


THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

Hamilton, The Federalist




THE FEDERALIST

a political review

Editor: Francesco Rossolillo

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by Mario Albertini together with a group of members of the Movimento Federalista Europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



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Europe and the War in Kosovo

The war in Kosovo has once again laid bare the total impotence of the states of the European Union, and with these states finding themselves, for the first time, directly involved in a conflict which is unfolding at the very heart of Europe, it has been a dramatic exposure.

The image of the European Union has been very badly damaged by the crisis in Kosovo. It was Europe, through its divisions and through the “power policy” which its governments chose to pursue in the region, that actively promoted the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991; it was Europe, recognising the inability of its own governments to solve the problem, that first called the Americans into Bosnia in 1995 — and the Americans, let us not forget, were actually very reluctant to become involved in the tangle of ethnic conflicts in the Balkan region. As a result, Europe, which would gladly have avoided a war, found itself obliged to enter into one as the Americans, having been called into the Balkans, were not willing to go home defeated and thus to risk losing their credibility as the only power in a position to shoulder the weight of responsibility for maintaining some kind of order at world level.

One effect of the conflict has been the emergence of growing and increasingly vociferous support throughout the continent for the creation of a “European defence identity.” But as always this issue is being approached without calling into question the principle of sovereignty. The establishment of any kind of European defence is envisaged solely within the confines of intergovernmental methods: in other words, it is viewed as a question of integrating the various military commands, of standardising weaponry, of strengthening multinational corps and, above all, of increasing cooperation among governments (for example, through the incorporation of the W.E.U. into the European Union, i.e., through the incorporation of one intergovernmental entity into another intergovernmental entity). But the fact is that defence, or the monopoly on physical

strength, is an element central to the principle of national sovereignty. It therefore follows that as long as the European Union is made up of many different sovereign states, there can be no single European defence, only numerous national defences, all inefficient and quixotic. In this context, the only element uniting the security policies of the various European states is their common dependence on the United States. However, unlike the situation which generally prevailed during the Cold War, America's current strategic interests no longer coincide with those of Europe.

* * *

Clearly then, the existence of a single European defence is dependent upon the existence of a federal European state, and until this is recognised, all talk of a European defence can only generate confusion and promote the idea that the tragic situation in Kosovo might have been solved more easily by dropping European bombs instead of American ones.

This is, of course, an erroneous idea. While there can be no doubt that a strong European presence in the Balkans is now essential, it must be appreciated that what is needed is a political presence and not a military one. In other words, a general design which might allow the people of the former Yugoslavia to envisage, as a very real possibility, a future that is not conditioned by nationalism, underdevelopment and dictatorship but, rather, by democracy and the union of peoples.

A federally united Europe could offer them this prospect by introducing a policy of unity to replace the strategy of bombing, thereby circumventing the need for recourse to troops employed in anything other than a humanitarian capacity or in the carrying out of peace-keeping functions.

* * *

Naturally, this does not mean that a European federal state should not have an efficient military apparatus. The creation of a European federal state would require, first and foremost, the disarmament of all the nation-states; the monopoly of legitimate strength would then be transferred to European level. Just as no European defence can exist in the absence of a European state, no European state can be established without a European defence. After all, to guarantee the effectiveness of any foreign policy that will, in whatever future circumstances, be conducted by a

European federation, there must be a universal realisation that this policy will be pursued by a power not subject to any external hegemonic force, in other words, by a power which has full control over the means needed to ensure, independently, its own security.

Having said that, Europe will be born as a power whose foreign policy will, at least for an initial and probably extended phase, be based mainly on its peaceful enlargement, on the promotion of the federal model as an instrument for the organisation of international democracy, on the strengthening of the United Nations and on political and economic cooperation among nations; it will certainly not be based on the use of military might. In fact, the less it has to be used, the more a European army will be seen as a factor crucial to progress and stability in Europe and in the world.

* * *

What Europe should do, in the wake of its federal unification, is launch a programme to rebuild the areas devastated by the war and, at the same time, offer all the republics of the former Yugoslavia the possibility to enter the European federation. As well as making provision for a transitional period — this would inevitably be required in order to make it possible, in part through the rebuilding programme, for these countries to meet the necessary economic convergence criteria — this proposal should also contain at least two political conditions. First, all the republics would be required, unequivocally, to adopt democratic institutions. Second, they would have to be willing, together, to form a regional federation which would become a single member of the greater European federation. It goes without saying that this latter condition should not prevent the admittance of some of the republics ahead of others which may still be unable to meet the criteria for entry. But any republics which were granted entry would have to accept that they would subsequently merge, in the way described above, with any other republics of the former Yugoslavia which may, at a later date, also be admitted.

It is worth pausing a moment to dwell upon this condition which, at first glance, might appear unrealistic. In fact, it is justified by two considerations: the first is the need to make sure that the admission to the European federation of a large number of small states, which have very little political weight, does not upset the federal balance between the central government and the member states, and thus drive the federation towards centralisation. The second and more important consideration is

based on the fact that the very legitimacy of the European federation is founded on the overcoming of nationalism. It would certainly be an extremely grave state of affairs if the European federation were to repudiate this basic principle by admitting as member states entities whose very existence as states is the result of the ugliest explosion of nationalism that Europe has witnessed since the end of the Second World War. Moreover, in this regard, we cannot fail to highlight the deplorable demonstration of weakness and irrationality given by the European governments when they declared their willingness to grant Slovenia admittance to the Union, thereby showing themselves ready to embrace a republic which, by its act of secession, started the long and bloody Yugoslavian tragedy.

* * *

In the former Yugoslavia, there remains a large section of public opinion that is open to the values of democracy and of the union of peoples. It must not be forgotten that prior to the fall of the Berlin wall, Yugoslavia was considered by far the most open and advanced of all the Communist nations. Certainly, there existed nationalist tensions within the country, but the overwhelming majority of its citizens regarded themselves as Yugoslavian first and foremost, and “mixed marriages” between men and women of its different regions were just as common as they are in any other European country. But with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Communism lost all its credibility as the basis for the legitimacy of the state, and this had the effect of weakening severely the central power in all the countries of central-eastern Europe, leaving nationalism as the only alternative basis for the legitimisation of power. And in Yugoslavia, it gave the go-ahead to violent minorities which acted in the name of nationalism. These minority groups, aided and abetted by the irresponsible policy pursued by the countries of western Europe, managed to seize power throughout Yugoslavia and thus turned what had been a peaceful country, one that was showing a strong inclination towards economic development and a degree of openness towards international cooperation, into the stage on which to play out a horrendous war, a war which has already dragged on for eight long years. This “silent majority” of Yugoslavian citizens has not gone away, of course, but in the absence of any political design with which it is able to identify, and for whose realisation it might strive, it is forced to remain inert.

Europe could create such a design, and with it, offer some hope to

those belonging to this silent majority. It is not hard to imagine the impact that the launch, by a federally united Europe, of a plan like the one outlined above, would have throughout the former Yugoslavia. It is not hard either to imagine the sheer force of the energies that would be released or the incredible difficulties that the region’s dictators would find themselves up against. But it must be emphasised strongly that there can be no hope that these same effects might be achieved by the extension, to some of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, of a general invitation to enter the Union, *structured as it presently is*, even if such an invitation were accompanied by an aid programme. Until the European Union has, through the creation of a federal government, given proof of its own independence, it will continue to be regarded in the Balkans as a mere appendage to the United States, and will go on lacking the capacity to propose a model for cohabitation that might allow the hostilities between the various ethnic groups to be overcome and the region to be set securely and definitively on the road towards stability, peace and democracy.

The Federalist

European Federation and World Federation*

FRANCESCO ROSSOLILLO

Premises and Terms of the Debate.

In the ambit of the Federalist movement, a debate is under way which centres on the relationship between the process of European unification and the process of globalisation and, more specifically, on the strategic relevance for federalists of the objective of world federation in relation to that of European federation. It is a delicate debate, as it concerns the very core of our strategy and involves some of the most important concepts on which the federalist doctrine has, until now, been based. The objective of our struggle, and the nature of the historical process within whose orbit it lies, are under discussion, as therefore is our identity, and thus the essential condition of our very survival. For this reason, the debate must be conducted with candour; every effort must be made to express ideas clearly, without arrogance, and with a constant awareness of the provisional nature of our affirmations.

Clearly the debate presupposes the existence of a common ground, in other words, of several convictions that are shared by all: the conviction that federalism is realised fully only on a world scale, both institutionally and as regards the affirmation of its values, as well as the conviction, and here we come to the philosophical-historical concept underlying federalism, that history is a process by which peace is built through the progressive political unification of the human race. As a result of their general adherence to such doctrinal principles, all federalists are world

* For some time now, a debate has been running in the ambit of the European Federalist Movement on globalisation and its consequences, a topic that has been considered in depth in *Il Dibattito federalista*. In this issue of *The Federalist*, and in the forthcoming one, we have decided to publish two articles, by Francesco Rossolillo and Lucio Levi respectively, which fit into the framework of this debate and which we feel, given the theoretical problems they touch on, will be of interest to our readers.

federalists. Indeed, reference to the ultimate objective of world federation and to the universal values that it will instil is universally considered essential in the recruitment and training of federalist activists. Acknowledgment of the existence of this common ground is essential for the continuation of the debate because it serves as a guarantee that each of us recognises the good faith of our interlocutors. Should anyone try to pass off efforts to consider the timing and the nature of the process of world unification as the rejection of a vision which is, in fact, central to the definition of our very identity, then this guarantee would crumble.

At the start of the 1980s, Albertini sought to develop and accentuate the theme of world federalism (which, moreover, has always been a part of the federalist vision). His concern was that the very source of commitment to federalism would run dry as the Second World War gradually receded into the pages of history, and as those with a direct memory of it became progressively fewer. He felt that there was a need to inject fresh life-blood into the values which underlay that commitment — to replace the huge motivating force constituted by the memory of a terrible catastrophe with a vision of the future that would allow, through the application of reason, the emergence of an inspirational ideal no longer founded on memory. This vision could never be anything other than the Kantian vision of perpetual peace achieved through the renunciation by all states of their sovereignty, in the framework of a cosmopolitan federation.

The first thing to do, therefore, was to place the struggle for European federation in the context of a historical perspective that would allow it to be infused with the universal values that are linked to the idea of the unification of mankind; in this way, the motives for the struggle would be strengthened. The intention behind the adoption of this world vision was, in a sense, *instrumental* vis-à-vis the European commitment: the implication was that the federal unification of Europe (which would be the first of a series of regional unifications) was a *necessary condition* for the construction of a world federation, and thus that the battle to achieve it constituted the real battle on which all those who were committed to this objective should be focusing.

The presence of the European Federalist Movement (MFE) within the World Federalist Movement was deemed crucial, its role being to seek to convince people who share our fundamental values that the building of a European federation (and, subsequently, of other great regional federations) was the only way in which the pro-world federation position could be rendered real and concrete (otherwise it would have been bound to

remain an abstraction or, seeking to become more than mere theory, it would have had to fall back on minimalist objectives and on vague pacifist struggles).

Emerging in the Movement today, however, there is a growing inclination to turn world federation into a strategic objective in its own right. But were it to be accepted as such, it would undermine the effort to achieve European federation instead of lending strength to it, as it would direct energy away from the European objective.

This is the point at which the debate begins. Its central question concerns the topicality of the question of world federation. Some of us maintain that the struggle to achieve this objective can begin now, and thus that political espousal of it already makes sense. Those same friends maintain that world federation is, in any case, the end towards which federalists will have to begin working in the immediate wake of the establishment of a European federation and, thus, that it is the objective that they should already be preparing to pursue. Certainly, it must be made clear that when it comes to defining concrete actions, it is not world federation as such that is being presented as an immediate strategic objective, but rather certain functionalist or partial reforms, such as the establishment of an International Criminal Court or the modification of the structure of the UN Security Council. Others, on the other hand, are convinced that the foundation of a world federation, seen as a strategic objective, is not on the immediate agenda, even though it must always be kept on the horizon as an ideal objective in order to preserve the awareness of the historical sense of our struggle; and hence believe that the partial objectives which are proposed are reforms in the purely intergovernmental mould rather than constituting stages in a process destined to lead, in a relatively short space of time, to the achievement of the ultimate objective. The only way to speed on the advent of a world federation is thus to continue and, if we prove capable of doing it, to intensify the struggle to achieve the foundation of a European federation which, in the historical journey towards world federation, will represent the first, indispensable step.

World Federation as a Strategic Objective.

This desire to define immediately a strategy for a world federation has the effect of turning the establishment of a world federation into an objective in competition with that of the establishment of a European federation, rather than one for which the advent of a European federation

represents an indispensable precondition. There is a real danger that this change in perspective could provoke a sort of *strategic strabismus* within the Movement that would effectively prevent it from acting. The capacity of any revolutionary movement — which, almost by definition, is always lacking in men and in means — to act and to mobilise support can only be guaranteed if it has a *single* objective in which to invest *all* of its energies (this does not mean, of course, that the movement should be restricted to a single action, rather that all its actions must be performed in pursuit of a single objective). The definition of *two* objectives, therefore, splits the energies of the movement and generates confusion over its priorities; it distracts attention and has the effect of weakening, and even extinguishing, the commitment of its activists. In the European Federalist Movement there is a considerable risk that all this will happen paradoxically at what is a key point in the process of European unification, a period in which politicians are starting to show an increasingly frequent and more acute awareness of the need to furnish the Union with a constitution; a period, therefore, in which our presence and our determination to fight is more vital than ever.

In what appears an affirmation of a quite different nature, some, while acknowledging that the European objective remains the strategic priority, maintain that federalists also have a duty to start defining, as from now, the strategy that they will adopt *after* the foundation of the European federation.

Before examining this affirmation more closely, however, it is worth pointing out that this need to *define* the strategy that will be implemented at a later date implies, according to those who acknowledge it, the need to *make provision* for it. And making provision for it means engaging, as from *now*, in struggles which *later* it will merely be a question of intensifying. In fact, therefore, there is no difference between this view and the one outlined earlier.

This ambiguity is actually inherent in the manner in which the problem is posed. The strategy for realising a political design is defined on the basis of an analysis of the current historical circumstances, and it is then modified in accordance with the evolution of these circumstances. In view of this, it would appear almost impossible to justify any claim to define the strategy that a movement should adopt in a historical phase which is yet to begin and whose course will depend on the outcome of a historical phase which has still not drawn to its close. The strategy adopted by the European Federalist Movement in its struggle to achieve the political union of Europe has evolved through a number of different

stages: the mobilisation of public opinion through the campaign for a Pact on European Federal Union, the struggle to establish a European Defence Community and a European Political Community, the Congress of the European People, the Voluntary Census of the European Federal People, and the campaigns to promote the direct election of the European Parliament, the single currency and a European constitution. None of these phases, with the exception of the last one, were specifically in the minds of the Movement's founding fathers from the very outset; they evolved as the process advanced. For this reason, the view that the Movement should be working out, right *now*, the strategy it intends to apply in a *later stage* simply masks the belief, on the part of those who hold it, that this *later stage has already begun*.

