


THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

Hamilton, The Federalist




YEAR XI, 1998, NUMBER 2

THE FEDERALIST

a political review

Editor: Francesco Rossolillo

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by Mario Albertini together with a group of members of the Movimento Federalista Europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



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Sovereignty and the European Currency

Thanks to the determination, at the European Council of Brussels, of the countries which will enter the single currency from the very start, and provided no unforeseen calamities occur, Europe can now be said to have achieved two fundamental milestones on the road towards European unification: the introduction of monetary union and the institution of a European Central Bank. A major advance has been made and, for those fighting for completion of the process (driving, that is, for political union), the outlook is brighter now than at any time in the past.

Having reached this point, federalists are bound to be asking themselves some radical questions. Since currency (like the armed forces) is one of the essential attributes of "statehood", does this mean that a piece of a European state has, in fact, already been created? Has a transfer of sovereignty from national to European level already taken place? Can the progress towards the foundation of a European federation now be considered irreversible?

* * *

Federalists feel that it is imperative to consider these questions as the answers to them will determine the role they play in the phase of the process which is about to begin.

At the heart of the question lies the concept of sovereignty, which has a real sense, and is distinct from the general idea of power, only if it is defined as *the power to decide in the last instance*. As such, sovereignty constitutes the foundation of law, as a legal order can be valid and certain only when the subject which has the power to decide in the last instance has been determined. And, within a given territory, there can be only one such subject, as the existence of more than one would indicate the concomitant validity of two or more legal systems and, in turn, mean that, in situations of conflict, the applicability of one or the other of these could,

in the last instance, be determined only by violence. Sovereignty is therefore the prerequisite for the maintenance of peace in society and for the growth of civilisation.

If there can be only one holder of sovereignty, it follows that those who consider the *division of sovereignty* between two or more levels of government to be a specifically federalist idea fail to appreciate the difference between the concept of sovereignty and the concept of power. While the institutionalisation of a balanced division of power (along territorial lines) among several levels of government constitutes the basis of a federal state, sovereignty, on the other hand, is indivisible as there must, in any particular instance, be one and only one law by which the citizen of a federal state is bound. And there must always be an authority which, in the event of uncertainty, has the power to settle disputes between the citizens or between the institutions of a state.

Even though, in daily life, this function is carried out by different institutions, it is important to appreciate that, since the institutions are shaped and legitimised by the legal system, and in particular by the Constitution, the true holder of sovereignty cannot be an institution because it is the political subject which renders the legal system legitimate (and therefore represents the last resort in the event of *institutional crises*).

In the light of this, the one true holder of sovereignty is the *people*, and each transfer of sovereignty signifies the replacement of one people with another. In the case of Europe, the transfer of sovereignty from national to European level means the exit from the stage of the national peoples, and the entry of the European people to provide the basis of the legitimacy which the institutions of a future European federation will enjoy.

If we accept all this, the implications, from the point of view of the federalist struggle, are considerable.

* * *

The birth of the European federation, which must coincide with the passing of sovereignty from the nations to Europe, will not be only an institutional event but also, and above all, one based on consensus: it will be an event signifying that the citizens of Europe recognise their existence as a single people. And it is this act of recognition which will bestow upon the new institutional order that degree of irreversibility without which it would be meaningless to speak of the birth of a new *state*. In other words, it is only through a *constituent process* (which, while generating,

as it proceeds, a series of events of highly symbolic value, must have a *duration*) that the transfer of sovereignty from national to European level can come about. This process, already under way, will come to an end *after* the formal foundation of the federation. It would appear reasonable to consider the first direct election of the European Parliament as the start of this process, and the creation of a single currency as one of its crucial stages. But the real importance of these two events is the contribution they have made towards raising the awareness among an increasing number of European citizens of their existence as a single people. Moreover, the creation of a European currency will not mark the end of the process, nor will it come to an end with the solemn declaration of the birth of the European federation. With the remark "once Italy has been made, then we must make the Italians" Massimo D'Azeglio once suggested that the process by which sovereignty was transferred from the regional peoples to the Italian people would continue after the formal unification of the country (and what a tortuous and difficult process it turned out to be, as the history of brigandage in the country's southern regions testifies). In the present context, the same idea applies to the transfer of sovereignty from the national peoples to the people of Europe.

It is opportune, at this point, to recall the dialectical nature of the relationship that exists, within all processes leading to the transfer of sovereignty, between institutional changes and the maturing of the civic consciousness (that is, the formation of a new people). The maturation of the civic consciousness is conditioned by changes in the institutional order, which alter the framework of political struggle and the orientation both of the mass media and of the educational system. In turn, the institutional order can be changed only through the will of men, men who enjoy a degree of freedom and who, faced with the inadequacy of the current institutions to meet the needs emerging within society, are driven to act; in short, men whose opinions and behaviour are not merely a passive reflection of the current institutional order. The constituent process is thus a cycle: the political will of men modifies the institutions and the modified institutions, in turn, favour the maturation of the civic consciousness, and thus the expression of a heightened political awareness. This leads to further institutional change, and so the process goes on until a balance is reached, at which point the transfer of sovereignty, i.e., the process leading to the formation of the new people, is over.

* * *

The above idea might appear to be at variance with the idea of the indivisibility of sovereignty, but this is, in fact, only an apparent contradiction. To affirm that sovereignty is indivisible means that, *during the phases in which a balance exists*, there must be a clearly indicated seat of sovereignty. Without this, caught between opposing orders, (each one cancelling out the legitimacy of the other), and prey to confusion and uncertainty, civil coexistence would be disrupted. However, this does not alter the fact that the phases in which there is a balance are separated by *transitional phases* during which there is uncertainty over the seat of sovereignty. Furthermore, when such a transition takes place in a relatively stable external context, such phases can be quite lengthy and orderly, as has been the case, so far, with Europe. Ultimately, the transitional phase will come to an end — making way for a new balance, or for a return to the previous equilibrium, or degenerating into chaos. This does not mean that sovereignty can be divided, only that, in certain periods in history, sovereignty may be latent or, and this amounts to the same thing, its true holder undetermined. Therefore, in reference to European monetary union, while it is incorrect to consider monetary sovereignty (supposedly held by the Central European Bank) as quite separate from political sovereignty (said to be exercised by the national governments), it is, on the other hand, right to see the creation of a European currency as a crucial episode in the transitional process leading to the transfer of sovereignty from national to European level.

* * *

Many people believe that, because of the information-oriented development of society, the world is moving towards an order in which the very idea of sovereignty will be definitively obsolete, superseded by a superimposition of non hierarchical orders and contractual relations which, leaving the way clear for endemic forms of violence (half way between war and internal anarchy) will make it quite reasonable to talk in terms of the advent of a second Middle Ages.

Those who hold this view consider the current order of the European Union to be the first and the most striking manifestation of this new trend, seeing the EU as a new and stable model of organised social cohabitation which, neither federal nor confederal, represents the progressive evaporation of the very idea of the State or, as some insidiously suggest, the emergence of a new form of State which does not even take the idea of sovereignty into account.

This theory must be rejected on the basis both of its deficiency as an analytical tool and of its underlying philosophy. First, because it is only through the adoption of common standards and a common legal rules that the world society in the form which it has assumed due to the evolution of information technology (a form of society which, moreover, would never have evolved without the stimulus of the United States government) is able to function and, in turn, because such standards and rules can be imposed only by political power (not, simply, as a result of competition between private operators). Indeed, any long absence or withdrawal on the part of the State would provoke the collapse of the very system which is supposedly seeking to supersede it. Second, the theory must be repudiated because of its underlying philosophy, based as it is on the selfish promotion of those private interests which allow immediate gain, (and are strong enough to guarantee, or create the illusion of being able to guarantee their own security), and on a lack of concern for the "Fourth World" both external and internal, which is prey to violence, poverty, crime, disease and social outcasting. It is certainly possible that the world is drawing ever closer to a major civilisation crisis and, should this indeed be the case, we must not simply sit back and wait for the advent of a second Middle Ages but rather, recognising the catastrophic nature of such an eventuality, invest all our strength in the fight to prevent it.

* * *

If the process leading to the transfer of sovereignty is essentially a process of maturation of the civic consciousness, its course must be marked by one or more *founding acts* which are so loaded with symbolic meaning that they become impressed in the collective imagination and stimulate a greater awareness of the existence of the new emerging people. The oath of the Tennis-Court and the Philadelphia Convention are two such founding acts. In the case of the process of European unification, it is inconceivable that the transfer of sovereignty might come about merely through an agreement among governments, an agreement prompted by the rational recognition of an objective need. The birth of a new people implies the death of the institutions in which the power of all those who stand for the old order is rooted. The transfer of sovereignty is a process destined to encounter stronger and stronger resistance the closer it draws to its conclusion. Like any major revolutionary historical transformation, the founding of the European federation is bound to go through dramatic periods, periods which will draw the

citizens into the process, heightening emotions, giving rise to hopes, generating fears and anxieties and provoking conflicts. In such periods, the European people in the making will, in one form or another, take an active and leading role and, by explicitly manifesting its will, underline its importance as the wielder of constituent power in Europe. Before this can happen, however, the inadequacy of the current European institutions vis-à-vis the problems, both internal and external, with which they are required to deal, will have to become so extreme as to provoke social paralysis, crisis and insecurity on such a scale that the daily lives of every citizen are affected.

* * *

At this point, it does not, therefore, seem possible to affirm that the process of the transfer of sovereignty from national to European level has, with the advent of monetary union, reached the threshold of irreversibility. This notion of the irreversibility of the process of European unification has always been central to the federalist debate and, because of the important implications it has on the federalist action, it is an idea which must be approached with the utmost care. Indeed, whether we see the process as a rigidly determined series of events or consider its phases to depend exclusively on the free will of the subjects that determine them, the capacity of the Federalist movement to spur others into action is severely compromised. Revolutionary political action is motivated by two things: first, by the awareness that one's own commitment may *make a difference* (may, in other words, help to change things) and, second, by the belief that this commitment reflects the direction which the historical course is following and that one's struggle is not quixotic since the message which the action seeks to convey is directed at men and women who have, by the evolution of events, been rendered receptive to it. Returning to the concrete example of European unification, it can be observed that since this process entered its constituent phase (with the first direct election of the European Parliament), the pro-European forces have presented a stronger and stronger front; furthermore, the federalist position has been simplified as the various aspects of many issues, like that of the single European currency, which previously had to be explained laboriously, have now been clarified by the evolution of events. However, we must not forget that, although the distance still to be covered is now relatively short, this last stage of the journey is bound to be much more difficult than the earlier ones, and that the anti-European forces are

becoming fiercer and more determined in their opposition: the more directly and explicitly their power is threatened, the more tenacious they will be in their defence of it.

Historical transformations are driven by the force of contradiction. The process of European unification is, in every phase, driven by the contradictions which continue to emerge between the nature of the Union's institutions and the nature of the problems with which these institutions have to deal. They are contradictions which, if Europe does become a single subject, the historians of the future will interpret as Hegelian stages in the manifestation of the Idea which, necessarily, contain within them their own conclusion. From the present-day perspective, however, and especially from the perspective of the activist striving to achieve a political result in the short-to mid-term, such contradictions emerge as a contrast between interests and alignments in favour of the overcoming of the status quo, and interests and alignments determined to see it maintained — and of course, in this context, the forces in favour of progress may win or lose. While it is true that political action is founded ultimately on faith in the capacity of human reason to overcome, *sooner or later*, the major contradictions of history in order to promote the emancipation of mankind and its liberation from the clutches of violence and need, it is also true that the gradual journey of mankind towards increasingly humane forms of social cohabitation has been marred by wasted opportunities, war, poverty and oppression. The price paid by mankind for its freedom is a high one indeed. But the length of the process and the extent of the costs involved depend, in part, on the will of man — if they did not, it would be impossible to view political commitment as anything other than a pure struggle for power.

The Federalist

The Theory of the Nation *

LUCIO LEVI

More than a hundred years ago, in his famous lecture, "What is a Nation?", Ernest Renan observed that the idea of nation, "apparently clear," is "easy to seriously misunderstand."¹ Even today the state of confusion clouding the literature on the nation has not substantially changed.

What is new is the fact that the tide of history is sweeping the nation-states away. In a world which every day is becoming more and more closely interdependent, the nation-states merely survive as a vestige of other times.

New forms of statehood and legitimacy of power, based on multinational and federal principles of political co-existence, are emerging and tending to replace the old, declining order of the nation-states.

If these tendencies are real, one may fairly claim that the time is ripe for a comprehensive understanding of the national reality. Indeed, systematic clarity of thought always comes at the end of a historical cycle. Hegel was right to consider the capacity to understand the contemporary world a premonitory sign of the approaching twilight of an era: "Philosophy... always comes on the scene too late... When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk."² In other words, if the national order has indeed run its course, its features are now becoming fully recognizable, because lit by twilight.

Yet the contemporary literature on the nation-state, if it has lost its former apologetic tone because of the exhaustion of its object, has not on

* The following three papers were delivered at the Convention in honour of Mario Albertini: "Nation, Federation and Europe", organised by the Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Political and Social Studies of the University of Pavia (23rd-24th October, 1997).

the whole made perceptible progress towards defining and explaining the nature of the nation. The case of Eric Hobsbawm is emblematic: in his book, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, having stated that without some understanding of the concept of nation the last two centuries of history are incomprehensible, he then fails to define nation. "This book", he writes, "assumes no *a priori* definition of what constitutes a nation. As an initial working assumption any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a 'nation', will be treated as such."³ Throughout the book, Hobsbawm does not go beyond this first assumption, which in truth is scarcely very illuminating.

In what was to be his last interview on the national question, Albertini observes that "Hobsbawm symbolizes very well the literature on the nation, based on rigorous scientific criteria, but which somehow has always evaded the question: what is the nation? People study the nation as if it were a given, already known even before they start studying it. Whereas what has to be ascertained is precisely what is the nation, who controls it, by what title, and for what motive, or to ask oneself whether the nation is not simply the illusory representation of something else."⁴ Because of the apparent incontestable evidence of a world organised into sovereign states, distinguished from each other on the basis of nationality, scholars tend to assume the existence of nations as an indisputable fact.

* * *

When a new political thinking asserts itself, it begins by contesting the established order. Its first task lies in identifying the essential features of the object it proposes to demolish. Mario Albertini's contribution towards understanding the sense of contemporary history is closely bound up with the values linked to the current federative movement in Europe, which marks the end of the era of nationalism, begun with the French Revolution. From this viewpoint, and spurred by the political motivation to overcome the limitations of the nation-state, Albertini elaborated a new conceptual framework which cast light on hitherto unknown aspects of the national reality and gave a scientific basis to the critique of the idea of the nation.

Albertini's essay on *The Nation-State*, which began to circulate in 1958 and was published in 1960,⁵ contains most of what we know (or should know) on this topic. The problem which Albertini tackled was that of identifying, within the broad category of the state-form, the typical

aspects of the nation-state. The analytical method used by Albertini is the ideal type, proposed by Max Weber. It does not reproduce the entire reality of the nation-state (which would be impossible), but isolates, by a comparative process, some aspects "by one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct."⁶ The ideal type therefore constitutes a model which aims to impose order on the chaos of empirical data, identifying and explaining a specific historical and social reality.

* * *

The starting point in Albertini's research was a critique of the objective criteria for defining the nation, such as race, language, religion, and so on, as in Renan's above-quoted lecture, held at the Sorbonne in 1882. None of these criteria stands up to close empirical analysis.

One interpretation of the nation is based on the assumption of a natural bond, which can be framed into the idea of race. This assumption lacks any scientific basis. The only aim for which the idea of race has been (and continues to be) used is to justify discrimination, to feed racial hatred, and to create and maintain hostility between human groups. It is true that genetically transmitted biological characteristics are distributed along a continuous line in the various parts of the world, so that in each human group the prevalence of certain characteristics can be observed. However, the prevalent characteristics of a group gradually converge with those of contiguous groups, so that it is impossible to distinguish a particular group on the basis of distinct biological characteristics. On the other hand, genetics and anthropology have shown that mental characteristics are not directly determined by biological characteristics, while hereditary characteristics and the biological evolution of the human species are conditioned to a large extent by historical and social factors, i.e. by the sum of norms regulating reproduction and matrimony, which in turn depend on the productive system, on the structure of political organisation and on the form of the culture.

A second criterion to define the nation is based on the supposed existence of a "living organism", i.e. of an entity endowed with a life of its own, distinct from that of the individuals who compose the national group. The nation would be identified by the existence of characteristics

common to members of the group (language, religion, territory etc.). First of all, the identification of a nation by language is unsustainable. There are cases where the same language is spoken by several nations (for example English or Spanish), while peoples who speak different languages are citizens of the same state and consider themselves as belonging to the same nation, like the Swiss or Belgians. The same applies to religion. There are nations in which several religions are practised, as in Switzerland or Germany, and religions, like Catholicism, which are professed in many nations (France, Spain, Italy, etc.). Equally unfounded is the idea of natural frontiers. Borders have a political, not a geographical origin. They are continually changed in the course of history as a result of wars, treaties, marriages, i.e. events determined by politico-strategic or dynastic interests.

Finally, custom and tradition are not uniform elements within a nation. Within the borders of a nation one may identify more important differences than those existing between neighbouring regions belonging to different nations. Consider for example the differences between a Lombard and a Sicilian, and between a Lombard and a Swiss citizen from Ticino Canton.

* * *

Equally baseless is the voluntaristic or elective concept, proposed by Renan, although seeking the basis of the nation in the individual consciousness constitutes progress in the right direction, which is to base the definition of the nation on observable behaviour. The subjective criterion, identified by Renan, consists of the "wish to live together" or "a daily plebiscite."⁷ This is a brilliant formula expressing a strongly idealised conception of the political process. It represents the nation as the terrain of free individual choice, hiding the fact that individual actions are conditioned and at times determined by political power.

The historiography has shown that the formation of the nations, far from being the fruit of a democratic will, is rather the result of the imposition of a power seeking a unifying principle over a territory whose borders are drawn by force. When we are born, we acquire our nationality without choice. At no time subsequent to our birth is an entrance ticket offered with an option to accept or reject it. On the contrary, while it is relatively easy to change religion or party, change of nationality is subject to stiff conditions, beginning with residence for a determined number of years in the state whose nationality one wishes to acquire.

