# THE FEDERALIST

a political review

*To look for a continuation of harmony
between a number of independent uncon-
nected sovereignties situated in the same
neighbourhood, would be to disregard the
uniform course of human events and to
set at defiance the accumulated experience
of ages.*

Hamilton, The Federalist

THE FEDERALIST

a political review

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by Mario Albertini together with a group of members of the Movimento Federalista Europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.

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Mario Albertini

Five years on from the death of Mario Albertini, the Universities of Milan and Pavia, together with the European Federalist Movement, devoted a special meeting to Albertini the scholar and militant. "Mario Albertini in the History of Federalist Thought" took place in Milan on April 8th, 2002.

Albertini's contribution to the theory of federalism and the struggle for European unity constitutes a rich and unique heritage, essential for anyone wishing to understand the history of our times and to add their "grain of sand" to the cause that is European federation and, ultimately, world federation.

Through Albertini, the theory of federalism shifted from a purely institutional approach (federalism as the theory of the federal state) to the global approach that has given it the stature and dignity of a political doctrine on a par with liberalism, democracy and socialism.

Drawing on Kant, Albertini saw federalism as a canon for interpreting history — history understood not as the sum of national histories but as the history of mankind on its journey towards perpetual peace. Taking as his starting point Hamilton's thought and battle to create the American federation, Albertini developed and probed the institutional aspects of federalism, and the problems of political and strategic action that arise wherever an attempt is made to create, through the unification of historically established states, a federal state.

Convinced of the revolutionary significance of federalism as a response to the problems with which mankind is faced in the present supranational phase of history, Albertini revisited the course of history concept, that western culture had assimilated in a mechanical fashion from marxism, through an innovative reworking of the thought of Marx and Kant. Similarly, he reconsidered, and extended, the ideas of the theorists of the *raison d'etat*, analysing the power aspects of politics.

At the Milan meeting, features of his thought and his fight for Europe were examined by John Pinder, Salvatore Veca, Francesco Rossolillo, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Lucio Levi and Sergio Pistone. By publishing their contributions in this issue, *The Federalist* wishes to help keep alive the intellectual and moral legacy of its founder.

The Federalist

Mario Albertini
in the History of Federalist Thought

JOHN PINDER

It is a great honour to be invited to give this address in honour of Mario Albertini, a man who did so much for us federalists, for Europe and for mankind. This honour is particularly significant for me because he, like Altiero Spinelli, made the thought of the British federalist school of the 1930s and early 1940s, together with that of the American founding fathers, the basis of his own federalist thought. Albertini explained that while the thinking founded on the British source gave an answer to the question "why create the European federation?" that founded on the American source answered the question of "how to create it?"[1]; and it seems to me that as regards the question "what form of federation?" the source for Albertini, as for the British, was the Constitution of the United States of America.

The question that I wish to address today is "how did Albertini's thinking develop these two federalist traditions?" The general response is that Albertini was the major exponent of hamiltonian thought in the second half of the twentieth century as well as creator of the Italian federalist school. He was, however, not just an exponent but also an innovator, often in a way that illuminated the thinking of other schools, sometimes in an interestingly divergent manner.

What Form of Federation.

For Albertini, as for Spinelli and for the British school, the central question was the transformation of absolutely sovereign states into federated states within a federal state. For them, the federalism of Althusius or of Proudhon, seen by Albertini as "a technique... for the decentralisation of political power,"[2] was not of much importance. Albertini indicated that Proudhon "remained, in his conception of the state, an anarchist," though he also called him a remarkable prophet,

"who foresaw what the tragic limits of national democracy would be, should it not find its correctives in local democracy and European democracy." Albertini also affirmed that federalism requires "the creation of spheres of democratic government located at every level of concretely manifested human relations."[3] But he concentrated his thought on the creation of a federation of sovereign states, essential to guarantee peace among them.

While the writers of the British school had given a classical exposition of the form of such a federation, Albertini provided the best exposition of the second half of the twentieth century.[4] Both, however, while following the principal elements of the American constitution, preferred the European system of a parliamentary executive to the American presidential system. Albertini underlined the merit of a "government responsible to the European Parliament... as the source of democratic control of the activity of the Union."[5]

Albertini also enriched federalist thought with his analysis of the relationship between nation and state.[6] For Albertini, the nation-state, with its arrogance, damages the life of the citizens, constraining economic production and producing war.[7] Its defects are also manifested in the "contradiction between the achievement of democracy in the national framework and its negation in the international framework," which also makes both liberalism and socialism impotent at the national level.[8] The nation-state should be replaced by a plurinational federal state; the European federation would be "a people of nations, a federal people" instead of "a national people;" and federalism foresees a structure of democratic plurinational states right up to the world level.[9] The thinking of the British school on this subject was similar, but Albertini's analysis was more refined.

In the thirties, the British school advocated federalism as a general remedy against war. World federation was the logical solution, but realisable only in the long term. Many supported Clarence Streit's proposal for a federation of fifteen democracies, including the United States, to prevent a war provoked by the Axis. But isolationist America was not available for this and in 1939 the leaders of the British school decided to base their thinking on the idea of a federation of European democracies, pending the accession of the fascist states after they returned to democracy.

This was naturally the starting point for Albertini who, after the refusal of the United Kingdom to participate in the European Community, foresaw, to begin with, "a European federation which will include at least the six countries that have assumed the leadership of the process of unification," and then its "gradual expansion to the whole of Europe."[10] When the UK entered the Community, he added that it is necessary "to wait until membership of the Community bears fruit."[11] We are still waiting for all this fruit to be harvested, and hoping for the best.

