


# THE FEDERALIST

a political review

*To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.*

Hamilton, The Federalist



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
YEAR XXXVIII, 1996, NUMBER 1

# THE FEDERALIST

a political review

*Editor:* Mario Albertini

*The Federalist* was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



*The Federalist* is published under the auspices of the FONDAZIONE EUROPEA LUCIANO BOLIS by EDIF, via Porta Pertusi 6, 27100 Pavia, Italy. English language editing: David Riggs. Three issues a year. Subscription rates: Europe 55000 lire or 35 \$; other countries (by air mail) 70000 lire or 50 \$. A three-year subscription (150000 lire, 100 \$ or 200000 lire, 120 \$ respectively) is also possible. All payments should be made by cheque or Eurocheque directly to EDIF.

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## Should the construction of Europe fail

From its outset, the European unification process has experienced a series of crises, ranging from the collapse of the EDC project, to de Gaulle's "empty seat" policy which was ended by the Luxembourg compromise, to the failure to adopt the Draft Treaty approved by the European Parliament as a result of Altiero Spinelli's action. Each of these crises has been followed by a period marked by stagnation and a lack of direction. Yet after each hiatus the process has been re-animated by setting short-term objectives which, although less ambitious than the projects which initially brought about the crisis, never lost sight of the general direction of the unification process and its ultimate destination. In this way, the European Economic Community was created from the ashes of the EDC, out of the policy of the "empty chair" came the agreement regarding the financing of the common agricultural policy, the Community's own resources and the European Parliament's budgetary powers, and out of the failure of Spinelli's Draft Treaty was born the European Single Act. The reality is that Europe's states have been carried along for forty years by a current which, despite pauses and setbacks, has advanced toward ever-closer integration by guaranteeing a stable reference point for the expectations of citizens and for the decisions of political forces.

European integration has been driven by the process of globalisation, which destroys everywhere and with increasing momentum the barriers that hinder the circulation of information, capital, goods and people. It is making the national dimension of the state obsolete throughout the world, and is creating also in other regions of the world groups of states that are being set up with the aim of creating regional markets sufficiently large to enable them to compete successfully in the great single global market.

This imperative gave rise to and pushed forward the European integration process prior to and to a greater extent than any other similar process which has manifested itself elsewhere, since the national state experienced its historic rise and fall in Europe before the other regions of

the world and demonstrated, through fascism and the Second World War, the tragic consequences of its ever more evident incapacity to guarantee within its own borders free and secure civil co-habitation and balanced economic and social progress.

Yet the European integration process has dragged on for half a century without reaching federal unification. This has happened because, apart from some temporary and ephemeral outbursts, the interest to conserve national sovereignty has obscured the awareness of the need to overcome it in the minds of European politicians.

\* \* \*

Globalisation does not only bring about well-being and economic development. If it is not controlled by politics, that is, by the conscious will of men and women formed and expressed within a framework of suitable institutions, it multiplies the occasions for conflict, spreads intolerance, and arouses and exasperates the defensive reactions of collective "identities" and vested interests which feel themselves to be threatened. This tendency toward disintegration was not apparent in Western Europe while the Cold War lasted. Throughout this period the governments of the countries involved in the integration process were relieved, thanks to the lead (in reality increasingly weak) taken by the United States through NATO, the idea of defending democracy against communism and the international role of the dollar, from the burden of confronting the fundamental political issues of security, democratic legitimacy and a common currency. These were problems which, had they not been to some extent resolved for Europeans by the Americans, would have caused the basic conflicts between the states of the Old Continent to re-emerge, bound as they are to the continuance of their sovereignty. Instead, these problems remained latent both during the Cold War and in the immediately following years, when Gorbachev's great plans made many people hope that the world was launched on a fast track toward its own unity.

Yet after the end of the Cold War and Gorbachev's fall the situation is changed. Today, the American protective umbrella no longer exists, the hopes that world unification will be achieved in the near future have dissipated and the fundamental political problems which were left unresolved must now be confronted without delay. An opportunity to do so is presented by the deadlines of 1996 to 1999 (Intergovernmental Conference and the beginning of the third stage of Economic and

Monetary Union), on which occasions the European governments will have to come to terms with the problem of creating, by means of the single currency, a democratic and federal institutional structure and a common defence, a new European political framework which will provide an alternative to the one America has now ceased to guarantee. Should this great historic opportunity not be taken advantage of, the movement of long duration which has so far led Europe toward forms of ever-closer union could change direction definitively. *What is at stake over the next few years therefore is the continuation or otherwise of the European unification process.*

\* \* \*

If this is true, the moment has come to ask what the interruption of the process would mean in practical terms, that is, what would be the impact should the objective of European unification be removed from the expectations of politicians and citizens. The aim is to try and identify, while accepting that any prediction about the future is risky, the great political, economic and social changes which would come to pass in Europe and the world if such an eventuality were to be verified. It is evident that it is impossible to go as far as to predict the rapidity of the processes and how advanced they would become. For each of the scenarios there can therefore be imagined developments and results that would be more or less extreme. Yet the facts of recent history and the current situation allow us to identify some *trends* with a reasonable degree of certainty.

The first of the great changes which seems reasonable to predict is a mutation in Germany's foreign policy and foreign economic policy. Faced with the disappearance of the perspective of Europe's political union, Germany would be forced to follow the only alternative road left open to her — that of strengthening the German sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe, which exists already today in embryonic form. This policy would be eased by the circumstance that the process of re-consolidating power in Russia is proving to be long and difficult and will have anyway as its prime objective, in the foreign policy field, the revival of some form of ties with the other countries of the ex-Soviet Union. Certainly, Germany's influence would be a weak and unstable hegemony, both because Germany's foreign policy status would be destined to remain fragile for a long time, and because the structure of the German economy itself would be insufficiently strong to give the mark

the role of a real international currency. Yet the re-orientation would nevertheless be enough radically to alter the make-up of the European balance and to destroy the Franco-German axis. France would seek to create a counter-balance to German hegemony by re-launching an impossible policy of national greatness and by looking for alternative alliances, in and outside Europe. Great Britain would move closer to the United States and would seek to gain advantages from the divergence of the policies of the two largest continental states. The smaller countries would line up in unstable opposing coalitions.

In this context the very foundations of a European foreign policy would prove to be lacking. It has existed up until now, even if in a weak and contradictory form, because the incomplete design of European unification has been sufficient to guarantee a minimum degree of cohesion among the countries involved; and it has encouraged, in international relations, an openness to dialogue and the intensification of exchanges with the rest of the continent and with other regions of the world, where Europe's presence has never been perceived as imperialist or neo-colonialist. Its results have been the enlargement of the Union, the Lomé Convention, the European Economic Area, the association agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and with Cyprus and Malta, the co-operation agreements with Russia, the intensification of relations with Latin America and the countries of the Far East, the free trade area with Turkey, the association or co-operation agreements with some countries in the Maghreb and Mashreq, the Barcelona project of co-operation with the countries of the Mediterranean, and the success of the negotiations in the GATT framework. Yet the sinister signals which were perceived during the Yugoslav tragedy, when the Union demonstrated its inability to prevent the war and impose a peace, and its member states lined up more or less openly in support of one or other of the parties in the conflict (thus aggravating the conflict and making it irreversible) provide an indication of what the total impotence of European states would be with regard to the rest of the world once the design of continental unification had lost all credibility.

In particular, the current timid attempts to conduct a European policy in the most sensitive of international situations, that of relations with the countries of the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, would completely disappear. In this area Europe's "middle powers" would each conduct its own policy of alliances, exasperating the existing tensions. The extremely difficult peace process underway in Israel, and between Israel and its Arab neighbours, to which a federal European state could

give a decisive contribution by exploiting the strong complementary relationships that exist between the two areas, would be definitively compromised. Fundamentalism and fanaticism would be encouraged to the detriment of pressures toward tolerance and unity. The irresponsible dictatorships which already today protect and promote terrorism as an instrument of aggression by means of destabilisation would be reinforced; and all hope of combating the phenomenon at the roots by favouring the democratisation of those regimes through a coherent policy which is both firm and open, and which only a great democracy based on a strong legitimacy could carry forward, would disappear.

In the same way all hope that Europe could conduct a balanced policy of immigration control and aid to modernise countries in Africa and Asia which have low incomes and high rates of demographic growth would be seriously prejudiced. Europe's weakness would force it to try and take refuge in a policy of closure. Yet Europe would be destined, on account of this same weakness, to fail to carry it out. Thus, immigration, which if encouraged and disciplined could be an effective counterpoise to the serious problem of the aging of Europe's population and an extremely important safety valve for the countries from which immigrants arrive, would risk becoming (far more than is currently the case) a chaotic and uncontrolled phenomenon, and an ever more serious source of disorder and intolerance, embittering relationships between the countries which send and receive immigrants and further exacerbating the sense of unease in European societies.

\* \* \*

The single market, enlarged to the countries of the East and South of Europe, would be watered down into a huge free trade area which would function precariously and without stability due to the lack of a single currency and an institutional framework capable of establishing rules and enforcing their respect. In the longer term, protectionist temptations which already in the recent past have been expressed in reaction to the devaluation of the lira and the peseta could not fail to be reinforced by the inevitable monetary turbulence. If today a return to national markets is unthinkable, it is by no means impossible to imagine a chaotic alternation of periods of liberalisation and protectionist backlashes. The policies of devaluation or competitive disinflation would render impossible any programme of re-launching the European economy and would aggravate further the already serious unemployment problem. Europe's economic

development and the modernisation of its society would be dramatically slowed down. It would have to abandon, or markedly dilute, its own model of the organisation of society, which is based on a mix of free enterprise and solidarity and is currently the most advanced in the world, and renounce perfecting and diffusing it. This would bring about a widening of the gap between the rich and poor classes, the spread and consolidation of behavioural models based on social Darwinism, a dramatic worsening of the general quality of life, and cause profound damage to the fabric of society. At the same time, the incapacity of European countries to govern their economies effectively would deprive them of the political instruments which are today indispensable for withstanding competition at the world level, in which great regional systems that are highly integrated and supported by a power endowed with a strong negotiating position and the capacity to direct productive activities tend to prevail. In particular, Europe would be definitively left behind in the race for technological progress and would become totally subservient to American and Japanese industry.

\* \* \*

The very future of democracy in the European states will also be at stake. Chancellor Kohl, if he stands for re-election in the 1998 *Bundestag* elections, will do so for the last time. He is today the most authoritative representative of a political generation the roots of whose democratic faith and European commitment can be found in the direct experience of the tragedy of the Second World War. This generation, among whose ranks however corruption is spreading, is being challenged by younger politicians with short historical memories and with restricted perspectives. If the European design were to disappear from the horizon, the consequent political and moral disorientation would greatly benefit the latter group, who would become everywhere the new governing class. They would be incapable of offering citizens any real prospects for the future, but only demagoguery and base calculations of power. This means that the foundations of the democratic consensus (which is not agreed on in exchange for petty privileges, but is founded on the capacity of a political class to *keep alive people's hope in the future*) would be irremediably undermined. Nor could they be re-built by offering citizens, in place of a grand design, the bourgeois perspective of prosperous and secure co-habitation, safe from the upsets of world politics. This is possible in small states like Switzerland, which live a parasitic existence

in the shadow of larger states. Yet Europe as a whole can not escape the tempests of history. It can only decide whether to create, through unity, a political power which is sufficiently strong to curb the violence and control the energies released by them, in order to promote the common good of humanity, or allow itself to be swept away by perpetuating its division. In the latter scenario, Europeans would be destined to be governed by authoritarian regimes. These would probably not be fascist in the strict sense, since the events of history do not happen in vain, but rather regimes based on the manipulation of public opinion through the control of the mass media, which would live off the death of politics and would take it on themselves to kill off European culture.

Alongside democracy, the very foundation of the legitimacy of the state would be at stake. With the dissolution of the prospect of an ever broader democratic citizenship across the borders between the nations, power would seek to anchor itself, in order to guarantee its own survival, to the idea of the nation. Yet it would come into conflict with the fact that the process of globalisation has irreversibly deprived the idea of the nation of the capacity to act as the cement of society and as the foundation of the loyalty of citizens toward the state. Secessionist tendencies and tribal impulses, which already today are active in the weakest of European democracies, would as a result be encouraged. The authoritarianism of the national powers would not stop the process of their disintegration. Europe would be launched toward its own Balkanisation.

\* \* \*

Mitterrand, in his valedictory address to the European Parliament, and Kohl, on repeated occasions, have posed the problem of the political unity of Europe as a problem of peace and war. The dramatic nature of their warning has not been understood. On the other hand, the prospect of war in Europe, after fifty years of peace, sounds unlikely. Yet it must be reconsidered in the context (which is entirely realistic) of a world in which war is nevertheless a recurring fact and of a Europe which would have departed from the path of unity and which would no longer be oriented by a solid alliance with the United States in the context of a rigid but stable world balance. In this context the conflicts which are external to Europe (above all those which will be carried out on its borders) would inevitably involve the great European states, and these will line up on opposing fronts, according to the demands of their *raison d'état*, as has already happened in ex-Yugoslavia. Certainly, in an initial stage, Euro-

pean soil would probably be spared actual military conflict, if it is true that wars are always fought in the weakest and most unstable regions of the planet where there exists a *power vacuum*. Yet a divided Europe in an anarchic world would be destined to become itself a weak and unstable region, in which the national powers would be de-legitimised and fragmented. In this situation the conflicts born outside Europe would easily spread to Europe itself, and others could arise inside Europe. The greatest of the benefits which Europeans have enjoyed for half a century thanks to the integration process, peace, would be lost.

Yet the bond between European unification and the problem of peace and war would not only be manifested in the European framework. The European Community has served as the model for many other regional economic integration experiments (in North America, in Latin America, in South-East Asia), even if these experiments are far less advanced than Europe's. Their outcome will depend largely on the conclusion of the process in Europe. If Europe is able to provide a successful example of the passage from economic integration to political unity and demonstrate the consequences of this passage in terms of economic development and the consolidation of democracy, the countries of Asia and the Americas involved in economic integration processes will also follow the same path and will unite themselves in great continental federations. Europe, which already today demonstrates a clear vocation (far stronger than that of the United States and Japan) to commercial openness and political, economic and cultural co-operation with the other great poles of world development, will be at the centre of an ever more active network of inter-continental exchanges and political and economic relationships. Europe would in this way lead the world toward the realisation of federalism in the same way in which, starting from the French revolution, the formula of the national state spread throughout the planet.