However, let us leave aside this difficulty and suppose instead that it is indeed a question of developing a strategy that regards exclusively this later stage. At this point we come up against the question of when, exactly, the European federation can be said to have been founded. There are strong arguments which support the theory that national sovereignty cannot be considered to have been transferred to a European entity until the process that will lead to the realisation on the part of all, or most, European citizens that they are in fact members of a single political community (a process which began with the direct election of the European Parliament and advanced with the arrival of the single currency) has been completed. In other words, until a new *European people's* identity has been created and consolidated. While this is an identity which doubtless already exists in an embryonic form, it is something which will not be fully formed even with the formal ratification, by the national parliaments, of a European federal constitution, hugely significant though this act would be. The new institutional order cannot, in fact, regard itself as irreversibly established until such time as it has, through the people's daily dealings with it, been lent life and substance; in other words, until the citizens have had the chance to experience the new form of co-habitation made possible by the new institutions. It cannot be deemed irreversibly established until a real civic sense, or to put it another way, a sort of European "constitutional patriotism" has been generated among the people of Europe through their contact with a new political reality, through their assumption, as citizens, of new duties and through the development of a much broader and more far-reaching sense of solidarity. This process will be hindered, even after the foundation of the European federation, by opposition from nationalist factions which will keep the new order, for as long as it continues to be

rendered fragile by the novelty of the political formula which it incarnates, under the constant threat of disintegration. *And until this process has reached its conclusion, federalists must continue to focus exclusively on the objective of European federation.*

It is true, however, that federalists, like all activists of revolutionary movements, must be able to envisage the future. Certainly, all our action is guided by a vision of the future. We are striving for a European federation because we believe that it will guarantee Europeans their security, improve their quality of life and make a decisive contribution to the establishment of a more stable world equilibrium and to the spread of the culture of peace. That these will indeed be the positive effects of the political unification of Europe is something that is verified by the opposite effects that are being produced and the grave damage that is being wrought by the current situation: that of a divided Europe. Describing these positive effects is an essential part of our struggle. If we were unable to appreciate fully the nature of this change for the better, and thus were devoid of the capacity to predict the effects of the realisation of our objective, then our commitment to it would be meaningless and our ability to mobilise public opinion and influence politicians quite simply nil. We must therefore be able to envisage the future, without, however, ever losing sight of the fact that the further into the future our predictions extend, the more uncertain and conjectural they will be, and the more general any predictions we may feel able to make regarding the lines along which the historical process will develop. This is why, looking beyond both the strategic objective that is the establishment of a European federation, and the immediate consequences of the same, we can certainly formulate hypotheses regarding the different paths which the course of history might follow, but we cannot make predictions sufficiently precise to form the basis of a strategy as such.

The fact remains that federalists can quite legitimately ask themselves whether they (and those destined to follow in their wake) will have a task to fulfil in the historical phase that will separate the advent of a European federation from that of a world federation. Indeed, it is something that no one who truly espouses the federalist cause can fail to wonder. Federalism must not be allowed to die out in the wake of the establishment of a European federation, but must continue to be active; and if it is indeed true that the foundation of a European federation will serve as the trigger launching the federalist phase of world history it will, in fact, be a much more active force than it is now. Federalists must keep alive the awareness that the state that they are helping to create will, being a *first step* towards

the creation of a world federation, inevitably be a *provisional entity* destined to be rendered obsolete by the growth of interdependence; and also that, serving as a model, it will have a crucial part to play in the spread of both federalism and the culture of peace throughout the world. There is, however, one thing of which we can, at the current stage, be sure: that this awareness will become an active awareness whenever it is presented by the historical circumstances with the opportunity to do so. But no one can predict at the current time how exactly this will come about, through what concrete struggles, in how long a time or what the sequence of events will be. Having said that, consideration of problems of this kind and contemplation of the lines along which the historical process may develop certainly have a natural place in cultural debate.

The Degree of Maturation of the Process.

However long we think it will take to come about, the advent of a world federation will be the culmination of a process (made up of different stages) that will, just like the process of European unification (the direct election of the European Parliament, the single currency) be characterised by the creation of partial institutions. Might it not be expected, therefore, that a process similar to that which federalists have already experienced at European level will, in the wake of the establishment of a European federation, begin on a world level (if it has not, in fact, begun already)? And since this process will once again raise the problem of creating institutions which, while admittedly still imperfect and contradictory (a parliament without a government, a currency without a state), nevertheless serve to draw us closer to the final objective, should not federalists play a central role in the struggle to achieve their realisation?

In this regard, however, it is important to recall that federalists have actually adopted different positions with regard to the various stages in the process of European integration. The Common Market, in particular, was bitterly criticised in federalist quarters where it was viewed as an attempt to solve solely through the instruments of intergovernmental collaboration problems which cannot truly be solved without the uniting of Europeans in a federation. It is also important to recall that it was in this phase of opposition to the Common Market that the Movement achieved its independence, breaking free from the tutelage of political parties and consciously assuming the identity of a movement opposed to the existing polity. Yet in the case of the attempt (failed) to found a European Defence

Community and the struggles (successful) to achieve the direct election of the European Parliament and the introduction of a single currency, the Movement, instead, pressed *for* the realisation of partial reforms. Here, however, their actions were based on the assumption that some of the very foundations on which sovereignty is built: the armed forces, democratic consensus and currency, would be called into question by the problems raised by the evolution of historical circumstances (a line of thinking inspired by what Albertini had termed “constitutional gradualism”). Federalists have never, therefore, been true supporters of campaigns of a functionalist or sectorial nature, such as those currently being conducted at world level to set up an International Criminal Court or to bring about a modification of the structure of the UN Security Council.

In the present context, however, the problem must be viewed in more general terms. In other words, as a question of understanding whether, in the wake of the foundation of a European federation, it will be possible — or even whether it is already possible — to compare the degree of integration reached at world level to that achieved in Europe at the end of the Second World War. Whether the achievement of a partial objective should be considered the acquisition of an important strategic position or, alternatively, should assume the significance of an action of propaganda, or even of mystification, depends exclusively on the degree of maturation that the process has reached. The contradictions raised by any battle to achieve a partial objective — however it is defined — highlight and render even more compelling the need *to go further*, when going further is possible (in other words, when the end of the process is in sight and allows its every intermediate step to be seen within the framework of a design that is both realistic and progressive). When the end of the process is not in sight, however, these contradictions may have one of several effects: historically premature battles either are not waged at all (because they are perceived as unrealistic) or, if they are waged, they are exploited as propaganda instruments or used as a cover-up for a hegemonic power; alternatively, these contradictions may even threaten to upset the balance of civil cohabitation by introducing an element of uncertainty into the existing legal and institutional order without setting against it a credible alternative.

A historical evaluation of how far the process of world unification will have advanced by the time a European federation can be deemed irreversibly established (a process of maturation in which the birth of the European federation will represent a crucial contributory factor) is not something that can be delivered with the certainty of a mathematically

demonstrated fact because it will depend on the type of contact which each individual has with the political, social and cultural reality of his times.

The fact remains that it is not at all easy to compare the situation in which the world will find itself in the wake of the birth of a European federation (providing this occurs within a historically short space of time) to that in which Europe found itself at the end of the Second World War, largely because of the sheer depth of the economic, social, political and cultural differences which, despite the spread of globalisation, still separate the major regions of the world, and the disorder, tensions and crises to which, daily, these differences give rise. It was in a context of great homogeneity, in the aftermath of a tragedy that had shaken dramatically the collective conscience, that Western Europe began its process of unification, a process that has taken fifty years and is still far from reaching its conclusion. As Europeans were made aware, by the horrors of the Second World War, of their membership of a single community of destiny, they also became conscious of the incapacity of the nation-states both to promote the values of civil cohabitation and to guarantee the security and wellbeing of their citizens, and of the need to establish a *new statehood*, federal in character and of continental dimensions, in order to meet these primary needs. Furthermore, the movement towards unification was strongly favoured by an international setting (characterised by America's leadership and by the threat posed by the Soviet Union) that allowed it to advance even in the absence of political unity. At world level, however, all these factors are missing, even though there is the need to ensure some form of *global governance* able to deal somehow or other with problems of a global dimension such as, first and foremost, that of guaranteeing, at international level, the establishment and the durability of a reasonably stable economic and political balance.

Furthermore, we cannot fail at this juncture to highlight the existence of another problem. It appears to be universally accepted within the Movement that the birth of a world federation can come about only through the merging of large continental federations, and that these federations will have to be *republics* in the Kantian sense of the word, i.e., founded on the values of freedom, equality and justice. At the present time, however, there exists only one continental federation that fulfils these criteria: the United States of America. In the other world regions, one or more of these conditions is lacking: either the state has yet to assume continental dimensions, or power is not structured along federal lines; maybe there is yet to be an affirmation of liberal-democratic values

and the establishment of a welfare state, or not even one of these standards has been met. Thus, the consensus seems to be that the road leading to the federal unification of mankind will necessarily pass through the progressive creation of these *continental federal republics* and that, in the meantime, we can expect a reformation and strengthening of the institutions of global governance. But until continental federal republics constitute the political basis of these institutions, their character will inevitably remain hegemonic and authoritarian, as they will continue to be the expression of the dominion exercised by strong states over weak states and by totalitarian governments over their peoples. A dialectical relationship will thus inevitably exist between the two lines along which the process will develop: on the one hand these two courses will strengthen each another, as every hegemony also involves the exercise of responsibility and thus indirectly favours the economic development and the civil evolution of those states obliged to submit to the dominion of the major powers; but on the other they will clash as the emergence of new active subjects within the world equilibrium will modify the balance of world power, thus provoking tensions and conflicts. Some thought must be given to this point before venturing to define a plan of action for international institutional reform.

The Foreign Policy of the European Federation.

Within the context of the debate on European and world federation, the issue of the topicality of the latter is sometimes seen not as a direct question of federalist strategy, but rather as a question of the *foreign policy* of the future European Federation, whose political choices need already to be prefigured. In this regard, the rather weighty affirmation has been made that the new dividing line between progress and conservation, that will replace the one sketched out by the Ventotene manifesto, will depend on the positions that are adopted on this issue. Here, as with many other issues that represent points of focus for the current debate, the initial statements are formulated ambiguously, and this ambiguity arises from the fact that prediction (a judgment based on fact) is confused with the assumption of a stance or the expression of a hope (a judgment based on values).

To further understanding of this problem, a clear distinction needs to be drawn between these two levels of judgment. In the first case (judgment based on fact) it is, as indicated, a question of predicting what type of world equilibrium the birth of the European federation will help

to create, and what new forces it will help to unleash. We are all federalists because of our conviction that the founding of a European federation will be an important step forwards on the road towards the creation of a world federation, that it will allow the establishment of more stable, peaceful and open relations between peoples, that it will give the United Nations a more solid basis for action, that it will, through the example which its own birth will set the world, favour the development of new trends towards regional unification and give considerable impulse to the diffusion of the culture of the unity of mankind. And it will do all this *by virtue of its mere existence*, and regardless of its governments' inclinations over foreign policy.

If, however, we fail to remain strictly on this level, we will inevitably fall into the trap (which has been at the root of many a blunder within the Movement in the past) of asking the question, "What kind of Europe?". In other words, of regarding the value of the European federation as dependent not on the mere fact of its existence, but on the choices which its electorate or its governments may freely make or not make. In truth, future European governments will undoubtedly be required to make choices over foreign policy, but it must be appreciated that these will be choices made within the confines of quite restricted limits defined by the objective power relations which the birth of the European federation will help to create. And it must also be appreciated that even the most hegemonic or, to go to the other extreme, the most isolationist of these possible choices will, in any case, be immeasurably more advanced than all the non-choices which the member states of the European Union are currently forced, by their division and by the consequent lack of any form of foreign policy, to make.

No mistake could be greater, therefore, than that of "deciding", right now, what kind of government the European federation should have, thereby forgetting, first, the fact that the European federation will be, above all, a democratic state subject to an alternation of governments with different political tendencies, and second, the unitary nature of the European struggle and the priority that should guide the action of all federalists: that of gathering consensus and forming alliances across the full breadth of the political spectrum (excluding only forces which are openly authoritarian and nationalist). In doing this, federalists must beware of the temptation to qualify their objectives, thereby creating divisions among potential supporters and alienating forces which might otherwise be sympathetic to the European cause. As far as foreign policy is concerned, therefore, our model of Europe must be defined in such a

way that it allows us to win the support of a spectrum of opinion that extends from realist pacifists to those who look to Europe to provide a guarantee of security, even military security. Having said that, all this is no more than what we are already doing day to day through our political action.

At this point, it is worth considering briefly the opinion that cooperation with the United States should represent the axis supporting European foreign policy, and that this orientation should even have constitutional, or quasi-constitutional, import. This, too, is an affirmation that needs to be clarified. Does it mean that the foundation of the European federation would be followed immediately by the start of a new phase, the construction of a Euro-Atlantic federation that would be ushered in through the institution of a community along the lines of the European Community? Given that it is the realisation of their common weakness in the face of serious and dramatic problems, problems that require a new dimension, that prompts states to unite, this would appear a rather unlikely project. In the scenario described above, the United States and Europe would actually form the pivots of a new international equilibrium and would thus enjoy the capacity, through the application of intergovernmental methods alone, to guarantee a reasonable degree of stability for a reasonably long period of time. Alternatively, this affirmation could express a desire to see very concrete cooperation between the two governments: a relationship highly desirable and one which might be anchored in treaties whose validity, like that of all treaties, would depend on the clause *rebus sic stantibus*, i.e., on the condition that such treaties continue to respond to the vital interests of the contracting parties, but certainly without constituting the object of a unilateral undertaking of constitutional, or quasi-constitutional, value. Cooperation between two international subjects is born of the will of both of these subjects, certainly not of the will of only one of them, unless it is a case of forced cooperation, which is merely a mask for the hegemony of one state over the other (in the case in point, the hypothesis is of a severely weakened Europe which, neither federal nor confederal, is obliged to remain within the sphere of influence of the United States).

The Nature of the Process of Globalisation.

The demand to define, right now, the strategy that will lead to the federal unification of mankind is coupled with a conception of globalisation as a radically new phenomenon in the history of mankind, as an exclu-

sively uniting force, and at the same time, as an unstoppable and increasingly rapidly-moving process destined to sweep away, like a river in full flow, the institutional structures through which politics controls the economic and social realities and to create rapidly and painlessly new institutions adapted to the evolution of those realities.

While that which is set forth here is certainly not an attempt to deny the reality of the process of globalisation, it is appropriate to clarify precisely, in three points, the nature of it:

1) The growth of interdependence in human relations has, over the last ten years or so, clearly advanced at an incredible rate. But, if it is true that the computer revolution can, at least in some sectors, be considered responsible for prompting a sharp acceleration of this spread of interdependence, it is also true that, in some ways, the world market in fact existed prior to this revolution and, in others, it is yet to come into being. The current evolution of the process is in fact more quantitative than qualitative. The whole course of the history of mankind can be equated with the movement towards the formation of a single world people. The process of globalisation certainly did not begin with the introduction of the term into political and economic jargon; rather, it dates back to the very dawn of history. The process was already under way when the civilisation of the Greeks and Romans prevailed in the Mediterranean and Europe, and in the era of the great geographical discoveries; it was advancing when Marx spoke of a world market, and when Norman Angell in his best seller, *The Great Illusion*, published three years prior to the outbreak of the First World War, affirmed that the intensification of trade relations and the interweaving of interests to which it gave rise had reached levels so considerable as to render war impossible.

What we are witnessing now in fact, and it is this which constitutes the truly new element characterising the historical era in which we live, is *the start of the federalist phase of world history*. In other words, we are being brought face to face with the fact that the federal form of state is, objectively, the only one which now has the capacity to control the process of the growth of interdependence. The turning point can be argued to have come at different moments in history, depending on whether it is traced back to the explosion of the very real contradictions which lay at the root of the process (fascism and the two world wars), or whether it is linked to the development of an awareness of the nature of the process and to the manifestation of the will to carry it through to its logical political conclusion (here we may think of Einaudi, of the *Federal Union* group, of Spinelli or, in more general terms, of the start of the

journey towards European unification). Either way, it cannot be traced back to any point in time more recent than the end of the Second World War. Thus, there can be no justifying the affirmation that globalisation is a new development that is so radical that it renders necessary a complete revision of the conceptual framework within which the political process must now be interpreted.

2) The growth of interdependence in human relations not only creates networks of complementary interests and opportunities for exchange and mutual enrichment between cultures. It also triggers conflicts, the spread of diseases and global financial crises; it promotes the spread of crime and of arms dealing on an international scale, and prompts mass migrations. Furthermore, it is leading to the impoverishment and outcasting of growing sections of the population in advanced countries, and of the whole of society in a large number of developing countries (let us not forget that while some tens of millions of people exchange messages via the Internet, a further eight hundred million or so are wrestling with terrible problems of malnutrition). It is certainly true that the negative aspects of the process prompt, in turn, the emergence of the positive ones. The Second World War, which was itself a consequence of the growth of interdependence, also proved to be a necessary condition for the start of the process of European unification. But acknowledging all this means acknowledging that the process of world unification is conflictory in nature, that its ultimate end is not imminent, and that there will inevitably be many, often bloody, setbacks on the road leading to that end. And anyone intending to make a meaningful contribution to its achievement must be aware of this.