Kenneth Wheare cited "similarity of political institutions" among the member states as a condition for the establishment of a federation.[12] Albertini was more precise, affirming the necessity, in both the federation and its states, of "the attribution of sovereignty to the people in the framework of the representative system of government, with the possibility of dual representation through the dual citizenship of each voter."[13] This condition has become particularly relevant as regards the new democracies that are candidates of accession to the Union, and remains a crucial problem for world federation.

Why Federation.

In 1937 Lionel Robbins's *Economic Planning and International Order* was published, analysing why an international federation was essential for the good government of an international economy. In 1939, in *The Economic Causes of War*, he explained why the cause of war was not capitalism, but national sovereignty, and concluded with a passionate appeal for a European federation.[14] Albertini noted that these books were the most important federalist sources for Spinelli when confined in Ventotene.[15]

For postwar British federalists, as for Robbins in 1939, peace was the aim of federalism. For Albertini too, the aim was peace: federalism's "particular value" and "supreme goal."[16] But the complexity of Albertini's thinking was sometimes concealed by the simplicity of his formulations. He had followed Lord Lothian in defining peace, not as "the mere fact that war is not being waged," but as "the organisation of power that transforms power relationships between states into relationships based truly and properly on law."[17] By 1981, Albertini recognised that "with the struggle for European unification the first forms of political Europe have been achieved together with the end of military rivalry between the old nation-states of Western Europe."[18] That is to say, for relations among these states that objective had been attained, while for some states of Eastern Europe, and above all for the world as a whole, it would remain the supreme objective.

For the citizens of the Union of today, other objectives have become

more salient. Albertini cited from the manifesto of Ventotene the affirmation that the issue as to who controls the "planning" of the economy is the "central question:"[19] the same question as Robbins had posed in 1937. Albertini also identified other values essential for contemporary federalism: ecological security;[20] the rejection of hegemony (c.f. the preoccupations of Carlo Cattaneo and of the American founding fathers);[21] and democracy in the nation-states, which is being increasingly constricted by their interdependence.[22] These elements, it seems to me, are necessary in order to explain federalist values to citizens of the Union today, whereas those in some states of Central and Eastern Europe will still see peace as the outstanding objective.

World Federation.

In his book *The Price of Peace*, published in 1945, Beveridge explained that national sovereignty is the cause of war, and its renunciation in a world federation the way to abolish it.[23] Although he recognised that this was a distant aim and that meanwhile only a confederation could be realised at the global level, this book was my introduction to federalism as the response to the terrible experience of the war. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, world federation seemed an urgent necessity to millions of people, among whom about half a million bought Emery Reves's *The Anatomy of Peace*.[24]

World federalist movements flourished, above all in the anglo-saxon countries and Japan; political leaders like former prime minister Clement Attlee became supporters; and a world federalist literature was developing. But the climate of the Cold War discouraged most supporters and this field was almost abandoned by federalist thought.

Albertini was an exception. He was more consistent, more tenacious, more resolute than others, in confronting the facts of power and their consequences. For him, "the risk of destruction of mankind" by the atomic bomb was "absolutely unacceptable."[25] But he recognised, like Beveridge, that the conditions for creating the world federation were not present. The struggle for a constituent assembly, fundamental for his doctrine with respect to European federation, was not yet practicable. So his strategy for world federation was similar to that of the anglo-saxons: "the strengthening of UN," together with other "intermediate goals" in the "process of transcending the exclusive nation-states," which had "already reached a very advanced stage" in the European Community.[26] Typical of his federalist thought was the emphasis on federalist militants:

on the need "to build up... a world political vanguard" to work for the creation of world federation.[27]

How to Create the Federation.

Albertini and the British federalists were generally in agreement about the what and the why of federation. But their ideas differed on how to create it.

The British sought to influence their government to adopt a federalist policy: in the thirties and forties to initiate the establishment of a federation, and later to support the building of prefederal elements into the institutions and powers of the Community. Albertini's fundamental principles were, instead, the constituent assembly and the separation of the federalists from the struggle for national political power.

Spinelli wrote that in the period from 1945 to 1954, he had "worked on the hypothesis that the leading moderate European ministers... would set about constructing the federation:"[28] a method quite similar to that of the British federalists. Then, after the failure in 1954 of the project for a European Political Community, he founded the Congress of the European People and launched the campaign to initiate a constituent assembly, creating "a growing popular protest... directed against the very legitimacy of the nation-states."[29] When it became evident to Spinelli that the campaign was not having the success he desired, he conceived the proposal that the federalists should gain power in an increasing number of important towns, as the basis for a subsequent campaign. Albertini was unable to accept this idea, which contradicted his fundamental federalist principles; and the Movimento federalista europeo agreed with him. Spinelli, vexed, wrote in his diary that for Albertini, "to try to prepare the event (of the final struggle) was squalid opportunism, it was necessary to prepare oneself for the event."[30] Spinelli was a brilliant politician with the capacity to conceive and conduct campaigns of action, culminating in the remarkable success of his final campaign to create the European Parliament's Draft Treaty to establish the European Union. He was not constrained by fixed roles; and his tendency to initiate "new courses", or strategies, caused too many difficulties for a movement such as the MFE. Albertini was absolutely convinced of the necessity to respect certain fundamental principles, which he did with exceptional consistency and tenacity. These characteristics were crucial for his place in the history of federalist thought, enabling him not only to develop his own intellectual *oeuvre*, but also to found the Italian school of hamiltonian federalism.