In short, if we take for granted that the existence of nation-states is founded on consensus and, more precisely, on the belief in their legitimacy, the fact remains that, as Albertini observed, Renan's formula does not show "how... the will to live together... *as a nation*" is formed.⁸ On the other hand, Renan does not explain what distinguishes national ties from the ties which unite other groups which depend on voluntary membership (such as a hunters' association or a religious community).

* * *

To Renan's formula (the will to live together) Albertini prefers that of "loyalty", used by Hans Kohn.⁹ It includes passive attitudes towards power, in compliance with a realistic view of political life.

Albertini's method is to define the nation on the basis of the empirical observation of individual behaviour, resolving the collective entity into the sum of individuals who form it, and collective actions into the sum of individual behaviours.¹⁰ Now, national behaviour is, as an initial approximation, loyal behaviour towards an entity no better defined: the nation. The concept of loyalty is therefore identified as the characteristic typical of national behaviour. Albertini stresses that, on the basis of this concept, Kohn "was able to turn the history of nationalism upside down, shifting the perspective away from national principles in order to view the characteristic typical of nationalism: the linking of various experiences to a single centre of reference, the nation." In consequence, Kohn showed that nationalism "does not depend on tradition, on language, or on the state, but on the individual's close political and cultural identification with his nationality, observable at the end of the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and extended to the economic field only during the last part of the nineteenth century."¹¹ In other words, the typical aspect of national behaviour does not lie in the linguistic, cultural, or traditional aspect of the action being considered, but in loyalty to the nation, justified by a supposed community of language, culture or traditions.

Kohn, using the approach of the history of ideas, studied verbal formulations of the conduct loyal to the nation. It is a valuable study in historical reconstruction, which enabled him to observe when this behaviour was manifested for the first time in history. Kohn maintains that although there were hints of it before, nationalism first became established with the French Revolution. This thesis distinguishes him from authoritative historians, such as Werner Kaegi or Edward Carr,¹² who

have also made an important contribution to the study of the nation-state, and yet see the national experience as beginning with the dissolution of the mediaeval unit and the formation of the modern state. The historical period running from this time to the French Revolution may be called the incubation of nationalism, during which, with the Industrial Revolution and the bureaucratic state, the historical and social and institutional conditions for the nation-state were prepared. Only after the French Revolution did the supreme loyalty of individuals, i.e. the highest loyalty in the hierarchy of collective values, formerly reserved for king and religion, shift towards the nations.

* * *

To clarify the meaning of this change Kohn distinguished two forms of nationality: "natural" and "artificial". What is natural in man is "the tendency... to love his birthplace or the place of his childhood sojourn, its surroundings, its climate, the contours of hills and valleys, of rivers and trees." Equally natural is "the preference... for his own language, as the only language which he thoroughly understands." Nationality in this sense is a territorial or linguistic tie and corresponds to the nation in the etymological sense of the word (*natio* means the place where one is born). It is to be distinguished from "artificial nationality", in which we find the same elements (attachment to territory, language and common origins), but extended to a territory and a population of much broader dimensions, which implies love for unknown cities and populations with no associated memory. This form of nationality, Kohn explains, is "an artificial product of historical and intellectual development."¹³

In harmony with this point of view, Nietzsche coined the distinction between *Nächstenliebe* and *Fernstenliebe*, love of the nearest, and love of the far away.¹⁴ But it should be pointed out that cosmopolitanism is also a form of love for far-off things. Here Albertini stressed that, alongside natural nationality, (he calls it "spontaneous nationality") there is a "spontaneous super-nationality", which consists of "universal values", for example "the Christian republic and the European republic of men of letters, which linked individuals beyond state frontiers."¹⁵

* * *

Kohn's history of nationalism is a history of ideas, understood in the most ingenuous form. From this perspective, the formation of nations is

presented as a process which has purely ideal origins, instruments and objectives. The underlying facts, i.e. the historical circumstances, as conditioned by the mode of production and by the structures of power and the economy, which have allowed national ideas to be affirmed in a particular country, at a particular time, and in a particular form, have an insignificant role in the narration of events.

In consequence of this choice of method, Albertini observes, "the facts have given Kohn the response already contained in the question; and the event in question [the formation of the nations], preconstituted by the selection of facts, appeared to him purely ideal."¹⁶

* * *

At this point Albertini examines the objective aspect of national behaviour, the history of facts. Guided by Boyd Shafer's work on nationalism,¹⁷ Albertini studied the process of unification of human behaviours, in particular the behaviours of political dependence, whether linguistic or religious, within those states which, beginning with the French Revolution, were to become nation-states. The consolidation of absolute monarchies on territories corresponding approximately to the current nation-states, the linguistic unification of these territories, and the division of Christianity into national religions, led to the formation of the modern bureaucratic state. The gradual political, economic and social unification of the current national territories culminated in the Industrial Revolution, which brought down the barriers which isolated individuals into many small self-sufficient agricultural-artisan communities. Consequently, behaviours became increasingly linked to the state, because individuals demanded state intervention to guarantee that social relations at national level were carried out in an orderly way.

But, while Shafer qualified this behaviour as "national", confusing the formation of the modern state with that of the nation, Albertini emphasises that these are two distinct processes. He calls the development of unified behaviour on vast territories co-extensive with the nations, and its association with the state, the "premises of nationalism."¹⁸ But at the same time he points out that such behaviour did not take on a national character until the French Revolution, in the sense that only then did the nation become the object of supreme loyalty.

Indeed, as Shafer had shown, whereas in the Middle Ages the scale of loyalties was so ordered that an individual felt himself "first of all a Christian, secondarily a Bourgeois, and only in third place a French-

man,"¹⁹ and bearing in mind that these feelings of belonging had a very different significance from today, in contemporary society practically all men are united and divided by their attachment to a single object: their nation.

"The passage from the pre-national to the national situation," according to Albertini, "took place when, once the ideas relating to past collective experiences had fallen away, individuals could become aware of how their various actions were linked on the political level, and expressed their situation in terms of loyalty to the group constituted by this link, the nation."²⁰

* * *

The coming of the era of nationalism coincided with a change in the principle of legitimacy of power. The French Revolution, the event which contributed more than any other towards defining the significance and values of contemporary consciousness, marked the passing from one historical era to another with the fall of the *ancien régime* and the affirmation of nation-states. The change which sums up the whole significance of this stage of history is the passage from the principle of dynastic legitimacy by divine right, to that based on the new ideologies of democracy and nationalism.

The organism onto which the national principle was grafted was the sovereign state, which was formed on the ruins of feudal society and had defined its own individuality, affirming itself as an independent power in the states system, and as a higher power than the other centres of power, chief of which was the Church, operating within the state.

It should be pointed out that the prevalent conception of the state in the age of the *ancien régime* was something very different from the present one. The state had an authoritarian structure: sovereignty belonged to the absolute sovereign, whose power over both possessions and subjects were unlimited. Consequently, the interests of the state were identified with those of the sovereign.

The national principle on the other hand meant the affirmation of the popular state, based on popular sovereignty. The national movement fought for the recognition of every people's right to become master of their own destiny. It thus pursued two aims, one domestic and one international. On the internal level, it struggled to make the peoples aware of their unity by assigning the same democratic rights to all individuals, who thus acquired the capacity to participate in determining the state

policy. On the international level, the principle of self-determination of peoples allows the realization of national independence, and in this way bases state foreign policy on the will of the people, without interference from other states.

At this point however it is as well to carefully distinguish between the aims of the democratic and of the national principles, as the evolution of history shows the levelling and oppressive character of the nation state more and more clearly, and brings out the contradictions between this form of political organisation and the values of freedom and equality. The basic value of the democratic ideology is political equality, whereas the goal of the national principle is to put the state into the hands of the people.

While democracy has no borders, because its goal is universal equality, nationalism serves to justify the existence of distinct political communities and hence of state borders. This feature of national ideology explains how the latter has succeeded in bending democracy, a universal ideology, to the requirements of a world divided into sovereign states, independent and in conflict between each other. The fact is that behind the sovereign nation, *raison d'état* has continued to operate, with the old needs for security and might, which required that freedom and equality were sacrificed to security when the survival of the state was in danger.

* * *

In substance, what characterizes loyalty to the nation, according to Albertini, is that it is not simply presented as loyalty to the state and to its constitutional principles, but is at the same time a loyalty towards other ethical and cultural values and towards an organic social entity, a collective personality, namely the nation, which does not correspond to any community definable in clear conceptual terms. The most characteristic innovation introduced by Albertini in the theory of the nation lies in relating the concept of nation to the notion of ideology.

When Renan said that "oblivion and even historical error represent an essential factor in the creation of a nation,"²¹ he opened the way towards this kind of interpretation. With this phrase he allowed it to be understood that devotion to the nation is based more on forgetting than remembering, more on error than on historical objectivity; and even on invented memories, in other words on real falsification.

But it is the conception of ideology as false consciousness, introduced into the political culture by Marx, that is Albertini's point of reference, because it showed that representations of social reality can be distorted

or disguised because of power relations. What people are and do, precisely because subject to social conditioning, does not correspond fully to their own self-awareness. "The ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the ruling ideas:"²² this phrase emphasizes that the essential function of the ruling ideas is to consolidate the power of the ruling classes. The function of objectively representing social reality is secondary to this.

However, ideology is neither a purely imaginary representation of reality nor simply a lie. Every ideology, to unfold itself effectively, must also contain descriptive elements, which make it credible and consequently likely to gain support.

As Gustav Bergmann showed, mystification occurs whenever a value judgement is mistaken for an assertion of fact.²³ This is a normal phenomenon in the political field, because political power is a social relationship in the presence of which the mind often, instead of representing reality, hides or deforms it.

Albertini's great contribution was to have extended the notion of ideology, which Marx had linked to class positions, to power relations within the state.²⁴ Albertini defines the nation as "the ideology of the centralized bureaucratic state"²⁵ and national feeling as "the ideological reflection of the ties binding the citizen to his own nation-state."²⁶

* * *

While natural communities are held together by spontaneous bonds formed without any intervention of power, nation-states, because of their size, have created an artificial bond by imposing linguistic and cultural unity on all populations settled on the territory of the state (fusion of state and nation). National consciousness, as a phenomenon diffused throughout the population, is therefore the consequence (and not the premise) of the formation of the nation-state and of a precise political programme, first devised by the Jacobins during the French Revolution, which undertook to impose unity of language, culture and traditions on all populations settled on the territory of the state. This involved destroying all links with communities greater and smaller than the state. Thus for national governments the fusion of state and nation became the basis for demanding exclusive loyalty of the citizens and for developing an aggressive foreign policy.

Albertini's essay on the *Risorgimento* confirms this hypothesis: "The history of the formation of the Italians", he wrote, "is... a chapter in the

history of the concentration of political power in Italy.”²⁷

* * *

At this point we have to ask ourselves why the fusion of the state and the nation is a phenomenon typical of the European continent. It produced states with a high degree of integration among the citizens and an equally high degree of centralization of power, so that the material and ideal resources of the country were subject to the direct control of central government. In contrast, Great Britain and Switzerland (essentially an island on the European continent), while having developed a bureaucratic state, have maintained a decentralized structure in their political institutions and a multinational society, so that state and nation do not coincide.

Historians of the Rankian school particularly, using the category of *raison d'état*, have shown that the strong politico-military pressure suffered by the states of the European continent on their borders impelled them to centralize their power; and this institutional system could not survive without developing the image of a society as homogeneous as its power was centralised.²⁸

* * *

In conclusion, the definition of the nation achieved by Albertini yields two important results.

First of these is the identification of the nature of national behaviour. “Much behaviour, relating to almost all spheres of human experience, shows, alongside its specific motivation, a second motivation, that of reference to ‘France’, ‘Germany’, ‘Italy’ and so on.” For example, “a German in Germany... is struck by a monument of art or by a beautiful landscape and thinks: ‘How beautiful Germany is!’.” It goes without saying that an example of beauty in nature or art is not an example of the aesthetic genre ‘Germany’, which does not exist, but of the Gothic or Romanic, of mountainous or lacustrine, etc. This is a case in point, where the specific motivation of aesthetic appreciation joins another: that of loyalty, or at least of reference, to Germany.”²⁹ As has been said, what marks national conduct is loyalty. The objective reference of this behaviour is the state, which however is not thought of as such, but as an illusory entity, to which are linked cultural, aesthetic and sporting experiences, whose specific character is not national. At the basis of this is a power relationship. Individuals who attend national schools, celebrate national

festivals, pay national taxes, and do national military service, which prepares them to kill and to die for the nation, express their behaviour in terms of loyalty to a mythical entity, the nation, an idealized representation of centralized bureaucratic states. This idealization of reality is the mental reflection of the power relations between individuals and the nation-state, and serves to consolidate the latter.

In the second place, Albertini’s research, by identifying the criterion which distinguishes the state group (the collection of individuals who have the legal requisites for citizenship of the state) from the national group (the collection of individuals who believe in the nation), has succeeded in giving a scientific definition of the national group. Empirical analysis shows that the two groups do not coincide: the national group is, in some respects, more restricted, and in others, broader than that of the state. For example, within the confines of the Italian state, the South Tyrolean community does not possess an Italian national consciousness, while beyond the confines of the Italian state there are communities which have an Italian national consciousness, while not having Italian citizenship (for example some Italian communities resident in Istria).

* * *

Like the great innovators who have ventured into unknown regions, Albertini opened up newpaths, the exploration of which will be the task of others (a whole school of thought).

Let us consider, for example, the notion of ideology. It has two meanings. In the more general acceptance, and in agreement with common language, which uses such expressions as “liberal ideology”, “socialist ideology”, the term ideology means a system of political ideas, a political vision. Alongside this notion, there is another more specific one, according to which ideology is self-mystified thinking. Albertini explored the national ideology from this second perspective, while he concerned himself only marginally with the former.

If nationalism is an ideology and the nation-state is the institution which generates nationalism, one has to identify a method of analysis which allows the two things to be studied together. One possible method is that proposed by Albertini to define federalism, but which can be extended, as he himself suggested,³⁰ to analyse other ideologies. According to this approach, in every ideology three aspects can be distinguished: a value aspect, which defines the goal of the ideology; a structure aspect, which defines the political institutions, i.e. the form of organisation of

power necessary to pursue that goal; and the historical and social aspect, which defines the historical and social conditions necessary for the affirmation of these institutions and these values. By analyzing nationalism in this way, one can formulate the hypothesis that the value aspect is the unity and independence of the nation, seen as superior values both to the individual and humanity; the structure aspect is the unified, bureaucratic and centralized state; and the historical and social aspect is an ethnically and linguistically homogeneous society, in which unity prevails over class and regional divisions.³¹

NOTES

¹ E. Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* Bizou, Press Pocket, 1992, p. 37.

² G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, tr. T.M.Knox, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 12-13. Originally published under the double title of *Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*, and *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, 1821.

³ E. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge, CUP, p. 8.

⁴ "Nazionalismo e alternativa federalista". Interview with Mario Albertini, in *Il dibattito federalista*, X, 1994, no. 4, p. 38.

⁵ M. Albertini, *Lo Stato nazionale*, Milan, Giuffrè, 1960.

⁶ M. Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Glincoe, IL, The Free Press, 1949, p. 90 (Originally published under the title *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1922).

⁷ E. Renan, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

⁸ M. Albertini, *Lo Stato nazionale*, *cit.*, p. 23.

⁹ H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism. A Study in Its Origins and Background*, New York, MacMillan, 1951.

¹⁰ M. Albertini, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-25.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 50.

¹² W. Kaegi, *Historische Meditationen*, Zurich, Fretz & Wasmuth Verlag, 1946, vol. I; E.H. Carr, *Nationalism and After*, London, MacMillan, 1945.

¹³ H. Kohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-8.

¹⁴ F. Nietzsche, *Also sprach Zarathustra*, 1883-85, in *Nietzsches Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Berlin, Gruyter & Co., 1968, vol. VI, t. I, pp. 73-75. *Thus spoke Zarathustra*, trans. 1954.

¹⁵ M. Albertini, *Il Risorgimento e l'unità europea*, Napoli, Guida, 1979, p. 18.

¹⁶ M. Albertini, *Lo Stato nazionale*, *cit.*, p. 61.

¹⁷ B.C. Shafer, *Nationalism: Myth and Reality*, London, Gollancz, 1955.

¹⁸ M. Albertini, *Lo Stato nazionale*, *cit.*, pp. 100 and following pages.

¹⁹ B.C. Shafer, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

²⁰ M. Albertini, *Lo Stato nazionale*, *cit.*, p. 126.

²¹ E. Renan, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

²² K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, edited by

T.B. Bottomore and M. Rubel, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1965, p. 93.

²³ G. Bergmann, *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism*, New York, Longmans Green and Co., 1954, p. 310.

²⁴ A precedent in this direction can be seen in Mosca's concept of "political formula". Cf. G. Mosca, *Elementi di scienza politica*, Bari, Laterza, 1953, pp. 108 and following pages.

²⁵ M. Albertini, "L'idée de nation", in *L'idée de nation*, Paris, P.U.F., 1969, p. 13.

²⁶ M. Albertini, *Lo Stato nazionale*, *cit.*, p. 143.

²⁷ M. Albertini, *Il Risorgimento e l'unità europea*, *cit.*, p. 143.

²⁸ Cf., for example, O. Hintze, *Staat und Verfassung*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962, Volume 3.

²⁹ M. Albertini, *L'idée de nation*, *cit.*, p. 8.

³⁰ M. Albertini, *Il federalismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993, p. 91.

³¹ I have developed this analysis of nationalism in L. Levi, *Lettture su Stato nazionale e nazionalismo*, Turin, CELID, 1995.

A Profile of European Integration

GIOVANNI VIGO

An exhaustive analysis of the process of European unification should begin with an examination of the unstoppable productive forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution which have, for some time now, extended beyond national barriers to reveal two things: the first is the irreversible crisis of the national state, which has shown itself to be totally unable to govern a process that has spread beyond its own borders, and the second is the need to create democratic institutions at supranational level, so that mankind may once again take control of his own historical destiny.

However, it is not my intention to explore these aspects here, but to consider, rather, the way in which the process of European integration has evolved in the period since the Second World War. The initial impetus for European integration was provided by the United States which, through the Marshall Plan, had made a decisive contribution to the rebuilding of post-World War II Europe. Unlike what had happened in the wake of the First World War, economic aid was not destined to individual countries, but poured into a single programme whose aim was to favour the evolution of new forms of cooperation. And it was to this end that, in 1948, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was instituted and entrusted with the task of managing the resources provided by the United States.