3) The fundamental reason for the contradictory nature of the process of world unification is the fact that politics is, to an extent, independent of the evolution of the economic and social spheres. While it is true that, *sooner or later*, politics adapts to the nature of the problems which arise as a result of the growth of interdependence, this adaptation is neither automatic, nor immediate. Politics and the growth of interdependence are thus two processes which are out of step with one another, and it is this lack of synchronisation which, on the one hand, is the cause of institutional crises and conflicts, but on the other, creates the space needed to allow a measure of freedom for the conscious actions of men. The need to unite Europe politically was already patently clear in the immediate wake of the Second World War. Now, fifty-four years on, the continent is still politically divided. In Europe, the growth of interdependence, striking, and incessant though it is — it is an evolution that involves not

only the financial markets, but also the very roots of society, and implies the sharing of political values, the harmonisation of ways of life, cultural exchange and closer contact between the young people of the different nations — has not yet managed to heighten and push to the point of explosion the contradiction that exists between the nature of the problems and the organisation of power. This evolution which we have all experienced, and which we continue to experience directly, provides, once more, confirmation of the assumption that a long process, fraught with difficulties and punctuated with crises, must unfold before we can talk *in strategic terms* of world unification. And this process must include the democratisation of China, the introduction of at least a degree of social justice in India, the political unification of Latin America and South East Asia, the overcoming of Islamic fundamentalism and the bringing of Africa into the modern world. All these are problems that will give rise to tensions and conflicts. The creation of the European federation will be crucial in directing each of them towards a positive solution, but on its own it will not be enough to solve them, and certainly not in a short space of time.

Evolution of the Mode of Production and raison d'Etat.

This last point deserves closer examination. The fact, mentioned above, that the political process lags behind the growth of interdependence is the result of the conflict between two factors: evolution of the mode of production and *raison d'état*.

The evolution of the mode of production is the process by which, through technological innovation and the introduction of new ways of organising the division of labour, men continually transform the quality of their lives. It is the engine which drives the historical process and it is the ambit of creativity. It renders increasingly dense the network of human relations and lengthens the chains of interdependence to such an extent that, in certain critical phases, the main ways in which society operates become incompatible with the existing organisation of power and with the institutions that are the expression of that organisation. *Raison d'état*, on the other hand, denotes the sphere of the rigid and immutable laws that govern politics — politics as the struggle for, and management of, power: a power which, due to its extreme inertia, tends to perpetuate the existing state of affairs and to condition the very way in which men perceive and interpret their own interests (thereby generating the consensus that sanctions its own conservation).

There exist two radically flawed ways of interpreting the times in which one lives. One involves failure to appreciate the reality of the historical process and the other, failure to appreciate the reality of the inertia of power, and of the laws which govern its equilibria. Those blessed with a certain enlightened optimism bracket as irrelevant the question of *raison d'état*, and see the historical process as a sort of triumphant march of humanity towards the full realisation of its potentialities. Political realists, meanwhile, ignoring the historical process, are able to see only the eternal supremacy of the laws of politics, the constant repetition of power situations which while differing in appearance are, in substance, always the same.

Only through an approach which embraces both of these factors is it possible to understand the real nature of the course of the historical process: a succession of phases of equilibrium, or of *slow movement*, in which there is an evolution of civil society (but in which the existing organisation of power remains substantially unchanged and able to control that evolution); and of phases of crisis, or of *rapid movement*, in which the existing organisation of power is no longer able to control the evolution of civil society, and is overturned (often in the wake of attempts to perpetuate its own existence through the use of force). These are the phases in which old equilibria are overcome and give way to the succeeding ones, and in the course of this passage the laws of *raison d'état* are temporarily suspended because the subjects whose behaviour they regulate are disappearing, starting to make way for new emerging subjects. And it is in phases such as these that a space opens up in history for the eruption of reason *tout court*.

There does not appear to be unanimous consensus within the Movement today concerning the truth of these statements. It is a fact, however, that as the debate evolves from day to day, and as concrete problems are discussed, affirmations are sometimes made which seem to be incompatible with such a consensus, affirmations to the effect that the nature of international law and the role and power of the international organisations are, as a result of the process of globalisation, undergoing radical change, or others still according to which there is a need to overcome the very concept of *raison d'état*. On the basis of these indications, it might be feared that there is growing support within the Movement for the idea that the increase in interdependence has rendered the logic of power obsolete and ushered in an era in which states, correctly appreciating where their interests lie, will be induced to behave more reasonably with one another and to cooperate more closely until the time comes in which, since there

are no reasons left to justify it, all the governments of the world will decide to overcome their division through the foundation of the world federation.

Certainly, efforts have been made to reconcile this conclusion with acknowledgment of the permanency of the laws of *raison d'état*. It has been affirmed that the process of globalisation may not lead to the evaporation, but rather to the *convergence* of the *raisons d'état* of all, or at least of the most important, of the world's states, and thus to a general awareness that the world constitutes a single community of destiny. It is a hypothesis inspired by Albertini's theory of the inclined plane, or of the eclipse, or convergence of the *raisons d'état* of the EEC member states. But Albertini's theory referred to a limited period of time and to a process which was advancing in a context of international stability (that of the Cold War). Indeed, throughout the whole of his political militancy, Albertini continued to hark back, with an insistence bordering on the obsessive, to page 89 of Einaudi's "*Scrittoio del Presidente*" in which the latter warned of the danger that the European states might, just like the Italian states of the Renaissance, miss their *fleeting opportunity*, or fail to exploit a *propitious time*. Albertini, therefore, viewed the convergence of the *raisons d'état* of the EEC member countries as a fragile and transitory reality. In the version currently upheld within the Movement, meanwhile, the hypothesis of the convergence of the *raisons d'état* is no longer placed within a specific context but is seen, rather, as a structural phenomenon destined to move forward smoothly, uninterrupted by crises, until the point at which the world federation, of which it is a precondition, is founded. This means that from now until the foundation of the world federation, which will abolish the very concept of *raison d'état*, the states will be induced by their own *raison d'état* to behave as if no *raison d'état* existed — which is the same as saying that the *raison d'état* has, in fact, already been abolished.

This is a decisive point. For the older ones among us — and for many young people too — our commitment to federalism began, thanks to the teachings of Albertini and our reading of the great founding texts by Kant and Hamilton, when we realised that politics is based on power relations and that its logic is one of self-preservation and of the accumulation of power to the detriment of the power of others. And this is the reason why peace and the pursuit of the common good of a number of states cannot come about through international collaboration, but only through the *creation of a supranational state*. It is opportune, at this point, to recall the words of Hamilton which feature on the front cover of this review: "To

look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages". Of course, this does not exclude that in certain circumstances, characterised by equilibrium, by a shared external danger or by submission to a common hegemony, some states might prove able to achieve peaceful cohabitation, and to manage their reciprocal relations through collaboration, but it does mean that this could only occur in a partial and imperfect way and for periods of time that are, in historical terms, brief. This is the reason why Einaudi was such a harsh critic of the League of Nations, why federalists criticised the Common Market and why they fought, and continue to fight, for the federal unification of Europe. The idea of the overcoming, or of the structural convergence, of the various *raisons d'état* thus throws into question some of the ideas that underpin our political engagement. Politics, understood as the struggle for power, disappears from view and is replaced by the peaceful coming together of reasonable men seeking to establish an ever greater level of collaboration among peoples, to promote widespread economic wellbeing and to increase intercultural exchange and understanding. In this scenario, reason takes the place, in history, of *raison d'état*, and with international collaboration alone sufficing to guarantee the realisation of the values which it embodies, world federation becomes, paradoxically, unnecessary.

Similar considerations apply to the questions of international law and the international organisations. Our position was developed on the basis of the Kantian view that law exists only where there is a state, and that where there is no state, the law of force prevails. Today, however, many no longer seem to take this doctrine for granted: some maintain that there needs to be a re-evaluation both of international law (believing that it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish the dividing line that separates international from domestic law) and of the international organisations (as the differences between these organisations and the states are becoming, in their view, less and less marked). At this point the question might quite justifiably be asked whether federalists are, after reflecting for decades on the nature of power, throwing their entire culture to the wind and turning into followers of Kelsen, or internationalists, or pacifists, so that they might base their evaluation of the progress made by man on his long journey towards peace no longer on analysis of the evolution of power situations, but on analysis of the texts of treaties and UN resolutions (ignoring the fact that the outbreak of the Second World

War came only eleven years after the signing of the Kellogg Pact which outlawed war).

Clearly, all this does not mean that international law and the international organisations are mere illusions. The birth of international law coincided with the birth of the modern State. It was, and still is, an important instrument employed by responsible political subjects to ensure that each is guaranteed the capacity to predict, to an adequate extent, the behaviour of the others. For four centuries, international cohabitation has depended on compliance — *rebus sic stantibus* — with the principle “*pacta sunt servanda*.” Neither is it my intent to deny that civilisation has advanced by giant strides since the sixteenth century, or that the same is also true of international relations (even though it has to be said that an absolute monarch, not being required to bow to the pressure of public opinion, could, in certain circumstances, actually have more freedom than a democratic government to respect the terms of a given agreement). But this does not mean that international law can be considered true law. If anything, international law is the *hope* of a law, the prefigurement of the content of some future cosmopolitan law which can only become such when it is supported by the coercive power of a world federal state. Indeed, international law has never (either in the current era or in the past) proved able to prevent war from raging, periodically, in every part of the world.

The same goes for the international organisations. With the partial exception of the European Union, which is the product of a phase of *revolutionary transition*, these organisations are merely reflections of the power relations between the states of which they are composed. This is not to say that they do not fulfil an important function in the management of international relations, or that their proliferation and evolution is not a manifestation of the growing interdependence among peoples. Having said that, however, it is still only as instruments of diplomacy that their value can be measured, and they still have no capacity at all to erode the sovereignty of their member states.

These considerations, which underpin our commitment to the foundation of a European federation, in other words, to the foundation of a European supranational power, are every bit as apposite today as they were forty years ago. Just as they did then, pacifism and internationalism still today represent the antithesis of federalism. And *it is the commitment to supersede them that represents the specific feature by which federalism can be identified*. To question this is to question our very identity.

What is more, it is a fact that, for all of us, the idea of history as a

journey towards world federation is based on the assumption that, in a certain phase of the process, a *final crisis* will come that is destined to culminate in the birth of the world federal people. Thus, it is possible to reconcile the foundations of our political culture with the idea of the topicality of world federation by advancing the hypothesis that this final crisis has already begun (and by passing off as mere ripples on the surface of an otherwise profoundly and definitively calm sea current situations such as ethnic conflicts and acts of genocide, the dramatic Russian crisis, the conditions of underdevelopment in which three-fifths of the world's population now exist, and the financial difficulties that are rocking, one after the other, all the world's economies). Alternatively, the hypothesis might be advanced that the final crisis is beginning now, and that it will prove to be so terrible, and so profound, that it will stir up, in the whole of mankind, the same feelings that the Second World War provoked among the peoples of Europe and which constituted the real foundation for the start of the process of the continent's unification. If one of these two hypotheses were true, in other words, if the whole world were already in, or about to enter, a phase of *revolutionary transition* towards its political unity, then it would be possible to regard international law in the same way as Community law is currently regarded in Europe, i.e., as something more than the mere hope of a law, and the international institutions (like the Community institutions) as something more than a mere reflection of the power relations between states. It is clearly impossible to demonstrate with the precision of a theorem that neither of these situations prevails, but it is important that the different aspects of the problem are made clear so that those who assume a position, or react to the positions assumed by others, do so in full awareness of all the implications attached.

The European Federation as a New Model of State.

It is, in my view, unrealistic to think that Europe is destined, in the wake of its political unification, to be overwhelmed by the process of globalisation or that this process will quickly induce the continent to transfer, progressively and until such time as a world federation is founded, its sovereignty to the United Nations. Having said that, Europe (by virtue of its mere existence and by providing an example of how opposing states, each with a power system rooted in centuries of mutual antagonism, can freely join together in a federation) will nevertheless do much to speed up the process. But given that the unification of mankind

will presumably be a difficult process, unpredictable in terms of the course it will take and punctuated by numerous crises and contradictions, it is imperative that Europe, once it is politically united, is made to *last*. Furthermore, it must make sure it is equipped to continue its mission to extend the sphere of solidarity using political instruments instead of relying only upon the strength of its own example; it must ensure that it is furnished, most importantly, with the internal solidity and strength that will enable it to withstand every danger of disintegration and secession, but also with the *capacity to act* which it will have to have if it is to shoulder the burden of its responsibilities within the new world order and to promote federalist values and the institutional model of federalism throughout the world.

The debate that is currently being conducted within the Movement raises, among other things, the question of the institutional profile of the Europe that we are seeking to create. In this regard, it must be pointed out that the opinion of those who tend to play down the importance of processes of regional unification, particularly that which is going on in Europe, and to highlight, instead, the global scale of the growth in interdependence, runs the risk of converging with the views held by pro-European moderates who are irritated by what they see as the “dogmatic” presentation of federation as opposed to confederation, preferring instead to think of the future political union of the continent as something ambiguous (“new”) that will be neither one nor the other of these things (an “unidentified political object” to use the expression of Jacques Delors). Both of these groups in fact, implicitly or explicitly, set little store by the objective of a European federal *State*, the former because it does not go far enough for their liking, the latter because it goes too far. Both dislike the idea of State: the moderates because their primary concern is not to frighten anyone — themselves primarily — with the traumatic prospect of the renunciation of sovereignty; the others because the establishment of solid federal states of continental dimensions would necessarily imply the inauguration of a phase of relative stability in the relations between these continental federal states, a phase whose length would be undetermined and which would precede the start of the battle for world federation. As a result of their mutual distrust of the idea of State, both groups end up tending dangerously towards the ultraliberalism of those who regard with favour globalisation as nothing more than a gradual surrender, by politics, to market forces.

In this way, federalists run the risk of leaving the field of political-cultural debate wide open for the clash between those who maintain that

globalisation has already rendered the nation-state obsolete, but who can propose no alternative vision to fill the gap (if not that of a second Medieval era in which the state, as such, has ceased to exist and in which the ideas of sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship are replaced by the inevitable advent of a world society dominated by interacting and opposing private interests, regulated in a haphazard manner by functionalistic organisations and contradictory legal systems, chaotically superimposed one upon the other); and those who, wishing to preserve the ideals of law, democracy and solidarity, see the state as a primordial necessity, but whose view is restricted to the only model of state which currently exists: that of the nation-state. In this clash, nationalism will tend to come out on top because while State as a concept can be sidestepped in the sphere of abstract thought, the reality of State in that of daily life is not so easy to dismiss. This is why nationalism can be overcome only through a federalist project whose scope is continental, a project which recognises that the values of civil cohabitation must be founded on the state, but which at the same time rejects the national dimension of the same.

Our struggle to overcome the nation-state is founded on the realisation that the problem of “statehood” in Europe (and elsewhere) has reached a crisis point. Our most immediate aim, therefore, is to establish a new “statehood” in Europe that might provide the framework within which the process of the civil advancement of the people of Europe (and subsequently of the whole of mankind) might be relaunched. From this point of view, then, it is wrong to start from the presupposition that the European Federation will, as soon as it comes into being, find itself in a state of crisis. On the contrary, it will do much to restore nobility to politics, and to reinforce both the sense of civic duty and the democratic consensus of its citizens. After all, as we have already pointed out elsewhere, the transfer of sovereignty at European level — which, if it ever does take place will be the event that loads the process of the political unification of Europe with revolutionary historical significance — will occur only once a deep-rooted and solid sense of European “constitutional patriotism” has been established. Admittedly, it is only within the framework of the world federation that all these values can be fully realised and it is true, too, that the European federation will be an imperfect state, destined after a period of time to be replaced by a greater reality. Initially, however, it will be vital, and if it is, as we believe, to become the vehicle of federalist ideology in the world, it will continue to be vital for a long phase in its historical course.