One cause of the difference between Albertini and the British was his form of historical thinking, where he followed Weber's method according to which, in his words, "there is no historical knowledge without specific theoretical frames of reference within which to arrange the facts and arrive at their significance ('ideal types')," though "the elaboration of theory should be pursued only up to and not beyond the point at which it renders historical knowledge possible, because beyond that point it becomes the presumption of substituting theoretical knowledge... for historical knowledge."[31] The British empirical tradition does not lack the capacity to develop theories, as witness liberalism and Darwinian evolution. But the development of theory may come earlier in the weberian tradition and its adaptation to the facts later; and perhaps this difference between their ways of thinking was a cause of the differences between the approaches of Albertini and the British.

The Development of the European Community and of Albertini's Thought.

Although the British developed their democracy through a reformist process, without a constituent assembly, the idea of such an assembly was acceptable to many. In 1948, R.W.G. Mackay, a leading federalist member of parliament, obtained the support of a third of all MPs for a resolution proposing a European constituent assembly.[32] But while for British federalists a reformist process of preparation would also be seen as useful and the European Coal and Steel Community a valid point of departure, in 1961 the point of departure for Albertini remained only "giving constituent power to the European people... all or nothing;" it was necessary to "refuse any power... until all of it can be obtained;" the solution of the Community "inspired by so-called functionalism (the bright idea of making Europe by bits and pieces) was bad" and *Economic Communities* were "empty words."[33] But as a good weberian he was ready to adapt the theory to the facts, and by 1966 he wrote that the ECSC had established "a *de facto* unity... solid enough to be able to support the beginning of a true and proper economic integration," which "was a fundamental fact for the life of Europe;"[34] and a year later he wrote that "European integration represents the process of overcoming the contradictions between the scale of the problems and the size of the nation-states." Thus "the facts of European integration" threaten exclusive national powers, "creating at the same time, through a *de facto* unity, a *de facto* European power," which the federalists can exploit politically.[35] In the same essay he identified the transfer of control of the army, the currency

and part of the revenue of the national governments to a European government as crucial elements in the transfer of sovereiguty;[36] and in 1971, considering the prospect of direct elections to the European Parliament, he wrote that such a situation could be regarded as "preconstitutional because where there is direct intervention of the parties and citizens, there is also the tendency towards the formation of a constitutional order."[37] It is interesting, even moving, to observe how, while the British, in their different situation, neglected the idea of the constituent, Albertini was modifying his theory in the light of the facts, that is of the success of the European Community. This led him to make a very important contribution to federalist thought: a synthesis of Spinelli's approach with that of Monnet.

Towards a Synthesis Between Spinellism and Monnetism.

His ideas on money itself provide another example of this development of his thought. In 1968, he had written that "there is no common market without a common currency, nor common currency without common government, so the point of departure is the common government."[38] But four years later he concluded that monetary union could "push the political forces onto an inclined plane" because, engaging on a project that implies a political power, it can happen that they end up "finding themselves, like it or not, obliged to create one." In the monetary field, steps forward would be possible "of an institutional character, tangible and European, for example in the direction indicated by Triffin," i.e. a currency reserve system, which would have been "mistaken" by the political class "for a stage on the way to the creation of a European currency;" and one could therefore foresee "a slippery passage towards a situation that could be called a 'creeping constituent'."[39]

Albertini was "preparing the event," even if not in a way approved by Spinelli, whose project at that time was different and who wrote in his diary that Albertini had reduced the MFE to "foolish followers of Werner," whose report had proposed stages towards economic and monetary union.[40] But the reconciliation between Albertini and Spinelli was no longer far off, thanks to the approach of the direct elections and Spinelli's great project of the Draft Treaty for European Union.

Already in 1973 Albertini, in his analysis of monetary union, identified the direct elections as a decisive point "because it concerns the very source of the formation of a democratic public will."[41] So the elections to the European Parliament would be one of the keys, together with the

currency and the army, to the transfer of sovereignty. In 1976, the European Council decided on the elections and Spinelli embarked on his fifth and final "new course."[42] Albertini observed that "the political phase — by definition constituent — of the process of European integration has begun." Thus he had concluded that the Community would be the basis of the European federation, by means of "single constituent acts that reinforce the constitutional degree of the process, making further constituent acts possible and so on," and that "only with an initial form of European state (to be establised by an *ad hoc* constituent act) can one launch the process of the formation of the European state, so to speak definitively:" i.e. it is necessary to accept "the paradox of creating a state in order to create the state." He made the Community's role in this process explicit, in the "gradual construction, by steps according to the degree of union achieved, of a European political and administrative organisation:" a process that "one can in theory consider complete only when the initial European state (with sovereignty over money, but not in the field of defence), has been transformed into the definitive European state, with all the powers required to act as a normal federal government."[43]

Thus Albertini's weberian journey had led him to a fruitful synthesis between spinellism and monnetism. This was, in his words, "the idea of exploiting the possibilities of functionalism to achieve constitutionalism," because "European unification is a process of integration... which is closely linked to a process of constructing institutions which, from time to time, become necessary..."[44] So he was ready to explain in theoretical terms Spinelli's crowning achievement: the European Parliament's Draft Treaty on European Union.

From the Draft Treaty to the Laeken Convention.

Albertini observed that the Draft Treaty was realistic, because it proposed "only the institutional minimum to found the European decisions on the consent of the citizens." "The greatest merit of the Draft" lay in the fact that "it entrusted the European Parliament with a) the legislative power," together (as in the present codecision procedure) with the Council of Ministers, which, "in this respect, would have a role similar to a federal Senate," and b) "the power deriving from the parliamentary control over the Commission, which would begin to take on the form of a European government." The Draft was "reasonable," because "only when the Union has demonstrated its capacity to function properly will it be possible to have the large majority to give the Union sovereignty in

the field of foreign policy and defence as well."[45] Thus the Draft was, in his earlier words, a proposal for "creating a state in order to create the state."