The same year also saw the creation of the Council of Europe, a body which, despite having no effective power, was, in the aftermath of Europe's bloodiest conflict ever, certainly of enormous symbolic value: the people of Europe wanted to distance themselves from a past punctuated by wars and characterised by division, and to look towards a common future of which all would share in the building.

The ideal of European unity, which over the centuries had fired the imagination of Dante Alighieri and Giuseppe Mazzini, Carlo Cattaneo and Victor Hugo, was now beginning to condition the conduct of

governments and to shape the expectations of citizens. From being an ideal to which to aspire, but one whose realisation belonged to some far-distant and uncertain future time, the question of European unity had become a real political issue. Indeed, according to the extreme view taken by Luigi Einaudi, it had become the overriding political problem on whose solution the fate of the people of Europe depended.

On March 1st, 1954, with the future of the Community for European Defence (CED) looking bleak, Einaudi wrote: "There is an evident need for a unified Europe. The existing states are nothing more than dust devoid of substance. Not one of them is in a position, independently, to bear the cost of its own defence. Only by uniting can they hope to survive. This is not a choice between independence and union; it is a choice between union and extinction."¹ It is not easy to establish whether there were, apart from Einaudi and those of federalist conviction, others who were so acutely aware of the historic nature of the period through which the people of Europe were living. What is certain is that the process of European construction has certainly not reflected the urgency of the times, and neither has it followed the straight line of reason. Rather, it has followed a tortuous path, with occasional actions following hurriedly on the heels of events rather than reflecting a coherent and tenaciously pursued plan.

It hardly needs to be underlined that the process of European unification, like all major transformations in history, is a phenomenon of the utmost complexity whose reconstruction and comprehension is possible only by isolating the salient features of its development.

In this respect, I consider the best interpretative scheme to be that proposed by Mario Albertini in a work dating back to 1963.² In Albertini's view, three distinct phases can be identified within the movement towards European unification: a *psychological* phase, an *economic* phase and a *political* phase. Although the last of these had, at the time, only just begun, it was already becoming clear what its final outcome would be.

The *psychological* phase coincided with the immediate post-war years when the dominant theme in the sphere of international politics was the power acquired by the Soviet Union and the conflict emerging between East and West. There was only one way in which a solid barrier could be built to provide protection against the dangers of Russian expansionism, and that was to transform the weakness deriving from the division of Europe into sovereign states into strength deriving from their union.

The European system of states, which for five centuries had domi-

nated the course of world history, had collapsed leaving Europe a mere appendage to the United States. It was in the vital interest of the latter to promote union among the states of Europe as a united Europe would constitute, for America, an essential line of defence against the Soviet Union, which had refused aid offered within the context of the Marshall Plan, and was fast becoming the West's most formidable adversary.

While it is true that the United States, as the only power with the capacity to organise the defence of the West, was acutely aware of the weight of responsibility which lay upon its shoulders, it is equally true that the governments of Europe should, according to the most basic logic, have been the ones most in favour of creating a union of European states. And yet it was not on their own initiative that they set out in this direction; they merely accepted it as the only road open to them.

In his essay of 1963, Albertini illustrated the deepest reasons motivating, and which were destined to go on motivating, the behaviour of the states of Europe. "Now, whether they like it or not, their own *raison d'état*, their basic need for survival, is forcing the states, in the absence of any other way out, to come together in the search for answers to problems which can neither be eluded, nor solved by any of them on their own. This is the unity trap. This is the reason why states, in defiance of their very nature, march together instead of each following its own national course."³

However, in order to march together in the long term, something more than a passive stance was needed. What the states were going through was a "complete transformation" of their history, a period of radical change that could not have been sustained had there not existed a deep belief that the Europe of single nations belonged to the past and to tradition, and that the future could only be envisaged in terms of a united Europe. And it was precisely this belief, shared by politicians (or the majority of them, at least) and the people, that constituted the *real psychological basis* (to quote Albertini once again) underlying the first phase of the process of European integration.

The psychological basis for any historical process can be considered both fragile and strong. It is fragile because a favourable attitude towards a certain objective (in this case European unity) is not, on its own, sufficient to mobilise the forces essential to its realisation. Its strength, meanwhile, derives from the fact that it represents the very last grounds determining human behaviour, and allowing the most difficult choices to be made without the creation of deep divisions. And the choice facing Europe was certainly a very difficult one indeed.

In 1949, due, in particular, to reticence on the part of the French, Germany had still not been restored its full sovereignty. However, in view of its geographical position and considerable resources, Germany had to be considered a country of great strategic importance in plans to contain the Soviet Union. There was only one way of resolving this dilemma: Germany had to be anchored firmly to Europe, subordinating those things on which its power was based — its heavy industry and army — to a common organisation which also embraced France. However, this plan still lacked one important element: the right kind of organisation to ensure its successful implementation.

Of course, the dilemma was ultimately resolved by Jean Monnet who conceived the idea of a European *Community*: in other words, of a structure, within the process of European unification, designed to carry out a common policy without eliminating the power of the individual states (as these, at the time, were certainly not ready to consider renunciation of their absolute sovereignty). And so, we come to the start of the second, or as defined by Albertini, the *economic phase* of the process of European integration.

While the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was the first Community, merged the heavy industries of six countries, the second, the Community for European Defence (CED), sought to pool their armed forces. Although the ECSC proved successful, the CED was doomed to failure. When the treaty was thrown out by the French National Assembly on August 31st, 1954, it seemed to signal the end of the road for the whole process of European unification. All the passion of governments, of parties, of intellectuals and of public opinion had been channelled into an undertaking which had gradually taken on the character of a very real crusade. Its failure generated a deep feeling of frustration among the supporters of European unification. Many felt that they were witnessing the definitive end of a historic process, and that there was no hope of ever going back to the beginning and starting again.

However, it soon became obvious that this failure did not mark the conclusion of the process, as the end of the CED did not of course mean an end to the problems which had prompted its creation. On the contrary, these difficulties persisted in spite of the fact that the death of Stalin had, at least from a psychological point of view, eased the pressure exerted by the USSR on the West.

Had the CED gone ahead, it would, of course, have prompted the creation of a European Federation since, in a democratic society, no army can exist in the absence of a political power to control it. As a result of the

failure of the CED, the governments became convinced that any project involving an immediate transfer of sovereignty from national to European level, was equally doomed to failure. They thus decided to proceed at a more gradual pace, following a path able to reconcile the immediate objective — which was to continue moving in the direction of integration — with the ultimate objective — which was to create a United States of Europe. This goal, having appeared within reach in 1954, was now postponed to some far-off and unspecified future time.

It was, once again, Jean Monnet who formulated an instrument able to realise this plan. The European Economic Community, established under the 1957 Treaty of Rome, quickly led to the dismantling of most customs barriers, to the affirmation of a common agricultural policy, to the creation of a market whose continental dimensions allowed the Six to enjoy an unprecedented period of growth and to regain, if only on an economic level, at least a part of the autonomy which they had lost as a result of the irreversible crisis of the national states.

Paradoxically, it was the success of European integration in the 1960s which gave rise to its crisis. As far as the economy was concerned, the Europe of the Six had become a single actor on the world political stage, one whose interests no longer coincided, or at least did not necessarily coincide, with those of the United States. The problem thus emerged of how international relations should be redefined, not only between the EEC and the United States, but also between the EEC and Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Japan and the world's developing countries.

The management of international relations is, traditionally, the task of governments — not of a council of six national ministers whose decisions are bound to reflect a compromise reached at the lowest level in order to ensure the consensus of the most reluctant member states.

The absence of a European government was most keenly felt in the period spanning the end of the 1960s and the start of the 1970s, when the countries of Europe were having to deal with the crisis of the international monetary system, the oil crisis, and the political disorder deriving from the decline in the power of the United States. And it was during this difficult and testing time that the process of European integration entered, definitively, its third, or *political*, phase of which Albertini had, in 1963, already seen the warning signs.

This does not mean that there had been no political side to the problems which had emerged prior to this time; it means, merely, that they had been difficulties which could be faced and solved, albeit not always in a satisfactory manner, within the Community framework.

Although this had, at times, slowed down the process of integration and created tensions, as in the case of the common agricultural policy, there had, contrary to the situation in the early seventies, never been any question that the process of integration might disintegrate.

At this point, the people of Europe realised, once and for all, the extent to which the American leadership had been undermined — aware that the United States would never again be in a position to establish a solid and peaceful world order, they responded to the historic challenge with which they were faced. The logical answer would, in modern parlance, have been to move from a “common” to a “single” policy, implemented, in other words, by a European government. But on this occasion, as before, the governments of Europe, despite starting to formulate proposals which were very much bolder than those put forward in the past, set out on another road.

The first of these proposals to come to fruition was the creation, in 1973, of the European Council — a body for which no provision had been made under the Treaties of Rome. This Council, bringing together periodically the highest representatives of the states, and involving them directly in European affairs, was felt to be a way of injecting fresh impetus into the process of integration — Jean Monnet, who had been its originator, envisaged the Council as a “provisional European government” whose task would be to direct the movement towards “a European government and an Assembly elected by universal suffrage.”⁴

Then came the proposal for direct election of the European Parliament which, in the belief that the Community institutions would be stronger if they were founded on public consensus, was passed at the 1975 Rome summit.

This was followed by the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. The decision to create the EMS came at the end of a difficult decade which had seen divergent trends in the European economies and a severe depreciation of the weakest countries' currencies. The creation of the EMS marked an important turning point as it revealed the desire on the part of the people of Europe to regain control of their own destiny, which in the previous years had been subject to the blind forces responsible for disseminating disorder on the international scene.

The same year saw the first direct elections of the European Parliament. There were opposing reactions to this event. Even though it had been ratified by the people, a section of the political forces and of public opinion continued to view the Strasbourg Parliament as an empty vessel: not being the parliament of any particular state, it lacked the support of

institutions with the capacity to translate its decisions into concrete actions. Others, meanwhile, saw the event as representing the start of a new political era which would culminate in the foundation of a European state. Sacharov, for example, hailed the first European elections as the dawn of international democracy, as never before had the citizens of different countries, divided by secular hatred, elected a parliament together. Duverger, who made no secret of his aversion to Europe, wrote that nowhere, in the entire history of mankind, was there an example of an assembly elected by universal suffrage which had not, sooner or later, been conferred constituent powers.

As time went by, the Strasbourg Parliament was in fact seen to be more an empty vessel than a protagonist in the building of Europe, even though its latent potential (which no one seemed willing to exploit) was clear as early as its very first term in office. During the period 1979-1984, and following a hard fight, Spinelli managed to gather the support of a very large majority of members of the European Parliament for the Draft Treaty which bore his name. Had it been adopted by the governments, it would have led to the formation of Europe's first federal nucleus. Its areas of competence would have been limited, in the early stages, to the economic and monetary spheres, and later extended to include other areas (foreign policy, defence, etc.). However, the heads of state, meeting in Milan on June 28th and 29th, 1985, had the courage neither to adopt nor to reject it. Instead, they went only so far as to convene an intergovernmental conference (IGC) to propose ways of improving, and of rendering more efficient, the Community's decision-making mechanisms.

It is said that the best way of burying a project is to entrust it to a commission. However, if this was what the governments really intended to do, then on this occasion at least, they got their calculations wrong. The IGC gave rise to the Single European Act which, despite being a rather depleted version of the Spinelli Treaty, nevertheless managed, by targeting the single market as the means of strengthening economic integration and of removing the last barriers within the Community, to put the question of a single European currency back on the agenda — and the achievement of this objective was bound, sooner or later, to raise the question of the need for a European government.

There are other reasons why the Milan summit constituted a turning point in the process of European integration. For the first time in the history of the Community, a majority vote had been taken which led to the emergence of two opposing alignments which, in fact, still exist today: a *federalist* (in truth, weakly federalist) alignment whose hard core

comprises the Community's six founder members, and a *confederalist* alignment which embraces those countries, Great Britain in particular, which are not willing to relinquish even the smallest portion of their sovereignty. The majority vote was a clear expression of the new orientation favoured by the most strongly pro-European governments: instead of striving for unanimity at all costs, as they had done in the past, these countries were displaying a desire to forge even closer links with one another, without allowing themselves to be conditioned by their opponents.

The rest is more recent history. The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant the demise of the old enemy and the end of the bipolar order in whose shadow the people of Europe had created their unity. America, now that its main enemy was no more, and no longer under the obligations of the past, was free to adopt a lower profile on the international scene — starting with Europe where it had been present in force ever since the period immediately following World War II. As in the early seventies, Europe was forced to take a long hard look at itself: this time, in order to solve its problems, it only had itself to rely on. Furthermore, there was an added complication which had not been part of the picture two decades earlier: while, in the seventies, Europe had been faced with what was simply a weakening of the political framework within which international relations had been conducted since the Second World War, this time that framework had disintegrated altogether, and Europe was called upon to provide a far more rapid and radical solution. All these events culminated in the Treaty of Maastricht, which was a contradictory response as it conferred upon the Union all the usual functions of a modern state — currency, foreign policy, citizenship, social policy — without, however, the powers necessary to implement them.

The boldest decision to come out of the Treaty of Maastricht concerned the single currency which, in the absence of some unforeseen catastrophe, will come into force on January 1st, 1999. It is quite probable that the new currency will give the European economy a new lease of life, creating, among the states of the Union, the illusion that a prosperous new era is dawning. This would certainly not be a new phenomenon. The same thing happened with the *Zollverein* in the last century, and in the post-World War II period with the birth of the Common Market. But it is important to remember that illusions will never be anything but illusions, however easy it is to mistake them for reality.

A currency cannot survive for ever without the support of a state, and

an economic and monetary union which is designed to have a profound effect on the daily lives of the people of Europe and on the global equilibrium, cannot last long in the absence of a government to regulate it. Furthermore, it will not be long before the European Union is forced to deal with the explosive question of its own enlargement — increasing the number of its member states first to eighteen, and subsequently to twenty, twenty-five or thirty. These numbers alone are sufficient to indicate that, unless adequate institutional reforms can be introduced, the union will seize up altogether.

And yet, meeting at Maastricht, the heads of state and of government were well aware of the fragility of their design. Indeed, the Treaty itself made provision for the convening of an IGC which would be entrusted with the task of improving the Union's decision-making mechanisms. This, for all their might, was all that these leaders were able to deliver. And as regards the institutional reforms needed to transform the Union into a proper federation, the Treaty of Amsterdam, which concluded the work of the conference, contained nothing to alter the *status quo*. However, judging by these clumsy attempts to complete the process of European unification by rendering the institutions more efficient, the political phase of the process is quite clearly coming to an end, with the governments, equipped with outdated institutions (at both national and European level), less and less able to deal with the issues of greatest concern to the people.

To conclude this brief profile of European integration, I return to Albertini's work of 1963. Drawing attention to the contradictions which were destined to plague the process of European unification to its very end, Albertini made the following assertion: "We need to be aware, as far as the conclusion of the process is concerned, that there will be no end to the dynamism present within, or to that present outside the sphere of governments, because nothing can alter the fact that a choice exists between the weakness that derives from division and the strength that derives from unity. Thus, as the process of integration proceeds, we will reach a point at which governments will be faced with problems whose unitary nature is so marked that they demand the presence of a single government."⁵ This is the point we have reached today.

NOTES

¹ L. Einaudi, *Lo scrittoio del presidente. 1948-1955*, Turin, Einaudi, 1956, p. 89.

² M. Albertini, "L'integrazione europea, elementi per un inquadramento storico", in L. Levi and S. Pistone (eds), *Trent'anni di vita del Movimento Federalista Europeo*, Milan, Franco Angeli, 1973, pp. 14-34.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

⁴ J. Monnet, *Mémoires*, Paris, Fayard, 1976, p. 592.

⁵ M. Albertini, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

Spinelli Monnet Albertini

JOHN PINDER

Spinelli.

Alberto Jacometti, still on Ventotene in the weeks following the liberation, wrote that "Spinelli has the stuff of a founder of movements."¹ Meanwhile, Spinelli was indeed inspiring the foundation of the MFE in Milano. But Spinelli was much more than a founder of movements. He was, in the words of Albertini, a Weberian political hero and, as Rossolillo has put it, what Heidegger called a "man of the work":² of "the work" in a sense akin to great achievement.

Spinelli's "work" is well known. But, for our purpose here, we need to recall the principal elements. When the French government proposed the European army in 1950, Spinelli immediately realised that such an army must be responsible to a federal government. He persuaded De Gasperi that a European Political Community was required; De Gasperi persuaded the other governments; and Spinelli worked with Spaak, then President of the Ad Hoc Assembly charged with the task of drafting the necessary treaty, to give birth to the EPC Treaty.³ Albertini observed in his inaugural lecture for the academic year 1985-86 of the University of Pavia that but for ill fortune, the European army, and hence the European federation, could have been established thirty years before.⁴ Spinelli, with his exceptional capacity for political analysis, had already written in his diary on the day after the death of Stalin that this "could also signify the end of the present attempt to unite Europe."⁵

Spinelli's reaction to this was the opposite of Monnet's, who sought to relaunch the Community in the economic field. Spinelli vehemently criticised this approach and instead tried to lead the UEF on a "new course", towards the Congress of the European People. But even in the MFE there was, again according to Spinelli's diary, "a notable discontent" against the new course on the part of men "with strong preoccupations in national political life." Spinelli was nevertheless content that

around him remained his "disciples, Badarau, Albertini, Da Milano... who have understood the meaning of the action desired by me" and, still in the diary, added that "the moment has now come for me, alone, to draw the conclusions, and not even to begin to discuss with others in order to find the new path, but to map it out myself, alone. And may God help me."⁶

This was the intrepid reaction of the political hero, of the "man of the work." But the venture did not have the political success that Spinelli desired. The campaign formed a number of militants, above all Italians. But this was never the main purpose of Spinelli, who always wanted political results in the short or medium term. Failing to obtain such results, and with the Community during that period dominated by de Gaulle, Spinelli suspended his federalist political struggle to undertake a decade of mainly academic activity. Then he came to terms with the success of Monnet's Community and sought to continue the federalist struggle as a member of the European Commission. There he learnt much about Community politics, but failed to convince the other Commissioners to engage in that struggle. The Commission was not the right place for Spinelli. He was a parliamentary rather than a governmental man. But that was precisely what was needed for his *chef d'oeuvre*, the Draft Treaty for the European Union.