At this point, we must ask ourselves whether it makes sense to think

that anyone who, in the wake of the birth of the European federation, intends to go on calling himself a federalist (and here we are assuming that following the start of the federalist phase of world history every *moral politician*, whatever his inclinations, will be bound to reflect on the values of federalism) will have to eschew any political involvement in the new order which has been established, devoting all his energies instead to the struggle to achieve world federation, or rather, to achieve certain functionalist (“intermediate”) objectives. Because, while it is true that day-to-day solidarity and the concrete commitment to the pursuit of the good of one’s own community in normal political life must, when statehood is in its deepest moments of crisis, be replaced by a revolutionary commitment to and striving for the creation of a new institutional framework that might once more make it possible to achieve these values, albeit partially, it is not realistic to expect such a renunciation to last until the end of history.

It is also important to underline here that the support of the citizens for the new political community will not, at least while the life of the federation is still in its ascending phase, clash in any way with the values of cosmopolitanism. What Europe will stand for in this phase will be the overcoming of national sovereignty, and thus the breaking down of a historical barrier, a rejection of nations as units which are closed to the rest of the world. The birth of Europe will thus be an event which embodies the very values which make world federation the ultimate federalist goal. And in this context, the symbolic value of the internal frontiers that the new state will have wiped out will far outweigh that of the external frontiers established by its creation. Of course, the time will come in which, as a result of the further growth of interdependence, Europe, too, will represent too restricted a framework, its frontiers signifying, just as national frontiers do today, closure to the rest of the world. And when that time comes, the objective of world federation will become topical.

But it is essential not to confuse the abstract with the concrete. In abstract terms, the concept of the sovereignty of a state can never be reconciled with the value of the good of mankind as a whole, even though, having said that, the instruments of politics always manage, somehow or another, to provide solutions to the problems posed by this contradiction, to restore the balances it upsets. This, after all, is what they are designed to do. In concrete terms, meanwhile, when the contradiction between the growth of economic and social interdependence and the political process becomes so deep that it places in grave and immediate danger the prospects for the development of a region of the world, the wellbeing of

its citizens and the survival of its democratic institutions, then the only way out of the crisis is to replace one form of state with another, more advanced form.

The “Intermediate” Steps on the Road Towards World Federation.

It is opportune at this point to look briefly, and singly, at what have been identified in the debate as intermediate strategic objectives in the process that will lead to the construction of a world federation. These objectives, in some contexts collectively referred to with the expression “partial world government”, are, in substance, the idea of a new Bretton Woods (or a world version of the European monetary system), the establishment of an International Criminal Court and various reforms of the United Nations.

The New Bretton Woods. The creation of the European Federation will give rise (after a period of possible initial unsteadiness as the ground settles) to a greater degree of stability in international relations than that which they currently enjoy. There is thus every reason to believe that it will (again following possible initial unsteadiness as the ground settles) make a decisive contribution to the birth of a world monetary system that will be more stable than the present one. After all, monetary stability is in the interests of the entire world. It is up to monetary economists, however, to say to what extent and in what form this new system can, and must, be institutionalised, and to make the relative proposals. While a valid proposal originating from a qualified individual who also happened to be a member of the Movement could only increase the prestige and standing of the MFE, battles to achieve purely technical objectives do not fall within the province of the Movement as such. There are, however, two considerations which, being of a political rather than a technical nature, I do feel entitled to bring to the attention of the Movement. First of all, the dollar must not be allowed to become the dominant currency in any new international monetary system that is created; instead, such a system must revolve around the dollar and the euro (and possibly the yen and other currencies too, if the right conditions emerge). The United States must forfeit the freedom it currently enjoys to create money without creating domestic inflation (making others pay its debts) and Europe must no longer be allowed the possibility to grow richer without bearing any of the responsibilities attendant upon the management of a world currency. The second point I wish to raise, which stems from all the arguments put forward in this document, is that a new international

monetary system is not destined to be the prelude to the creation of a world currency (unlike the EMS vis-à-vis the European currency), but only an instrument of international collaboration which, while undoubtedly important, will last only as long as the power situation which makes it possible.

The Regionalisation of the Security Council and the Participation of the European Union. According to this proposal, all the world's major regions should be represented, either directly or indirectly, on the UN Security Council. Regions which are already unified would be represented directly while those which are not would be represented by one of their most important states. It has also been proposed, in particular, that the European Union should have a seat on the Council.

The proposal to enlarge the Council to embrace new states, in particular several Third World states, as permanent members holding the power of veto is, while desirable, destined to remain an unlikely prospect until there is a radical change in power relations at world level. Moreover, in view of the strictly and clearly intergovernmental nature of this objective, it can be considered neither the duty nor the responsibility of federalists to pursue it.

The proposal to ensure the presence of a representative of the European Union among the permanent members of the UN Security Council — assuming the proposal refers to the European Union in its current form and not to the future European federation, in which case the problem would not exist — is another matter. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine — at least until the transformation of the European Union into a federation equipped with the capacity to decide (among other things) its own foreign and security policy — the present European members of the Security Council, Great Britain and France, being prepared to relinquish their seats in favour of an entity which does not, in fact, exist and whose representative would be required to act on the basis of instructions imparted to it, unanimously, by the governments of fifteen sovereign states. At this point, it is important, too, to consider another problem: since decisions taken by the European Union in the ambit of foreign policy must be based on the unanimous consensus of all the members, the Union's representative would not know what stance to adopt on the many occasions on which unanimous agreement could not be reached (to say nothing of the enormous complexity of the consultation procedures whenever consensus were possible). If, instead, a European Union representative were to be included as a permanent member alongside the British and French representatives, then its presence would have nothing

more than purely symbolic value: the EU representative would be subordinate to the other two European members of the Council, always requiring their agreement, together with that of the other thirteen members of the Union, in order to act.

The International Criminal Court. This is an institution which, if it is created, will exist in an international setting shaped by the balance of power between sovereign states — states on which it will depend for the handing over of accused persons and for the execution of its sentences. And this prompts two considerations of different kinds.

The first is that it would, inevitably, be a court that judges only the crimes committed by the defeated and never by the victors, or in any case, those committed by the weak and never those committed by the strong. Often, the authors of the same deeds are considered heroes within their own countries and criminals without, and their fate would thus depend on the position of their country in the international arena. Thus, rather than imposing respect for the law, the International Criminal Court would, in fact, do nothing more than endorse the existing balance of power. Under the rule of law, norms are enforced (albeit not always and not perfectly) regardless of the power relations between the parties in conflict; this is possible thanks to the irresistible power of the State which cancels out the power differences between its citizens. In the relations between sovereign states, the prevention of conflicts and the limitation of their destructive capacity depend solely *on the instruments of politics*. And politics, in certain situations, means being required to get your hands dirty, to operate in the shadows, to reach compromises with despicable individuals, or sometimes with out and out criminals, often even encouraging and assisting them. And the greater the responsibility shouldered by those whose actions are conditioned by this need, the more pressing, and frequent, it becomes. In many of these cases, strictly legal intervention (i.e., conducted in the open and leaving no room for compromise) would, if it were allowed any real influence, place very real obstacles in the path of politics and threaten to ruin any attempt at mediation. Thus, instead of serving to prevent, or to lessen, the effects of wars and dictatorships, it would render them more likely, more drawn out and more destructive. And this is what makes American opposition to this proposal — the United States is currently the only world power which bears any real burden of responsibility for limiting conflicts in the world — understandable. There can also be no denying that an International Criminal Court would, in some cases, actually save those members of vanquished or weaker sides in a conflict who are guilty, or thought to be guilty, of acts

of genocide, of war crimes or of crimes against humanity from the blind and fierce revenge of extremist factions on the side of the victors, guaranteeing them a fair trial and a humane punishment. Thus, far from representing a threat to these criminals, it would, instead, offer them a guarantee. It would, therefore, be misleading to present, before public opinion, the establishment of an International Criminal Court as a step on the road towards the introduction of a legal framework within which to conduct international relations.

The Democratic Reform of the United Nations General Assembly. This is an objective which has entered the sphere of federalist debate as a result of certain similarities it presents with the direct election of the European Parliament. It is an ambitious project as it would involve both modification of the composition of the national delegations (in order to render them, roughly at least, proportional to the size of the population of the states they represent) and the democratisation of all the member states (unless some of the states were to proceed with unilateral elections). It is, furthermore, an objective which can only be considered meaningful and credible if it is part of a project (like that envisaged by the treaties of Rome) which makes provision for the evolution of the organisation towards an institutional reality that is federal in character. The truth is that the difference between the direct election of the European Parliament which, despite the considerable weakness of the institution, has played an important role in the process of European unification, and the hypothetical election by universal suffrage of the General Assembly of the United Nations lies in the fact that the European Economic Community had, in 1979, achieved a degree of economic integration and developed a collective consciousness sufficient to render credible the idea that the election of a parliament as yet devoid of any powers might represent the first step in the constituent phase of the process of European integration. The same cannot, however, be said of the world today. And, in turn, the lack of any real prospect for further evolution strips of all meaning, and thus of all credibility, the proposal to elect democratically the representatives of one hundred and eighty states — over half of which are not, or at least not entirely, endowed with democratic structures — to a body which wields absolutely no power.

Partial World Government. This is not meant in the Einsteinian sense of federal union (a nucleus of countries whose power is sufficient to render them a magnet in the formation of a cosmopolitan federation), but rather in terms of a quasi-federal reformation of the United Nations. As well as reforming the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the

ways outlined earlier, this objective would involve endowing the first of these two bodies with a permanent peace-keeping and peace-enforcing military force (which would be independent of the states supplying the relative contingents), and with independent financial resources. At this point it should be underlined that unless this handing over to the Security Council of control of the armed forces and of the budget is nothing more than an outward appearance, and unless the dimensions of both are so modest as to render the reform purely symbolic, then the ratification of a proposal of this kind on the part of the member states would signify a true relinquishment by them of their sovereignty: this would turn the Security Council, and in particular its permanent members who are elected by no one and who, by exercising their power of veto, condition all the decisions reached by the Council, into a sort of *world dictatorship* (albeit a dictatorship tempered by the discord among its component parts). But, whatever form it takes, this proposal must be seen as further evidence of the belief in the idea that the foundation of the European federation will mark the passage of the world into its own constituent phase. The soundness of the proposal depends therefore upon the extent to which this view is shared. And yet, it cannot be very clear, even to those who maintain that the time is ripe for a reform as radical as this, why it should be necessary to propose an objective of this kind. When and if it eventually does arrive, the constituent phase in the process of world unification will begin with a single, partial reform (just like the direct election of the European Parliament in relation to what we believe to be Europe's constituent phase). By exposing a series of contradictions, this reform will generate the need for even more reforms, and thus the pattern will be established that will continue until the achievement of the final objective. Those who believe in this objective should therefore seek to identify both the *first step* in the process, and the point that will mark its culmination. It is, in fact, unclear to me why some should consider it necessary *right now* to define what amounts to the *penultimate* step on the road towards world federation (which constitutes neither a concrete target nor a mobilising final goal) as the strategic objective which federalists must pursue in the wake of the foundation of the European federation.

Conclusion.

At first glance, the considerations set forth in this document may seem purely theoretical in character and, as such, capable of having only a

limited impact on our action. This is not the case. The reality is that the fundamental principles underlying our political engagement are at stake. I am well aware that those of our number whose positions I do not share are fine militants who have devoted their lives to the Movement. It would be ungenerous of me to accuse them of wanting to undermine these principles, just as it would be ungenerous of them to accuse me, and those whose opinions are similar to mine, of failing to share the values and vision of world federalism. But the fact remains that certain views often make their own way regardless of the intentions of those who profess them, and can wreak havoc, particularly among the young.

I thus wish to end these considerations by summarising my concerns:

1) Attributing the Movement with *two strategic objectives* creates confusion, weakens the commitment of its activists and prevents it from acting.

2) By shifting the emphasis away from the *objective role* that the European federation will, by virtue of its mere existence, play in the world, placing it instead on the *foreign policies* that it will pursue, the foundation of the European federation will be turned *per se* into a neutral event, one which only the choices made subsequently will have the capacity to invest with any positive or negative significance. And it is difficult to see why anyone should decide to devote their life to a difficult and unfulfilling struggle to achieve an objective that is not, in itself, an expression of positive and momentous values.

3) *The concern that a united Europe should not initially be too strong* (so as not to jeopardise the continuation of the process of world unification), pushes to the background the questions of statehood, of the transfer of sovereignty and of the distinction between federation and confederation. In this way, our strategic objective and its importance as a *critical event* in the process of the unification of mankind tends to be overshadowed, and weight is given to the view that the solution to the world's problems can only be reached through the strengthening of international institutions. And this opens the way for the rise of internationalism.

4) If the process of globalisation is, *whatever happens*, destined to bring about in a short space of time the unification of mankind, then the foundation, or otherwise, of a European federation is a circumstance of limited importance. In such a scenario, the intrinsic value of this event as an example to the rest of the world is quite irrelevant and the foundation of the European federation need not be seen as an indispensable step forward on the road towards the unification of the world. And if all this is true, why bother struggling to achieve it at all?

5) The same question might be asked if *politics* is not recognised as having any *autonomy*. Our political engagement is rooted in a series of convictions: that the growth of interdependence is not, on its own, enough to bring about the unification of mankind, that the political process lags behind it, creating a gap that can only be bridged by political will, and that political will cannot, in turn, be generated without the initiative of a revolutionary movement. But if it is true that politics does not enjoy a measure of autonomy, then the Movement serves no useful purpose.

6) If it is true that the concept of *raison d'état* is obsolete, or in any case that the *raisons d'état* of all the world's nations are converging (as a result of the merging of interests prompted by the process of globalisation), then politics is no longer a struggle for power, having become, instead, the coming together of reasonable people who have the capacity to comprehend correctly the medium and long-term interests of their respective communities and to act harmoniously in pursuit of the common good. This is, basically, a variation on the old theory that trade is incompatible with war. European federation — and incidentally the same will apply to world federation — will be a reality which emerges by itself, or its emergence could even become irrelevant as Europe's governing classes prove able, by virtue of their reasonableness, to resolve through the existing institutional structures the problems that they face. In a setting such as this, our presence is thus, once again, entirely pointless.

I do not think that voicing these concerns implies a rejection of the values of world federalism, or even an inclination towards European nationalism. In fact, I think the opposite is true. It is only through the unification of Europe that the seed of federalism can be sown in the world today, and the process of world unification launched. It will certainly be a long a difficult process, but without the unification of Europe, it is one that will not even begin. Confronting the obstacles that it will encounter in its path is still the only effective way of equipping federalist culture to overcome them.

Notes

EUROPE, TURKEY AND THE KURDS

The events that have led to the sentencing to death, in Turkey, of PKK leader Ocalan by a court of first instance raise a series of very delicate questions which need to be tackled with caution and from a balanced perspective. Before going any further, however, it is important to make quite clear that any analysis of the relationship between the Turkish State and the Kurds must be conducted with a view to identifying a path that might lead towards a resolution of this explosive situation, rather than as an exercise in the apportioning of blame. Turkey, an imperfect democracy with a lamentable record in human rights, has used indiscriminate violence to quell the Kurdish rebellion, and in the Ocalan case too, it did not hesitate to make public, through television, the abhorrent methods adopted by its security services. On the other hand, certain Kurdish militant groups are guilty of practices every bit as barbaric and violent as those to which the Kurds themselves have fallen victim. Rebellion entails repression and repression feeds rebellion. Violence stokes the fire of violence. The only real problem that must be tackled, therefore, is how, without prejudicing the rights of anyone, to bring an end to it.

From this standpoint, the first thing that must be stressed is that any attempt to call into play the so-called right of *self-determination of peoples* would do far more harm than good in this situation. The effects of the application, in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, of this ill-fated principle have been so terrible that even the European governments have now stopped promoting it (having, until a few years ago, exploited it in a way which was both cynical and irresponsible, in the hope of gaining some meagre advantage from the disintegration of the two regions). It is also important to point out that there are Kurdish populations residing in regions belonging to four different states of the neighbouring chessboard of the Middle East, and that support for the birth of a Kurdish state would trigger, in what is already one of the world's most

unstable areas, a series of disastrous chain reactions. Furthermore, there exists absolutely no evidence to suggest that a hypothetical Kurdish state would be any more democratic than the present Turkish state. On the contrary, all the indications are that it would be far more likely to resemble one of the region's many dictatorships, as intolerant towards minorities within its confines as Turkey is towards its minority groups, and torn to pieces internally by the violent opposition between the numerous Kurdish nationalist factions.