Yet if the European attempt were to fail, the consequences of its failure on the other regions of the world would be extremely serious. Europe is the only area of the world in which the idea of federal unification has penetrated, even if in not entirely conscious forms, the expectations of citizens, has generated a culture and has given place to an elaborate institutional structure. It is difficult to think that the same path could be pursued elsewhere, if not after many decades, should Europe no longer exist as a reference point. Indeed it is probable that, in the end, the other groupings of states which currently exist would disintegrate under the weight of the same internal contradictions and the same international pressures which are currently burdening Europe. The process of the

creation of a real and effective world system of states would be arrested. The United States would remain the only world power, albeit incapable alone of imposing order on a planet that would be prey to anarchy.

On these developments will depend the future of the UN. If it is supported by the co-operation of a restricted number of great regional federations of states that are democratic and aware of their world responsibilities, the UN will be able to carry out an effective action of peace-keeping and peace-enforcing, confront with success the great environmental challenges of the planet, launch itself toward its own democratisation and, in the longer term, acquire a monopoly of the detention of nuclear arms and of the development of the technology necessary to guarantee their security. In short, it would assume the function of a real and effective *world government*. Conversely, the UN will be condemned to impotence and will leave the world prey to disorder should it remain the screen for the sole weak leadership of the US.

If Europe's governments are able to impose in Europe the reasons of federalism against those of nationalism, the forces for unity will prevail over those toward disintegration also at the world level, by giving concrete form and visibility to the perspective of establishing *perpetual peace*. If they are unable to do this, the threat of a new, long and dark period of disorder and war will descend on the world.

\* \* \*

Having surveyed the most probable consequences of an interruption of the European unification process, we must ask what are the circumstances that, if verified, would allow us to determine whether the historic opportunity Europe is today presented with will have been seized or else definitively lost. In reality, identifying right now the specific event which would signal the point of no return of the crisis seems impossible. In the coming years, Europe will have to face the problems of the currency, institutional reform, the re-financing of the Community budget, enlargement and defence. These problems will tend to blend together into a single great permanent negotiation, in the course of which priorities will be alternated and alliances will, at least in part, be modified. There will be moments of serious tension and of stagnation. Yet no defeat on a single objective will lead of itself to the end of the process, even if the date of 1st January 1999 which has been set for the start of the third stage of economic and monetary union will be crucial. A serious crisis could induce the governments most deeply involved in the process to gain an

increasingly clear awareness of the nature of the interests at stake, encourage the creation and consolidation of opposing groups and progressively reinforce their European will.

The outcome of the entire matter will nevertheless depend on whether the governments which today are aware of the need for a European currency and the greater effectiveness and democracy of the Union's institutions are able to go to the very heart of the matter, deriving from this awareness the consequence that these objectives can be reached only through the creation of a federal-type *state* framework. Furthermore, it will depend on whether (given, as today seems certain, it prove impossible to obtain from the governments currently opposed to any significant cession of sovereignty their agreement to a federal project) the others show the necessary clarity of thought and determination to proceed alone. This evolution will require time. Yet the moment will arrive when it will be clear to all whether the challenge has been successfully overcome or not. Probably only in the early years of the third millennium will it be possible to establish beyond reasonable doubt whether the European unification process should be considered as having failed or whether it will be destined to continue.

\* \* \*

All predictions concerning the future course of history must be accompanied by an awareness of their inherent uncertainty. For this reason, it can not be excluded that the scenario outlined here be revealed incorrect and that the possible failure of the projects whose fate will be decided in the coming years will not lead to the end of the European unification process. It may be that the future will show that the interdependence acquired over fifty years of integration, although not consolidated by federal institutions, will be sufficiently strong to survive a change in the international context. In this case the perspective of the political unification of Europe will remain in play for an indefinite period of time, which will allow it to overcome other serious crises, to keep alive the hopes of citizens, to guide the decisions of politicians and to preserve peace, prosperity and democracy, even if in a generally more difficult context. Maybe. Yet this would mean that the European integration process is by now irreversible, that is, that the political unification of Europe as regards its essential aspects *has already been accomplished*, even if no-one is yet aware of it.

Such a hypothesis could be hazarded by a detached observer. Yet not

by those who are committed to the process as actors and, as such, are *obliged* to live it as open-ended. For this reason the federalists, faced with the disquieting signals that are multiplying on the European stage, have the duty to attract the attention of politicians and public opinion to the seriousness of the dangers which are threatening us. Only in this way is it possible to help the political class to gain an awareness of its responsibilities and the more aware citizens to come to a judgement that is not distorted by the deforming perspective of national politics.

\* \* \*

Those who seek to be actors in the historic process and to pursue the goal of improving the conditions of human co-habitation must believe that reason is destined, in the long term, to prevail. Moreover, this is an attitude which, if it has its foundation in the need to give a sense to one's own civil commitment by rooting it in an idea of the historic process which finds in reason its ultimate driving force, is also backed up by the observation of actual history which, despite its tumultuous and tragic nature, has produced over the millennia the enlargement of the framework of peaceful and democratic co-habitation among people, from the Greek city-state to the American continental federation. Yet reason is destined to prevail only *in the long term*. This means that a possible historic crisis of the European unification process, and, above and beyond this, that of world unification, would not mean it will be impossible for the process to be started again in the future. It does mean however that a long period of the obscuring of reason could push Europe to the margins of history and impoverish drastically the quality of our material and spiritual life for one or more generations. It is not sufficient in order to exorcise this danger to resort to the idea of the unstoppable advance of the process of increasing interdependence among peoples. It should not be forgotten that the same impulse to increase interdependence which was at the origin of the European unification process provoked, in the preceding period, fascism and two world wars, and that the start of the European unification process itself would not have been possible without the horror with which people reacted to the experience of oppression and war. What re-awoke reason (even if only partly) in the post-war period was the tragic observation of the terrible effects of its lethargy. Yet with the passing of the decades the memory of those events is fading. And in order today to give force once again to reason, it is necessary, albeit while maintaining firm the reference to the past, to turn our attention to the



future and to try and make understood the horrors which could come to pass within a few years should Europe's leaders prove unable to meet their historic responsibilities and should they lack the necessary clarity of thought and courage to begin, by uniting Europe, the federal stage of world history.

*The Federalist*

## Democracy, Regionalism and the Search for Pax Africana

ALI A. MAZRUI

Democracy in Africa has been damaged or destroyed by the consequences of three inter-related factors — the artificial borders which were created by colonial rule, the standing armies which were inherited from the colonial order, and the painful gap between new political institutions and old cultural continuities.

The artificial borders have sometimes thrown together groups which have no pre-colonial experience of shared governance; the borders have also sometimes split asunder groups which should have been kept together. This has often put enormous stress and strain on the democratic process.

The standing armies inherited from the colonial order have repeatedly demonstrated that in Africa ultimate power does not necessarily reside in those who control the means of destruction. Soldiers in Africa have often played havoc with the democratic process, as they have staged one military coup after another. Soldiers have controlled the means of destruction.

The third factor which has destabilized democracy in Africa has been the gap between the new postcolonial political institutions and the old cultural continuities in Africa. The new political gloves do not necessarily fit the old cultural hands. Democracy is one casualty of this misfit.

The balance among these three impediments to democracy varies from country to country in Africa. In Rwanda and Burundi, for example, the boundaries are not so artificial. The Hutu and the Tutsi have lived together for centuries. Why then have the two groups been committing reciprocal genocide in the second half of the twentieth century?

In Rwanda and Burundi the other two impediments to democracy have been more salient — the gap between new political institutions and old cultural realities, on one side, and the presence of new means of military destruction, on the other. Animosity between Hutu and Tutsi

now lack the old institutions of conflict-resolution. They have acquired instead the new guns of mutual destruction.

In countries like Nigeria and Uganda, on the other hand, all three impediments to democracy have been at play — artificial boundaries, new means of military destruction and the gap between new political institutions and old political realities.

How can regional integration help? Paradoxically countries as Rwanda and Burundi need to have their borders *artificialized*. They need to be persuaded to enter into a federation with Tanzania. Such a federation would indeed artificialize the territorial context of Rwanda and Burundi by making them part of a country far less homogenous than Rwanda and Burundi had originally been, but a little more stable.

On the other hand, the Hutu and Tutsi armies would either be disbanded or become part of the larger army of the United Republic of Tanzania. Hutu and Tutsi soldiers would no longer be targeting each other, but would be integrated into military units far away from home in other parts of Tanzania.

The Hutu and Tutsi would rediscover what they have in common with each other in contrast to other Tanzanians. The gap between new political institutions and old cultural realities would be partially narrowed by the cultural reunification of the Hutu and Tutsi.

Such regional unification would (in the best-case scenario) bring stability to Rwanda and Burundi without destabilizing Tanzania. Such minimum levels of stability are indispensable for democracy.

Again using the best-case scenario, a voluntary federation is usually a mother of constitutional guarantees for all contracting parties, probably including a Bill of Rights. While constitutionalism is not the same thing as democracy, it is nevertheless an important precondition for a healthy democratic order. A federation of Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania could help nurture a democratic constitutional order binding the three countries together. But are such federations in post-colonial Africa possible? Here we are up against the uneven history of Pan-Africanism as a striving for African Unity. Let us look more closely at these wider Pan-African issues.

#### *Pan-Africanism: Liberation vs. Integration.*

We start with a fundamental duality in the paradigm of Pan-Africanism — the distinction between Pan-Africanism of *liberation* and Pan-Africanism of *integration* (or, unification). Under both headings the

name of Ghana's founder-president, Kwame Nkrumah, is immortalized.

In the second half of the 20th century Pan-Africanism of liberation has been triumphant. It is the solidarity of Africans who fought against colonialism, confronted racism and struggled against apartheid. Those struggles of the second half of this century have been impressively victorious to a considerable extent.

Pan-Africanism of *integration*, on the other hand, has been a dismal failure. This is the Pan-Africanism which has sought *regional integration* — at least a free trade area, or perhaps a development alliance, or an economic union or economic community. Sometimes the effort is to sustain military co-operation. The ultimate dream has been to try and create whole new federations out of disparate nation-states.

Long before the idea of federating Rwanda and Burundi with Tanzania arose, we were talking about such efforts as the former East African Community (EAC) encompassing Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. This form of Pan-Africanism of integration has failed. Africans are better at uniting for freedom than at uniting for development. Solidarity in the cause of political independence has been easier than solidarity in the cause of collective social and economic transformation. Kwame Nkrumah symbolised this painful paradox. He led Ghana's independence in 1957, and inspired Pan-Africanists world-wide. But his experiments with Ghana-Guinea and Ghana-Guinea-Mali union were fiascos in integration.

In reality Pan-Movements are born out of a combination of *nightmare* and *dream*, *anguish* and *vision*. What were the nightmare and the dream which released the forces which culminated in the formation of the *European Union* as a *success* story?

Pan-Europeanism had two parents — poetry and war. The poetry provided the vision and the sensibilities of being European; war provided the practical impetus either through conquest (as European nations expanded and contracted) or through a desire to avoid some future war. That was the combination of nightmare and dream. After World War II the Schuman Plan, and the European Coal and Steel Community illustrated the creation of deliberate Pan-European interdependence to avoid the future risk of war. The Cold War both divided Europe (between east and west) and united Europe within each camp. Once again nightmare and dream played their paradoxical integrative roles. The *poetry* of Pan-Europeanism goes back at least to the European Renaissance as Europeans were stimulated by a new sense of shared civilization. By the time of the French Revolution from 1789 onwards William Wordsworth across

the Channel in England could proclaim passionately:

*Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive  
But to be young was very heaven.*

However, the French revolution was a combination of both *poetry* and *war* — the two major stimuli of Pan-Europeanism. The French revolution was both nightmare and dream.

Does Pan-Africanism have a comparable stimulus of poetry and war? The real stimulus for Pan-Africanism has been the combined power of poetry and *imperialism*, rather than poetry and war. The poetry includes legends of past heroes and makers of history. More recently there have been two schools of Pan-African cultural nationalism — *romantic primitivism* and *romantic gloriana*.

*Romantic primitivism* celebrates what is simple about Africa. It salutes the cattle-herder rather than the castle-builder. In the words of Aime Cesaire:

*Hooray for those who never invented anything  
Hooray for those who never discovered anything  
Hooray for joy! Hooray for love!  
Hooray for the pain of incarnate tears.  
My negritude [My blackness] is no tower and no cathedral,  
It delves into the deep red flesh of the soil*

On the other hand, *romantic gloriana* celebrates Africa's more complex achievements. It salutes the pyramids of Egypt, the towering structures of Aksum, the sunken churches of Lalibela, the brooding majesty of Great Zimbabwe, the castles of Gonder. Romantic gloriana is a tribute to Africa's empires and kingdoms, Africa's inventors and discoverers, great Shaka Zulu rather than the unknown peasant.

Both forms of Pan-African cultural nationalism were a response to European imperialism and its cultural arrogance. Europeans said that Africans were simple and invented nothing. That was an alleged *fact*. Europeans also said that those who were simple and invented nothing were incivilized. That was a *value* judgment.

Romantic primitivism accepted Europe's alleged facts about Africa (i.e. that Africa was simple and invented nothing) but rejected Europe's value judgement (that Africa was therefore uncivilized). Simplicity was one version of civilization, Romantic primitivism said: "Hooray for those who never invented anything, Who never discovered anything..."

Romantic gloriana, on the other hand, rejected Europe's alleged facts about Africa (that Africa was simple and invented nothing) but seems to have accepted Europe's values (that civilization is to be measured by

complexity and invention).

The same country in Africa can produce both types of Pan-African nationalists. Senegal's Léopold Senghor has been a major thinker and poet in the negritude school. Negritude is associated with romantic primitivism. Senghor's most hotly debated statement is: "Emotion is black... Reason is Greek."

On the other hand, the late Cheikh Anta Diop, Senegal's Renaissance Man who died in 1986, belonged more to the gloriana school. He spent much of his life demonstrating Africa's contributions to global civilization. And he was most emphatic that the civilization of pharaonic Egypt was a *black* civilization. This was all in the grand Pan-African tradition of romantic gloriana. *What of the reality of Africa?* It was a fusion of the simple and the complex, the cattle-herder and the castle-builder. It was *more* than romantic primitivism and romantic gloriana. Real Pan-Africanism must go beyond the twin stimuli of poetry and imperialism. Pan-Africanism of *economic* integration will be led by Southern Africa with the new community which has added South Africa to the old SADCC fraternity. The success of this economic sub-regional integration will be partly because one member of the new economic fraternity (Southern African Development Community — SADC) is more equal than the others — the Republic of South Africa. A pivotal state often helps to assure the success of regional integration.

