


THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

Hamilton, The Federalist




THE FEDERALIST

a political review

Editor: Mario Albertini

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by a group of members of the Movimento federalista europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



The Federalist is published under the auspices of the FONDAZIONE EUROPEA LUCIANO BOLIS by EDIF, via Porta Pertusi 6, 27100 Pavia, Italy. English language editing: David Riggs. Three issues a year. Subscription rates: Europe 55000 lire or 35 \$; other countries (by air mail) 70000 lire or 50 \$. A three-year subscription (150000 lire, 100 \$ or 200000 lire, 120 \$ respectively) is also possible. All payments should be made by cheque or Eurocheque directly to EDIF.

YEAR XXXVIII, 1996, NUMBER 2

CONTENTS

<i>The End of Politics?</i>	p.	71
SERGIO PISTONE, <i>The Club of Florence and the Intergovernmental Conference for the Revision of the Maastricht Treaty</i>	»	76
JEAN-FRANCIS BILLION, <i>The World Federalist Movements from 1955 to 1968 and the European Integration</i>	»	96
NOTES		
<i>Internationalism and education</i> (Silvia Sandrini)	»	119
FEDERALISM IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT		
<i>Dante Alighieri</i> (Antonio Padoa-Schioppa)	»	133

The End of Politics?

Many people argue nowadays that the state, intended as the organisation of a people on a territory for the pursuit of the common good, has entered irreversibly into a crisis. The process of globalisation is held to be *undermining the territorial basis* of human relationships, and removing an increasing number of functions from the state, transferring them to regional groups with weak institutional structures and to international organisations of a functional nature. At the same time, it is argued that the state is being replaced by a complex of global *networks*, through which, by means of the circulation of information, and the realisation of transactions and trade in services, interests of an exclusively sectorial nature are promoted, which will no longer find in politics, and in particular in democratic institutions, a moment of mediation. According to this view, together with the state, the very idea of legitimacy would be obliterated, to be replaced by a muddle of rules from different sources and contradictory in their content, which would mark the beginning of a sort of second Middle Ages for humanity, starting in its most advanced part. Institutions, as concerns their responsibility for pursuing the common interest, and borders, as the territorial demarcations of the exercise of sovereignty, would be replaced by an undefined situation of the *diffusion* of power, in which there would tend to disappear every unique and exclusive point of reference for consensus and every border between territorial areas in which relationships among citizens can be organised along precise rules.

This trend, it is argued, would be accompanied by an apparently opposite one, which would compensate for the indifference of the former trend regarding collective values and the social and cultural uprooting which it would bring about. This second trend is represented by an exasperated stress on real or presumed “community” identities, of an ethnic, religious or cultural nature, whose purpose would be to restore to individuals the sense of belonging to a group that is united by deep ties, and that is able to give each of its members the awareness of creating with

the others a “we” that sets everyone free from the anxiety of loneliness and from the dizzying sense of responsibility. This is held to be the common denominator of the religious fundamentalisms which exist in some Third World countries, the closed communities that are undermining the unity of American society, the micro-nationalism of the separatist movements of Eastern and Western Europe, and the sects which flourish in all parts of the world. Yet these movements born in reaction to globalisation reveal in practice the same features of the trend which they believe to be opposing: and in fact they have no precise reference to a territory (and this is also true for the micro-nationalist movements which, because of the transient and contradictory nature of the “ethnic” pretensions they refer to, work exclusively as factors of disintegration for existing state structures and not as agents for the creation of new state structures); they do not even bother to consider the problem of elaborating their own idea of the common good, but confine themselves to fomenting the exercise of violence by stimulating instincts of a tribal nature; and they are therefore in their turn indicators of a serious crisis of politics and democratic institutions.

Therefore, on the one hand, the global information society, by its *de facto* overcoming of the state as the natural framework of the political debate with regard to the promotion of the general interest, would repress all dialogue which was not confined to the exchange of data for the promotion of particular interests; while, on the other hand, the development of the “community” phenomenon, in its various aspects, would deny the very legitimacy of the idea of the general interest, by subordinating it to the violent assertion of “identities” whose nature is unclear and which are unable in their turn to communicate.

Out of this would arise an ambiguous situation of “neither peace nor war” (since only a sovereign state based on a specific territory can guarantee peace and make war), but in which the disappearance of the very ideas of sovereignty and the common good would be the premise of the development of a widespread and generalised violence, which would be as (if not more) destructive than war among the states, and which would co-exist with the sterile and impersonal reality of the global information networks. In this way, we would be heading toward the *end of politics*.

* * *

In reality, behind the seeming objectivity of this forecast, these

theories hide a very real rejection of politics and the state, a resignation to the progressive transformation of man into being the tool of his tools, the abandoning of any semblance of will to submit history to the control of reason, and the conscious option for chaos against all forms of peaceful and democratic order.

It is significant that these insidious trends, albeit in moderate and attenuated forms, are gaining currency also in pro-European circles, or at least in circles close to Europeanism. Many people tend to fall back on the idea that the construction of Europe is not a political problem but a technical one, which will not render the democratic mobilisation of citizens necessary, nor lie at the heart of damaging contrasts between different conceptions of the common good. The litmus test of this attitude is the strong resistance to recognising that the construction of Europe will bring about the *foundation of a new state*. It is this resistance which explains the definition of the European Union by one of its foremost champions, the eminent European Jacques Delors, as “an unidentified political object.” And it is this same resistance which underpins the widely-accepted theory, according to which in the case of Europe, the traditional opposition between confederation and federation would no longer have any reason to exist, since, in its definitive form, the European Union will represent a totally new political formation, which will be neither one nor the other. In this way the problem of sovereignty is made to disappear as if by means of a conjuring trick, since it is not ascribed to the national states (as would be the case if the Union were to become a confederation) nor to Europe (as would be the case if it were to become a federation). Yet along with sovereignty, the last point of reference of consensus, the bond represented by the awareness of belonging to a single community of destiny, and therefore the very idea of citizenship, are made to disappear. The logical conclusion of this tendency is the eclipse of politics as the pursuit of the common good and the end of democracy.

* * *

The federalists must be rigorous on this point. The Europe we are fighting for is a *federal state*. Its creation will therefore bring about a *transfer of sovereignty* and a radical change in the internal and external balances of power of the states that will be involved in it. Its realisation will undergo major opposition and will involve a hard and difficult struggle, whose consequences it would be useless and irresponsible to try and avoid with purely linguistic tricks.

This definition of our objective presupposes the belief that the current phase of the globalisation process, which has made it possible to think of scenarios such as that described above, marks without doubt a period of crisis for politics. Yet equally that this crisis is not the crisis of the state *tout court*, but of a historic form of state: the national state. Therefore the crisis of politics is not definitive and is not removed from the remedial intervention of conscious human will. Moreover, the United States of America has demonstrated that the federal organisation of democracy on a continental scale has been possible since the end of the 18th century. There is no reason why not to believe that the same thing should be possible today, first in Europe and then in other regions of the world, until the achievement of a world federation. Similarly, there is no reason not to believe that mankind, instead of abandoning itself to the brutality of tribalism, should be able, albeit through a long and difficult process, to organise co-habitation peacefully over a range of differently-sized territorial communities, in which all people can re-gain a deep sense of belonging based on the civil commitment of everyone to the solution of common problems according to the rules of democracy.

Certainly, in addition to its peaceful side, the state has a bellicose one as well. Where the state exists, there exists *raison d'état*, with the conflicts that this brings about. And the path towards the world federation remains long. Therefore, we must not forget that the creation of the European federation will be the beginning, and not the end, of a process, and that Europe will have to interact with other great continental formations, which will probably also progressively adopt a genuine federal nature, and each will have its own interests to defend in a context that will lack any mechanism for legally solving disputes. It is true that it will be possible to achieve federalism only on a world scale, and that its entrance into history will tend to render unstable any intermediate state formations, by keeping alive the flame of world federal government and limiting the excesses of *raison d'état*. In the same way it is foreseeable that the balance that the European federation will help to establish, also thanks to the constant increase of interdependence and to the generalisation of the awareness of the collective nature of security, will be more peaceful and stable than the current one, and that the division of the world into a few great federal blocs will strengthen that embryo of world government which is represented by the United Nations. Yet it is also true that awareness advances slowly through history, that the ties of interdependence which have always united the states among themselves (even if in different spheres and with different degrees of intensity in different

historical situations) have never prevented wars, and that therefore any perspective of improving the world balance after the creation of the European federation does not authorise us to disregard Kant's lesson that peace is the state, and that the establishment of perpetual peace presupposes the creation of a world federal state.

The Federalist

The Club of Florence and the Intergovernmental Conference for the Revision of the Maastricht Treaty

SERGIO PISTONE

1. The report which the Club of Florence¹ published shortly before the opening of the intergovernmental conference for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty (IGC-96), which took place in Turin on 29th March 1996, represents one of the most thorough and systematic contributions to the debate on the decisions facing the European integration process in the current phase. All the crucial issues are considered and, by virtue of its thoroughness (even though in my opinion the text contains, alongside some very convincing arguments, also some significant weaknesses), the critical analysis allows us to take stock of European unification and can help to clarify some of its fundamental aspects.

The report's central thesis is that IGC-96 is now facing challenges to the very existence of Europe: the decisions at IGC-96 will either lead to radical institutional reform in a federal sense or the way will be opened up to the collapse of the European integration process and a return to the hegemonic temptations of the past.

Above all, there exists the challenge of economic and monetary union (EMU). On the one hand, the start of the third phase of EMU, albeit without the participation of all member states at the outset, represents the essential condition for completing the single market (which will remain structurally unstable as long as there are independent national monetary policies) and for guaranteeing economic development which is not polluted by inflation and the degeneration of the welfare state, but founded on a currency that is stable because controlled by an authority independent of the national and European political structures and founded on sound finances. On the other hand, progress towards the single currency must be accompanied (if we seek to avoid its certain failure) by

the parallel implementation of some decisive common macroeconomic policies and by a consequent increase in common finances. This is essentially to guarantee more substantial social and economic cohesion between strong and weak countries, so as to avoid that the enormous problem of structural unemployment be dealt with by diverging national employment policies that will have a disruptive effect on economic and monetary integration, and to allow the European Union to guide Europe toward recovery in a world economy which is ever more dynamic and competitive. Therefore the planned transfer of sovereignty at the European level in the monetary field must be accompanied without delay by the overcoming of the unanimity principle in the field of macroeconomic policy (particularly regarding fiscal and budgetary matters).

The EMU issue is closely connected to the issue of internal security. The abolition of all controls at internal borders for goods, capital, services and people renders the achievement of effective co-operation regarding home and justice affairs a necessity which can no longer be delayed; were this not to be implemented, the maintenance and/or re-introduction of controls at internal borders would become inevitable, and would represent a most dangerous setback to the progress so far made in the single market. On the other hand, the Maastricht Treaty's provisions regarding internal security seem utterly inadequate to the authors of this report, such that the radical revision of these provisions is one of the inescapable conditions if the drives toward re-nationalisation are to be prevented from overwhelming the economic integration process.

Beyond the challenge of implementing EMU, and the related issue of internal security, the European Union currently faces the vital challenge of external security, now particularly topical following the dissolution of the bipolar system. The collapse of the Soviet bloc has brought about the end of the cold war and the related threat of large-scale military aggression, and has opened up great opportunities for the spread of democracy and economic efficiency; yet at the same time it has produced a power vacuum which has permitted ample room for the drives to nationalist disintegration to develop. The Balkanisation phenomena which have occurred in Central and Eastern Europe and in the ex-USSR now threaten the security of the European Union both directly and also, very dangerously, indirectly, due to the disintegrative effects that the transfer from East to West of millions of refugees and immigrants may produce (and, I would add, also the nationalist contagion).

The Club of Florence argues that it is possible to respond effectively to this challenge by operating on two different levels. On the one hand it

is necessary to enlarge the European Union quickly to include the countries of Central and Western Europe (in addition to Cyprus and Malta), so as to extend to this area the implications in terms of economic, social, and democratic progress and stability, which the integration process has brought about in Western Europe. Nevertheless, passing from fifteen to around thirty member states would clearly create a totally ungovernable situation under the current institutions; hence, every further enlargement must definitely be preceded by thorough institutional revision. Moreover, it is necessary to achieve a genuine common foreign and security policy, in order to allow the European Union effectively to help prevent and pacify inter-ethnic conflicts and develop and stabilise the region of the ex-USSR.

A genuine common foreign and security policy must be rapidly implemented also because the end of the permanent state of emergency which was the cold war has decided the United States to give priority to their own domestic problems and to reduce drastically their commitment in Europe; this development implies that NATO will have to be reorganised, a change which will hinge on a decisive strengthening of its European component. Furthermore, only a European Union which is able to act effectively at the international level will be able to play its part with regard to threats of global significance, connected to religious fundamentalism, the spread of poverty, demographic trends, migratory pressures, and the crisis of the environmental balance, and therefore give its vital contribution to the diffusion, in an increasingly interdependent world, of those achievements in terms of welfare and peace which have been made possible in Europe by the supranational integration process.

The radical institutional reforms in a federal sense of the European Union proposed by this report are also considered, finally, as a very urgent response to the crisis of legitimacy that the European unification process has been going through for some years now, the seriousness of which was highlighted in particular by the difficult ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty. Since, as all opinion polls demonstrate, public opinion demands a Europe which is run along more transparent and democratic lines and which is at the same time more effective and receptive to the problems that are held to be priorities, such as unemployment and internal and external security, only steps toward federalisation would seem able to provide a response to these expectations, while conversely the option to favour an intergovernmental system based on the unanimity principle would simply lead to decision-making paralysis and hence to an irreparable split between public opinion and the construction of Europe.

2. On the basis of this generally well-founded vision of the decisive challenges that face the European integration process, the Club of Florence proposes specific institutional reforms that are defined by two guiding principles. First, there is the option of an immediate and rather decisive qualitative jump in a federal direction with regard to the community pillar of the Maastricht Treaty and a more cautious and gradual approach concerning instead the overcoming of the purely intergovernmental procedures in the second (common foreign and security policy — CFSP) and third (co-operation in home and justice affairs) pillars. Second, the report stresses that the institutional reforms needed by the European Union must be directed toward greater democracy and greater effectiveness, yet should not be conceived of as being designed to create a centralised European super-state. This means reinforcing the dual legitimacy of the Union, that based on the will of the states and that based on supranational democracy. Therefore, though the latter will have to be organised on a federal basis, it must not replicate the legitimacy of the national institutions at the community level and hence a federal Europe must not turn itself into a supranational state, which would inevitably undermine the rationale of the national states and hinder the creation of a pluralist democracy at the European level. On this subject, the report's authors argue, it is worth noting, that one should not talk of a European constitution, but rather of the "Charter of the European Union", since the idea of a constitution is generally linked to the idea of a state, and hence such a term would add to the worries of those who are already afraid that the European Union will end up supplanting the states which comprise it.

Regarding the specific proposals, I will discuss only those concerning the first and second pillars of the Maastricht Treaty, which seem to me to be the most significant, limiting myself with regard to the third pillar to pointing out that the recommended reform is one of gradual and partial insertion of this pillar into the Community's institutions.

The reform aspects of the community pillar which are worth highlighting are as follows.

As regards the Council of Ministers, the report proposes the generalisation of majority voting, specifying that the double majority principle (of the states and the people) must be introduced, that the qualified majority must normally be two thirds, and that furthermore there should be provision for a super-qualified majority of three quarters for certain matters such as fiscal issues, the Union's finances, the nominations that have to be made by the Council or by "common agreement" of the member states (as in the case of the Commission), the admission of new

states, and the revision of treaties.

With regard to the European parliament, the main issues are: the full implementation of the co-decision principle with the Council regarding legislation and its relationship with the Commission, the introduction of a standardised electoral procedure, and the setting of an insuperable limit of seven hundred members as concerns the increase of Euro-MPs linked to the forthcoming enlargement of the Union.

Turning to the Commission, the main proposal, both for functional requirements as well as in the perspective of enlargement, is that the number of its members (twelve or fifteen) be related to its responsibilities and not to the number of states, and that therefore the principle that each state must have at least one commissioner be abandoned. This innovation, already planned for the board of governors of the future European central bank (which will have six members in a Community of fifteen member states), should also be applied to the Court of Justice and the Audit Office. Second, the report argues that in spite of the need to strengthen the powers of the European Parliament, the Commission should not become fully responsible to Parliament, since the maintenance of a fairly high degree of autonomy by the executive with regard to the Parliament would seem a more functional institutional balance in a highly decentralised federation that is based on the dual legitimacy of the state and supranational democracy. For this reason, it is recommended that the Commission be politically responsible not only to the Parliament but also to the Council (which, moreover, would make the fact that not all states have their own nationals in the Commission more acceptable) and that, as a result, motions of censure be regulated by procedures similar to those adopted for appointments to the Commission.

Finally, as far as the Community's administration is concerned, the report argues that this should not be enlarged substantially in order to avoid growing toward a centralised super-state; rather, co-operation between the European administration and the national administrations should be improved, since in the majority of cases the latter have the task of putting into practice the decisions that are taken at the Community level. The basic instrument recommended for improving co-operation between the Community's administration and the national ones (avoiding that the principle of decentralising to the national administrations be called into question, yet also that their independence does not result in practices that may endanger the single market) is the establishment of specialised Community agencies, on the model of the European Environmental Agency, that will be dedicated to guaranteeing the compatibility

of national policies (establishing procedures to inspect and evaluate them) with Community regulations and thereby ensuring their efficacy while avoiding the creation of excessive bureaucratic burdens.