It is, therefore, a question of guaranteeing the Kurds — within the Turkish state — the same rights as the rest of the citizens, and this includes the right to use their own language at school and in their dealings with the public administration. This would necessitate an evolution of democratic attitudes on the part of the Turkish authorities and the Turkish citizens: an unconditional acceptance of the cohabitation, within the same state, of populations with different languages and customs. In other words, the problem that needs to be solved is not one of self-determination so much as one of democracy and mutual solidarity between the two communities. What needs to be created in Turkey is a type of cohabitation similar to that which, after a period of tension and despite some continuing difficulties, has been established in the period following the end of the Second World War between the German-speaking and Italian-speaking communities of southern Tyrol.

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Clearly, this is not a problem that will be easily solved. Its inherent difficulty lies in the fact that Turkey is a nation-state which founds its legitimacy on the idea that it is the political expression of a nation, in other words, of a community which considers itself united by deep natural and cultural bonds, such as a common language and shared customs and traditions. Throughout its history, the nation-state has always sought to wipe out — through violence if necessary — the differences existing within its confines, or at least to impose the belief that no such differences exist. In those situations in which neither of these solutions has proved possible, any different populations present within a nation-state have been recognised as “minorities”, and the central power, forced either by its own weakness or by the international scenario, has endeavoured to tolerate their difference. It can be noted, moreover, that relations between “majority” and “minority” groups within nation-states have always been fragile and precarious, even in areas where any violence that does still

occur is sporadic and marginal in character. The existence of minorities in fact throws into question the legitimacy of a state which claims to be founded on a nation, and often tends, in so far as it is tolerated, to degenerate into separatism and to stir up irredentist currents in neighbouring states. For this reason, life for Europe's minorities has always been, to different degrees in the different situations, difficult.

The only conceivable solution to the problem of minority groups is thus to create a political framework in whose ambit they cease to be minorities — in other words, to found a state whose legitimacy is based not on the principle of nationhood, but on some other principle. And if it is to go hand in hand with democracy rather than to serve as the justification for an imperial form of dominion, then this principle can be none other than the federal principle.

This is not the place to embark upon the difficult task of analysing the positive nature of this principle, at least in the period prior to the founding of a world federation. In this context, it suffices to underline its value as a negation of the principle of the nation. When it comes to the differences in language, culture and traditions that exist within its confines (providing of course, these differences are accompanied by a universal acceptance of certain fundamental values of cohabitation), the federal state makes absolutely no distinction between its citizens. In the framework of the federal state, such differences are *politically irrelevant*. In this context, there is no group considering itself homogeneous whose very existence forms the basis of the legitimacy of the state: no such group which condemns to oppression, assimilation, or in the best hypothetical scenario, to the status of tolerated minority, all those who do not identify with it. Thus, as it loses its function, the idea of the nation is unmasked as a lie — a lie founded on crude simplifications — and the very concept of minorities becomes meaningless. A federal state recognises all citizens as different from one another in their indisputable individuality, and as equally entitled to enjoy, and bound to assume, the rights and duties attendant upon their common citizenship.

It is quite obvious that the overcoming of the federal state will not mean the disappearance of language differences, or of differences of a cultural and traditional nature; it is equally clear that, for a time, the barriers and divides of the past will continue to be visible in attitudes and behaviour, hindering the development of mutual understanding and thus influencing the formation of alignments and the content of political debate. But they will be vestiges of the past that are destined to disappear as multiplicity of language is a natural condition of men and cultural

differences — providing they do not clash with the fundamental values of civil cohabitation — are determinants of mutual enrichment, and thus of contact and dialogue between people. What is more, it must be appreciated that linguistic and cultural differences will ultimately cease to represent a sufficient foundation for the legitimacy of the various levels of government (below that of general government) that will characterise the organisation of the federal states of the future. In these states, consensus will be founded on a basic sense of solidarity which will, in turn, be the product of a mutual commitment to solving the common problems relating to the organisation of cohabitation that will emerge, in different ways, in the different parts of the territory.

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Thanks to the advance, and the intensification of the process of European unification, the problem of peaceful cohabitation with “minority groups” has, in Western Europe, despite the persistence of the structure of the nation-state, been tackled in a reasonably satisfactory manner in the period that has elapsed since the end of the Second World War. It is a process which has been, and still is, ambiguous, but by promoting an awareness (albeit obscure and uncertain) of the community of destiny that binds the peoples of Europe together, it has weakened nationalistic motivations and undermined the function of the idea of nation as the principle on which the legitimacy of the currently existing states is based. Indeed, the current movement towards a settlement of the intractable situation in Northern Ireland — the most inflamed of all the hotbeds of crisis created by the coexistence in a single territory of two communities which feel that they are different from one another — would not have been conceivable outside the context of the process of European unification. The sense — a sense of which they are barely aware — on the part of both communities of belonging to, and being embraced by, a future common political entity which is bigger than both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, has had the effect of overcoming the absoluteness of the opposition between two identities which considered themselves irreconcilable, and of leading to a first embryonic awareness of a common identity.

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As far as relations with minority groups are concerned, the results

achieved within the European Union, however, are vastly inadequate. The reason for this is that until the process of European unification reaches its federal conclusion, nationhood remains the only recognised principle on which to base the legitimacy of the state. Having said that, the results achieved are visible enough to allow us to form an idea of the potential of a democratic European Union equipped with the capacity to act — in other words of a federal Union — and of the part it could play in finding a solution to the tragic problem which is currently destroying all hopes of peaceful civil cohabitation in south-east Turkey. The European Union could open the eyes of Turks and Kurds alike to the prospect of a great political community which embraces both groups, and which has the capacity to enforce, in both, the principles of the rule of law, and in whose ambit all could live together in peace without any threat to the identity or security of anyone. Clearly, Turkey's journey towards full membership of the Union, or of a European federal state, will be difficult because of the very deep and ongoing problem of the country's poor record in the area of human rights. This, however, does not alter the fact that Europe is faced with two possible choices as regards the attitude it should adopt vis-à-vis Turkey: either it can use the prospect of membership of the European Union as a lever to improve, progressively, the human rights situation, or it can use the problem of the country's poor record in this field as an excuse for blocking its membership of the Union. The first attitude would have the effect of strengthening progressive, secular and democratic tendencies, in both the Turkish and the Kurdish camps, while the second would only serve to encourage those of an authoritarian, nationalist and fundamentalist nature.

But it is clear that the first of these positions could only be adopted by a Europe which has turned its back, once and for all, on the principle of the nation, and which feels sure of its own strength and confident that it has the consensus of its citizens: in other words by a federal Europe. In the meantime, the present confederation is obliged, by its weakness, to adopt a closed and defensive attitude in its relations with Turkey, an attitude which also characterises its relations with the countries of central and eastern Europe and one which masks its inability to bear the weight of the historical responsibilities which it should be assuming.

* * *

In addition to all this, it is also necessary to consider the decisive role that a united Europe could, through its help and influence and through the

example that the completion of the process of its unification would set to the states of the region, play on the stage of the Middle East: a stage which, due to the instability that plagues it and to its geographical proximity to Europe, would, more than any other world stage, be predisposed to the maturation of a federalist project within its confines. But the vision of Europe's politicians is not equal to grand designs like this, remaining focused instead on the problem of weighing up the costs and benefits attendant upon their country's membership of the Union and on efforts to reduce the former and increase the latter at the expense of its fellow members. The fact remains that the incapacity of the governments of the Union to look beyond their own selfish and extremely short-term interests is destined, if it persists, to wreak irreparable damage. The nation-state is not dead and gone, and the tensions generated by the principle of nationhood which forms the basis of its legitimacy continue to simmer below the surface, ready to re-emerge violently at the first sign of a U-turn in the process of European integration. Western Europe, whose vocation should be to export federalism to other world regions, could instead be destined, tragically, to re-import from outside its confines a nationalism (or worse still, a micronationalism) which it believed it had definitively overcome, and to witness, in its very bosom, the resurgence of tensions which had seemed assuaged, and the birth of new ones.

Francesco Rossolillo

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE FEDERALISTS

1. *The United Nations and their financing rules.* I wish to make an analysis of the functioning of the United Nations and its financing not as an expert, but as a federalist. It is worthwhile going into some detail on this problem and on the current crisis, the most serious which the UN has ever had to face.

In their book *Renewing the United Nations System*, published in 1994, Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart¹ list eight proposals to reform the financing mechanism advanced by governments and three advanced by

the Secretary-General. On average this means one proposal for every five years since the UN's foundation in San Francisco, generally put forward at moments of acute financial crisis.

These crises have one constant: they are due in the vast majority of cases to the refusal of member states to pay their quotas, and not to administrative errors. As we shall see, these quotas must be paid to the UN on the basis of commitments undertaken. While the UN certainly requires structural reforms, which the federalists have called for since its creation, it is also true that endemic financial crisis has not facilitated its tasks.

For many years the countries which have contributed most to its financing have asked for zero increase on spending. I will merely quote some data to squash the accusations of waste, financial frauds and uncontrolled growth in spending, made by the more reactionary and nationalist side of the political classes, in particular in the American Congress, or by the multinationals which in recent years have organised press campaigns against the UN to impede its efforts in the area of labour and environmental legislation.

When the UN was established, the Charter laid down in article 17-2 a single source of funds. In practice the General Assembly saddled each member state with a contribution which takes account of the ten-year average of its gross domestic product, adjusted on the basis of its foreign debt and its *pro-capite* income. The expenditure of the Organisation was planned by the General Assembly, but the payment of state contributions was obligatory on the basis of law and international treaties.

At that time all participating states had accepted the principle of paying quotas proportional to their capacity to contribute. It is the same principle as that on which the fiscal systems of the western democracies are based. In theory at least, none of these countries would tolerate it if citizens and companies, particularly those which contribute most to the public purse, should use blackmail to obtain particular advantages, or should suspend their payments with impunity until the political and economic decisions adopted by the majority are changed.

We can clearly see the hypocrisy of governments which call themselves "democratic" and speak of the sacred nature of the law and international treaties, but then — and this concerns primarily the United States — take the liberty of not paying the amounts which they owe to the United Nations. These states and their governments are "outlaws". Those who pay late are in the same position.

In 1946 the working budget of the UN was 21.5 million dollars and in 1992 this reached 1,181.2 million. A 55-fold growth over a period of

46 years is by no means scandalous for an organisation which started from nothing, and taking account of the fact that in the meantime the value of the dollar has diminished considerably. In real terms, the UN budget has only increased tenfold, as has also happened for its specialised agencies (the FAO, UNESCO, ILO etc.). During the same period the UN has gone from 51 to 185 member countries (which include almost all of mankind) and has developed programmes which at the time of its foundation were not foreseen. It can therefore be said that the growth in the UN's financial needs has been very modest, particularly if one takes into account that in 1986 the request to diminish functional expenditure froze the level of outgoings and reduced staff by 13 per cent.

In 1992, as Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart further observe, the expenditure of all organisations under the umbrella of the United Nations reached only 0.0005 per cent of world GDP and only 0.0007 per cent of that of the 24 most industrialised countries according to the OSCE classification.

When the UN was first set up, the United States contributed around 50 per cent of the regular budget and the poor countries joining the United Nations were very few, since among Third World states only those of Latin America were independent. Since then the United States quota has progressively diminished, by common agreement, to 25 per cent (310 million dollars in 1994), as against the 12.45 per cent from Japan, 8.95 per cent from Germany, 6.71 per cent from Russia, 6 per cent from France, 5 per cent from Great Britain, 4.29 per cent from Italy and 3.11 per cent from Canada. The contribution of the 87 poorest countries cannot go below 0.01 per cent of the total budget. Other countries find themselves in an intermediate position: Brazil contributes 1.59 per cent of the budget, China 0.77 per cent, India 0.36 per cent, Nigeria 0.2 per cent and Indonesia 0.16 per cent.

For the other activities — like peacekeeping for example — the criteria for calculating contributions is slightly different. The five countries of the Security Council must pay 22 per cent more than the contribution calculated on the basis of the criteria adopted for the regular budget; other countries pay a sum equal to those resulting from the normal criteria, and a third group pay less. The most serious problem in this connection springs from the fact that the Secretary-General only has available a permanent fund of 150 million dollars and that all peacekeeping operations decided by the Security Council require the General Assembly's approval of an *ad hoc* budget, which considerably slows down the possibility of intervention.

One of the more recent proposals to regulate the UN's financial problems in the short term was advanced in February 1993 by group of international financiers (the Volker-Ojima Report), which suggested making quota-payments quarterly; penalising late-payers by charging interest; doubling the permanent capital fund (200 million dollars); and creating a complementary reserve fund of 400 million dollars for peace-keeping operations.

In 1993 Bill Clinton again asked for a reduction of the American contribution to the global funding of the United Nations, observing that the US quota "should be reduced to reflect the rise of other nations that now can bear more of the financial burden."² In his first speech to the General Assembly he declared that American participation in the peace-keeping budget should be reduced, thus signalling an important change in US policy with regard to the international organisation. This highlighted the problem of UN financing and the need to avoid excessive financial dependency on any one member state.

It was not the first time that the United States had asked for a drop in their contributions. They had already done so in 1957 when they obtained a reduction in their quota from 49 per cent to 37 per cent of the total budget, and then again in 1974 when they wrung a further reduction from the UN to 25 per cent. In 1985 the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, immediately supported in Italy, had suggested a new reduction of 10 per cent, sharing out the smaller amounts among the countries able to sustain an extra financial effort. In 1986, right in the middle of a crisis provoked by the United States, an informal document (written by the Aga Khan and Maurice Strong) advanced several proposals, including some similar to those mentioned above. None of these proposals was accepted favourably and some industrialised countries officially rejected them, at least until the United States had settled their arrears, something which the American government has declared it can only do through annual instalments.

2. *The current data on the financial crisis.* The delay of payments, unsanctioned by the addition of interest or other penalties, is a serious problem which has lasted for decades now. The data presented here gives an idea of their importance.

At 31 July 1988: a) the arrears accumulated over the years amounted to 2.4 billion dollars, including around 900 billion for variable expenses, 1.5 billion for peacekeeping and 26 million for the *ad hoc* tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; b) the United States debt came to 1.5

billion dollars, i.e. more than half the total (569 million for variable expenses and around one billion for peacekeeping costs). The United States is therefore the main "outlaw" of the international community, and their situation is made still more unacceptable by the conditions which they unilaterally place on their payment of arrears, which go so far at times as the adoption of political orientations contrary to the decisions of the majority of the other member countries; c) the other principal debtors are Russia, Ukraine and Brazil; some countries like Japan, Germany and Great Britain pay late, while others have unilaterally reduced the voluntary quotas for population and development funds.

At 5 August 1998 only 85 countries out of 135 were up-to-date with payments. Up to now the budget relating to variable expenses for the two years in progress is very limited. It banks on zero growth, which means the Secretary-General has to make the organisation function on a budget of 2.5 billion dollars, in other words with 100 million less than in the previous two-year period, despite the fact that all around are demanding an increase in UN activities. Moreover, from the mid-eighties, the UN staff dropped from 12,000 to 9,000, while the states which imposed these severe cuts have not yet fulfilled their own obligations.

It is therefore misleading to speak of UN bureaucracy since its staff, including that of the specialised agencies, is smaller than that of a city like Stockholm or of a company like McDonalds, and since in 1992 the variable expenses were equivalent to 0.5 per cent of the American military budget, or the cost of two strategic bombers.

It is necessary to add here a few more detailed remarks which will help give a proper understanding of the phenomenon: article 19 of the United Nations Charter specifies only that a state in arrears with payments of at least two years loses the right to vote in the General Assembly. Each state can therefore work on a knife-edge, keeping just below this fatal threshold, because the authors of the Charter would never have imagined that some of the principal contributors would be years late in paying; the permanent members of the Security Council cannot lose their rights within this institution even if they exceed the two-year threshold; article 19 says nothing about the widespread and recurrent practice of paying as late as possible in the year, and in recent years the UN has, to avoid financial collapse, been obliged to perform real feats of acrobatics in shifting funds temporarily available in the peacekeeping budget to other items; the cost of peacekeeping operations in very unstable situations is difficult to foresee and the UN can suddenly find itself in grave financial difficulty if the member states do not respond immediately to the request

for funds on the basis of estimated costs. The countries participating in these operations can be reimbursed late, which makes it harder for them to pay their contributions on time.

