000 lire or 50 $. A three-year subscription (150000 lire, 100 $ or 200000 lire, 120 $ respectively) is also possible. All payments should be made by cheque or Eurocheque directly to EDIF.

YEAR XXXVI, 1994, NUMBER 2

CONTENTS

Neo-fascists in the Italian Government

Federalism as an ideology and a political movement was born in Ventotene out of the awareness that fascism had been an extreme and desperate attempt of the nation-state, and of parasitic interests connected to it, to perpetuate their own existence by imposing a totalitarian regime and exalting nationalism, in the face of the irresistible historical trend to create ever larger areas of democratic government, caused by the continuous increase of interdependence among people. Federalism opposed this crude and tribal ideology, which was based on hatred and discrimination, with the historic plan of suppressing war and oppression by overcoming national sovereignty and by creating international democracy, initially in a European, then in a world framework.

Federalism, then, is not only different from fascism, but its exact opposite. If we heed closely the idealistic roots of our political commitment, we can not declare ourselves to be anti-fascists *and* federalists, but rather anti-fascists *because we are* federalists. Anti-fascism, in the real meaning of the term, and federalism are the same thing.

However, while for consciously-experienced federalism the identification with anti-fascism is complete, it is also true that the values of the resistance are objectively the idealistic basis on which the Italian republic was constructed; and that these values inspired that section of the political class that knew how to place and maintain (albeit not without weaknesses, delays and hypocrisy) Italy on the rails of European unification and of Atlantic co-operation. In this way a country that the war brought on by fascism had reduced to a pile of ruins, was guaranteed almost half a century of peace, and with peace the possibility to grow in liberty and prosperity.

* * *

Italy has recently witnessed a phenomenon without precedent in post-second world war Europe: the formation of a government which includes

members of a neo-fascist party (Alleanza Nazionale — National Alliance). This is a fact that the federalists should analyse with great care, because their judgement on this aspect of the current political framework calls into question their identity, and hence their very existence.

In fact Alleanza Nazionale denies being a neo-fascist grouping. Yet its essential component is the Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement), a party founded post-war on unequivocally neo-fascist policies, and which has never subsequently abandoned them, even though it has always been divided into hard-line and "respectable" wings. In light of its inclusion in the government, Alleanza Nazionale has strongly emphasised its moderate nature. Today many of its leaders adopt positions that are much more reasonable than those of numerous members of the extreme currents to be found in many European conservative parties that are often in power in their respective countries, and whose commitment to democracy no-one would consider denying.

It is true that there has remained within Alleanza Nazionale a grouping that openly harks back to fascism, and that the declarations of the party leaders themselves are far from unambiguous. Yet this ambiguity could be interpreted as the price that the more responsible leaders are obliged to pay to lead the party into the fold of a moderate right-wing movement that recognises and accepts the principles of democracy and that allows for the creation in Italy of a healthy alternation between a conservative line-up and a progressive one, as happens in Anglo-Saxon democracies and, even if in an imperfect way, in the other democracies of Western Europe. To this can be added the fact that, on the basis of opinion polls, only a negligible percentage of Alleanza Nazionale voters declare themselves to be fascist, and that anyway Alleanza Nazionale is a minority partner in the government coalition. Within the coalition, the component that won the strongest support in terms of votes, "Forza Italia", despite having concluded an electoral as well as governmental alliance with Alleanza Nazionale, and despite having repeatedly expressed disturbing populist and nationalistic attitudes in some of its policy declarations, has never formally questioned its commitment to the values of liberty and democracy.

***

However the idea that Alleanza Nazionale could transform itself into a component of a grand right-wing democratic grouping, without ceasing to exist, is hardly credible. All political movements live in a continuum,

drawing on the memory of their origins for the force to pursue their own projects. They have therefore an insuperable element of inertia that is linked to the nature of the choice out of which they were founded, and that conditions, over and above the alterations brought about by the need to tailor themselves to an evolving situation, the way in which their militants perceive the motivation of their common commitment. Currently, Alleanza Nazionale is the point of arrival of an evolutionary process that began in neo-fascism, and it would not exist without the latter: a neo-fascism that can not be denied without repudiating the movement's past and hence its identity, on which depends its very existence.

It is often said in Italy that a rejection of Alleanza Nazionale is an indication of sectarianism, because, on the opposite side of the political spectrum, the communists have been legitimised as part of the democratic political line-up despite being the descendants of Stalinism. That the memory of Stalin has placed obstacles in the way of those who opted to bring communism back into the enclave of democracy is a matter of fact. And it is right that this was so, because the atrocities of Stalinism were as cruel as those of nazism, and without a doubt considerably more cruel than those of Italian fascism. There remains, however, the fact that communism originated in the proletariat's struggle to emancipate itself in the name of the universal ideals of equality between people and liberation from want. Stalinism was, then, a tragic degenerative episode of a movement that in its founding ideals provided a vital contribution to the political culture of mankind and to its process of emancipation. Fascism, on the other hand, was founded on the negative values of man's oppression of man, of national hatred and of intolerance. It is for this reason that some ex-communist parties have been able, with much effort, to legitimise themselves again by a return to their original values and the rejection of the degenerative episodes that have stained their history, while this option is not open to movements of fascist origin. And this is why the trend towards the polarisation of political life that is currently manifesting itself in Italy is unhealthy.

***

Italy is unlikely, in the short term, to risk any real danger of a fascist regression. Yet it remains a fact that the future of Italian democracy depends on the solidity of the European framework, which is the precondition for the Italian economy's capacity to keep step, one way or another, with the other advanced economies; and that the European

framework would be greatly weakened if the national-populist trends in the foreign and economic policy of one of the Community's founding countries, that had until now been one of the most explicit and consistent supporters of its federal vocation, were reinforced. In any event, Italian society is from now on running the real danger of the trivialisation of fascism, that is of the end of anti-fascism. It is disturbing to note how nowadays in Italy arguments such as that the opposition between fascism and anti-fascism has by now been consigned to history, and that it is time to undertake the task of "national reconciliation", are being given serious consideration. Such a formula attempts to put on an equal plane the reconciliation between people (that is an inexistent problem, if for no other reason than because those that personally experienced the drama of the fall of fascism, and of the resistance, are old or dead) and a compromise between the values of liberty and democracy, and their negation. Values (and their opposites) do not die, nor do they grow old; nor can they be separated from the judgement of events and movements through which they have historically manifested themselves. The great idealistic affirmations of the French revolution have become the everlasting patrimony of the human race. Conversely the historic identification of fascism with dictatorship and nationalist violence can not be erased by the passing of time. Those who currently pretend to profess the values of liberty and democracy without simultaneously rejecting their negation, as it has concretely manifested itself in history, are not credible because they remain prisoners of an incurable contradiction.

It is difficult in today's Italy to escape the deep unease that provokes the observation that for many people fascism has become an idea like any other — that like other ideas it has a right to a place in political debate. Above all other considerations, the spread of this attitude is an indication of the dramatic worsening of the crisis of Italian political life that has coincided with last April's profound changes in the political landscape, in which many wanted to see the dramatic breakthrough of something "new".

A serious indication of this crisis lies precisely in the fact that in the current Italian government, nationalistic and anti-European positions are gaining ground, even if inevitably attenuated and rendered ambiguous by the awareness that no national policy can be carried forward today in Europe without some form of co-operation among the states of the European Union. And if it is true that nationalism is always and everywhere a regressive phenomenon that turns its back on the future, it is a sign of a profound civil malaise and of a very serious rejection of values

in a country such as Italy, where the war against fascism was not fought as a national war, as was the case in Great Britain and to a certain extent in France, but where, on the contrary, nation and fascism have been historically identified as one and the same thing.

***

It is true that April's electoral earthquake had specific causes, the most evident of which was the reaction of public opinion against the corruption of the parties that had governed Italy in the post-war decades. But it is necessary strenuously to guard against the temptation to confuse the historical understanding of a phenomenon with its moral justification. In politics there is a time to understand and a time to judge. It should not be forgotten that nazism also had specific historical causes, yet that understanding them does not render nazism itself less odious.

The political parties of the first republic largely betrayed their ideologies by their concrete actions, and were jointly responsible for the progressive degeneration of Italian political life — even if this phenomenon has not been only Italian, and even if its ultimate cause should be identified in the inability of European governments and political forces as a whole to lead the process of continental unification to a federal conclusion. But their ideologies, whose roots lie in the great civil struggles of the 19th century and the first years of the 20th, however much they were professed superficially and hypocritically, forced Italy's post-war political parties to orient themselves in political debate with regard to values, to seek legitimisation and continuity in their own historical past, and to try to delineate perspectives for the future. For this reason these parties, although not all at the same time, came to recognise themselves unreservedly in the ideal of European unity and they spread acceptance of this to almost the whole of public opinion. Today on the other hand, after the dramatic breakthrough of the "new", the reference to values, to history and to the future has simply disappeared from politics, substituted by crude and provincial nationalistic outbursts and by a pragmatism that is only a screen for a lack of ideas. Today's Italy is worse than the bad Italy of yesterday.

***

Some argue that they can not condemn the presence of neo-fascists in the Italian government, asserting that this is the result of the democratic

expression of the Italian people's will, and as such must be respected. If by that the aim is to state that this disturbing phenomenon should be combated with the tools of democracy, then the argument is simply obvious. But if the argument is used to legitimise the neo-fascists politically, it should be rejected. Moreover, if it were sound, it would serve to legitimise historically the fascist and nazist regimes, which rose to power using the tools of democracy. The truth is that in today's Europe, the states, to recall one of Einaudi's famous expressions, are dust without substance. And dust without substance are also the national peoples. The Italian people can not express any will because it has simply ceased to exist, in as much as within the Italian framework there no longer exist real alternatives from which to make a choice.

Or rather, the Italian people continue to exist only as part of the European people-in-the-making, as do the other peoples of the European states, and only in this form can they express their will, regain the capacity to pursue projects and possess again an authentic historical understanding. The something "new" of which in today's Italy there is so much talk, most of it superficial and hypocritical, will emerge only when a political grouping is formed on the basis of the awareness that the change on which Italy's and Europe's salvation depends is that which consists specifically of giving expression to the European federal people that is in the process of coming about. Yet politicians, old and new alike, are prisoners of the contests of the past and obstinately refuse to recognise this.

The Federalist

European Citizenship and European Identity

GUIDO MONTANI

European federalism and the crisis of militant political thought.

The authors of the Ventotene Manifesto who, in 1941, launched an appeal for a free and united Europe were resolved to save modern civilisation, whose existence was threatened by the overwhelming and destructive violence of nazism and fascism. In this sense they formed an integral part of the great popular resistance movement in which also traditional political forces participated. But differently to those forces, the federalists put forward a completely new way to conceive of the State and international relations. In the final analysis, for the federalists, responsibility for the European disaster lay in the incapacity of traditional political thought to overcome the limitations of internationalism: the democratic, liberal and socialist parties deluded themselves that a peace treaty signed at Versailles could safeguard peace in a Europe of great powers. None of the great political traditions of the 19th century had denounced the myth of absolute sovereignty as the primary cause of tension and war, and at the moment of the clash, in 1914, all the parties lined up to support their respective governments, suppressing all internal dissension which, when it existed, was unable to go beyond the sterile protests of anti-militarists and pacifists. For this reason the Ventotene Manifesto spoke of the need to organise a "revolutionary party."[1] This proposal was to be understood not only in the sense that the immediate post-war period was foreseen as being characterised by a period of disorder in which a well-organised and strongly-determined force would have succeeded in directing the stream of popular enthusiasm along the path of European unification, but also in the wider political sense of the continuation, albeit with new objectives and different methods, of a tradition of thought that the parties had betrayed. Through the European federation, the ideals which the pacifists and internationalists within the

parties had displayed themselves totally incapable of defending and promoting, would have been realised.

This substantial continuity of action with the militant political tradition, was translated, in the post-war period, into a precise strategy. The European Federalist Movement, at the moment in which concrete possibilities of fighting for a European federation manifested themselves, chose the constituent method without hesitation, re-proposing for the construction of European unification what the revolutionary Americans at Philadelphia had previously done in their 1787 Convention. In essence, for the European federalists, the constituent process is the only available method for building the European federation in democratic countries. Under the constituent method, the representatives of the people elaborate a new constitutional charter which subsequently has to be ratified by the member states. The European federalists have always adopted this model of action through countless battles, even when an appeal to the European people may have seemed a desperate and utopian undertaking to those who know only how to follow the well-worn paths of ordinary political action. These well-worn paths are by definition national, since the struggle for power is a national one until a European federation exists.

For this reason, and due to the fact that the European governments did not want to accept the democratic means proposed by the federalists, the building of Europe began and progressed using the gradualist method of Jean Monnet. This enabled the implementation of partial transfers of sovereignty over important aspects of political life (as happened in practice for the European Coal and Steel Community) as the first step toward the construction of a real and effective European federation at the end of the process. The Jean Monnet and constituent methods are not contradictory. Steps forward toward European integration, if they lead to corresponding institutional reinforcement, can favour a subsequent constituent decision. But it is clear that the European federation will not spring from an infinite succession of partial reforms. Sooner or later it will be necessary to pose the constitutional question so that European citizens can understand that the European union represents a new form of State (an international State) only if the entire European edifice is erected on constitutional foundations, as must happen for any democratic State.

This is the political perspective that is imposing itself with ever greater clarity following the ratification of the Maastricht treaty. This treaty creates a European Union that is in substance considerably closer to the typical institutions of a federal State: the European parliament votes confidence in a Commission, which carries out the functions of a

European government. Monetary sovereignty, moreover, is transferred from the national level to the European one. However these federal aspects are suffocated by the excessive powers of the Council of Ministers, within which for many crucial aspects the opposing will of one country can block the decision-making process, thus achieving in practice the real and effective dictatorship of the minority. Maastricht, then, is a partly federal and partly confederal construction, and difficult for the ordinary citizen to understand. Nevertheless, in the Maastricht treaty there exists a breech (European citizenship) through which the democratic forces favourable to the definitive transformation of the Union into a real federation can progressively infiltrate themselves.

The issue is still little understood by public opinion and politicians, but the recognition of European citizenship causes contradictions to emerge that are so strident that it will be very difficult for the European institutions to avoid long term the growing demands for European democracy. And European democracy is impossible without federalism. After Maastricht, the European federation is no longer an ideal, but rather a requirement of good government. With the decision to establish an economic and monetary union the European governments have now entrusted the European institutions, in particular the Commission, with the power to direct and determine the development of the European economy. It is an enormous power, and unthinkable that it should remain in the hands of a bureaucracy that is not answerable to anyone. In all democratic regimes, monetary and economic policy do not escape the control of parliament. On the European level, there exists a parliament with few powers, but nevertheless sufficient to claim greater ones, if the parties represented within it had the will to fight for them. In other words, all the conditions for activating a circuit consisting of European citizens, European parties, the European parliament, and the European government are present. In essence, this is the political dynamic of a federal state.

The Europeans therefore find themselves on the threshold of a European federation. With the recognition of European citizenship, the battle for democratic European government through the direct participation of citizens in its construction finally becomes possible and necessary. The federalists have fought for this objective on other occasions, and in at least two cases, those of the European Defence Community (1952-54) and the Spinelli Project approved by the European parliament in 1984, they almost achieved it. But the opposition of some European governments (initially France, later the United Kingdom) caused the initiative to fail. The current situation is different. Maastricht establishes a pre-

federal union. The new, open opposition of the governments will be increasingly difficult if the federalists succeed in mobilising, at least in certain decisive European countries, the European people. But to do this, to be up to the task at hand, they must call on all their resources of thought and action — in short they must show European citizens that the European federation is the only real alternative to the crisis of democracy, which is currently betrayed by all those parties which consider the fight for national power as the priority. In Europe, the parties have forgotten their idealistic roots, and for this reason continue to ignore the democratic claims of European citizens. The most evident sign of this betrayal is the fact that the very word of revolution (i.e. the perspective of the emancipation of the entire human race) has disappeared from their political programmes.

Epitaph for the revolution.

The crisis of the traditional political ideologies, which has manifested itself all over the world as a growing scepticism toward political activity, has been further worsened in the wake of the end of the cold war. For a brief moment it was believed that the collapse of communism would represent the definitive triumph of democracy and the free market. There were even some who were able to talk about the end of history[2], as if the "real" democracy, personified by the democratic regimes that have developed in the West, represented the destination point of modern political thought and of the political movements that have generated it. Or rather, if it is possible to admit with ease that ultimately the cold war was won by the liberal and democratic regimes of the West, it is also true that the world is very far from having achieved democracy as government of the people — so much so that some consider it more appropriate to call polyarchical[3] the regimes that currently call themselves democratic. To these considerations it is necessary to add not only that many peoples are still far from any form of representative government and political pluralism, but also that in the contemporary world there survives among the democratic countries themselves a hierarchy of powers in international politics, with a superpower that occupies a position of world leadership. It is extremely difficult for a political order in which some countries are more important than others to call itself democratic. An American citizen has on the average a much greater power to influence world politics than other inhabitants of the world. If the degree of democracy currently reached were sufficient to make the planet evolve

towards a situation of greater liberty, equality and justice, it would probably also be possible to accept that, albeit imperfectly, a stage close to the "end" of universal history had been reached. But the same facts of international politics force us to come to a very modest conclusion on this subject. There has reappeared in Europe, with the practice of ethnic cleansing in ex-Jugoslavia, a form of atrocity that seemed impossible following the defeat of nazism and fascism. And equally threatening clouds are forming over the nationalities in the ex-Soviet republics. In the Third World, famine, mass poverty and war continue to cause innumerable victims. The survival of the planet is threatened by an industrialisation that is still incapable of being reconciled with respect for the environment. Mono-polarism does not seem an acceptable alternative to the bi-polarism that is now defunct. The United States is unable to offer rational solutions to world problems, either in the immediate future, or for the next century. And since a planet without government is more likely to head toward disaster than toward the reign of Utopia, history, in as much as it represents also suffering and tragedy, is far from finished.