Turning to CFSP, the Club of Florence's most significant proposal is to create a special commissioner responsible for these matters, to be nominated by the European Council in agreement with the Parliament and the president of the Commission. This commissioner would be a full member of the Commission, yet personally answerable to the European Council and not subject to the collective discipline of the Commission, so that the commissioner may enjoy a completely free hand in relationships with the national capitals. This proposal is an integral part of four further innovations, which are: the introduction of a majority decision-making system, accompanied by an opt-out clause; the establishment of an analysis and planning body under the joint authority of the Commission and Council; the introduction of the principle according to which the representation of the political aspects of foreign relationships are the preserve of the president of the Council, who, however, will be backed up by the European commissioner responsible for CFSP, so as to offer foreign representatives the stable point of reference which is currently lacking; the reform of the Council's current six-month rotating presidency, by introducing a collective presidency of four countries per annum and organising the annual groups of the presidency in such a way to ensure a balance between large, medium and small states.

The discussion of CFSP is rounded off by some suggestions of considerable interest on the matter of defence. Here, the argument starts from the correct observation that European defence can not in the current phase be constructed within the framework of the WEU, which has favoured enlargement to deepening, and not even within the framework of the European Union itself, since many member states are presently unwilling to grant the Union powers in the field of defence. As a result, the only way that can lead to real progress is held to be that of co-operation on specific practical issues, including the use of *ad hoc* treaties and agreements, among those countries that are willing to proceed effectively to construct the European pillar of NATO. In substance, this involves taking the experience of relations between the OEEC and EEC in the 1950s as a model. When it was decided to move on from a proclamation (through the creation of the OEEC) of principles regarding the need for economic integration, to concrete action, the result was the creation of the EEC, which, starting from an initial group of six members, has progressively been extended to the majority of European countries.

The fundamental practical initiative directed to constructing gradually but effectively a European defence is identified in the creation, on the basis of a specific treaty among the countries that are willing, of a European armaments agency, which would be responsible for organising the production of material, excluding nuclear arms, for equipping the armies of participating countries. This body should be provided with a common budget and be endowed, through a three-stage development plan, with structures similar to those provided in the Maastricht Treaty for EMU. Alongside the formation of the armaments agency, the creation of integrated military structures should be carried forward, by developing initiatives such as the founding of the Euro-corp (which already brings together troops from France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain), the decision by France, Italy, Spain and Portugal to create multinational forces, the co-operation in the fields of training, operations, communications, intelligence, and so on. The final outcome of these initiatives and developments should be at a certain stage the creation of a political structure that is able to decide on the employment of the integrated forces and the arms which have been produced in common. However, the report's authors consider it presently premature to make precise predictions about the structures and characteristics that this body should have and argue that, given that the achievement of common defence is still far off, it makes sense to confine ourselves to identifying the first steps to be taken, which nevertheless should be put into effect without delay. Moreover, if we link the affirmation, expressed in this context, according to which defence is one of the cornerstones of the very concept of the state with the argument that the construction of European unity is not destined to give rise to a supernational state, it can be inferred that the report's authors do not foresee, even in the final stage of a common European defence structure, a real transfer of sovereignty similar to that provided for in the economic and monetary sectors.

3. With regard to the institutional reforms (whose most significant aspects have been examined above) proposed by the Club of Florence and in particular the guiding principle behind them, I would express a generally positive judgement yet with some reservations. I fully agree with the distinction made between the radical federalist reform applied to the Community pillar and the more cautious and gradual approach proposed for the second and third pillars. In fact, in the field of EMU, that is, the completion of economic integration, it is not only necessary, but also politically feasible, to achieve a qualitative leap in a federal sense in

the near future. What specifically is at stake here is the definitive implementation of the single market (with the formidable interests that are by now involved), which absolutely requires not only the federal management of a single currency, but also federal and democratic decision-making mechanisms in the field of macroeconomic policy. As a result, the suitable strategy must be to concentrate energies on this objective and avoid excessive commitments on fronts that are at present secondary and which will only serve to weaken the force of the main offensive.

Certainly, for the reasons highlighted in the report, some more limited but effective achievements also in the sectors of CFSP and internal security are now indispensable. Yet in these cases we do not face turning-points that are so pressing and tangible as to offer real opportunities (unless sudden qualitative changes in the present situation arise) to overcome the resistance to an effective transfer of sovereignty. If therefore a more cautious attitude in these sectors is more advisable for the moment, in order not to reduce the pressure on the decisive front, on the other hand it would seem evident that the realisation of a real transfer of sovereignty in the economic and monetary field (difficult but possible in the near future, provided there is an adequate commitment) would bring about the irreversibility of European unification and so would open up the way to a transfer of sovereignty in the immediately following phase also in the sectors covered by the second and third pillars.

Hence, also in the case of defence, which is a fundamental aspect of foreign and security policy, there would end up being a transfer of sovereignty, even though the Club of Florence seems to exclude it. In fact, a situation in which there existed on the one hand a single currency managed by a supernational authority and a system of European economic government able, among other things, to decide the size of the budget by majority vote (albeit and rightly a super-qualified one) and, on the other hand, a common defence with common armaments and integrated troops, yet with each government having the right of veto over the use of its own troops, would become rapidly unsustainable. The equality of rights and responsibilities, and the solidarity expressed in the economic and monetary fields would not be compatible with the inequality of rights and responsibilities and the lack of solidarity in the military field. It will only be possible to escape from this contradictory situation (in which the countries engaged in military actions would inevitably demand economic compensation from the militarily uncommitted countries, creating obvious potential for argument and disunity) by returning to

intergovernmental practices in the economic and monetary fields, or by extending federalism also to defence (including obviously nuclear armaments, to the extent to which they will continue to play a role in military defence). That the second hypothesis seems definitely the more likely, depends not only on the fact that the creation of EMU will enormously strengthen the interests in favour of furthering integration, but also on the introduction, if the institutional reforms supported by the report are put into practice, of a system of treaty revision based on majority voting (albeit super-qualified) and no longer based on unanimity.

While, with this clarification, it seems to me possible to agree with the reform strategy proposed by the Club of Florence, it seems to me equally possible to agree with the option in favour of a highly decentralised federalism founded on the principle of subsidiarity. This option, as seen above, is expressed in particular by the preference for a lean supranational administration and, consequently, a limited budget, in the very important role ascribed to qualified and super-qualified majorities, and in the principle of the dual responsibility of the Commission with respect both to the Parliament and the Council.

The refusal to prescribe a dominating role for the European Parliament in the Union, which is expressed in this latter suggestion as well as in others, corresponds to the just requirement to avoid that the present situation of imbalance in favour of the body which represents the interests of the individual states (a situation which has negative implications for efficiency and democracy) is replaced by an imbalance in favour of the organ called on to pursue the interests of the whole — which would lead to serious centralising dangers. Above and beyond this specific aspect, the anti-centralising concerns of the Club of Florence seem in general fully justified, considering that if the integration process is not halted and hence will gradually extend to the borders of the CIS, it is destined to result in a federation of more than half a billion inhabitants (600 million, if Turkey is also included). In such a broad community with such profound internal differences (also in cultural terms) a centralised form of federalism, along the lines of existing federations, would prove a clearly inadequate system of government and would end up fatally producing reactions toward disintegration.

That said, it seems to me on the other hand that the rejection of an overly centralised European Union is off the mark when it goes as far as to deny that the institutional reforms proposed in the report have as their ultimate objective the creation of a supranational state. In fact, the Club of Florence is proposing a European Union which is endowed with a

centralised monetary policy, government powers in the strategic sectors of economic policy, and the responsibility of guaranteeing a common defence which, in spite of being initially based on a confederal mechanism, is destined for the reasons mentioned above to develop into a fully federal system. In other words, it is proposing that the European Union inherit the fundamental tasks which were previously the exclusive competence of the national states, which, nevertheless, should not disappear but rather continue to carry out important functions, albeit more limited ones, in the context of the new order.

Yet this means precisely creating a European federal-style state, that is, according to a fundamental and ever valid precept of federalist doctrine, a state of states. The affirmation that we must consolidate the dual legitimacy of the state and democracy and not construct a supranational state is therefore entirely unconvincing and may even introduce dangerous ambiguities, to the extent to which, taken literally, it seems to make a distinction between the state and democracy, while these two concepts are held to be strictly inseparable by western liberal and democratic thought.²

If it is necessary to stress that the federal reform of the European Union means progressing in the direction of a federal European state, it is also necessary, returning to consider again the valid aspect of the Club of Florence's anti-centralising concerns, to point out that the creation in Europe of a new type of federal state, one that is markedly more decentralised and "lean" than the federal models realised up until now, is not only a requirement but also a practical possibility, since there exist particularly favourable conditions.

First, it is important to bear in mind that in a post-industrial and increasingly globally interdependent world, two fundamental factors that have historically decisively encouraged the development of centralised states, and which have involved also federal states, are generally tending to become less important. On the one hand, the development of the post-industrial society tends to undermine the relevance of the class struggle, which encouraged centralism, both because by making a sense of belonging to a social class prevail over all other forms of social solidarity industrial societies hindered the establishment of strong bonds of solidarity in regional and local communities, and because the policies of social reallocation (implying, among other things, a major increase in state budgets) induced the strengthening of the central power. On the other hand, growing global interdependence, which is connected to advances in science, technology and communications, tends to weaken the central-

ising drives deriving from *raison d'état*, intended as the primacy accorded to the requirement of external security with respect to every other objective pursued by the state. It is true that the policy of external security has constantly favoured state centralisation (and its particular development in countries whose strategic situation is least favourable), in as much as it is an essential instrument of defence in an anarchic international system in which conflicts among states are settled in the final instance by resort to force. Yet it appears equally clear that national external security policies now historically face the vital need to overcome violence in international relations and to deepen international co-operation in qualitatively new terms on a global scale, so as to face up to challenges which are endangering the very survival of the human race. In other words, we are witness to the historical tendency of different *raisons d'état* to converge, which, while it encourages the processes of regional integration, starts to pose the problem of supranational integration on a world scale (regarding which the end of the cold war has eliminated a fundamental obstacle), and as a result is mitigating, as stated above, the drive to centralisation arising from the policy of external security.³

The European integration process needs therefore to be analysed within this general context, yet it is equally necessary to stress how the more general anti-centralising factors result, in the European case, in specific favourable conditions. In particular, it should be pointed out that a state has yet to be created at the European level and therefore there is no need to overcome the inertia of a consolidated state tradition, as well as the equally important fact that there exists a national, cultural and social pluralism in Europe which has no equal elsewhere. For these reasons, there exist here certain premises that are much more positive than is the case for example in the US, to construct a strongly decentralised federal model. Once again, Europe, if it is capable of resolutely pursuing the path toward its own unification, will be able to act as a path-breaker for the rest of the world.⁴

4. The Club of Florence does not limit itself to proposing a qualitative leap in the institutional structure of the European Union, but is equally aware that this requires, in turn, a qualitative change in the method of institutional reform. Also in this case, in my opinion, the report's specific proposals contain, alongside certain convincing features, some striking inconsistencies.

The fundamental defect of the procedure for the revision of treaties set down in article N of the Maastricht Treaty (previously article 236 of

the EEC Treaty), which has until now always been observed, is correctly identified in the principle of unanimity. This procedure, which obliges the pursuit of compromises based on the lowest common denominator, has not so far prevented significant steps from being achieved in the process of European integration. The report maintains, however, that faced with the need to achieve a qualitative leap in the institutional sphere, so as to avoid the European Union's disintegration, the unanimity principle can not but lead to disastrous results. This prediction, above and beyond any theoretical arguments supporting it, has a very solid basis in the implications which emerge from the positions that the various European governments have adopted with regard to IGC-96. These confirm the existence of basic differences among the Fifteen regarding the very concept of the Europe to be constructed and, in particular, the fundamental split with the British government which is opposed to any kind of reform in a federal sense. In this light, the Club of Florence argues the issue is to overcome the unanimity principle not only in the re-vamped institutions which should emerge out of IGC-96 (and which should also provide for decision-making by super-qualified majority as regards institutional reform), but already in the conference itself, by establishing (unanimously, of course, as is prescribed by article N) the adoption of a method which will prevent individual states from hindering those states willing to do so from making substantial progress and which at the same time will not oblige reluctant states to follow the decisions of the majority.

In practical terms, this means above all that if the fifteen member states do not agree on the institutional reforms that are effectively suited to the tasks to be faced, it will be necessary to apply the differentiation method much more widely than has so far been the case, creating (within the European Union, which would continue to exist among all the Fifteen and any future members) a vanguard group which will lay the foundations of a real political community. Such a community could be established even by a minority of states in the European Union and would be open to future entry by states that are presently unwilling to join. The political community should be founded by those states which accept the institutional reforms that are indispensable for effectively pursuing the three priorities identified by the Maastricht Treaty: economic and monetary union, which implies the close co-ordination of fiscal and budgetary policies (and, therefore, a strong supranational economic power to balance the European central bank in the monetary field); a common foreign and security policy, to be rounded off in future by an integrated

defence system; and the strengthening of co-operation regarding internal security matters.

As regards specifically EMU, the report specifies that the states wanting to take part in the final stage, but which are unable to do so at the outset since as yet unable to meet the economic and financial convergence criteria, should be at once closely associated to the functioning of the political community, by asking them to undertake a dual commitment: that of submitting themselves to the common discipline as soon as they are able to satisfy the pre-set conditions, and that of adopting without delay the measures necessary to join the vanguard as rapidly as possible. Those states which, on the other hand, though possessing the right qualifications, do not desire to take the qualitative leap foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty will be given the possibility to join the political community as and when they wish to do so, provided that they accept the rules of the game and the further achievements made up until that time. In the meantime, it is possible to foresee forms of co-operation limited to certain sectors, such as in the case of the armaments agency, which may be of interest to Great Britain.

Concerning the institutions proposed for the functioning of the political community, the solution presented by the Club of Florence is based on the model of EMU in its final stage, which essentially provides for the participation of all the states of the European Union at the consultative and examination levels, yet avoiding the possibility to block the wishes of those states which will take part in monetary union and, consequently, in the federal mechanism of the European central bank and the European system of central banks. In short, the result should be a single institutional system, yet one of variable geometry, which will link all the states of the Union to the activities of the political community, while avoiding however that the directly interested countries run the risk of having their rules of behaviour dictated to them by the others. The essential points are as follows: the Court of Justice and the Commission will operate both at the levels of the Union and the political community without differences in the internal decision-making procedures, but the rule will have to be introduced by which the Commission, with regard to the political community, will have a non-exclusive right of initiative and the Council will not need to be unanimous in order to modify the Commission's proposals; as regards the Council, every time that the competences of the political community are called into question, there will be an exchange of opinions among the representatives of all the member states, but the right to vote will be restricted to those states that

are members of the political community, in similar fashion to what is already foreseen for monetary union; in Parliament, the measures relating to the most integrated core will be discussed in plenary session, with the possibility of adopting a consultative opinion, while, on the contrary, in the final vote, only the votes of parliamentarians elected in the member states of the political community will count.

According to the Club of Florence, in addition to the large-scale application of the differentiation method (which has nothing to do with the British option of a "Europe à la carte" since it is founded on the creation of a magnetic core with federal aspects), the unanimity principle must be superseded also concerning the ratification of the results of IGC-96. Taking inspiration from article 82 of the draft treaty of European Union, approved in 1984 by the European Parliament on Spinelli's initiative, it is proposed that ratification be provided for by a super-qualified majority, comprising four fifths of the entire population (Spinelli's draft treaty provided for an absolute majority of states and a two thirds majority of the Union's population), and the right of non-ratifying states to withdraw from the Union and become associated states, on the model of the European Economic Space.

The other fundamental defect of the procedure contained in article N is identified by the Club of Florence (and also in this case absolutely correctly) in its limitation to a diplomatic negotiation, which excludes the systematic involvement of public opinion and, therefore, of the parties and the organised manifestations of civil society in the drawing up of the plans to revise the treaties, and instead puts forward to the (parliamentary or referendum-based) procedures of national ratification pre-packaged results, which must either be accepted or rejected *en bloc*. If we consider the experience of the difficult ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the legitimacy deficit which besets the European integration process, and the fact that what is at stake is a qualitative leap at the institutional level, then the application of the traditional diplomatic procedure to IGC-96 means the planning of its failure.

In order to avoid this outcome, the report suggests, in similar fashion to what is foreseen for the unanimity principle, to anticipate at least partially in the current phase of institutional revision those principles of democracy and transparency which will have to become the norm for the institutions that will be created by IGC-96. In practical terms this means: inviting a delegation of the European Parliament to attend the meetings of IGC-96 at the ministerial level, so that it can express its opinion promptly on the different reform projects; keeping the national parlia-

ments constantly informed as to the progress of the intergovernmental negotiations, so that they can use their opinion to influence the evolution of the negotiations themselves; summoning the European inter-parliamentary "Assizes", that is, the joint meeting of the representatives of the national and European parliaments, along the lines of the meeting that took place in November 1990 in Rome, shortly before the start of the two intergovernmental conferences that drew up the Maastricht Treaty.