All these facts and situations which have repeated themselves for at least thirty years can certainly not be attributed merely to administrative errors.

Other points must be noted too: the governments have accepted the principle of penalties in some sectors of UN activity. So far, however, the General Assembly has been rather reticent in adopting this system as regards the organisation's working budget; the requirement that member states make their payments in dollars sometimes makes the task difficult for developing countries, and for this reason proposals have been advanced over the years aiming to replace the dollar, currently unstable, with a basket of currencies.

What is to be done? The financial crisis is such that, as Childers and Urquhart suggest, a global review of the whole thing should be undertaken by a Commission of economists extraneous to the UN with a mandate from the General Assembly.

The Ogata-Volker Report of February 1993, written under the auspices of the Ford Foundation,³ had not ruled out the possibility, in the proposals addressed to the Secretary-General, that it would one day be necessary to find new financial resources for the United Nations. However it considered that the current method of funding was still logical and appropriate because "it encourages the member countries to maintain effective control over the budget and agenda of the UN."⁴

An alternative and more divergent point of view maintains that the financing of the UN is too serious a matter to be left to the national governments alone, as the experience of the last three decades shows. Alternative proposals have therefore been advanced, such as that whereby individual citizens are authorised to make donations to specialised UN funds. Other sources of funding have been identified, but it is hard to see how they can become effective without the intervention of civil society.

Thus various types of world tax have been proposed; on the sale of arms or on anti-personnel mines; on international movements of capital;⁵ on international trade, or on the production of pollutants such as oil and hydrocarbons, or on the extraction of certain raw materials; on air and sea transport, with the justification that the UN is responsible for their functioning in a peaceful world climate; one day a year of "United Nations communication" in which all postal and telephone expenses, publicity and other means of communication are taxed with a surtax specifically for

UN financing (this tax would have to be accompanied by a campaign of public information).

The problem is considered in the report *Our Global Neighborhood*, published in 1995.⁶ It was written by the *Commission on Global Governance* (composed of public figures such as Ingvar Carlsson, former Swedish Prime Minister, Shridath Ramphal, former Secretary of the Commonwealth and Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission), created in 1992 to take up the mantle of the independent Commission on problems of international development led by Willy Brandt. Its task was to recommend the means to improve global security and governability, thanks to the possibility of increasing co-operation after the end of the Cold War. In the chapter "Financing Global Governance" the Report made the following proposal: "A start should be made in establishing practical, if initially small-scale, schemes of global financing to support specific UN operations." The Commission underlined the complexity of the problem by means of a comparison with the European Union which, despite a higher level of integration, has not been able to make much progress in the way of taxation. In very diplomatic language the report considered that "The time could be right, however, for a fresh look and a breakthrough in this area. The idea of safeguarding and managing the global commons — particularly those related to the physical environment — is now widely accepted; this cannot happen with a drip-feed approach to financing. And the notion of expanding the role of the United Nations is now accepted in relation to military security."

The Commission proposed a few basic principles: a) to tax the exploitation of certain common resources; b) to share out the financial burden not only among certain industrialised countries, but among the entire community or the international players, adopting a progressive approach; c) to consider these new sources of income as additional and not as replacing the national taxes.

The Commission also suggested that the proposals "can be initiated in the UN system — in the Economic Security Council, when established — and negotiated and approved by the General Assembly before being embodied in an international agreement to be approved and ratified." The Commission considered that such proposals "do not involve major elements of supranationality." It also considered that "any system of global taxation requires the identification of a tax base that is politically acceptable to governments but also reflects global processes." Finally it summed up the projects under study, namely: 1) the Tobin tax, from the name of the American economist James Tobin, Nobel prize-winner,

which concerns international commercial transactions; 2) a solidarity tax on multinational companies; 3) a tax on exploitation of common resources; 4) other taxes on air and sea transport, on fishing in the high seas, on the use of the Antarctic as part of the common heritage of the human race, on geo-stationary satellites, on the electromagnetic spectrum, etc.

The Commission concluded that while some of these measures have primarily symbolic meaning, others, like the tax on carbon dioxide emissions, could have "colossal implications."

As regards the Tobin tax the Commission notes that this levy on capital movements is intended not only to affect financial revenue, but also to improve the functioning of the wider world market.

This project, proposed by its author in 1978, is still under discussion. It was taken up again recently in France during a meeting of the *Conseil d'analyse économique* (created a year ago by the Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, it groups around forty economists of all tendencies) which confirmed that any important reform — and in particular if it concerns the democratisation of international life, i.e. the overcoming of the exclusive sovereignty of the nation state — is all the more acceptable if one is in opposition.

The Tobin project was also at the centre of a long debate in the French National Assembly when the national budget for 1999 was being examined, in the course of which the Minister for the Economy and Finance, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, responding to numerous questions and comments, emphasised the difficulty of realising such a project after the coming into force of the European currency because "in the context of the euro it is even more difficult for one country to be subjected to a tax and another not. It is as if a tax were imposed on allowances in Brittany but not in the rest of France." In this way Strauss-Kahn implicitly recognised the essential role which the European Union could, or rather should have in all projects for reforming the United Nations and democratising international political life, as the federalists demand.

Finally, at the first national meeting of the Attac Movement (*Action pour une tax Tobin d'aide aux citoyens* — Action for a Tobin tax to help the citizens) which took place at La Ciotat on 17 October 1998, it was decided to submit a series of proposals to Strauss-Kahn including "the application of the Tobin tax" which "even reduced to 0.05 per cent, could make a contribution to the struggle against inequality" at world level.

The *Commission on Global Governance*, which, as we have seen, comprises political and economic personalities who are among those most conscious of the challenges ahead in the next century and of the

unavoidable need to organise international life to democratise and regulate globalisation, did, for its part, recognise the interest of the Tobin tax. It concluded the part of its Report concerning UN financing⁶ by calling on "the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions to explore the feasibility of such a system in consultation with the regulatory authorities of the leading financial markets."

"The financial crisis which began some months ago in the markets of South East Asia risks assuming global dimensions. It has affected Russia and Latin America and exposed the total inertia and impotence of Japan. It is sowing fear in the American and European financial markets."⁸ In the face of this hard reality, the moment has come to draw the political conclusions from the analyses undertaken by the more enlightened exponents of the ruling classes, like Raymond Barre, who declared that "good global governability must no longer be a utopia, it must be an ideal."⁹

3. *The role of civil society, of the NGOs and of the federalists.* All of these new means of financing taken as a whole would still be subject to the control of the member states, which would have to give their assent to levy new taxes, to collect them and to transfer the proceeds to the UN. They would keep their power of blackmail and would hold the United Nations under the permanent threat of financial crisis. It is therefore evident that any significant reform of UN financing must go hand-in-hand with thorough reflection on the democratisation of the United Nations and of international political life.

The federalists consider that the democratisation of international political life is too serious a matter to be left to the governments and diplomats. It is obvious that the national governments will never take any initiative in this direction. At the most they will propose, as Mikhail Gorbachev and the *Commission on Global Governance* did, a reinforcement of the UN.

After the Rio Conference of June 1992, it became clear which are the two principal actors who will tend to promote the process of world unification, the only way to control the globalisation imposed by the evolution of the mode of production.

These are on the one side, the governments, "the diplomatic expression of the process," and, on the other, "the ecologist and pacifist movement, which expresses itself through the Non-Governmental Organisations and represents the democratic aspect of the process." The avant-garde role of the federalist movement is to make these forces aware

of the means — i.e. the political institutions — which mankind needs to realise peace, democracy and international justice.¹⁰ This movement is continually spreading, as Strauss-Kahn recently acknowledged: in connection with the French rejection of the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI), Strauss-Kahn said that “After MAI people will not negotiate as before. From a certain point of view the defeat of MAI is a victory of globalisation... It will be necessary to bear in mind the new constraints when negotiating. The peoples no longer accept being governed as in the past.”¹¹ This is the significance which the World Federalist Movement assigns to its participation as co-ordinator of various groupings of NGOs: in the struggle for the affirmation of the International Criminal Court; as promoter, on the occasion of the Rio Conference, of the International NGO Task Group on Legal and Institutional Matters (INTGLIM);¹² for the organisation of the Peace Conference which was held at The Hague in May 1999 within the international collective Hague Appeal for Peace 1999;¹³ and in the ambit of the Forum of NGO's which is being organised under the auspices of the UN on the occasion of the Summit for the new millennium which, according to Kofi Annan, is to propose how the United Nations should meet the challenges of the next century.

The federalists attach the same significance to their participation, along with other international organisations, in the third universal vigil of protest against the financial crisis of the United Nations, while emphasising that the UN is very far from being the appropriate instrument for international democracy. Indeed, only the federalists demonstrated during the San Francisco Conference of 1945 to denounce the confederal nature of the organisation, and they do not deny any of the criticisms advanced since then of the inefficiency of the United Nations and of its non-democratic nature.

In conclusion I would like to mention briefly the issues currently occupying the attention of the European and world federalists, for whom democracy can be fully realised only if it is affirmed at all levels from local district, through continental region, to the world; in which Europe is a crucial stage.

In the European Union the federalists are conducting a Campaign for the European Constitution, gathering signatures among citizens and political and social forces and “asking the governments and parliaments of the Union, and indeed the European Parliament, to start a democratic process.”¹⁴

At world level, the WFM is in favour of a radical reform of the United

Nations system, and in particular indicates the following objectives:

1) The ratification of the Treaty on the International Criminal Court. This was adopted in Rome thanks to the pressure of civil society and of the Coalition of NGOs for the ICC, of which Bill Pace, executive director of the World Federalist Movement, was the co-ordinator for three years in New York. The action of this coalition has been exemplary because, as Pierre Blanc noted in October 1998, “who could have believed, at the time of the G7, that their demands for the setting up of the ICC or their calls for the banning of anti-personnel mines would lead to the establishment of the former and the signing of the Ottawa Treaty against the latter?”¹⁵

2) The creation of a World Environmental Authority, appointed to supervise the application of a model of development compatible with safeguarding mankind's heritage, to put an end to the tragedy of the exploitation of common resources. The second Earth Summit — which met in New York from 23 to 27 June 1997 as a special session of the UN General Assembly — had inflicted a heavy blow on the proposals and prospects advanced five years previously at the Rio Summit.¹⁶ On the occasion of this second Summit the WFM, together with *EarthAction*, a coalition of 1,800 NGOs, and *Globe*, an international group of parliamentarians interested in ecological matters and in the democratisation of international political life, joined the plenary session of NGOs in which a few hundred organisations participated, in parallel with the UN General Assembly, and called for the “creation of a democratic Chamber within the United Nations.”

3) The constitution of an Economic Security Council, already suggested in some governmental circles and more recently invoked by Dominique Strauss-Kahn. This claim shows clearly how, before unbridled globalisation, the only effective solutions are supranational, and how the abandonment of sovereignty, when chased out of the window, generally turns up again at the door. To “save democracy in the process of globalisation”, the alternative does not lie between national independence on the one hand and supranationality on the other, as is the view of the ATTAC movement, which gravitates around the monthly newspaper *Le Monde diplomatique*.¹⁷ It lies rather between ineffective, non-democratic confederal collaboration, and effective democratic federal supranationality. The true distinction between the forces of reaction and those of progress is therefore that — defined by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, European militants of the Resistance to Nazi-fascism, during their internment on Ventotene — that separates those whose goal is the conquest of national power and those who aim for the creation of a “solid

international state.”¹⁸

4) The reform of the Security Council, by removing the right of veto and creating a single permanent seat for a finally united Europe. This would take account of changes in the world balance of power since the end of the Cold War, and prefigure the transformation of the Council into a Senate of the great regions and continents, by degrees as other democratic processes of regional integration develop. Despite its imperfections, the European Union, which represents the most advanced frontier in current processes of political unification, could even now become the centre of initiative for the reform of the Security Council.

5) Finally, the reinforcement of the financial means of the international community (and of the UN in particular) and the adoption of initial measures towards a world fiscal system. For the federalists these cannot be taken into consideration unless they are accompanied by a procedure for their democratic control and the creation, alongside the Security Council and the General Assembly, which represents the member states, of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA), which represents all the world's citizens. This project is currently supported, outside federalist circles, by the Canadian Parliament, the European Parliament, and the Interparliamentary Union (IPU), which in 1996 made a commitment to join the World Federalist Movement in supporting it; each case underlines the importance of the involvement of civil society to achieve it. It was mentioned during the proceedings of the *Commission on Global Governance* (together with the reinforcement of the General Assembly and the creation of a forum of NGOs and of civil society) and by the General Assembly group which since 1996 has had the remit of working for the reinforcement of the United Nations. Finally, it is taken into consideration in the later proposals of the former Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali (*Agenda for Democratisation*) and of the current Secretary-General Kofi Annan (*Renewing the United Nations System. A Program for Reform*) published in July 1997.¹⁹

Jean-Francis Billon

NOTES

¹ Erskine Childers was a United Nations official and Secretary-General of the World Federation of UN Associations (WFUNA); Brian Urquhart as been Under-Secretary-

General to the United Nations, a researcher with the Ford Foundation and later a member of the Commission on Global Governance, of which more later.

² Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

³ *Financing an Effective United Nations. Report of the Advisory Group on UN Financing*, New York, The Ford Foundation, 1993.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁵ Martin Walker, (“Global Taxation”, in *World Policy Journal*, 1993) calculated that a levy of 0.003 per cent on the 900 billion dollars traded daily would correspond to a sum of 8 billion dollars a year.

⁶ *Our Global Neighborhood. The Report of the Commission on Global Governance*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995.

⁷ *Our Global Neighborhood*, *cit.*, pp. 217-24.

⁸ Publius, *European Letter*, October 1998.

⁹ Quoted in Erik Izraelwicz, “Chronique du Monde de l'économie. Sur l'Etat du monde”, in *Le Monde économie*, 27 October 1998, concerning two recent conventions, *Carrefour des sciences et de la culture*, organised in Lyons from 14 to 27 October 1998 by the European Commission forecasting group, and the *Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations internationales* (CESPI) conference, organised on 21 October 1998 in Paris on the occasion of its twentieth anniversary.

¹⁰ Cf. Lucio Levi's introduction to Dieter Heinrich, *The Case for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly*, New York, World Federalist Movement, 1998.

¹¹ Dominique Strauss-Kahn, quoted in “La défaite de l'AMI est un victoire de la mondialisation”, in *Libération*, 22 October 1998.

¹² INTGLIM was set up at the end of the second meeting of the preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) of 1991. It is co-ordinated by the World Federalist Movement and by the Center for the Development of International Law, and it helped set up the coalition of NGOs for the International Criminal Court.

¹³ See *Appel de la Haye pour la paix*, drawn up in October 1996 by the promoting Committee, led by, in addition to the WFM, the International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms, the International Peace Bureau, and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (*Fédéchoses pour le fédéralisme*, Lyons, 1996, n. 97).

¹⁴ See “Appel pour une Union européenne démocratique. Pour une constitution européenne”, in *Fédéchoses pour le fédéralisme*, Lyons, n. 99. See also Lucio Levi, “C'est seulement avec la constituante que la citoyenneté européenne verra le jour” (*ibidem*, 1997, n. 98); Francesco Rossolillo, “Réflexions sur la constitution européenne” (*ibidem*, 1998, n. 100); Dominique Rousseau and other constitutionalists, “Pour une constitution européenne”, in *Le Monde*, 5 May 1998. Finally, see the issues so far of *European Letter*, published by “Fondazione Europea Luciano Bolis” in support of the UEF Campaign.