The old European Economic Community soon after 1958 survived partly because some members were definitely more equal than others. The Franco-German axis was, under Charles de Gaulle, more "Franco" than German. But now German economic might has restored the balance in the new European Union. Similarly, Southern Africa has the advantage of having one member indisputably "the first among equals" — the Republic of South Africa. The pivotal power is the promise of regional survival. One day Southern Africa stands a chance of achieving both federation and relative democracy.

Pan-Africanism of *cultural* integration will probably be led by East Africa with its good fortune of a region-wide indigenous language — the role of Kiswahili binding Tanzania, Kenya, to some extent Uganda, Somalia, and potentially Rwanda, Burundi, and Eastern Zaire. Northern Mozambique and Malawi are also feeling Swahili influence. A shared language is an asset, both for the cause of democratization and for the mission of regional integration.

Swahili is spoken by more people than any other indigenous language of Africa. It will hit its first 100 million people early in the 21st Century

if not sooner. Kiswahili is expanding more rapidly than any other *lingua franca* in the continent.

Pan-Africanism of *political* integration will probably be led by North Africa. There is already a kind of economic co-operation fraternity binding five countries — Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania. The economic co-operation has been limping along. However, Egypt has now expressed an interest in joining this movement towards greater North African regional integration. The sub-region is still a long way from political integration, but it is the best placed in Africa for such an adventure — since it shares a religion (Islam), a language (Arabic), a culture (Arabo-Berber) and a substantial shared history across centuries. Part of the stimulus for North Africa's integration will be European integration. The economies of North Africa and Southern Europe are to some extent competitive. The deeper integration of countries like Spain and Portugal and Greece into an enlarged European Union is ringing economic alarm bells in North Africa. This could help Pan-Africanism in Arab Africa. Pan-Africanism of *military* integration is likely to be led by West Africa — with the precedent set by ECOMOG under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In spite of the difficulties and inconclusiveness of ECOMOG's attempted rescue operation in Liberia, the effort has been a major pioneering enterprise in the history of *Pax Africana*. Democracy without some minimum peace is a contradiction in terms.

But this issue is precisely the Achilles' heel of Pan-Africanism as a whole. Who will keep the peace in Africa as we approach the end of the millennium? If we do not want American troops in Somalia, or French troops in Rwanda, should we just be spectators to carnage in Africa?

#### *A Bridge Across Nations: Re-colonization?*

Contemporary Africa is in the throes of decay and decomposition. Even the degree of dependent modernization achieved under colonial rule is being reversed. Pro-democracy movements are frustrated. Successive collapse of the state in one African country after another during the 1990s suggests a once unthinkable solution: re-colonization.<sup>1</sup>

To an increasing number of Africans, this is the bitter message that has emerged from the horrifying events in Rwanda. While Africans have been quite successful in uniting to achieve national freedom, we have utterly failed to unite for economic development and political stability. War, famine and ruin are the post-colonial legacy for too many Africans.

As a result, external re-colonization under the banner of humanitarianism is entirely conceivable.

Countries like Somalia or Liberia, where central control has entirely disintegrated, invite inevitable intervention to stem the spreading "cancer of chaos" in the phrase of Brian Atwood, Director of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The colonization impulse that is resurfacing, however, is likely to look different this time round. A trusteeship system — like that of the United Nations over the Congo in 1960, when order fell apart with the Belgian pull-out — could be established that is more genuinely international and less western than under the old guise. But even humanitarian colonization could hardly be democratic. At best it can only be a preparation for democracy. Administering powers of the trusteeship territories could come from Africa or Asia, as well as from the rest of the UN membership. The "white man's burden" would, in a sense, become humanity's shared burden.

In the 21st century, for example, might Ethiopia (which will by then presumably be more stable than it is today) be called upon to run Somalia on behalf of the UN? After all, Ethiopia was once a black imperial power, annexing its neighbouring communities. Why should it not take up that historical role again in a more benign manner that has legitimate international sanction? Might Egypt re-establish its "big brother" relationship with the Sudan? Might the UN implore post-apartheid South Africa to intervene to end the Angolan civil war? Surely, it is time for Africans to exert more pressure on each other, including through benevolent intervention, to achieve a kind of *Pax Africana* based on regional integration or unification of smaller states. Some African countries will simply need to be temporarily controlled by others. Inevitably, some dysfunctional countries would need to submit to trusteeship and even tutelage for a while, as Zanzibar did when it was annexed by Tanganyika in 1964 to form Tanzania? Democratization gives way to the imperative of averting chaos.

If Burundi and Rwanda had been similarly united into a larger state, where the balance between Tutsi and Hutu would have been part of a more diverse population, the savagery which was reported over several months in 1994 would very likely not have happened on the scale it had occurred. If re-colonization or self-colonization is the path that lays ahead for Africa, there must be a continental authority to ensure that such an order does not merely mask base aims of exploitation. What I propose as a longer term solution to problems exposed by today's crises is the establishment of an African Security Council composed of five pivotal

regional states, or potential pivotal regional states, which would oversee the continent. This Council would have a Pan African Emergency Force, an army for intervention and peacekeeping, at its disposal. And there would also be an African High Commissioner for Refugees linked to the UN's High Commission. While Africa accounts for one-tenth of the world's population, it has sometimes accounted for nearly one half of the world's refugees and displaced persons.<sup>2</sup>

The African Security Council that should be formed over the coming decades would be anchored in the North by Egypt and in the South by South Africa. Although it is currently experiencing troubling times, Nigeria would be the pivotal state in west Africa. Its size and resources could give it the equivalent weight of India in South Asia if it can find political stability.

In East Africa, the pivotal country is still in doubt. Ethiopia, among the more fragile of the largest African states today, is the most likely anchor because of its size. Although Kenya is more stable, it is far smaller.

In Central Africa, the presumed regional power of the future — Zaire — is currently itself in need of trusteeship. If Zaire can avoid collapse into chaos in the near future, it will be one of the major actors in Africa in the 21st century, taking Burundi and Rwanda under its wing. Zaire has the population and resources to play a major role. In the next century it will even surpass France as the largest French-speaking nation in the world. As permanent members of an African Security Council, these five states would co-ordinate among each other and with the UN. Regional integration is the order of the day in Europe, in North America, in East Asia and even, tentatively, of course, in the Middle East. If Africa, too, does not follow this path, the lack of stability and economic growth will push the entire continent further into the desperate margins of global society.

In tandem with the efforts of UN to establish a peaceful world order, Africans need an African peace enforced by Africans, from Angola to Rwanda and Burundi. In the agenda of history, stabilization comes before democratization. There are no doubt frightening ideas for proud peoples who spilled so much blood and spent so much political will freeing themselves from the control of European powers. To be sure, self-colonization, if we can manage it, is better than colonization by outsiders. Better still would be self-conquest. But that implies an African capacity for self-control and self-discipline rarely seen since before colonialism.

Such discipline will have to be found in the 21st century if Africa is to undertake successful social engineering and build resilient and solid bridges across its varied political chasms.

### *The Neo-Colonial Legacy: A Conclusion.*

If Pan-Africanism was born out of poetry and imperialism, where does neo-colonialism fit into this? For example, has French neo-colonialism in post-colonial Africa helped or harmed the cause of Pan-Africanism? What is the balance-sheet between negative and positive consequences of neo-colonialism for Pan-Africanism?

The monetary linkages among francophone states and a shared membership of the CFA franc zone have themselves been a form of solidarity. The fact that francophone Africans conspire with each other in order to exploit the web of networking with French politicians in France has been a form of solidarity. The wider fraternity of francophonie has carried with it a partial intra-African solidarity. All in all, we can indeed conclude that francophone Africa's shared dependence upon France on a wide spectrum of issues has itself been creating forms of solidarity among those former French and Belgian colonies themselves. But does that same Franco-African liaison harm autochthonous horizontal Pan-Africanism? Does it make it harder for francophone Africans to be self-reliant? It is true that there has been an occasion in the 1990s when Africans in a former French colony have burnt the French flag. But that was in protest against France *not* intervening. Those who burnt the French flag felt that France should have intervened "on the side of democracy." This demand for French intervention was itself a form of dependency. In June 1993 Moshood Abiola apparently won the presidential election in Nigeria, and the military régime in the country prevented him from taking office. Abiola committed a colossal strategic mistake by flying to London and Washington to complain about the Nigerian military. He damaged himself almost irreparably at home. In francophone Africa, on the other hand, flying to Paris for solutions to political problems at home in Africa is almost routine. Had Nigeria been francophone, what Abiola did in 1993 as he sought intervention from the metropole would have been the natural order of things. The Nigerian military leader who thwarted Moshood Abiola's ascent to presidential power was President Ibrahim Babangida — whether or not he acted alone (singly). One question which arises is how to encourage African Heads of State like Babangida to hand over power graciously to an elected successor. It might not have worked with Babangida, but Africa needs to create conditions in which former presidents retain dignity and national standing provided they voluntarily hand over power to a democratic process. I have suggested the establishment of a Pan-African Senate

consisting of precisely former Heads of State who have either allowed themselves to be defeated at the polls (like Kenneth Kaunda), or handed over to a democratic process (like Obasanjo of Nigeria) or retired in conditions of pluralism and the open society (like Léopold S. Senghor and Julius K. Nyerere).

The purpose of such a Pan-African Senate would be two-fold. Firstly, the Senate would enable Africa to continue to tap the wisdom and accumulated political experience of some of its most historic statesmen (and, one day, stateswomen). Secondly, the Pan-African Senate would help to give African Heads of State the promise of a continuing honorific role. Is there life after State House? Africa has to find ways of assuring its presidents that there is such a thing as a dignified retirement within Africa. Africa needs to rescue the institution of the presidency from continuing to be a zero-sum game. It need not be a case of "either I am President — or I am nothing." Membership of a Pan-African Senate would be a step — only a step. Other ways of reassuring African Heads of State about their last years need to be found if we do not want them to cling on to power until they are as sick as Hastings Banda or as senile as Habib Bourguiba. Or until they are overthrown in yet another humiliating coup. Pan-Africanism may be able to play a part in devising appropriate institutions to help Africa solve such major concerns of succession and stability. And one day Pan-Africanism of integration may at last approximate Pan-Africanism of liberation in establishing a genuine record of achievement. After all, Africa has now reached a stage when, unless Pan-Africanism of integration (uniting for development) succeeds, the old accomplishments of Pan-Africanism of liberation (uniting for freedom) could be negated. Africa could be re-colonized in new ways. From nightmare to nightmare — with no poetry in sight.

But the ultimate dream of regional integration has to be actual *federation*. The most urgent is precisely a federation of Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania if the three countries can be persuaded to merge their destinies in this way. Will they one day be joined by Kenya and Uganda? This would be a kind of merger between the old German East-Africa (combining Tanganyika and Rwanda-Urundi) and the subsequent East African Community (combining Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda). A federation in Southern Africa led by post-apartheid South Africa and a federation in North Africa after the upheavals between Islamists and the secularists are also more than just feasible in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. Elsewhere in Africa federations may take longer to create. What is clear is that the search for democracy in Africa is inter-

linked with both *Pax Africana* and the unremitting search for regional integration. Democracy and Pan-Africanism are two ideals which have shared rendezvous with African history.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See, Ali A. Mazrui, "Decaying Parts of Africa Need Benign Colonization", in *International Herald Tribune*, 4 August 1994, and William Pfaff, "A New Colonialism? Europe Must Go Back into Africa", in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, n.1 (Jan/Feb 1995), pp. 2-6.

<sup>2</sup> See in this context, Leon Gordenker, "The United Nations and Refugees", in Lawrence S. Finkelstein (ed.), *Politics in the United Nations System*, Durham, NC and London, Duke University Press, 1988, pp. 274-302, and various issues of *Africa Confidential* (London) 1990-1995.

## Notes

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### THE PROCESS OF LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION

The ideal of unity among Latin American states has its roots in the 19th century,<sup>1</sup> but only in the current century has this ideal become a pursuable political project.

As was the case in Europe, the first steps toward unification have been in the sphere of economic integration, through regional and sub-regional projects, and the European model has played and continues to play an important role in the choice of objectives and in the methods employed to achieve them.

The main difficulties which the Latin American states have had to face, clearly identified by the high degree of fragmentation of the initiatives and projects, are linked to the different starting position in economic and political terms when compared to Europe. Yet the process has been started and since the 1960s has seen the creation of associations, pacts, and economic communities, which among difficulties and re-launches represent a response to the need to overcome the division into sovereign national states as the premise for peace, economic development and the consolidation of democracy.

\* \* \*

Before examining the various organs of the integration process in their different sub-regional variations,<sup>2</sup> it is necessary to outline the different goals pursued in the last four decades by Latin America (which now comprises 18 countries, if we include also Mexico, with its total of 400 million inhabitants).

Before the Second World War, the prevailing economic strategy in Latin American states was that of autarchy and state intervention. The depression of 1929 and the subsequent closing of some markets and national outlets gave a decisive impetus to this double process of falling

back on internal resources and state intervention. At the same time, populist political regimes established themselves, which were often at the extremes of nationalistic exaltation, even if they officially professed a desire to unify the continent.

This economic strategy enabled the maintenance of reasonable levels of economic activity until the Second World War (especially if compared to the relative weakness of economic activity in the most developed countries of the time) and this relatively favourable trend was maintained also in the post-Second World War period, thus allowing the region to achieve an average annual growth rate of 5% until the end of the 1950s.

It was only at the beginning of the 1970s that the majority of Latin American countries, and especially those of the southern triangle, tried to make up for lost time and to open their economies to the rest of the world. This allowed these countries to take advantage of the opportunities arising at the international level, yet imposed certain rapid and profound changes in the structure of production, which had up until that time been protected from the effects of international competition.

The 1980s were marked by the international debt crisis and the end to the policies of internal development and autarchy. Right at the end of this decade, when it became clear that most states' GDP would not reach the levels of 1980, and this in spite of much higher inflation rates, the expression "lost decade" made its appearance.