Nevertheless, traditional political thought seems unable to propose a rational and acceptable future for the whole of the human race. It is passively submitting to the criticism of those who would like politics to renounce its global vision, in other words ideology, and not concern itself with the destiny of the world, by projecting alternatives to the existing international order. In effect, the last political force that claimed to be the "party of world revolution" succeeded, in 1917, in achieving only the first step of that revolution. But to the extent that it consolidated the power that it had won, the global nature of that message of emancipation became weaker and weaker until it completely disappeared. The Bolshevik revolution represented the last attempt to think of the world as a community of destiny. As much as one can dissent from the Bolsheviks' political programme, it is impossible to deny the global nature of their project. This revolution was none other than the first step of the world revolution, and would not have made sense without that perspective, as is testified to by the fierce controversy between Trotsky and Stalin over the permanent revolution. Nowadays, politics no longer seems capable of the same audacity. No party dares refer to revolutionary traditions — that, evidently, are not restricted to socialist developments, but trace back their roots much deeper, in the liberalism and democracy of the age of the enlightenment.

It is worth recalling an episode that testifies to a widely-held perception of politics nowadays: an epoch in which we should accept nothing

but an ordinary way of life, a sacred respect for the existing order, notwithstanding the fact that the whole world daily experiences the tragedy of the organised violence of the states or armed bands that claim to be states. Recently, on the occasion of the bicentenary of the insurrection of the Vendée against the revolutionary and centralising power of Paris, Alexander Solzhenitsyn could assert: "The word 'revolution' (from the Latin *revolvo*) itself means 'go backwards', 'return', 'try again', 're-alight', in the best of cases turn upside down, a sequence of meanings that is hardly enviable. These days, the epithet 'great' is no longer assigned to a revolution, except with circumspection and often with a certain air of complaint. By now we understand ever more clearly that the social effect that we desire so ardently can be obtained through normal, incremental developments, with infinitely less loss, and without generalised savagery. We need to know how to improve patiently what we are daily offered. And it would be useless to hope that revolution might regenerate human nature, even though this is what your revolution, and in particular ours, the Russian revolution, had strongly hoped."[4]

This funeral oration for the idea of revolution should be considered seriously. If for revolution one intends firstly the conquest with violence of political power, it is natural that those who consider themselves to be democrats instinctively reject this point of view. Many authoritarian regimes, including fascism and nazism, have abused the idea of revolution to suppress the democratic rule of alternating power and to affirm an absolutist regime. In this case the idea of revolution is used solely for the justification of the illegal suppression of the government. But the same attempt to falsify the situation occurs when a regime defines itself as democratic or socialist without being so at all in fact. We should not renounce use of the word democracy or socialism for this reason. Hence, even if it is true that past revolutions have engendered violence against regimes that did not allow a legal opposition, it is not violence which constitutes the essence of the idea of revolution.

The idea of revolution entered the cultural patrimony of politics to indicate the overcoming of an old order, the *ancien régime*, by a new and progressive order. From the sphere of political action, subsequently and by analogy, the idea of revolution was applied to the economy, where one talks of industrial revolution, for example; and to the history of science, where there exists a very broad debate on the structure of scientific revolutions; to the history of art, where one talks of aesthetic revolutions to indicate the passage from one style to another, such as impressionism compared to neo-classic art, and so on. There is no reason,

then, why politics should renounce using a concept coined by itself. The only explanation lies in the fact that the traditional political currents, from liberalism to socialism, are no longer able to conceive of a project that represents effective progress for the human race, one that radically changes the perception of every individual's future, as members of a political community. The great revolutions of the past, starting with the liberal revolutions of the 17th century, continue to merit the name of revolutions in history books because they altered not only the juridical and *de facto* situation of certain individuals in a certain place at a certain time, but because they offered a new perspective of change and progress for the entire human race. Revolutions mark the beginning of a new era of emancipation.[5]

It is on the basis of this more profound sense of the idea of revolution that Solzhenitsyn's assertion, according to which "it would be useless to hope that revolution might regenerate human nature", must be rejected. Here we can ignore the philosophical problem whether human nature can alter through time or not, and limit ourselves to the simple observation that the civilisation which we are living in is the fruit of countless revolutions that have altered the way in which people organise their relationships, by placing restraints on forms of behaviour that from time to time are judged to be "uncivilised", and therefore repressed and punished by custom and the legal system. The modern state should be considered a superior form of civil co-habitation because it guarantees greater liberty, security and well-being to its citizens, compared to what used to occur in primitive times, in the rudimentary forms of association of the horde or the tribe. Incest, rape and cannibalism are considered normal behaviour among Australian aborigines and certain tribes of the deep Amazonian forest. They are no longer considered either normal or legal in the contemporary world. And even if these crimes have not completely disappeared from civilised societies because people will probably never succeed in completely suppressing their animal and instinctive natures, it should be observed that they are manifested in statistically small percentages with regard to the mass of behaviours that can be considered the norms of a civilised society. In this specific and limited sense it can therefore be asserted that the human condition has changed for the better. We could make other observations, such as that the average life-span for a person born into a pre-industrial society was around 35-40 years, while today it reaches, and exceeds, 75 years. Nevertheless, to guarantee this average longevity an efficient health organisation is necessary, and only a State that is well-governed can

manage to develop such an entity. This is demonstrated by the fact that following the social and production difficulties which took place in the collapsing Soviet Union, a drastic fall in the average life-span of its inhabitants occurred. The examples could go on. The underlying point is, however, that only through better political institutions is it possible to ensure the visible progress of the human condition. Politics is that part of social activity in which people exercise the greatest degree of liberty compatible with the existing historical conditions. The Greek city, the Roman empire, and so on, are the fruit of the passions and struggles of people that had a certain vision of the political order and that fought and won against alternative conceptions of civilised common life. Politics is impossible, or is reduced to the simple administration of the existing situation, without a vision of the world, a *Weltanschauung*, an ideology which explicitly expresses the values that it is intended to pursue, and the necessary means for their implementation. Only in a technical sense is politics the struggle for power. Without values, politics does not exist.

Naturally, it is possible to object at this point, along with Solzhenitsyn, that there is no intention whatsoever to deny change or progress, but that this should be pursued "through normal, incremental developments", in other words without overthrowing any regime or existing political order. Even Kant, notwithstanding the fact that he welcomed the French revolution, later suggested that political change should come about only as a result of the proceeding of public debate and of the enlightened spirit of the prince. This viewpoint is important and can not be rejected out of hand. It is true that in many cases, particularly within democratic regimes, it would seem reasonable to hypothesize that only through the alternation of majority and opposition is normal progress possible. No radical and revolutionary change is necessary if we admit that reason makes itself progressively appreciated by citizens. This argument is nevertheless only partly true. The political institutions that have historically asserted themselves, intrinsically demonstrate varying degrees of flexibility, but also rigidity, as regards the limits that can not be crossed without putting into question the institutions themselves. Gaetano Mosca indicated in his "political formula" the grouping of ideas that legitimate a certain form of government or State. In a society that allows slavery and survives by it as a productive force, it is possible to achieve, as in classical Greece, very advanced forms of civil co-habitation, but not democracy in the modern sense that all citizens must participate freely in the political process. In the ex-USSR, the attempt of Gorbachev to reform the collective system with gradual doses of democracy and the market has, up to a certain point,

called into question the principles of Leninism, on which the whole Soviet order was based. It is possible to imagine endless reforms that can be made within a certain political formula, but not those that undermine the legitimacy of established power.

And in this precise sense the traditional ideologies (liberalism, democracy and socialism) have lost their capacity to plan for the future, that is to give convincing answers to the problems that spur on the human race. To the extent that the major questions of our time take on a global dimension, while the political forces that look to traditional political thought continue to envisage solutions within the "internationalist political formula", in other words through simple intergovernmental co-operation, an alternative democratic political order to the world of national states will never emerge. Those who really want to build an international order in which it is the citizens, and not governments, that are the protagonists of world politics, should call into question the myth of national sovereignty. This is the essence of the federalist message. Politics will continue to be looked on with suspicion by young people, and national democratic institutions will suffer a continuous waning of support, until citizens are able to participate in the great world decisions that put their future at risk. If the crucial choices regarding war and peace, North-South dialogue and the ecological protection of the planet remain the monopoly of a few government bureaucrats, enclosed in splendid palaces, far from indiscreet eyes, and from the criticisms of public opinion, national politics will increasingly bore the ordinary citizen. The crisis of politics is the crisis of those who think that democracy is unable to go beyond the boundaries of the national state.

Federalism and the great revolutions of the past.

The great revolutions of the modern age represent the final stage of a long period of intellectual and social turmoil in which new political thinking was displayed, and a new way of organising relationships between individuals ultimately asserted itself. Today, the world is upset by shocks and violence, such that it will be possible to return to normal civilian life only by a radical reworking of the international order. For this reason it is necessary to rethink the potentiality of contemporary political ideologies, and return to their revolutionary origins. It was while the great revolutions were underway that the language of politics itself (right and left, conservatism and progress, for example) was shaped and the funda-

mental institutions of modern associative life were born (the State based on law, representative democracy, and so on). Revolutions represent moments of supreme tension when mankind asserts a new beginning in history. The revolution is the start of a new era in which a novel way of organising political and social power is achieved, and the human condition itself is altered both as an immediate effect of the institutional reforms and through a new way of thinking about the future that pervades the whole of associative life. Revolution is inseparable from the idea of progress and the course of history. For this reason every revolution that is conscious of its worth establishes profound roots in the past.

Contemporary politics has lost the memory of its past. With the collapse of the USSR and communism, the last ideology that boasted of a direct link with the revolutionary tradition has also been overcome. This does not solely concern relationships between the Soviet regime and the October revolution. There is an evident historical continuity between the great revolutions of the modern age. The Bolsheviks claimed to be the legitimate descendants of the French revolution, bringing to conclusion a historical development that had seen, initially, the bourgeoisie triumph over the aristocracy and, finally, the liberation of the proletariat and the disappearance of the class struggle itself. The strength of communism as a political idea consisted in large part of its constant call to continuity with the revolutionary tradition. It was partly for this reason that the USSR was able for decades to fulfil the role of a great power, and successfully counter the Western order that was relegated to the conservative camp.

An awareness of the continuity of the historical process is therefore a mobilising and strength-giving factor *per se*. Every revolution, imposing itself as the motor of contemporary history, interprets and renews all previous political thought. The American revolution was mainly inspired by the English revolution of 1688, and the French revolution by the American one. It is as if people, in their untiring search for a better world, are concerned always to depart from the outpost that has already been conquered. An appreciation of the revolutionary roots of political action provides a measure of the capacity to innovate. Those who lack the courage to speak of revolution, renounce the concept of radical politics itself, that is of a politics that does not solely pursue the changes that are made possible from previous victories, but that would introduce into political life a new way of conceiving of relationships between individuals.

The American revolution, whose significance is not yet fully understood, marks an important milestone in the history of the world. In 1787,

the first federal constitution in history represented the climax of a long process, begun with the claim to independence of the thirteen American colonies. Without union, the independence and self-government won by the colonies would have been impossible to maintain, both because of the conflicts that would have undoubtedly emerged among the colonies themselves, and because of the policy of interference practised by the European powers in America.

The American federal constitution, nevertheless, became part of the political culture of those times only because of its democratic content, and not as a possible new way to organise international relations peacefully. The outbreak of the French revolution, which occurred in the same year that the government in Washington was established, attracted the attention of the world to much more dramatic and disturbing events. The fall of the *ancien régime* called into question the whole social and political structure of the European States. It threw down the gauntlet to the old world. The same rights of independence and self-government were asserted in the French revolution that the American colonies had claimed, but the new achievements concerned a great European power, and the rights were proclaimed in the name of the entire human race. For this reason the French revolution spread everywhere and marked the start of a new area, overshadowing the federal aspects of the American revolution.

The French revolutionaries that had overcome the old monarchical institutions established the authority of the new republican government on the national principle, and the identity of the State and the nation represented the new paradigm of international political existence. The innovative meaning of the American federal constitution remained a message to posterity, entrusted to the pages of *The Federalist*, and did not become an active principle of political life. In time the Americans themselves moved away from the original federal aspirations of their constitution, both in foreign policy, where imperialism was substituted for the practice of enlarging the union, and in internal policy, where progressive centralisation strongly reduced the original autonomy of the States. In Europe the destiny of federalism was to oppose weakly, and unsuccessfully, triumphant nationalism. In France, federalism was fought against as a principle that would disintegrate the centralised state. In Italy, federal projects were proposed to achieve political unity, but in reality, in a Europe dominated by power politics, the centralised state model imposed itself. In Germany, federalism followed a similar fate; in fact the Germany of Bismarck set up a federal constitution only in name, in which

Prussia stood above the other German States. In Great Britain, federalism was proposed as a possible solution to avoid the collapse of the colonial empire, but without overcoming the national concept of a Greater Britain, in which the individual colonies of the Commonwealth would have enjoyed lesser powers than those of the mother country. In all these instances, the federal project was therefore subordinated to the nationalist perspective. Even the federations that were born in the era of nationalism (Switzerland, Canada, Australia, and others) became, in turn, nations. The Bolshevik revolution asserted itself in dispute with democracy and with federalism, notwithstanding the fact that the first Soviet constitution had had to be defined "federal" in an impossible attempt to reconcile the single-party regime with the republics' hopes for autonomy.

The legacy of the revolution: the rights of man and of the citizen.

One of the most significant phases of the revolutionary tradition, for the consequences it had on the course of world events, consisted of the proclamation of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* (26th August, 1789). With this solemn gesture, the French constituent assembly placed the old political and social order, based on divine power and class divisions, definitively into crisis, and opened the era of democracy and equality. The subject became a citizen, that is a holder of rights and duties. From then on only the people would be the legitimate depository of power. This simple idea, but one pregnant with innovative consequences, impinged on all those regimes that, in France and throughout the world, had attempted to suppress, usurp or limit the fundamental liberty of individuals to choose their own government.

The significance of the 1789 declaration lies in the effort made by the constituents to draw up a text of a universal nature. The *Bill of Rights* had already been approved in the course of the English revolution, and many American colonies had founded their institutions on similar texts. But the French constituents wanted to go beyond this; they did not seek to affirm rights only for their own fellow nationals, but for the entire human race. For this reason Kant could assert that the French revolution had aroused "a participation of aspirations that borders on enthusiasm" and that "such a phenomenon in the history of humanity will never be forgotten, since it has revealed in human nature an openness toward, and a force for, improvement."[6]

Nowadays it is said that we live in an age of rights.[7] Liberalism has progressively asserted itself through the affirmation of liberal rights

(freedom of expression, of the press, of association, etc.); democracy through the affirmation of political rights (universal suffrage, political pluralism, etc.); and socialism through the so-called social rights (controls on child labour, night work, and the right to work and health assistance, etc.). These represent gains that, depending on the period and the country, are making progress everywhere. Nobody openly questions these rights any longer, in as much as they are national rights, even if some dictatorial regimes deny them. But precisely because they are placed in opposition to the flow of history these regimes are weak; they survive only due to military bullying and they live on the margins of the international community.

The sole rights that are ignored in the "age of rights", that remain solely a declaration of principles, without any significant implementation, are cosmopolitan rights. The rights to liberty and to political and social equality can not concern only national citizens, but must be valid for people as human beings, for the citizens of the world. In theory, the universality requirement has made progress through history. Indeed, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted in 1948 the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, that derived in essence from the 1789 declaration, but it then entrusted enforcement to individual national governments. The countless violations of these rights by not only authoritarian and dictatorial regimes, but also by democratic ones (restricting migratory movements, denying the right to vote to "foreigners", and so on) are more than evident enough. The political reality is therefore very far from the ideal world that these same national states proposed to achieve. What is rational is not yet real. The contemporary world is for this reason scarred by a profound gulf between facts and values.

Natural law and positive law.