¹⁵ Cf. Bill Pace, “Intervention de William Pace à la table ronde sur le Tribunal pénal international”, Lyons, 28 June 1998, in *Fédéchoses-pour le fédéralisme*, Lyons, 1996, n. 93, and “Mondialiser la justice. Trois ans d'action des ONG pour le Tribunal pénal international”, in *Fédéchoses pour le fédéralisme*, 1998, n. 101. In the same issue see also “Thèses fédéralistes à propos du TPI. Pas de justice sans paix, pas de paix sans gouvernement mondial démocratique”. Finally, cf. Lucio Levi, “Tribunal permanent de l'ONU et justice internationale”, in *Fédéchoses pour le fédéralisme*, 1988, n. 100.

¹⁶ Franco Spoltore, “Sommet de la terre: un nouvel échec”, in *Fédéchoses pour le fédéralisme*, 1997, n. 97.

¹⁷ Cf. *Le Monde*, 20 October 1998.

¹⁸ Altiero Spinelli, *Il Manifesto di Ventotene*, with an essay by Norberto Bobbio, Bologna,

Il Mulino, 1991, p. 50 (Eng. ed., *The Ventotene Manifesto*, The Altiero Spinelli Institute for Federalist Studies, Ventotene 1988).

¹⁹ Dieter Heinrich, *op. cit.* For the latest developments cf. the latest edition, currently being printed (Lyons, Presse fédéraliste).

Thirty Years Ago

THE POWER ASPECT OF EUROPEAN PLANNING*

MARIO ALBERTINI

1. There are no such things, in reality, as pure economic events. Strictly speaking, we cannot even talk of economic events, only of historical-social ones that have a prominent economic aspect. Such events can, and indeed must, be analysed in purely economic terms as these are the only ones capable of highlighting this specific aspect. But that, on its own, is not enough. Together with this specifically economic aspect, these events also present psychological, legal and political aspects which must, in turn, be examined in purely psychological, legal and political terms. This is, indeed, the way in which historians examine events in the past. When it comes to true economic projects, like that of European planning, which cannot be actuated without resolving, together with the problem of their economic coherence, the question of their feasibility from a psychological, legal and political point of view, this theoretical perspective, which in historical research manifests itself in dialectical forms, becomes an operational necessity that gives rise, or should give rise, to interdisciplinary analyses.¹

In other words, no approach to European planning can fail to tackle the non economic aspects of this economic problem. It is my intention to present here some considerations of a political nature, or rather, to examine what might, in the light of this clarification, be termed the power aspect of European planning. With the evolution of political science lagging behind that of economics, my considerations will inevitably lack

* This text, slightly modified, was published in French in *Le Fédéraliste*, XI (1969).

the precision of those advanced by economists. It is already difficult in politics to recognise problems, to separate the real ones from the imaginary ones. Therefore, by way of an introduction, I will seek, first of all, to identify the main problems relating to the power aspect of European planning, and only having done this will I, in order to make my comments more concrete, go on to discuss possible solutions to them.

2. In my view, the first question that arises is this: has the question of European planning reached its moment of truth? Political problems fall into two categories: there are those that, posed by the evolution of the historical-social process, cannot be escaped, and there are others which depend upon voluntary choices. In the first case, they are problems which will not go away until a solution is found; in the second, they are problems which can as readily be tackled as shelved. It is my belief that European planning has, in ways that will be specified, reached its moment of truth. This does not mean, however, that we can predict how long it will be before a solution to the problem is reached. There exists no conceptual analytical instrument that can enable us to predict times of this kind, to indicate the dates, and the precise form, of future historical events. But what we can do, using the analytical instruments at our disposal, is identify macroscopically certain historical and social trends, and assess their substance and, at times, their irreversibility; thus, we may ultimately do as the ancients would have done and (to use a term taken from classical political language whose original technical and human significance is lost today) indicate, in political-operational terms, their *necessity*.

I think that European planning *can* be said to have reached its moment of truth, an affirmation based on my belief that the development of the mixed economy is a process which, like that of European integration, can correctly be regarded as irreversible in nature. The link between these historical trends is clear to see. A mixed economy promotes a concerted economy and the need for economic planning,² and this planning must, reflecting the extent of the passage of the economy from the national to the European sphere, take on a European dimension. The link is clear to see, but the irreversibility of the process remains to be proven. In the framework of this discussion, the irreversibility of the development of the mixed economy can be taken as read, while a question mark hangs over that of the process of European integration.

Opinions are divided, and the uncertainty derives, in part, from the fact that this is a process of transformation that is progressing along the lines of least resistance and generating provisional and discordant situa-

tions, one that is creating, in short, an overall picture characterised by confusion. Perhaps, as we shall see, the surest way of establishing what point the process of integration has reached, and what form its development might now take, is to identify the lines along which it is advancing. However, before embarking on this exercise, I believe that the question of its irreversibility might reasonably be considered by bearing in mind the difficulty, or the impossibility of turning back. The economic-social process, notably in the ambit of 'the Six', has now extended beyond national confines. To bring it back within the ambit of the nations would mean travelling once more, this time in the opposite direction, along the path that led to the birth of the Common Market. At the present time there is — unless some political or social catastrophe occurs — no political power with the capacity to carry through such a policy, even should it wish to do so. It is a fact, for example, that even re-emerging nationalism is obliged to bend to the logic of European integration, even though it strives, of course, to prevent the ultimate consequences of the process from being realised.

On the other hand, while this hypothesis of political or social catastrophe serves to put this prospect of irreversibility back within the bounds of uncertain historical predictions (uncertain as regards the times and forms of historical developments), it does not in any way alter the conceptual terms of the problem. It points to the possibility of a temporary eclipse, not a disappearance, of the process. Integration in the ambit of 'the Six' is merely the most advanced stage of a much vaster process of integration of human activity at world level whose character seems to be that of the beginning of a new historical cycle, that is, of an irresistible historical force. Naturally, an evolution of this kind is not immune to crises, or even periods of stagnation or regression, crises or periods that could even, hypothetically, affect the Common Market. But it does exclude, in principle, the possibility of a lasting return to closed domestic market forms. There have already been examples in Europe this century of periods of regression characterised by protectionism and a flourishing of corporative interests — periods that have been followed, in a manner so forceful and spontaneous as to seem natural, by the revival of integrative processes which, for this very reason, seem to depend, precisely on the evolution of the mode of production, in other words, on a primary historical event.³

3. The second question that arises, again in my view, is this: what type of power is needed for European planning? The nature of the power

required could be obscured by the fact that the kind of planning possible and needed is, roughly speaking, "indicative" planning based on a "concerted" economy.⁴ When the characteristics "indicative" and "concerted" are highlighted, however, thinking is "led astray by words" (by their usual meanings, the ones they have outside the present context, that is)⁵ and runs quickly towards the idea of a compromise between different centres of political and economic power, rather than towards the idea of an autonomous political power with the capacity to act on its own behalf. And depending on the degree to which one thinks in this way, the power of the EEC Commission (a power based on initiative and on dialogue between the national governments represented in the Community's Council of Ministers) might even be deemed adequate for the task. However, this hasty hypothesis fails to take into account two things.

a) It forgets that the framework of an "indicative" plan must incorporate economic policy, and therefore that while it is indicative only where certain activities conducted by private operators are concerned, it is in principle — and very much in fact — automatically binding where economic activities carried out directly by the political power are concerned⁶ and, directly or indirectly, also as regards aspects of the economic activity carried out by private operators who are conditioned, or appear to be conditioned, by the economic policies of governments.

"Indicative" European planning — multicentric and concerted — does not render total elimination of the economic sovereignty of the national governments necessary. It could be ascertained, for example, which state-owned enterprises should remain in the hands of the national governments (thus becoming national elements in coordinated policies implemented at European level), and which need to become European. But there can be no denying that for some state-owned enterprises, becoming European is, especially in the high-tech sector, a necessity. There can be no denying that monetary policy, and many other general components of economic policy, must be established at European level. And there can be no denying, finally, that these indispensable preconditions for European planning demand a level of political strength, and political will, that can be manifested only in a European governmental power, in other words, in a constitutionally defined state-type power. There exists no real theory that allows the refutation of such a conclusion, or the identification of a power of a lower order which is equal to the task of planning.⁷

In the absence of a European governmental power, thoughts can turn only to a "harmonisation" of national economic policies. This is an idea

which is usually advanced by chance, without any examination of its political prerequisites, and without questioning whether it is realistic or utopian. The problem that is overlooked in this case is that of verifying the degrees of "harmonisation" compatible with the absolute sovereignty of the states. And the fact that is overlooked is the persistence of this type of sovereignty, which is a long way from being even slightly undermined as some theorists rashly affirm. Within the limits of an empirical application of the concept of sovereignty (as the faculty to decide in the last instance, not as a lack of any external influence on the decision-making centres), it is possible, without the fear of being belied by events, to affirm that the absolute sovereignty of the EEC member states has remained intact, because the process that is the formation of the political will of the people comes to a complete, indeed an absolute, stop at the level of national elections, a level beyond which the "lawless freedom" so effectively illustrated by Kant⁸ persists.

In any case, harmonisation is in fact incompatible with planning because it excludes *a priori* the establishment (liberated from concerted decision-making) of the bare minimum in terms of fixed points of reference, starting with that of currency, which the indicative planning of a multicentric economy needs if it is to take shape. It goes without saying that nothing in a concerted economy, can be "concerted" (or "harmonised") without first rendering impossible the very aim that is being pursued: the establishment of a global economic direction, broadly regulated but compatible with wide freedom of choice for private operators and public powers which rank below the level of the general power.

b) The fact is also overlooked that the technical blueprint of the European plan cannot be divorced from the power situation. There is no need to bring in the sociology of knowledge to realise that any social planning, like any social cognition, is dependent on point of view, and that point of view, in turn, depends upon the position of power of whoever does the planning, or examines proposals. A European plan, even seen as pure technical elaboration, is destined, until such time as it originates from a European governmental power (that is, from technicians in the service of such a power), to be inadequate.

It must also be underlined that this European governmental power must not extend beyond the limits of federal competency. In a concerted economy, it is essential that not only private operators, but also political centres operating at levels lower than that of the general one, have autonomous decision making capacity. In Europe this means, in practice,

limited but nevertheless real autonomy for public centres both national and regional. In constitutional terms, this implies the balanced division of power not only on a functional level (legislative, executive, judicial), but also on a territorial one, in other words the federalist scheme for the distribution of power.

As far as the development of the idea of planning is concerned, there is still a long way to go. In the final analysis, such planning embraces not only the economy, but also the idea of modern government, of a government whose every activity (including those which are not directly economic) is organised democratically and rationally. This is not only because such activities involve costs, but also and above all because with a haphazard use of the territory, they open up the risk of so-called "ecological catastrophe", as well as that of the mishandling or destruction of natural resources and of urban organisation (in the true sense of the term, imbued with all its historical, artistic and community value), ultimately endangering the elements which constitute the very environment for the physical and civil existence of mankind.⁹

But, despite the fact that the road is still long, European planning, seen as work in progress, demands, from the very outset, a series of powers which are, at once, both strong and limited — a power situation which is incompatible with the unitary, national form of state — and which can reach a certain level of decentralisation, even though they can never arrive at the federalist stage of a plurality of independent and coordinated centres of power.¹⁰

4. The third question that arises, still in my view, is this: what kind of policy is needed for the formation of a European governmental power? Despite the failure of this simple question to emerge with clarity and find an answer in political debate, there can be no denying, in principle, that if we can talk of a process of formation of such a European power, we are, in effect, talking of a process which depends not only on the concurrence of wills flowing each of its own accord, wittingly or otherwise, towards this end — all historical transformations involve an unwitting concurrence as a subjective manifestation of the objective forces generated by the evolution of the mode of production — but also, and specifically, on human actions organised precisely with the objective in mind (in other words, on that which might be called a political line).

In this area of human activity, illusions are wont to form (or, in practice, wrong roads are wont to be taken) which can stimulate a process in its initial phases but which cannot, without constant and adequate

adjustment, bring achievement of its ultimate aim. And the bearing that these illusions (or, technically speaking, this ideological self-mystification) have on political awareness is such that it serves no purpose, theoretical or practical, to examine a political line without investigating also the specific ideological context in which it evolved. This is clearly true in the case of European integration, too. It is not, in effect, possible to deal seriously with the matter of the "political line of the formation of a European governmental power" without first discussing a few preliminary problems, and the first that should be examined is, without doubt, that of the myths which prevent it from being recognised in its real terms.

In the context of European unification, there has evolved the myth (in different ways according to the power positions of the forces and people involved) of its spontaneous, and purely evolutionary formation (without any break; without any sudden qualitative stepping-up of the drive for it). This myth, a true example of ideological self-mystification, serves to prevent those who favour a European unity based on a position of national power from recognising the individual and collective implications of the need to destroy national power — as the general power — in order to build the European power. In all cases of this kind, the idea of this need, or of similar needs, even if it is well known, finds itself stuck in a limbo of consciousness (which emerges as split) and of action (which, with regard to the ultimate aim, emerges as ineffective).

As far as its empirical, potentially descriptive, non imaginary content is concerned, the myth of the spontaneous formation of Europe confuses two distinct strategic phases: the phase characterised by attempts to bring about situations in which it might be possible to create a European government, or to move in this direction, and the one characterised by the act, necessarily constitutional and constituent in nature, of its creation. In short, it confuses the policy of approach with that of realisation.

In the recent past, the idea of the spontaneous passage from economic to political integration has represented the most widespread version of this myth. In schematic terms, the pseudo-rational content of the myth was this: "Let us get started on the process of the formation of the Common Market. Sooner or later we will need a European currency. But a currency implies the need for a government. So, the Common Market will, necessarily, lead to the formation of a European government." The flaw in this lay, as is immediately obvious, in the word "necessarily" which — like in the classic example of he who believes he has a hundred thalers in his pocket, simply because he has, in his mind, the idea of having a hundred thalers in his pocket — mistakes a logical consequence

for a practical one.

Federalists promptly replied that the correct sequence, still looking at the problem in schematic terms, was actually the reverse: "There can be no common market without a common currency, and no common currency without a common government, therefore the right place to start is with the question of a common government." They also pointed out that the free trade compatible with the absolute sovereignty of the states would, in fact, inevitably find its development limited by that very sovereignty, and by the corresponding lack of a European government. And finally that, in any case, the formation of a European government could not be regarded — in a utopian way — as the by-product of other activities, but should be seen as an activity in its own right. Europe's ruling class failed to consider these federalist observations, and hard facts have now exposed as illusory both the idea of an automatic passage from economic to political integration and — at least in the view of the most perceptive of its members — that of the establishment of an economic union in the absence of an adequate political basis (indeed, the Italian minister Emilio Colombo recently expressed views along these lines).

This is recent history. One aspect of the link between economic and political integration (a link, not an evolutionary relationship) emerged in real terms, as is well known, with the proposal of the so-called *federal budget*. In the area of the common agricultural policy and the funding of the same, and in view of the lowering of customs barriers and the establishment of the Common External Tariff, the Commission of the EEC proposed the transfer of common customs revenue from the states to the Community, which is *per se* logical in economic terms. But such a transfer, amounting (in accordance with the theory of the inclined plane) to the transfer of a measure of economic sovereignty from the states to the Community and, in the last instance, of part of their political powers — though still within the sphere of the policy of approach — was, for this reason, rejected. Thus, rather than strengthening the Community (in line with the myth of an automatic passage from economic to political integration), the first real problem that emerged proved capable in fact, in the absence of a policy oriented towards the objective of a European power, only of weakening it.¹¹

Today, while the myth persists, particularly in sections of national left-wing politics, that the European government will be formed as a by-product of the much-desired convergence — based, according to the logic of the cart pulling the horse, on a position independent of that of the United States — of the foreign policies of the states, a second economic

myth threatens to develop, i.e., that of the evolutionary formation of a European government as a by-product of the start of the process that will lead to the development of European planning. Once again, it is, rather, the opposite which is true. The process that will lead to the development of European planning is, indeed, under way but it is still only in a very preliminary phase, one which corresponds to the affirmation of the principle in abstract terms. And affirmation of the principle cannot be mistaken, by those who retain a cool head, for the affirmation of the fact. Thus, it is a phase which is destined rapidly to run its course and to remain, if reduced by the lack of practical success to nothing more than a vain intention, as just another political whim.¹²

5. The idea of European planning could contribute to the formation of the will to found a European government. Were this to favour the definition of a true political line directed towards this end, and were this power indeed to be constituted, then its consolidation could go hand in hand with the progress of European planning. There exists an enlightening historical precedent. The economic policy through which Hamilton consolidated America's federal government in its very early years is an example of this kind of development and one which, in the economic terms of the time, demonstrates the same political logic. But it is important not to forget that Hamilton's achievement depended on the fact that the federal government of the Union had been conceived by the Philadelphia Convention as a constitutional formula; furthermore, its realisation (involving the transfer, according to the Philadelphia plan, of certain powers from the States to the Union) had depended upon its ratification by the people of the States. It is also important, in order to avoid mistaking this dialectical process for a simple evolutionary fact, to remember the bitter opposition of the ruling class of the thirteen States lying along the Atlantic coast, a resistance so strong that it could not have been broken without circumventing the States and having direct recourse (through the system of popular ratification) to the American people.