After the launching of this crucial initiative at the famous dinner in the Crocodile restaurant, Bruno Visentini, who had been present, wrote to Spinelli reproving him for "having always been and having become yet more intolerant of the ideas of others," and Albertini too wrote to Spinelli in the same vein. Spinelli's observation in his diary was interesting: "I recognise that in discussion I employ an aggressive style which may appear intolerant. But I do not believe that I am intolerant. I hold to my opinion, but have always had the feeling that I pay attention to the ideas of others, and am ready enough to coopt them if I succeed in connecting them with mine. But if this has to be called intolerance, that means I am asked to abandon my ideas to demonstrate how much I understand those of others."⁷

There is some truth in that. But it is a question of degree. It seems to me that in the past his readiness to coopt the ideas of others had been too limited, and that was a reason for his difficulty in working with others for any extended period. "It is now fifteen years that I have been striving to create a group of hamiltonian federalists," he wrote in his diary on 10 January 1956, "and I am still a loner. Should I continue? And if so, in which direction?"⁸ As we saw, Spinelli rapidly regained his courage and

launched the original and ambitious campaign of the Congress of the European People. The words of Eric Weil that Rossolillo cited in *The Federalist* are clearly apt: the “man of the work” is “not only unique... but alone. It would be absurd for him to imagine himself in somebody else’s position, since there are no comparable places, nor beings... Men are nothing but means... the mass, the material of ‘the work’... the ‘man of the work’ cannot speak *with* the others, but only *to* the others.”⁹ Of course Weil had defined an ideal type, not Spinelli. But Spinelli came closer to this type than anybody else I have known.

In creating the Draft Treaty in the European Parliament, however, Spinelli worked with great success with almost all the political groups and above all with his colleagues in the institutional committee. Finally, after the Parliament’s approval of the project, he persuaded many groups and political personalities, including President Mitterrand, to support it. The British MEP Derek Prag praised Spinelli’s ability to make the necessary compromises and to secure consensus on the project, even when the initial positions were apparently irreconcilable.¹⁰ Perhaps Spinelli had finally, as the title of his volume of autobiography affirmed he had been trying to do, “become a wise man.”

The Draft Treaty had two consequences. The model of a Community transformed into a federal union, even if the institutions for foreign policy and security were to remain provisionally intergovernmental, has remained an inspiration for federalists; and the Treaty was, together with the single market project, one of the two sources of the Single European Act. The latter did not please Spinelli. But the anathema he cast on it as a “dead mouse” was not justified. The Single Act relaunched the process of uniting Europe, with the direct consequence of the Maastricht Treaty and hence of the enormously important single currency. But that process exemplified the federalism of Monnet, not that of Spinelli.

Monnet.

Spinelli was sure that Monnet “really does want to arrive at a federation,” even if he did not have “the least idea of what it means to make a constitution, and thinks that a few scraps of improvised ideas are sufficient.”¹¹ Monnet was not at all highly educated. Directly on leaving school he had become a businessman. So he learnt how to negotiate, organise, make his plan and carry it out; and, because he had also occupied high posts in the public service, including as deputy secretary general of the League of Nations, he had learnt how to persuade the

governments.

Monnet launched the ECSC as the foundation for the construction of a federation. It is not right to call him a mere functionalist. He fully understood the need for European institutions independent of the national governments. He was, as Spinelli observed, not capable of an analysis of constitutional type. But he repeatedly affirmed that a supranational authority was required. It was his colleagues who inserted the Court and the parliamentary Assembly into the project, and he understood that they were proper elements for a Community of democratic countries. But for him, the independent executive was the fundamental element.

Monnet had also understood that the European army “touched on the core of national sovereignty,” so that “the federation of Europe would have to become an immediate objective.”¹² After the collapse of the project for the European Defence Community, Monnet, then President of the ECSC’s High Authority, said to his colleagues that what the ECSC was beginning to achieve “must be continued until it culminates in the United States of Europe.”¹³ Monnet consequently left the High Authority and founded the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, with the aim of promoting a transfer of power on the part of all the participating countries “in favour of federal institutions.”¹⁴ Since the members of the Committee were the leaders of almost all the democratic parties and trade unions and since Monnet was tireless in persuading and organising them, the Committee ensured the ratification of the Rome Treaties and the adoption of a number of successive steps towards European federation.

Monnet too, then, was a “man of the work.” He created something that “did not exist before.”¹⁵ He was not a loner like Spinelli. Certainly, he took his decisions walking alone in the mountains. But he cultivated a vast network of friends among politicians, civil servants, lawyers, journalists and businessmen throughout Europe and the United States; and he worked closely for many years with a few faithful collaborators such as Etienne Hirsch, Pierre Uri and Robert Triffin. Whereas Spinelli frequently wrote in his diary that he must “command” the MFE or the UEF, Monnet wrote: “What I sought from my colleagues was fidelity rather than obedience... No one has ever succeeded in making me do anything which I did not think desirable and useful... but I in turn have rarely obliged anyone to act against his will.”¹⁶

Our inheritance from Spinelli is the federalist movement, the influence of his ideas and of his example in the movement, and the Draft Treaty. That from Monnet is the European Community, now the Union, and his method of construction through steps in the federal direction

which the governments are capable of accepting. It is not right to talk habitually, as many do, of small steps. The foundation of the ECSC was not a small step, nor that of the EEC. With the Single Act and the Maastricht Treaty, and thus the single market and the single currency together with the power of co-decision for the European Parliament, Delors too, following Monnet's method, obtained very important results. Spinelli, who often criticised this method, nevertheless wrote in 1985: "Thanks to the European Community, our generation has seen the enduring dream of a free, united Europe beginning to become true."¹⁷ Monnet's work was a construction that was not only original and important, but truly indispensable for the political civilisation of Europe.

Monnet and Spinelli.

Spinelli once said: "Monnet had the great merit of having built Europe and the great responsibility to have built it badly."¹⁸ He thus demonstrated the ambiguity of his relationship with the other "man of the work" in the uniting of Europe.

Monnet had sought out Spinelli after learning that he was "the author of the UEF's memorandum no.3 sent to the ministers," in which Spinelli explained "the method to pursue in order to entrust to the Assembly of the Schuman Plan the constituent mandate." Monnet said to him that it is "so rare... to encounter a person who thinks clearly... What we want is a revolution, and we must accomplish it with legal means, with statesmen who lack energy and any emotional commitment." Spinelli observed that Monnet has "the dramatic and absolutely not rhetorical sense of the gravity of Europe's situation, which completely coincides with my thinking."¹⁹

Monnet then invited Spinelli to prepare his inaugural address as President of the High Authority in August 1952.²⁰ Spinelli analysed precisely the federal elements of the construction: the independent executive, responsible to the European Assembly; the Assembly, independent of the governments of the member states; the Court of Justice, independent of the member states' courts; the direct relations with persons and enterprises, including the competence to impose levies on the latter.²¹ Two days after Monnet had delivered the address, Spinelli wrote in his diary, not without a certain pride, that "the first supranational European authority was inaugurated. It was my address."²²

Monnet proposed to Spinelli that he stay to work at the High Authority, preparing Monnet's "political speeches, which should, ac-

ording to him, be the equivalent of Hamilton's *Federalist*." But Spinelli replied that he preferred "to wait a year to join the European institutions as a politician, rather than to enter them at once as an official." Spinelli also helped Monnet to prepare his first speech to the Assembly (in fact the first political speech that Monnet had ever made!²³) then went his way. Two "men of the work" cannot work together.

Monnet and Spinelli went their separate ways also because their ideas were different. After the failure of the project for the European Defence Community, Spinelli tried to mobilise the people against the governments, while Monnet continued to believe, in Spinelli's words, "in the capacity of the governments to relaunch the construction of Europe, through the results of the Messina conference." But in Spinelli's view this conference was the occasion of the "liquidation of Monnet," who had the choice to "stand alongside me or disappear."²⁴ Spinelli was mistaken. The governments relaunched the European construction. Monnet did not disappear. As Spinelli later said, Monnet had the great merit of having built Europe. It was, to be sure, as Spinelli also said, built badly. But without the agreement of the governments, Europe would not have been built at all. It is possible that the governments would have accepted a Europe that was built well, if Monnet had better understood "what it means to make a constitution." But I am inclined to doubt it. In fact, the emerging realisation of the "dream of a free, united Europe," affirmed by Spinelli, was the work of men of governmental type, above all Monnet. Spinelli's enormous merit was to demonstrate the necessity of a good construction, effective and democratic, that is to say federal, and to indicate a method of constructing it by men of parliamentary type, like Spinelli himself.

Albertini and Spinelli.

In the 1950s, Spinelli had greatly appreciated Albertini. Already in 1954 Spinelli had proposed to him to "think of a federalist review."²⁵ In 1958 he observed that "Albertini and Guderzo are thinking of a review. I have proposed to them to study it. But if they do not have the necessary creative force it will not be born."²⁶ His scepticism was not justified: thirty years later *Il Federalista* remains in excellent health. I have already mentioned Spinelli's satisfaction in seeing that his "disciple" Albertini had understood the sense of the action that Spinelli wanted, that is to say the campaign for the Congress of the European People. In the context of the campaign Spinelli had sent this "disciple" to Bolzano, where he had

“scandalised the Bolzanesi a bit, but,” added Spinelli, “it is good that the MFE should contain a type of Saint Just.”²⁷ The disciple *pur et dur* pleased Spinelli well. But this purity was a manifestation of the “rationality as an absolute value, in certain cases exaggerated,” which, according to Gianni Merlini, explains “the difficult (but always intense) relationship that Mario Albertini had with Altiero Spinelli.”²⁸ What Spinelli called the “language of the day,” based on reason, was a language common to Albertini and Spinelli; but perhaps Spinelli’s more instinctive “language of the night” was not comprehensible to Albertini.²⁹

The difficulty that Albertini and Spinelli had in understanding each other burst into the open in 1961, when Spinelli proposed that the federalists should “conquer some positions of power, throwing out the old politicians. It is necessary,” wrote Spinelli, “to concentrate for 4-5 years in three cities... to conquer them, as a model for future action.”³⁰ For Spinelli, this was a new federalist tactic for a new situation, that of Europe dominated by de Gaulle. For Albertini, it was a violation of a fundamental principle, that the federalists must concentrate on the struggle for European, not national power. Spinelli admitted in his diary that this new opposition placed him “in some embarrassment because it is the pure and abstract spinellism that is turned against me... I would not have expected to find, right in the middle of something so little ideological as federalism, such a pure expression of bordighism... of that extremism...”³¹ Spinelli’s plan failed and he entered his academic decade, while in those years Albertini assured the continued life of the Movement, despite the “political divergence” that divided it for a time.³² Spinelli did not tolerate opposition on the part of the “disciple”. The division between him and Albertini was profound. Albertini’s name does not appear in the published version of Spinelli’s diary during the period from June 1962 up to March 1969.

Towards the end of that decade, there was a modest rapprochement between Spinelli and Albertini. Spinelli participated in the UEF’s Central Committee; he proposed a text, Albertini accepted it and the motion was carried unanimously.³³ But the relationship remained difficult through the 1970s. Spinelli certainly appreciated the letter from Albertini in 1974 that invited him to become President of the MFE, as well as Albertini’s robust response to the demand from some UEF sections that Spinelli should resign from offices in the UEF.³⁴ But Spinelli continued his harsh criticism of Albertini’s political choices.

When, in 1970, Albertini had caused the Italian federalists “to set about the study of a project for a federal European constitution,” Spinelli

criticised his habit of making his moves “at the wrong moment,” affirming that he should follow “the plan of action suggested by me and adopted” by the central committee.³⁵ Perhaps one can detect in the language a certain vexation that Spinelli’s former disciple should continue to pursue a policy different from that of the master. But the difference was more fundamental. Spinelli always concentrated on his own chosen political objective, while Albertini was constructing a strategy for the long term and an organisation to carry it out.

Albertini’s policy was not always “pure and abstract spinellism.” He was capable of pursuing a more monnetist policy. The single currency and the direct elections were for him valid intermediate objectives; and in 1978 he adopted the European Monetary System too as an intermediate objective towards the single currency. This choice was sharply criticised by Spinelli, on the grounds that it followed the heresy “of Werner and his chatter about monetary pre-union,” and he wrote that Albertini had “waged a battle for the EMS as if it were for the European federation.”³⁶ But I believe that Albertini was right. The EMS was a step towards the single currency, which in turn is a great stride towards federation.

After that incident, the relations between them improved. Spinelli praised Albertini’s initiative to establish a “permanent encounter” between federalists and politicians of the Left, and also his “good speech” at the fortieth anniversary celebration of the *Ventotene Manifesto*.³⁷ Above all Spinelli appreciated Albertini’s support for the Draft Treaty. Perhaps, indeed, Spinelli, in this last period of his extraordinary life, had become truly wise.

Albertini.

One last citation from Spinelli’s diary, this time of May 1956: “I threw out to Albertini the idea of constructing a ‘European federalist order’.”³⁸ I hope I may be forgiven if I do not appreciate the precise connotations of the Italian word *ordine*. But if Spinelli was suggesting that he create a group of people morally and intellectually committed to a great cause, Albertini has indeed done so.

Amedeo Mortara recounts how Albertini, in the 1950s, “explained with passion to [a] group of young people the principles of hamiltonian federalist thought and demystified the false ideologies that seek to justify the nation-states.”³⁹ Albertini continued to pursue his pedagogic vocation up to the end and was “a great master” for the federalists of the MFE. His “passion for the *logos*, that is to say for reason;” his “absolute morality,

including political morality”; his “total openness to dialogue”; his “absolute respect for the interlocutor”; his consistent fidelity to the MFE: all these qualities were perfectly adapted to the construction of a movement that has characteristics of an order.⁴⁰ The campaign for the direct elections, the great demonstration at Milan in support of the Draft Treaty in June 1985, the referendum of June 1989 when over 88 per cent of the voters approved the proposal for mandating the European Parliament to draw up a federal constitution: these bear witness to the strength of this movement.

There is a certain danger that a movement with characteristics of an order might become too doctrinaire. This was one of Spinelli’s criticisms of the “MFE of Albertini.” But Albertini, though a maestro of doctrine, was not doctrinaire. Thus this radical spinellist accepted a monnetist policy when that seemed to him reasonable. He explained that the MFE “should seek to promote... situations in which the conduct of national power itself may push the governments onto a slope on which sovereign power tends to slide from the nations to Europe...”⁴¹ that is to say, the MFE should promote such steps towards the goal of federation.

Death is not only an occasion of inexpressible grief but also a time for reflection. The conclusion of my modest reflection on Albertini is that he was ready to accept what is useful in the federalist methods of Spinelli and of Monnet, and to base his policy on this. I am sure that the MFE will continue to achieve great success if it follows this wise example.

NOTES

¹ Citation in Altiero Spinelli, *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio: Io, Ulisse*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1984, p. 315.

² Mario Albertini, “Altiero Spinelli, Hero of Reason”, in *The Federalist*, XXVIII (1986), p. 3; Francesco Rossolillo, “Spinelli, ‘Man of the Work’”, in *The Federalist*, XXVI (1984), pp. 134-41.

³ See Sergio Pistone, “Il ruolo di Altiero Spinelli nella genesi dell’Art. 38 della Comunità di Difesa e del progetto di Comunità Politica Europea”, in G. Trausch (ed.), *La construction de l’Europe, du Plan Schuman aux Traités de Rome: Projets et initiatives, déboires et échecs*, Brussels, Bruylant, 1992.

⁴ See Mario Albertini, “Europe on the Threshold of Union”, in *The Federalist*, XXVIII (1986), p. 26.

⁵ Altiero Spinelli, *Diario europeo: 1948-1969*, edited by Edmondo Paolini, Bologna,

Il Mulino, 1989, p. 168.

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 290-92.

⁷ Altiero Spinelli, *Diario europeo: 1976-1986*, edited by Edmondo Paolini, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1991, p. 508.

⁸ *Diario: 1948-1969*, p. 284.

⁹ Eric Weil, *Logique de la philosophie*, Paris, Librairie philosophique P. Vrin, 1974 (1st edn 1967), cited in Rossolillo, *op.cit.*, pp. 139-40.

¹⁰ Derek Prag MEP, “A New Framework”, in *Facts*, September/October 1982, London, European Movement, pp. 6-7.

¹¹ *Diario: 1948-1969*, p. 163.

¹² Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, London, Collins, 1978, p. 343.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 399.

¹⁴ *Action Committee for the United States of Europe: Statements and Declarations 1955-1967*, European Series No. 9, London, Chatham House and PEP, 1969, p. 11.

¹⁵ Eric Weil, *Logique de la philosophie*, cited in Rossolillo, *op.cit.*, p. 139.

¹⁶ Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, *cit.*, p. 405.

¹⁷ Altiero Spinelli, “Preface”, in Roland Bieber, Jean-Paul Jacqué, Joseph H.H. Weiler (eds), *An Ever Closer Union: A critical Analyses of the Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union*, Brussels, Commission of the European Communities, 1985, p. 3.

¹⁸ Interview with Spinelli, cited in Michael Burgess, *Federalism and European Union: Political Ideas, Influences and Strategies in the European Community, 1972-1987*, London, Routledge, 1989, pp. 55-6.

¹⁹ *Diario: 1948-1969*, p. 140.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 142-5.

²¹ Jean Monnet, “Séance d’Installation de la Haute Autorité, Luxembourg”, in his *Les Etats Unis d’Europe ont commencé*, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1955, pp. 55-9.

²² *Diario: 1948-1969*, p. 143.

²³ *Memoirs*, p. 382.

²⁴ *Diario: 1948-1969*, pp. 261, 269, 270.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 202.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 338.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 301.

²⁸ Gianni Merlini, “Ricordi e testimonianze”, in *L’Unità Europea*, no.275 (1997), p. 3.

²⁹ See *Io, Ulisse*, p. 309.

³⁰ *Diario: 1948-1969*, p. 416.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 417.

³² Teresa Caizzi, “Ricordi e testimonianze”, in *L’Unità Europea*, no.275 (1997), p. 2.

³³ *Diario: 1948-1969*, pp. 552-3.