Spinelli's political genius, manifested in the Draft Treaty, was the cause not only of the reconciliation between him and Albertini, but also of the completion of the development of a most important element in Albertini's political thought: the relationship between the political action and philosophy of Monnet and those of Spinelli. It is tragic that Spinelli died believing that the Draft Treaty had failed because the Single Act was a "dead mouse." Albertini, however, survived until really significant consequences had become evident. In his document published in *L'Unità europea* in December 1990, he was able to affirm that, "barring catastrophes," the power over monetary policy would be transferred to the European level, and that it was therefore necessary to adapt the decision-taking mechanism accordingly, "making the Community function like a federation in the sphere where there is already, in prospect, a European power (the economic and monetary field including its international implications) and like a confederation in the sphere within which there is no such power nor will be for an indefinite period (defence)." Then he referred to the Parliament's "Treaty-constitution" and to a "natural evolution of the institutions (the European Council as collegial president of the community or Union, the Council of Ministers as house of the states, the Commission as government responsible to the European Parliament, the European Parliament as the source of democratic control of the activity of the Union and as holder, together with the Council, of the legislative power)."[46]

One can record a significant progress of this "natural evolution" during the nineties. The procedure of qualified majority has become applicable to over 80 per cent of the Council's legislative acts; the Parliament now codecides with the Council over half of the laws and of the budget; the Commission's responsibility to the Parliament has been resoundingly demonstrated. The Community does not yet function "like a federation in the sphere where there is already a European power," that is mainly in the economic and monetary fields; but the Laeken Convention opens the door to completion of the process of creating it.

The question is no longer whether there can be a document called a constitution, which now appears to be acceptable to the British government as well as others. The crucial question is whether the institutions will be properly federal, completing their evolution foreseen by Albertini, including codecision and majority voting for all legislative decisions,

together with the Commission, like a government within the field of Community competence, being fully responsible to the Parliament.

This federalist struggle has not become less arduous, because the supporters of the intergovernmentalist doctrine include, it seems, not only the British, Danish and Swedish, but also the French and even the Italian governments. It is necessary to persuade the citizens and the political classes, and finally the governments, that an intergovernmental constitution would be both ineffective and undemocratic. Thanks to the life's work of Spinelli and Albertini, together with the contributions of so many others, the MFE is surely ready to confront this challenge, as regards the Italian citizens, political class and, crucially, government.

Albertini and His Place in the History of Federalist Thought.

I hope I have given some indication of the rich, broad, deep and erudite contribution of Mario Albertini to the federalist thought of his age.

Perhaps it has been the subjective choice of a British federalist, to have underlined the particular importance of Albertini's synthesis of the approaches of the two great federalists of the second half of the twentieth century: Jean Monnet and Altiero Spinelli.

In addition to his personal body of work, Albertini contributed to federalist thinking as the founder of the modern Italian school. At the same time, after Spinelli had founded, inspired and guided the MFE with his unique charisma, Albertini constructed and sustained the Movement which was capable of organising the great demonstration of some half a million people in Milan in June 1984 demanding the European Council's support for Spinelli's Draft Treaty and, five years later, of obtaining the assent of 88 per cent of Italian voters in the referendum on a constituent mandate for the European Parliament. How and why was one man able to ensure the achievement of all these different things? Perhaps the impression of a "non-participant observer" could be of interest.

Albertini emphasised in his writings both reason and will.[47] He practised and inspired them both, with the stress on reason for his intellectual work and on will as President of the Movement; and he placed both at the service of his profound faith in federalism as the essential priority for the welfare and the survival of mankind. He expressed this attitude in a way too little known outside the MFE, underlining that people are needed "who make the contradiction between facts and values a personal question," in a context in which "the disparity between what is and what should be is enormous."[48]

Albertini dedicated his own life to the task of resolving this contradiction and had the capacity to persuade others to do the same. He was an inspiring orator and, although his writings were sometimes complicated, was also able to formulate in simple terms inspiring visions, for example that "federation... has created very wise institutions, capable of transmitting to many generations a powerful experience of diversity in unity, of liberty, of peace;" that "only politics, and only in its highest form, can resolve the problems of international relations;" and that the world political vanguard is needed "for the great world task of the construction of peace."[49]

Fundamental to his ability to inspire others was his faith in the value of each one of them, with the belief that each had both the capacity and the responsibility to make his or her own contribution.[50] His ideas on the various contributions of different people and organisations were part of his own contribution to federalist thought. There was room for those who accepted federalism passively and for "occasional," ad hoc leaders. But his passion was for the hard core of militants, for whom the contradiction between facts and values was the primordial motive of their work. He had a special message for intellectuals: that it is necessary for them to go "out into the open... to complement politics as the art of the possible — politics in a narrow sense — with politics in a broad sense, that is the art of making possible that which is not yet possible."[51] For them — for you — the emphasis was on will as well as on reason.

In May 1956 Spinelli wrote in his diary: "I have mentioned to Albertini the idea of constituting a 'European federalist order.' Is it a good idea?"[52] Spinelli was a great innovator with remarkable power of intuition. Albertini had the qualities to do that: sincerity, integrity, courage, consistency, devotion. It seems to me that he did indeed create a kind of federalist order.