The basis of the declarations of the rights of man is the doctrine of natural law. Rousseau began the Social Contract with the assertion, "Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains." But during the course of the 19th century this doctrine was severely criticised by legal positivists, and progressively fell into disrepute. Natural laws do not exist, the jurists of positive law maintain, because there are no citizens in the state of nature, prior to the formation of the State as a juridical organism and fount of law. Only the foundation of the State, thanks to its powers of government and coercion, can ensure respect for the rights of individual

citizens. It is the State that creates law, not natural law that creates the State. Kelsen goes as far as to argue for the identity of State and juridical order: the state is the legal system.[8]

Very similar criticisms, nevertheless, had already been made by Hamilton, concerning the demand to precede the American constitution by a charter of rights. According to Hamilton, the bills of rights "would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government". Consider the freedom of the press. This can be enforced only if the constitution recognises as legitimate also the power to punish those who violate it. Otherwise the declarations of rights remain a pure invocation, a prayer that everybody can ignore, as happens today for the universal declaration of the rights of man. It is nonsense to proclaim a certain action illegitimate for which there exists no corresponding power of punishment. For Hamilton, "the Constitution is itself, in every national sense, and to every useful purpose, a bill of rights."[9]

Hamilton's objections are entirely pertinent and can only be superseded within a wider cultural context than the doctrine of positive law. It is true that natural rights do not exist in the state of nature prior to the emergence of the State as a political organism, but it is also true that they exist as claims of reason. Since reason is universal, what holds for an individual must hold for all individuals. People want justice. Positive law must on the contrary conciliate justice with interest and power relations. For this reason, the dialectic between positive law and just law is unsuppressible.[10]

In declarations of rights certain demands relating to the established powers are laid down, and these powers should commit themselves to respecting these demands, and to enforcing them. They represent an effective or potential restraint on the power of one man over another. It is for this reason that declarations of rights often concern a group of attitudes that goes beyond the field of action of the existing constitutions. No constitution is perfect. This is the limit of Hamilton's observations. Even the American constitution, in which the freedoms of expression and the press are recognised and explicitly protected, did not manage to guarantee these rights in their entirety during the years of McCarthyism, since the defence of American *raison d'état* with regard to the USSR allowed a chauvinistic movement to orchestrate a real and effective witch-hunt against individuals suspected of communism.

The issue is dealt with in its entirety by Kant: "The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution depends on the problem of law-governed external relations among states and cannot be solved unless the latter is."[11] This means that declarations of rights will not possess a definite significance until the world federation is established. Every right, if it must be truly valid for all individuals, prefigures the claim toward a world power that today does not yet exist, and that therefore is unable to guarantee universal rights. Only in a world federation will cosmopolitan rights exist. Nowadays, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is none other than the foreshadowing of cosmopolitan law, or, for those who want to translate the declaration into a political programme, a starting point for the elaboration of a manifesto for action on a global scale.

European citizenship is the first positive affirmation of cosmopolitan law.

To measure empirically what concrete progress the process of human emancipation can gain from the realisation of European unity, let us consider the meaning of European citizenship, as foreseen in the Maastricht Treaty, compared to the 1789 *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*.

Art. 1 — Men are born and remain free and have equal rights. The universality of this assertion, as mentioned above, has been clearly violated by the national principle. No national State recognises foreigners as legal subjects. The UN's attempt to affirm the universal nature of the principles of 1789, runs up against the insurmountable obstacle of absolute national sovereignty. Only recently, and in particular circumstances, has the so-called "right of interference" made any headway, namely the attempt through UN-directed action to impose respect for individual rights that are violated by despotic governments. But we are still very far from effective juridical guardianship, with the rights of citizens supported on a world scale by coercive power.

The Maastricht treaty asserts that "anyone who has the citizenship of a member State is a citizen of the Union." This means that European citizens can make claims to the European Court of Justice hold against anyone (including a national government different from their own one) who violates their rights. European citizenship, in this way, is added to the national ones, establishing a real and effective post-national political community. In essence, the European Union has achieved the first pacific form of co-habitation between citizens of different nations in history. The US also represents a melting pot, that is a multi-ethnic and multi-racial society very similar to the European one.[12] But the substantial difference is that Europe unites national States, in other words the national political

communities that are territorially organised. The prerogative of the national States has always been that of asking their citizens to die for the fatherland and to kill for its defence. In the European union, the right not to kill other Community citizens in war has been asserted *de facto*, since controversies between member states are by now no longer resolved through military confrontation. Nevertheless it would be opportune if this implicit right were cited explicitly in the European constitution, so that even non-Community peoples can become aware of the profoundly innovative nature of the European Union. European citizenship establishes a post-national, but pre-cosmopolitan, legal status, in as much as other peoples must necessarily remain excluded from the European Union.

Art. 2 — The goal of all political association is the preservation of the natural and inalienable rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance against oppression. In this article, the main liberal rights are set out. Over the two centuries since the French revolution, political and social rights have been added to these fundamental rights. Let us examine them in order. a) In the Europe of the internal market (a market without frontiers), the so-called four liberties have by now been almost completely realised: namely, the freedom of movement of peoples, goods, services and capital. The achievement of post-national civil rights has been implemented, then, even with the weak European power of the current Community. But it should be recalled that many rights connected with the implementation of the internal market (such as the mutual recognition of academic qualifications, the freedom of market entry throughout the territory of the Community, impossible without a single currency) are still very far from effective realisation. b) The set of European political rights is summed up in the power of citizens to elect their own government. Under this aspect, therefore, we find ourselves faced with the problem of the "democratic deficit" of the Community and with the need to overcome it through the implementation of an effective federal constitution. On this subject it should only be noted that the existence of a European parliament elected by universal suffrage clearly indicates the path along which to proceed. c) The achievement of social rights in the Community is more a formal, rather than a substantial, fact. Indeed, the group of social rights (the right to work, to balanced regional development, to the safeguarding of the natural, urban and cultural environment, etc.) depends on active *ad hoc* policies. The case of employment, for which satisfactory results can be reached only through a combination of monetary, fiscal and social policies at the European

level, is typical. This concerns the effective powers of political economy, which the Community will have fully at its disposal only to the extent that the democratic deficit is overcome.

In conclusion, cosmopolitan rights widen the scope and reinforce the content of liberal, social and political rights. Thanks to the conquest of cosmopolitan rights, citizens can finally be freed from the condition of moral and civil minority in which the ideology of nationalism relegated them.

Art. 3 — The origin of absolute sovereignty resides fundamentally in the nation. With this article, the French constituent assembly substituted for the principle of divine right, an equally arbitrary principle, that of the nation (in other words, a natural phenomenon or a myth), as the fount of legitimacy for the republican government. In any event this concerns the past, namely the nation-States. It is now clear that the European Union can not derive any source of legitimacy from a hypothetical "European nation". To talk of Europe as a "nation of nations" is a nonsense, since the principle of nationality imposes one and only one national identity on its citizens (they are Italians or Germans, etc.).

Whence, then, does the European Union's legitimacy derive? The answer can be found in a shrewd assertion of Thomas Paine: "Government without a constitution is power without a right."[13] For this extremely simple reason, neither the Community, nor the Europe of Maastricht, represent solid political institutions. They are entities that do not derive from the popular will. Only the European parliament, the sole legitimate representative of European citizens, would have been able to draw up a constitutional project that respected the popular will. Maastricht is an *octroyée* constitution, granted by governments that are concerned solely to yield the smallest amount of powers possible to European citizens. Through the Maastricht treaty, the national governments (the *ancien régime*) have created the semblance of European democracy (citizenship, a tiny amount of co-decision, etc.), but not its substance — a democratic government. Hence it ought to be concluded that the entire European Community power system, until such time as it is based on popular consent through a real federal constitution, must be considered illegitimate.

European identity.

The components of a political community (a party, a city, a State) must possess certain shared and distinguishing characteristics. Identity is

defined in relation to others. The identity of a people, therefore, regards those aspects of their own cultural life that are recognised as their specific contribution to the patrimony of the understanding of the human race.

From this viewpoint, European history has shown how in Europe certain scientific facts and forms of political (thanks to the great ideologies of liberalism, democracy and socialism) and legal life (the nation-state included) have developed that have progressively become the common patrimony of the human race. It is possible then to assert that European identity consists of the universal aspects of European culture. It is from Europe that the enlightenment, rationalism, scientific research and modern technology, emerged. The whole world has made this culture its own, thereby widening ever more the material bases of global interdependence. Even the Third World, which in many ways finds itself currently at the other extreme from the so-called industrialised world, provides testimony through its struggles of the extent to which the universal values of European culture allow all people, however abject their material living conditions may be, to join progressively a community of free and equal people. It is in the name of the universal rights of man that the emancipation of the Third World becomes possible.

Nevertheless, this world that is unified by culture, the market and political interdependence, remains unable to think out and achieve concrete forms of equality among peoples, namely international democracy. The answer lies in federalism. The European federation is the institutional model to organise relations between the nations peaceably. As Albertini has written, the European federation, by becoming a subject of world politics, would represent also "a great cultural fact". This would concern "the establishment of the multinational model, which is truly human, in the historical seat of the nations itself; the first appearance of the political culture of the unity of the human race... At this point, there would no longer be European culture, but simply the culture of all, a universal human culture, at the second stage of its appearance."[14]

This now concerns being aware that European citizens will necessarily have a political identity and a cultural identity that will enter into fruitful contradiction with each other. The political identity of European citizens will be defined from day to day by the debate that will be fed, in the context of the European Union, by the European political parties, cultural forces and the mass media. Hence a European public space will be formed with regard to the battle for European power. It will be participation in the Union government, through debate, that will shape the character of European citizens, and hence their political identity. The

parties will be able to conquer the trust of European citizens to the extent that they will be able to demonstrate a capacity to fight for the defence of Europe's interests and vocation. European political identity will be unable to coincide completely with its cultural dimension, since European politics will only be partially identified with the cosmopolitan ambitions of its culture. The identity of culture and political system has been a requirement of nationalism which the European Union will no longer be able to satisfy. Hence, any effort to generate European patriotism, notwithstanding the fact that Europe, in as much as it will be a sovereign state, will certainly strive for the defence of its own interests against the interests of the rest of the world, will be in vain. Eventually, it will be possible to talk, as Habermas maintains, of constitutional patriotism[15], namely of a loyalty towards the democratic constitution of the European Union. Constitutional patriotism is a form of public behaviour, of respect for democracy and its institutions.

This contradiction between the political and cultural identities of European citizens represents the seed of a federalist world dynamic that deserves to be analysed in its fundamental aspects.[16] The nation-states of the past exploited the institutions of national defence and education to impose the national identity on their citizens. This represented the real occult manipulation of consciences, through national ideology, by the political authority. The army and schools were the *longa manus* of governments for directing the individual lives of citizens who were reduced to the state of passive subjects, as is demonstrated by the fact that in the army "passive and absolute" obedience is demanded. Let us now consider the meaning of these institutions in the European Union.

European defence and European identity.

The nation-State was able to ask its citizens to "die for the fatherland". The State, which emerged in the modern age as a means to guarantee the life and well-being of its subjects, was in this way transformed into an instrument of death. The extreme sacrifice of life was historically justified by the inevitable battle for power within the system of sovereign states. A people's combined achievements of civilisation were threatened with destruction if the State was overthrown by foreign aggression. In the world of sovereign states only the strong survive. These are the explanations that justified the search for maximum power in foreign policy, and the formation of well-trained national armies as the sole possible means to guarantee security.

The European Union is emerging into a world context in which, albeit still with unsure steps, a policy of détente among the industrialised countries that confronted each other during the era of the cold war, is asserting itself. This does not yet represent peace, but rather only the necessary recognition of common rules for managing new forms of co-operation and integration between East and West. But it is sufficient to eliminate from the international scene, barring a dramatic and illusory return to the past, the image of the superpower as a mortal enemy. Micronationalism, that has returned to the spotlight of history the nazi principle of ethnic cleansing, seems unable to disturb the larger process of European integration that is currently underway. Micronationalism shares with classic nationalism the idea of ethnic and racial purity. It is a form of exclusivity and political fundamentalism. However, unlike the nationalism of the past it does not propose the domination of the world through military conquest and imperialism. The cold war is over because mankind has recognised the folly of a policy of military supremacy in the nuclear age. Micronationalism can not upset the course of world politics.

The structural characteristics of international politics will define the fundamental aspects of Europe's foreign policy, and its military security. Europe no longer has enemies to fight against among the countries of the North of the world. There are no superpowers which can reasonably aspire to hegemonic pretensions and launch a potentially fatal attack against Europe. It is only in the South of the world, particularly from the Mediterranean, that threats to its security arise: terrorism is the weapon of the poor. In any event, the politics of military confrontation must be subordinated to policies of co-operation and détente, not for humanitarian reasons, but because of simple political calculation. Europe is a happy island surrounded by poor and desperate peoples. It is impossible to prevent the assault of the dispossessed from Asia and Africa by building ever more impenetrable borders. Europe's best response to its security problem is an effective contribution toward the development of the South.

To the extent that Europe will have to intervene militarily beyond the European continent, it will only be able to do so legitimately under the insignia of the UN. Europe's colonial past does not permit it any other choice. European security will increasingly depend on the military strengthening of the UN. The creation of a world army must therefore become the priority of European foreign policy. The specific contribution that the European Union can give to its security is the formation of a European contingent of "blue helmets", the European section of a world force for peace.

Young Europeans will not be called to die for a European fatherland. A European federal State, not a national community, will exist. The European political class will not be able to invoke a common ethnic and blood identity in order to demand absolute loyalty from European citizens. European foreign policy will be based on the pure and simple defence of the interests of Europeans, not of a mythical "fatherland". It will not therefore be possible to conceal the real motivations for mobilising a European peace force behind ideological veils. Clearly, it will be impossible to eliminate the temptation for a European government to resort to force to defend its own interests. But it will be extremely difficult to find young people willing to sacrifice their lives to defend interests rather than ideals. An occasional imperialistic impulse will not suffice to overturn the great trends of world politics. Imperialism and power politics are no longer the order of the day in history in the wake of the collapse of the USSR and the unstoppable decline of the US as a superpower. Europeans will be called on to construct a fairer and more peaceful international order, through the gradual strengthening and democratisation of the only institution that possesses a world vocation, the UN — in whose government not only rich countries, but also poor ones, can participate.

The school system and European identity.

The school system is the institution through which culture is transmitted from one generation to the next. Even though scholastic systems differ from country to country, it seems possible to assert that there are two causes that condition progress in the field of education. The first concerns constraints deriving from work conditions, and that often impose on young people studies which are limited to professional ends, when there does not exist the much more dramatic constraint of having to renounce studying completely or in part (as in many poor countries of the South, that have extremely low education levels). Secondly, education is conditioned by the political authority which, by imposing curriculums with a nationalist misrepresentation of the facts of history (the French celebrate Napoleon, the English Wellington, etc.), manipulate culture to obtain maximum loyalty from its own citizens. The subordination of schools to the political authority is a phenomenon that is so pervasive in the history of the European nation-States that Ortega y Gasset could even put forward a "principle of education", according to

which "the school, as a normal institution of a country, depends much more on the public atmosphere in which it exists as an integral part than on the pedagogical atmosphere that is produced artificially within its walls."[17] Therefore, according to Ortega y Gasset, it follows that it is impossible to have a good school in a State that is unable to promote the universal values of culture. The European educational systems, however pedagogically effective, have all been poisoned by the ill-fated culture of nationalism, whose major aberration consisted of placing the idol of the nation above the values of religion, liberty and equality.

With the achievement of the European Union and a supernational scholastic system the "principle of education" can finally be overcome, in the sense that European scholastic institutions will no longer find insurmountable obstacles to the promotion and development of cosmopolitan culture. With the reciprocal recognition of academic qualifications within the European Union and the free circulation of people in the internal market, the national monopoly of the State school has now been undermined. The national scholastic systems will be forced to compare themselves, and to compete in guaranteeing the best cultural training to young people that, to a greater or lesser extent depending on the local and social circumstances, will be able freely to enter any national education system. Schools therefore will have to liberate themselves progressively from the shackles imposed by the national bureaucracy. Schools denationalise by becoming free to concern themselves with history as history of the human race, with literature as the expression of the taste and aesthetic of a certain age, and so on. In the European Union, the national States become, in turn, simply States of "national dimensions" since they no longer have to resort to the ideology of nationalism to survive. In effect they are losing functions towards the top (the European government) and towards the bottom (the regions and local authorities). The principle of subsidiarity holds for the member States of the European federation too: they should not try to implement policies that can be carried out with greater effectiveness at other government levels. The school system, therefore, can become an articulated educational institution at different government levels, according to its territorial relevance. For example, it is opportune that primary schools are run mainly by a municipal or city-district government, while universities can probably best be organised at the regional level. In educational matters, the national and European government levels should mainly fulfil co-ordinating and promotional roles, as in the case of advanced scientific research. But the concept of an education ministry that dictates scholastic programmes and regulates the

minutiae of scholastic life is obsolete. In a post-national society there is no longer a role for the paternalistic State that maintains the institutions of culture in a minority condition. Schools must programme their educational activity in full independence, fully respecting scientific truth and the great civilising orientations laid down by the democratic constitution.