³⁴ *Diario: 1970-1976*, pp. 727, 946.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 39-40.

³⁶ Altiero Spinelli, *Diario europeo: 1976-1986*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1992, pp. 186, 240-1.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 548, 670.

³⁸ *Diario: 1948-1969*, p. 297.

³⁹ Amedeo Mortara, *L’Unità Europea*, no. 275 (1997), p. 3.

⁴⁰ These citations are taken from the contributions of Teresa Caizzi, Gianni Merlini and Francesco Rossolillo in *L’Unità Europea*, no. 275 (1997).

⁴¹ Mario Albertini, “L’aspetto strategico della nostra lotta”, editorial of *L’Unità Europea*, no. 205 (March 1991), reprinted in *L’Unità Europea*, no. 275 (1997), pp. 4-5.

Notes

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AS INTERPRETED BY ERNST NOLTE

The historical research conducted by Ernst Nolte focuses essentially on the first half of the 20th century — in particular, on the period from the Russian Revolution of 1917 to the end of the Second World War in 1945. However, he has also written about Germany during the Cold War and, following the end of the East-West conflict and the dissolution of the USSR, set forth in a number of essays, articles and book-interviews, succinct but nevertheless quite elaborate reflections on the second half of the 20th century which link up with his ideas relating to its first half. It can thus be said that he has developed a personal interpretation of the whole of the 20th century and, following its essential lines, it is this interpretation which I propose to set forth here.¹

* * *

There are two fundamental phenomena of the 20th century which any overall interpretation of it must seek to comprehend in depth. The first of these, relating to the first half of the century, is the National Socialist movement which generated the most finely honed and efficient fascist totalitarian regime the world has ever seen, and led to the horrendous genocide of the Jews as well as the crimes committed against the gypsy and Slavic populations and against minority groups. It also heightened the expansionist and imperialist tendencies which Germany had already shown at the time of World War I and triggered, in all its horror, the Second World War. The second phenomenon is the East-West conflict which clearly represents the main thread running through the period spanning the years from 1945 to the dissolution of the Soviet System in the 90s. Despite the obvious differences between them, these two aspects are linked by the fact that the action of Hitler's Germany was a crucial

factor in the passage from the first to the second of the relative phases. Germany's attack on the democratic powers of the West and on the USSR prompted an alliance between them; and with the victory of this alliance in the Second World War the USSR achieved the rank of a world superpower, a position which enabled it to challenge the Western world led by the other superpower, America.

If these are to be considered the two fundamental phenomena of the 20th century, the peculiarity of Nolte's interpretation lies in his view that the origins, not only of the East-West conflict, but also of the Nazi movement lie, at their deepest level, in the Russian Revolution. He draws attention to the deep-rooted tendency to see Communism as the greatest and most fundamental affliction of the 20th century, a view which, despite leading to different conclusions, is also expressed by François Furet.²

In Nolte's view, two fundamental lines of reasoning point to a connection between Bolshevism and National Socialism. According to the first of these, the left-wing extremism of the Bolsheviks can be seen as the decisive historical factor which allowed the rise to power of the radically and fanatically right-wing National Socialists. In short what Europe had witnessed in 1917, in one of its most powerful nations, was the seizure of power by a party which had started a civil war against the bourgeoisie. And this war, having as its ultimate and openly declared objective the assimilation of all national states into a system of socialist government on a world scale (not through the mere expropriation but, instead, through the elimination of the landowning classes), did not affect Russia alone, but had repercussions on Europe and on the world as a whole. Since this design based on "class extermination" was effectively put into practice in Russia at the time of the civil war, and followed by the collectivisation of agriculture, it was inevitable that a party resistant to Communism would emerge in those countries which had strong Communist parties (or strong extremist forces which pursued the Soviet model) and in which a similar evolution of events might be expected. National Socialism, whose main precedent had been Italian fascism, represented the strongest form of resistance to Communism, and its victory can be attributed to the fact that it gave the appearance of being able, in a radical manner, to eliminate a danger in whose face the political forces which favoured liberal-democratic political principles seemed impotent.

In Nolte's view, therefore, Hitler's position can be defined, essentially, as anti-Lenin, in that the main motivation for his political action was the defence of bourgeois society, together with a rejection of the

universalism that sought to achieve the elimination of nations. In the context of this motivation, Nolte identifies two important, if subsidiary, elements: anti-semitism (based on the false conviction, which Hitler, among others, shared with people like Henry Ford, that Judaism represented fertile ground for the cultivation of Bolshevism) and expansionism (which, provided it also targeted democratic countries, would serve to increase Germany's capacity to overcome the international danger which Communism represented). Although the birth of National Socialism (with rejection of Communism seen as its main motivation) can, up to a point, be deemed a sincere and legitimate reaction to events in Russia and go some way towards explaining the public support which the National Socialist movement enjoyed, Nolte stresses that this does not justify in the slightest the crimes committed by the Nazis, and in particular, the massacre of the Jews. And here, we come to his second line of reasoning.

Despite obvious differences in their ultimate objectives, the ideology constructed by the National Socialists, and that developed by the Communists, displayed the same totalitarian features — both promising to deliver, by bringing about a radical change in human nature, the definitive solution to all problems; indeed, it is precisely for this reason that the National Socialist movement proved able, in the ideological civil war triggered by the rise of Communism, to offer such strong and efficient resistance to this force. And because it involved the lifting of all restrictions on the power exercised by the political class, the passage from a totalitarian ideology to a totalitarian state inevitably resulted in the committing of crimes of the greatest atrocity. The crimes committed by the National Socialists had, furthermore, an important precedent: the “class extermination” carried out by the Bolsheviks earlier in the century represented application, on a massive scale, of the principle according to which guilt depends not on one's actions as an individual, but on one's membership of a group collectively deemed to be guilty — the first time since the Enlightenment that this principle had been applied in Europe. And the “racial slaughter” carried out by the National Socialists follows exactly the same logic, even though it was, in this case, applied in a much more carefully planned and systematic manner than it had been in Russia where, due in part to the backwardness of the country, it had often been disorganised and haphazard.

However, it is important to underline that the idea of Bolshevism as the logical and historical prius of National Socialism does not, in Nolte's view, mean that the two can be considered equivalent. In fact, he

acknowledges the qualitative difference that separates them: since Bolshevik Communism is characterised by universal values — the emancipation of the exploited and brotherhood among peoples — many of the crimes committed by the Bolsheviks can be seen (and indeed were seen by many Communists) to betray the very basis of the ideology which they professed. The crimes committed by the National Socialists, meanwhile, were perfectly coherent with their ideology, based as it was on the consciously anti-Enlightenment beliefs in a natural inequality among men and peoples and in the existence of a superior race. The fact remains that Bolshevism, by applying the principle of “group guilt”, barbarised the political struggle and prepared the way for the even more barbarous ideas and practices of the National Socialists. Hence the absolute need to free ourselves from the “tyranny of collectivist thought” and, with intransigence, to protect liberal-democratic ideals against any movement towards totalitarianism.

According to Nolte, this view of a connection between Bolshevism and National Socialism, and, in particular, the theory that the latter represented a comprehensible and, up to a point, a justifiable reaction to the former, is confirmed by the evolution of events after 1945. While the defeat of Nazi Germany signified the removal of a serious threat to the liberal-democratic world, it allowed the USSR to become a world superpower and Communism to assume dimensions enabling it, for a period lasting almost fifty years, to intimidate the West and even to threaten its very survival. The ideological civil war triggered by the Russian Revolution which, until 1945, involved Europe — only becoming a world issue after that date — thus represents the main thread running through the history of the 20th century as a whole, a history which culminated in the irrevocable defeat of Communism. This defeat was made possible by the steadfastness of the political forces of the Western world which, recognising quite clearly the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime, and denouncing the ambiguous nature of an anti-fascist movement which sought to conceal this essential fact, resisted Soviet attempts to remove, supposedly in the spirit of the “peace movement”, the American presence in Europe and thereby to “neutralise” the Western half of the continent.

* * *

Nolte's considerations on the post-1945 period clearly represent a schematic continuation of his basic idea that there exists a connection,

both logical and factual, between Bolshevism and National Socialism — an idea which is specific to his historical interpretation. And it is important to point out, in order to understand it more fully, that this interpretation contrasts with the view that the German people must be considered collectively guilty of the crimes committed in the name of National Socialism, and that National Socialism itself reflects the very essence of the German nation. Nolte opposes the first part of this interpretation, maintaining that the guilt can be attributed only to individuals or to well-defined sections of the political class, and not to the population as a whole, as a population is always easily manipulated by the political classes. He also points out that the idea that the German nation is collectively guilty of the crimes committed by the fascists is nothing other than a further manifestation of the “tyranny of collectivist thought” introduced by the Communist ideology. In opposition to the second part of this interpretation (that National Socialism must be an expression of the very essence of the German nation), Nolte points out that the idea of a connection between Bolshevism and National Socialism highlights the fact that the objective historical conditions in which a people finds itself are, in general, sufficient to explain the prevalence of certain behaviour, and stresses that any other nation, faced with the situation Germany experienced in the 20s and 30s, would have reacted in substantially the same way. Nolte believes, furthermore, that had a Communist party of the dimensions of the German one become established in America, it would have generated, in that country, an even more extreme form of fascism than that which actually emerged in Germany.

Nolte himself underlines the significance, in practical terms, of his interpretation: were the people of Germany collectively guilty, this would imply a need, within the framework of a European or world union, to exert a special control over the country, limiting substantially its sovereignty as a state. If, on the other hand, National Socialism is a consequence of Bolshevism, then the German people are entitled to feel that they belong to a normal nation, and need not labour under any form of inferiority complex. This does not, however, imply opposition to a form of supranational integration, only that such integration should be conceived along confederal lines (that is, without substantial restrictions on sovereignty, in accordance with the model of the German confederation of the nineteenth century to which explicit reference is made), and that provision should be made within it for an appropriate level of German hegemony, (i.e., a level which corresponds objectively with the dimensions, both economic and demographic, of the reunified Germany).

In Nolte's considerations on what the post-Cold War future holds, this question is dealt with further. He feels that there are important lessons to be learned from the story of the 20th century, a century ravaged by Communism, violence and ideological civil wars played out on the European and on the world stage, a story which has culminated in the victory of liberalism. We must, in Nolte's view, acknowledge the absolute need to defend liberalism against all forms of totalitarianism and, in more general terms, against abstract ideologies which, in the belief that they can bring about a radical change in human nature, can, in reality, only trigger violence. But, unless two essential aspects of it are put right, the liberalism which has emerged victorious will not be able to cope with the problems which we now see emerging: while the days of general wars, fought among the most powerful of the developed nations, are over, there is a growing threat of aggression on the part of a section of the mass of underdeveloped countries denied the wellbeing achieved by the countries of the liberalised world.

On the one hand, the individualism whose sole motivation is the quest for a hedonistic form of happiness (and which leads, ultimately, to the crisis of the family and a decrease in the population) must be integrated with the ethos of solidarity. And in this context, Nolte supports the principle of the right to a minimum social standard of living which is guaranteed in advanced countries — a principle which, however, in the long run, should apply also in the relationships between developed and underdeveloped countries.

On the other hand, the “progressive” universalism embraced by liberalism, (which realises the central issue contained within the “militant universalism” of Communism), needs to be integrated with what is the rational core of fascism, when the latter is seen as “militant particularism.” In short, we need, notwithstanding all the dreadful memories of the fascist era, to have the courage to accept a form of “national and cultural self-affirmation which, unlike the ‘nationalism’ of the past, is no longer in conflict with the rational core of universalism, i.e., with the commandment to men to live together peacefully in a planet which has become small and threatened (to live together, that is, free of the diktat of a form of ‘humanitarianism’ which has not grasped fully the real consequences of its excessively idealistic principles).”³ Thus, not only should the unification of Europe remain within the boundaries of confederalism, (otherwise, the states would be reduced to provinces and all sense of the nation destroyed), but also the objective of a world government (which would represent the very worst kind of despotism ever to exist in the

world) must, on principle, be opposed.

* * *

Having illustrated in an extremely concise but, I hope, faithful manner, Nolte's interpretation of the 20th century, I will now express my own critical reservations on it. However, before beginning, I wish to stress that I support Nolte's rejection — which constitutes the *Grundmotiv* that induced him to develop the interpretation set forth above — of theories based both on the idea that the Germans, as a people, shoulder a collective guilt and on the idea that the very essence of the German nation is, in some way, diabolic. Both are inconsistent concepts which, when put forward by non Germans, represent an ideological cover for their anti-German nationalism and, when adopted by German people themselves, betray only an inability to understand just what it was which, in the first half of the 20th century, gave rise to the imperialism and totalitarianism of the German national state.⁴ This inability is even shared, sadly, by the eminent scholar Habermas who, in the controversy which grew up around the historiographical theories of Ernst Nolte, proclaimed that all Germans, even those belonging to post-National Socialism generations, should, still today, continue to hang their heads in shame over the crimes committed by Nazi Germany.⁵

Having said that, I do not consider convincing the arguments which Nolte uses to contest the incrimination and "demonisation" of the German nation. His theory that Communism represents the greatest affliction of the 20th century to which fascism is a reaction that can, up to a point, be justified, and that there is, therefore, within fascism, a rational core which must be held good, fails to clarify a number of important questions which I outline briefly below:

— First, it was not Communism which provoked the outburst of World War I, an event which was certainly crucial in the history of the 20th century and, indeed, rendered possible the Russian Revolution of 1917. (And here, we should ask ourselves why it is that Nolte takes 1917 as the starting point for his interpretation of 20th century history and not 1914, the year which saw the start of Europe's new thirty-year war?)

— Second, the observation (certainly a not novel one) that Bolshevik Communism and its repercussions outside Russia favoured, in a decisive manner, the rise of fascism is quite valid, (any extremism is bound to favour the emergence of an opposing form of extremism), but it explains little unless it is inserted in a wider perspective which clarifies the fact that

the growth and establishment of Communist extremism was also a reaction to the carnage provoked by the war, and to the authoritarian and tendentially totalitarian regimes which became established in the course of it. (This, in turn, explains why no strong Communist parties emerged in countries like America and Great Britain).

— Then, while it is true that the Russian Revolution brought "class extermination", it must not be forgotten that all the major revolutions in history (and not only the French one) have been characterised by episodes of extreme violence. The Irish and the Scots suffered untold violence along the road towards the establishment of liberalism in Great Britain, (added to which, there were the horrors of the Industrial Revolution), and in the United States, the rise of liberalism was accompanied by the massacres of the Civil War.⁶ The atrocities which characterised the Soviet experience must be connected, not only with the Communist ideology, but also with Russia's "Asian" backwardness, and with its need, in order to conserve its power on an international stage plagued by conflict, for rapid industrialisation.

— Moving on to the period of the East-West conflict, while the anti-totalitarian steadfastness of the West was clearly a central factor in the defeat of Communism, two other highly important factors cannot be overlooked: first, the existence of arms capable of destroying the entire world removed the possibility of recourse to the extreme weapon of general war as a means of saving a despotic empire, and shifted the conflict essentially to the terrain of economic efficiency, on which the Soviet Union was, in the end, overcome; second, although it has still to reach its conclusion, the process of integration, founded on French-German reconciliation and embracing Western Europe, created, in an area previously plagued by instability, a climate of peaceful cooperation, and a situation characterised by economic expansion and the growth of democracy. Furthermore, it proved attractive to Eastern Europe and went a long way towards discrediting the Soviet ideology according to which liberal democracy and the market economy on which it is founded, can only lead to greater impoverishment and war.

In my opinion, these facts are best explained within the framework of the interpretative model which, going beyond Nolte's vision, sees, as the main thread running through the 20th century, not Communism and the reactions which it provoked but rather, according to the theory developed in federalist thought, the crisis of the sovereign states, in reference to which,⁷ I wish to underline several essential points.

The expression "crisis of the sovereign states" refers to the contradic-

tion that exists between, on the one hand, the growing interdependence of all the peoples of the world, (produced by the Industrial Revolution and heightened by the more recent technical and scientific revolution), which renders necessary the creation of states of continental dimensions and, tendentially, the unification of the human species, and, on the other, the absolute sovereignty of the state. This contradiction became apparent in Europe in the period spanning the end of the 19th century and the start of the 20th century and is, according to federalist thought, the main thread running through the era of world wars and fascism, in other words, running through Europe's new thirty-year war. On the one hand, the spread of interdependence outside national confines meant that supranational integration at continental level was indispensable if economic growth, security and the advance of democracy were to be guaranteed. On the other, the desire to preserve the absolute sovereignty of the state (which constitutes the guiding principle of nationalism and is the structural cause of international anarchy and conflict) obstructed the peaceful progress of supranational integration and ended up by leaving the way open for an attempt to unify Europe under the hegemony of what was, at the time, the continent's most powerful state. World War I was, indeed, the first stage of Germany's attempt to unify Europe under its own imperial dominion, and its conclusion produced no lasting solution as the defeat of Germany was followed not by a policy for the peaceful unification of Europe, but by an order which served only to heighten the crisis of the continent's system of national sovereign states. Meanwhile, the creation of small new states lengthened, by thousands of miles, the economic frontiers within Europe, and this economic fragmentation of the continent became even more marked with the increase in protectionism (itself rendered possible by the unlimited sovereignty of the states) — all this occurring in the context of a crisis which, precisely because of the increasingly inadequate dimensions of Europe's national states, had become endemic. However, even though the burden of this situation weighed most heavily on Germany, which lost territory and economic outlets of vast importance to it, the country still had enough energy left to launch, in a second attempt to achieve dominion, a further offensive.

* * *

By examining, in this context, the history of Germany between the two world wars, we can begin to understand why it was that an opposition to Communism that was so strong as to favour, as a reaction, the

victorious emergence of fascism, should emerge in Germany, and not in other countries characterised by the same level of economic and social development, such as the United States, Great Britain and France. In fact, while, due to its sheer size, the United States was not yet affected by the phenomenon of the crisis of the national state (and thus was able to emerge from the crisis of 1929 with an even stronger liberal-democratic system), in Germany, this same phenomenon produced a catastrophic level of economic and social instability which, in turn, led to a decisive strengthening of the deadly, extremist, anti-democratic tendencies at work in the country. And the reason why this did not occur in Great Britain and France is that these countries were cushioned by their vast colonial territories and thus their decline as national states was more gradual.