His work was a continuous process of construction; and now you, his colleagues and friends, have the responsibility of carrying on this great work without him, not just as a monument of erudition and exceptional commitment, but as a living tradition that you must continue to develop.

As for me, although I do not agree with all his ideas, I have such sympathy for his work and conviction of its importance that I am engaged, with the help of the Istituto Altiero Spinelli, on an anthology in English of his writings, in order that these ideas should be better known to a readership that reads, not Italian, but the language that Albertini designated, in the first issue of *Il Federalista* also published in English, as the universal language that is required in the field of politics.[53] I hope

that this anthology will not only be useful for federalists who read English but not Italian, but also for a just recognition of the contribution of Albertini in the history of federalist thought.[54]

It gives me great pleasure, in conclusion, to express my admiration and gratitude for the life of Mario Albertini, and for his exemplary devotion to our supreme cause of federalism. In Shakespeare's incomparable words, "he was a man, take him for all in all, (we) shall not look upon his like again."

NOTES

[1] For example Mario Albertini, "L'unificazione europea e il potere costituente" (1986), in *Nazionalismo e Federalismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999, pp. 302, 304. (Many of Albertini's writings have been reprinted, and the original sources given, in two anthologies: *Nazionalismo e Federalismo* and *Una rivoluzione pacifica. Dalle nazioni all'Europa*, to which the first citation of each essay below refers. In each reference, the date of the original essay is given in brackets after its title, in order to help readers to appreciate the context and to trace the chronological development of his thought).

[2] M. Albertini, "Il Risorgimento e l'unità europea" (1961), in *Lo Stato nazionale*, Bologna, Il Mulino,1997, p. 184.

[3] M. Albertini, "La federazione" (1963) and "Le radici storiche e culturali del federalismo europeo" (1973), in *Nazionalismo e Federalismo, cit.*, pp. 99, 128, 114.

[4] "La Federazione", *ibid.*

[5] M. Albertini, "Moneta europea e Unione politica" (1990), in *Una rivoluzione pacifica. Dalle nazioni all'Europa*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999, p. 323.

[6] M. Albertini, *Lo Stato nazionale*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997, containing a reprint of the previous editions of 1960 and 1980.

[7] M. Albertini,"The Nation, Ideological Fetish of Our Time" (1960), in *The Federalist*, XXXII, 1990, p. 83.

[8] M. Albertini, "Le radici storiche" (1973), *cit.*, pp. 126-7; "L'integrazione europea, elementi per un inquadramento storico" (1965), in *Nazionalismo e Federalismo, cit.*, p. 235; Qu*est-ce que le fédéralisme? Receuil de textes choisis et annotés*, Paris, Société Européenne d'Etudes et d'Informations, 1963, p. 32.

[9] M. Albertini, "For a Regulated Use for National and Supranational Terminology (1961), in *The Federalist*, XXXV, 1993, p. 191.

[10] M. Albertini, "The Strategy of the Struggle for Europe" (1966), in *The Federalist*, XXXVIII, p. 53.

[11] M. Albertini, "Il problema monetario e il problema politico europeo" (1973), in *Una rivoluzione pacifica, cit.*, p. 185.

[12] K. C. Wheare, *Federal Government*, London, Oxford University Press, 1951 (1st edn 1946), p. 37.

[13] M. Albertini, "L'unificazione europea e il potere costituente" (1986), in *Nazionalismo e Federalismo, cit.*, p. 296.

[14] L. Robbins, *Economic Planning and International Order*, London, Macmillan, 1937, and *The Economic Causes of War*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1939.

[15] See M. Albertini, "L'unificazione europea" (1986), *cit.*, p. 302. See also John Pinder (ed.), *Altiero Spinelli and the British Federalists: Writings by Beveridge, Robbins and Spinelli 1937-1943*, London, Federal Trust, 1998, p. 46.

[16] M. Albertini, *Quest-ce que le fédéralisme?* (1963), *cit.*, p. 32; "War Culture and Peace Culture", in *The Federalist*, XXVI, 1984, no. 2, p. 9.

[17] M. Albertini,"Le radici storiche" (1984), *cit.*, p. 114; Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr), *Pacifism is not Enough, nor Patriotism Either*, London, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1935, p. 7, reprinted with a preface by Sir William Beveridge, 1941, and in John Pinder and Andrea Bosco (eds), *Pacifism is not Enough: Collected Lectures and Speeches of Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr)*, London, Lothian Foundation Press, 1990, p. 221.

[18] M. Albertini, "La pace come obiettivo supremo della lotta politica" (1981), in *Nazionalismo e Federalismo, cit.*, p. 151.

[19] M. Albertini, "L'unificazione europea" (1986), *cit.*, p. 304.

[20] M. Albertini, "War Culture and Peace Culture" (1984), *cit.*, p. 18.

[21] M. Albertini, "Le radici storiche" (1973), *cit.*, p. 140.

[22] M. Albertini," The Strategy of the Struggle for Europe" (1966), *cit.*, pp. 57-58.

[23] W. Beveridge, *The Price of Peace*, London, Pilot Press, 1945.

[24] E. Reves, *The Anatomy of Peace*, New York, Harper, 1945; London, Allen & Unwin, 1946; Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1947.

[25] M. Albertini, "La pace come obiettivo supremo della lotta politica" (1981), *cit.*, p. 184.

[26] M. Albertini, "Towards a World Government", in *The Federalist*, XXVI (1984) (first English-language issue), n. 1, pp. 5-6.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] A. Spinelli, *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio. La goccia e la roccia*, ed. by Edmondo Paolini, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1987, p. 18.