5. These proposals, which aim to overcome the fundamental defects of the procedure provided for in article N, are headed in the right direction yet, in my opinion, do not go far enough.

Starting from the overcoming of the unanimity principle, I am absolutely convinced that the variable geometry institutional system which is proposed harbours very serious problems as concerns implementation due to its complexity; moreover, this would further reduce the transparency of the Union's activities, a situation which already seriously weakens the current institutional framework.⁵ Such a solution would be difficult to manage and highly unstable, and therefore bound to evolve rapidly either toward a system of Europe *à la carte* along purely intergovernmental lines, or toward the adhesion by all the states to the political community with federal aspects, or else toward the creation of two concentric circles, that of the political community and that of the associated states, without common institutions. The ideas of the Club of Florence relating to variable geometry can therefore be appreciated essentially in terms of an attempt to explore all avenues before breaking with the British government, an outcome which the British government itself would be definitively responsible for.

That said, the fundamental weak point of the discussion as concerns the superseding of the principle of unanimous reform is to be identified in the assumption that the governments opposed to reforms in a federal sense will be willing, despite the fact that article N recognises their right of veto, to accept the creation of a federal core within a Union that would essentially preserve its current institutional nature, and even to accept the principle of ratification by majority voting together with the automatic withdrawal from the Union of those states which do not ratify. If we take into consideration the unambiguous policy declarations of the British government (which moreover serve as a convenient alibi for other less explicit governments), the expectation that there will be a unanimous decision to renounce unanimity has in fact no realistic basis; it is instead decidedly more likely that there will be agreement on very weak compro-

mises that will be absolutely unsuited to preventing the danger that the dynamic of European integration be brought to a grinding halt. There will be real opportunities to avoid this outcome only if the governments belonging to the vanguard group persuade themselves to pursue the overcoming of the unanimity principle to its full conclusion. In essence, they must prepare themselves to summon (once the lack of a unanimous consensus on decisive institutional reforms or on a system of institutional variable geometry in the above-indicated sense, is unambiguously clear in IGC-96) a separate conference with the purpose of adopting a new founding treaty for the political community which will succeed the European Union, while the states that do not participate in the elaboration of the new treaty or do not ratify it will be able to choose to become associated states, on the model of the European Economic Space.⁶ If this policy is pursued without hesitation, it is very likely that the Euro-sceptic governments, unable to resort to the right of veto, will end up accepting substantial reforms in order not to be left on the fringes of the integration process. Of course, it can not be excluded that they will opt not to participate, at least initially, in a European Union with federal features, yet, in this case, they will not be able to block the indispensable qualitative leap in integration and it is reasonable to expect that before much time has passed they will have second thoughts.

Certainly, the vanguard group will require an extremely strong political will in order not to shy away from the prospect of a split with the British and other Euro-sceptic governments; I imagine that the Club of Florence has numerous doubts in this regard and precisely for this reason proposes a more cautious strategy concerning the overcoming of the unanimity principle. However, two observations seem pertinent here. First, it should be recalled that the political will to proceed without Great Britain has a precedent in the launch of the Community itself, when the more pro-European governments faced a decisive challenge to the existence of the European project by abandoning reform within the juridical framework of the Council of Europe and giving life to a new treaty. Why should a similar will not arise again today in light of the extremely serious danger that the Community's integration will be compromised?⁷ Secondly, if we start, as the Club of Florence rightly does, from the assumption that the most pro-European governments can be persuaded, precisely in light of this danger, to found a more integrated political community comprising even a minority of the current European Union's member states, it is not clear why they can not be persuaded to choose the objectively necessary method (the complete overcoming of

the unanimity principle) in order to fulfil this objective.

While it is necessary, therefore, in my opinion, to be more coherent (also in order to be more persuasive in an undertaking the difficulty of which can hardly be denied) in rejecting the principle of the unanimous revision of the treaties, the same logic can be applied to the need to overcome the purely diplomatic nature of the procedure set down in article N. Also in this case, if the aim is fully to involve public opinion and the political, economic and social forces in the constituent debate and avoid a yes/no choice about pre-packaged outcomes, information procedures based on the European and national parliaments are not enough. Instead, it is necessary to achieve a form of co-decision between the European Parliament and the national governments similar to that which the Maastricht Treaty introduced for parts of the Community's legislation (and which should be extended following the revision to be undertaken by IGC-96). In essence, the European Parliament (which has every interest to establish in this matter a close co-operative relationship with the national parliaments) should be given the right to amend the proposals drawn up by the governments' plenipotentiaries, and a conciliation committee between the European Parliament and the intergovernmental conference should draw up a joint document which should then be approved by a qualified majority of the two bodies, to be submitted finally to national ratification. It is necessary to stress once again that an effectively democratic procedure for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty would seem indispensable, aside from obvious reasons of principle (what is involved is the establishment of a constitution), not least because it is clearly difficult to take such a radical decision, such as that to proceed even without the British and other Euro-sceptic governments, without clear democratic legitimisation in all the phases of the constituent procedure.

In this analysis of the Club of Florence's report, I have tried to highlight how, in my opinion, it contains alongside some very convincing observations and proposals, certain inconsistencies of no small account: above all, the idea that Europe's institutions should be federal in nature yet not those of a state (and the maintenance, even in the final stage, of the national right of veto in the military sphere), and the half-way house nature of the proposals designed to overcome the unanimity principle and absence of democracy in the procedure for revising the Maastricht Treaty. I ought to specify that it is highly likely that what appear to me as inconsistencies represent in reality a conscious decision by the report's authors to leave concealed the ultimate consequences of the gradual and

partial evolution which is being proposed, so as to let sleeping dogs lie and render more easy the overcoming of opposition to the transfers of sovereignty to federal institutions. What this seems to amount to, then, is a typical feature of the functionalist approach to European integration, which is characterised, aside from gradualism, by an attitude which can be defined, let us say, as one of freemasonry.

If this is the case, I would conclude my analysis by asking whether such an attitude, which has undoubtedly made its contribution to the advance of European integration, remains feasible in the current phase of the process. To be honest, I feel that, while gradualism (not demanding everything, all at once) may still have a certain role to play, the freemasonry mentality (not stating things openly and explicitly) is no longer adequate now that a qualitative leap in a federal sense can no longer be delayed. The members of the Club of Florence are right to state that European integration is a "tranquil revolution", from which all forms of compulsion are absent, yet which aims to introduce radical changes. Nevertheless, if the European integration process is in this sense a revolutionary process, then the principle that truth is a fundamental revolutionary force holds ultimately also in the case of European integration. In other words, never before has it been so important to indicate with utmost clarity not only the great values which are at stake in the European integration process, but also its final outcomes in the institutional sphere, and the dramatic decisions which we must find the courage to take, since only in this way can we hope to mobilise completely the indispensable energies for overcoming the opposition to the qualitative leap toward federation. Without a high and widespread degree of awareness, the expectation of revolutionary changes will remain nothing other than an illusion.

NOTES

¹ The report has been published by Il Mulino, Bologna, 1996, under the title *Europe: the impossible status quo*, with an introduction by Jacques Delors; it has been translated into English, French and German. The members of the Club of Florence, which was founded in autumn 1993, are: *Enrique Baron Crespo* (Spanish), Euro-MP, ex-minister, ex-president of the European Parliament; *Cristoph Bertram* (German), ex-director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, currently diplomatic correspondent of the German weekly, *Die Zeit*; *Stanley Crossick* (British), president of the *Belmont European Policy Center* and vice-president of the Committee for European Affairs of the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels; *Renaud Dehousse* (Belgian), professor at the European University Institute at Florence; *René Foch* (French), director general of the Commission of the

European Communities, currently general secretary of the Action Committee for Europe; *Franz Froschmaier* (German), ex-director general of information, research and culture of the Commission of the European Communities, ex-minister of economic affairs of Schleswig-Holstein (Germany); *Max Kohnstamm* (Dutch), ex-secretary of the High Authority of the ECSC, ex-vice-president of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, created by Jean Monnet, and ex-president of the European University Institute at Florence; *François Lamoureux* (French), ex-director of industrial policy of the Commission of the European Communities, ex-deputy director of Edith Cresson's departmental staff in Matignon, currently director of her departmental staff at the Commission; *Emile Noël* (French), ex-general secretary of the Commission of the European Communities and ex-president of the European University Institute at Florence; *Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa* (Italian), ex-director general of economic and financial affairs of the Commission of the European Communities, supporter of the Delors Committee for Economic and Monetary Union, currently vice-director general of the Bank of Italy. Kohnstamm is the president of the Club of Florence. The report was written by Dehousse in collaboration with Kohnstamm and Noël.

² Francesco Rossolillo clarifies very well why the theory of dual legitimacy is a wholly unconvincing way to describe conceptually the current phase of the Community's transition (which is unfinished and could even be interrupted) from a situation which remains overwhelmingly confederal to one of a federal nature. See in particular, "Considerations on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the Passage to the Third Phase of Monetary Union", in *The Federalist*, XXXVII (1995), pp. 62-74, and "Popular Sovereignty and the World Federal People as its Subject", in *The Federalist*, XXXVII (1995), pp. 150-190.

³ On this subject, see in particular Mario Albertini, *Il federalismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993. Among other things, he argues that the full realisation of a federal system, which up until now has always been polluted in its practical manifestations by strong centralising tendencies, will be possible only within the framework of world unification, which will represent the radical suppression of power politics.

⁴ On this subject, I refer back to Sergio Pistone, "The Security Policy of the European Union", in *The Federalist*, XXXIV (1992), pp. 97-112.

⁵ On this subject, see *Pour une Union européenne efficace et démocratique*, Report of the reflection group of the international European Movement presented in March 1995.

⁶ This is the line suggested by both the European Union of Federalists (see "European Union Reform and Constitution", in *The Federalist*, XXXVII (1995), pp. 50-61), and the international European Movement (see the document of the Initiative Committee with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference — whose president is Jean-Victor Louis — entitled "The scenarios of the IGC" and published in *Crocodile*, 1996, 1-2). See also Antonio Padoa-Schioppa, "Towards a European Constitution", in *The Federalist*, XXXVII (1995), pp. 8-25.

⁷ Certainly, the initiative to achieve a qualitative leap in a federal sense, and consequently to persuade the more pro-European governments not to hesitate to split with the British government appears very difficult, if we consider that France (without which it is obvious that the vanguard core can not be created) is favourable to a federal system in the monetary field, but expresses strong doubts, under Chirac's presidency, regarding a further strengthening in a federal sense of the European Union's institutions. At the same time it needs to be stressed that the great majority of the French political class, both in office and opposition, strongly desires the furthering of European integration (in addition to the rapid implementation of EMU also through the creation of a European defence), because it is French *raison d'état* itself which obliges making integration with Germany irreversible as soon as possible and excludes any alternative, other than those leading to disaster. France

therefore finds itself on a downward-sloping path (it is being pushed toward the objective of irreversible integration with Germany, but is recalcitrant regarding the unavoidable means to achieve it), which by no means guarantees the successful outcome of the battle to overcome French resistance to the qualitative leap in a federal sense, but offers real opportunities for success.

It also needs to be appreciated that the great majority of the German political class strongly desires rapid European unification on a federal basis and through the strategy of the magnetic core (the highest degree of awareness in this regard is represented by Karl Lamers), because it is well aware of the danger that the catastrophic hegemonic tendencies of the past re-surface in the re-unified Germany. This will also have a highly practical foundation in the fact that the German Constitutional Court's sentence of October 1993, which recognised the constitutionality of the Maastricht Treaty, clearly expressed its negative judgement on the creation of a monetary union which did not provide for the democratic strengthening of the European Union's institutions (see on this subject, F. Rossolillo, "Can We Delegate the Founding of the European Federation?", in *The Federalist*, XXXVI, (1994), pp. 29-32).

In this context, it must finally be remembered that the Italian government can play a decisive role. In fact, the history of European integration shows how Franco-German initiatives have always had a leading role, yet equally how Italy has been able to strengthen these initiatives in a supranational sense every time it has committed itself seriously to this end. Today, this means both carrying on with the strategy outlined here as regards institutional reforms and the method for achieving them, and working without hesitation for the balancing of the budget, in order to be able to participate fully in the vanguard group and thereby to reinforce decisively the credibility and effectiveness of the Italian proposals within IGC-96. The weakening of the Euro-sceptical forces present in Italy, which the results of the national elections of 21st April 1996 clearly demonstrated, undoubtedly opens up more favourable prospects in this direction.

The World Federalist Movements from 1955 to 1968 and European Integration

JEAN-FRANCIS BILLION

The World Movement for World Federal Government (WMWFG), now called the World Federalist Movement (WFM), was founded at the end of the Second World War in Montreaux. After an initial burst of enthusiasm, when it seemed the long-awaited moment had all but arrived, the organisation met a serious crisis at the Rome Congress of 1950, when its American section blocked an appeal that was directed at the communist-inspired Partisans of Peace.

Faced with the increase of international tension at the time of the Korean war, the movement was obliged to restrict its objectives and moderate its ambitions. At the same time, its relationships with the European federalists, which were at times conflictual, became more and more tenuous up until the 1970's. Nevertheless, the movement succeeded in keeping the flame of world federalism alive until the new international situation at the beginning of the 1980's enabled, through the Gorbachev Plan and the end of the cold war, the political unification of mankind to become a key issue in history.¹

The Congress of Paris.

The ninth Congress of the Young World Federalists (YWF) took place in Saint Mandé from 22nd to 24th July 1955, just before the 7th Congress of the WMWFG, which was held in Paris from 26th to 29th July. Francis Gérard, president of the *Union Fédéraliste Mondiale* (UFM), assigned it the task not so much of "elaborating a doctrine, nor of giving a global overview of our methods, but of establishing and asserting our presence with regard to the difficulties of our time." Francis Gérard also wrote that "the reform of the UN Charter is of the utmost importance this year; in fact, the General Assembly will meet in New

York on the second Tuesday of December and will be able to decide, in particularly favourable circumstances, to summon a Conference for the revision of the Charter."² The Congress met with success: *Citoyens du Monde*³ headlined their November 1955 issue, "After the Congress of Paris, world federalism has become a political reality," highlighting the fact that 16 ministers of the French government⁴ and 100 international personalities, including the ex-secretary general of the UN, Trygve Lie⁵, had either attended the congress or sent messages to the participants. The WMWFG Congress deliberated a number of problems: the revision of the UN Charter, disarmament, regional federalism and, finally, aid to less-developed countries.⁶

The reform of the UN Charter has never really been undertaken, despite the hopes of the world federalists and a vote of the 10th General Assembly which accepted the need for it and nominated a commission charged with presenting a report to the General Assembly in 1957; after a 10-year delay, in 1965 the issue was adjourned indefinitely.

It is in this context that the world federalist parliamentarians and the world federalist youth were set to hold their annual congresses in London and Manchester, while the WMWFG was organising a study conference at Lyme Hall. These three meetings were held from 25th July to 11th August. At London's County Hall, some parliamentarians proposed the fusion of the parliamentarians and the WMWFG, in the hope that this would enable a greater degree of incisiveness, since "although there exists a liaison committee between the two bodies, its action, and above all its effectiveness, has proved to be insufficient."⁷

The Suez Crisis and the Failure to Reform the San Francisco Charter.

The Suez Crisis provided the opportunity for the world federalists to stress the urgent need for a world federation, and in particular for international intervention forces that would be able to avoid the repetition of situations similar to those generated by the lone intervention of Great Britain and France.⁸ In light of the outcome of the crisis, some world federalists asserted that, "the most insignificant events go beyond the European context," and concluded that "the world union will be created prior to the European one."⁹

The World Association of Parliamentarians for World Government adopted an "Urgent Manifesto", in which it called for an immediate revision of the San Francisco Charter, publishing this in its magazine *One World* during the winter of 1956-1957.¹⁰ The 10th Congress of the

WMWFG, whose general secretary at the time was Ralph Lambardi, took place in Scheveningen-The Hague, from 26th to 31st August 1957, on the theme "How to make the UN more effective." The Congress, which adopted a number of resolutions and approved the "Hague Manifesto", elected as the new president of the World Movement, Komla Agbeli Gbedemah, Ghana's finance minister, who had been connected with the world federalists since 1951 and spoke as "a representative of one of the youngest nations." He declared his conviction that the inter-parliamentary union and the WMWFG would be able to increase their influence by collaborating with each other, called for a "more decisive effort for the revision of the UN Charter," supported the plan "for a single police force for the world" and, finally, highlighted the anti-colonialist struggle of the African continent.¹¹

In October 1957, the WMWFG, following an invitation by its Japanese section and the Japanese parliamentary group for a world federation, held a regional congress in Kyoto. This was dedicated primarily to issues concerning Asian and African countries and insisted on the need for co-operation among the peoples of these two continents, "with regard to economic aid and the abolition of colonialism"¹² (in English-speaking Africa, not only in Ghana but also in Nigeria and Sierra Leone, WMWFG sections were being founded). Debates in the commissions dealt instead with the issue of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of UN powers.

The Law of the Sea.