An understanding of the crisis of the national states in Europe, and of the particularly acute way in which this phenomenon manifested itself in Germany, favours in turn a deep understanding of both the expansionist design, which is the most fundamental characteristic of National Socialism, and of the systematic connection between this design and the totalitarian system and racist ideology which the movement favoured. National Socialism represents, in fact, a highly radical and coherent attempt to provide an expansionist-hegemonic response to the crisis of the European national states. And, to this end, (alongside the progressive intensification of power struggles in a system made up of states which are increasingly interdependent and yet, still attached to the principle of absolute sovereignty, unable to set up an efficient legal system at supranational level), a totalitarian state structure is functionally perfect, as it takes to an extreme the centralist, authoritarian and fanatically nationalist tendencies characteristic of continental European powers (which are structurally more militaristic and centralist than an insular power like Great Britain, as, having inland borders which are difficult to defend, their security is more fragile). And the racist ideology which, taken to an extreme, entails genocide, is coherent with the design for the permanent dominion of one European people over the other peoples of Europe. From this perspective, Hitler appears not only, and not principally, as anti-Lenin, but above all as the most radical and coherent expression of an attempt to oppose the historical need for subjugation of the national sovereign state and for peaceful supranational integration. Furthermore, the detection of a connection between National Socialism and the crisis of the national state in Europe not only highlights the guilt of the Nazi political class, but also reveals the considerable level of

responsibility which can be laid at the door of the political classes of the democratic countries of Western Europe which, instead of opting for the pathway towards European unification, preferred to take the path of national egoism, (demonstrated particularly by the increased protectionism following the economic crisis of '29), thus favouring to a decisive degree the victory of fascism in the country which was, objectively, the one hardest hit by the crisis of the national state.

Moving on to the period since 1945, just a few considerations, again extremely schematic, are sufficient to demonstrate that the crisis of the sovereign state also constitutes the main thread running through the second half of the 20th century. The era of world wars and fascism ended with the loss of autonomy of the European powers and their insertion in a bipolar system dominated, significantly, by two powers of continental dimensions. However, this very real decline in the sovereignty of the national states made way for the process of Western European integration which, although it has not yet culminated in federal unification of the continent, has nevertheless covered a considerable amount of ground in this direction and has already yielded extremely important results in terms of social and economic development and the progress of democracy, as well as prompting a number of imitative processes all over the world. In the meantime, the increase of international interdependence — linked to the advance of the technical and scientific revolution — is such that it has led to the emergence of challenges which place the question of the elimination of the absolute sovereignty of states on a world scale (in other words, the need for a gradual but effective unification of mankind) well and truly on the historical agenda. And these challenges relate not to the progressive globalisation of economic interdependence so much as to the existence of arms capable of mass destruction, to the ecological question, and to the North-South divide, issues which threaten the very survival of the human race. Moving on, we also need to look at how the end of the East-West conflict and the dissolution of the Soviet system fit into this wider context. If it is true that these major turning points in history are in fact linked to factors associated with the process of European integration and the impossibility for the Soviet Union to use its increasingly costly arms in a general war, as well as with the untenability of its closed attitude towards the world market, then it must be considered that the drive towards world unification, of which these factors are a manifestation, may be the guiding thread of the historical process in the period since 1945.

In conclusion, a practical imperative, quite different from that pro-

posed by Nolte, derives from this interpretation of the 20th century not as the century of Communism and violence, but as the century which threw into crisis the unlimited sovereignty of the state and brought the start of supranational unification. It is not only a question of rejecting all theories based on incrimination of the German nation as a whole, or simply of refusing all forms of totalitarianism. These are positions which must be seen in the context of a crucial and much broader aim, which is to triumph over the absolute sovereignty of the state — and in this sense, the conflict between nationalism and federalism emerges as the crucial ideological conflict of our age — beginning with the federal unification of Europe (based, of course, on equality of rights and obligations, and thus with no form of hegemony) and ending with the federal unification of the world, an order which will have, as its supporting pillars, a small number of continental and subcontinental federations. And unless this is the course indicated by “the commandment”, of which Nolte talks, “...to live together peacefully in a planet which has become small and threatened,” then that commandment can be considered nothing more than mere rhetoric.

Sergio Pistone

NOTES

¹ The works of Ernst Nolte fundamental to a reconstruction of his interpretation of the 20th century are: *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche*, Berlin, 1963; *Marxismus und industrielle Revolution*, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1983; *Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg*, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1985; *Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus*, Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main 1987; *Geschichtsdenken im 20. Jahrhundert*, Berlin, 1991; *Intervista sulla questione tedesca ieri e oggi*, ed. A. Krali, Bari, Laterza, 1993; *Lehrstück oder Tragödie? Beiträge zur Interpretation der Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Cologne, Böhlau, 1991; *Gli anni della violenza. Un secolo di guerra civile ideologica europea e mondiale*, Milan, Rizzoli, 1995.

² Cf. F. Furet, *Le passé d'une illusion. Essai sur l'idée communiste au XXe siècle*, Paris, Robert Laffont/Calman-Lévy, 1995. For a critical analysis of historical revisionism, cf. D. Losurdo, *Il revisionismo storico. Problemi e miti*, Bari, Laterza, 1996.

³ Cf. E. Nolte, *Gli anni della violenza*, cit., p. 147.

⁴ For a critical analysis of the theory of collective guilt on the part of the German nation, see my following works: *F. Meinecke e la crisi dello Stato nazionale tedesco*, Turin, Giappichelli, 1969; *Ludwig Dehio*, Naples, Guida, 1977; *La Germania e l'unità europea*, Naples, Guida, 1978; “A proposito delle colpe dei tedeschi e degli italiani”, in *Piemonteuropa*, December, 1987.

⁵ Cf. *Germania: un passato che non passa. I crimini nazisti e l'identità tedesca*, ed. G.E. Rusconi, Turin, Einaudi, 1987, which examines the contribution of Habermas, and others, to the debate over the theory of Nolte and other revisionists.

⁶ Cf. The book by Losurdo cited in Note 2.

⁷ To examine in more depth the theory of the crisis of the sovereign state as the main thread running through the 20th century, see the following texts: M. Albertini, *Il federalismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993; L. Levi, *Il federalismo*, Milan, F. Angeli, 1987; L. Dehio, *Equilibrio o egemonia*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1988; S. Pistone, "Ludwig Dehio e l'interpretazione federalista dell'epoca delle guerre mondiali e del fascismo", in *Piemonteuropa*, December, 1988; Id., "Alcune considerazioni sulla riunificazione tedesca e lo sviluppo dell'integrazione europea", in *Piemonteuropa*, October, 1990; Id., "Il ruolo internazionale dell'Europa, la società cosmopolitica e la pace", in *Piemonteuropa*, May, 1997.

IDEOLOGY, UTOPIA AND RELIGION

Foreword.

It is well known, to most people at least, that there are two conceptions of the term federalism which, while having many points of contact, nevertheless present substantial differences.

The first — the classical and better known view, which some call "Hamiltonian" because it inspired the founding fathers of the United States — is of essentially liberal matrix, with the doctrine of liberalism as its premise and background. Its specific objective is not to propose a general idea of man, of society and of the state, but to suggest a scientifically valid means of replacing the rule of violence in relations between states with the rule of law, by overcoming state sovereignty: limited, but not cancelled, in a political order characterized as much by a real unity of the whole as by a real autonomy of the parts.

Parallel to this conception there is however another, primarily of French origin, which is presented as a genuine philosophy, and as such claims to possess a global response, as far as this is possible today, to all the fundamental political problems — and not only to those of order and peace — which plague humanity. This is integral, or global federalism, of Proudhonian matrix, whose leader today is Alexandre Marc and whose

organ is the journal — founded by Marc — *L'Europe en Formation* from Nice.

I in any case, having formed my views in the Italian federalist tradition, from Einaudi through Spinelli, Rossi and Albertini — which descends from the liberal federalism of the Federal Union and Lionel Robbins —, while recognizing various merits in Marc and his school of thought, remain ideologically, as well as sentimentally, bound to the Hamiltonian conception: and it was in support of this central thesis that in 1996 I participated in an international conference, organised by followers of Alexandre Marc and dedicated to the theme "Ideology, utopia and religion considered from the federalist point of view". The paper I presented on that occasion is reproduced, with various cuts and some modifications, in the pages that follow.

Rudolf Bultmann: Demythologisation of Religion...

I would like to start with the distinction drawn by a great theologian and student of the history of Christianity, Rudolf Bultmann, between *kerugma* and *mythos*. It is scarcely necessary to remind my listeners of the essence of this conception, so well known is it. In approaching a religion, and in particular Christianity, the historian's analysis and the philosopher's judgement must distinguish, and clearly separate, what really constitutes the *profound and eternally valid message* (a system of moral teachings which the Kantian imperative has "rationalised") from that which is, so to speak, the external clothing, the *myth*: a web of legends, tales and miracles, of superhuman qualities and deeds attributed to superhuman beings: a "wrapping" which, thanks to its hold on the imagination of the masses, has contributed decisively to the affirmation of the Christian religion, for example, and has constituted the indispensable "vector" which, in the west, has allowed it to acquire and keep its cultural hegemony.

From this starting point then, the tolerance towards religious beliefs proper to the democratic idea is justified and must be defended in the field of politics: a tolerance which became established in Europe in reaction to the crimes of intolerance which characterised the wars of religion during the Reformation and Counter-reformation. It is a liberal conception which Rawls¹ recently expressed in more general terms: the existence of reasonable but incompatible convictions does not undermine the functioning of a well-ordered society, as long as the latter is not seen as being unified by its moral convictions, but by the principle of tolerance, so that

the divergence of moral ideals and cultural horizons does not prevent recognition of the same rules of justice and the pursuit of the community's interest before all else.

Herein lies the essence of liberalism, from this point of view, and I do not believe that federalism, one of whose fundamental inspirations is ecumenism, has anything to modify in this idea of tolerance, which is also its own.²

...and of Political Ideologies.

Bultmann's theory referred to above — the roots of which can be found in Spinoza's *Tractatus theologicus-politicus* — can be related to Raymond Boudon's theory that successful ideologies are all based on a "scientific core" (the equivalent of Bultmann's *kerugma*), from which a more or less all-encompassing *myth* is constructed, which forgets the limitations and the profound meaning of the message.³

Boudon thus shows, quite rightly, how the kind of demythologisation proposed by Bultmann in the religious field must be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to political ideologies.

The Concept of Ideology.

To make this point clearer it is worth first finding a better definition of the meaning and import of the word "ideology". In harmony with those numerous, if not innumerable authors who have laboured over this problem,⁴ ideology can be defined as a "holistic" conception which, starting with a genuine nucleus, resorts to arbitrary generalisations and ends up forgetting the limited and relative nature of this truth, arriving at an all-encompassing vision of society and of history. It thus becomes one-sided, reductive and finally false, whatever the causes — as a rule at least partially subconscious — of such a distortion: simple ignorance; class interests (Marx); or a will for political power (Cassirer).

Ideology is therefore a conception which lacks *consciousness*, i.e. a clear awareness of the meaning of philosophy, which is defined by Georg Simmel as the interpretation and construction of the world *starting from a particular point of view*, in other words a personal vision of all that is. This implies a consciousness of the relative nature of all philosophical systems, none of which is capable of an exhaustive, once-and-for-all explanation of reality in all its aspects, and which therefore is wrong if it makes any such claim, however valid it may be in what it has to say in

relation to the specific problem, time and place in which it was conceived and to which it remains bound.⁵

The Risk of the Myth...

Ernst Cassirer, whom we quoted above,⁶ rightly warns us against the danger, still a constant threat today, of the shift from the rational nucleus to the mythical generalisation to which there is an almost irresistible tendency to resort whenever there is a lack of scientifically appropriate means to resolve serious difficulties facing society and the state. (Cassirer, in the conclusion to his work, quotes fascism and Soviet-style communist-socialism as examples of the revival of such a "mythical" mentality, of such a regression to primitive and "magic" stages: today one might add Islamic fundamentalism). A grave danger not only in the socio-political field, but, more generally, within what the Germans call *Geisteswissenschaften*, or the humanities (not that the natural sciences are immune to it).⁷

Hence the importance of every *mise en garde* against what Boudon called the "perverse effects" which ensue from over-ambitious projects of social reform, whose results are often contrary to the intentions of their authors.⁸ It is important, as I was saying, to always bear in mind the distinction between what Boudon rightly calls "the scientific nucleus" of a theory, and in particular of a political project, on the one hand, from that which, on the other hand, is nothing but arbitrary generalisation, illusion and wishful thinking.

...Exorcised by Alberto Mochi.

At this point I would like to bring out of oblivion the thinking of an Italian author from the first half of this century, who published his most important work in France and in French.⁹

The physico-chemical sciences, he observes, have been able to reach the level of objectivity associated with them since the days of Bacon and Galileo because of their foundation on rigorous experimentation: this rigour consisting first of all in the precise definition of their object, which Mochi calls the "presupposition" of each science. (We note in passing that with this concept Mochi, who has remained entirely unknown, anticipated Kuhn's theory of the fundamentals of science by almost half a century:¹⁰ except that Mochi calls "presupposition" what Kuhn was to call "paradigm". The power of what comes from the United States and is

written in English!...)

But Mochi did not stop at this explanation of the objectivity of the natural sciences. These sciences, he observes, have the possibility to experiment without limitations, and for this very reason, theoretical progress in these sciences is independent of its practical applications. It is quite another matter in life sciences, beginning with medicine. Here every experimentation without limitation being either immoral (human vivisection) or impossible (in the field of sociology), the progress of every science depends, and often closely, on the progress of therapeutics — and in general, on practical applications (an objection which Mochi directs particularly against the sociologist Vilfredo Pareto).

For this reason, the politician must proceed with the same prudence as the doctor, always based on the confirmation of experience: in other words applying what Mochi — a doctor and medical philosopher¹¹ — calls “minimum effective intervention”. This is the course taken by the doctor to treat the patient’s most serious complaints, a course which Mochi calls the “fundamental problem” (*indicazione vitale*), since improvement in this area is the prerequisite to overall improvement. Here it is the practical results which guide science and for this reason, he adds, the social sciences cannot but remain closely connected with moral judgements.

Each historical era has its own “fundamental problem”: writing in the forties (*Civiltà: i termini di una crisi*, published in 1947), Mochi identified it as international anarchy. For Mochi, the first step to take was the realisation of a European Federation, a theory which he found convincingly confirmed, in terms particularly consonant with his own philosophy, in the works of Lionel Robbins on this topic, in particular *Economic Causes of War* and *Economic Planning and International Order*.¹² We note in passing that in this sense and within these limits, the “Hamiltonian” idea of federalism is without doubt of more immediate priority.¹³

The alternative, Mochi continued, was decadence: wherever man fails to adapt the environment to himself and ends up adapting to the environment, society deteriorates morally, in a vicious circle whose disastrous consequences, I might add, are also feared by such recent authors as Alain Minc and Umberto Eco, speaking of a new mediaeval period.¹⁴ The same happens when, on the contrary, the attempt is made to modify the foundations of society, without the preliminary check of experience. The failure of totalitarianism and the disasters it has caused are definitive proof of this. Under the illusion of “enriching and liberating man” one succeeds only in “enslaving and mutilating him.”¹⁵

A Way Out: Karl Mannheim.

This rule developed by Mochi, of prudence on the basis of a careful assessment of the situation — the exact opposite to immobilism — must in my opinion now on the one hand be completed by what Karl Popper has written on “non-falsifiability” as a fundamental criterion of objective and scientific truth, and on the mistaken nature of historicism, when it claims to possess the key to grasp the laws of history and predict the future of mankind;¹⁶ and on the other hand, be related to Karl Mannheim’s conception of *Ideology and Utopia*,¹⁷ which, while theorising the still one-sided, partial and limited nature of every historical interpretation as of every political project, nevertheless, in relation to the latter, admits the possibility, for a *freischwebende Intelligenz*, of overcoming one-sided positions and proposals in a new dynamic synthesis, thanks to the independence of this intelligence from conditioning by the political struggle. Thus the function which Mannheim entrusts to such a learned class, as an American sociologist has remarked,¹⁸ is comparable to the function which Hegel attributed to the “absolute Spirit” and Marx to the proletariat. Perhaps, as another interpreter of Mannheim remarks, one has here the realisation of objectivity, the foundation of politics as science.¹⁹

Such “freedom” of the man of culture from external conditioning is however always relative and could not alone guarantee the objectivity and scientific validity of the political projects it elaborates. Hence the importance, or rather the indispensability, of completing this conception with Mochi’s “philosophy of prudence”, if I can call it thus, which puts us on our guard — here too, fifty years ahead of its time — against the “perverse effects of social action” later denounced by Raymond Boudon, and calls us back to graduality and to factual evidence.

Lessons for Federalist Doctrine.

This conception should constitute an important chapter in the doctrine of federalism, and in particular of integral or global federalism. The fundamental inspiration of this federalist philosophy is to avoid every monism, every all-encompassing and one-sided conception, every arbitrary mutilation of reality: certainly federalism opposes to these conceptions the constant search for an organic synthesis, and for a unitary vision of the diverse aspects of society and of the various individual vocations; but always conserving the difference and the distinction — and recognising the autonomous value — of each man and woman. It is in this sense

that federalism constitutes an anti-ideological conception, and a vaccine against every ideology intended as a totalitarian vision, which sacrifices the richness and pluralism which constitute the value — and the essence — of human beings and of any society worthy of the name. And this is precisely the position that has always been put over by Alexandre Marc.²⁰

This clear and coherent position in the field of doctrine then must be matched in the field of political forward planning and action — even more decidedly and *ex informata conscientia* than has been done so far — to the, in my opinion still original and practically unknown contribution of Alberto Mochi, so well completed, as we have seen, by that of Mannheim.

In other words, recognition of the global nature of problems (in reality *tout se tient*), and therefore of the unduly one-sided nature — or even the falsity — of every partial and non-organic vision, does not mean that such a “globalization” must also characterise action. Revolutions, total and immediate changes, realised independently of any confirmation of experience (and of the general consensus of competent opinion) risk producing the opposite effect to that hoped for.²¹

Conclusion: Against Revolutionary Utopianism.