At the level of society, this period was marked overall by a growing gap among the different classes with regard to their capacity to benefit from the goods and services of the consumerist society, precisely when increased education levels and the development of the mass media made them more demanding. As a result, as individual and collective aspirations moved closer to those of the developed countries, the majority of the population demonstrated their growing frustration: among other things, this gave rise to a growth in violence and crime, drug consumption and trafficking, emigration to North America and, at the political level, a certain return to populism.<sup>3</sup>

Analysing this period, the Institute for Latin American Integration (INTAL) wrote that this has been "the worst economic crisis of the region after the great depression. Clearly, the economic integration projects could not ignore this problem; as a result, inter-regional trade suffered a big reduction, greater than the reduction of exports which occurred at the world level. This phenomenon reflected, among other things, the effects of a deep recession in the region, the scarcity of hard currency and the creation of barriers to imports."<sup>4</sup>

Following the end of the 1980s, with a sharp acceleration after 1990, a new cycle began involving the gradual opening-up of Latin American economies to the rest of the world; this has encouraged a decisive re-launching of the integration progress. Although this phenomenon is an integral part of the world economy's trend toward integration and the creation of great regional economic blocs of states, INTAL has rightly emphasised that the region has undergone a process which was "probably among the most accelerated in the world economy in recent years."<sup>5</sup>

This new cycle has been flanked by two new significant and interdependent political phenomena (to be found in all the sub-regional integration schemes) which this time encourage the hope that real progress is going to be made in the Latin American integration process: the commitment of the highest political authorities in its favour<sup>6</sup> and democratisation.<sup>7</sup>

The phenomenon of the renewed involvement of the highest political authorities in the integration process was prepared from the mid-1980s above all by the creation in 1983 of the Contadora Group as a means to avoid conflicts in Central America. This group has gone through a number of stages, first as the Group of Eight, then, after 1986, as the Rio Group or Political Co-ordination Mechanism.<sup>8</sup> It met every year from 1986 to 1990 at the heads of state level, as a forum for discussing regional problems and their respective solutions. At the close of meetings, instructions were given to ALADI (Latin American Development Association, the institutional framework) and to SELA (Latin American Economic System, the political framework of integration) as to the "actions to be undertaken in order to achieve the objectives which had been set out in every meeting."<sup>9</sup>

Finally, it is not possible to talk of the new vitality shown by the Latin American integration process, in its different versions, without at least mentioning the Initiative for the Americas proposed to the continent by President George Bush in June 1990, and to which the various countries have tried to come up with a common answer, for the most part by signing framework agreements with the United States, sometimes within sub-regional integration schemes, such as MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South) or CARICOM (Community of the Caribbean).

#### *Latin American free-trade association (ALALC).*

The Montevideo Treaty, which created ALALC, was signed in that city in February 1960 (within the decidedly protectionist context of the

end of the 1950s, as we saw above) by representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, with the aim of establishing a free trade area among the signatories, thanks to the gradual suppression over the course of twelve years of customs duties and non-tariff protection measures. The treaty provided for the following institutions: the Conference, in which each national delegation had the right to one vote, the Committee, which was permanent and was composed of one member for each contracting country, and the General Secretariat.

This organisational model was changed in December 1966 by the Montevideo Protocol, which created the Council of Foreign Ministers to be the supreme organ, alongside the Conference and the permanent Executive Committee. These reforms were not sufficient to hide the clamorous failure of ALALC, despite the good will shown by the member states, caused by the association's overly ambitious objectives with respect to the means at its disposal, since the clauses of the treaty had not been adequately altered.

Miguel A. Ekmedjian has analysed the failure of the first institutional attempt of Latin American integration as follows: "If the objective was really to create a free trade area and a common market, the adequate means and probably a real and effective mechanism to harmonise the national interests at stake were nevertheless lacking, since the conviction of signatory countries that the integration process satisfy their national interest (even though it damages certain sectoral interests) is an indispensable element for its consolidation."<sup>10</sup>

#### *Latin American development association (ALADI).*

ALADI was founded in August 1980 in the wake of the clamorous failure of ALALC (even though the latter had, in 1969, created within its structure the Andean Group — GRAN) with even more ambitious objectives.

The new Montevideo Treaty, which was this time signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, aimed at "revitalising the Latin American integration process and setting out objectives and means which are compatible with the regional situation," "by promoting a convergence process which will lead to the creation of a regional common market."<sup>11</sup> Article 1 specified that "the contracting parties support the integration process which is destined to promote the harmonious and balanced economic and social development of the region... This process has the



long-term objective of the gradual and progressive creation of a Latin American common market.”<sup>12</sup>

The institutional organs which ALADI disposed of were the Council of Foreign Ministers, as the supreme organ, the Conference of Evaluation and Convergence, the Committee of Permanent Representatives and the General Secretariat as the technical body.

Miguel A. Ekmedjian emphasises in his study certain similarities with the European Communities’ institutions (prior to the Maastricht Treaty), although he highlights the limitations of these analogies: the Council could be compared to the EEC’s Council of Ministers, the Conference to the Parliamentary Assembly (now European Parliament), in as much as its basic function was to provide political control over the functioning of the institutions. In this regard, Ekmedjian points out that the Conference, contrary to the European Assembly, did not possess the power to establish the size of the member states’ contributions nor that of setting the organisation’s budget, functions which imply “a significant power, which allowed the European Parliament progressively to widen its competences, a possibility which was evidently not open to the ALADI Conference.”<sup>13</sup> Ekmedjian also highlights that “as a permanent and executive organ, the Committee possesses certain similarities with the European Community’s Commission, although it can not apply sanctions to those responsible for infringing Community laws.”<sup>14</sup>

Moreover, two of the main limitations of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty consisted of not having provided for the direct and immediate application of the decisions of the community’s organs to the citizens of the member states and of not having created a community judicial power above the national jurisdictions. This explains ALADI’s numerous difficulties in putting regional agreements into practice, as, for example, the Program of Trade Support and Expansion, launched in 1985, or the provisions regarding regional customs privileges.

ALADI stagnated throughout the whole of the 1980s and it was only in October 1989, within the framework of the above-mentioned Rio Group, that Latin American heads of state took measures to give it greater dynamism through the decision to “transform substantially ALADI’s objectives, giving it a greater role to play in leading the regional integration process.”<sup>15</sup> Even if not all the countries belonging to ALADI were members of the Rio Group, this did not prevent the latter from wielding a decisive influence. In the spring of 1990, in Mexico, the ALADI’s Council of Ministers confirmed its ambition to be “the fundamental organ of the regional integration process and the framework of co-

operation,”<sup>16</sup> by adapting regional integration to the new situations evolving at the international level. In October 1990, in Caracas, the Rio Group reaffirmed “the inescapable need to accelerate and further the regional and sub-regional integration schemes... in order to create a Latin American economic area.”<sup>17</sup>

In this context, in September 1990, the ALADI Secretariat presented an action plan for the three year period 1990-92, which was organised under seven general headings, each of which indicated the action to be taken and the necessary implementation times: “consolidation and re-organisation of the regional market, productive compatibility and technological co-operation, financial and monetary co-operation, co-operation in the fields of transport and communications, new areas of activity (co-operation regarding border issues, tourism, culture, the environment), diffusion and evaluation of the integration process and, finally, legal adjustments.”<sup>18</sup>

At the same time, the driving force of private actors and the various social forces was developed, since those “officials managing the different sub-regional integration processes appreciated that private actors also represent, by their nature, important sectors of the national communities and that their active involvement was therefore necessary.”<sup>19</sup>

Finally, from a more political viewpoint, the “creation of the Latin American Parliament, of parliaments in the framework of the Andean Pact and of the Central American Common Market (MCCA), just as the actions and improvements achieved along the way to creating the CARICOM parliament, show the importance attached to integration.”<sup>20</sup>

Alongside the revitalisation of ALADI and the sub-regional integration projects, which will be dealt with in more detail below, it is worth recalling the trend towards the overlapping of these latter projects and the signing of integration and co-operation agreements which often involved only some of the members of one or other of the groups. In this way, Argentina and Brazil, both members of ALADI, signed a bi-lateral agreement in 1988 which subsequently gave rise to MERCOSUR, while in September 1990, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela created the Group of Three. This phenomenon created the problem of co-ordinating the different bi- or multi-lateral programmes and meant that ALADI was to play a new communicating role between the various projects.

The Council of Ministers, ALADI’s highest political organ, specified in 1991, in Cartagena, the outlines of a new role for the organisation as “the institutional and legislative framework of regional integration,” assigning itself the task of guaranteeing the convergence of the various

sub-regional schemes; this produced "a flexible system of integration, comprising in turn sub-systems in smaller geographic areas, such as MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact, the Group of Three... and a whole series of bi-lateral conventions undertaken by the member states."<sup>21</sup>

Yet the debate as to the need or otherwise of a radical reform of the organisation continued. While some recognised that "ALADI has created a legal and institutional framework which has enabled the development of integration programmes of varying breadth and content, even if this has not always taken place in an entirely multi-lateral environment, as would have been preferable," others however pointed out that this association "has not satisfied the expectations it created as a framework for launching trade among the member countries and has therefore remained below the historic needs of Latin America."

At the end of 1992, in Buenos Aires, the Council of Ministers decided to convoke an ad hoc group of government representatives from the 11 member countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela, which represent more than 90% of the GDP of Latin America and the Caribbean) with the aim of carrying out an analysis of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty and its mechanisms, of evaluating its effectiveness and functioning and, if necessary, to suggest "new models in order to improve it or new mechanisms within the Treaty itself."<sup>22</sup>

Since its creation, which followed that of ALALC, up to the end of 1993, ALADI has represented the framework of more than forty bi-lateral free trade agreements, of a free trade agreement between four countries and of more than twenty, variable-geometry sectoral agreements. More recently all members have signed agreements in favour of less-developed countries, which relate also to a regional pact regarding customs privileges.

Although the macro-economic instability of some countries and the differences in their levels of development continue to hinder the integration process, nevertheless a series of so-called "new generation" agreements have been signed in recent years. These agreements "deal with broad sectors of the world of production, establish certain programmes for the automatic tax exemption of trade and include also some new matters such as environmental protection, intellectual property, investment guarantees, trade in services, and technical norms."<sup>23</sup>

Similarly, the regional economic landscape reveals the rapid progress of MERCOSUR and GRAN, the conclusion of the Group of Three negotiations and the signing of various agreements among these three

countries and those of Central America and the Caribbean, the negotiation by Chile of various bi-lateral agreements within ALADI and, on ALADI's borders, the coming into force on 1st January 1994 of the North America Free Trade Agreement, between Canada, the United States and Mexico (NAFTA).

#### *The Andean Group (GRAN).*

GRAN was founded by the Cartagena Treaty, signed in Colombia in 1969 by Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru; Venezuela joined in 1973, prior to General Pinochet's Chile withdrawing in 1977, three years after the beginning of the military dictatorship.

GRAN represented a response by the Andean states to their dissatisfaction with the way ALALC was run and with the attitude of its three most important members (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico). In its early years, the Andean Group implemented a decidedly protectionist strategy, since its most important objective was the substitution of imports at the sub-regional level.

From the outset, the signatory countries tried to follow in a broad sense the model of the European Communities' founding treaties, creating three organs: the Council, whose responsibilities were of a technical nature, the Commission, with political responsibilities, and, from 1976, the Andean Tribunal. However, GRAN did not adopt the super-national aspects of the European Communities, since, while the decisions of the Tribunal are legally binding for the member states, the decisions of the other two community organs must be ratified by a legislative act in each of the states prior to becoming enforceable.

Precisely as was the case for ALADI, Andean integration was relaunched a few years ago, and in 1989 at Cartagena the presidents of the member states decided to undertake this task themselves. As a result, a strategic plan for the future direction of the Andean Group was approved at Galapagos, in which were listed the steps considered necessary to strengthen integration and guide its development through the 1990s. This document sets out the objectives of consolidating the Andean economic area, improving GRAN's international relationships and renewing support for Latin American integration as a whole, taking into consideration also new aspects such as scientific and technological development, tourism, common foreign relationships and, naturally, the commercial, industrial, agricultural and service sectors.

In May 1990 at Macchu-Picchu the Andean Presidential Council was

created with the task "of evaluating, encouraging and guiding integration." The Macchu-Picchu meeting recognised the need for national economic policies which are compatible with the imperatives deriving from the integration process and for a common effort to obtain a reduction in the level of foreign debt. Moreover, it highlighted the risks connected with the unilateral initiatives of member states in the framework of the Initiative for the Americas and with bi-lateral economic co-operation and commercial liberalisation agreements among Latin American countries.

In November 1990, at La Paz, the presidents then decided to create a free trade area and apply a common external tariff, both by the end of 1991, so that the customs union would be operational by 1995. For the same deadline, GRAN also decided on a common agricultural policy and took steps to boost investments coming from outside the region. Finally, the presidents authorised the member countries to negotiate bi-lateral customs privileges with all the other members of ALADI and with the countries of Central America and the Caribbean, so that "by the end of the decade (that is, in 2000) there be established a free trade area throughout the entire hemisphere."<sup>24</sup>

Since 1992, however, difficulties arose when numerous countries decided not to undertake the consequences deriving from the adoption of the customs union and free trade area. The political events which took place in Peru, with the dissolution of the Congress by President Fujimori in April 1992 and Venezuela's subsequent decision to break off relations with this country have only served to deteriorate the situation. At Quito, in June 1992, Peru voted against the common external tariff, the liberalisation of regional trade and the harmonising of economic policies (despite continuing until April 1994 to sign a series of bi-lateral conventions with other countries which aimed at maintaining the existing commercial channels). Almost at the same time, Ecuador announced that it was in its turn unable to respect the deadline which had been set for integration, so that "towards the middle of the year, the above-mentioned events combined to lead the Andean Group into what some observers have considered the worst crisis of this association since its foundation, although others have regarded it more as 'a crisis of growth'."<sup>25</sup>

In July 1992, the new Ecuadorian President Sixto Duran Ballen imposed a pro-GRAN line on the policy of his own country, notwithstanding the reservations of certain national economic groups. This enabled the prospect of a way out of the crisis of Andean integration, and the launching on 1st October of a free trade area involving all the members except Peru.

At the end of 1993, INTAL was able to sum up this crucial period by stating that "the five countries of the Andean Group have responded to the national and regional crises by liberalising their economies, including with regard to foreign trade. The new Andean Group is conducting a policy of economic liberalisation at a sub-regional scale. The main features of this new strategy are the creation of a free trade area for goods, the formal adoption of a common external tariff which will soon be implemented and the liberalisation of trade among the member countries... Colombia and Venezuela have proved to be the countries with the highest rates of increase in intra-regional trade and they have given a new impulse to the process of reorganising the new GRAN.