At the beginning of 1958, the UN Law of the Sea Conference was held in Geneva; from the world federalist point of view it was a failure. The world federalists held this problem to be of great importance, since the conservation and correct use of marine resources seemed to them essential in order to prevent famine in a world that was at the height of a demographic explosion. The French jurist Paul de la Pradelle argued that "except for the Convention on the open seas..., the Geneva Conventions regarding maritime law asserted the rights of the states over the sea, rather than drawing up a set of rules governing the use of the sea which went beyond the various sovereignties for the common good of the nations."¹³

Citoyens du Monde, the organ of the French *Union Fédéraliste Mondiale*, had in the meantime changed its title to *Monde Uni*, in order to avoid confusion with Garry Davis. In its editorial, it specified that, "The UFM is not disowning the World Citizens, who have been and

remain an integral part of our movement. It is not a matter of relegating World Citizenship into a trunk full of objects for which we no longer have any use... Unfortunately, an unpleasant confusion has been created in the minds of many people. Since Garry Davis stimulated this wonderful popular enthusiasm which caught the imagination of the masses for a season, the likeable and worthy expression, "world citizen", has been on everyone's lips and in all the newspapers. The country experienced a great moment of expectation and hope... Then the gesture, which was not supported by any doctrinal thinking and which caught the world by surprise, proved to have no future... From time to time, there was news about the difficulties, the successes and the setbacks of the hero of the new dawn, but it was ignored that disparate groups of people of good will upheld the hope and kept alive the sacred fire. It is at this point that for many people "world citizenship" became synonymous with lost cause and puerile utopia... where beauty used to be, there remains nothing but banality."¹⁴

Discussing this change of title, Francis Gérard, president of the UFM specified that, "The international situation continues to deteriorate... Local conflicts are multiplying... The arms race has reached a climax... The failure of traditional diplomacy is clear to all... Faced with the catastrophic evolution of world affairs, the world federalists have more than ever the duty to speak up... This extension of the UFM's propaganda is symbolised by the name change of its publication." Moreover, he never failed to insist that *Monde Uni* would reserve "also for the idea of world citizenship a privileged space, a dedicated column."¹⁵

World Federalists and Decolonisation.

The new theme of the abolition of colonialism became a constant subject of the world federalists' deliberations, who sought in this way to counter the reputation for being a pro-western movement which had been attributed to them after the Rome Congress of 1951. This was particularly pronounced in France, in the context of the decolonisation of black Africa. Philippe Comte analysed from a world federal viewpoint the role of federalism in Africa, from the moment when it "entered the scene" on the occasion of the conquest of independence by African collectives: "Can the slow, but irreversible, shift from a regime of colonial administration to one of autonomy... serve the cause of world federalism? Can world federalism in its turn encourage this change? We believe that on these two points the answer is 'yes'. World federalism can expect a

decisive contribution from an Africa that will carry its fair weight in the Third World and the United Nations Organisation as a whole, helping it to exit the blind alley where it currently finds itself. The apparently irremediable conflict between the two imperialisms has caused the failure of disarmament projects and reform of the UN... The problem is to break through this devilish impasse... The impact of a 'détente', which would lead to an agreement 'at the highest levels' of the most serious conflicts, is not to be underestimated... A forceful presence of the 'non-aligned' states at the UN may prove much more decisive. Following Bandung, it should have been understood that the grouping of forces can not be reduced to a simple bi-partite division: the Third World has asserted its independence; President Nehru's 'five points' have won the approval of sincere pacifists. The representation at the Assembly of the United Nations of young states desirous of their independence, which will be strengthened some time in the future by the delegations of new African states, may have an enormous impact on the evolution of the organisation, leading it towards the realisation of an international order in which the use of force is subordinated to law and justice... Will not the young states of the Third World, currently condemned to various types of co-existence yet indifferent to all compromises, sooner or later be spurred into calling for their political and economic independence to be guaranteed by an international authority that possesses the effective legal and material means?"

Philippe Comte was optimistic about the potential role of the ex-British colonies, which combined "indigenous aspirations" with the "tradition of British liberalism." Regarding French black Africa, he observed that while its future remained undecided between national independence, an African federation, a confederation with the ex-colonial metropolis or a combination of these different formulas, even in the framework of a confederation with France, "the African influence can direct the foreign policy of the future confederation towards a renewal, a détente, a more energetic action aimed at strengthening international institutions." Philippe Comte argued that Third World countries, and especially Africa, could expect a great deal from a world federalism that would be able "to facilitate and consolidate their access to a genuine command over their destinies" since "the solution proposed by the world federation is the only one which is free from all imperialistic implications." He also noted that "The new African states will be able to achieve stability and prosperity only if they integrate themselves into a structured international community."

Referring back to the Congress of Kyoto, which he likened to a "real and proper federalist Bandung," Philippe Comte concluded by underlining the importance of this theme for the WMWFG, which is "'world federalist' in its principles, but overly 'western' in its actions" because, he stressed, "a malevolent propaganda will not fail to play on this ambivalence and to see in it, under a veneer of idealism, a more subtle form of western imperialism. Our only chance to dispel this ambivalence is to balance our efforts by developing them initially in the vast terrain of the Third World."¹⁶

In September 1958, the 7th Conference of the World Association of Parliamentarians for a World Government was held in Paris, Versailles and Royan, in an itinerant fashion. It gathered together many famous personalities, including Lord Attlee, ex-leader of the British Labour party, who declared in his welcome address: "In practice or potentially, international anarchy exists throughout the world. Twenty years ago I stated that Europe had to federate or else perish. I now say that the world must federate or else perish." During the same conference, Robert Buron, member of the French government and president of the French world federalist parliamentary group, passed on to the delegates one of de Gaulle's reflections, who, when welcoming in his capacity as prime minister a delegation of the Congress, made this observation with regard to their ideal: "It is the dream of a wise man: if peace is the aim, then a world government will be needed."¹⁷ The Royan Congress called for the creation within the UN of an "Administration for the direct management of the trust territories, which should progressively take over from the current international trust authorities,... under the control of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council and answerable to the General Assembly."¹⁸

Finally, in 1958, the WMWFG was officially recognised by the United Nations as a non-government organisation (NGO).

In August 1959, the 10th Congress of the WMWFG took place in The Netherlands, attended by delegates from Asia, Africa, America and Europe, and unanimously re-elected the Ghanaian K.A. Gbedemah to head the organisation. The Congress particularly stressed the importance of the role that neutral and non-aligned countries could play to facilitate peace, by placing themselves between the two opposing blocks. A series of resolutions were adopted, in a reasonably optimistic atmosphere a few months after a summit between Soviet and American leaders, regarding the conditions for a revision of the UN Charter, its universality, the creation of an international police force, the end of nuclear experiments,

the setting up of an agency for aid to developing countries and the Berlin crisis.

At the end of September, the Association of Parliamentarians for a World Government sent a project to the secretary general of the United Nations prepared by Lord Attlee and approved by the Bern Congress, at which 34 nations were represented.¹⁹ This project for UN reform included the request that, in the framework of a bi-cameral legislative system, the General Assembly be replaced by a House of Commons elected by universal suffrage and by a House of States, whose members were to be appointed by the governments. The Security Council would become an executive organ elected by the two houses for a period of four years.

At the end of 1959, faced with the "exacerbation of the ideological struggles and tensions caused by nationalisms, demographic pressures and economic injustices," the *Conseil français pour une Assemblée Constituante du peoples* (CFACP) and the UFM decided that "while respecting the differences in their nature, functioning and methods, to coordinate their activities to the greatest degree possible."²⁰ From April 1961 onwards, the CFACP's publication, which since 1954 had been issued under the title *Pour des institutions mondiales*, appeared inside the UFM's magazine.

In the May 1960 issue of *World Federalist*, the WMWFG's international magazine, John Pinder (a member of Federal Union, who in the 1980's became president of the UEF after its re-unification) took a pro-European federalism line, in support of which he presented a solemn appeal.²¹ Some months later, the WMWFG Congress was attended by 200 delegates in Cologne, and focused on the themes of "world order", "world progress" and more specifically, aid to developing countries.²²

At the beginning of 1961, in the wake of the propaganda efforts of previous years, the WMWFG was able to set up many national sections in French-speaking Africa, especially in Cameroon, and to establish contacts as a first step to creating new groups in Congo (Brazzaville), Madagascar and Tunisia. In November, a delegation of the UFM went to Senegal, where it was received by Jean Rous, at that time a councillor in the republic's presidential office.²³

The Congress of Vienna and the "Strategy for Peace".

In July 1961, the WMWFG organised its 10th Congress in Vienna on the theme, "The strategy for peace." It was held some time after John Kennedy met the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in the

same city, a meeting which, despite not achieving spectacular results, had nevertheless not aggravated the international situation either. In this context, the WMWFG occupied itself particularly with the significance of neutral countries²⁴ and launched an appeal to the world "so that we refuse to be dragged along by the psychosis of war: war is not unavoidable... The world federalists assert that peace can be guaranteed only if law substitutes violence in the relationships among peoples; they therefore insist on the need to create common institutions at the world level... The Congress stresses that the United Nations Organisation must not only survive, but must develop, become universal and strengthen itself in this world that is in transformation."

This urgent appeal by the WMWFG was later addressed more specifically to the Third World: "Economic development becomes particularly urgent once independence has been won in new countries whose standard of living must be rapidly raised to a decent level by an organisation which is placed under the aegis of the United Nations, in particular through the organisation of markets and stabilisation of the competition for raw materials. In order to organise a lasting peace and prosperity in the world, the world federalists appeal to the active co-operation of the peoples of East and West and those of the Third World, whose role in world politics must be predominant in order to oblige the two blocs to work together."²⁵

The Japanese physicist and Nobel prize-winner Hideki Yukawa was elected as the new president of the WMWFG by the congress, which gathered together over 300 participants from 34 countries in North America, Europe, and also Latin America, as well as from Pakistan, Japan, India, Vietnam, Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Senegal, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Egypt, and others.

The First Contacts with the Soviet World.

During the following months the world federalists took their considerations on the need for a rapprochement between East and West to the pacifist organisations of the socialist block, because, as Philippe Comte wrote in *Monde Uni*, "deliberating the reform of the United Nations among a restricted clique will never be anything other than a mere academic exercise. It is of no use developing arguments without taking into account the existence of socialist states which make up nearly half the world's population, pretending to ignore that without the agreement of these states even the best reform projects will end up in the waste-paper

basket. The agreement of the Soviet Union and the states which are in its sphere of influence is more than an aspect of the problem: it is the very basis of the problem of reforming the United Nations."²⁶

For the first time, on the initiative of the British movement *Christian Action*, representatives of the World Council for Peace, heavily conditioned by Soviet *raison d'état*, and militant pacifists from the Third World and the West gathered together for an international conference on disarmament and tension reduction, held in London in September. Maurice Cosyn, the very active organiser of the *Union Fédérale Belge*, took part and detected the first signs of the "thaw of the Soviets with regard to the world federalist movement;" a Soviet academic, Alexandre Korneitchouk, a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, proposed to summon for 1962 a peoples congress "composed not only of the delegates of all the peace organisations, but also of a wide cross-section of representatives from the fields of science, culture, religion and professional organisations, in front of which the political and military leaders of the great nations would be invited to present themselves in order to explain their attitude towards humanity." In October, a delegation of the World Association of Parliamentarians for World Government went to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Peace Committee.²⁷

On 19th December, the UN's General Assembly unanimously adopted a motion which declared the 1960's a "decade of development": the member states committed themselves to increasing their efforts to aid developing countries and the secretary general was charged with drawing up a plan in light of the intensification of the UN's activity to facilitate economic and social development."²⁸

In February 1962, the European Federalist Movement (MFE) held its congress in Lyons, and on this occasion the arguments of Altiero Spinelli's supporters were contrasted with those of the Federalist Autonomy group, gathered around Mario Albertini. Among other things, this congress marked the end of the constituent experience of the Congress of the European People that had been inspired by Spinelli, which, at least in its guiding principles, was similar to the People's Congress that some world federalists planned to launch in 1963. For the first time after many years, this congress offered an opportunity to the world federalists of the UFM to take a position with regard to European integration. After recalling that the MFE asserts in its statutes that "the European federation must be considered a stage-post on the way to the world federation," Francis Gérard stressed that it was in fact "easy to

appreciate that the creation of a world federation would be enormously eased if the world were composed essentially of a dozen or about fifteen regional federations." He welcomed the fact that the passage to the second stage of the Common Market had brought about significant progress regarding the social and economic integration of the six member countries, but denounced "the absence of direct participation by the peoples in this integration, for example in the form of a European parliament elected by universal suffrage, and the absence of a common political power," pointing out that the main obstacle was represented by Gaullist France. Finally, Francis Gérard highlighted that "the most important thing from the world federalist point of view is the fact that the Europe of Six has no desire to close itself off through economic autarchy, which would be an ill omen for relationships at the world level. In fact, Europe is on the verge of enlarging itself through the membership or association of other European countries, it has established very wide-ranging commercial relations with the United States, it has joined in association with the African states of the so-called Monrovia group and carries forward its commercial policy within the GATT framework."

Francis Gérard argued therefore that "to a certain extent" the European Community satisfied "the condition of being open to the world," with the exception of relations with Eastern-bloc countries, even though he re-asserted the world federalist conviction according to which certain problems would be "utterly unsolvable within the European framework." The federalist leader concluded thus: "The regional federations are very important not only as stage-posts towards the world federation, but also from the viewpoint of the very foundations of federalism... If regional federal solutions were to be discarded, there would remain nothing else but the choice between centralisation on a world scale, which would be dangerous for the fundamental freedoms, and the maintenance of the national states, which are incapable of solving the great problems of our time... The regional federations are then as necessary for the good functioning of the world federation as the world federation is necessary in order to complete the regional federations."²⁹

In autumn of the same year, two world federalist meetings were set to take place in Geneva. The first, on the initiative of the "Phoenix group", was supposed to summon delegates from the governments of various nations in a world constituent assembly, but it did not take place. The second, organised by Philip Isely's "Denver group" was held as expected, as a preparatory meeting for the project launched by the World Committee for a World Constituent Assembly. This project looked forward to

assembling in a single gathering government delegates, others elected by the peoples, and representatives of the world federalist associations. In the course of this meeting, a motion was adopted that pleaded for the participants of the Peoples Constituent Assembly (PCA) to unite in a single organisation, regardless of what projects they may have.

From 23rd to 26th October, the 21st Conference of World Federalist Parliamentarians was held in Paris, and Lord Silkin was elected president of the association. On the subject of European unity, this British parliamentarian declared: "The path towards European unification (which is linked to America and perhaps to the British Commonwealth and to the territories of the ex-colonies of other nations, particularly France) is a very promising trend towards world unity. I recognise that this is a controversial issue and that not everyone in our movement shares my opinion."³⁰

The Encyclical "Pacem in Terris".

A significant event for the world federalists in 1963 was the publication of the encyclical *Pacem in terris* by Pope John XXIII. Other voices, aside from those of the European or world federalists, were raised to highlight the importance and universal significance of this text³¹, in which the head of the Catholic Church asserted the need, in order to deal with the problems of world proportions, for a "political authority with universal responsibilities, in which power, the constitution and the means to act are themselves of world dimensions, and which can operate throughout the world." *Monde Uni* expressed its approval and satisfaction by noting that "the author... was not an intellectual free of responsibilities, nor a head of state caught up in the tortuous ways of international policy," and contrasted the behaviour of the pope "in office" with the attitude of the highest-ranking political leaders who, like Lord Attlee or Edgar Faure, had openly taken identical positions, but generally "in moments when they no longer had government positions."³²

The British M.P. E. Lancelot Mallalieu, who was a member of Federal Union, of the British world federalist parliamentary group and vice-president of the Inter-parliamentary Union, became general secretary of the WMWFG some months before its 11th Congress, which the organisation held in Tokyo in August. Concerned with the central theme of disarmament, in its political and economic as well as moral implications, this congress focused less than previous ones on the legal aspects of the world federalist struggle and concentrated primarily on a strategic

analysis of how to bring about the reform of the United Nations and invert the trend in the arms race. The Tokyo Declaration, approved by federalists coming from 32 countries and including about 2,000 Japanese,³³ began with the sentence: "We must choose between world law and world war" and recalled the principles and objectives of the organisation prior to setting out a plan of action aimed at "constructing a war-free world."³⁴ On their way back from the congress, which "opened the doors of Asia to world federalism," some delegates stopped off in India, where they were received by president Radhakrishnan and Indira Gandhi. Following this, the prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Lord Attlee held a public meeting and Lancelot Mallalieu set up the local section of the WMWFG in Teheran, whose chairman was the president of the Iranian senate, Sharif Amami.

Some weeks later, in Moscow, the United States, Great Britain and the USSR signed a treaty to halt nuclear experiments, whose limitations the federalists criticised, since it did not include a commitment in favour of disarmament and was neither irrevocable nor universal. The American federalists welcomed the adoption by the U.S. senate of a document that banned nuclear experiments,³⁵ yet subsequently complained about the meagre sum of \$10,000 p.a. assigned by the House of Representatives to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.³⁶ In September, some weeks before his death, John F. Kennedy, addressing the General Assembly of the UN, took a stand in favour of the revision of the Charter, declaring: "The United Nations cannot survive as a static organisation.... Its Charter must be changed as well as its customs. The authors of that Charter did not intend that it be frozen in perpetuity. The science of weapons and war has made us all, far more than 18 years ago in San Francisco, one world and one human race with one common destiny. In such a world, absolute sovereignty no longer assures us of absolute security."³⁷

On 17th December, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, the General Assembly approved amendments to increase the number of members of the Security Council from 11 to 15 and the members of the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27, in order to enable the better representation of African and Asian countries.