In the same way, without the creation of its political prerequisite, European planning can never progress from the design phase to the phase of facts, and to that of its concrete development. In this regard, it is also important to look at why the myth of the Common Market as a process of the formation of the European political power has held sway for so long. There are two reasons: first, the myth itself projected the eventual culmination of the process into a distant time, a time far-removed from its origins, and second, the transition period, thanks to the limited nature

of its economic measures, could be completed in the absence of a European government. In terms of the strategy of the struggle for Europe, this is like saying that the Common Market (in reality, a customs union with an embryonic form of economic union in the sector of agriculture) has, while failing to represent the road that will lead directly to the formation of a political power, nevertheless coincided with a policy of approach to this end.

But without a European government, there can be no truly effective development of European planning (excepting the preliminary formation of a general consensus of principle), because planning is so much more than a simple phasing out of customs tariffs in the ambit of a group of states; because it involves so much more than haggling over common agricultural prices. Programming means governing in the most modern sense of the word, and it needs a government that is up to the task. The start of European planning cannot therefore coincide with the start of a new phase of approach to a European government, but only — when the political problem of economic integration has been solved — with the effective start of the activity of a European federal government proper.

6. Having cleared the myth of Europe's spontaneous formation out of the way, there remains a particular problem of political technique which must be tackled before examining, in the light of the inevitable premises, the question of the specific action needed for the formation of a European government. The character of this action must, as mentioned, be political; but the fact is that political action, in so far as it concerns European integration, differs in character from the concept of political action as it is normally understood.

There is one aspect of past phases in the process of European integration that highlights particularly clearly the difference between the normal course of political action and political action with regard to European integration. It is an aspect which is known, but one whose theoretical and practical importance is not recognised, because the normal course of politics is usually perceived as something organic or natural, that is, as something outside whose bounds only political illusions might form, certainly not true political actions; thus, such actions, even when they unfold under the eyes of everyone, are destined to remain in the background, in the shadows.

It is true, however, that the origins of the phases in the process of European integration that have already passed cannot be traced back to decisions taken in the bosom of parties and governments; they do not lie

within the normal (institutional) framework of the process that is the formation of political will, but rather in designs developed by small groups of people which, thanks to exceptional circumstances, men of government have been made to accept, solely on the basis of a general inclination towards European unity among the majorities in power in the various states.

These designs allowed serious difficulties that had emerged in the normal course of politics to be resolved, they had a European dimension, and the quality of seeds about to grow. This is why, having been introduced into the political equilibrium from outside, they developed into situations that needed to be managed through to their maturity. In other words, they became established facts of the European power situation, actual conditions of the normal process through which political will takes shape, which caused this process (in spite of its being fundamentally — a characteristic not yet overcome in the structure of the institutions — a struggle to preserve national powers) to assume, temporarily, a European dimension, too.

These aspects emerge, in a typical fashion, in the most important event that the process of European integration has seen, i.e., the formation of the European Community. Initially, the biggest political difficulty was the tricky question of West Germany's inclusion, in an active role, in the North Atlantic sphere. The problems that needed to be solved were those of the Rhineland industry and of Germany's armed forces. The British and Americans had pressed for German rearmament and for the relaunch of the Rhineland industry, but the French were reluctant. Taking advantage of the ensuing *impasse*, Monnet and his group developed, and brought before Schumann, the model of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), in other words the proposal to bring Germany's coal and steel industry under European control. Schumann, who could not have gone on refusing the British and American demands for long, accepted the proposal as a last hope. Subsequently, the French proposed, as a means of preventing German national rearmament, that the Community model should be extended to the sector of defence (EDC). However, this proposal was thrown out as the result of a surge in French nationalist feeling (Italy, moreover, had not yet ratified the EDC). But the will to relaunch Europe in the economic sphere, a will driven in fact by the failure of the EDC and the consequences of that failure, focused naturally on the Community model which, under Monnet's guidance, had already proved itself in the form of the ECSC.

7. In the light of an examination of these preliminary problems, the

problem of the specific action needed for the formation of a European governmental power comes down, if I am not mistaken, to the following question: does the general political situation (i.e., not only the political situation in terms of the advances towards European integration already achieved, but the broader political situation) present an objective difficulty that can be approached through the conception and introduction into the political equilibrium, from the outside, of a germ that the political class must manage, and whose potential for development is such that it might lead to the constitution of a European federal government?

In my view, the answer is yes, it does. To justify this answer, in the light of what I have already said, I wish first to examine, in relation to the general political situation, a few aspects of European integration in its current state. As far as European integration is concerned, we find ourselves face to face with an institutional anomaly: a European parliament not elected directly by the citizens. This is a serious reality as the parliament is, despite the current change in its function, symbolic of the highest level of popular participation in public life (as well as the channel allowing that participation). At the same time, we are faced with a European economy which is not democratically controlled. This reality, too, is a serious one. It means that a relationship has been established between civil society (largely European) and a political society which fails even to fulfil the requisites of classic liberalism, and this in an era in which events and values require actual planning, albeit "indicative" planning, and no longer the simple subordination of economic activity to a few basic civil principles.

As a rule, no connection is made in contemporary political analyses between these aspects of European integration and political evolution. But it is a connection which does exist, and when due consideration is given to it, it is easy to start to see a relationship of cause and effect emerging between these European bottlenecks and the growing tensions between the states of the North Atlantic sphere, the dwindling respect for America's leadership, and the crisis of authority among democratic national powers. In the context of this inquiry, it is the same as saying that we are once again faced, as we were at the time of the ECSC proposal, with obstacles of an extra-national, European nature which are conditioning the normal course of political action even though, by themselves, they do not suffice to prompt, at party and government level, adequate examinations or effective responses.

The fundamental aspect of the situation (the power relationship between Western Europe and the United States, which has now decided

to cut back its military presence in Europe) has been altered by the partial success of economic integration. At the same time, the deadlock that has been reached, as regards both the strengthening and the enlargement of the Common Market, has had the effect of fuelling, once again, the differences between the European states, of creating problems in economic and political relations within the North Atlantic sphere (monetary difficulties, NATO problems etc.) and of preventing those aspects of the economy that have already taken on a European dimension from being effectively managed. It will also prevent the filling of the power vacuum that will be created in Europe by the withdrawal of American military forces. Thus, the European states which, as a result of the process of integration, find their control over the economy taken away from them, and which risk losing upon the partial closure of the American umbrella the most important factor contributing to the maintenance of their security, are declining, like any state which loses its essential functions. On the other hand, however, there is still no European power to act as a counterpoise to the Americans. The European Community, given the degree to which its organisation has evolved — and at which it has come to a halt — is not yet equipped to manage the problems of economic politics and security which, as a result of the imbalance caused by the lack of a congruous European pole, can no longer be dealt with in the context of the North Atlantic sphere.

The deadlock in the direction of enlargement of the European Community appears, in the wake of the downfall of De Gaulle and the recent conference in The Hague, to have been overcome. But this is not enough. The crisis that I have pointed to here is a crisis generated by the weakness of Europe's political centre and it is one that can only be overcome through the strengthening of the same. Enlargement of the Community, achieved in the absence of any strengthening of its organisation, would not result in the establishment of a partner to the United States, and would certainly amount to no guarantee that Europe would be given the resources (in the areas of technology, currency and defence) available to Great Britain, and the other countries which have applied to join the Community.

8. In relation to the specific mechanism by which the Common Market has evolved, it is worth recalling, at this point in the discussion, that the above situation, which has now unfolded in all its gravity, was foreseen by the Treaty of Rome which, through Article 138 (EEC), sought to introduce measures (concerning the direct election of the

European Parliament) designed to counteract it. And there is no faulting its design. As it advanced, the process of economic integration was destined to generate, as indeed it has done, problems that could not be solved without a European political centre endowed with greater strength than the initial one. And direct election of the European Parliament would, indeed, have equipped Europe's political centre with the power needed to ensure its continued progress.

This aspect of the Treaty is generally poorly understood due to the tendency to view the Community organisation, and in particular, its parliamentary organ — both of which were originally conceived as evolutionary realities, as institutions of transition — in static and abstract, rather than in dynamic and concrete terms. To understand them in the latter terms, we must look beyond the European Parliament as it is today, and seek to evaluate, in the light of Article 138, what the political consequences of a European election would be.

From the electoral perspective, the Treaty makes provision, in my view, for two important elements: the alignment of the parties at European level, (which would effectively base the European Parliament on the same political interests and public consensus as the states), and the incorporation of the economic interests and needs created by the process of integration into the motivations underlying the behaviour of the parties which, in view of European elections, would have to win the consensus of the citizens also on the basis of European interests and needs.

Upon consideration of these elements, it is possible to affirm that, in concrete terms, that is, in reference to the process of the formation of political will, the reasons for the Common Market's stagnation can be found in the failure to put Article 138 into practice. As a result of this failure, and the persistent confinement of elections to the national sphere, national economic data (as well as national political interests and national consensus), and not European ones, are incorporated into the motivations underlying the conduct of the political class. The result is a power vacuum at European level. In a confused way, the parties perceive this problem but, being unable to fight for a European political power that does not yet exist, they remain imprisoned by the national restriction, not only practically but theoretically, too (i.e., in terms of their development of political diagnoses and formulation of plans of action).

On the other hand, it is possible to affirm, again on the basis of consideration of these elements, that European suffrage is, in the framework of an evolving European society, a factor that could lead to, or represent the germ of, the formation of a European governmental power.

In this regard, and in order to evaluate this view, it is necessary to consider not the Community organisation in its current state, so much as the alignment of the parties at European level, the expression of popular consensus at this level, the extent to which European political and economic interests and European ideals are incorporated with the motivations underlying the behaviour of the political class, and finally, the effects of these factors on all that Europe possesses in the way of organised institutions.

It seems certain to me, from what we know of the nature of politics, that phenomena of this kind, when fully developed, cannot fail to assume a state-like character. I am also convinced that were it possible to introduce the factor of European suffrage, the parties would, in the absence of radical changes in the political equilibrium, be required to manage it through to its full maturity. This then is, as I believe I have demonstrated, the germ that must be introduced, the germ destined to lead to the formation of a European government. The question now is whether or not such an introduction is possible. Within certain limits, what we are required to examine is an action that is already in progress.

No effective initiative that might allow the full application of Article 138 (in any case a difficult undertaking) has ever been developed either at party or government level. The reason for this is probably the fact that the decision-making centre endowed with the relevant competency, the Community's Council of Ministers, is not, and cannot be, the organ through which this kind of political will is autonomously formed. Yet, and it is precisely for this reason, support has been growing throughout Europe, and in Italy particularly, for the staging of unilateral European elections. The idea rests, substantially, on the direct election of each country's MEPs with eligibility to stand for election restricted, in accordance with the provisions of Article 138 concerning the appointment of delegates on a national basis, to the members of the national parliaments.

The hope that is the driving force behind these efforts is based on the hypothesis that the very first acknowledgement of the citizens' European electoral rights would place any governments reluctant to recognise such rights *vis-à-vis* their own citizens in such an awkward position that ultimately similar decisions would be taken in other countries, a process that would culminate, finally, in the general direct election of the European Parliament.¹³

In Italy, the movement towards the direct election of the country's MEPs is already far advanced. On June 11th, 1969, a delegation from the

Italian Council of the European Movement, led by its president Giuseppe Petrilli, presented the President of the Senate, Amintore Fanfani, with a popular initiative for the direct election of the Italian members of the European Parliament. The reactions on the part of the government, and other parliamentary groups, were very favourable. Examination of the bill has already begun and there is thus the possibility that it will be passed.¹⁴ We will learn, in the near future, whether this possibility will become a reality, and whether or not such a development will have the consequences I have suggested, as it is only through facts that conjectures can be scientifically proven. But when it comes to political conjectures, which we must make in spite of the imperfect nature of the conceptual instruments at our disposal, we must also accept that fortune has a part to play too.

NOTES

¹ "psychological" is used as an umbrella term here. The aspects generally embraced by the term obviously include those referred to by sociologists under the heading "culture".

² The use of the term "concerted", like others, "indicative" — or "operational" and so on — in relation to planning is uncertain. The meaning that I attribute to these terms, however, emerges clearly from the text.

³ The reference here is to historical materialism, which in my view can be used as a canon of historical interpretation, as affirmed, for example, by Benedetto Croce, irrespective of its dogmatic interpretation by communist parties.

⁴ On the theory of indicative planning, see the recent contribution by J. Black, "The Theory of Indicative Planning", in *Oxford Economic Papers*, 1968, p. 272.

⁵ Alberto Moravia provided an effective illustration of psychological processes of this kind in the short story "Le parole sono pecore" (cfr. Alberto Moravia, *Una cosa è una cosa*, Milan 1967, pp. 231-36).

⁶ This applies not only when it is a question of direct management of, or participation in, formal government activities, but also in reference to economic situations, of any nature, which are strictly bound up with the power situation.

⁷ The current view opposes this however. Francesco Forte, for example, maintains that: "...a mechanism of European economic planning, with its own fiscal and para-fiscal financial resources and a system of European monetary institutions that are the product of institutionalised coordination on the part of the central banks (which still retain their autonomy), could allow the EEC to remain, stably, in this intermediate situation [between the nation-state and the federal state]" (cfr. Francesco Forte, *Manuale di politica economica*, Turin, 1970, p. 961). But I fail to see the theoretical basis underlying this affirmation. Cfr., for the sources of my interpretation, Lionel Robbins, *Economic Planning and International Order*, P. Ransome (ed.) *Studies in Federal Planning*, London, 1943 (containing essays by Lord Lothian, Kenneth C. Wheare, Lionel Robbins, Barbara Wootton etc.) and the renowned works of Luigi Einaudi.

⁸ Cfr., in particular, Immanuel Kant, *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*.

⁹ Very interesting, although debatable, angles on this can be found in: Tomás Maldonado, *La speranza progettuale*, Turin, 1970. For more on the regional organisation of planning in relation to the resources of the territory, and on current urban developments, cfr. Jean Gottmann, *Essais sur l'aménagement de l'espace habité*, Paris, 1966. On the crisis of city planning, from a viewpoint of urban microsociology, cfr. Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, New York, 1961.

¹⁰ For this definition of federal state, cfr. Kenneth Wheare, *Federal Government*, New York, 1946.

¹¹ This link, which is dialectical in the material sense, being the fruit of the point which the process of integration has reached, emerges once again with the downfall of De Gaulle. In the wake of the recent conference in The Hague, decisions have been taken in relation to the "federal budget". These decisions have regenerated the same unfounded hopes as before. That these hopes are unfounded — if we leave aside the fact that it is only through the emergence of a contradiction, and the overcoming of the same, that a dialectical link can trigger a process — is demonstrated by continuing difficulty in resolving the problems of economic policy and by the return, in the very bosom of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, to the practice of national haggling.

¹² Cfr., on the subject of myths surrounding the formation of Europe, Altiero Spinelli, *L'Europa non cade dal cielo*, Bologna, 1960.

¹³ Cfr., on the European Parliament's contribution (provided for by Article 138) to the question of European elections, and on projects for unilateral elections: Parlement Européen, (Direction général pour la documentation et pour l'information), *Pour l'élection du Parlement Européen au suffrage universel direct*, Septembre 1969.

¹⁴ For information on this popular initiative, its technical problems and political repercussions, cfr. special issue of *Il Federalista* entitled *Una elezione per l'Europa* (1969, supplement to no. 2).

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