Peru's involvement in this process has been marginal, even though it is to be hoped that she will participate fully in the free trade area in 1995."<sup>26</sup>

#### *Central American Common Market (MCCA).*

The first official policy statement of the Central American states in favour of their economic integration dates back to the spring of 1951. An initial treaty between Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador was signed in 1958 at Tegucigalpa, prior to the signing at Managua, May 1960, of the general treaty of economic integration between Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador, to which Costa Rica adhered in 1963.

The MCCA worked very well until the economic crisis of the 1980s (during which time regional trade was reduced by more than half, with an inversion of the growth trend starting in 1987) and political or political/military conflicts called its development into question.

In October 1989, the ministers in charge of Central American economic integration and regional development asked their advisors to elaborate a concrete proposal directed toward the "re-organisation, revitalisation and reinforcement of the Central American economic and social integration process."

Starting in 1990, more favourable conditions existed following the placation of the main breeding ground of regional tensions (Nicaragua), which made it possible to rebuild the national economies and re-launch integration. In June, the presidents defined their objectives and expressed their intention to "re-organise, reinforce and re-activate the integration process... by adjusting or re-designing its legal and institutional framework... and by encouraging its conversion to the new strategies of openness towards the outside and to the modernisation of the means of

production”<sup>27</sup> through a Central American Plan of Economic Action (PAECA). At Puntarenas in December, the same presidents called on the international community for help and re-affirmed the fundamental role of the Summit of Central American Presidents as the “superior decision-making and co-operative mechanism.”

In December 1991, at Tegucigalpa, the Summit analysed “the measures necessary for making human development more dynamic and for combating poverty” and decided to create the Regional Commission for Social Affairs. The Summit also stressed the need to involve the various social parties and groups in the integration process and to make the common external tariff rapidly effective.

Honduras, which withdrew from MCCA in 1969, signed an agreement with its partners, the first step toward its effective re-integration which took place in February 1992. Guatemala signed some bi-lateral free trade agreements with El Salvador, while Panama expressed its interest in “gradually joining the integration scheme.”

At the end of 1991, ten international and regional organisations, both public and private, were called on to give their opinion in a detailed document about the broad outlines of integration and on the steps along the way to the Central American economic community: re-organisation, reinforcement and re-launching of integration, transition towards the economic community with the harmonisation of economic policies and improvement of the mechanisms and tools of regional co-ordination; finally, the launch of the community, intended as a productive structure integrated at the regional level with a development model which provides for a just balance between the use of natural resources and the protection of the environment, while guaranteeing progress and the quality of life.<sup>28</sup>

In addition, it was decided to re-activate the Organisation of Central American States (ODECA) and, already in mid-1991, to approve a plan of action for Central American agriculture (PAC), while negotiations were conducted to create a free trade area with the United States within the framework of the Initiative for the Americas, and agreements among various Central American and other Latin American countries were signed.

In 1992, El Salvador and Nicaragua moved toward constitutional normality and the path toward pacification followed its course in Guatemala. Nevertheless, the region’s most serious problem remained the process of stabilisation and structural adjustment. Faced with the danger that Mexico’s adhesion to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) could damage Central America’s exports to Canada and the

United States and hinder the flow of investments coming from these two countries, the regional authorities were convinced that the MCCA could play a fundamental role in development. They therefore broadcast a vigorous message regarding the “social debt of the region” and on the need for further integration especially in the agricultural sector, stressing their will to widen the geographic area of MCCA with the integration of Panama and by inviting Belize as an observer to some of their meetings.

On the institutional level, the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN), which was established in Guatemala City in October 1991, with the support of the European Parliament, began to meet in the presence of the representatives of four out of the five member countries, while at the same time progress was made towards the creation of a common legal system, with the creation of a Central American Court of Justice and it was decided to launch definitively, from December 1993, the Central American Integration System (SICA), which had replaced ODECA in December 1991.

The agreement of Nueva Otopaque, in El Salvador, May 1992, reaffirmed the decision of the presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras to establish a free trade area, which was followed by the announcement of their intention to move towards political union and the creation of a federal state. Some months later, during the Panama Summit, a similar plan was proposed for the integration of the whole region, under the name of the Central American Republic,<sup>29</sup> but it was not possible to debate this project.

During 1993 the tendency toward integration was generally strengthened, although with different emphasis and at different speeds from state to state: while Costa Rica announced that, despite having signed the Guatemala Protocol in October 1993, it was not willing immediately to create a customs union with its partners (in financial and monetary matters, the Guatemala Protocol limits itself to affirming that “the integration must take place in a gradual fashion”), Nicaragua instead joined El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras to sign, in April, the Managua agreement, which looked forward “to achieving a customs and economic union as rapidly as possible” and “to work for a political union among themselves.”<sup>30</sup>

#### *Caribbean Community (CARICOM).*

CARICOM was created in 1973 through a treaty signed by Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, which were later joined by

other states in the region (Belize, Antigua and Barbados, the Bahamas, San Cristobal-Newis, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Monserrat, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines).

After a period of inactivity, from 1985 onwards the heads of state have demonstrated their willingness to re-launch integration, a willingness which went from strength to strength up until the beginning of the 1990s in the face of the challenges of the globalisation of the world economy and of the creation of great regional economic blocs: the single European market of 1992 and the North American free trade area. In 1989, with the Declaration of Grande Anse, Grenada, it was decided "to define the three basic instruments for creating a common market, as foreseen in the Chaquaramas Treaty: a common external tariff, common rules of product origin and a harmonised system of fiscal incentives."<sup>31</sup>

As is the case for all the other systems of Latin American sub-regional integration, the institutionalisation of the annual meetings of the heads of state has proved fundamental for saving the process from the fatal quagmire into which it had fallen for over a decade. At the same time, two further measures for gaining support were enacted: the East Indies Commission, made up of public figures, was charged with making proposals to the political authorities, and the Regional Economic Conference, which met for the first time at the beginning of 1991. At the same time, a study was begun into the creation of a parliamentary assembly, along the lines of a project ratified by six countries at the end of 1993.

The East Indies Commission has identified the objective of creating a common monetary authority and a single currency before the year 2000 and has proposed some institutional reforms. Even though not all the suggestions have been accepted, a Bureau has been established, and each member country has designated a minister to deal with issues relating to CARICOM. The heads of state have also accepted the principle of joint representation abroad, a strengthening of the secretariat, a charter of civil society and a supreme court.

At the end of 1993 the common external tariff gradually entered into effect among eight countries, while the others committed themselves to applying it in the near future; the rules regarding product origin came into effect in May.

With the aim of enlarging the area of CARICOM, the East Indies Commission also suggested in 1992 to start negotiations designed to create an Association of Caribbean Countries (AE Car), which would include the countries of Central and South America bordering the Caribbean sea, and also the extra-regional powers with interests in the

area, such as France, Holland, Great Britain and the United States. While the negotiations for the creation of AE Car seemed promising at the end of 1993, there remain however doubts as to the effectiveness of CARICOM itself, given its small population (5 million inhabitants distributed across 13 countries) and its limited economic activity.<sup>32</sup>

#### *Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR).*

MERCOSUR was the result of a process which began in 1985, when, after Argentina and Brazil returned to democracy, they signed the Declaration of Iguazó, which gave rise towards the end of 1986 to their programme of integration and economic co-operation.

These two countries decided in 1990 to create a common market which was to be definitively launched on 1st January 1995, and in March 1991 MERCOSUR was created, through the signing of the Asunción Treaty by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay.

The treaty provides for the free circulation of goods, services and various factors of production among the four member countries, the setting of a common external tariff and the adoption of a common trade policy toward other countries or groups of countries. The treaty states that, at the Latin American level, this should be considered "as a new step forward in the effort towards the gradual development of Latin American integration,"<sup>33</sup> and emphasises the need for MERCOSUR to assume an active role in the world framework, which is characterised by the creation and consolidation of great regional entities. In fact, this policy has been put into practice by the signing of a treaty with the United States and by contacts both with the EEC and Japan.

MERCOSUR's institutional organs are: the Council, which is its supreme political organ and is made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs, and the Common Market Group, its executive organ, which is composed of four permanent members and an equal number of second-rank members for each country, who are the representatives of the above-mentioned ministers and the central banks. Finally, the treaty establishes an administrative secretariat and a common parliamentary commission.

At the beginning of 1992 the Brasilia Protocol was adopted in order to solve disputes among the member states regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty; it provides for an arbitration tribunal which decides in the last resort without possibility of further appeals. Following this, with the aim of launching the various policies which should enable

the effective creation of a common market (programme of trade liberalisation, co-ordination of macro-economic policies, the definition of a common external tariff and the suppression of non-tariff barriers, sectoral agreements), meetings were arranged at the level of the ministers and presidents of the central banks and an internal set of rules was approved for the Common Market Group and the sectoral sub-groups contained within the latter group.

Following its appearance, MERCOSUR has had some success in serving as a magnet for other countries and in re-vitalising the Latin American integration process as a whole.

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The return of democracy, though not entirely stable, in the majority of Latin American states and the re-launching of the economic integration process provide the premises for the more ambitious objective of a real Latin American federation, which could become one of the pillars of a future federal world government. Yet in order to achieve this objective, which implies the overcoming of national sovereignty,<sup>34</sup> co-operative efforts among the governments are not enough. As the history of European unification shows, the governments tend to search for joint solutions which are compatible with the maintenance of sovereignty. It is for this reason that the role of militant federalists is important and crucial, since the federalists are a group which, holding the federation as their main objective, are able to avoid being trapped by the national powers and to indicate from time to time the correct answer to the problems of the moment, until the political objective has been reached.

It is therefore important that also in Latin America an independent and super-national federalist movement be re-established.<sup>35</sup>

Jean-Francis Billon

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Jean-Francis Billon, "Latin American federalism", in *The Federalist*, XXXV (1993), pp. 21-27.

<sup>2</sup> The author has studied the publications of the Institute for Latin-American Integration (INTAL) since its foundation up until 1993 and particularly its annual reports and journals, the most recent of which, *Integración Latino-americana*, is currently being re-organised.

On the subject of relations between Europe and Latin America see the publications of IRELA, *Instituto de relaciones europeo-latinoamericanas*, in Madrid.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Fernando Fainzylber, "Technical Progress, Competitiveness and Institutional Change", in *Strategic Options for Latin America in the 90's*, Paris, Ed. OECD, 1992, pp. 101, 140.

<sup>4</sup> INTAL, *El proceso de integración en América Latina y el Caribe en 1993*, Buenos Aires, 1994, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> INTAL, *ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>6</sup> José Maria Puppo, Director of INTAL, writes in the introduction to the Institute's report for 1993: "It must be noted that also the uninterrupted process of democratisation seen in recent years has been fundamental. The legitimacy of the governments made it possible to achieve some international compromises... In certain cases such conditions have been reached after political and military struggles that have seriously conditioned the integration process which the adhering countries have taken part in, and which have brought about dramatic delays in the development of their economic and social conditions." In the Preface to Antonio Toledano Laredo's book, *Intégration et démocratie* (Brussels, Editions de l'université libre de Bruxelles, 1982), which compares the European and Latin American integration processes, Jean-Victor Louis wrote that, "integration necessarily presupposes that the national interest is not held to be the supreme goal, or more exactly that the interest of each of the states which comprise the union can no longer be defended except within a framework of common interests. Regional integration among totalitarian states can not survive and progress since the structure of these states is in substance nationalist, and hence naturally in contradiction with the liberties that are the presupposition for opening up frontiers." Antonio Toledano Laredo has stressed the difficulties of the Latin American integration process, recalling that this sub-continent comprises "industrialised countries, democratic or otherwise, socialist countries, countries that are still far from having achieved industrialisation, countries that are exporters of petroleum and countries entirely without oil resources;" and pointing out that "the social, economic and political mix is in like proportion to the geographical extension and distances which are unheard-of in Europe," and that "the very expression 'Latin America' ... is not exhaustive, since although it includes the Spanish and Portuguese elements, in a word Hispanic America, it does not however bring to mind other Indo-American (and also Afro-American) elements, each of which represents a native or imported reality that constitutes, along with the former, a combination of cultures and traditions that is enormously rich."

<sup>7</sup> Miguel A. Ekmedjian, Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Buenos Aires, writes that, "the will to integrate is evident in the new Latin-American political class, which having put aside provincialisms and local disputes, has ventured onto the difficult path toward integration. This change of mentality is connected to the return of democratic governments in the great majority of the countries of the sub-continent, and is therefore a fairly recent phenomenon" (Miguel A. Ekmedjian, *Hacia la República Latinoamericana*, Buenos Aires, Ed. Depalma, 1991, p. 31).

<sup>8</sup> The Rio meeting of December 1986 was attended by Argentina, Brasil, Columbia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, all of which possess democratic governments; Panama was temporarily suspended from the group at the beginning of 1988.

<sup>9</sup> INTAL, *El proceso de integración en América Latina y el Caribe en 1990*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>10</sup> Miguel A. Ekmedjian, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

<sup>11</sup> Preamble to the Montevideo Treaty, in Miguel A. Ekmedjian, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19, which also cites a comparative analysis of the two Montevideo treaties: Raimundo Barros Charlin, "Análisis comparativa de los Tratados de Montevideo del 1960 y 1980", in *El*

*Derecho de la Integración en América Latina*, 1979-1982, a thematic compilation edited by Eduardo R. Conessa and Jorge L. Oria, Buenos Aires, Ed. INTAL, 3 volumes, 1983.

<sup>12</sup> Miguel A. Ekmedjian, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> Cf. INTAL, *El proceso de integración en América Latina y el Caribe en 1990*, *op. cit.*, p. 29, which states also that "on the occasion of the meeting at Ica in Peru, it was acknowledged that it was necessary to update the institutional structure of the strategies and to consider other ways to complete the integration process in the fields of communications, transport, scientific and technological co-operation and culture."

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> "The Caracas Declaration", in *ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>19</sup> INTAL, *El proceso de integración en América Latina y el Caribe en 1991*, Buenos Aires, 1992, pp. 11 and 230.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>21</sup> INTAL, *El proceso de integración en América Latina y el Caribe en 1991*, Buenos Aires, 1992, pp. 11 and 230.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 23-4; among other matters, there are cited various policy stands made by Chilean and Mexican leaders in 1992.