1963 also saw the creation, in May, of a Committee for the Peoples Congress. This was promoted by the partisans of the PCA, who were aware of the fact that the plans drawn up in 1949 by the Constituent Assembly on the back of the wave of enthusiasm in the immediate post-war period, had by then become impractical in the short term. Jeanne

Haslé and Josué de Castro, who were later to become the first two delegates elected to this congress, a “prototype for the world assembly,” specified how “the idea of the Peoples Congress” had been “born out of the need to find a rapid and effective solution to the practical representation of the claims of the citizens of the world.”³⁸ Alfred Rodriguès-Brent, resistance fighter and Dutch world federalist, had taken nearly 15 years to develop his project, helped by the Belgian Maurice Cosyn and the Frenchman Jacques Savary, both engaged with *Citoyens du Monde* and with the world federalists.³⁹ In May 1963, the project was adopted during a meeting in Brussels: it defined “the bases of the electorate, the organisation of elections and their financing, as well as the organisation, tasks and work methods of the Peoples Congress.”⁴⁰ It was some years before the project could become reality. In March 1966, in Paris, on the occasion of a press conference attended by four of the signatories, an appeal drawn up by Jacques Savary and supported by 13 internationally-renowned personalities was launched.⁴¹ In November 1968 a further meeting with 3,000 participants was held in Paris, attended this time by eight of the signatories, of which two came from Eastern Europe. The first round of the transnational postal ballot took place the following year, in March 1969. From 1969 to 1994 many elections have been held, which have enabled year after year the members of the International Register of World Citizens, the embryo of “a world civil state”, certain pacifist or world federalist associations and the inhabitants of the globalised local communities of different countries, to vote for what Guy Marchand termed “a laboratory experiment.”⁴²

In 1964, the federalists of the UWF formed a coalition with the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) which gathered together the majority of pacifist groups, and together they established a committee that was charged with studying the merger of the two movements with the aim of creating a “new dynamic” and constituting “the biggest American organisation for peace, disarmament and world law.”

European Unification, World Federalism and Gaullism.

Once again *Monde Uni* took an interest in European integration, denouncing the Gaullist policy regarding the adoption of a common agricultural policy in December of the previous year: “In order to highlight his disgust for any organisation which aspires to use its authority in the common interest, above the national sovereignties, General de Gaulle once used the derogatory term ‘thing’ with regard to

the UN... It is not the French ultimatum, but the arbitration of the ‘European thing’, the Executive Commission of the Community, that has enabled a split to be avoided.”⁴³

In autumn, the American federalists, through their president C. Maxwell Stanley, called on president Johnson and the secretary general of the UN, U Thant, to reinforce urgently the peace-keeping capacities of the United Nations in light of the Vietnam crisis.⁴⁴

The Twentieth Anniversary of the UN and the War in Vietnam.

Meanwhile, the American federalists of the UWF pursued their negotiations with SANE, denouncing the prospect of an Indonesian withdrawal from the United Nations as a serious threat to the very future of the UN, should the right of secession be recognised,⁴⁵ while the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the San Francisco Charter was prepared for by both diplomats and world federalists.

The 12th Congress of the WMWFG took place in June 1965 in San Francisco itself, on the general theme “The UN in the next twenty years.” The work of the congress was divided among three commissions regarding “freedom from war,” “freedom from need” and “freedom for diversity,” while the very functioning of the UN was called into question by serious financial problems and by the continual escalation of the Vietnamese conflict. General Carlos P. Romulo, chancellor of the University of the Philippines and ex-president of the General Assembly, gave the opening address. Most notable of the other speeches were those by the Brazilian doctor and parliamentarian Josué de Castro, who was active within the International Register of World Citizens and the Peoples Congress, the American Norman Cousins and the Pakistani professor Muhammed Zafrula Khan, who was a member of the International Court of Justice. The 1,000 participants, coming from 30 countries and including a very numerous Japanese delegation, approved the Declaration of San Francisco, whose objective was to highlight forcefully the dangers that the abolition of the UN or its long-term impotence would have caused for mankind. In the aftermath of the congress, Francis Gérard noted: “Faced with the incoherence of the political stands of the so-called ‘classical bourgeoisie’ and with the schism which is dominating the communist world, world federalism represents the only coherent and unifying basis of world politics.”⁴⁶

In an article presenting the Declaration of San Francisco, *Monde Uni* wrote: “Perhaps the declarations of two, essentially different organisa-

tions should not be compared... On one side, the representatives of the states, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations. On the other, the militants. Both of these groups have expressed with remarkable similarity their fears and hopes for the UN, yet their accord ended there. This is because the former expressed the viewpoints of their national governments; whereas the latter, seizing the opportunity of the 12th WMWFG Congress, were able to claim to be speaking in the name of the peoples."⁴⁷

The American writer Norman Cousins was elected president of the WMWFG, in place of Hideki Yukawa, while the world federalists attacked American policy in Vietnam, addressing a solemn reprimand to president Johnson.⁴⁸

In June 1965, *Monde Uni* intervened once again in the debate raised by the European crisis, when the French minister of foreign affairs re-affirmed that France, "in order to resolve the crisis," would rely "only on inter-governmental solutions."⁴⁹ At the world level, the general secretary of the United Nations, U Thant, launched an appeal for the admission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, while ten countries claimed that "the restoration of Peking's rights" should be added to the agenda of the twentieth session of the General Assembly.

For a second time, twenty years after the first Dublin Conference, the American jurist Grenville Clark organised a new conference in this New Hampshire town, which, under the direction of Kingman Brewster, president of the prestigious Yale University, demanded an effective world organisation for the prevention of war: "... in these twenty years an increasing number of us have come to believe that national sovereignty must be tempered and replaced by regional and international systems of cooperation..... The Dublin conference points out that the UN Charter, drafted before Hiroshima, is inadequate for its avowed purpose of maintaining peace and security. While appreciating what the world organization has accomplished, it finds the UN now deficient in these respects: 1. Nations having more than one fourth of the population of the world are not members. 2. The Security Council has often been paralyzed by the veto. 3. There is no standing peace force to take effective action against aggression. 4. The one nation, one vote rule in the General Assembly makes unrealistic the conferring of needed legislative powers on that body. 5. There is no court system with the jurisdiction and powers required for the peaceful settlement of disputes among nations. 6. There is no system to provide sufficient and reliable revenues."

The Dublin Conference then made three recommendations: the first

on total and universal disarmament, the second on the creation of a strong world police force, and the third on the universality of the UN. The conference also called for the abolition of the veto in the Security Council and proposed the urgent creation of a world authority for development, so as to reduce the gap between industrialised and developing countries.⁵⁰

In 1966, *Monde Uni* took a stand on the Vietnam war, writing: "The efforts to arrive at a solution of the conflict with bi-lateral negotiations and the offer of mediation by various states have failed. Even a return to the 1954 and 1961 treaties does not seem to offer a solution, given the absence of any guarantee that they will be respected. Only a global initiative on a world scale will be able to provide a future of liberty to the Vietnamese people... In a realistic spirit and in the absence of anything better, it is necessary to set as initial objectives the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement, as a preliminary to the withdrawal of the Vietnamese and American forces... and the replacement of said forces with a UN peace-keeping force... The same agreement should fix the third stage, that is, the organisation of free elections under the control of the United Nations, this being the only possibility for the Vietcong and the supporters of the government to compete peacefully with equal chances of success. Such a policy can succeed only if the following conditions are met: 1) that the People's Republic of China participates in the UN as a full member; 2) that the organs of the UN and all their members possess the necessary will to co-operate fully in this operation; 3) that the UN is provided with not only the police forces necessary to wield controlling powers, but also all logistic, administrative and legal means that this operation requires."⁵¹

During the summer of 1967, 500 world federalists from 22 countries, including 200 Japanese, met in Oslo for the WMWFG Congress on the theme of reinforcing the UN's capacity to ensure peace-keeping. For the first time, the entire congress was covered by a Soviet journalist, who was able "proudly to show the congress participants an article published on the eve of the congress in *Pravda*." Another theme dealt with was the need for world federalists to strengthen the WMWFG's structures since "up until now they had not succeeded in organising their own movement on the basis of federalist principles."⁵²

At the beginning of January 1968, the YWF and the WMWFG summoned their Councils in London, and between the end of July and the beginning of August the WMWFG held an extraordinary congress in Elsenore, Denmark. During this congress, the federalist leaders, coming from many countries (out of the about 35 in which groups officially existed), approved a new constitution for the movement in order to make

it more effective and increase the powers of its international secretariat. It was decided to transfer the secretariat from The Hague to Ottawa (though the YWF's secretariat was to remain in Copenhagen), which was now no longer to confine itself to being a liaison office, but publish a magazine in various national editions and set up a development fund for the movement.⁵³

In the context of its policy of on-going contacts with the countries of Eastern Europe, the YWF organised in Vienna in July 1968 a seminar which was attended by 70 young people from 22, mostly socialist, countries on the theme: "East-West: co-operation as a step towards international order."

Thus, even during the cold war, the world federalists understood the need to maintain contacts with circles close to the socialist countries. Furthermore, they had developed a genuine policy toward non-aligned and Third World countries in the decolonisation period. At the Brussels Congress of 1972, organised by the European Movement, which was attended also by numerous militants of the Union of European Federalists, the world federalists demonstrated once again a real interest in European integration.

It was only in the mid-1980's that the various branches of the international federalist movement began to meet regularly once again and to take common initiatives, along the path to an operational and organisational unity which still needs to be consolidated despite the notable progress which has been made to date.

NOTES

¹ For the history of the world federalist movement and its attitude towards European integration from the end of the Second World War to 1954, see Jean-Francis Billion, "The world federalist movements from 1945 to 1954 and European integration", in *The Federalist*, XXXIII (1991), pp. 26-53.

² Francis Gérard, "Le Congrès de Paris", in *Citoyens du Monde*, no. 4 (May 1955), p. 1.

³ *Citoyens du Monde*, the quarterly magazine of the UFM, whose then director was Guy Marchand, began to be published after June 1954. From no. 11 onwards (July-August 1956), it was to become the organ of the UFM as well as of the *Union des mouvements européens et mondiaux pour un monde sans guerre*.

⁴ Aside from prime minister Edgar Faure, the following were present or sent messages: Vincent Auriol, Edouard Bonnefous, Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, Robert Buron, Edouard Corniglion-Molinier, Henri Laforest, Pierre July, Joseph-Pierre Lanet, Pierre-Olivier Lapie, Jean Lecanuet, Pierre Mendès-France, François de Menthon, Jules Moch, Antoine Pinay and Gaston Riou. Several of them were, moreover, staunch federalist militants at the time, such as Robert Buron or Gaston Riou, who had been militants in the WMWFG or UEF

for many years, or leaders of the world federalist parliamentary group, such as Joseph-Pierre Lanet or Jean Lecanuet (the latter had signed the editorial of the no. 5, June 1955, issue of *Citoyens du Monde*). In addition to politicians, also intellectuals, writers and musicians, such as Pablo Casals, Albert Camus, Georges Duhamel, André Maurois, Daniel Rops and Jean Rous took the opportunity to show their support for world federalist arguments.

⁵ As regards the foreign personalities, it is worth noting the presence or support of Lord Boyd Orr, president of the FAO, Sicco Mansholt, Holland's minister of agriculture and future member of the European Commission, Lord Beveridge, K.A. Gbedemah, Ghana's finance minister, Lord Bertrand Russell, Josué de Castro, Brazilian M.P. and president of the FAO council, Clement Davies, leader of the Liberal Party in the House of Commons, I.J. Pitman, conservative M.P. and former director of the Bank of England.

⁶ See the minutes of the debates and final resolution of the congress in *Citoyens du Monde*, no. 6 and 7 (November 1955).

⁷ Cf. Henri Vautrot's comment, "Les Congrès mondialistes", in *Citoyens du Monde*, no. 12 (September-October 1956), p. 2. See also in the same issue the resolutions on the Suez crisis which were adopted during the meetings of the parliamentarians and the WMWFG. In the parliamentarians' view, "the world's main waterways are the common property of the peoples of the world and should not be used for the benefit of a single nation; as a consequence, the administration of these waterways should be, as much as possible, in the hands of a world community." For this reason, they recommended "that effective steps be taken immediately to transfer the administration of the Suez Canal to an authority nominated and controlled by the United Nations" and "that the possibility of transferring other international waterways to the United Nations be examined in the near future, before they become the cause of international conflicts." In the WMWFG's opinion, "one of the causes of the conflict lies in the lack of an international institution which is able to finance projects like the development of the Nile Valley," hence again the recommendation to "create a world fund."

⁸ Max Juvenal, "Police et forces internationales" and Francis Gérard, "Urgence de créer une Fédération mondiale", in *Citoyens du Monde*, no. 13 (November-December 1956), pp. 3-4.

⁹ Hippolyte Ebrard, "L'Union mondiale se fera avant l'Union européenne", in *Citoyens du Monde*, *ibid.*, pp. 8-10. "The great dream of the United States of Europe, which was barely valid a century ago, is now fully superceded; economic, political and social life can no longer be contained within this framework. The opportunity to establish a European unity can be considered to have been lost... To organise 'for' something and not to unite 'against' somebody: this is the true spirit of peace. And the only way to achieve it is the world federation of the peoples. 'Inconceivable, if union has not been achieved even in Europe!' cry the partisans of Europe. 'No, European union can not happen, because Europe is a creation of the spirit, not a reality'". For an argument against this text, see Francis Gérard, "L'Europe et le monde", in *Citoyens du Monde* (no. 14, February-March 1957, p. 12) in which he recognises that "there are therefore two essential aspects to the principle of European federalism: the extremely evident immediate advantages and the long-term contributions to the peace and prosperity of the whole world and in this way to the world federation."

¹⁰ The world federalist parliamentarians' publication *One World*, subtitled *For World Trade and World Law*, should not be confused with the periodical of the same title published some years later by the WMWFG.

¹¹ Regarding the Hague Congress, see in particular "Participations au X^e Congrès du MUFG", in *Citoyens du Monde*, no. 17 (July-August 1957), and for the speeches and messages, texts of the resolutions and manifesto, no. 18 (September-October 1957). In the

former issue, see also "Euratom, Marché commun et fédéralisme mondial" by Francis Gérard and an unsigned article, "Fédération régionale", in which the magazine takes a stand in favour of regional federalism: "The recent events which lead towards a European federation, such as for example the creation of a coal and steel pool, are very encouraging for many world federalists, who consider them to be examples of what could be achieved on a world scale... Some federalists are considering the possibility of setting up an Asian federation, others are interesting themselves in an African federation and still others are working for an Atlantic federation."

¹² Resolutions: "This Congress: 1) asks all colonial powers to take measures immediately to grant independence to all colonies and to the countries under mandate. 2) Calls on the independent countries of Asia and Africa to provide the maximum amount of aid to all the peoples who are still under the dominion or oppression of the great nations in order that they may be enabled to reach independence", in *Monde Uni*, no. 21 (April-May 1958), p. 16.

¹³ "Les Conventions de Genève sur le droit de la mer", in *Monde Uni*, no. 23 (September-October 1958), pp. 3-4.

¹⁴ "Nouveau départ", in *Monde Uni*, no. 20 (February-March 1958), p. 1-2.

¹⁵ "A propos d'un changement de titre", in *Monde Uni*, no. 20 (February-March 1958), p. 3.

¹⁶ Philippe Comte, "Le fédéralisme mondial et l'Afrique Noire", in *Monde Uni*, no. 22 (June-July 1958), pp. 3-4.

¹⁷ Cf. *Monde Uni*, no. 23 (September-October 1958). This issue also re-published two extracts from the unanimously-approved Charter of Versailles, which provided for: "1) A world parliament to draw up world laws with the aim of guaranteeing and maintaining a lasting peace; 2) an executive power to apply these laws; 3) international courts of justice with powers and jurisdiction over all conflicts relating to these world laws; 4) a world police force charged with enforcing the respect of these universal laws by all those who violate or risk violating such laws, in order to render possible the universal, simultaneous and complete disarmament of all the nations."

¹⁸ *Monde Uni*, *ibid.*

¹⁹ "Thirty-four Countries Attend Eighth World Conference in Parliament House, Bern, September 24-29, 1959", in *One World*, II (1960), no. 4.

²⁰ *Monde Uni*, no. 28-29 (October 1959). The CFACP defined itself on this occasion as "a Council of individuals elected by the commissions of the registration and information of the World Citizens. It controls these commissions, which seek to prefigure future world public services."

²¹ "The WMWFG has always accepted theoretically that the regional federations represent a constructive step forward towards world federation. Nevertheless, among all the associations which adhere to the WMWFG in Europe, the British *Federal Union* is the only one to have maintained European federalism as an essential part of its policy. Are its members right?... Perhaps the first advantage of the European federation... lies in its force of example for the world as a whole... Most people learn from real images and not from theoretical concepts... The development of the European federation shows us not only what needs to be done, but also teaches us how to set about it... The last two world wars began in Europe. They were European civil wars which spread to other continents. A European federation would avoid a repetition of this. Yet the existence of a European federation would also make a war between the United States and the USSR less likely... Ultimately, Europe needs a federation for its own prosperity and the world needs a prosperous Europe."