This “philosophy of prudence based on careful evaluation of the situation” fully deserves to be part of the history of European culture. The great political discovery of Europe in the modern era was — as has already been noted — the lesson it drew from the absurdity of fanaticism and the crimes of the wars of religion: the lesson of tolerance. Similarly the lesson which it must draw from the failure of totalitarianism in our century is that of reforming prudence. It is basically the same virtue as underpinned the affirmation of the natural sciences. “Test and test again” was the motto of the *Accademia del Cimento* and “*Nullius in verba*”, that of the British “Royal Society”, mottos which clearly express the philosophical *arrière pensée* of these academies, the new reforming idea, opposed to the sterile Aristotelianism of the later Scholasticism (though not, in general, to Aristotle), lost in the dogmatic somnolence of *jurare in verba magistri*.

The task is much more difficult in the field of political forward planning, where one must not only avoid the risks of the “perverse effects of social action”, but also determine what is, in Mochi’s words, the “fundamental problem”, the most serious evil to be extirpated first. And yet only at this price will utopia emerge from the mists of arbitrariness and enter the field of reason.

Kant said, in his *Prolegomena*, criticising the possibility of metaphysics as science, that the dove, if it were gifted with reason, could delude itself that in the void its flight would be easier and speedier. In reality, without the support of air, it could not even rise from the earth. Mochi invites us to similar modesty.

Andrea Chiti-Batelli

NOTES

¹ John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, Columbia University Press, 1993.

² It remains however to be seen what attitude one should assume before intolerant religious or political conceptions (not “reasonable”, to use Rawls’s words), or even aberrant ones (the Indian widow who must be burnt on the pyre of her dead husband, or more simply the Muslim girl who presents herself at a French school in a *chador*). In all these cases the liberal conception must defend itself, because otherwise it risks being eliminated: one should therefore not hesitate to practice rigorous intolerance of the intolerant, based on a careful evaluation of the situation. The freedom which remains impotent before its enemies, fearing to contradict itself, ends up allowing its own annihilation; here, exceptionally, *in dubio contra reum*.

³ Raymond Boudon, *L'idéologie. L'origine des idées reçues*, Paris, Fayard, 1986.

⁴ For a bibliography I refer to Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction*, London and New York, Verso, 1991, a brief but fairly complete history of the concept of ideology and of the authors who have over the years, particularly in the last two centuries, contributed to its definition. See also Jorge Larraín, *The Concept of Ideology*, London, Hutchinson (and Athens, University of Georgia Press), 1979. A less succinct treatment (3 vols.) is found in *Histoire des idéologies*, ed. François Châtelet, Paris, Hachette, 1978. See also Michel Amiot et al., *Les idéologies dans le monde actuel*, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1971 and J. Gabel, *Idéologies*, Paris, Anthropos, 1974. A short but exhaustive introduction, with bibliography, to the history of the concept of ideology over the last two centuries is found in Luciano Gallino’s *Dizionario di Sociologia*, Turin, Unione Tipografica Torinese, 1993, 2nd ed. (under the entry “*Ideologia*”). Particular attention is due on the one hand to Hans Barth, *Wahrheit und Ideologie*, Zurich, Manesse, 1945 (and Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1974, New York, Arno-Ayer, 1975, English tr. Stratford, California University Press, 1976); and on the other hand to Paul Ricoeur, in his three essays “Herméneutique et critique des idéologies”, in *Démythisation et idéologie*, ed. E. Castelli, Paris, Aubier, 1973; “Science et idéologie”, in *Revue de Philosophie de Louvain*, May 1974 and “Idéologie et utopie”, in *Annual Proceedings of The Centre for Philosophical Exchange*, 1976, vol. 2, n. 2.

⁵ Still on the subject of a definition of the concept of ideology, see Mireille Marc-Lipiansky, “Le fédéralisme est-il une idéologie?”, in *L'Europe en Formation* (Nice), winter 1992-93, pp. 41-64 (especially pp. 55-6).

⁶ Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (1946), New Haven, Yale University Press, 1979. It is no chance that one century later Karl Dietrich Bracher (*Zeit der Ideologien*, Stuttgart, D.V.A., 1982) manifests a concern similar to that of Cassirer, which I indicate immediately

after in the text, expressed in almost identical terms.

⁷ This observation is made by Klaus W. Hempfer, "Ideologienanfälligkeit und Relevanzverlust der Geisteswissenschaften", in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (insert in the weekly *Das Parlament*, Bonn), 3rd April 1992.

⁸ Raymond Boudon, *Effets pervers et ordre social*, Paris, P.U.F., 1977.

⁹ Alberto Mochi, *La connaissance scientifique*, Paris, Alcan, 1927; *De la connaissance à l'action*, Paris, Alcan, 1928; *Science et morale dans les problèmes sociaux*, Paris, Alcan, 1932. He also published in Italian the equally noteworthy *Civiltà: i termini di una crisi*, L'Universale di Roma, 1947. Mochi's conception finds significant confirmation in Paul Ricoeur, *Science et idéologie*, quoted at the end of n. 5.

¹⁰ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, The University of Chicago, 1962.

¹¹ Alberto Mochi, *Filosofia della medicina*, Siena, Ticci, 1948.

¹² Alberto Mochi, *Oriente comunista e Federazione europea*, Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1950.

¹³ According to Mochi's way of thinking — which we share — one must therefore try to identify other "vital indications" for tomorrow, for example the joint control of closely inter-connected phenomena, which can therefore only be treated together, such as planetary pollution; the indiscriminate rise in the birth rate; the unemployment produced by automation; the North-South imbalance; the increasingly massive waves of emigration from what in Europe are called "non-EC" countries. This joint treatment implies, among other things, finding an economy which is not founded and reliant for its survival on indefinite growth (which in the long term is impossible, or indeed suicidal, in a planet with limited resources). In my view — as I have tried to show elsewhere — a "vital indication" which must soon come to the fore is the reform of the democracy of universal suffrage, which the formation of grand continental state units, such as the European Federation, will, I believe, render indispensable.

¹⁴ What they say is summed up by Joscha Schmierer, *Mein Name sei Europa. Einigung ohne Mythos und Utopie*, Frankfurt, Fischer, 1996 (particularly pp. 188 and following). Let us add a less recent author, inventor of the expression "new Middle Ages": Roberto Vacca, *Il Medioevo prossimo venturo*, Milan, Mondadori, 1971.

¹⁵ These words are from Alexandre Marc (*L'Ordre Nouveau*, July 1933), who, even at the beginning of the Thirties had foreseen what could be observed *de visu* some ten years later.

¹⁶ Karl Popper, *La logique de la découverte scientifique*, Paris, Payot, 1973 and *Misère de l'historicisme*, Paris, Plon, 1956.

¹⁷ Karl Mannheim, *Ideologie und Utopie*, Bonn, Cohen, 1929; a more complete edition: *Ideology and Utopia*, New York, Harcourt and Brace (and London, Routledge and Kegan), 1953.

¹⁸ R. K. Merton, "K. Mannheim and the Sociology of Knowledge", in *The Journal of Liberal Religion*, Chicago, III, winter 1941; by the same author, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1957.

¹⁹ Antonio Santucci, preface to the Italian translation of the work quoted above in n. 17, Mannheim, *Ideologia e Utopia*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1957, 1965.

²⁰ See also for example, by Marc, "Tuer l'idéologie ou tuer l'homme", in *L'Europe en Formation*, April-May 1974. Similarly, Mireille Marc-Lipiansky, quoted above in note 5.

²¹ It is tempting to quote, in support of this theory which Mochi fully develops, the ironic... "demonstration" given of it by Paul Reboux, in his well-known collection *À la manière de...*, with his parodies of Jaurès and Tolstoy.

FEDERALISM AND CITIZENSHIP

The trend towards globalisation which, more than anything else, characterises the historical phase through which we are living is manifested, above all, in the easy access to information and ideas and in the increasing speed with which such information and ideas can be diffused — a phenomenon which is allowing more and more people to extend their circle of contacts and to widen their knowledge on a scale inconceivable until recent times. It would seem normal to expect all this to generate a heightened and more widespread awareness that the human race is a single community of destiny, as well as a greater level of understanding among peoples. And yet, the prevalent movement appears to be in the opposite direction. Never before has the political sphere been so rife with disorder, fanaticism, incomprehension and intolerance. Never before have the ideas of political philosophers been so strongly inclined towards relativism and towards scepticism over the usefulness of dialogue.

On many occasions, we have, in this journal, expressed our view that this apparent paradox is rooted in the contradiction between the conducting of inter-human relations on a planetary scale and the stubborn determination to keep politics within the national sphere. Even states of continental dimensions continue to retain the closed and rigid structure characteristic of the national state, rather than seeking to create a *network* (the structure most suited to the era of globalisation) which is able, by increasing its knots and narrowing its meshes, to keep on growing in size and density. In the complex and changeable global society in which we live, the idea of society being ruled only from the centre is becoming less and less tenable as more and more centres of initiative spring up. And the state, in the forms which it has assumed in this last part of the twentieth century, is no longer equal to its role, either as an actor on the international political stage, or as a promoter of the common good at home. As the consensus on which such forms of state are based gradually dissolves, so too does the sense of solidarity which binds its people together.

* * *

The success of Huntington's theory of the *clash of civilisations* is explained by the crisis of the national state and by the effect that this crisis has had on the international equilibrium. According to this theory, the real protagonists of world politics are not states, but vaster and less well-defined entities, i.e., "civilisations". While the success of this theory can

be explained by the fact that it seems, initially at least, to take certain phenomena into account, (the role currently played in the world by Islamic Fundamentalism or that played in political debate, until a few months ago, by "Asian values"), it has implications of the utmost gravity. Huntington's "civilisations" represent radically different visions of the world, and radically different views on what is meant by civil cohabitation. And these visions and interpretations, stemming from natural origins or being rooted in an ancient and profoundly internalised history, contrast one another, and render impossible the establishment of a common ground on which agreements might be reached. In Huntington's view, the values of freedom, justice and democracy are unique to the "Western civilisation" and, as such, can never be extended to other cultural settings, as there exists no other cultural setting able to assimilate them. According to this view, therefore, there are "civilisations" which are sentenced for ever to obscurantism and dictatorship, and there exist neither universal values nor a communication-based community able to embrace, in a virtual sense, the entire human race: it is only on the terrain of violence that civilisations can encounter one another.

Ideas showing a certain affinity with this have emerged as a result of a growing awareness of the incapacity of the national state to guarantee, within its own confines, social peace, respect for the law, economic growth and social justice. Consequently, throughout the industrialised world, the sense of solidarity generated by a feeling of belonging to the fatherland is disintegrating, leaving in its wake innumerable alternative "identities". Men and women, establishing a precarious *ubi consistam*, are able to delude themselves that, by identifying with groups based on race, ethnic, religious or gender affiliations, they can cancel out their individuality. As well as contributing to the accentuation of social closure and the growth of conflict, each of these groups, or collective entities, also provides an excuse for men and women to shirk the responsibilities imposed on them by the need for solidarity and cooperation. Here again, these different feelings of identity or belonging are, in the minds of those caught up by them, embedded in natural factors or atavistic affinities which render these identity-based groups impervious to dialogue and resistant to change. After all, the word "identity" itself suggests something which is not subject to change, something which remains true to itself.

A word of warning, however. These stirrings, or feelings of "identity", are in no way linked with the black freedom movements in America, or with the movements for the emancipation of women, (at least in so far

as the aim of such movements was to allow a section of the population — the object of discrimination — to achieve a status equal to that of the rest of society). The pursuit of "identity" is not a struggle for equality so much as an endeavour to strengthen differences — it does not strive for an opening up of sections of society towards one another but seeks, rather, to tighten its closure. By considering "identity" as the basis of truth, it shies away from rational debate. This is how, in America, the concept of political correctness arose, a concept which seems to justify and strengthen segregation, in particular spiritual segregation, and which has led to the emergence of morally unacceptable practices, such as university courses run by blacks on blacks for blacks, and books written by women on women for women, thus shifting the focus of attention away from what should be the fundamental imperative underlying the actions of every "moral politician" i.e., the obligation to work together to create a society in which whites and blacks, men and women come together in the pursuit of the common good.

* * *

These approaches to, and conceptions of the modern historical reality are disturbing in so far as they constitute an acknowledgement that the *differences* between men represent the main factor within political debate, (so that it is only as a distinct zoological species that mankind can be considered a single entity). They constitute an acknowledgement that, as far as its historical action is concerned, the human race must be seen as a juxtaposition of "civilisations" or of "identities" (defined in the most diverse ways), none of which has anything in common with the others, but all of which are faced with the sole problem of how to ensure their social cohabitation with the other "civilisations" or "identities" and, when their relative strength allows it, how to dominate them. In this context, the role of the state is radically reduced — it no longer embodies values, these are now incorporated by the "civilisations", or groups which share a common "identity", each of which has its own, equally valid notion of what is true and good. This is the framework within which the ethical lives of men are shaped. While, in this context, the role of the state in the sphere of international relations is secondary to that of the "civilisations", domestically it acts as little more than a neutral mediator, seeking to maintain peace among the various "identity" groups, and to impose behavioural rules whose content can be dictated only by the existing balance of forces.

These affirmations are ominously reminiscent of several frenzied

passages from *Mein Kampf* which expound the theory that race, being organic and natural, should prevail over the state which is bureaucratic and artificial. But this is, of course, a wild idea. History shows us that it was the state which was responsible for creating the political conditions required for the affirmation of such great and fundamental values as civil peace, freedom, democracy and social justice. However, states have so far proved unable to establish, at supranational level, the rule of law which each have created, albeit imperfectly, within their own confines, (and because of this inability, they have been forced to resort to the barbarity of war in order to safeguard their existence), and it is certainly true that, in the course of their more recent history, they have been obliged to promote the ominous and mythical idea of the nation, in order to shore up their legitimacy in an increasingly unstable and violent international setting. However, let us not forget that the idea of state is linked irrevocably with the idea of *citizenship*, in other words, with the notion that all are *equal* in the eyes of the law and that all have a duty to contribute to the furtherance of the common good. Furthermore, it is impossible to acknowledge equality among the citizens of a state without implicitly acknowledging the equality of all people (in so far as all men are citizens of a virtual world state).

The state is not the product of any supposed natural affinity; rather it is based, ideally, on a *social contract* which has been freely entered into. And it is thanks to its particular nature that it has proven able to evolve during the course of history, to extend the sphere of solidarity, and to bring together different cultures and identities, allowing, as a result of their proximity to one another, new shared values to emerge. Of course, none of this can alter the fact that, in history, the state has been the perpetrator of the most evil deeds: but its shortcomings must be seen as an indication that the emancipation of the human race is still only in its initial stages. Indeed, because of the limitations due to the fact that this process is still in its infancy, it is only in the context of the state and of the struggle to modify the state (never outside this context, never independently of the state) that the values of civil cohabitation can be expressed and affirmed.

* * *

The social contract is that act by which, to use an expression of Kant's, *the multitude becomes a people*. There can be no state without a people. At this point, in order to avoid falling into the trap of believing that

citizenship, like membership of a people (and of a state), is based on a repudiation of pluralism, it is important to recall the distinction between people and nation, (and likewise, between state and national state). In truth, the idea of "the nation" is a corruption of the idea of "the people": while the latter implies a voluntary union of reasonable individuals who wish, together, to further the common good, the former is based on the mythical representation of a pseudo-religious, or a blood tie. Unlike a people, which can be defined as a community forged on the basis of its capacity for communication, (a community to which territorial boundaries are therefore nothing other than something which must be overcome in order to realise, in the creation of a world people, its fullest potential), a nation is united by all that which distinguishes it from other nations; in the case of a nation, the existence of territorial boundaries is fundamental to its very survival.

If this is true, then no contradiction can be said to exist between citizenship (meaning membership of a people) and any sense of "identity" (be it ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, gender-related or whatever). The concept of citizenship emphasises, as essential factors shaping the sense of human identity, both our common membership of the human race and the absolute originality of our individual personality: both point to the impossibility of considering the individual as nothing more than an expression of the characteristics which define the group or groups to which he belongs. In a state free from the idea of nationhood, all the "identities" can thrive alongside one another, providing it is accepted and understood that any behaviour which clashes with the universal duty to respect the freedom of others will firmly be repressed. To this, it must be added that if, rather than a mere formality, citizenship is destined to become the accepted basis of dialogue and solidarity, it will inevitably lead to a greater level of mutual understanding among men and thus to a situation in which differences between them are irrelevant, not only in the eyes of the law, but also in the conviviality of their social cohabitation. This is why, in the current phase in which we are living, characterised by the mass migration to industrialised countries of peoples from vastly different cultural backgrounds, if it is true that the idea promoting the forced assimilation of these peoples must be forcibly rejected, then so must the idea that these migrants can simply be *inserted* into the society which admits them for, although this is hidden by a mask of tolerance and respect for the culture of these newcomers, insertion really means nothing other than ghetto-like segregation. What is really needed is an attempt to further their *integration*; in other words, a process which, while fully

respecting their specific characteristics and customs (providing these do not go against the basic principles on which the state is founded), urges and encourages them to play a more active role in the political and social life of the country to which they have emigrated, so that they might become an integral part of its people, improving the quality of social cohabitation through their cultural input.

The fact remains that the pluralism that constitutes the basis of freedom is more than just a sterile juxtaposition of apolitical identities which, being inward-looking and not at all open to one another, are unable to evolve. True pluralism stems from the political commitment and involvement of citizens, citizens who are stirred by common values and motivated by the infinite diversity of problems which emerge within a state whose territorial structure is complex and varied. It is in the *local community*, therefore, that true pluralism is to be found because, while still within the wider context of the issues which affect the community as a whole, it is in the local community that these problems take shape and in which opinions can be exchanged. This pluralism is certainly not a denial of the oneness of mankind, rather, it allows those whose circumstances dictate it to become fully fledged members of different communities, without having to feel an outsider in any of them.

Federalism is the only adequate political answer to the challenge of globalisation. Only federalism rises above the national state without, however, repudiating the notion of state — after all, a world federal state would be the absolute expression of federalism. It is only through federalism (by holding on firmly to the idea of the people, resisting both its degeneration into the idea of nation and attempts to break it down into countless closed, narrow and hostile identity-based groups) that the ideal of citizenship can be realised. By proposing an institutional scheme based on levels of government which allow local and global problems to be tackled together, federalism alone is able to unite equality and difference. In view of the growing sense of disenchantment which currently pervades the relationship between men and politics, federalism is today the only viewpoint which allows expectations to be re-oriented, hopes to be rekindled and fresh moral strength to be generated, once again embedding in history the fundamental values on which civil cohabitation is founded.