<sup>23</sup> Doc. ALADI/CM/VIII/dt 1/Rev 1/3.2.1994, cited in INTAL, *El proceso de integración en América Latina y el Caribe en 1993*, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>24</sup> INTAL, *El proceso de integración en América Latina y el Caribe en 1991*, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

<sup>25</sup> INTAL, *El proceso de integración en América Latina y el Caribe en 1992*, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

<sup>26</sup> INTAL, *El proceso de integración en América Latina y el Caribe en 1993*, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

<sup>27</sup> INTAL, *El proceso de integración en América Latina y el Caribe en 1991*, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

<sup>28</sup> *Acciones para la reactivación, fortalecimiento y restructuración de la integración y la inserción centro-americana en la economía internacional*, Guatemala, November 1991, cited in INTAL, *ibid.*, p. 160.

<sup>29</sup> Current Central American constitutions, with the exclusion of Costa Rica's, provide for, as did those approved following the Second World War by different European countries of the EEC, the renouncing of sovereignty under condition of reciprocity; that of Honduras even asserts that this country "is a state currently 'removed' from the federal republic of Central America."

<sup>30</sup> INTAL, *El proceso de integración en América Latina y el Caribe en 1993*, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

<sup>31</sup> INTAL, *El proceso de integración en América Latina y el Caribe en 1991*, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Wolf Grabendorff (director of IRELA), "European Integration: Implications for Latin America" in *Strategic Options for Latin America in the 1990's*, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-48.

<sup>33</sup> INTAL, *El proceso de integración en América Latina y el Caribe en 1991*, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

<sup>34</sup> Javier Villanueva, an analyst at INTAL, wrote in 1990 in the report on integration (p. 4) that "under the pressure of globalisation currently underway and of the need to adapt to new requirements in order to be able to join in co-operative processes and benefit from international financial flows and in a situation of limited possibilities for action and strategic

decisions, both due to their debatable effectiveness, and due to exaggerated demands for material improvements, the national state has become one of the key points of the changes to introduce in the next decade."

<sup>35</sup> On the subject of federalism, and Latin-American federalist movements which disappeared during the 1970s, see Jean-Francis Billion, "Latin American federalism", in *The Federalist*, XXXV (1993), pp. 21-7, and "The Movimiento Pro Federación Americana", in *The Federalist*, XXXV (1993), pp. 123-39.

## THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO PEACE

The atrocities committed in the civil wars of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda led the UN Security Council, first in 1993 and again in 1994, to promote the constitution of two *ad hoc* international tribunals responsible for prosecuting crimes committed in these two areas "in violation of international humanitarian law and those crimes which offend the conscience of the human race."<sup>1</sup> But the worldwide increase in episodes going against all respect for human rights has meant increasing demand for justice in world public opinion. Thus in the December of 1995 the United Nations General Assembly asked a Preparatory Committee to write a draft Statute for a permanent International Criminal Court, with the aim of calling a World Intergovernmental Conference by 1997. These decisions were greeted favourably by all countries (Italy has already offered to host the Conference in 1997) and by the majority of non-governmental organizations which, coordinated by the World Federalist Movement,<sup>2</sup> were in the forefront of demands for the institution of this Court. This battle is a significant example of the opportunities which are opening up for the federalists at world level to take the lead in initiatives that can bring together the major international non-governmental organizations. But, as in many crucial battles in which the transfer of a part of the sovereignty of the states is at stake, in this case in the judiciary field, one of the dangers to be avoided by the federalists is precisely that of letting their attention stray from strategic institutional objectives. The events of the last few years have shown how the battle to protect human

rights cannot be won by acting at national level alone. What could only be theorized at the outset of the battle for human rights is today beginning to become reality. A famous champion of the Rights of Man like Thomas Paine, a fierce critic of the systems of government of his time because they were almost all enemies of fundamental human rights, pointed to the American federal government as the first example of a government compatible with respect for human rights. Paine underlined also how a government based on human rights cannot fail to consider a “system of universal peace”. This point of view is still struggling to spread in the majority of human rights movements, but the federalist perspective of this battle now has a chance to enter the political debate. On this point it is worth considering some simple questions. In what sense can the creation of an International Criminal Court open new opportunities for federalists to act? Is the creation of such a Court to be considered a strategic objective in itself? Or has this battle an instrumental value only to the extent that it can bring out more clearly how maintaining national sovereignty is incompatible with respect for the value of justice?

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Two considerations may perhaps help us clarify the terms of the problem. The first concerns the ambiguity of wanting to set up a Court which punishes individuals, but which in reality, in the current situation, would be obliged to judge on the basis of an *a priori* distinction, not of a legal but of a political nature, between good countries and bad countries. The precedent of the Nuremberg Tribunal is emblematic. It was instituted on the basis of a political choice: the conquerors had to judge the conquered. And in fact, during the trial, whenever the lawyers defending the accused referred to possible crimes committed by the victors, the President of the Tribunal overruled their requests since it was not within that Tribunal's remit to investigate the activities of the allied powers. More recently, other episodes have highlighted this ambiguity. The difficulties which emerged following the arrest of two Serbian officials by Bosnian government authorities, and their referral to the International Court of Justice at the Hague on the basis of the Dayton Peace Agreement, have for example highlighted the dangers inherent in the exercise of a partial and casual justice, which is not really concerned with identifying and prosecuting those responsible for the countless crimes which accompanied the Yugoslav tragedy. In fact, apart from Mladic, Karadzic and their respective collaborators — already universally considered crimi-

nals — should not individuals such as the Croat Tudjman, the Serb Milosevic and even the Moslem Izetbegovic, who are by no means extraneous to what happened in the former Yugoslavia in the last few years, at least be investigated? But as heads of state were their actions not perhaps exercising the power they derived from the sovereignty recognized to them by the other nation-states?

In a much more peaceful context, the diplomatic incident which arose between Spain and Belgium, two countries of the European Union and of the common judicial area sanctioned by the Schengen agreements — in other words of the world's most integrated area in every respect — confirms the difficulty of exercising a penal action against individuals without having the appropriate institutions to regulate justice between countries.<sup>3</sup> These observations bring us to a second consideration. There is an irreconcilable contradiction between justice and the exercise of *raison d'état* by nation states. The latter, in the attempt to defend their own sovereignty at all costs, presume to administer justice at the international level in the same way as absolute monarchs administered it in their kingdoms. Bacon effectively stigmatized this *modus regnandi* thus: “Let judges be lions, but yet lions under the trone being circumspect that they do not check or oppose any parts of sovereignty.” These are the judges that sovereign states would like to have at international level. It need hardly be said that this is not due to any evil intention of the states themselves, but because the very existence of national sovereignty denies international justice, since it denies the principle of equality and liberty for the citizens of different states. This relationship between equality and justice has been well known since the time of Aristotle, who made very clear how “those who are neither free nor equal have no political justice in their dealings with each other, but a sort of justice called thus by analogy.” Justice, concluded Aristotle, exists only for those whose relations are regulated by law. It is law which guarantees both justice and equality simultaneously. At the international level therefore, the problem is precisely that in the final instance relations between states are not yet regulated by law. This problem, far from being resolved with the creation of the International Criminal Court, is, on the contrary, destined to crop up again and again, more and more obviously.

In a passage of the intervention at the United Nations General Assembly already quoted at the beginning, it was stated that “the European Union considers that an important characteristic of the Court should be that it is complementary to the national systems of penal justice.” In the preamble of the draft Statute for an International Criminal



Court drawn up in 1994, it was also specified that "being complementary is to be understood as the possibility of undertaking a judiciary action when national action shows itself impracticable or ineffective." This idea of complementarity would presuppose the possibility of legally judging the political choices of sovereign states. The identification of the guilty parties and of which criminals to prosecute would in fact continue to depend more on the balances of power within and between states, rather than on the judgement of the Court.

The expectations raised by the General Assembly's vote do not yet take sufficient account of these ambiguities and contradictions.<sup>4</sup> These expectations concern above all the attribution of autonomous power of initiative to the future judges of the Court, the capacity to bring suspects to justice, the definition of the principal crimes on which the Court could exercise its jurisdiction, and guarantees for the accused. But can these expectations be satisfied without the states accepting a general law governing them and the interference of an international police within their borders? Is it possible to win the fight to create an International Criminal Court without tackling the problem of creating an effective International Court of Justice above the States? An answer to these questions was already given by the historian Seeley more than a century ago: "I do not assert that such a court can never be established, simply because there has not yet been any example of it. But I point out that no presumption of its success can be drawn from the success of existing courts, since these courts have succeeded under widely different conditions... A judge, therefore, or bench of judges, cannot exist in isolation, but stands necessarily connected with other powers — a nominating power, a regulating power, and an enforcing power. But where all these powers meet — a power of nominating officers, a regulating or legislative power, a judicial power, and a power of executing sentences — there you have the complete organization of a State, and thus it is matter of demonstration that a State is implied in a law-court, and, as a necessary consequence, that an international law-court implies an international or federal State."<sup>5</sup> This declaration by Seeley is only apparently contradicted by the existence in Europe of a Court of Justice which, even without a federal union, has helped affirm the precedence of community over national law. In fact the European Court of Justice has acted and continues to act in a context in which, since 1945, the European states have renounced, or, more precisely, have been forced to renounce war, and have decided to start a process of supranational political unification which has not only gradually advanced but has by now reached a crucial point.

The constitution and the effectiveness of an International Criminal Court are therefore linked to the creation of a federal state, and once more raise the unresolved problem of the relationship between justice and national sovereignty, between the right to justice and the right to peace.

Over two centuries ago, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the French National Assembly for the first time affirmed the principle according to which the ultimate aim of every political organization must be the safeguarding of the natural and inalienable rights of man. These rights were identified as the right to freedom, the right to property, the right to security and to resistance to oppression. But the fundamental articles of the declaration were not limited to laying the foundations for the defence of individual freedoms. They also introduced the principle of safeguarding the freedom of nations, and pointed to the nation as the single true source of sovereignty. Regarding this point, during the debate in the French National Assembly the doubt was already raised that this double claim to freedom for individuals and for national groups of individuals contained the seeds of a dangerous contradiction. Indeed, some members of the Assembly noted that the Declaration of Rights should have been accompanied by a Declaration of Duties. The objection was not seriously taken into consideration, since it was observed that each individual right always implies a corresponding duty to guarantee the same right to all individuals. Thus the problem was not tackled of how it would have been possible to guarantee the same rights to the citizens of several free and independent sovereign nations, underlining how "the only causes of public misfortune and government corruption" are to be found in "the ignorance, neglect and lack of respect for human rights." The Declaration of the Rights of Man, by affirming the right of individuals to equality and freedom, but not to peace, therefore laid the foundations for claiming justice at national but not at international level.

As long as nationalism continued to embody the myth of the liberation of peoples and individuals, this limit was not perceived as an intolerable contradiction. Only recently, with the progress of economic, social, cultural and political integration on an international scale, has the nation state increasingly appeared an anachronistic and dangerous obstacle on the road to development and emancipation of mankind from the global dangers which hang over it. Thus a new era has opened in the fight for human rights. An era in which it becomes possible to finish the revolutionary battle begun with the Declaration by the French Assembly; an era in which it may perhaps become possible to translate into political action

Kant's intuition on the basis of which "the problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter is also solved."<sup>6</sup>

Starting from this Kantian point of view, it is possible to read the story of the peace movement and human rights movements in a new light, so as to finally show how the fight to abolish war and the fight to affirm human rights are two sides of the same coin.

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International action for the protection of individual rights initially developed in the last century in two situations where every respect for human rights was most obviously infringed: slavery<sup>7</sup> and war. The fight for the abolition of slavery, helped by the evolution of the mode of production which progressively marginalized the slave-trading economies, substantially reached its goals. In contrast, the fight to humanize war has proved impossible to win. It was after the Crimean War that the Geneva Convention of 1864 established the primary obligations with regard to combatants wounded in battle. The preamble of this Convention expressed the international community's concern over the fate of combatants as follows: "The inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and governance of the principles of the law of nations, derived from the usage established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of the public conscience." Evidently the Geneva Convention confused the fact that the nation state had succeeded in imposing law internally in order to abolish violence between individuals, with the simple aspiration to justice in relations between countries. It is incredible to observe how the voice of the majority of the leagues for peace and peace societies of the nineteenth century substantially agreed with the aspirations of the Geneva Convention, as indeed Seeley himself complained in the article already quoted. The affirmation of the fight to protect those human rights which are denied at the very moment war is admitted as a means to resolve conflicts between States, significantly coincided with the pacifist movement's progressive acquiescence on national ideology.<sup>8</sup>

Two factors contributed to the consolidation of this renunciatory attitude. On the one hand the absence of great wars in Europe for about forty years (from the Franco-Prussian to the First World War) was erroneously taken to mean the impossibility of further great wars in

Europe. On the other hand the rise of nationalism was greeted as a temporary, innocuous revindication of the rights of peoples. In the last century the movement for peace, on the basis of a mistaken analysis of the facts, therefore renounced really fighting for the value it championed, a renunciation which resulted in inaction at the outbreak of the First World War and an ambiguous existence after the Second.

The reasons for and the nature of this renunciation should be analyzed more thoroughly than is possible in this note. Suffice it here merely to mention how the problems of peace and the imposition of a law above the states are interwoven in the course of the debate, lasting over several decades, within the peace movement.

In the First International Congress of the Leagues for Peace and Peace Societies in London (1843), for the first time there were two opposing factions: the American delegates, who proposed the federal model, and the European delegates, who proposed the establishment of a Court for the Nations. At the Frankfurt Congress too (1850), two currents were formed, one Anglo-American and federalist, the other continental European and democratic, which saw peace as the final stage of the wars of national liberation. At the Congress of 1867, in which around 6,000 delegates participated (the grand Assizes for European Democracy), the pacifist movement approved the following programme: 1) the creation of the United States of Europe; 2) the realization of all revolutionary rights and principles, self-determination, freedom of conscience, the abolition of permanent armies, the abolition of racial prejudices, freedom of speech and association, the right to work, mass public education, and the harmony of economic interests in freedom; 3) the creation of an international organization capable of fighting to realize the present programme without regard to borders.<sup>9</sup> Very soon however there was a return to the divide between the American and the European positions. The American delegation at the Interparliamentary Conference (today Interparliamentary Union), which initially shared their international secretariat for some years with that of the pacifist movement, proposed the creation of a European Parliament, but without success. Thus after the Franco-Prussian War, the attention of the diplomatic services and of the national sections of the pacifist movement took a decisive turn towards the creation of an International Tribunal. But the Permanent Court of Arbitration, known as the Hague Tribunal, was no sooner established (1899), due to the efforts, among others, of the Interparliamentary Conference and the League for Peace, than its fragility immediately became obvious. At the outbreak of the Boer War the British Government

refused its arbitration and Salisbury's government declared itself not bound by the Hague Convention since the Boers were not among its signatories. The US and Great Britain never ratified the Treaty of Bilateral Arbitration. Later, in 1911, during the war between Italy and Turkey for the control of Libya, the Italian summits of the pacifist movement, instead of appealing to the Tribunal, sided with the Italian government in support of the invasion.<sup>10</sup>

The result was that on the eve of the First World War the pacifist movement was no longer even able to release a joint *communiqué* from its general headquarters in Berne because the Council was divided between supporters of the French cause and those supporting Germany. A movement of about two hundred sections, several thousand activists, and about twenty newspapers in over ten languages, dissolved just at the moment when it should have made its voice heard.