European schools will only become aware of their potential very slowly, because in the initial stage the European authority will find it difficult to avoid the temptation to imitate the old stereotypes of nationalism (it is sufficient here to recall the European Commission's clumsy attempt to promote the drawing-up of scholastic texts with a "European" vision of history[18]). But it is easy to predict that these attempts will come to nothing, since the European scholastic system, once freed from the harness of the national bureaucracies, will certainly not allow itself to be easily gagged by an authority that lacks the ideological tool of a European "national" identity to defend. Moreover, thanks to improvements in economic conditions, the school-leaving age could be extended and a growing number of young people will be able to go on to university, which is already profoundly integrated into the world university system.

Thus, European schools will not find insuperable obstacles to implementing finally that educational plan which Kant discussed in his lessons on pedagogy: "Parents think of home the princes of the State. Neither the ones nor the others have as final objective the universal good and the perfection for which mankind is destined and they are gifted. And yet the concept of an educational plan must have a cosmopolitan bent."[19] This represents a challenge. If European schools are able to present the educational plan proposed by Kant as their goal and the supreme ideal, then the education of European citizens will be able to proceed until the point at which even European political life will be able to liberate itself from the bonds imposed by the defence of selfish interests, so as to reconcile them with the common good, which in a world strictly interdependent can be none other than the *summum bonum* of the entire human race.

European federal society.

The concept that society is made up of a mass of isolated individuals, closed within their restricted family circle and daily interests has undergone, starting in the 19th century following the first social breakdowns caused by industrial development, growing criticisms from socialist

political thought and the teachings of Christian solidarity. The liberal concept of the State recognises respect for certain fundamental citizen rights. But these rights, such as that to property and to the search for happiness, remain a dead letter for those who are deprived of the material means for their enjoyment. Without solidarity, a society of rights remains profoundly unjust.

The affirmation of the concept of solidarity (brotherhood, according to the revolutionaries of 1789) proceeded in stages, gradually, as socialist criticism managed to demonstrate effectively the limitations of individual charity and the need for corrective intervention by the State. If we exclude the collectivist experience, whose failure is recognised by the societies that experimented with it, it is possible to assert that the concept of solidarity has progressively established itself through the construction of the social State (the *Etat providence* in France, the *welfare State* in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and the *Sozialstaast* or *social market* in Germany).

The rise of the social State occurred in roughly three different stages, even if these partly overlap, depending on the countries and the time periods. The first stage, begun towards the end of the last century in Bismarck's Germany, consisted of the introduction of initial forms of social security for illness, injury at work and the guarantee of a minimum pension to the elderly. If to these measures is added free elementary school education, it is possible to see how the ideal of social solidarity was realised not by transferring directly the wealth of the richest to the poorest, but through the guarantee to all citizens of a minimum of social services such that nobody was completely excluded from participating in collective life. This means guaranteeing the equality of opportunity. Differences in income remain, even if progressive taxation tends at least to smooth out the peaks, but these differences must not impede the less fortunate from a dignified life.

The second stage, corresponding roughly to the period following the second world war, consists of the recognition that the State must do what it can to guarantee a job to all citizens. A market-based economic system is unable to guarantee full employment to all those who are looking for a job. There can exist long phases of stagnation in the economy during which certain businesses go bankrupt and plant remains inactive due to a lack of demand. To avoid these negative effects of the market, the State can intervene using a combination of fiscal and monetary policies. This is the new Keynesian economic policy, based on the control of the great macroeconomic aggregates. Thanks to this active intervention by governments, the western economies in the post-war period enjoyed a long phase of stability and growth. The fundamental instruments of the full-employment policies were the anti-unemployment funds, public investment and wages policy (to translate increases in productivity into new jobs). In recent years, due to growing international economic interdependence, Keynesian stabilisation policies required ever closer international co-ordination. In fact, this is one of the reasons that has induced European governments to launch the project of economic and monetary Union.

The third stage of the social state is only beginning, and the outline can be defined with difficulty. It seems to comprise of the need to change over to policies of solidarity between one individual and another, through the State, and going beyond the generic solidarity towards entire categories or social groups. The modern post-industrial society, while enabling an increase in material well-being and life-span (compared to time at work), to such an extent that people talk of an "opulent society", also generates a series of problems and needs that were unknown in traditional societies. For example, the elderly are becoming considerably more numerous in relation to the working population. Mass communications destroy the residual social prejudices of the past, but uproot individuals from their communities of origin (the family, village, etc.), creating problems of insecurity and a lack of identity (drugs, child crime, illness without care, etc.). Hence, a difficult dynamic is established in which the great structures of collective assistance (for example, hospitals) no longer seem enough. Rather it has become increasingly necessary to intervene comprehensively with tailor-made solutions that only the voluntary and non-remunerated sector can provide (possibly backed up by traditional professional workers). This is the case for home assistance for the elderly, for the handicapped, for young people in search of a useful social role, and so on. If this type of assistance were to be met by expanding the traditional structures, public funds would rapidly be exhausted, or citizens would have to support an increasing fiscal pressure, that would in any event be insufficient to supply the type of personal assistance that only the individual knows how to provide. In reality, the public sector should in these cases only guarantee co-ordination among the growing groups of volunteers by introducing legislation and the minimum indispensable frameworks to match up those who seek help with those who offer it. In some cases, this concerns improving and broadening community service structures, that in certain instances arose as palliatives or substitutes for other public activities in decline (such as military service).

It should now be noted that while the first two phases of the development of the social state required the ever greater centralisation of the State, since only the national government could develop suitable health or pension services, or the combination of policies needed to reach full employment, the third stage requires the progressive strengthening of the local structures' power to intervene, since the closer the public authorities are to individual citizens, the better they will satisfy their specific and personal requirements. To this end, a movement is underway in Europe opposite to the one in favour of the transfer of certain competences from the national level to the European one. Many centralised powers of the national bureaucracies (in particular certain powers in fiscal matters) need to be progressively transferred to the local communities so as to put them in the condition of exercising true self-government. Federalism represents the institutional model through which regions and municipal governments can reorganise the life of territorial communities smaller than the nation-State. In particular, regional planning and the rebirth of urban centres represent a key feature of this project, since the urban structure, and the town district within it, represent the expression of spontaneous solidarity, in other words the neighbourhood and street communities. In the town district the rebirth of the solidarity that in pre-industrial societies only the patriarchal family and the little mediaeval borough knew how to guarantee is possible (the elderly can undertake to help in the kindergartens, contribute to education in the elementary schools, supervise the public parks, and so on; the young can experiment with concrete forms of solidarity toward other needy young people, the elderly, the ill, and so on).

In addition, the federal State allows the realisation of a type of solidarity that is completely foreign to the ideology of the centralised nation-state, namely solidarity among different political communities. Indeed, it can happen, once political and fiscal autonomy is guaranteed to the local structures, that some cities or regions find themselves in a position of clear advantage over others, since they manage to guarantee their own citizens a better standard of living and social services. To avoid this drawback, federal States have established policies of territorially balanced growth; for example, federal grants in the US or *Finanzausgleich* among the German Länder. In Europe there exists the regional policy of the European Union, and the Maastricht treaty has established a fund in the Union budget for economic and social cohesion, with the goal of guaranteeing compensation to States with an income lower than a certain level. In federal States, therefore, not only vertical solidarity among rich and poor citizens, but also horizontal solidarity among territorial communities with different levels of per capita income, is possible.

To this different conception of solidarity in the federal State corresponds a different conception of citizenship. The French revolution, with its idea of the equality of all citizens, let democracy take an enormous step forward, since the republic overturned all social privileges, and economic (education for all) and political (ever broader suffrage) obstacles that still impeded the equal participation of all individuals in participating in the government. But the nation-State idea created at the same time borders, excluded foreigners from the political community and suffocated any pretensions to local autonomy. Federal citizenship is the exact opposite of this centralising and monolithic concept of community. National citizenship, in the framework of European citizenship, must not prevail either over the European one, or over the regional and local ones. The national level is one of the spheres in which solidarity among citizens is displayed. It is right that certain social services be organised at the national level, but this is simply a question of suitability and efficiency. The citizens themselves (who are simultaneously inhabitants of their own city, the region, national State, and Europe) will decide, by an open debate, which level is best for organising solidarity policies. The federal model of government is, moreover, essential for facing up to, and resolving, the problem of protecting the environment and sustainable development. The safeguarding of the interests of future generations can be guaranteed only globally, at the world level, but many other issues call for action at lower government levels, even at the neighbourhood or the village level, if the goal is to defend the integrity of the places we live in daily.

It does not presently seem that this model of society is about to be established in other parts of the world. In the ex-Soviet bloc countries the crucial problem is the transition from the command economy to a market economy. The issue of a federal constitution was posed in Russia, but democracy is still fragile and the problems of economic reconstruction are too big to imagine that it would be possible to pose in a short space of time the typical problems of a post-industrial society. In the US, the level of material well-being has in many respects overtaken the European standard. Nevertheless the US, the first example of a federation in history, has undergone a long period of centralisation, such that the major policies typical of the welfare State have been created at the federal level, while the individual member states have progressively lost power and autonomy. Nowadays, while the need for greater decentralisation is in-

creasingly felt, some social policies, such as that of health, are still being implemented at the federal level, hence further augmenting the powers of the central government.[20] Japan seemed for many years to be the most advanced industrialised country, due to its industry's high levels of competitiveness and because of the extraordinary stability of its society, which has always registered extremely low rates of unemployment. All the same, Japan's social model is based on the grafting of Western technologies onto a feudal-style social structure, in which workers enter into a sort of contract-for-life with businesses, and in which considerable discrimination between the sexes and prejudice towards immigrants survive. This model has now entered into crisis and it seems increasingly likely that, with the drive toward the international integration of the economy and society continuing, Japan will proceed down the path already followed by countries in the West.[21]

In any event, however imperfect the European social model may be, it does not seem for the moment that significant alternatives exist. It is the result of centuries of debate and battles for a more just society. Therefore even this particular conception of solidarity among individuals and among different political communities defines European identity.

The European Union, an imperfect federation.

The European federation will make the culture of the political unity of the human race come alive in international politics. But the European government will necessarily be the expression of the needs, interests and aspirations of European citizens and their parties. And since Europe will be unable to give anything more than partial answers to the needs, interests and aspirations of non-European citizens, there will inevitably survive in Europe a democratic deficit and an identity deficit.

The European federation, unlike the US and Swiss ones, will be an international State. There are no clear limitations to its enlargement, beyond the fact that only countries that have a democratic constitution can ask to join. Indeed, there are already many countries that have requested to enter the European Union: not only those of Central and Western Europe, but also Morocco, Turkey, Cyprus and some of the ex-Soviet republics. To the extent that democratic reforms will take place within these countries, it will become practically impossible for the Community to prevent further enlargement. In reality, the borders of Europe coincide with the borders of democracy. But since it is also unthinkable that the European federation will progressively grow until it

becomes a world federation, the tension between European democracy and international democracy will become the fundamental dynamic of the European federation's foreign policy. Europe will be coherent with itself only if it acts positively to promote the establishment of other regional federations in the various continents, and to favour the gradual strengthening of the UN until real democratic world government is created.

Similar considerations hold for the identity deficit. Immigration from the countries of the East and the Third World is already provoking serious social tension, and European governments are continually forced to switch between policies of restriction and benevolent openness. In effect, the principle on which the European federation is based (the abolition of national frontiers) itself prevents the drastic solution of complete exclusion. Clearly, if Europeans concede the benefits of the welfare state to all non-Community citizens too easily, they would encourage a migratory flow that would be insupportable in the long term, both for public budgets, and for the tensions that would be generated within the urban and social network. An excess of laissez-faire could not avoid sparking off a crisis of rejection among the public. Hence, these new problems of identity should be managed in the awareness that the issue is nevertheless one of compromise and a transition phase in which Europe must facilitate democratic transformation and development in the Third World. Today one of the principle obstacles to international co-operation derives from a refusal to discuss, and from the prejudiced sectarianism, of certain religions and cultures in their relations with the Western world. A history of war and mistreatment is certainly not easily overcome. But in Europe signs of a new spirit of tolerance among peoples is beginning to emerge, that will increasingly establish itself until transformed into a real and effective cosmopolitan spirit. In France, for example, the State has promoted the foundation of an Islamic church of France, which exists side by side with the older and more established Catholic church. This represents no more than a first step in the right direction, since it is clear that a vast number of co-habitation difficulties will arise among lifestyles that are often based on irreconcilable principles (for example, Islamic polygamy with Western culture's principle of sexual equality). But if Europeans show that they favour the creation of a multi-ethnic and multi-racial society, they will also accelerate the opening up and democratisation of those regimes which, in defence of an exclusive and intolerant identity, still reject peaceful international co-habitation.

European citizenship will represent the most visible and inspiring

aspect of the cosmopolitan civilisation that is in the making. The world of cosmopolitan rights will nevertheless exist in a contradictory and problematic way as long as certain States base their existence on the evil desire of separation, discrimination and dominion. The federal revolution will advance through the world as slowly as reason wins over the forces of authoritarianism. But the European Union will not be able to accelerate the process of the spread of federalism through power politics. Even if the European Union is allowed to become a great international power (it already is in the economic sphere, and it could become so in the military one), it will certainly not be able to construct international democracy through expansionist and imperialist policies. Neither democracy nor federalism can be imposed by force. The European Union will be all the more influential in world politics the more it establishes itself as a model of universal civilised co-habitation. The strength of Europe lies in the reasonable nature of a civilisation founded on cultural and national pluralism, and on tolerance and respect for people's rights.

The arrival of the European federation in international politics will not signify, therefore, the complete affirmation of federalism. The forces opposed to federalism in the world are extremely powerful. Nationalism, racism and all the ideologies that legitimise authoritarian and violent governments will continue to lie in wait and call into question the world of cosmopolitan rights. But to the extent that Europeans begin to think and act as citizens of the world, they will very soon find allies among other peoples, first of all in the Unites States where the federal idea was born and where, albeit in a different form, the same ideals reside. Gradually, by force of argument alone, the idea of a world united in peace and democracy should come to be accepted as reasonable also among the rest of the human race.

NOTES

[1] The possibility of the federalists organising as a party was elaborated at Ventotene on the occasion of the drafting of the Manifesto, and discussed at length. It was abandoned, however, because it was seen as being incompatible with the aim of European unity, which needed to be shared by all the great democratic political groups. Hence, on 27-28th August 1943 in Milan, the European Federalist Movement, not a party, was founded. On the subject of the debate about the choice of party or movement, see Altiero Spinelli's account in *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio. La goccia e la roccia*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1987.

[2] Cf. F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, The Free Press, 1992.

[3] Cf. R. Dahl, *Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1973.

[4] A. Solzhenitsyn's speech in the Vandée was published in *Le Monde*, 28th September 1993.

[5] The term is used this way, for example, in H. Arendt, *On Revolution*, The Viking Press, 1963.

[6] This assertion is contained in *Der Streit der Fakultäten* (1798), in the chapter entitled "Erneuerte Frage: ob das menschliche Geschlecht im beständigen Fortschreiten zum Besseren sei?"

[7] Cf. N. Bobbio, *L'età dei diritti*, Turin, Einaudi, 1990.

[8] Cf. H. Kelsen, *Reine Rechtslehre*, Vienna, Franz Deuticke Verlag, 1934.

[9] Essay no. 84 in *The Federalist*.

[10] In this perspective see for instance L. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, The University of Chicago Press, 1953.

[11] *Seventh Thesis* of the 1784 essay, "Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose."

[12] In the United States, widespread and worrying particularist claims, based on imaginary ethnic differences, particularly among non-European groups that reject the traditional European culture, have recently emerged. This crisis of the American model of social integration seems, however, to derive from incidental phenomena such as the decline of US world leadership, the rebirth of micronationalism in Europe and the lack of co-operation policies for the development of Latin-American and Pacific Rim countries, rather than from an intrinsic inability of the federal model to adapt to the new situation. On these issues, cf. A.M Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America. Reflections on a Multicultural Society*, New York, Norton & Company, 1991, and the survey "Diversity and Its Dangers", in the *New York Review of Books*, 7th October 1993.

[13] T. Paine, *Rights of Man* (1791-2), Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1969, p. 207.

[14] This passage comes from the essay "L'identità europea e la crisi della ragione", in M. Albertini, *Il Federalismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993, p. 289.

[15] J. Habermas, *Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität. Überlegungen zur europaïschen Zukunft*, St. Gallen, Erker Verlag, 1991.

[16] On this subject cf. also the collection of essays edited by J. Lenoble and N. Dewandre, *L' Europe au soir du siècle. Identité et démocratie*, Paris, Editions Esprit, 1992.

[17] J. Ortega y Gasset, "Misiòn de la Universidad" (1930), in *Obras completas*, IV, Madrid, 1966 (quoted from the Italian translation, *La missione dell' Università*, Naples, Guida Editore, 1972, p. 17).

[18] This refers to the justified protests of certain Community countries against the European Commission's attempt to ask a working group, headed by the historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, to elaborate a "European" history text. Cf. "A Eurohistory for the United European", in *International Herald Tribune*, 16-17th February 1991.

[19] I. Kant, *Education*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1960.

[20] A.M. Rivlin's, *Reviving the American Dream. The Economy, the States and the Federal Government* (Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1992), is a very interesting analysis of this subject.