²² On this subject, see the dossier of *Monde Uni* (October 1960, pp. 4-23) on the evolution of Africa. This round table, organised by the UFM and broadcast by radio to

listeners in the states of the French Community, gathered together world federalist militants and sympathisers and journalists specialised in African issues, to discuss the theme "Will Africa be a new battle-field in the struggle between East and West, or will it be the first field of operation of international co-operation inspired and directed by a world authority?"

²³ On Jean Rous see Jean-Francis Billion and Jean-Luc Prével, "Jean Rous and Federalism", in *The Federalist*, XXVIII (1986), pp. 119-130.

²⁴ See Philippe Comte, "Le poids des neutres", in *Monde Uni*, no. 52-53 (June-July 1961), pp. 3-4 and 21.

²⁵ Cf. *Monde Uni*, no. 54 (August 1951). In the same issue, see also the article by the ex-deputy secretary general of the United Nations, Henry Laugier, "Pour une coalition des petits", and the messages addressed to the Congress by some African leaders, particularly that of the president of Senegal, Léopold S. Senghor, from which we report some extracts. "In our opinion, federalism must be both internal and international. It represents essentially the search for unity in diversity... Unable to build true federal states immediately in Africa, we created, through the African and Madagascan Union, unions of a confederal nature. It is only on the basis of this initial form of union that we will be able to take a step forward along the path to a federal state. You have the problem of the reform of the United Nations on your agenda... I have always been in favour of the constructive reforms proposed by your movement... it is particularly necessary to complete it with an assembly of the peoples... I am not unmindful of the fact that, since 1953, the world federalists have contributed to creating the edifice of what today is called action against underdevelopment... As far as we are concerned, we are committed in the African continent to the efforts to beat underdevelopment... to the measures of socialisation and planning which take into account the human freedoms and the existence of living communities and which are such as to enable equilibrium and the continual growth of economic and social progress. Our revolution is based on the idea of co-operation and community. In accordance with federalist principles, we seek to combine centralisation and decentralisation, respecting regional diversities... After your Congress, we propose that you set up in Dakar a Senegalese section of the World Movement for a World Federal Government."

²⁶ Philippe Comte, "Un impératif pour le mouvement fédéraliste mondial: engager le dialogue avec l'Est", in *Monde Uni*, no. 57-58 (November-December 1961).

²⁷ Maurice Cosyn, "Un membre du Comité Central du PC de l'URSS propose d'organiser un 'Congrès des peuples' en 1962", and Henry Osborne, "La pressante sincérité de Lord Attlee a impressionné les russes — Maintenant ils savent ce que nous représentons", in *Monde Uni*, *ibid.*

²⁸ Philippe Comte, "La décennie du développement", in *Monde Uni*, no. 67 (January 1963), pp. 4-11.

²⁹ Francis Gérard, "Position des fédéralistes mondiaux à l'égard du fédéralisme européen", in *Monde Uni*, no. 61 (March 1962). On the construction of Europe, see also the important dossier published by *Monde Uni* under the title "Visa pour l'espoir", no. 64-65 (August-September 1962), which took stock of the situation regarding European unification through the evolution of the various communities, ECSC, EURATOM, etc., gave space to Etienne Hirsch, who had recently been removed from the presidency of the European Commission for atomic energy by the French government for his federalist stands, and who later became president of the French MFE, and to Alexandre Marc, re-publishing also the motion of general policy of the Montreux Congress of the UEF in 1947.

³⁰ "XI World Conference of World Parliament Association", in *One World*, III (1963), no. 3.

³¹ See, among others, the extracts, comments and articles dedicated to the encyclical *Pacem in terris* in the world federalist press. In particular, "Une voie pour la famille

humaine", in *Monde Uni*, no. 71-72 (May-June 1963), and "Papal Encyclical for World Government", in *The Federalist*, Washington, IX (1963), no. 8-9 (April-May). The American federalists of the UWF also published some extracts from the encyclical under the title "Calling for World Government. Encyclical Highlights." For its part, *Il Federalista*, the magazine edited by Mario Albertini, published a long critical editorial under the title "La signification politique de l'encyclique 'Pacem in terris'", (V (1963), pp. 95-106). The text concluded: "... we do not join the chorus of praise and approval directed at 'Pacem in terris' on account of the way in which the issue of peace is presented... The truth is that a truce is not peace, but, on the contrary, the maintenance of war; that there exists no prospect of world peace until the federalist principle (which goes beyond the absolute sovereignty of the states) is not re-launched in the world, breaking and unmasking the two opposing blocs; that the struggle for world peace, as for regional federations, must be fought by the peoples against the absolute sovereignty of the states, and therefore against the political classes in power."

³² *Monde Uni*, *ibid*, p. 3.

³³ *The Federalist*, Washington, October 1963.

³⁴ "Déclaration de Tokyo", in *Monde Uni*, no. 73-74 (July-September 1963). It can also be found in *World Federalist*, VIII (1963), no. 4 (October).

³⁵ "Test Ban Treaty Ratified. UWF Readies for Further Push", in *The Federalist*, Washington, October 1963. The UWF announced its initiative to send 25,000 letters to senators in support of the treaty.

³⁶ "House Votes ACDCA \$10 Million. Federalists Supported Larger Authorization", in *The Federalist*, Washington, X (1963), no. 4 (December).

³⁷ "Kennedy Calls for UN Charter Change", in *The Federalist*, Washington, September 1963.

³⁸ "Vers le Congrès des Peuples - Historique", in *Citoyens du Monde*, no. 14 (October 1969). See also the obituary of Rodriguès-Brent in *Citoyens du Monde*, no. 21 (April 1971) and that of Josué de Castro, in *Citoyens du Monde*, no. 29 (October 1973).

³⁹ Alfred Rodriguès-Brent, "Pourquoi le Congrès des Peuples", in *Congrès des peuples*, Paris, pp. 6-9. This undated book traces the history of the origins of the Peoples Congress from 1953 to 1977 and reports the texts of its main declarations, starting from its creation in July 1977 and continuing up until 1982.

⁴⁰ *Citoyens du Monde*, *ibid*.

⁴¹ Lord Boyd Orr, Shinzo Hamai, Linus Pauling, Bertrand Russell, Hans Thirring, Danilo Dolci, Josué de Castro, Alfred Kastler, l'Abbé Pierre, Jean Rostand, Rajan Nehru, Father Hromadka and Ivan Supek.

⁴² Despite the distances and the impossibility of meeting regularly, because of financial difficulties if for no other reason, the individuals elected to the Congress of Peoples, whose general secretary was, in succession, first Guy then Renée Marchand, will live in history, according to their own definition, as "the first world citizens who were elected democratically above the nation states to occupy themselves with managing symbolically, but democratically, the affairs of all mankind." The Congress of Peoples passed a series of declarations on the environment, the United Nations, the oceans, energy and raw materials, world population, nutrition, disarmament, women, human rights, disarmament and the United Nations, the rights of children and teenagers, multinational companies, refugees, telecommunication satellites, drinking water, the right to information, health, civil nuclear energy, and desertification. Finally, during its life it set up various organisations, such as the *Institut d'études mondialistes*, inaugurated in La Lambertie in 1978 and currently chaired by the Belgian Marc Garcet, the *Agence mondialiste du presse* and the *Fonde mondial du solidarité contre le faim*. The tenth election, initially planned for June 1995 in

San Francisco, to be held alongside the celebrations for the fiftieth anniversary of the Charter and some days before the XXII Congress of the WFM, has been postponed indefinitely.

⁴³ Jean-Pierre Cornet, "Ce 'machin' qui a sauvé l'Europe", in *Monde Uni*, no. 78 (January 1964). Jean-Pierre Cornet concluded: "For a moment, there was the fear that the 'Six' would not be able to choose between Europe and margarine. It was the Commission, this international 'thing', which ultimately tipped the scales towards the future. Without it, the Common Market would have begun in December a period of stagnation prior to its definitive collapse and the failure of this experiment would have had incalculable repercussions not only for the countries directly involved, not only for the other countries of Europe and Africa associated to the EEC, but for the very cause of the regional federations, which is one of the paths along which the world will travel toward its unity." On Gaullist foreign policy and the UFM's criticism of it, see also Michel Voirrol, "Critique mondialiste de la politique extérieure gaulliste, — Etre 'grand' dans un monde féodal", in *Monde Uni*, no. 93-94 (May-June 1965) and "Jupiter aveugle ceux qu'il veut perdre", in *Monde Uni*, no. 95 (July 1965).

⁴⁴ "UWF Asks Caution on Vietnam, Looks to UN Peace-keeping Role", in *The Federalist*, Washington, XI (1964), no. 1 (September), which also published the message from C. Maxwell Stanley and the answer from the White House.

⁴⁵ "Indonesia Withdrawal from UN Poses Unique Problems", in *The Federalist*, Washington, XI (1965), no. 5 (January-February).

⁴⁶ Francis Gérard, "A San Francisco, une force politique s'affirme au dessus des idéologies", in *Monde Uni*, no. 96-97 (September-October 1965).

⁴⁷ *Ibid*. Under the title "Le défi", *Monde Uni* published the declaration adopted by the WMWFG. "Mankind is threatened not only by war and the loss of freedom. Hunger, disease and poverty also weigh on the human race and represent such an impending danger that it is necessary to deal with them even before mankind reaches the objective of the world federation. Yet the elimination of these scourges needs nothing other than institutions on a world scale... History teaches us that whenever people live together, laws to regulate their conflicts of interest are needed. If we need to have world laws, we will need a world authority to create them, interpret them, pass them into law, and impose them on citizens. It is time that the power of law be recognised in international affairs, as it is now recognised within the nations... There is nothing less, nor different, to be done." See also the final resolution of the XII Congress in *Monde Uni*, no. 98 (November 1965).

⁴⁸ Commenting on the WMWFG meeting, the *San Francisco Chronicle* wrote: "The resolutions adopted by the world federalists state that the action of the United States in Vietnam risked provoking 'a world conflagration' and their intervention in the Dominican Republic has 'weakened the United Nations'. These resolutions assert that the United States' long-standing commitment to a world order guaranteed by the law requires that American foreign policy stands aside in favour of the UN. This legal basis is seriously compromised when, in order to solve a crisis, the government employs methods which ignore or weaken the UN... In light of this, President Johnson has been strongly requested to: put forward precise proposals to amend the UN Charter in order to strengthen its powers in the field of peace-keeping; encourage, until such time as these proposals are accepted, the opportunities the UN has to keep peace in the current situation..." Quoted in *Monde Uni*, no. 98 (November 1965).

⁴⁹ Jean-Pierre Cornet, "La crise du Marché commun: deux philosophies en conflit; l'Etat et la Communauté", in *Monde Uni*, *ibid*.

⁵⁰ "Grenville Clark Calls Second Conference", in *The Federalist*, Washington, vol. 12, no. 3 (November 1965).

⁵¹ "Vietnam, USA et Nations Unies", in *Monde Uni*, no. 100 (January 1966).

⁵² "World Congress Held in Oslo", in *Canadian World Federalist*, no. 32 (September-October 1967), pp. 1-3.

⁵³ "WAWF Turns a Corner", in *World Federalist of Canada*, no. 36 (May-June 1968), pp. 9-10.

Notes

INTERNATIONALISM AND EDUCATION*

The Twentieth Century: An Overview.

I would like to open this conversation by indicating first of all some reasons why I feel it is important today, looking at education, to take into consideration problems connected to internationalism.

The main reasons lie in certain features of contemporary society, which I believe are worth noting, considering that the goals of education are set by society — as Piaget puts it — both "spontaneously through the constrictions of language, customs, the way of thinking, the family, economic conditions *etc.*," and "indirectly through the organs of the state or particular institutions."¹

Without taking up the various analyses available, I will limit myself on this subject to pointing out the balance drawn up by Eric Hobsbawm in his book *The Short Century*, because I consider it particularly effective.

"Between 1914 and the early 1990s," he writes, "the globe has become far more of a single operational unit, as it was not, and could not have been in 1914. In fact, for many purposes, notably in economic affairs, the globe is now the primary operational unit and older units such as the national economies', defined by the politics of territorial states, are reduced to complications of transnational activities. The stage reached by the 1990s in the construction of the 'global village' — the expression was coined in the 1960s (MacLuhan, 1962) — will not seem very advanced to observers in the mid-twenty-first century, but it had already transformed not only certain economic and technical activities, and the operations of science, but important aspects of private life, mainly by the

*Text of a lecture delivered at the Seminar for teachers on "Nationalism, Internationalism and Federalism" held in Ventotene 4-6 September 1996 under the auspices of the Association for Research and Teaching in Philosophy and History in co-operation with the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Turin and the Altiero Spinelli Institute, Pavia.

unimaginable acceleration of communication and transport.”²

The first characteristic element of our century is therefore the intensification of interdependence at global level, which has radically transformed economics, science, technology and private life.

But alongside this element, and closely connected to it, Hobsbawm perceives another: that of the problem of managing these processes at world political level: “Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the end of the twentieth century is the tension between this accelerating process of globalization and the inability of both public institutions and the collective behaviour of human beings to come to terms with it. Curiously enough, private human behaviour has had less trouble adjusting to the world of satellite television, E-mail, holidays in the Seychelles and trans-oceanic commuting.”³

And this tension is rendered even more dramatic by a further element which, according to Hobsbawm, characterizes our century: “the disintegration of the old patterns of human social relationships, and with it incidentally, the snapping of the links between generations, that is to say, between past and present,” a disintegration which proves “particularly evident in the most developed countries of the western version of capitalism, in which the values of an absolute a-social individualism have been dominant, both in official and unofficial ideologies, though those who hold them often deplore their social consequences,” but which can “be found elsewhere, reinforced by the erosion of traditional societies and religions, as well as by the destruction, or autodestruction, of the societies of ‘real socialism.’”⁴

If these are some of the fundamental elements characterizing our century, which make it different from previous epochs, and if, as said, society determines the goals of education, clearly one cannot occupy oneself with education and the values it refers to, without taking account of the process of globalization and the problem of the construction of public institutions and collective behaviour suited to this process and hence able to govern it.

In this perspective it may be useful to recall briefly the thinking of certain educationalists of our century on internationalism.

The Consciousness of Historical Transformations and of Their Relationship with the Philosophy of Education in Dewey.

In quoting Hobsbawm we referred to a date, 1914, as the starting point from which to consider what is specific to our century. Indeed, we all

know that the First World War was the first thing to signal this process of globalization, dramatically but very evidently.

It is no mere chance that from this there already emerged the need for a political instrument able to solve international disputes by peaceful and democratic methods, a need realized in the League of Nations. And this independently of the fact that from the very beginning it was deprived of real significance by the USA’s refusal to join it, and that it subsequently proved to be almost a total failure. Certainly I do not propose to go over or offer interpretations of the events of the twentieth century; I have cited these elements, underlining their presence already during the First World War, because it is precisely starting from these years, probably under the impression left by the events of war, that at the level of pedagogy and educational proposals there emerged in various authors a clear consciousness of the specificity of this epoch compared to previous ones, and consequently there is a strong affirmation in educational circles of an internationalist perspective, often connected with pacifist ideals.

In my opinion Dewey is the thinker who, more than any other in these years, expresses this consciousness of the close connection linking the internationalist perspective to the concept of education in the twentieth century.

In *Democracy and Education*, he arrives at this awareness both by an analysis of the contemporary world, and by a consideration of educational theories of the past.

In this connection Dewey considers in particular three eras, because of the great importance given in them to the social significance of education. The first is that corresponding to the thinking of Plato; Dewey finds in Platonic philosophy a fundamental pedagogic intuition, the most “adequate recognition... of the educational significance of social arrangements and... of the dependence of those arrangements upon the means used to educate the young;”⁵ however, because of the influence on his thought of the conditions of the society he lived in, Plato failed to recognize “the infinite diversity of active tendencies and combinations of tendencies of which an individual is capable,”⁶ nor escape a static perspective, one in which “the final end of life is fixed.”⁷

After this reference to Platonic philosophy, Dewey concentrates his own analysis on the modern antecedents of contemporary educational theory: the “individualist” ideal of the eighteenth century and the national and social ideal of the nineteenth century.

According to Dewey, statements current in the eighteenth century concerning the diversity of natural individual talents and the need for free

development of individuality only convey "an inadequate idea of the true significance of the movement," whose chief interest lay "in progress and in social progress."⁸ In other words we are dealing with a "seeming antisocial philosophy," which in counterposing nature and society was "a somewhat transparent mask for an impetus toward a wider and freer society — towards cosmopolitanism," a philosophy whose true ideal lay in "humanity." And this because "in membership in humanity, as distinct from a state, man's capacities would be liberated; while in existing political organizations his powers were hampered and distorted to meet the requirements and selfish interests of the rulers of the state."⁹

It is the ingenuousness of this theory which explains the shift to the national ideal in the nineteenth century: indeed, according to Dewey, it was bound to soon show its weakness from an educational point of view, since "merely to leave everything to nature was... but to negate the very idea of education."¹⁰ Within a few years in fact the conviction grew that if the educational process, directed towards the "complete and harmonious development of all powers" was so important as to have "as its social counterpart an enlightened and progressive humanity," this certainly could not be entrusted to the "accidents of circumstance," but "required definite organization for its realization."¹¹ And this organization, in the nineteenth century, was identified precisely in the nation-state, which replaced humanity as an ideal; therefore "to form the citizen, not the man, became the aim of education."¹²

Thus the preceding theory was turned on its head. Dewey wrote, "with the immense importance attached to the nationalistic state, surrounded by other competing and more or less hostile states," it was in fact impossible not to end up demanding "the subordination of individuals to the superior interests of the state," and to consider "the educational process" as "one of disciplinary training rather than of personal development."¹³ And nevertheless the philosophy of education attempted, by recourse to the concept of the "organic" nature of the state, to theoretically reconcile the idea of the complete realization of the individual with the ideal of the state.