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If this brief and partial account of this experience has any meaning in relation to the choices which the federalists must make today, it probably lies in the confirmation that Hamilton's warning not "to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages," encamped on the front cover of this review, must also be valid for political movements. In the last century, and indeed in the first half of this century, the socio-historical situation was not yet ripe for the development of a battle for federation such as was to develop after the Second World War. The political forces and public opinion were mobilized by national and social questions, and not by themes of democracy and international justice. But, at least on the level of theoretical elaboration, the federalist current of the movement for peace lost the chance to denounce utopian pacifism openly, to point out the deeper causes of the war and the links between peace and justice. Today, as a century ago, the movement for peace, now ranged with the ecological and human rights movements, finds itself having to choose whether to take the federalist path or cede to the temptation to ride the ephemeral successes of internationalist chimeras. However, unlike a century ago, the ground is more fertile for cultivating federalist ideals in the growing number of energies disillusioned by the prospect of continuing on the path of simple international cooperation. No-one can now realistically believe that individual human rights can be protected by justice without overcoming the dividing line between an association of sovereign states and a federal government. For the Federalist Movement

therefore there is a historic opportunity to play an avant-garde role in this phase of the unification of the human race.

*Franco Spoltore*

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Intervention by the permanent Spanish representative at the United Nations (30th October 1995).

<sup>2</sup> See also the intervention by Fergus Watt, "Global Governance and Global Citizenship", in *The Federalist*, XXXVII (1995), pp. 198 ff.

<sup>3</sup> In the course of these events the Belgian government accused France, Spain and the United Kingdom of having made it impossible to reach a European agreement on what meaning to attribute to the term "political criminal" for acts of terrorism. For its part, the Spanish government hoped that an agreement would be reached in a bilateral or multilateral context.

<sup>4</sup> A sufficiently detailed description of these expectations is found for example in the article "Challenges Ahead for the United Nations Preparatory Committee Drafting a Statute for a Permanent International Court", by Christopher Keith Hall, in *Amnesty International UK Lawyers' Network Newsletter*, Supplement, N. 21, 1996.

<sup>5</sup> John Robert Seeley, "United States of Europe" (1871), in *The Federalist*, XXXI (1989), p. 177.

<sup>6</sup> Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose", in *Kant's Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, tr. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 47.

<sup>7</sup> During the eighteenth century in Great Britain and in the United States, especially due to the initiative of the Quaker movements, there was a campaign to sensitize the governments to the problem of slavery. In 1787 an Anti-Slavery Society was founded in Great Britain and the following year saw the establishment in France of the *Société des Amis des Noirs*. The British Society succeeded in bringing its demands to Parliament: in 1807 the slave trade was forbidden in all British territories. Only in 1841, with the Treaty of London, did the other European governments recognize the right of every signatory state to block any ship involved in slave trade. In 1890, when the majority of countries, including the USA, had abolished slavery, the Treaty of Brussels established the obligation to abolish the slave trade between signatory countries, creating a system of international supervision to ensure that this obligation was respected.

<sup>8</sup> See Sandi E. Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism — Waging War on War, 1815-1914*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991.

<sup>9</sup> The Assembly took place under the chairmanship of Giuseppe Garibaldi, and Victor Hugo vigorously maintained the need for a United States of Europe. In the next congress Hugo abandoned this slogan in favour of social revolution.

<sup>10</sup> The leader of the Italian movement at that time was Teodoro Moneta, who epitomized the contradictions in which the peace movement was struggling. He was a supporter of

national independence in the insurrection of Milan against the Austrians in 1848. He then sided against the French in 1867. As leader of the Lombard Union for Peace, the most important Italian section together with the section in Turin, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1907. When Italy began to flex its own political muscles, amid the disconcertment of European pacifists Moneta did not hesitate to enter the field actively in favour of the Italian invasion of Libya against Turkey, and of Italy's right to conquer an empire for itself in North Africa.

## Thirty Years Ago

### THE STRATEGY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE \*

MARIO ALBERTINI

The strategy of the struggle for Europe must be defined in terms of the ultimate objective. This objective consists of the bare minimum necessary to ensure the irreversibility of the unification process and its gradual expansion to the whole of Europe, that is, of a European federation which will include at least the six countries that have assumed the leadership of the unification process. It is therefore necessary to examine the nature of the decision to establish the European federation.

*The problem of a favourable attitude.*

The first observation to make is that the decision to establish the European federation represents the most serious decision that can be taken in the realm of political activity, since it implies the foundation of a new state in a new geographical area, in other words a decision which will determine the destiny of the inhabitants of numerous countries for many generations to come.

To the extent to which the states of Western Europe will remain democratic, this decision can only be taken by the individual national governments. However its exceptional nature is such that the governments, granted that they want or must take this decision, will be able to do so only with a maximum amount of political backing. As far as the parties are concerned, this means with the blessing not only of those parties in power, but also of those in opposition, except for national oppositions to the democratic regime itself. As far as the general public

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\* This article was published in French in *Le Fédéraliste*, VIII (1966).

is concerned, this means with the approval of all the citizens of all the countries involved (who will therefore feel themselves to form part of a single, though pluralist, people: a people of nations), except for numerically and morally insignificant fringe groups.

This consideration alone already enables us to exclude the possibility that the strategy of the struggle for Europe can be brought to fruition by means of a political party, albeit a federalist one. By definition a party divides the people of a country, whereas in order to take this decision it is necessary to achieve a common platform among the citizens of all countries.

Secondly, the decision to establish a European federation is not only extremely serious, but also very complex. This is due to the fact that, as we will see below, a favourable attitude towards the European federation does not necessarily imply the capacity to take the initiative to found it and to turn this sentiment into a concrete intention. As a consequence, a favourable attitude contains a certain ambiguity (one can be in favour of something without manifesting a real will) and anyway represents only a necessary, but not alone sufficient, ingredient in the European strategy. For this reason, we will deal with the problem of a favourable attitude and the issue of initiative separately.

The attitude of the governments and the peoples towards the European federation is conditioned by both ideological and historical factors.

#### *The ideological factors.*

The ideological factors are comprised to a greater or lesser extent of the doctrines of the political parties and groups, that is, of the great ideologies which dominate the world of politics and which provide the values and the criteria that stimulate and channel political activity in today's Europe. It is not necessary to demonstrate that in politics, liberalism, democracy, socialism, as well as Christianity are without doubt in favour of a European federation at an ideological level, whatever the changing consciousness of individual people may be in this regard. These are forces that without this objective, intended of course as a stage toward the universal affirmation of their values, could not even exist. There can be no doubt on this point. Their values can neither be limited to a single country without being demeaned, nor can they be diffused outside their country without the federalist principle. For such reasons, these forces have always professed federalist principles, albeit in a confused fashion (primarily the confusion of federalism with internation-

alism) and with peaks and troughs that have been determined by historical events.

On the contrary, nationalism (nationalism as a real doctrine, not as a sentimental attachment to one's own country), fascism and communism are opposed to federalism. In fact, communism becomes incoherent when it refutes the European federation (as a stage towards the world federation), not only because by doing so it contradicts what it has always asserted during the years of its formation, but also because unless the barriers among nations are overcome it will be impossible to achieve the world-wide emancipation of the proletariat. It is anyway a fact that, from the moment of the decision in favour of socialism in one country, communism has sided wholeheartedly, and indeed with pride, for the intransigent defence of national sovereignties; and that, in Western Europe, it has reiterated this position even with regard to European unification. Nevertheless, it is necessary to distinguish on this subject between political leaders and their voters. National sovereignty, which is defended by communist leaders only in terms of the requirements of international communism, does not in any way correspond to the interests of communist voters, and in practice has not destroyed their heart-felt belief in the traditional ideal of the brotherhood of all workers existing over and above the states, a sentiment powerfully expressed in the slogan: Workers of the world unite!

These observations are valid both for the governments and the peoples and they demonstrate that on an ideological level the political backing does exist. All parties are in fact in favour, excepting the national oppositions to the existing regime, as is the whole population, bar insignificant splinter groups. It goes without saying that the favourable attitude at the ideological level will not be turned into political action until such time as suitable historical circumstances arise, and may even be dampened down if the historical circumstances are unfavourable. In reality, ideological backing means nothing more than that there are no insuperable obstacles.

#### *Historical factors.*

The element which shows up the overturning of the historical situation of Western Europe (and which is present, embryonically, behind the oppression also in Eastern Europe) lies in the fact that military conflict between France, Germany and the other European countries has become totally inconceivable. This situation has been acknowledged by all

sensible people, but its real nature can not be understood until it is appreciated that this means that the national states, considered individually, no longer fulfil the fundamental role of guarantors of security, that is, they are no longer states in the true sense of the word, they no longer control the destiny of their citizens. In order to eliminate the mental associations linked to the national terminology of the past, which hinders an understanding of the current situation, it is necessary to describe the new situation with tailor-made expressions that clearly indicate what is about to come to an end and what is about to start in its place. The following expressions would appear suited to this task: the nations have remained sovereign, but we are witnessing the connected phenomena of the decline of national sovereignties and the development of European unity.

The meaning of these expressions becomes clear immediately their connection with another fact is appreciated, a fact which likewise is as universally acknowledged as its consequences are misunderstood. And it is this: at the current stage of development in the European productive process, the dimension of the great problems of foreign, military, economic and social policy have reached a "supernational" dimension, that is, a dimension that is superior to that of the European states, which are typical nations with a unitary concept of sovereignty along the lines of the French model (in this regard it is worth recalling that the United States and the Soviet Union are rather more than simple nations: they are federations, however imperfect, that is to say political communities which, thanks to the duplication of the sovereign representation, can unite different national communities and reach continental dimensions).

The consequences are as follows. The biggest problems, since their size has outgrown the states, can no longer be solved within the states themselves. Theoretically, they can only be solved within a European framework. In practice, since no European political power exists, the problems end up being only imperfectly solved within the limits of the imperfect unity that is compatible with maintaining the formal sovereignty of the states. Nevertheless any unitary solution to these problems, however imperfect it may be, alters the situation such that when new problems arise, their solution requires an even greater degree of unity.

This is the logic of Europe's post-war history, from the Marshall Plan to the present day. This practical logic, which will lead us from one level of unity to the next until federation is achieved, has so far found its most important and advanced expression in the Common Market. The Common Market can not be explained without taking into consideration the

decline of the national sovereignties. For as long as the states had to concern themselves individually about security, they were compelled to nurture their own power in relation to the strength of their neighbours; and for this reason to control trade with their neighbours to the extent that this could decrease their power. With the end of this requirement was removed the obstacle preventing the enlargement of economic areas, which is unstoppable in the long run since it corresponds with the expansion of production and our life sphere, from manifesting itself also in Western Europe and from reaching a degree of realisation equal to the degree of de facto unity.

### *Democracy in the sphere of European unification.*

However, it is important to elaborate to what extent this logic has generated in the past and may generate in the future a favourable attitude to the European federation not only at an ideological level, but also a practical one. To this end, it needs to be kept in mind that this logic has confronted, and continues to confront the parties and national governments with the following alternative: either to accept the policy of European unification, in order to solve, albeit for the time being imperfectly, the major problems; or to restrict themselves to national policy pure and simple, and thereby agree to leave the biggest problems completely unsolved. It is sufficient to note that such an alternative consists of a choice between maintaining and developing democracy or eliminating it (democracy can not survive if it proves unable to resolve the great problems of domestic and international policy), in order to appreciate that the parties whose future is linked to the fate of democracy, as well as being in favour of federation at an ideological level, can not but be simultaneously in favour of the policy of European unification at a practical level. To refute the European unification process means to opt for the politics of defeatism, of not solving problems in order to exacerbate the situation. It goes without saying that this policy can only be followed, as in fact has happened, by national oppositions to the existing regime, and particularly by the strongest ones, namely the communist parties. This is not to say that their electorate follows them blindly on this subject; rather, the contrary is true. The communist parties can no longer mobilise their electors against the European union, and will certainly not be able to mobilise them in future against the decision to establish the European federation democratically.

At this point, the problem of the ambiguity of a favourable attitude

becomes clearer. It is in fact possible to state that the democratic parties are favourable to the construction of Europe, but it is not possible to argue that they have shown, at least up until now, the definite will to establish the European federation. It is a matter of fact that such an initiative has not arisen inside any party, as we will see in more detail below. This does not alter the fact that great opportunities in this respect are created by the reality that all forces which should support this decision (the democratic parties in power and in opposition and nearly all citizens) have been brought into the sphere of European unification and can not exit from it.

This situation has become a permanent fact of political life. The nationalism which has developed anew in recent years is unable to change it. This nationalism depends on the recovery of the states, but the recovery of the states depends in turn on European economic unity, that is, on a fact which specifically denies nationalism, which prevents it developing fully and which will end up by destroying it.

#### *The problem of initiative.*

Also with regard to this subject, it is necessary to analyse the positions of the governments and the people together, rather than separately, since the same fact, comprising the power situation and its evolution, conditions both the former and the latter. However, before dealing with this specific point, it is useful to take a look at the relationship between the gradual formation of the will to take this decision and the development of European integration. No alternative exists if the goal is to remove any possible misunderstandings.