[21] L. Thurow, *Head to Head. The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe, and America*, New York, William Morrow and Company, 1992, and P. Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, New York, Random House, 1993, also express this opinion.

Notes

EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE DELORS PLAN

The economic crisis afflicting Europe, which is provoking enormous social problems because of rising unemployment, combined with a wave of Euro-pessimism as to the chances of achieving political union in the wake of the difficult ratification of the Maastricht treaty, is creating a disturbance of such proportions to make catastrophic arguments, such as that of those who forecast the advent of a "new Middle Ages"[1] for the old continent, seem credible.

Among the many consequences of this climate, which makes it difficult to conceive of future progress for Europe's economy and society, the great confusion provoked in the field of education should be highlighted. This confusion is justified, given the enormous contradictions between the demands that are currently made on educators and the resources they are provided with. On the one hand, they have the responsibility to provide young people (tomorrow's protagonists in political, economic and social life) with the cultural, professional, and moral resources adequate for best managing their individual and collective capacities. On the other hand, the world of education and training is asked to change without being offered the necessary institutional and material support and, above all, without making it clear what direction this change must take.

In other words, this debate does not take into account that if the aim is to think seriously about the future of education, it is necessary to tailor ourselves to an economic and social scenario that is different from the current one and in step with the great changes underway in the world.

This is not an impossible enterprise, even if it does require the courage to reason in new ways, recuperating a historical perspective that is currently being lost. This perspective can be found in Delors' white paper.[2] This represents, in its underlying design, an attempt to think about what is necessary to do today in order to be able comprehensively to achieve a new form of society in the future.

The plan is by now a reality: even though it is not yet backed up by the clear political will of the European political parties and governments, it has been adopted by the December 1993 European Council in Brussels. It represents, objectively, one of the alternatives (if not the only clear alternative) which must be taken into consideration when thinking about the future of the young generations.

The nature of the Delors plan.

The federalists have defined the Delors plan a real and effective European government programme. What justifies this judgement is primarily the particular perspective the plan embarks from in dealing with the issues of employment and economic growth in Europe. The perspective is wide-ranging, both temporally and thematically, and in the even more significant terms of the political and idealistic choices that influence it.

From the first viewpoint, the explicit nature of the plan is that of seeking to look far into the future, projecting itself into the economic and social situation that will emerge in the 21st century. In this sense, as will be seen below, the plan seeks to elaborate a global framework for the changes presently underway as a consequence of what can be summed up as "the advent of the post-industrial mode of production" (resorting to an expression that, in this context, is used to indicate the economic and social order in the wake of the scientific and technological revolution, or as some call it, the second industrial revolution).

As regards the second characteristic, it should be said that, while not made explicit, the choice that leaps from the page when reading the white paper concerns two basic issues: a) the institutional future of Europe, to the extent that certain actions that are comprehensively realisable only by a democratic government of the Union are proposed; b) the values that will have to guide the development of European society. In this regard, the white paper goes decisively against the current with respect to an exaggerated free market and technocratic orientation that, together with nationalism, seem currently to be re-emerging in many European countries. In fact, one of the basic presuppositions of the plan's choices of political economy is that a healthy and competitive economy necessarily includes the safeguarding of undeniable values such as solidarity (domestic and international), the right of every person to work and, in general terms, to a good quality of life, as well as protection for the environment.

When Delors talks of a "new development model", then, he goes well

beyond the explicit objective of formulating a political economy strategy that would guarantee "growth, competitiveness and employment" in Europe. This can be deduced, for example, by the fact that alongside plans of action that would allow the exploitation of all the opportunities offered by the scientific and technological revolution, there is a constant concern in the plan to focus on the necessary correctives to ensure that the process of changing the economy and society occur in a controlled fashion and with social solidarity.

Within this orientation, the white paper dedicates particular attention to the proposal of new educational and training strategies, conceived of as necessarily the road to go down nowadays. This is for two reasons: to guarantee the economy the "human capital" it will need in the technological age, and to offer European citizens all the educational, training and cultural resources[3] that are their right for their development as human beings, as well as for their economic well-being.

The departure point: the nature of the economic crisis and unemployment in Europe.

The European economy is nowadays incapable of coping with international competition for reasons that are, at the same time, cyclical, structural and technological. In this situation, unemployment (which has become the no. 1 problem for European states) is progressively increasing.

Since the phenomenon is not only the result of cyclical factors, it is clear that to reverse the trend it is not enough to resort to cosmetic measures. Cyclical unemployment, explains the white paper, has superimposed itself in recent years on unemployment of a structural nature (aggravating its proportions) and on the sacking of a considerable number of workers from firms that have adopted automatised production processes (so-called technological unemployment).

Structural unemployment is caused by the fact that Europe is currently paying, through a loss of competitiveness and hence a constant reduction in growth rates, for its persistence with a development model that has by now been overtaken by the advent of the scientific and technological revolution.

The solution of the problem can not however be proposed only in terms of modernising machinery. In fact the issue is much more complex, as is demonstrated by the debate that developed from the 1950s on[4], about the social consequences of automation. If the introduction of highly-

automatised processes, made possible by new technologies, is not enacted within a framework of a global strategy of investments in new sectors of activity and the re-training of the non-skilled workforce, there exists the risk of increasing unemployment rather than decreasing it. This is what is happening in Europe, where technological unemployment is the result of the fact that the introduction of technological advances in certain fields of production has not been accompanied by action designed to abolish the gap "between the speed of technical progress, which is concerned primarily with how to produce (manufacturing processes and work organization) and which therefore often destroys jobs, and our capacity to think up new individual or collective needs which would provide new job opportunities."[5]

The basic issue is that the development model generated by the industrial revolution no longer functions. All the same, this understanding, coupled with the will of economic operators to adapt to the change is not sufficient, of itself, to resolve the problem. Political and institutional points of reference that have the power to "give a new direction" to development, based on a clear analysis of the nature this development must take, are required.

The white paper aims to respond to this need. Let us see how.

The context: economy and society on the threshold of the 21st century.

The industrial revolution, whose effects spread far and wide during the course of the 19th century, changed people's patterns of working and living. The central elements of this change were the transformation of craftsmen into workers, and of subjects into citizens. Not only factories were created, but also states, cities, communications, consumption, schools, services, political groupings, and cultural and artistic trends in contemporary history.

The second industrial revolution, which has already begun and which will determine the history of the 21st century, is destined to produce changes that are equally radical in material, institutional and cultural forms of life in society.

Three key elements of this revolution can be identified, which are in practice related aspects of a single process.

The first is the liberation of an enormous quantity of energy and *time* for people, thanks to the introduction of machines capable of rescuing them from unskilled tasks: workers will be replaced by technicians and scientists.

The issue of free or freed time, of a different relationship between work and spare time (which includes the issue of a generalised reduction of the working week[6]) is central to this perspective. Delors is aware of this, even though he does not deal with it explicitly. In the white paper, probably for tactical reasons, he prefers to leave it to readers to work out for themselves from certain choices whose significance is nevertheless precise (such as that of focusing on "continuing training" which requires interruptions, even long ones, in a working career) or through rapid asides, such as those found in the proposals on "Flexibility and job creation".

The second element is linked to the fact that science and technology represent the prime resource of the economy. This means that the key factors for production, hence work, *are not material*: they become research and management of information. Human capital is the core element of economic growth. New jobs require creativity, flexibility, and continuing training.

The prime importance of creating and exchanging information, in the field of production, makes even the disappearance of factories, or at least of traditional factories, conceivable. To make but one example, it is sufficient to reflect on the consequences, also in terms of urban development and territorial organisation, that could be provoked if teleworking (a scenario the white paper also considers), carried out in people's houses via computer, were developed for certain tasks.

The third element consists of the progressive extension of the area of *interdependence* among people, until it includes the entire world and all spheres of activity. Already today information can be transmitted in real time from one end of the world to the other; the scientific community has world-wide references; the mobility of people among states and continents is a daily fact; the great goods and capital markets are global; the labour market itself will end up by taking on these proportions.

This leads to designing not only a new worker, but (making explicit a component that does not appear, at least not openly, in the white paper) also a new citizen.

The novelty consists primarily of the fact that the entire world (the level which it is by now normal to think of for many aspects of daily life) is becoming a community of destiny, a reference point for one's own sense of belonging. This is a community in which it is equally important to feel equal to people who live on the other side of the globe and, at the same time, to safeguard one's own cultural roots, those that anchor us to our immediate environment of life and relationships. Secondly, by

increasing both the time free of work as well as personal and cultural resources, citizens can place a considerable part of their energies at the disposal of voluntary activities for the good of society, the most important being participation in political life, above all in the local community.

In this context it becomes clear why nowadays the traditional educational and training systems are in crisis. They were created not only for training the workers required by the old mode of production, but primarily for creating citizens of the nation-state, which is centralised and closed within its frontiers.

The "plurality of membership" which ranges from the local community to the world, brings with it an institutional set-up that is suited to the democratic management of issues that are raised at different levels. The new citizen is cosmopolitan, the new society is multicultural. In order to manage this situation, a new form of statehood is needed, one that can guarantee unity in diversity and democracy at all the levels. It is necessary to move away from the national criterion toward the federal one — in a continental and world perspective.

All the same, it is on this point that the white paper shows its greatest limitation. On the one hand, it delineates a framework that presupposes a new institutional set-up. On the other, it leaves the issue in the background, creating a contradiction between the scenario of the transformation underway in the world, dealt with in the first part, that will inevitably lead to the creation of democratic governmental authorities at the supernational level, and the fact that in the second part the responsibility for implementing the plan is attributed to the current organs of the Community. These organs have for some time now proved their political ineffectiveness, stifled as they are by their fundamentally undemocratic nature: they manage the affairs of Europe by resorting to the instrument of treaties and intergovernmental accords based on the unanimity rule, rather than on the basis of a constitution and democratic dialectic that is placed under the control of citizens.

This ambiguity ends up calling into question the feasibility of the plan itself. This can be clearly seen in relation to the policy on education and training.

Education and training in a 21st-century perspective.

The white paper, in line with the scenario that it leaves the reader to work out, attaches central importance to the issue of education and training. The white paper contains both suggestions for short-term policy

(ideas for improving the prospects of labour market entry for low-paid workers) and the outlines of a long-term strategy, which links new educational directions to transformations in the economy, society and state referred to in the preceding paragraph.

The trump cards of the change which it is already necessary to start to launch in the educational and training systems are (extrapolating from both the short and long term suggestions) the concepts of permanent education, of flexibility and creativity and of interdependence (horizontal and vertical).

By *permanent education* (or "lifelong learning and continuing training", as the white paper defines it) is meant a different way of spacing out over a person's life the time spent in school (or in a training system, if one prefers) and that spent in the workplace. Today, these two periods are still conceived of as separate, with a very strict sequential criterion: first people learn (usually behind school desks), then this experience is concluded to enter definitively the world of work. Some exceptions to this logic are already beginning to make headway in practice. For certain professions (for example teaching) updating courses are organised, which usually do not decisively interrupt the working period; in some European countries (such as France and Germany) specialisation (of a technical nature) is provided for at the secondary level which also contemplates temporary forays into the world of work (usually apprenticeship periods that are carried out during the summer holidays or toward the end of studies); "back to school" initiatives are being developed at the end of working careers, such as those linked in Italy to courses of the so-called "Università della Terza Età" (University for retired people). The idea of permanent education (or training), nevertheless, brings with it a much more complex and radical change, linking itself to the logic of close interdependence between the world of education and the world of work, between the public sector and the private one, that is not yet to be found in Europe.

On the subject of permanent education, the basic suggestion is that "education and training systems must be reworked in order to take account of the need — which is already growing and is set to grow even more in the future — for the permanent recomposition and redevelopment of knowledge and know-how. The establishment of more flexible and more open systems of training and the development of individuals' ability to adapt will become increasingly important, both for businesses, so that they can make better use of the technological innovations they develop or acquire, and for individuals, a considerable proportion of whom may well have to change their line of work four or five times during their lives."[7]

In the passage cited above, the connection between the concept of continuing training and that of *flexibility and creativity*, which represents the second new characteristic referred to above, is clearly displayed. What has been said so far justifies in an almost intuitive way the affirmation that the transformation of educational and training systems must be oriented toward criteria that place prime importance on flexibility and creativity. It is therefore not necessary to add much more on this subject, nevertheless it should be emphasised that the reference to flexibility and creativity permits the by now decades-old issue that in Western countries opposes two different orientations for the reform of secondary schools to be done away with. On the one hand there are the upholders of reform based on criteria that strictly focus on professional training; on the other, there are those who stress the need to privilege basic training curriculums in this reform, deferring the moment of professional training in a strict sense. Looking to the long term, the white paper opts decisively for the latter perspective: basic training should characterise school-life up to the age of 18, a period of specialisation at university or a university-type institution, and for the rest of a working life a series of repeated returns to the world of training, coinciding with temporary breaks from work (continuing training).

Closer contact between the world of school and training on the one hand, and the world of work on the other, a greater interlinking between public and private, a high degree of internal work mobility (the possibility to move repeatedly between different professional activities) are all previously-mentioned elements that contribute to characterising what could be summed up as *horizontal interdependence*. This interdependence should be encouraged by the creation, in a decentralising perspective, of "employment areas" at the local level.

There nevertheless also exists the criterion of *vertical interdependence*, in the sense that the birth of a European labour market presupposes the elimination of all the obstacles (cultural and professional, apart from normative) that hinder the geographic mobility of workers. It is in this sense that all the proposals enacted to intensify student, teacher, and apprentice exchanges, to coordinate and harmonise educational initiatives, to encourage so-called "distance learning", should be interpreted. Interdependence and exchanges are equally crucial in the field of research, where not only a closer relationship between the public authorities, universities/research centres and businesses should be promoted, but

also the continuous transfer of information and resources among the different levels and areas.

The need to stimulate and organise all these related areas of activity makes the role of national and supernational authorities an issue.

Responsibilities in the fields of education and training.

The white paper foresees the attribution of specific responsibilities to the various levels of government.

The local organs must manage the employment areas and the interdependence between schools and businesses that should stimulate the best allocation of human resources in the local labour market (meant as the basic unit of a European labour market that is presently in the making). What the plan does not make explicit is that in many European countries this innovation already requires profound institutional change. In many states, the local administrations would be inadequate for this task, which necessitates a change in the distribution of territorial responsibilities, functions, and powers, as well as control over resources.

As regards the member states, by concerted action at the European level, they should, among other things: 1) promote "the development of genuine 'training policies' with the involvement of the public authorities, businesses and the social partners"[8]; 2) establish "generalized and versatile systems of 'training credits' ('training vouchers') which all young people would receive and could spend relatively freely throughout their working lives"[9]; 3) create "On the basis of a partnership between universities, public authorities and businesses, systems of initial and continuing training ... in the areas corresponding to the technological and social skills required for developing functions and occupations (multidisciplinary types of training; training for work in an environment which makes intensive use of information technologies; compound, technical and management skills, etc.)"[10]; 4) pass, at a later date, the "provisions needed to increase the flexibility of the various parts of education systems and the level of decentralization of management of education systems."[11]

The European authorities can undertake three types of action: a) "to develop still further the European dimension of education", with initiatives that stimulate interdependence (mobility and exchanges of information and experience) between universities and schools, creating a "European area of — and market in — skills and training", making European data banks available and so on; b) "In association with the measures taken

at Community level in the areas of social and employment policy, and in concert with the Member States, the Community should *set* in place a political framework for the medium and long-term measures for linking the systems of continuing training and training credits with measures for increasing flexibility and reducing working time"[12]; c) "Generally speaking, the Community should set firmly and clearly the essential requirements and the long-term objectives for measures and policies in this area in order to make it easier to develop a new model for growth, competitiveness and employment in which education and training play a key role and to ensure essential equality of opportunity and the coherent development of the three dimensions of the European system of education and training (education, training and culture)."[13]

The plan foresees also specific training initiatives in the short term to help the low-skilled unemployed. Specifically, there is a suggestion to modify systems of unemployment compensation and to reallocate "part of this funding for training measures" for the unemployed and young people in search of their first job who left school before gaining a diploma. The suggestion to offer these young people a period of apprenticeship in the public utility sectors of other Community countries, to be financed out of the European social fund, is also interesting.

To achieve all this, it is not sufficient to think of action by the Community, that is to say of the summits of the heads of state and government (constrained by the need to defend national powers and particularisms) and of Brussels' bureaucratic organs. If, as is affirmed at a certain point in the white paper, the launch of this educational and training policy can happen "only within certain limits, and in combination with measures in other areas (industrial and trade policies, research policy etc.)"[14], then this task requires strong support from citizens and the creation of real instruments of government at the European level. Above all, in fact, the industrial and trade policy suggested in the white paper requires a high degree of monetary stability. Without a single currency, one of the central presuppositions of the plan is missing, hence also the possibility to start to realise the framework within which educational and training reform is conceivable. Second, the creation of a European labour market necessitates a political authority that has the power to control it. And this is, typically, the task of a democratic government.