Now it is precisely this nationalistic goal, characteristic of nineteenth century education according to Dewey, with which the democratic concept of education of the twentieth century must take into account, in order to distance itself from it and itself be realized. He writes: "one of the fundamental problems of education in and for a democratic society is posed by the conflict between a nationalistic and a wider social aim."¹⁴ The problem is generated when "the social aim of education and its

national aim" are identified, because "the result" is "a marked obscuring of the meaning of the social aim."¹⁵

On the other hand, Dewey himself realizes that "this confusion corresponds to the existing situation of human intercourse," in which he sees "on the one hand, science, commerce and art transcend national boundaries" and "involve interdependencies and cooperation among the peoples," while on the other "each nation lives in a state of suppressed hostility and incipient war with its neighbours."¹⁶

Faced with this contradiction, twentieth century educational theory should, according to Dewey, seriously consider the question: "Is it possible for an educational system to be conducted by a national state and yet the full social ends of the educative process not be restricted, constrained, and corrupted?"¹⁷

In order that the true social ends of the educative process are not corrupted, enormous problems have to be faced: "Internally, the question has to face the tendencies, due to present economic conditions, which split society into classes some of which are made merely tools for the higher culture of others. Externally, the question is concerned with the reconciliation of national loyalty, of patriotism, with superior devotion to the things which unite men in common ends, irrespective of national political boundaries."¹⁸

To eliminate the effects of economic inequalities and nationalistic barriers, powerful administrative provisions are necessary first of all; but also "modification of traditional ideals of culture, traditional subjects of study and traditional methods of teaching and discipline."¹⁹

As for what concerns, in particular, teaching related to relations between nations, according to Dewey "it is not enough to teach the horrors of war and to avoid everything which would stimulate international jealousy and animosity. The emphasis must be put upon whatever binds people together in cooperative human pursuits and results, apart from geographical limitations. The secondary and provisional character of national sovereignty in respect to the fuller, freer, and more fruitful association and intercourse of all human beings with one another must be instilled as a working disposition of mind."²⁰

The democratic idea "of education as a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social aim" is closely linked for Dewey to these aspects. If these are not tackled, Dewey tells us, "a democratic criterion of education can only be inconsistently applied."²¹ By way of explanation, we could say that the importance given in Dewey's pedagogy to interest, to the connection between practice and

theory, to the investigative method and to group research, finds its full significance only if linked to the prospect of overcoming social and national barriers.

The Internationalist Perspective in Other Educationalists.

In addition to Dewey, who expressed so clearly back in 1916 the consciousness of the connection in a democratic society between education and overcoming the nationalistic perspective, and of the need to link this aim to the utilization of suitable economic, cultural and methodological-didactic means, many other authors could be cited. These are generally exponents of the new schools and of activist pedagogy, who, starting from these same years and up till the period following the Second World War, dealt with the same theme. I will limit myself to recalling a few, chosen for their contribution to focalizing various aspects of the problem.

Still in the ambit of the United States and in the wake of Dewey, Kilpatrick, discussing the problem of nationalism in 1926, links it to anarchism, declaring in no uncertain terms: "Nationalism... has, as we know, a history. The conception of absolute national sovereignty is comparatively new in the world and, in a world of ever growing inter-relatedness, quite as unworkable as is the theory of absolute personal sovereignty... Just as history has convinced mankind that laws are necessary to the most effective freedom of each person living in human relations with others, so now, with integration daily weaving the world more and more into one social whole, does it increasingly appear necessary that law must govern nations. And if enforcement by the common strength is necessary to save the weak person from the unwarranted invasion of the strong, why not so with nations? Increasingly the world sees and understands it so."²²

From this point of view it is, for Kilpatrick, a matter of transforming not only methods in education,²³ but the traditional cultural vision of certain disciplines. If it is the school's duty to give "a vision and a grasp of facts able to cope with these facts as they are," it must adopt "world-mindedness." "And this means a new history," writes Kilpatrick, "a new geography, probably a new inclusive social science. For the old history and the old geography by a selective perversion of the facts render us incapable of seeing truly the actual oncoming situation."²⁴

It is worth underlining that this importance attributed by Kilpatrick to the transformation of the historic-social disciplines is confirmed by other authors who adopt a similar perspective against nationalism; to

quote only one example, we may mention the name of Cousinet. Writing in Europe and at a later date (1943), he condemns traditional history teaching, directed at children and pre-adolescents: "There is the sole preoccupation of always exalting national sentiment and leaving school-children ignorant of all those cases where people not belonging to the same country have cooperated and worked for the common good in commerce, industry, arts and sciences. This is the source in all peoples of the hatred of the foreigner, whom schoolchildren never see appear on the scene of history except with weapon in hand."²⁵

Other authors, still taking the perspective of an internationalist education, seem on the other hand to favour the analysis of more properly psycho-affective dynamics with respect to the organization of content.

This is the case with Pierre Herman Bovet,²⁶ who, in discussing civic education, takes into consideration human instincts, and among these the instinct for struggle and the instinct to solidarity; according to Bovet these are closely linked together in man, which is why the transformation of the former to the service of the ideals of solidarity — in various forms, from canalization to sublimation — is possible and constitutes one of the principal tasks of education. In fact "education inspired by the ideal of peace between peoples is simply the moral, civic and human education of the individual taken as a whole."²⁷ "From the family to the clan, from the clan to the tribe, from the latter to the country. Who will stop us from setting our sights even further and seeing the moment when this highest form of social sentiment, solidarity, will take as its object not the state alone, but all mankind? After the confederation of districts into cantons, the confederation of cantons into a nation, the confederation of nations."²⁸

This emphasis on affective dynamics is also found in Montessori, who, discussing the question of peace, maintains that among "the hidden instincts which guide man in the construction of himself," and which "education must exploit," there is "a powerful social instinct."²⁹ In reality, "the child is misunderstood by the adult,"³⁰ who represses him. "A war without truce... awaits man from birth and accompanies him throughout his development,"³¹ a war "between the strong and the weak", won by the adult; it is "fatal for humanity,"³² because, according to Montessori, who here appears to take up psychoanalytical themes, "the obedience to which the child is subjected in the family and in the school, obedience which does not admit reason and justice, prepares man to accept subjugation as his fate... it opens up the way to the spirit of devotion, almost of idolatry towards leaders, who represent for the trapped man the father and schoolmaster, figures which imposed them-

selves on the child as perfect and infallible.”³³ And the children’s life of slavery, punished if they help their classmates and encouraged if they do better than them and beat them by emulation, is an education which prepares men for war.

These psychological mechanisms count much more, according to Montessori, than the cultural content they are taught: “Whether one speaks of war to children, whether the history of mankind is adapted this way or that for the use of children,” she writes, “this changes nothing in the destiny of society.”³⁴ Montessori, aware of the transformations going on at a historical level in the direction of interdependence (further signalled by how different war is in the contemporary world), considers it fundamental that they are accompanied by progress on the interior level in the direction of mental health and happiness; because “a union of withered and isolated men is not a society, cannot be a fertile society offering any moral progress, or any human elevation.”³⁵ To construct a “science of peace” — in short — it is necessary to base it on two realities. “One is that a new child exists... the other is that today humanity constitutes in many respects a single nation... both from the economic point of view, and from the material and intellectual point of view.”³⁶ And central to all this is the task of an education which makes the most of the child: “The man who today is overwhelmed by his time must dominate it. If men were prepared for the present state of life, instead of being dragged along by events, they could themselves direct them so that mankind, instead of precipitating from one illness to the other, from one crisis to another, would start on the conquest of social health.”³⁷

Claparède also refers to psychological dynamics, but more focalized on cognitive development, in an essay written in 1937, where, referring to the social development of the individual described by Piaget, he compares nationalism to infantile egocentrism, and internationalism to the level of higher mental development constituted by socialized thought, maintaining that “the current maladjustment in international relations can be put down to a state of infantilism due to retarded growth.”³⁸ In his opinion, “only by educating the new generations can these sentiments be modified,” and for this education he advances some proposals: “the young person has to experience for himself these international sentiments, for example through inter-scholastic correspondence and international holiday camps.”³⁹

And Piaget himself is the last author whom I intend to consider, since I find the analyses conducted by him extremely profound and interesting. When looking at the problem of international education after the Second

World War, Piaget points out to us that, from the point of view of implied mental operations, “social reality in general, and particularly current international social reality, are among the things which we understand least;”⁴⁰ and this because “collective phenomena have changed in scale, and the level on which they are produced is that of complete interdependence,” “a state of affairs which in truth we fail to assimilate, to which we are not yet accustomed.” It is with these difficulties of comprehension, which are both intellectual and moral, that education must reckon. It must not only offer the child “some new knowledge concerning reality and international institutions,” but above all it must foster “an attitude *sui generis*, an instrument of coordination both intellectual and moral, valid at all levels and adaptable to international problems too.”

This attitude however meets a fundamental obstacle in another attitude, the “most spontaneous and least easily uprooted from every individual consciousness as from every collective consciousness — egocentrism ... and sociocentrism.” If thinking directed towards natural reality has succeeded in freeing itself from egocentrism over centuries of striving, as the development of science shows us, “from the social point of view... the decentring of the I, of the we, or of their symbols and territories, is still impeded by much more numerous obstacles” ... “our spirit is divided between national egocentrism, class egocentrism, racial egocentrism, and many other more or less powerful forms which impose on it a whole gamut of errors ranging from simple illusions of perspective to the lie stemming from collective constrictions.”

For an international education therefore it is not enough to add on some teaching concerning international institutions. In the first place, all teaching must be rendered “entirely international: not only that of history, geography and modern languages, disciplines in which the interdependence of nations leaps to the eyes of even the most blind”, writes Piaget, “but also that of literature and science;” in this way we might hope to arrive at comprehension and tolerance.

In the second place, active methods must be used, “which put in the first place shared research (group work)... and the social life of the pupils (self-government):” and this on the one hand because social experiences help them discover directly those “same conflicts of reciprocity” and the “same lack of comprehension” of which “international life is the theatre, on an entirely different scale naturally;” and on the other hand because “in organizing a social life among the pupils themselves it becomes possible to extend it by setting up international exchanges and also study groups which have as their object international problems.”

From the International Pedagogical Movements to the International Institutions for Education.

The authors considered, as we have said, are not the only ones to concern themselves with the problem of international education: their analyses certainly make them particularly significant; but they are significant also because in various cases they made themselves promoters or participated actively in associations or movements with international perspectives in the field of education. Among the various movements, institutes and associations, — the list of which would be of little significance here and necessarily incomplete — I would like to limit myself to noting, because of its importance and influence, the *Bureau International d'Education*, founded in 1925 in the ambit of the Jean Jacques Rousseau Institute in Geneva, of which two of the authors quoted — Bovet and Piaget — were directors.

The BIE was founded as a reaction to the exclusion of questions of a pedagogic nature from the area of action of the League of Nations, an exclusion due to the explicit opposition expressed in many intellectual environments, under the pretext of national sovereignty, to any form of international collaboration in education (we must not forget that in the pedagogical ambit in the twentieth century there are not only internationalist orientations).

The BIE, born as a private institution, after having organized various congresses, changed its structure in 1929 so as to be able to receive governments or ministers of education as members. Thus it began, at the annual assemblies of its Council, to organize the discussion of general reports given by ministers of public education represented in the Council itself. In this way, the international Conferences on Public Education originated, starting in 1932, which from 1934, because of the intermediation of the Swiss government, were opened to all countries, members and non-members of the *Bureau*.

After the Second World War, the opposition to international collaboration in education having disappeared, Unesco (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) was set up under the aegis of the United Nations; it immediately set up close relations with the BIE, to the point that the international conferences on public education, from which, as is well-known, emerged important "recommendations" on education, were organized in collaboration between the two institutes. The BIE, at the end of the mandate of Piaget and Pedro Rossello, while continuing to maintain its own intellectual autonomy, was incorporated

into the general structure of Unesco.

Unesco, in addition to carrying out important work regarding literacy and education in developing countries, adopted and agreed to realize various projects coherent with the proposals of the educationalists quoted, relating to education in an internationalist perspective. I will limit myself here to citing two achievements.

First of all, as regards the need for a transformation of culture in an international sense, in particular of the historic-social disciplines, I would like to note the *History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind*,⁴¹ originally planned by Julian Huxley, director-general of Unesco, then carried forward with wide international intellectual cooperation, and published by Unesco itself.

In the second place I would like to note as an example of an action directly aimed at affecting teaching practice, the creation in 1953 of the system of schools associated to Unesco, schools which integrate their own curricular activities with others inserted in syllabuses for the promotion of an education tending to foster international understanding.

The Current Situation. Limitations and Prospects.

The work of Unesco is certainly very important and represents, among other things, an attempt to give concrete form to certain of the principles and objectives enunciated by the educationalists whom we have quoted, and an important effort in the direction of international intellectual cooperation. However, from the point of view of effectiveness, it has some limitations which I believe are clear to anyone who, like us, works in the field of teaching. The chief limitation can be seen at once when one asks how well-known the two initiatives mentioned, — the *History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind* and the system of Associated Schools — are among teachers.

Things clearly become unstuck between Unesco and those who work directly in the field of education, due to the fact that the international meetings fostered by Unesco, via governments, are in fact meetings between ministers.

But that is not all. This difficulty of relations exists, to a large degree, also for the experts. This was already signalled by Piaget in 1965, when he maintained, for the realization of the aims of Unesco, the need for "continuous and organized dialogue" not only between governments, but also between experts, and "a constant to and fro"⁴² between these two groups and the groups of teachers and their associations. And if the

difficulty of dialogue is harmful for the aims of Unesco, it is so, I believe, also from other points of view, namely from the point of view of pedagogic research and that of educational action.

Indeed, if we consider the pedagogical research of the second half of the twentieth century — the same which reaches teachers in the form of orientation for teaching offered in manuals or journals of didactics, training courses or competitive examinations — I think that in these the tendency can be noted, apart from specializing into various branches, to concentrate more on the operational and concrete aspects of didactic action than on the great problems debated in the first half of the century.

Certainly, the minute and concrete problems of didactic practice have great importance; but if their connection with general problems is lost sight of — as for example might happen with that of the international perspective of education, obviously brought up to date compared to the first half of the century — the various proposed solutions risk becoming devoid of meaning and therefore not leading to any real educational reform. Piaget wrote : “Only when a dialogue is set up between three interlocutors, the scientific currents, the authorities and the real protagonists, can one speak of a sufficiently complete international collaboration in the sector of education.”⁴³

I would like to add that perhaps it could be precisely this “three-way dialogue” which might foster a new interest in powerful themes, give pedagogical research a more far-reaching orientation, and make teachers rediscover the full meaning of what they are doing.

Silvia Sandrini

NOTES

¹ Jean Piaget, *Psychologie et pédagogie*, Paris, Edition Gonthier, 1969.

² Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991*, London, Michael Joseph, 1994, p.15.

³ *Ibid.*, p.15.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.15.

⁵ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, New York, Macmillan, 1916, p. 104.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.105. Elsewhere in the same section of *Democracy and Education*, we find further details of Dewey's interpretation of Plato: “Lacking the perception of the uniqueness of every individual, his incommensurability with others, and consequently not recognizing that a society might change and yet be stable, his doctrine of limited powers and

classes came in net effect to the idea of the subordination of individuality.” (p. 105) And again, “He thought that change or alteration was evidence of lawless flux; that true reality was unchangeable. Hence while he would radically change the existing state of society, his aim was to construct a state in which change would subsequently have no place.” (p. 105)

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 109.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p.115.

²² William Heard Kilpatrick, *Education for a Changing Civilization*, New York, Macmillan, 1926, pp. 72-74.

²³ In connection with W.H. Kilpatrick, we recall the “project method”, illustrated in *Fondamenti del metodo*, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1962.

²⁴ W. H. Kilpatrick, *Education for a Changing Civilization*, cit., p.74.

²⁵ Roger Cousinet, *Une méthode de travail libre par groupes*, Paris, Edition du cerf, 1949.

²⁶ Bovet, born in Switzerland in 1878 and died in 1965, collaborated with Claparède, director of the Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute in Geneva and founder of the *Bureau International de l'Education* in 1925, which he directed until 1929.

²⁷ Pierre Herman Bovet, *L'instinct combatif*, Paris-Neuchâtel, Delachaux et Nestlé, 1961.

²⁸ See *La paix par l'école*, proceedings of the International Conference held in Prague April 16th-20th 1927, Paris, Flammarion, 1927.

²⁹ G. Galeazzi (ed.), *'Educazione e pace' di Maria Montessori e la pedagogia della pace nel '900*, Torino, Paravia, 1992, p. 68.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 59.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

³⁸ Edouard Claparède, *Psychologie de la compréhension internationale*, Actes du XI Congrès international de psychologie.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ For this quotation from Piaget and those that follow see: Jean Piaget, *Où va l'éducation?*, Paris, Unesco, 1948, 1972.