[29] *Loc. cit.*

[30] A. Spinelli, *Diario europeo*, I, 1949-1969, ed. by Edmondo Paolini, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1989, p. 417.

[31] M. Albertini, "L'unificazione europea e il potere costituente" (1986), *cit.*, pp.293-4.

[32] R. Mayne and J. Pinder, *Federal Union: The Pioneers — A History of Federal Union*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, p. 96.

[33] Mario Albertini, "Four Commonplaces and a Conclusion on the European Summit", in *The Federalist*, XXXIII (1991), no. 2, pp. 156, 157, 158, 161; original version in *Il Federalista*, III (1961).

[34] M. Albertini, "L'integrazione europea, elementi per un inquadramento storico" (1965), *cit.*, pp. 249-50.

[35] M. Albertini, "The Strategy of the Struggle for Europe" (1966), *cit.*, pp. 62, 64.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

[37] M. Albertini, "Il Parlamento europeo. Profilo storico, giuridico e politico" (1971), in *Una rivoluzione pacifica, cit.*, p. 216.

[38] M. Albertini, "L'aspetto di potere della programmazione europea" (1968), in *Nazionalismo e Federalismo, cit.*, p. 262.

[39] M. Albertini, "Il problema monetario" (1973), *cit.*, pp. 184, 187, 191.

[40] A. Spinelli, Diario europeo, III, 1976-1986, p. 186.

[41] M. Albertini, "Il problema monetario" (1973), *cit.*, p. 192.

[42] A. Spinelli, *La goccia e la roccia, cit.*, p. 18.

[43] M. Albertini, "Elezione europea, governo europeo e Stato europeo" (1976), in *Una rivoluzione pacifica, cit.*, pp. 223, 225, 226.

[44] Mario Albertini, "Europe on the Threshold of Union", in *The Federalist*, XXVIII (1986), no. 1, pp. 25, 27.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 33-4.

[46] "Moneta europea e unione politica. Un documento del Presidente Albertini in vista del Consiglio europeo di dicembre" (1990), in *L'Unità europea*, n. 202, dicembre 1990, p. 20.

[47] For example, M. Albertini "Towards a World Government", *cit.*, p. 7.

[48] M. Albertini, " The Strategy of the Struggle for Europe" (1966), *cit.*, p. 72; "Le radici storiche" (1973), *cit.*, p. 136.

[49] M. Albertini, "La federazione" (1963), *cit.*, p. 100; "L'integrazione europea" (1965), *cit.*, p. 252; "Towards a World Government", *cit.*, p. 8.

[50] M. Albertini, "The Strategy of the Struggle for Europe" (1966), *cit.*, p. 59.

[51] M. Albertini, "Il Parlamento europeo" (1971), *cit.*, p. 204.

[52] A. Spinelli, *Diario europeo, I, 1948-1969, cit.*, p. 297.

[53] M. Albertini, "Towards a World Government", *cit.*, p. 4.

[54] I have not so far mentioned a living Italian federalist, because it would not be fair to single out any among so many who have done significant things for contemporary federalism. But in this particular context it would be unjust not to mention Roberto Castaldi, who has initiated the idea of the anthology and proposed for it a selection of Albertini's writings (which have also provided a major part of the material on which this essay is based); and I wish to thank him for making many linguistic corrections to my original Italian text for this article. I should also explain that there are some slight differences from that text, where matters that are well known to Italian readers may not be known to readers of this English translation.

The Ethical Foundations of Politics

SALVATORE VECA

I first met Mario Albertini in 1981, at a symposium on Kant, Europe and peace, organised by the University of Pavia — Albertini's own university and the one in which for many years he lectured in philosophy, occupying the chair to which, around ten years later, I had the honour of succeeding him. At the aforementioned meeting, I delivered a paper on *local justice and global justice* in Kant. I recall how, at the close of the proceedings, we discussed the topic at great length in the Aula Foscolo. And I also recall quite clearly that, as we took our leave of each other, Albertini said two things to me: first, that he would have liked to continue our discussion and second that, in his view, one needed to have two things in order to be a good political philosopher: a passion for politics and a mastery of the profession of philosophy, of the kind demonstrated by his friend Giulio Preti.

Our discussions continued for as long as it was possible: in his, and later my, study, at the Department of Philosophy, in Via Luino, and also at his home, thanks to the kind hospitality of his wife, Valeria. Ever since then, I have always sought to remain faithful to Albertini's view of the profession of political philosophy and I have borne it very much in mind while developing my theory of international justice. It is a theory that centres on criteria of ethical judgement and on the bearing these have on things political, and it seeks (from a perspective of value that guides us as we work out, to quote Albertini, "what should ideally happen") to treat seriously both descriptions of how things are and precepts relating to how they should be. Albertini is convinced that analysis of the present should bring to the fore its peculiar significance — i.e., the significance that derives from its "capacity to evolve into a new situation," — and that exploration of the realm of future possibilities should "take the form not of simple description, but rather the more specific form of new principles of action." The art of the possible must go hand in hand with the art of making possible and endeavour in this sense must work on the tension or

contradiction that exists between reality and values, a concept that, in the history of political theory, was dear and familiar to Mario Stoppino.

My observations here focus on several aspects of the area of political philosophy that is concerned with the idea of justice without frontiers, an idea to which I devoted my most recent book, *La bellezza e gli oppressi.** These observations can, in the broad way that I have indicated, be attributed to Mario Albertini and are thus dedicated to the lesson — philosophical, political and human — that he imparted.