There is however a more general consideration to bear in mind, concerning the fact that when discussing changes to the educational and training systems, it is not possible to ignore the values that inspire educational action. It is at this point that the above-mentioned contradic-

tion between the first and second part of the white paper appears more serious. In the first part a scenario which implies a clear option in favour of transforming the current Community into a federal state, endowed with democratic governmental organs and which sets up a citizenship based on the principle of the plurality of membership, on cosmopolitarism, rather than on exclusive loyalty to the nation-state is shied away from. In the second part, instead, it is almost taken for granted that the great changes which European society needs can be launched by the Community's current structures. All the same, even limiting itself to the problem of professional training, it is clear that the changes the Delors plan outlines are not solely comprised of mere technical actions, but raise the issue of an ideological factor that can not be passed over in silence. In effect, the individual states are being asked to renounce the exercise of exclusive control over training citizens, as well as workers. This means calling into question the current Community set-up, based on the recognition of the member states' national sovereignty. If they really put the suggestions of the Delors plan into practice in the field of education, the European states would in fact have to renounce one of the pillars of their own survival: the creation of the exclusive loyalty of citizens through the homogenisation of language, culture, and values, effected by schools over all the national territory.

It is highly probable that the ambivalence of the plan with regard to the crucial problem of the institutional changes (a democratic government for a federal state structure that designs a form of citizenship based on cosmopolitanism) needed for its actual implementation, is the price Delors had to pay to make the white paper acceptable to the council of the heads of state and government. It would hence be ungenerous to deny Delors and his team the merit of having nevertheless carried out a courageous and far-sighted effort. They have performed their task, delivering to Europeans a plan for the government of European economy and society. The task of creating the government capable of implementing the plan now falls to the Europeans themselves, and primarily the political forces.

The achievement of political union through a constitution and a democratic government is the question that must begin to be seen as being the priority: it should be overcome as soon as possible so as to enable European society successfully to face up to the challenges posed by the transition from the industrial to the post-industrial age.

Marita Rampazi

NOTES

[1] This argument seems particularly dear to Alain Minc, for example.

[2] European Commission, *Growth, Competitiveness, Employment. The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century.* White paper. Office for official publication of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1994.

[3] This concerns dimensions that, together with the equality of opportunity, are elaborated on particularly in chapter 7 ("Adaptation of education and vocational training systems") of the plan.

[4] The debate on the social consequences of automation began to develop in the United States toward the end of the 1950s, as can be read in Pollock's book, *Automation. Materialien zur Beurteilung der ökonomischen und sozialen Folgen*, Frankfurt a/Main, Europäiche Verlagsanstalt, 1956/1964. This work, in the course of the following decades, became the reference point for the argument of the so-called 'pessimists', who came to oppose in this debate the 'optimists', whose diagnosis rested initially on the vision put forward by R. Richta in *Civilzace na rozcesti, Rozmnozeno proakastniky konference "Clovek a spolecnost ve vedeckotechnicke revoluci*, v Marianskych Laznich 1-6 dubna, 1968.

[5] European Commission, *Growth, Competitiveness, Employment. The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century.* White paper. Office for official publication of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1994, p. 11.

[6] For the present state of the issue, around which there developed a debate fed initially by a study promoted by Delors himself at the beginning of the 1980s (Echanges et Projets, *La Révolution du temps choisi*, Paris, Albin Michel, 1980), cf. the work of A. Gorz, *Métamorphose du travail. Quête du sens. Critique de la raison économique*, Paris, Ed. Galilée, 1988.

[7] European Commission, *Growth, Competitiveness, Employment. The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century.* White paper. Office for official publication of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1994, p. 136.

[8] *Ibid*, p. 137.

[9] *Ibid*, p. 137.

[10] *Ibid*, p. 138.

[11] *Ibid*, p. 138.

[12] *Ibid*, p. 138.

[13] *Ibid*, p. 138.

[14] *Ibid*, p. 133.

THE CHALLENGE FOR EUROPE: REDUCING THE WORKING WEEK

The European economy is going through a critical phase. Despite considerable growth, above all in the second half of the 80s, it must now deal with an extremely serious unemployment crisis. Even the most optimistic forecasts estimate growth rates of 2 or 3% for the coming years, insufficient to create the jobs needed to provide good prospects and a bright future for young Europeans.

Thanks to the contribution of Asian countries and those from other areas that have entered a period of tremendous growth, the world economy has on the other hand registered sustained growth. Throughout Europe the search is underway to identify the means to adapt European countries' productive structures to the new rules of the world market. This phase of economics is profoundly different to the experiences of the past, in particular with regard to the effects of inflation and private consumption on economic growth.

Growth and inflation.

From the 1970s on, the advanced economies, and in particular European ones, have no longer conformed to Phillips' correlation between inflation and economic growth.[1]

Inflation no longer fulfils the role of economic stimulator that had been noted in the past, and a new term has been introduced into the economic lexicon to express the simultaneous existence of inflation, and slow economic growth: "stagflation".

This change has not been analysed in detail by economists and seems even now a marginal subject in economic research. With the reappearance of recession in Europe, many economists have suddenly rediscovered the idea that an accommodating monetary policy, which allows for a certain increase in the inflation rate, is a suitable recipe for overcoming the current difficulties, without on the other hand taking into account the experience of stagflation that has characterised recent cyclical phases in the European economy.

The lack of research into the causes of stagflation makes it difficult to analyse the changes which have come about in economic behaviour, and which lie at the root of the new situation, and, as a result, to establish whether these are long-term causes. One hypothesis observes how,

precisely in the period that inflation was losing its role of economic "elixir", there occurred a strong shift of financial wealth away from firms and the state toward households, and how this phenomenon is more pronounced in Europe than the United States.

Households began to establish increasing amounts of savings, which they then placed at the disposal of firms and the state through the financial markets, which, in turn, became increasingly more integrated at the international level. While until the 1970s most people were relatively indifferent to inflation, from that moment on the defence of the real value of savings became the goal for increasing numbers of households, until there was a diffuse, pan-European demand for monetary stability. The German Bundesbank was the first central bank to establish a policy of monetary stability; this was in keeping with the fundamental interests of the German people, whose average age was rising rapidly, to safeguard its savings and above all to maintain the purchasing power of pensions. This policy of monetary stability later came to be an essential condition for the realisation of a single European currency, institutionalised in the Maastricht Treaty along with the constitutional innovation of the independence of Europe's future central bank.

There have been proposals to re-launch the European economy by relaxing the fight against inflation, many of them put forward during the summer of 1993, particularly on the occasion of the crisis in the EMS. Such proposals were also given significant backing by numerous American Nobel prize-winners, but fortunately they were not followed up, and the presentation of the Delors report on "Growth, Competitiveness and Employment" marked the definitive end of all illusions of a quick fix for European economic recovery. In this way the idea that monetary stability is a requirement for European economic development, and that only the swift implementation of a European currency can allow a policy of low interest rates, above all long-term ones that are decisive for investment, has become the consensus.

Growth and private consumption.

The European economy can hope to achieve sustained growth again if it is able to export products and services to the emerging countries.

The possibility of increasing consumption in Europe, particularly of durable goods such as electrical appliances, cars, televisions and so on, is by now limited because the market is saturated and so demand tends to be stable. In addition, environmental and ecological constraints are

becoming increasingly tight. Only collectively-used services, such as education, culture, sport, and the quality of living, show increased demand, as do advanced services, such as telecommunications and transport.

The trend toward privatising the agencies and businesses that operate in this field indicates how it is necessary to decentralise costs directly onto the families in all households where the market can function, given the additional fact that technology has now broken the monopolistic barriers in many sectors that previously could be run only by a public operator. The other emerging trend in this period, federalism (particularly fiscal federalism), that decentralises public expenditure that was previously managed at the centre to smaller territorial units, responds to the need to widen the availability of collective services to the general public.

The importance of public utility firms compared to manufacturing enterprises indicates the significance of the changes that have taken place in the European economic system, and in industrialised countries in general.

Employment levels and production increases.

The arrival of the scientific and technological revolution in Europe is underway, and the process is not only irreversible but is tending to gather speed. Employment in traditional industrial sectors, as happened in the past for agriculture, tends to be dramatically reduced.

In every phase of development a particular aspect of technology has markedly influenced the mode of production, as was the case for the internal combustion engine and engineering in the last century, and subsequently for electrical energy and chemistry in the current one.

The arrival of the computer age is a real revolution for the economic system, as was clearly foreseen by the famous "Nora" report,[2] commissioned by the French government in the 1960s. Mass production at the beginning of the century generated the production technique called "Fordism", which comprised the simplification and repetition of industrial workers' tasks. But precisely the capacity of computers to "automate" all simple operations has sparked off a process of the progressive substitution of machines for repetitive work. This is profoundly modifying the structure of the labour market, which is moving away from blue overalls and white collars toward white coats.

Unskilled tasks are being reduced in companies (regardless of their size) and technicians and specialists are taking over. Even the service

sector is by now profoundly affected by the scientific and technological revolution — it is enough to consider the spread of automatic vending machines for all kinds of products.

Employment, which in recent years made up for the jobs lost due to new industrial technologies by new opportunities in the tertiary sector, is no longer on the rise. Unemployment now exceeds 10% in nearly all European countries, afflicting mainly young people and employees who are unable to learn new skills rapidly.

Production is increasing, but the greater productivity made possible by the scientific and technological revolution is notably changing the labour market and markedly reducing the number of traditional jobs in factories and offices.

The emergence of "self-employed" work.

Firms tend to reduce drastically the number of their employees as a result of two ever more widespread trends: 1) increasing investment that results in the spread of automation; 2) the farming out of a growing range of services that were previously carried out in-house. As a result the demand for jobs tends to display new characteristics: a) in large firms and businesses, functions that are both "specialised and managerial"; b) in activities carried out in small firms (craft, distribution/retail industries), creativity, flexibility, and adaptability; c) the spread of low-paid, unskilled, temporary work. The supply of labour must, as a result, change and adapt through: a) advanced education and technical preparation for carrying out all functions in the "employed", "self-employed" and "quasi self-employed" sectors, the latter two growing in relation to traditional employment forms; b) the flexibility, re-training and permanent updating of workers.

The changes all countries have already introduced into the labour market as concerns employing people, mobility, and training are steps in the right direction. Clearly in this new period the protection of employees must be undertaken differently from the past, relying much more on the "professional" status of workers than on the traditional defence of the union.

Entering the labour market tends to come about (as is already the case in the US) through temporary jobs, that are low-skilled and precarious, and a subsequent transfer to "self-employed" or specialised activities in larger firms, following the acquisition of suitable training and experience.

The challenge of the world market.

Only firms which can penetrate the world market have prospects for expansion and development. The possibility of relying solely on domestic national markets will no longer guarantee a firm's future, which must instead, meet the international challenge with adequate research capacity and a skilled workforce.

World integration puts pressure on the labour market both due to the competition brought on by the mix of lower wage levels and advanced technology that characterises newly-industrialised countries, particularly those in Asia, and through immigration which impinges on work opportunities in marginal and unregulated sectors. The retention, and possibly the creation, of skilled jobs in Europe depends on the ability of businesses to compete by focusing on research and the innovation of processes and products.

The proposals of the Delors plan.

The Delors plan's main proposal to re-launch employment concerns reducing the social costs imposed on jobs, particularly less-skilled ones. The lost revenue will be made up by a tax on energy consumption; this has been forcefully re-proposed by the Commission notwithstanding the resistance that still emanates from some states, such as the United Kingdom.

The energy tax is particularly suited to facilitating the transition from the old to the new model of development, since it respects environmental and ecological factors by encouraging the substitution of obsolete consumer durables for low-energy consuming products. Households can subsequently recuperate the higher purchase price of these goods through lower running costs. Similar considerations hold for new concepts of the consumption and saving of energy in houses, offices and factories.

The introduction of an energy tax would also have a probably decisive effect on the competitiveness of European firms, which, being the first to be obliged to face the "energy" challenge would acquire a significant advantage over their rivals. A similar phenomenon previously took place in the countries that were the first to introduce ecological and environmental regulations — consider the example of the catalytic converter for the German car industry.

The Delors plan's two other main proposals for the labour market are more traditional. The first, increasing the flexibility of the labour market, is a solution that has been proposed in many quarters as the only way out. This provision is already being implemented in Europe, but it makes sense (given Europe's productive structure) only if it serves to create the conditions for the mobility of manual workers that are increasingly well-trained and highly-skilled.

The second proposal concerns the concentration of all available financial resources in "training" and "re-training" programmes; this is certainly the best way to use European taxpayers' money to maintain employment levels.

The challenge for young people.

The new generations that survey the world of work will have to meet a difficult challenge. All previous generations had to face enormous sacrifices, such as working in factories or emigration. Today, young people must obtain advanced qualifications that will occupy them in studying and training, but above all they must assume a positive attitude toward "risk".

The guaranteed life-long "position" is no longer available to the coming generations. Instead, it is necessary to start with a "temporary" job, so as then to prepare for more challenging activities that will nevertheless require continuous training and mobility from one firm to another, and from one role to another.

Current employment legislation, which evolved gradually over the whole, more than century-long, span of the industrial revolution, is based on the defence and protection of employees. In the new period it is necessary rather to construct a system that facilitates the establishment of young people in self-employed activities or such like, based on professional qualifications or small cooperative enterprises. This concerns, particularly, the guaranteeing of equal assistance to those who enter a company and those who undertake "high risk" activities as outlined above, by: a) the extension of health assistance and the pension system to the self-employed; b) the introduction of insurance formulas aimed at guaranteeing workers a minimum wage, even in the event of difficulties in self-employed activities; c) awards and incentives aimed at covering part of the set-up costs of newly-established enterprises.

There exists a great task for institutions at all levels, from Europe to the municipal council, for associations, and for individual scholars, to understand the new situation and build an economic system that values the work of individuals, both within a firm and in the increasing number

of self-employed roles.

A "Manchesterian" policy.

In the short term, an incomes policy for European workers that provides for the overall stability of nominal salaries, and even for a limited reduction of them, is possible without compromising real incomes. This is because of the benefits that opening international markets can contribute to reducing prices, primarily of foodstuffs and consumer durables. This is in reality the prospect opened up by the conclusion of the GATT agreement, which should enable the entrance of these goods into the European market from emerging economies at markedly reduced prices.

Monetary stability, guaranteed by a European currency, and the opening of markets can generate, at least for a considerable length of time, a situation of decreasing prices to which we are unaccustomed, given the psychological attitude of considering continually rising prices to be an unalterable characteristic of the economic system.

As at the outset of the industrial revolution, when the Manchester school hypothesised that a reduction of the price of grain would favour the first industrial factories that needed to pay low salaries, so probably today, at the threshold of the scientific and technological revolution, we find ourselves in a situation of being able to maintain the living standards workers have attained, even with lower salaries.

The challenge for Europe: reducing the working week.

The immense capacity for production, developed particularly following the second world war, provides consumers with goods and services in increasing quantities and at ever lower prices.

The possibility of working less while incomes increase is a constant feature of this century, but there approaches, particularly in the most advanced part of the world and hence in Europe, the opportunity to reduce more significantly the amount of time dedicated to work. This conquest is ideally bringing us close to liberation from the slavery of work, since, as Aristotle observed, "if every tool were capable of doing its task either on command or by predicting a command, ... and likewise bobbins wove of their own accord and plectrums played the zither, then craftsmen proprietors would clearly not need apprentices, nor would bosses need slaves."[3] If Europe meets the challenge of international competition by

spreading and expanding its scientific and technological capacities, a drastic reduction of the working week will be made possible. As a result, the needs to be satisfied will become increasingly tied to the quality of life, rather than to the availability of traditional goods and services.

The reduction of the working week: a revolution.

The reduction of the working week will have, long term, profound effects on the organisation of economic and social life.

For production, and for individual companies themselves, the reduction of the working week imposes changes to productive structures and the management of firms on the basis of work shifts. The discarding of the "Fordist" phase, already brought on by automation, will become crucial, and a new philosophy of business activity must replace that which characterised firms world-wide for almost a century.

The urban layout of the city itself will change notably with a reduction of the working week, given the possibility to reduce the number of journeys between the home and workplace with the transition to the city region designed by Mumford,[4] the reduction of pollution, the reorganisation of traffic, and so on.

Even individuals, and families themselves, will be directly affected by the reduction of the working week that will allow a more just division of the family's duties among its members, and more time to dedicate to children's upbringing, the needs of old people, the ill, and community activities.

The transition: "community service".

It will not be possible initially, however, to make fully available to individuals all work-time freed by developments in the scientific revolution.

On the one hand the requirements of personal solidarity, which are manifested at the smallest levels of civil co-habitation, such as the municipality or the city district, can only be partially satisfied by the interventions of local bodies and other bureaucratic organs, given the enormous cost this would place on taxpayers. This makes it necessary to ask citizens to make a direct contribution. The growth of the voluntary sector is an indication of the trend we must follow, namely the need for all citizens to participate through "community service" in providing effective solidarity to society's weakest and most needy groups.