1. *European integration and federal initiative.* As soon as the states of Western Europe resumed a minimum of international activity in the aftermath of the war, they found themselves immediately caught up in the European unification process, which had been launched by the United States through the Marshall Plan. Nearly twenty years have passed since then, and major progress, especially during the period of the Europe of Six, has been achieved. In order to evaluate this progress better, it is sufficient to compare the aftermath of the First World War with that of the Second. As regards economic development, social integration, the political situation in Germany and its relationships with the democratic states, and so on, the policy of European unification, by replacing the old policy of division, has radically modified, and in some vital sectors actually revolutionised, the situation in Western Europe.

It is undeniable that the gradually advancing unity has enabled us to

achieve some impressive results. Precisely for this reason it is important to point out that the gradual unification in the realm of the economy and regarding co-operation among countries has absolutely not been matched by an equal degree of progressive unification regarding the formation of the will to take the initiative to create the European federation nor, and it is as well to emphasise this point, concerning the evolution of the political struggle. The transfer of the most important decisions in foreign and economic policy from the national spheres to the European one, despite some vacillation, is continuous and progressive, such that even the price of cereals is now established at the European level. Yet during this period the life of the parties and the political struggle have not budged an inch, continuing to be restricted to the national spheres. From this point of view, we remain at the starting line.

To the extent to which this point is not understood, it is thought in a mechanical way that the decision to create the European federation is simply the last step in the progressive series of steps that comprise European integration and is not considered to be a separate event. Yet it is sufficient to appreciate that the gradualism in the economic sphere and in co-operation among governments does not correspond to a similar gradualism as regards the formation, inside the parties, of the will to found the federation, to understand that the final step represents instead the need to resolve a power problem, and that this is a problem that is helped but not solved by the integration currently underway.

The past confirms and rounds off this interpretation. At the end of the Second World War it would have been possible to create a federation in the western part of the European continent. The United States was in favour, the resistance movements were for the most part Europeanist, the national military, bureaucratic and industrial interests were debilitated, the people were in favour in a virtual sense, and the problem was open to a solution; the issue was to establish a new order for Europe. Yet the political class then in power, instead of lining up in support of unity, passively rebuilt the national divisions of the past without even realising that there existed the opportunity to overcome them. The opportunity existed once again with the EDC treaty, which by eliminating the armies of the states and creating a European army, posed the problem of a European government. The EDC treaty, signed by six governments and ratified by the parliaments of Germany, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, remained a possibility from 1952 to 1954 and was finally voted down in France by a handful of votes, even though for the whole of 1953 there had been a majority in favour of the EDC in the French parliament,

and while Italy, by not ratifying it in spite of being predominantly in favour, had done nothing to speed up the French decision. This shows that European integration is not a linear process but rather a zig-zagging one, that is, a process which can arrive various times at the point where it is possible to take the decision to found the European federation, yet never exploit it.

2. *The power aspect of the federal initiative.* From the power viewpoint the decision to found the European federation signifies the transfer of control over the army, currency, and a portion of tax revenues and so on from the national governments to a European one. Put more precisely, this entails the transfer in a general sense of foreign and military policy, and of part of economic and social policy, from the national states to a federal state. From this, it follows:

a. That this decision can not be gradual. Many people believe that the decision to create the federation need not in reality be taken as a once and for all decision, since it is simply a matter of achieving it step by step. Yet above all else it is evident that an army can not be controlled partially by the national governments and partially, though to an ever greater extent, by a European entity which does not yet have the character of a real government. The transfer of the armed forces from the national governments to the European one will either happen in a single step, in the very moment when the European government itself is created, or it will not happen at all. Moreover, this is true not only for the army, but also in a general way for the economic and social policy of the federation's competence. In order to transfer these matters, it is necessary also to transfer the "sovereignty" at issue (this means, in an empirical sense, the possibility to take in the last resort the supreme decisions in the spheres defined by a constitution): but the "sovereignty" can not be separated from the electoral reality, which in turn can not be gradually transferred but only handed over in a specific moment.

b. That a tendency to take these decisions will not arise spontaneously within the governments. The obstacle does not solely consist of the fact that the passage from a national system to a federal one is disadvantageous for the parties, since it signifies the elimination of political positions (one head of state rather than six, and so on), the reduction of important parliamentary seats (a single parliament which deals with foreign policy rather than many), and the reorganisation of the parties themselves. The major obstacle lies in the fact that the tendency to take this decision and the general attitude of the parties will diverge for as long as the national power remains stable. In this case the future of the parties

depends exclusively on their ability to govern or provide an opposition, that is, and this is the most significant point, on how much they manage to achieve (or manage to generate the hope that they will be able to achieve) inside their own country in the realms of foreign, military, economic and social policy.

This is what is at stake in their manoeuvrings, this the basis of the creation of their political will. European integration drives the parties toward an acceptance of the idea of federation, but the political process, election by election, forces them to declare what their own country will do in the fields of foreign, military, economic and social policy, that is, precisely the opposite of the proposal to hand these competences over.

c. That this decision can only be taken in a supranational European centre and that the governments can support it only in the event that the national power is in crisis. The first point does not require explanation. It goes without saying that a supranational political movement, if it is really such, in other words if it is not dependent on national elections, becomes stronger precisely to the extent to which it demonstrates such a capacity. The second point instead needs some clarification, and this requires a purely typological examination, in which the notion of a crisis of power implies exclusively a lack of power, without necessarily an artificially dramatic consequence and without any consideration as to how crises of this kind may have evolved historically. It is a fact that in the event of a crisis of the national power, the main problem for the parties ceases to be that of exercising power and becomes instead that of the creation of a new power. Now then, it is true that the idea of a European power, since it is foreign to the habits and the established positions of the parties, can not therefore be spontaneously formed in their midst, yet it is also true that they could easily accept it were it suggested to them from outside, because a European power would be stronger, more democratic and less subversive than any other power formed at the national level as an alternative to a previously existing democratic power. This requires of course that the European power be organised in perfectly democratic terms, so as to gain sufficient force to resolve the crisis through the participation and the support of the people. This formula can be none other than that of the constituent power of the European federal people, since there exists no other way to recognise the right of Europeans to decide the nature of the federation for themselves than through a constituent assembly.

The above has brought to light the two essential features of the European strategy: the crisis of the national power and the action of a



supernational vanguard capable of taking the initiative to demand the European constituent assembly. It is now time to examine them.

The *crisis of power* is not an uncertain, far-off and unpredictable fact, but rather it is already evident in embryo. No state on the European continent has established a stable democratic order since the French revolution. Political life has been repeatedly interrupted by crises of regime. Even nowadays, the crisis of the state represents one of the fundamental features of political life in Western Europe, so much so that not only the experts, but also the political forces themselves, are everywhere faced with, alongside the normal problems of government, the specific problems of the constitution and regime. Though more evident in France than elsewhere, this phenomenon is generalised.

It is superfluous to demonstrate that the crisis of the state is a premise to the crisis of power. It is instead necessary to identify its nature. The parties try to solve the former within the national framework without taking European integration into account, without realising that it radically modifies the functioning of the states or understanding that it is the cause of the crisis. The crisis of the states and European integration are two aspects of the same phenomenon. The same fact, the dimension of problems, sets both of them off. The irresistible trend toward European unity is due to the fact that the problems of government (defence, foreign policy and the economy) have taken on a supernational dimension. Yet precisely this fact is provoking the fatal decline of the national states, their crisis, and in the long run the crisis of their power. Ultimately, European integration represents the process of overcoming the contradiction between the scale of the problems and the size of the national states. For this reason, to the extent to which European integration advances, it also moves forward both the crisis of the national states' power and the creation of the alternative at the European supernational level.

Despite the fact that few people realise it, there can be no doubt about this. The advance of European integration creates day by day a pluralistic European society, that is, it destroys the very foundation of the national states, which is the exclusive national society. This nevertheless involves the preparation of a specific moment of transition, rather than a gradual transition, not only because there can be no gradual passage from national sovereignty to the federal one, but also because through the formation of a large-scale economy European integration restores an apparent vitality to the exclusive national powers, prior to demolishing them. In practice the crisis will evolve according to the following mechanism. For as long

as the states face European-scale problems for which co-operation among themselves is sufficient to provide a joint solution, that is, matters which remain within their capacities, they will retain some power. Yet when they will face European problems for which a joint solution requires a European government, they will suddenly find themselves powerless. This point is of great interest since it demonstrates that the crisis, despite being the driving force behind the process of creating the federal government, could develop externally in a thoroughly normal fashion. It is a matter of fact that in such cases the governments would face this alternative: either to avoid the problem (or simply appear to solve it), or to create a European government in order to solve it. In other words, there will appear within the normal political process a possible supernational trend, and in exceptional cases there will be presented the opportunity to found a European government, provided that the federalist vanguard, strengthened by the circumstances, will be able to make the governments accept the solution of the problem that corresponds with the creation of a European government, even if this European government were to assume a constituent form only at a later date.

Such a situation has already come to pass with the issue of the European army; and it will reappear between 1967 and 1969. The end of the Common Market's transition period will pose the issues of the currency, customs and European economic policy. Likewise, the expiry of the North Atlantic Treaty will pose the issue of a new defence system for Europe. This concerns problems which specifically can not be solved without a European government. In theory, they can perhaps be postponed, though this is uncertain, through an enlargement and a temporary dilution of European integration, yet they can not be laid aside for ever, since they are inherent in the nature of integration itself. Therefore the crisis is inevitable, even though its evolution is also partly dependent on human will; in this specific case, on the governments' proposal to maintain a structure of six countries and on the capacity of the federalist vanguard to keep up the fight.

It needs also to be pointed out that, in the event of a severe crisis on account of a lack of responsibility by the governments, the crisis will not necessarily emerge at the same time in all countries. Nevertheless if, as is likely, the crisis strikes France or Germany first, and if the federalist vanguard immediately and everywhere channels the crisis toward the European constituent assembly, it will be enough for the French or German government to ask for the constituent to be summoned in order to avoid a disaster in their own country, for the crisis of power to be set

off also in all the other countries and for them to line up in favour of the European alternative.

The *federalist vanguard* represents the theoretical and practical consciousness of the European nature of the fundamental political alternative. As a specifically theoretical awareness, it is founded on the theory of federalism and on the demystification of the nation. Nationalists, both genuine ones and opportunists (such as the communists) claim that no popular entity can be created beyond national ones, and hence not even a democratic European power. In order to expose the nationalists, it is necessary: (a) to demonstrate that the real characteristic of nations is no more than a spontaneous phenomenon of a territorial (one's own birthplace) or cultural (a common language) nature, and absolutely not the non-existent racial unity of the French, Italians, Germans and so on (the ideological fiction for justifying the closed, exclusive and tendentially monolithic nature of the national state); (b) to identify clearly the popular organism which is being created through European integration: the European people, which represents the meeting of the spontaneous European nationalities (a pluralist, federal people).

As a specifically practical awareness, the federalist vanguard signifies opposition to the community, which is different from the typical opposition to governments or regimes since, instead of refuting a particular government or regime, the federalist vanguard rejects the national community as an exclusive political community. Only at this point does the decision in favour of a European federation abandon the vagueness of good intentions to become a definite will, a real and effective political attitude, that is, a daily relationship with the power structure. Those who do not aspire to this level operate inside the framework of the management of the exclusive national powers, even if they sincerely desire European unity, and therefore perceive only the events which maintain the national framework. Those who instead reach this point, that is, those who act to destroy the exclusive national powers, put themselves in a position to observe also the events of European integration that are undermining the national powers, creating at the same time, through a de facto unity, a de facto European power, and can exploit such events politically.

This exploitation, namely the opposition to the community, is not easy. Its negative aspect, the rejection of the exclusive national power, is evident, yet its positive aspect, the struggle to transform the de facto European power into an established, democratic power that is entrusted

to the people's will rather than to the blind force of events, is complicated. A power which has not yet been constituted remains invisible. In the case in point, only by analysing the situation in a rational way is it possible to distinguish, behind the facade of European integration, what will constitute this power: the European people in-the-making. On the other hand, an as yet unconstituted power does not make any decisions, that is, it neither favours nor damages any immediate interests: it remains outside the balance of these interests and hence also outside normal politics. For this reason, those who fight for the European power seem to be fighting for nothing. They can not organise immediate interests, nor exploit the possibilities of the existing balance of forces, but must act only with the aim of introducing a new element into this balance in order to create an opportunity that would otherwise not exist. Since they propose the constituent assembly (a solution that will always remain outside the realm of reality until the very moment of the crisis), they are able to fight only thanks to the contradictions of the normal political process, which presents problems that normal politics is unable to solve.

As we have seen, the major political and economic problems can not be satisfactorily solved in the sphere of the national states. Therefore, in periods when such problems arise, those who fight for the European power can join the battle alongside those who seek a real solution, whereas in periods when, in order to resolve problems with its imperfect means (the national governments and European co-operation), normal politics contents itself with imperfect and precarious solutions, the supporters of the European power must instead withdraw from the battle, denounce the compromise and constantly lie in wait for those who remain in the national framework. That is all. The commitment to the real solution of these problems coincides with the gaining of awareness of the European nature of the political alternative, that is, with the strengthening of the federalist vanguard and with preparing the initiative to decide in favour of creating the European federation. Compromises based on precarious solutions or the continuous fleeing forwards into an illusory future, represent a persistence with the national way.

#### *The foundation of the European federation.*

A struggle of this type, because of its practical and intellectual difficulties, can only attract a small portion of those people who regard the contradiction between events and values as a personal matter which concerns them. Yet these people are enough. As long as the problem

which will set off the crisis remains distant, the issue is simply one of survival, of entering and exiting the political balance with a flexible tactic that aims at building political fronts and of organising what already exists in the heart of the people, the European aspiration (diffused Europeanism), so as to have a popular platform ready at the decisive moment. Organised Europeanism (the MFE etc.) is sufficient to achieve this goal. Moreover, as this problem approaches and the European nature of the political alternative will become easier to understand, many of the above-mentioned type of people (organisable Europeanism) will end up embracing the federalist cause. And this will be a sufficient base for lighting the fuse of the decision to found the European federation. As in any technically revolutionary enterprise, the crisis of power, "with its high conductivity of ideas," will do the rest. In this situation the watchwords corresponding to the need for power will "produce by themselves thousands of channels."

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**The Federalist**  
**EDIF**  
**Via Porta Pertusi 6**  
**I-27100 Pavia (Italy)**

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Direttore responsabile: Mario Albertini - Editrice EDIF - Autorizzazione  
Tribunale di Pavia n. 265 del 13-12-1981 - Tipografia Pi-Me, Pavia - Spedizione  
in abbonamento postale 50%.

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YEAR XXXVIII, 1996, NUMBER 1