1. Uncertainty demands theory. In the three philosophical meditations contained in *Dell'incertezza*, I showed exactly how, and in what circumstances, the effects of significant uncertainty can invade different domains: the domain within which we wrestle with theories regarding that which is, the domain within which we seek to judge that which, in our view, matters, and finally, the domain within which we try to answer questions about who we are: in short, questions relating to truth, justice and identity of facts with values. At this point we can ask ourselves a question: what is the nature of the uncertainty that generates the demand for a theory of justice without frontiers, and induces us to take seriously exercises whose aim is to draft possible prolegomena of the same? We can, on a basic level, respond by pointing out that globalisation, regardless of the interpretation of this controversial term, upsets well ordered ideas relating to theories of justice.

Let us consider the following: our theories on political value have been developed within the framework, stable and immune to uncertainty, of closed, political communities with clearly defined boundaries. It is precisely this framework, within which we are able to recognise things that are *familiar* to us, that globalisation seems to have been altered and transformed. The whole topography of that which surrounds us, like the map of political space, has been thrown into question. As we try to feel our way in this altered setting, we endeavour to *understand* and *explain*, to connect familiar things with less familiar things, enduring features with changing features, distorted by the metamorphosis of a Heraclitean world that is constantly being deformed. A similar situation arises when our main aim is *to assess*, when our demand for a theory of justice encounters ethical criteria of justice regarding what matters, and what is just and unjust: in short, the ethical foundations of politics.

It is easy to see how, in these circumstances, our identity as observers or participants involved in the business of understanding, explaining and assessing what is, as the expression goes, a changing world, also finds

itself subject to pressure generated by uncertainty.

At this point, therefore, the initial and basic answer, which is that globalisation upsets well ordered ideas relating to theories of justice, must expanded upon. We might say that globalisation upsets our ideas both of politics as it is, and of politics as it should be. As a result, both our descriptive and our normative endeavours are put to the test. Once again, we see at work the familiar tension between facts and values. And at the same time, we recognise that this tension affects the way in which we define and acknowledge our identities as observers of and actors on the great stage, or "great city of humankind," that is today's contested world or divided planet.

2. Let us consider the preliminary question of our identities. Our identities are made up of borrowed things, of loyalties and commitments, of undertakings and of ways of viewing and assessing things that inevitably derive from a contingent and local history as well as from a life history. If we do, indeed, possess some identity, it is because we are, essentially, *heirs*. It is a fact of life. Put another way: we are creatures of habit. When we attempt to make sense of a world that is changing, and that is changing us, when we become committed to political or moral judgement, to the search for new, or simply less familiar alternatives, we are inevitably doing this, in part at least, as heirs. But as heirs to what? To the legacy of our counterparts of the past, whose beliefs, attitudes, inclinations when appraising, and sense of justice were shaped in other times and in other social settings. How could it be otherwise? We are required, by a principle of Confucian wisdom, to be both loyal to ourselves and mindful of others.

This attention to, and focusing on others and on a changing world, are vital elements in our varying capacity to respond to change, and put to the test, quite literally, the body of our loyalties and political beliefs. Traditions of political belief can survive only if our capacity to respond manages to find a balance, which can be as unstable and provisional as you like, between inherited beliefs and exploration of the changing and uncertain social landscape that we are attempting to understand and assess. And here, we come up against a real brain-teaser: how can we prize, at once, both the coherence and oneness over time of a body of political beliefs and loyalties and also the *capacity to respond* to change that, in turn, requires us to make corrections, and introduce innovations and changes? It is natural to ask oneself: what is the point at which innovation and modification of beliefs alters and undermines relentlessly

our political loyalty; what is the point at which our resources of loyalty and allegiance to a cause start to be eroded and dissipated? In other words, does there exist something that, if we wish to preserve (over time and through generations) a tradition of political judgement and belief, must be deemed irrevocable, non-negotiable? Something that allows us to go on seeing ourselves as those who share a particular conception of political value and, for this reason, are *distinct* from those who have other loyalties, beliefs and identities, born of other, different traditions? Just what is it, from within the body of distinct beliefs and political loyalties, that we have inherited?

It is to be remarked that this *distinction*, or possibility to distinguish, between different ways of understanding political value constitutes an important and familiar requisite in the order (based on fundamental institutions), and the political regime that we call democracy. As a result of the way it has, over time and through trial, error and conflict, taken shape, the architecture of a well ordered democratic regime makes provision for the liberal sphere of fundamental rights and of the sharing of essential constitutional elements and for the sphere of democratic competition between various interpretations of the long-term interests of a *given* community. It is within this second sphere, that of competition for the power to govern society, a *given* society, that this possibility to distinguish between views of political value, deriving from different bodies of inherited political tradition, plays a crucial role.

This is, after all, a realm we know well — the political sphere par excellence, a sphere that we have inherited and with which we are thus entirely familiar. Within this sphere, in the rich part (our part) of the world, there have, over the past century and a half, been collective movements and conflicts; considerable resources, in terms of political commitment and hope, have been invested and used up; political and social actors have emerged that specialise in interpreting, defining and promoting the interests and ideals of sections of the population, such as political parties and trade unions; the conditions have evolved that allow identification, participation and collective action; institutions have become consolidated. Here we have seen exercised the free art of association à la Tocqueville, and pluralistic constellations of polyarchic institutions have emerged. In short, what has been constructed within this sphere, more in a chain of effects and responses than in a long march of conquest, and in a range of processes in which varied and divergent projects have played crucial roles, is *democratic citizenship*, and this has been accompanied, over time, by a continuous defining and redefining of

the fragile balance between politics and social powers.