On the other hand, the experience at the beginning of this century, when (with the creation of illness insurance and pension institutions) a type of obligatory saving for workers was introduced with the aim of helping to cope with difficult periods like illness or retirement, indicates how it is perhaps necessary, in the initial phase of the reduction of the working week, to provide for rules and institutions that make people accustomed to using the free time that will be gained in such a way that is useful for society.

This basically involves making it clear that people who dispose of a resource, such as free time, should dedicate some of it to society, in exchange for the help and assistance that they received from society during their periods of need, such as education, health assistance and so on.

The realisation of generalised "community service" undoubtedly creates many problems, but above all it should be implemented by allowing individuals a considerable amount of freedom as to how they should fulfil their obligations.

The debate is already underway in Europe, and "community service" will certainly be one of the most frequently discussed topics over the coming years.

There are certain questions about the introduction of "generalised" community service which, over time, must be answered. For example: who should do it and for how long; which institution should run it; where and in what fashion should it be carried out?

Some initial answers can be proposed: 1) people should be free to choose where to do community service — in the city district, in the region, in Third World countries; 2) it is necessary to identify an institutional level that is responsible for organising community service — probably the regional government or a body at the same level; 3) day-to-day management should be entrusted by the chosen institutional level to voluntary associations, cultural institutions, international bodies and such like, on the basis of agreements and conventions.

* * *

Over the past years, Europe has been faced with the problem of guaranteeing peace among the old belligerent states.

The long process embarked on with European integration has brought us to the threshold of a real European federal union that can now be realised through the adoption of a European constitution on the basis of a project elaborated by the European parliament. To obtain the support of citizens, however, it is necessary that Europe is able to propose projects to its citizens that meet the challenge of the scientific revolution and the progressive integration of all countries into a world market, and indicate new values to today's young generations.

Alfonso Jozzo

NOTES

[1] A.V. Phillips. "The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rates of Changes in the Money Wage Rates in the U.K. 1861-1957", in *Economica*, vol. 25, 1958, pp. 283-299.

[2] Simon Nora, Alain Minc, *L'informatisation de la société*, Paris, Documentation française, 1978.

[3] Aristotle, *Politics*, Cambridge Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1944.

[4] Lewis Mumford, *The Urban Prospect, Essays*, New York, Harcourt Brace/World, 1968.

FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS AND URBAN POLICY

1. *Introduction.*

In recent years cities have returned to occupy a central place in political debate at the national, European and world levels. In Italy the discussion concerning the proposal to create new regional aggregations,[1] and the removal of ministries and other public organs from the capital has been re-launched.[2] This follows the example of what has occurred in Germany, where, for instance, in Frankfurt the Bundesbank, the federal railway body and the federal office for industrial economy have their headquarters, alongside other institutions of prime importance; the federal work tribunal is based in Kassel; the federal supreme court and the constitutional court are in Karlsruhe, and so on.[3] Furthermore, some Italian communes are building the metropolitan areas provided for in a

recent law governing local autonomy.[4] In Great Britain and France the respective governments have launched a process of relocating public organisations concentrated in the capital to other urban centres, and recently, the French government presented a draft law to give the go-ahead for the creation of seven macro-regions.[5] The Commission of the European Community has promoted a series of studies into the decay provoked by zoning policies and into the problems of urban areas that are undergoing industrial decline, with the prospect also of launching an active policy in this field.[6] Finally, the World Bank has argued that cities play a decisive role in the development of an economic system, and that therefore aid policies to the poorest countries must be rethought in light of this.[7]

The political orientations behind these studies, and the provisions that are proposed or approved, reveal two limitations. First, they do not deal with the problem of revitalising the life of city districts (or they do so scantily, as in the case of the "Green paper on the urban environment"), and of how to guarantee the compatibility of this vitality with the aim of cities' economic growth. Secondly, since being considered in a local, or at best, national context, policies are elaborated that compete with other national or European urban areas, when instead the growing relationship between European urban systems, and the goal of European unification, should demand the development of co-ordinated policies. The creation of metropolitan areas provided for in a recently-approved law in Italy, seems itself, to the extent that it is not organised in the context of a global reform plan of the state and public finance in a federal sense, to be in practice an incomplete response that the bureaucratic and centralised state intends to give to the by now unavoidable requirement for the greater autonomy of local bodies from the central power.

The risk of all these proposals is that the areas which are more generously endowed in economic terms, and which are more efficient and better organised, will attract increasing amounts of resources at the expense of less fortunate urban areas, unless there is compensatory action at the supernational level. In practice, then, the real problem posed by these initiatives has become that of the organisation of a territorial policy that is articulated from the local to the European level. This article, that starts with the problems of cities at the local level and continues on to the European one, aims to analyse three aspects of the urban problem that make it urgent for the continent to be given a territorial policy whose elaboration includes the elected representatives at the various levels of government — also because the debate that has been begun on these

themes will form a structural element of Europe's political and economic life in the coming years. Hence it becomes necessary for the federalists to take up again the discussion that was launched some years ago.[8]

2. *The dilemma facing cities: the economic growth of cities and the vitality of their city districts.*

Experience teaches us that there is no contradiction between a city's economic growth, and the unequal distribution of vitality among the city districts that comprise it, while the policy of urban renewal requires the reconciling of these two requirements. Hence it is necessary to try and understand why this does not occur automatically.

The starting point for analysis are Jane Jacobs' observations concerning the conditions that make the security and vitality of streets and districts in a large city possible. According to Jacobs, the vitality and security of city districts depend on the surveillance and frequenting of citizens. In order for citizens to be interested in surveillance and the frequenting of urban streets, it is necessary that a blend of uses and activities that is sufficiently complex to generate this interest is realised over the urban territory. In particular, according to Jacobs, "To generate exuberant diversity in a city's streets and districts four conditions are indispensable: 1. The district, and indeed as many of its internal parts as possible, must serve more than one primary function [e.g. places of residence, offices, small industrial activities, shops]; preferably more than two. These must ensure the presence of people who go outdoors on different schedules and are in the place for different purposes, but who are able to use many facilities in common. 2. Most blocks must be short; that is, streets and opportunities to turn corners must be frequent. 3. The district must mingle buildings that vary in age and condition, including a good proportion of old ones so that they vary in the economic yield they must produce. This mingling must be fairly close-grained. 4. There must be a sufficiently dense concentration of people, for whatever purposes they may be there. This includes dense concentration in the case of people who are there because of residence."[9] In effect, if one reflects momentarily on the different city districts that our cities are comprised of, we can not avoid observing that the urban territory's "mixture of uses" which Jacobs refers to, is a characteristic only of some of them, and in the case of the historic centre of cities and some other zones, only for certain hours of the day. To understand why the "mixture" does not happen spontaneously, it is important here to re-examine the thesis of the German geographer,

Christaller,[10] who has developed a model for analysing the distribution of human settlements over territory. In particular, Christaller, arguing that in equal conditions these settlements are distributed over territory according to the economic principle (or the market), has formulated a rule that possesses a more general validity — in the sense that it also explains how economic activities are distributed within cities, and in effect clarifies why city districts tend spontaneously to have different degrees of vitality.

The analysis of the distribution of central functions over territory, on the basis of the economic principle, highlights the fact that a hierarchy is established among the different central localities, determined by the *number* and *type* of functions that establish themselves there. And those that Christaller calls central localities of a higher order, are so because functions found within them are of a higher number and more specialised compared to those of localities of a lower order. However, in as much as the former also contain the functions of the latter, it can be derived from this that the localities of a higher order also tend to be more vital than those of a secondary order. If this is true also for the distribution of functions among a city's districts, the economic principle would highlight that some city districts are structurally more vital than others, and therefore, in the absence of discretionary intervention, would lack one of the conditions that according to Jacobs makes a large city liveable in and secure, because it would lack the prime condition of this, the urban territory's mixture of uses: if, therefore, the goal is for this condition to be satisfied, the mixture of uses will have to be arranged.

Summing up what Christaller says, the most significant characteristic of human settlements, as regards investigating the territorial distribution and development of them, is their "centrality", that is their vocation to constitute "the central point of a territory" surrounding the settlements themselves, as the place that satisfies their needs. A place, in other words, is central "when the inhabitants carry out economic activities necessarily tied to a central position. These economic activities should be termed *central activities*, and the goods and services that are produced in the central place, precisely because it is central, should be termed *central goods and services*." There exist, then, central localities of different levels, as a function of the size of the territorial area whose needs they satisfy. Central localities are therefore of a lesser order when they exercise their influence over immediately surrounding territory, and of a superior order when central functions are exercised over a territory that includes other central localities of lesser importance. The observation of the existence of different types of central locality highlights the existence

of a "hierarchy" among central localities themselves, which is not the expression of a geometric fact, but rather of the function they fulfil. This function is represented by supplying the surrounding territory with central goods and services. These goods and services in fact define the centrality of a locality: central goods and services of a higher order will be offered only in a locality of a higher order, and central goods and services of a lower order will be offered in localities of a lower order, rather than, naturally, in those of a higher order. It is important to remember that according to Christaller, the characteristic of centrality depends above all on distributive activities (rather than on productive ones in the strict sense) and on services in general, in as much as the location of these functions occurs principally in light of the facility of access for potential consumers and users.

Central goods and services can be classified according to their nature (health, cultural, administrative services, etc.) and according to their level of complexity and specialisation (for example, in the sector of health, local medical officer, chemist, specialists of the various medical branches, hospitals of different proportions; in the educational sector, elementary, primary, and secondary schools, universities, and post-graduate institutions). The various central goods and services serve territories of different proportions (that is they have different territorial environments of influence) that are broader the higher their degree of specialisation and complexity is (for example, a general practitioner serves at the most one city district, a specialist several city districts, and a hospital the whole city). In equal conditions, the form assumed by the territorial environments covered by central goods and services is a circular area. The extension of each of these territorial environments is in turn determined by two parameters: the *upper limit* of the radius of influence for central goods and services of a certain order delimits the maximum distance from a central place that consumers and users are willing to travel to procure them. The *lower limit* delimits the minimum territorial extension (for a given density of population) indispensable for economically sustaining the institutions that supply these same goods and services.

As already observed, if Christaller's argument holds, this means that different parts of the territory do not have the same vitality as the central localities of the highest order, that is of those that beyond offering the most basic goods and services are endowed with economic units that also offer more sophisticated and complex goods and services. These latter localities in fact find the quantity and variety of goods and services

offered over their territory concentrated in a way that is not comparable in any, or else present in few, other localities. The extension of Christaller's observations to the distribution of settlements within an urban area would highlight therefore how the principle of the market would tend to develop a system of central localities of urban dimensions, with some city districts more vital than others, when instead vitality should be a characteristic of all city districts. Hence, until an effective multiplicity of uses for the urban territory is developed, the system of central localities as described by Christaller at the urban level should tend to exhaust itself within each city district, in the sense that each of these should have at least the same number of services whose lower limit has a range equal and superior to the extension of the city district.[11]

3. *Toward a European and world system of central localities.*

The cities of Europe are submitted nowadays to different demands from those that accompanied their development during the 19th century and the first part of the 20th. These demands emanate on the one hand from the process of European unification, which is provoking a high degree of wealth redistribution among the different urban areas, and on the other from the fact that a European and world system of central localities is being consolidated.

The effects of the process of European unification on the redistribution of wealth among the cities of Europe are enormous. And it is worth underlining this fact here because, with reference to what was elaborated in the preceding paragraph, a development plan for cities and their city districts can not be considered outside the context of European choices. To cite an illustrative example, it is sufficient to recall what has happened to certain city ports in Great Britain, a country that in 1965 exported only 18.2% of its goods to the EEC, while in 1983 this percentage had reached 44.7%. The growth of the European outlet for British goods has meant a complete reversal of the relative importance of English ports. Liverpool, which in 1965 handled 18.5% of British exports, in 1983 handled only 2.8% of them. In the same period, Dover, which faces the continent, saw the share of British exports that used its port facilities rise from 1.7 to 12.1% of the total, while the port of Felixstowe's share rose from 3.2 to 9.1%.[12] More examples are available, but the fact remains that the European Union's response to these problems is absolutely inadequate, limited to provisions for the granting of funds to urban areas in industrial decline. The problem is instead much broader, in as much as alongside

urban areas in decline can be noted a growing number of cities that are becoming part of a European system of central localities. Cities, or at least today's major ones, are invested with new functions, that serve not only a territory of regional or national proportions, but rather a European one, if not directly a world one. The issue therefore can no longer be that of a more-or-less effective welfare policy, but of promoting a territorial policy that guarantees the balanced vitality of territory on a European scale. The model elaborated by Christaller shows that the principle of the market ensures a balanced distribution of the supply of goods and services, avoiding that sizeable parts of the territory are left unprovided for. Looking at the European territory, however, clear imbalances can be noted, and above all a trend toward their worsening, whose causes need to be investigated in order to be able to formulate suitable remedies.

It should be observed generally that this situation was developed on the basis of the inheritance left by the industrial revolution and of the action exercised by the political authorities over territory during the period of the birth of the nation-states. In Europe, the action of political authorities to defend and control territory has tended to concentrate all functions in the capital (and, secondarily, in the capitals of the administrative subdivisions of the state) and to leave the border zones abandoned. As Christaller argues, "the fundamental idea of the administrative structure is that of creating the most complete territories possible, that is districts of a uniform physical area and, always to the extent that it is possible, with a uniform number of inhabitants, at whose centre would arise the most important locality and whose borders must be found in scarcely populated zones in such a way as to link themselves to the natural barriers and frontiers."[13] This policy contrasts to the distribution of the settlements that would take place on the basis of the principle of the market. In fact, the localities of an immediately inferior order, that were to be found in the vicinity of a political border would be penalised by the attitude of the political authorities, leading the localities in question to have a level of development decidedly lower than their potential.

The opposite result awaits the capitals. Confirmation of this can be drawn from a report, edited by the *Délégation à l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l'Action Régionale* (DATAR), concerning the endowment of European cities with a certain number of functions chosen as indicators of their international vocation. The study, albeit of a very empirical nature, highlights the consequences for a territory of the division of Europe into sovereign and independent nation-states and of the process of centralisation that took place above all in the continental states. In

particular it can be noted how in Spain (with the sole exception of Barcelona, whose high degree of development is however to be ascribed to entrance into the European Union) the territory that surrounds Madrid lacks cities of a certain European significance, and how in France the territory to the south of Paris results as being almost completely deprived of cities of a certain importance, at least until the southern coast.

The consequences of the political authorities' action over territory are still more evident in the case of the urban areas of the border regions. For example, in the case of north-west Italy, the urban system is increasingly being organised around the area of Milan, which is privileged, in addition to a favourable geographic position, by the economic policy pursued in the post-second world war period and the policy of implementing infrastructure and communication projects that favoured the convergence of traffic toward Milan, rather than France and Spain. Certain studies have brought to light how this process of economic dependence is very advanced, by now influencing the jobs market for the most advanced professions.[14]

The DATAR report has the merit of attracting attention to the fact that at the European level some important specialisation in the supply of services of European significance is emerging. For example, in financial activities London occupies the first place in Europe as a privileged location for financial transactions, given the size of its stock market, the existence of commodity markets, futures and options markets, the number of large banks' headquarters, the merchant banking business, and so on. In goods transport via sea, and particularly as a place for the interchange of goods between the European continent, the United States and the Far East, Rotterdam has established itself as the most important port in Europe and the world. Also in the transport sector, but via air, connecting services with areas outside the Community are effected principally from Paris, London and Frankfurt. In other important services for businesses, such as the organisation of trade fairs, exhibition halls and conferences, Paris and London are the main cities of Europe. Finally, Paris, London and Milan are the cities with the greatest proportion of the working population employed in the roles of administrators, engineers and technicians in general, further proof of the fact that these are the main sites of businesses with higher added value.

A great proportion of the imbalances described above in the distribution of functions over the European territory, and in particular the excessive concentration of functions in cities such as Madrid, Milan, Paris and London are also the fruit of a radio-centric transport policy for

these urban areas that has weakened the surrounding urban areas. In effect, as Christaller once again reminds us, the transport system explains the distribution of central places for those regions that are crossed by intensively-used long-distance communication roads. The existence of better conditions of transport brings with it a reduction of economic distances, a reduction that is not only of effective costs, but also of the loss of time and other obstacles that put a break on the more frequent acquisition of central goods. Therefore, all other conditions being equal, the central locality in a territory with better conditions of transport will be larger and hence there occurs an accentuation of its importance with respect to central localities of a territory with worse conditions of transport.[15] As regards instead the *distribution* of the central localities, in the case of the realisation of communication roads, everything depends on the type of connections that is embarked on. If the tendency to create long-distance connections prevails, the central localities of the highest order will be connected only among themselves. In this case, in a territory organised according to the market principle, as Christaller demonstrates, the localities of an order immediately inferior will remain cut off, unless specific local connecting lines are enacted that connect the localities of the highest order to localities of an immediately inferior order.[16] Furthermore, with a goal to realise the same type of connections, the amount of time between connecting the large centres and connecting all the localities that surround the localities of the highest order is also very important. If the development of the transport system is put into practice slowly, and if long-distance lines are built in preference, the system of central localities may model itself according to the traffic principle: in this case the settlements tend to fall into line along the traffic axis and to denude the rest of the territory. If instead the development of the transport system is rapid and local lines are also built, the distribution of the central settlements will continue to develop itself according to the scheme of the market.[17]

The fact remains that at the European level, at the initiative of individual nation-states, decisions are taken in matters of transport policy that will significantly affect the distribution of central localities over the European territory and their relative importance. Paradoxically, these investments are supported by the Community's authorities with the "declaration of European interest" (which serves to release national and European financing for specific projects) without it being clear however what really is the long-term interest of European citizens.