⁴¹ The project of this history, which corresponded initially to the conceptions of Julian Huxley, at that time director-general of Unesco, was adopted in Florence in 1950 on the basis of a compromise, designed to avoid any form of bias on the part of the organization

towards any particular philosophical vision: each volume was entrusted to an author whose value was recognized and yet all the preparatory work was the object, through national committees, of wide consultation. For a reconstruction of the history and an examination of some of Unesco's achievements, it may be useful to read *Dans l'esprit des hommes*, Unesco, 1946-1971.

⁴² Jean Piaget, *Psychologie et pédagogie*, Paris, Edition Gonthier, 1969.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

Federalism in the History of Thought

DANTE ALIGHIERI

Anyone wishing to explore the historical roots of federalist thought can not avoid taking a careful look at the ideas expressed by Dante Alighieri in his essay on monarchy. As is well-known, this work was written on the occasion of Emperor Henry VII's entrance into Italy, that is, around 1311-12: an initiative which Dante had welcomed in the hope that the imperial authority could be re-established not only with regard to the communes (which contained very serious internal rifts, as well as conducting wars amongst each other, as Dante himself had dramatically experienced) but also concerning a Church and papacy which was ever more directly involved in Italian politics.

Dante's essay aimed to offer a theoretical basis for the political and juridical role that the empire (in the hopes of its supporters) was called on to play in the Europe of that time. Dante based his argument on three main theses, to each of which is dedicated a chapter: the empire is necessary to the world; the Roman Empire, from which the medieval emperors descend, is the only legitimate one; imperial authority derives directly from God, and therefore depends neither on the authority of the Church nor on the Roman papacy.

Each of these theses is maintained, on the basis of various arguments, following the typical style of medieval culture in the age of the Scholastic. Dante tended to develop his arguments by syllogisms; very often he anchors his assertions on the authority of passages in the scriptures, or on the authority of Aristotle, who is called "the Philosopher". Yet, many of Dante's assertions are original and arise out of a shrewd and profound analysis of the great political issues of his time.

Dante's most audacious thesis, if we consider the historical context in which the work was written, was that concerning the source of imperial authority, that is, the autonomy of the empire from the Church and the pope. That the emperor owed his position to God alone had already been maintained in the past by certain royalist authors, particularly in the 11th

century, the age of the controversies surrounding imperial investitures (by Pietrus Crassus, for example). Yet Dante re-proposed with force and considerable courage (in an Italy which had become predominantly Guelph) the thesis of the equal dignity of the two supreme posts of the papacy and empire, each autonomous within its sphere since directly created by God. The arguments against Dante's thesis are rejected one by one, including those drawn from the Bible: for example, Dante rejects the argument that the investiture or deposition of the kings of Israel by the prophets prefigures a papal prerogative to select or depose the emperor, since Samuel and the other prophets did not act as "vicars of God" (as those of the papal party argued), but as simple messengers of a decision taken and expressed by God himself (Monarchy, 3. 6). The profound meaning of this approach lies clearly in the championing of the autonomy of the temporal sphere with regard to the spiritual one, that is, one of the main achievements of European civilisation.

But the most interesting aspects of the essay, as regards the pre-history of federalism, are to be found in certain passages of the first book, where Alighieri develops the thesis of the need for a universal monarchy. These are the passages that we reproduce below and which we submit to the attention of our readers.

Three of Dante's assertions seem to our eyes extraordinarily important. Above all, the thesis according to which the ultimate aim of the human race as a whole, in as much as it is organised in political institutions, is universal peace (note how Dante did not refer only to Christianity but to mankind in general, to the "human race"). Secondly, the lucid explanation of the need for a political authority that was superior to the cities and kingdoms, and able to impose itself if necessary even with force in order to avoid the proliferation of insoluble disputes (and therefore, to avoid the resort to war). Thirdly, the idea that the emperor does not possess the exclusive right to make laws, but only a superior legislative power, which integrates with but does not eliminate that legitimately wielded by the cities and kingdoms, each of which possesses specific characteristics that require specific laws.

Certainly, we must not forget that the political construction theorised by Dante is inseparably linked to the world of mediaeval culture. The universal political institution is the empire, which is potentially absolute, at the service of men but desired by God in the form of dynastic succession and within the parameters of the Roman and Christian tradition; an empire in which there was no space for the division or balancing of functions and powers, and even less so for forms of

democratic control over public offices and the exercise of authority. Yet the greatness of this intellectual construction, conceived (it should be noted) when the political role of the medieval empire was historically on the wane, does not fail to impress, if only we consider the complex evolution, then just at the beginning, of the formation through history of the "national" states: those states which, by proclaiming themselves "sovereign" and "absolute", were to dominate the European political scene for about seven centuries.

Lay authority, universality and subsidiarity: these are the three cornerstones of a coherent vision of political institutions that Dante theorised. Of these, only the first was to be achieved in Europe during the modern age. The second and third were instead to remain unrealised necessities (more precisely, they were not even expressed) until contemporary times.

* * *

MONARCHY*

I.1

All men whom the higher Nature has imbued with a love of truth should feel impelled to work for the benefit of future generations, whom they will thereby enrich just as they themselves have been enriched by the labours of their ancestors. [...]

Now since the truth about temporal monarchy is the most beneficial yet neglected of all these other beneficial but obscure truths, and yet has been neglected by all because it leads to no immediate reward, I intend to draw it out of the shadows into the light. There I shall be able to examine it for the benefit of the world, and to my own glory gain the palm of so great an enterprise. [...]

*We publish here a number of extracts from Dante's work, privileging only those passages that are most directly connected with federalist matters. We have used the translation by Donald Nicholl: "Monarch and Three Political Letters", London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1954. The notes contain some particularly significant points from the original Latin edition, as well as indicating some of the biblical and Aristotelian sources referred to by Dante himself.

I.2

Therefore we must first consider the meaning of “temporal monarchy”, what its essence is and what its end.

The temporal monarchy that is called the Empire is a single Command exercised over all persons in time, or at least in those matters which are subject to time.¹

Doubts about temporal monarchy give rise to three principal questions. The first is the question whether it is necessary for the well-being of the world.² The second is whether it was by right that the Roman people took upon itself the office of the Monarch.³ And thirdly, there is the question whether the Monarch’s authority is derived directly from God or from some vicar or minister of God.⁴ [...]

[...] if the whole process of human society has an end, then this end can serve as the principle by which to demonstrate the validity of our subsequent argument. It would be absurd to suppose that this or that society has an end without acknowledging that there is one end common to them all.

I.3

Therefore let us see what is the ultimate end of human society as a whole.

[...] there must be some particular function proper to the human species as a whole and for which the whole species in its multitudinous variety was created; this function is beyond the capacity of any one man or household or village, or even of any one city or kingdom. What this function is will become clear once the specific capacity of mankind as a whole is evident.⁵ [...]

I.4

[...]

Now since what applies to the part applies also to the whole, and since the individual man becomes perfect in wisdom and prudence through sitting in quietude, so it is in the quietude or tranquillity of peace that mankind finds the best conditions for fulfilling its proper task (almost a divine task, as we learn from the statement: “Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels.”⁶ Hence it is clear that universal peace is the most excellent means of securing our happiness.⁷ This is why the message from on high to the shepherds announced neither wealth, nor pleasure, nor honour, nor long life, nor health, nor strength, nor beauty, but peace.⁸ [...] “Peace be with you” was also the salutation given by the Saviour of men.

I.8

[...]

The human race is at its best and most perfect when, so far as its capacity allows, it is most like to God. But mankind is most like to God when it enjoys the highest degree of unity, since He alone is the true ground of unity — hence it is written: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one.” But mankind is most one when the whole human race is drawn together into complete unity, which can only happen when it is subordinate to one Prince, as is self-evident.[...]

I.10

And wherever there is a possibility of dispute there has to be a judgement to settle it;⁹ otherwise there would be imperfection without a remedy to heal it, which is impossible, since God and nature never fail in essentials.

It is clear that a dispute may arise between two princes, neither of whom is subject to the other, and that this may be their fault or their subjects’; therefore a judgement between them is indispensable. However, since neither can take cognizance over the other (neither being subject to the other — and equals do not rule over equals), there needs to be a third person enjoying wider jurisdiction who by right rules over both of them.¹⁰ This person must be either the monarch (in which case our argument is complete), or not the monarch, in which case he himself will have an equal outside his own jurisdiction, and it will again be necessary to have recourse to a third person. Either this process will go on to infinity (which is impossible) or eventually it will lead us back to a first and supreme judge whose judgement will either directly or indirectly solve all disputes: he will be the Monarch, or Emperor.

Therefore monarchy is necessary to the world. [...]

I.11

[...]

In regard to acts, the contrary to justice is to be found in limitations on power; for since justice is a virtue governing relations, between people, how can it operate in practice without the power of rendering to each his due?[...]

On the basis of this exposition we reason as follows: justice is the most powerful in the world when located in a subject with a perfect will and most power; such is the Monarch alone; therefore justice is at its most potent in this world when located in the Monarch alone. [...]

I.12

[...]

The Philosopher says that “in the perverted forms [of government] a good man is a bad citizen, whereas in the true form to be a good citizen is the same as being a good man.”¹¹ And these true forms of government aim at liberty; they intend men to go on living for their own sakes. Here the citizens do not exist for the sake of the consuls, nor the people for the sake of the king; on the contrary, the king is for the sake of the people, and the consuls for the citizen. Because just as the laws are made for the sake of the body politic rather than the body politic for the laws, likewise those living under the law do not exist for the sake of the legislator but he for them (as the Philosopher asserts in the writings which he has left to us on this issue.)¹² From which it is evident that although the consul or the king are lords over others in regard to means, they are themselves ministers towards others in regards to ends. And this is particularly true of the Monarch, who is to be considered the minister of everyone. Thus one can already recognize how the very purpose of law-making postulates the necessity of Monarchy.

Therefore mankind is in its best condition under a Monarch; from which it follows that monarchy is necessary for the well-being of the world.

I.14

[...]

Of course, when we say “mankind can be governed by one supreme prince” we do not mean to say that minute decisions concerning every township can proceed directly from him (though even municipal laws sometimes prove wanting and need supplementing from outside [...]).¹³ For nations, kingdoms and cities have different characteristics which demand different laws for their government [...].¹⁴

But our meaning is that mankind should be ruled by one supreme prince and directed towards peace by a common law issuing from him and applied to those characteristics which are common to all men.¹⁵ This common rule, or law, should be accepted from him by particular princes [...]. Indeed this was precisely what Moses says he did in writing the Law: having called together the chiefs of the tribes of Israel he left minor judgments to them whilst reserving to himself the major decisions that affected everyone;¹⁶ these were then applied by the chiefs of the tribes according to the particular needs of each tribe. [...]

I.16

[...]

For if we survey the ages and condition of men since the fall of our first parents (the false step from which all our errors have proceeded) at no time do we see universal peace throughout the world except during the perfect monarchy of the immortal Augustus.

(Prefaced and edited by Antonio Padoa-Schioppa)

NOTES

¹ “Est ergo temporalis monarchia, quam dicunt imperium, unicus principatus et super omnes in tempore vel in hiis et super hiis que tempore mensurantur.”

² “An [monarchia] ad bene mundi necessaria sit.” This is the subject of book I.

³ Book II deal with this topic.

⁴ Book III is dedicated to this subject.

⁵ “Est ergo aliqua propria operatio humanae universitatis, ad quam ipsa universitas hominum in tanta multitudine ordinatur; ad quam quidem operationem nec homo unus, nec domus una, nec una vicinia, nec una civitas, nec regnum particulare pertingere potest. Que autem sit illa, manifestum fiet si ultimum de potentia totius humanitatis appareat.”

⁶ Psalms 8.6.

⁷ “Unde manifestum est quod pax universalis est optimum eorum que ad nostram beatitudinem ordinantur.”

⁸ “Peace on earth and good will to all men”: Luca 2.14.

⁹ “Et ubicumque potest esse litigium, ibi debet esse iudicium.”

¹⁰ “Inter omnes duos principes, quorum alter alteri minime subiectus est, potest esse litigium vel culpa ipsorum vel etiam subditorum, quod de se patet; ergo inter tales oportet esse iudicium. Et cum alter de altero cognoscere non possit — nam par in parem non habet imperium — oportet esse tertium iurisdictionis amplioris qui ambitu sui iuris ambobus principetur.”

¹¹ Aristotle, *Politics*, III. 4 (1276b); III. 18 (1288a).

¹² Aristotle, *Politics*, IV. 1 (1289a).

¹³ “Cum dicitur humanum genus potest regi per unum supremum principem, non sic intelligendum est, ut minima iudicia cuiuscumque municipii ab illo uno immediate prodire possint: cum etiam leges municipales quandoque deficiat et opus habeant directivo.”

¹⁴ “Habent namque nationes, regna et civitates intra se proprietates, quas legibus differentibus regulari oportet.”

¹⁵ “Sed sic intelligendum est: ut humanum genus secundum sua comunia, que omnibus competunt, ab eo [imperatore] regatur et comuni regula gubernetur ad pacem.”

¹⁶ Exodus, 18.26.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

JEAN-FRANCIS BILLION, Member of the Comité Régional Rhône-Alpes of the Mouvement Fédéraliste Européen.

ANTONIO PADOA-SCHIOPPA, Member of the Central Committee of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of Milan.

SERGIO PISTONE, Member of the Executive Bureau of the European Union of Federalists, Professor in History of European Integration, University of Turin.

SILVIA SANDRINI, teacher in philosophy and pedagogy, Liceo Psico-socio-pedagogico "Veronica Gambara" of Brescia.

Some articles from recent numbers:

1992

Editorials

Europe after Gorbachev's Downfall.

Federalism and Regionalism.

From Common Rules to a World Environmental Government.

Essays

Sergio Pistone, The Security Policy of the European Union.

Hilary F. French, From Discord to Accord.

Alberto Majocchi, The European Community's Proposal for a Carbon Tax.

Pape Amadou Sow, International Economy, Poverty and Desertification.

Notes

Realism, Opportunism and Innovative Thinking.

The World Community after the Collapse of the Soviet Union.

Some Considerations on the Strategy for Achieving European Federation.

Thirty Years Ago

A draft Manifesto for European Federalism.

Federalism in the History of Thought

Karl Jaspers.

1993

Editorials

European Citizenship and Post-National Identity.

Europe and the Crisis in Yugoslavia.

Interdependence and Cultural Identity.

Essays

Guido Montani, Micronationalism and Federalism.

John Pinder, From Milan to Maastricht: Fifty Years of Federalist Struggle for the Uniting of Europe.

Maurice Duverger, The Milan Manifesto.

Antonio Padoa-Schioppa, Which Constitution for Europe?

Notes

Latin American Federalism.

European Citizenship, Cosmopolitan Citizenship and International Democracy.

Thirty Years Ago

Mario Albertini, For a Regulated Use of National and Supranational Terminology.

Federalism in the History of Thought

Arnold J. Toynbee.

The Movimiento Pro Federación Americana.

1994

Editorials

Enlarging the European Union.

Neo-fascists in the Italian Government.

The Timing of European Unification.

Essays

Franco Spoltore, The Future of Schools in the Age of the Scientific Mode of Production and World Unification.

Guido Montani, European Citizenship and European Identity.

Domenico Moro, The Problem of Underdevelopment in the Era of World Unification.

Notes

Education and Training in the Delors Plan.

The Challenge for Europe: Reducing the Working Week.

The Identity of the Individual Between Ideology and Reason.

Interventions

Sergei A. Beliaev, Federalism in the Constitutional Debates in Russia of 1992-1993: A Review.

Wolfgang Wessels, Post-Maastricht Strategies.

Thirty Years Ago

Mario Albertini, The Defence of Europe and the Significance of Nuclear Weapons.

Federalism in the History of Thought

Abbé de Saint-Pierre.

1995

Editorials

Turkey and Europe.

The Crisis of Democracy and the Crisis of Foreign Policy.

Europe at the Crossroads.

Essays

Marita Rampazi, Working Time, Temps Choisi and Federalism.

Karl Lamers, A Federal Core for the Unification of Europe.

Francesco Rossolillo, Popular Sovereignty and the World Federal People as Its Subject.

Notes

The Right to Secede.

World Government, Climatic Risk and Nuclear Proliferation.

Citizenship in the European Union.

Discussions

Is the European Union Legitimate?

Federalist Action

Francesco Rossolillo, Considerations on the 1996 Intergovernmental
Conference and the Passage to the Third Phase of Monetary Union.

Thirty Years Ago

Mario Albertini, The National Idea.

Federalism in the History of Thought

William Penn.

Direttore responsabile: Mario Albertini - Editrice EDIF - Autorizzazione
Tribunale di Pavia n. 265 del 13-12-1981 - Tipografia PI-Me, Pavia - Spedizione
in abbonamento postale comma 27 art. 2 legge 549/95.

Dear Sir,
The Federalist
has been published
theoretical and
and philosophy
The restructuring
structure by
We suggest
issue with
means of the

SUBSCRIPTION

The Federalist
LUCIANO BOCALINI
language editor
Europe 55000
A three-year
respectively)
Eurocheque d

The Federalist
EDIF
Via Porta Pertusi 6
I-27100 Pavia (Italy)

YEAR XXXVIII, 1996, NUMBER 2