Francesco Rossolillo

Viewpoints *

THE REGIONALISATION OF POST-SOVIET SPACE: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

There is a tendency, in the modern world, towards the formation of regional alliances among neighbouring states, most of which, like the European Union or associations in the Asia-Pacific region, have both a political, including military-political, and an economic bias.

Regional alienation and inter-state integration grow more spectacular in periods of world economic and political instability and when the prospects for improvement look bleak.

The break-up of the military-political and economic blocs of socialist countries — the Warsaw Treaty Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (Comecon) — in the 1990s gave rise, in the post-socialist space, to a powerful impetus towards separation and the formation of new entities. With the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of 15 newly-independent states, the process gained momentum. The disintegration of the USSR, a far more closely knit economic bloc than the Comecon or the EU, with all the republics developing as parts of a single entity, proved to be a more controversial and traumatic upheaval than the collapse of the USSR-dominated Comecon. Besides, the republics of the Soviet Union lacked sovereignty, unlike the Central and East European states, which had each retained an independent status within the Comecon.

The process of political and economic change in the former socialist sphere, including the USSR, began with institutional dissolution and is now moving towards the formation of new entities. Regionalisation of the post-Soviet space is therefore an intermediate stage, an inevitable passage in this restructuring of the entire post-socialist space. It can be also viewed as a component of the process of world integration, in which Russia and other former Soviet republics are now actively involved.

* This heading includes contributions which the editorial board believes readers will find interesting, but which do not necessarily reflect the board's views.

When the USSR ceased its existence in December 1991, 12 former Soviet republics formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which, according to an agreement stipulated in 1993, was subsequently to evolve into a Russia-led economic union. Meanwhile the Baltic countries — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — merged in September 1993 into the Baltic Union, which aspired to become part of the leading European structures.

Our studies have led to the conclusion that the differences between the former Soviet republics (both geopolitical and in their foreign economic policies) hamper their comprehensive integration. The deepening of these contradictions over the period 1992-1997 prompt a pessimistic forecast for the foreseeable future: the 12-member Commonwealth is unlikely to grow into a military, political or economic union centred on Russia (following the EU pattern). Regionalism in Russia is taking root.

Of the 15 former Soviet republics, ten have united into regional groups, with Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia joining simultaneously two regional alliances and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Uzbekistan, the Ukraine and Moldavia being members of a single association. Five states, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have so far withheld from joining any alliance.

By the end of 1996, five regional groups of USSR heirs had been formed: 1) the Union of Two, or the Treaty of Two, with Russia and Byelorussia; 2) the Customs Union of Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, also called the Euroasian Union, the Union of Four or the Treaty of Four; 3) the Central Asian Economic Union, also known as the Union of Three, embracing Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kirghizia as well as Russia and Tajikistan as observers; 4) the Baltic Union (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania); 5) the Ukrainian-Moldavian Union.

There has also been much talk of establishing a Caucasian economic bloc (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan).

These regional groups fall into two categories: those whose members, in the absence of a clear leader, carry equal weight, and those which have a powerful “nucleus”. The former category includes all the regional alliances which do not include Russia (the Baltic Union, the Union of Three, the embryonic Ukrainian-Moldovian Union). The second category embraces what might be termed Russia-led unions — the union of Russia and Byelorussia and the Customs Union of Four.

The communities currently in existence are either free trade zones or customs associations, and represent the initial stages of integration schemes. The objectives declared in their constituent documents — a

common market and a monetary union — are unlikely to be attained by most of the groups.

There are different views on the current tendency towards the formation of regional groups within the CIS, a tendency which we feel may be explained by the absence of a consistent and transparent integration policy on the part of Russia. Having proclaimed a desire to promote integration and the formation of an economic union of the 12 states, Russia has so far failed to become an attractive economic and political partner for these countries.

Another reason may be the effectiveness of the protectionist policies implemented by smaller CIS countries in order to safeguard domestic producers: they have established Russia-free regional blocs in order to make up, at least partially, for the loss of the Russian market. There is also the awareness that if Russia opts for a strategy of autonomous development, the aggregate potential of regional groups will be able to offer more powerful resistance to Russia's attempts to subordinate the development of CIS members to its interests.

One main obstacle to the integration of the CIS states, a factor which, at the same time, favours regionalisation is the disaccord between the member states and their leaders, arising from objective clashes of economic interests as well as political leaders' personal ambitions. “Euroenthusiasts” seeking a common Europe and “Eurosceptics” fearing any form of unification seem to be mirrored in the context of the CIS, by Uniophiles and Uniophobes. The former, which can imagine no alliance without Russia, are Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tajikistan, while the latter, which oppose an economic and political union of all CIS members with the further development into a confederation of Euroasian republics and the introduction of a single currency, include the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Meanwhile, the position of Armenia and Moldavia is not clear; they do not make public statements rejecting the establishment of closer unions to replace the CIS, but still tend to establish bilateral contacts, with Russia as well as with other states.

When examining the political and economic factors underlying the regionalisation of the post-Soviet space, one should not underestimate the importance of the Western countries' resistance to the trend for greater levels of integration within the CIS. Although they admit publicly that the former Soviet republics represent an area of vital interest to Russia, many Western politicians and strategists disfavour the growth of Russian influence in this area and exploit contradictions existing within

the Commonwealth, especially between Ukraine and Russia. Nor should we ignore the fact that a multitude of Western companies have, in the last five years, penetrated and become firmly established on the markets of former Soviet republics and are not inclined to relinquish their positions, especially in the raw material sectors of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.

In view of all the major obstacles in the path of rapprochement on a multilateral basis, CIS members are opting for regional blocs with a restricted number of participants (2 to 4. See the table).

* * *

Let us now examine the objectives and mechanisms of functioning of these main alliances.

1. The Customs Union of Four, incorporating Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, is often seen as a nucleus of the future economic union of CIS members. Established in January 1995, it has gone through several stages of evolution, acquiring its present form in the spring of 1996 when Kirghizia joined the Union of Three (see table). The signing of the last treaty opened up wider prospects than are suggested by its denomination as a customs union.

The treaty is open to all CIS member states wishing to enter into common customs space with Russia. The inter-state structures of the Customs Union — the Inter-State Council, the Inter-Parliamentary Committee and the Integration Committee — emulate the coordinating structures of the CIS. The latter follows the pattern of the Inter-State Economic Committee in the CIS and is made up of government members from the four states. This body must ensure that all parties to the Customs Union respect the relevant economic agreement.

In accordance with the treaty establishing the Customs Union, the territories of member countries are, from the moment it comes into force, regarded as a single customs area. Which means that in the future all the tariff and non-tariff restrictions on the movement of commodities manufactured in the countries of the Four should be lifted. A single set of customs rules should be applied with regard to the Union's external perimeter (the borders with other countries) so as to ensure the implementation of a single export-import policy in trade relations with third countries. By the autumn of 1996, all the export-import duties within the territory of the Four had been cancelled.

The Customs Union of CIS members, few as its members are, has

injected fresh impetus into trade relations both among its members and between the Union and other CIS members; for Russia this has meant increased imports. Even during the first stage of the formation of the Customs Union, the general volume of trade recorded by Russia, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan increased 1.4 times (the Russian-Byelorussian share 1.7 times and Russian-Kazakh share by 15 per cent).

Thus, the simplified customs procedures on the borders with neighbouring states, the elimination of the so-called red-tape surrounding customs controls, as well as reduced export and import costs have for the Customs Union's member states promoted and raised the competitiveness of their goods on the internal and on neighbouring markets. The benefits of more lively mutual trade have been felt by all the members of the Union.

However, the Union is plagued by problems as well. The prevailing ones concern the member countries' differing attitudes toward third countries, the elaboration of a single tariff system protecting the Customs Union on its external perimeter as well as the provision of economic guarantees for each of its members. The latter problem is particularly acute, especially bearing in mind the limited nature of the Union's territory and the fragility of its borders with neighbouring CIS members.

The Customs Union functions according to stated principles: uniform economic methods of managing external affairs and identical trade arrangements with regard to third countries. But uniformity of management methods and unanimity of foreign trade policy are not easy targets to achieve: the four countries differ from one another structurally, the reforms are not equally advanced in all of them and their dependence on foreign relations also varies. These are the problems underlying the serious contradictions which have emerged during attempts to coordinate foreign economic policies, policies which have resulted in damage inevitably being inflicted upon some members by the adoption of certain measures. The examples of this are numerous, and in an attempt to illustrate just how premature the move to create a customs union (instead of beginning with a free trade zone) was, we will cite only the most telling ones.

In the second year of the Union's existence, first one, then another member modified, unilaterally, the table of duties, especially, import duties protecting the domestic market. As we have already indicated, the rate system operated by the Four virtually mirrors the Russian one and therefore, in foreign economic policy toward third countries, reflects Russia's interests. Herein lies the main source of contradictions.

In April 1996, Kazakhstan announced a reduction of import duties on a wide assortment of goods. While improving its relations with the West, this move generated friction between the country and its Union partners. With rates lowered by 2-40 per cent, the reform applied to imports of furniture, industrial and agricultural machinery and automobiles, in other words, those areas of trade which Russia seeks to protect against higher quality, lower cost imports. An obvious imbalance in the industrial structures of Russia and Kazakhstan emerges here: the Russian automobile and agricultural machinery industries are based on giant works designed to cater for the needs of the internal market and whose products are unable to compete with imported analogues. It is quite natural that Russia should protect its national companies, through tariff policies as well as by other means. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, does not manufacture automobiles and farm machinery and is therefore interested in increasing its importation of these goods.

Byelorussia also has a different economic structure from Russia and its raw materials are scarcer, yet under the agreement the republic should apply the same customs duties as Russia on goods imported from third countries. The adoption of the Russian table of import duties in Byelorussia provoked an upsurge in import prices and higher production costs in some areas of light industry. For instance, the republic's clothing factories are compelled to pay high duties on natural fabrics which are not produced domestically with finished goods becoming more expensive and thus less competitive as a result.

The examples cited show that much coordination and unification still has to be done before the Customs Union can be considered beneficial to all sides and before the customs and tax barriers can be said to protect, effectively, the Commonwealth market. Russia has so far incurred financial losses.

2. The Union of Russia and Byelorussia is another association involving Russia. Its nature, in substance rather than in declared intentions, is far less clear than that of the four-party Customs Union.

The Treaty of Two implied a greater level of integration than that which is provided for by the Customs Union which incorporates both Russia and Byelorussia. Close scrutiny of the constituent documents and of the way in which the bilateral agreements were implemented in the first year following the signing of the Treaty (April 1996-August 1997) reveals that the member states have achieved little more than preferential trade with each other. They have set up new inter-state administrative and coordinating bodies: the Supreme Council of the Union (headed by the

presidents of the two countries), the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Assembly. This organisation is reminiscent of the three-member structure of CIS inter-state bodies, the only difference being that the Executive Council of the Union is vested with clear-cut supranational competences. Plans were made to set up a special fund for joint Russian-Byelorussian projects. But our interviews with Russian government experts fail to confirm that these intentions have ever been realised, and most experts affirm that the functions of the new bodies involve little more than coordination.

For the time being the articles contained in the Treaty of Two can be seen only as declarations of intent which necessitate extensive additional dialogue. While the message they convey points to a desire to pursue a single economic policy (itself a feature of highly-integrated economies and of an economic union), in practice the ambitions embodied by the Treaty have proved to be too lofty, as the actual economic conditions in Russia and Byelorussia preclude the possibility of rendering concrete most of the provisions contained within it.

It is too early to talk of real progress having been made on the way towards Russian-Byelorussian economic integration — there is no evidence that any of the provisions contained within the Treaty have actually been implemented. Byelorussia appears at the present stage to be politically well placed for close forms of cooperation with Russia, and this is largely due to a subjective factor: President Alexander Lukashenko's personal commitment is unification. There are, however, in both countries many who oppose the current special relations between them and there is a chance that possible power reshuffles, above all the removal of Lukashenko from his post, may lead to a cardinal shift in Byelorussian policy. The prevailing sentiments among the pro-Western opposition in Byelorussia are as follows: "Lukashenko is trading our sovereignty", "The union with Russia means a return to a backward Byelorussia", "Byelorussia should follow its own path into Europe and the EU."

The negative tendencies typical of these bilateral relations persist as a result of the mounting Byelorussian fuel debt and the continued losses incurred by the Russian budget due to third nations exploiting the Russian-Byelorussian Customs Union. Nevertheless, progress has been made in the bid to establish inter-State financial-industrial groups and to increase cooperation in the financial sphere (joint banks are in the making) and in the purchasing by Russian oil companies LUKoil, Yukos and Slavneft of property in Byelorussia. But these tendencies, in particular, the establishment of multinationals, are characteristic of the present

stage of Russia's links with all CIS countries and therefore do not represent features of an increased level of integration with the regional union under review.

3. Russia is absent from the Central Asian Union (CAU), which incorporates Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Uzbekistan. The CAU was conceived as a stable political and economic alliance capable of functioning without recourse to Russian aid. Its architects believed it would counterbalance an eventual group of Slavic states whose amalgamation on ethnic grounds (Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine) seemed quite feasible in the early years of CIS existence. Admittedly, Kazakhstan's position has always been characterised by a Euroasian approach (favouring, in other words, the idea of including Russia, the states of Central Asia and the European members of CIS in a single economic grouping). Kazakh President Nazarbaev has always favoured closer relationships within regional alliances involving the establishment of supranational governing bodies, the obligation to respect the decisions taken by all the member countries and supreme forms of integration from a common market to currency and political unions. Kazakhstan started out from this premise when working on the founding Treaty of the CAU officially known as the Treaty establishing a single economic space between Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Uzbekistan.

This Treaty remains little more than a theoretical agreement among politicians. They have never introduced the planned mutual convertibility of currencies (the Kazakh *tenge*, Uzbek *sum* and Kirghiz *som*) and given up the project to introduce the *altyn* as a single CAU currency. Customs duties on mutual trade remain in force, which means that the area represents a restricted zone of free trade where the free turnover is limited by "seizures". As a result, Kirghizia has until recently bought oil from China rather than from neighbouring Kazakhstan and bought grain from Canada because with 20 per cent duties levied on Kazakh grain, consumers prefer cheaper overseas grain.

The Alma-Ata session at the end of September 1996 approved a programme for the formation, in the period 1996-1998, of a single economic space embracing the three countries. Ten documents were approved (on the utilisation of fuels and water resources in the region, a programme for the construction and exploitation of gas mains, a project of cooperation in the field of transport and communications, an agreement on inter-State land-leasing, etc.).

Some experts believe that the transformation of CAU into a common market-type economic alliance is not economically necessary. Unfortu-

nately, indispensable conditions such as common export specialisation, a mutual interest in one another's markets and the availability of vast investment resources are lacking. In addition, the economic structures of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan do not complement each other particularly well, and there exist deep divides between the two countries. The Treaty of Three is also thwarted by differing approaches to economic reforms and by Uzbekistan's unconditional rejection of Kirghizia and Kazakhstan as members of the Customs Union (alongside Russia and Byelorussia).

But the problem can certainly be viewed from another angle as well. The success of the CAU summit last August testifies to the promising future of this alliance. The Cooperation and Development Bank of Central Asia that has already been operational for three years has allocated the three states \$20 m. for 15 investment projects.

To conclude: 1) A number of the current groupings can be seen as interim unions which, in the future, will either fall to pieces or merge with other groups. They are comprised of members which could easily defect to other regional amalgamations, including those that exist outside the CIS and the former USSR.

2) In general there is a tendency towards consolidation of the subregional cooperation within the CIS framework. Within the next few years Russia will have to seek new mechanisms of cooperation in order to ensure the integrity of CIS economic space.

A closer integration between the CIS countries (i.e. the establishment of a real economic union) may necessitate agreements between the CIS and the Customs Union existing within the first for regulating foreign economic relations. This would not, on a world level, be a new experience: one can cite the example of the establishment of a treaty between the EU (12 countries) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA, 7 countries).

Igor Kossikov and Lidia Kossikova

Table
Regional Alliances of Former Soviet Republics

Name	Members	Date of Establishment or Entry	Type of Alliance, Prospects
<i>I. Russian-led Alliances</i>			
Union of Russia and Byelorussia, "Treaty of Two"	Russia, Byelorussia	April 1996 in force as from August 1996	Customs Union Plans: — Common market — Monetary union (based on the rouble) — Confederation
Customs Union of Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, "Treaty of Four"	Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia (Tajikistan likely to join)	Jan. 6, 1995 (Russia, Byelorussia) Jan. 20, 1995 (Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan) March 29, 1996 (Kirghizia)	Customs Union Plans: — Payment union and common market
(to continue)			

Table (continuing)
Regional Alliances of Former Soviet Republics

<i>II. Russia-free Associations</i>			
Central Asian Union (CAU), Central Asian Economic Space, "Union of Three"	Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia (Russia and Tajikistan as observers)	1991: CAU 1995: Treaty on single economic space	Common market Plans: — Monetary union
Baltic Union, Baltic Free Trade Zone (BFTZ)	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	Sept. 1993 April 1, 1994 New Treaties on free trade in force as from 1996	Free trade zone Plans: — Customs union, — Political union, — Entry to the EU
Union of the Ukraine and Moldavia	The Ukraine, Moldova (including Dniester area as party in the inter-governmental agreement)	June 1996	Free trade zone Plans: — Entry to Central European free trade association

Source: CIS Economic Committee documents and reference literature

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ANDREA CHITI-BATELLI, Movimento Federalista Europeo.

IGOR KOSSIKOV, Ph. D. (History), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

LIDIA KOSSIKOVA, Ph. D. (Economics), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

LUCIO LEVI, Member of the National Council of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Member of the Executive Committee of the World Federalist Movement, Professor in Comparative Politics, University of Turin.

JOHN PINDER, Honorary President of the Union of European Federalists, President of Federal Trust.

SERGIO PISTONE, Member of the National Council of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Member of the Executive Bureau of the European Union of Federalists, Professor in History of European Integration, University of Turin.

FRANCESCO ROSSOLILLO, Former President of the Union of European Federalists.

GIOVANNI VIGO, Member of the National Council of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, Professor in Economic History, University of Pavia.

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