The investment policy for innovative transport infrastructure such as

the high-speed railway, that received much backing initially by the French government, but that has subsequently been adopted also by other European governments, could be recalled as an example.[18]

High speed will have revolutionary consequences on the European territory, on the relationships between European cities, and on the distribution of wealth among European cities and their surrounding territory. It is sufficient to imagine the reduction of connection time between the cities that will make up part of this new railway network. To cite the most significant time reductions, starting with certain European cities, it can be noted that the current travelling time from Brussels to Barcelona, Bordeaux and Milan will be reduced by up to a third, with significant reductions in absolute terms; the current travelling time from Paris to Barcelona, Berlin and Munich will be reduced by half. Yet another important effect will be the Paris-London connection through the tunnel under the Channel: in this case also the current travelling time from London to Paris, Brussels, Barcelona and Berlin will be reduced by up to a third. But what should be underlined here is that the tunnel, while on the one hand it represents the most tangible example of the growing (and irreversible) links within the European urban system, on the other it unites, as seen above, the European cities that already enjoy leadership in many functions at the European level. It is moreover foreseeable that the city of Lille, half an hour away from Brussels and about an hour and forty minutes from London, will in turn assume growing importance in the European urban framework.

A recent study sought to assess what will happen to the European territory with the enactment of the high-speed network, as foreseen by the European Union's programmes from now until 2010.[19] The aim of the study was to see how the geographic map of continental Europe will change, reconstructing the distances between European cities not on the basis of distance in kilometres, but rather on distance as units of time. The changes produced are extremely revealing: first, in general terms, north-west Italy will become closer to northern Spain than to southern Germany, while the distance that separates northern from southern Germany will be greater than the time-distance between Milan and Barcelona; secondly, the fact that the main cities of Portugal, southern Italy and Greece will be excluded from high speed connections will contribute to further distancing the markets of central Europe from the urban areas of southern Europe.

What is important to note, in the absence of a European plan, is that the high-speed lines, that require considerable funds, are generally set to

connect cities of high-population density, of high per capita earnings and between which significant traffic already exists.[20] These choices seek to respond to the requirement of greater economic viability, compared to other connections. If the investment decisions were to depend on these considerations alone, a further concentration of development around urban areas that are already developed would be inevitable, with the more accentuated concentration of the main functions of European significance in a few cities.

4. *The economic and institutional conditions for an effective urban policy.*

While economic growth was mainly sustained by the process of mass industrialisation, which required an enormous accumulation of physical capital, necessary to attain previously unheard-of productivity levels and improvements in living standards, it was inconceivable to organise territory differently. The launching and consolidation of the industrialisation process required the construction of large productive units close to the sources of raw material supply, or close to the market outlets for these goods, just as it required the employment of great masses of workers concentrated in a few large productive units. This process, while on the one hand it has influenced the territorial distribution of the urban areas that have maintained until now a high degree of economic vitality, and has favoured the joining together of an urban hierarchy based on the distribution of wealth and an urban hierarchy based on the bestowal of central goods and services, on the other it has also conditioned the urban plan to the extent that the productive units, initially built on the periphery of the original nucleus of the city, have found themselves, with the process of urbanisation that accompanied industrial development, located in the central part of today's cities.

We are currently assisting in the passage from the industrial to the post-industrial mode of production. The latter, compared to the former which was based on the overriding importance of the accumulation of physical capital and low-skilled work, on the inflexible organisation of work, and on a high degree of social division into competing classes, is characterised instead by the greater importance given to research as a factor of production,[21] by the progressive elimination of repetitive work made possible by the automation of productive processes and by the progressive overcoming in effect of society's division into opposing classes. In addition technological development makes it possible to

decentralise productive units outside the city, and in many cases also allows their re-sizing in terms of physical space occupied for a given amount of wealth produced. Hence the economic growth of the city is no longer necessarily accompanied by the development of great industrial concentrations in an urban environment, but tends to rely on smaller productive units. The cities that drove industrial development are increasingly less the places where the physical production of goods occurs, but rather the place of their conception, experimentation and commercialisation, and the importance of services compared to production is increasing, that is to say financial and administrative services, professional training, the elaboration of data, and so on, due also to the impact of farming out services that were previously concentrated within the firm. Hence the factors that contribute to determining the success of cities, and the economic areas that belong to them, are changing: quality of life, level of professional training, research and development incentives are replacing the factors of urban location that characterised the industrialised period, putting all European cities in direct competition.

The European economic system is in fact profoundly modified already: service sector employment represents about 60% of the total workforce, against 33% for the industrial sector (of which about 20% are managers and clerical staff). In Italy, for example, the number of those who do jobs which require considerable autonomy and professional ability (entrepreneurs and self-employed professionals, managers and clerical staff, self-employed workers) has increased from 37% of the total workforce in 1960 to 57% in 1990: hence employment where "grey matter" counts, represents much more than half of the working population, while employment linked to the "assembly line", and for which less flexible behaviour is required, was equal to 49% of the working population in 1960 and by 1990 had fallen to 39%. This means that intellectual capital (the capital invested in "grey matter") is becoming, if it is not so already, more important than physical capital. Hence, it is useful to bear this structural fact in mind, also as regards the direction for a discretional policy to support the balanced development of the districts that comprise cities.

Alongside these underlying changes that make a more balanced distribution of productive activities in the urban environment conceivable, the rationalisation of industrial activity underway, as seen above, in its continual search for increasing levels of efficiency, is leading to the abandonment of industrial locations in urban environments. These, in the industrial development stage, found their setting in the lee of cities' historic centres, and have subsequently been engulfed by the urban development of the second half of this century. Now they find themselves in a strategic position as regards the recuperation, and vitality and security of city districts, and their recuperation and inclusion in a development plan that privileges the multiplicity of their end uses is the first step in this direction. This process allows the development of a policy geared toward eliminating the compartmentalisation of urban areas produced by the mono-functional use (industrial, tertiary, residential districts for the rich only, residential districts for the poor only) of many city zones.

Furthermore, it is necessary today also to think of the infrastructure of the future (the so-called information highway) that can contribute decisively to the capacity to live in a city. In fact, the development of an efficient telecommunications network makes possible, at least to a great extent, the overcoming of the separation, typical in European urban areas, between places of residence, production and consumption, by developing widespread forms of telecommuting over the territory and in production sectors.[22] In this way it is conceivable that the spontaneous trend to match a hierarchy of urban city districts with a hierarchy of central goods and services, organising the vitality of city districts without penalising the efficiency of the supply of goods and services that is implicit in Christaller's scheme for the distribution of such goods and services according to the principle of the market, may be attenuated if not eliminated altogether.

These developments can be further strengthened if the suggestions contained in Delors' white paper concerning trans-European networks and information networks are acted on.[23] Investments in trans-European networks, reducing the time and cost of transport, will make possible a further step forward in the defence of the European industrial system's efficiency, and in the more balanced distribution of industrial settlements over the territory. Combined, they will be an opportunity for economic growth and the development of European society, if inserted within the context of a balanced policy of connecting medium-sized cities, and these with other large cities, and not only with the capitals.

A greater degree of recuperation and vitality for urban city districts, and for overcoming the competition between city and countryside will however derive from the enactment of the information network programme. The Delors plan foresees four possible applications: telecommuting, tele-training, tele-medicine and tele-administration. The investments in information and communications technology will make possible, beyond the re-composition of the locations of residence and

work, the reduced importance of a significant series of central services that until now have characterised the central localities of the highest order. In particular, in the sector of the highest training, in universities and post-graduate institutions, smaller and decentralised departments in different city districts and different cities of the same region will be possible. The same can be said for services rendered by the public bureaucracy, which is in large part responsible for the current centralisation of functions in the historical centre of cities at the expense of the periphery.

All this simply means however that there exist the economic and technological conditions for drawing up an urban policy aimed at revitalising all city districts, and overcoming the contrast between cities' historic centres and peripheries, and between city and countryside; but it does not yet declare that these will be put into practice. In order that they are, it is necessary to introduce at the local, regional, national and European levels, institutional innovations comprising the presupposition of the elaboration of a European territorial policy, in as much as the problems seen above pose the need for co-ordination among the different levels of government.

The first innovation to introduce is that of the electoral system. If the goal is for the needs manifested at the lowest level, that of the city district, to be assimilated at the highest level, the federal one, when formulating European territorial policy, it is necessary to envisage a system of successive elections.[24] These should be effected in order from the lowest level to the highest one, and over a time interval that allows the immediately higher level not to dissipate the contribution of the lower level and to effect a synthesis with the corresponding levels to be transmitted to the immediately higher one. This process will be even more effective if bicameralism is introduced at all levels, from the lowest to the highest. In this way, at the urban area level the communal council will have to be composed of two chambers: the chamber of the city districts and the chamber of the citizens of the urban area; at the provincial level there will be the chamber of the cities and that of the citizens of the province, and so on up to the European federal level, with provision, if opportune, for new intermediate groupings between the regional and national levels. Nevertheless, in light of what has been said about the urban functions of the cities of the highest order, many of these have a capacity that stretches beyond the borders of the city and the region, and hence they influence the life of other cities and other regions. It is therefore necessary that institutional innovations that take these relationships into account are undertaken. Taking the example of north-west Italy, given the strong economic ties between the Piedmont and Lombard economies, representatives of the Lombard region and of the neighbouring French and Swiss regions should also be present in the Piedmont regional parliament, just as the representatives of Piedmont should sit in the parliaments of these other regions.

It goes without saying, however, that this plan requires the transformation of the current European parliament into a real and effective legislative assembly, and of the council of ministers into a chamber of the states. The deadline for revisions to the founding treaty of the European Union, set for 1996, represents therefore a favourable opportunity also for re-launching the debate about these problems. The committee of the regions, introduced by the Maastricht treaty, can enable local bodies to voice their support in requesting a democratic European policy for the territory.

Domenico Moro

NOTES

[1] AA.VV., *Nuove regioni e riforma dello Stato*, edited by the Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, Turin, 1993.

[2] M. Demarie and P. Gastaldo, "Capitale reticolare e riforma dello Stato", in *XXI Secolo*, no. 1, January 1994.

[3] AA.VV., *La capitale reticolare*, edited by the Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, Turin, 1993.

[4] The law in question is number 142/90 concerning local autonomies. As regards the projects for the creation of metropolitan areas provided for in this law, cf. AA.VV., *Progetto città metropolitana*, edited by the Comune e Provincia di Bologna, Bologna, 1993.

[5] F. Grosrichard, "Le gouvernement détermine sept 'espaces d'aménagement' à l'échelle européenne", in *Le Monde*, 19 May 1994.

[6] The Commission of the European Communities, *Urban Problems and Regional Policy in the European Community*, Brussels, 1988; *Green paper on the urban environment*, Brussels, 1990; *Urbanization and the Functions of Cities in the European Community*, Brussels, 1992.

[7] It is worth recalling on this subject a World Bank study into the role that a policy dedicated to urban areas can play in the development of Third World countries: World Bank, *Urban Policy and Economic Development (an Agenda for the 1990s)*, Washington, 1991.

[8] F. Rossolillo, *Città, territorio, istituzioni*, Naples, Guida, 1983.

[9] J. Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, New York, Random House, 1961.

[10] W. Christaller, *Die zentralen Orte in Süddentschland, 1st ed. Jena 1933, 2nd ed.*

Darmstadt 1968.

[11] According to a study into the number and distribution of central localities within the city of Turin, there results a strong imbalance in the distribution of tertiary businesses, and of services in general, among the city' s districts. The investigation enabled the identification of a system of urban central localities that is articulated on four levels: one locality of the highest order, which provides the most specialised services and comprises the historic centre; seven central localities of the second order; 38 of the third order; and 66 of the fourth order (cf. G. Dematteis, *Le località centrali nella geografia urbana di Torino*, Turin, 1966).

[12] The Commission of the European Communities, *Urban Problems and Regional Policy in the European Community*, Luxembourg, 1988, p. 210.

[13] W. Christaller, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[14] C.S. Bertuglia, T. Gallino, G.A. Rabino, "Le aree di pendolarità in Piemonte al Censimento 1981. Un' analisi disaggregata per settori e figure professionali", in *Quaderni di ricerca Ires*, no. 38, July 1986. By the same authors cf. "L' organizzazione gerarchica del territorio piemontese. Stato, trasformazioni in atto e scenari in evoluzione", in *Quaderni di ricerca Ires*, no. 40, November 1986.

[15] W. Christaller, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

[16] W. Christaller, *ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

[17] W. Christaller, *ibid.*, p. 123.

[18] Commission of the European Communities, *Report of the High Level Committee on the Development of a European High-Speed Train Network*, Brussels, 1990.

[19] C. Cauvin, H. Reymond, *Du ferroviaire au TGV, simulations et anamorphose, apport de la cartographie transformationnelle*, presented at the meeting "Villes et TGV", organised by the Centre Jacques Cartier of Lyons, December 1993.

[20] In addition to the case of the European high-speed network, see also: D. Brand, *Forecasting High Speed Rail Rideship in the Canadian Corridor: Quebec-Montreal-Toronto-Windsor*, and F. Martin, *L' allocation interrégionale des effets d'intégration économique d'un TGV dans l' espace canadien*, memoirs presented at the meeting "Villes et TGV" of the Centre Jacques Cartier of Lyons, December 1993.

[21] L. Thurow, *Head to Head*, New York, 1992.

[22] G. Scarpitti, D. Zingarelli, *Il telelavoro*, Milan, Franco Angeli, 1993.

[23] European Commission, *Growth, Competitiveness, Employment. The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century.* White paper. Office for official publication of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1994.

[24] M. Albertini, "Discorso ai giovani federalisti", in *Il Federalista*, XX (1978), pp. 51-67.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ALFONSO JOZZO, Vice-President of the Movimento Federalista Europeo.

GUIDO MONTANI, National Secretary of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Member of the World Council of the World Federalist Movement, Professor in Theory of Economic Development, University of Pavia.

DOMENICO MORO, Member of the National Council of the Movimento Federalista Europeo.

MARITA RAMPAZI, Member of the National Council of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Professor in Sociology, University of Pavia.

Some articles from recent numbers:

1990

Editorials
The Revival of Nationalism.
Europe and the Gulf Crisis.

Essays
John Pinder, The Federal Idea and the British Liberal Tradition.
Guido Montani, European Currency, Reform of the Welfare State and Economic Democracy.

Notes
Reflections on the European Common Home.
Can Federalism Be a Model for Africa?
Towards a Supranational Government of the Ecological Emergency.
The Principle of Self-determination.

Thirty Years Ago
The Nation, Ideological Fetish of Our Time.

Federalism in the History of Thought
Bertrand Russel.
Lewis Mumford.

1991

Editorials
A just War?
Federalism and Self-determination.
The European Summit at Maastricht.

Essays
Lucio Levi, Considerations on the European Community and the New World Order.
Jean-Francis Billion, The World Federalist Movement from 1945 to 1954 and European Integration.
Francesco Rossolillo, Europe: A World Power or a Model for the World?
Sergio Pistone, Europe and the Policy of World Unification.

Notes
Europe and the United States: Lessons of the Gulf.
The Centralisation of the European Community.

Federalist Action
History Will not Wait for Europe.

Thirty Years Ago
Four Commonplaces and a Conclusion on the European Summit.

Federalism in the History of Thought
Kenneth C. Wheare.
Edward H. Carr.

1992

Editorials
Europe after Gorbachev's Downfall.
Federalism and Regionalism.
From Common Rules to a World Environmental Government.

Essays
Sergio Pistone, The Security Policy of the European Union.
Hilary F. French, From Discord to Accord.
Alberto Majocchi, The European Community's Proposal for a Carbon Tax.
Pape Amadou Sow, International Economy, Poverty and Desertification.

Notes
Realism, Opportunism and Innovative Thinking.
The World Community after the Collapse of the Soviet Union.
Some Considerations on the Strategy for Achieving European Federation.

Direttore responsabile: Mario Albertini - Editrice EDIF - Autorizzazione Tribunale di Pavia n. 265 del 13-12-1981 - Tipografia Pi-Me, Pavia - Spedizione in abbonamento postale 50%.

Dear Sir,

The Fed
has been pu
theoretical ar
and philosop

The revi
structure by

We sugg
issue with a
means of the

SUBSCRIPTION

The Federalist i
LUCIANO BOI
language editi
Europe 55000
A three-year
respectively) is
Eurocheque di

The Federalist
EDIF
Via Porta Pertusi 6
I-27100 Pavia (Italy)

YEAR XXXVI, 1994, NUMBER 2