Politics has responded, within *this* sphere, to social change. And it is through the formulation of distinct and different responses, regarding the government of a society that is changing, that the match between alternative political beliefs and allegiances, between right and left, has, where we are, been contested. Naturally, I do not wish to maintain that this is the *whole* story. Clearly, the periods in and paths followed by this process have been conditioned by their particular geopolitical context, that of a world for a long period, in the second half of the twentieth century, regimented by hostile imperial powers. What I do maintain is that political loyalties and beliefs have been established and lastingly transmitted on the basis of the promise that politics can govern societies, territorially defined by borders, according to an agenda dictated by distinct groups associated with distinct political views.

We might say, then, that the *national* constellation constitutes a prerequisite of democratic conflict, as we know it. In spite of instances of strong, collective identification at international level, sometimes carrying considerable motivational force, the national institutions and collective movements adhere to, or better, have adhered to, the following basic logic: institutions are the result, stable over time, of what have been successful responses to movements and conflicts in the past, and they find themselves cyclically challenged by movements wanting to see democratic citizenship embracing, universally, new rights and new interests. All this is tied up with the proud building of western pluralism. Within the national constellation, social contracts are, in this way, exposed to the effects of uncertainty and the result is the creation of more or less scope for (and the generation of conflicts of varying intensity over) the rewriting, negotiation and redefinition of their basic terms.

3. It can be remarked that it is always against this background, that is to say, from the familiar *inside* of constitutional democracies, that developments in the intellectual endeavour of political theorists can be identified. In the case of theories of justice, reference to the inside and to the political community that is defined by stable boundaries is, in the most important philosophical studies of the last decades of the twentieth century, implicitly or explicitly constant. Disputes over utilitarianism and contractarianism, libertarianism and pluralism, communitarianism, republicanism and the theory of deliberative democracy, concern the principles of justice that make a political community a just society for those who live within it. The criteria of just and unjust are applied to basic

institutions and social practices that belong to a given society and they presuppose that the latter is understood as a unit that, having boundaries, is closed. This is the society whose requisites, in terms of justice, normative theory defines. If these requisites are met, then we can regard *that* society as a *well ordered* society.

In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls, with great intellectual honesty, made it clear that these were the limits and this the scope of normative political theory and added that, were it successful, the theory could be *extended*: one extension of it coincided with the conception of international justice or *ius gentium intra se*. Rawls' remarkable book, a work of philosophy that, completely faithful to the tradition of political belief of the liberal left, evokes the long season of political hope and of trust in the power of politics to govern society, reforming its institutions in favour of the rights of democratic citizenship and of social equality, established something of a paradigm.

A Theory of Justice provided the framework that was the background to a philosophical debate over a well ordered theory of justice. This framework, like the well ordered theory of justice, are as I have said, upset by globalisation. And this brings us back to the conditions of uncertainty that generate the demand for theory. We might say that the best political philosophy of the second half of the twentieth century did respond to the uncertainty generated at the level, now familiar to us, of conflict and democratic debate within the *national* constellation: the sphere of our distinct and conflicting political loyalties, beliefs and traditions. Now, at the turning point that is the start of this new century, uncertainty is generated as a result of the new traits characterising a new, post-national constellation that, moreover, is set within the broader one, less familiar to us, of a world whose political geography has changed: a contested world, a planet split between areas of wealth and immense areas of poverty, between the arrogance of welfare and the reality of oppression. From a wider perspective, it is, in fact, the *injustice of the world* with which we have to contend.

4. Now let us consider a list of impressionistic assertions: the economy is global in a way that politics is not. Communication is global; information is global, and so are science and technology. Distance and space constitute no barrier to financial transactions. Several elite groups are global. Multitudes of men and women live lives that are tied to local niches and settings. Decisions and choices made *in some parts* of the world have repercussions on the lives of people in *other* parts of the

world, the *same* world. The oligarchic decisions taken by a few affect the quality of life, in terms of welfare, opportunities and rights, of many, sometimes very many human beings. The oligarchies are remote, ubiquitous and obfuscated; the oppressed are without a voice. The great international institutions, the United Nations first and foremost, are in general shaped according to the balances of power that emerged at the end of the Second World War (mid-way through the last century), and operate increasingly weakly, on a world stage that has been drastically modified by the collapse of the Soviet empire and by the emergence of the probably unstable but certainly unipolar equilibrium characterised by the domination of the United States. The sovereign states are seeing their degrees of freedom constantly eroded: the constraints and obligations, both internal and external, conditioning collective choices are multiplying. In our part of the world, we are able to witness the unfolding of the fascinating, ground-breaking and complicated process that is the building and start of the European Union. The aftershocks of the geopolitical earthquake that took place at the end of the last century continue to be felt, altering boundaries and generating new and fragile state structures. Ethnic and tribal wars, religious wars, and terrible wars linked to no law or faith, are becoming interwoven with one another all over the world.

In the wake of the events of September 11th, 2001, war against ubiquitous and global terrorism has, as a practical necessity, been placed firmly on the agenda of the twenty-first century. International law, the Westphalia model having run its course, is undergoing a profound transformation, a transformation that, while certainly dating back to the years immediately following the Second World War, now seems, in this new century and in the midst of flaws and inconsistencies, to be gathering speed. Before September 11th, 2001, NATO had endowed itself with the resources of legitimacy it needed to pass ethical judgement and to sanction wars on the grounds of their being "humanitarian."

Before September 11th, 2001, the G8 performed its rites of apparent power in remote or besieged buildings. And now we have courts of international justice. International regimes, which strengthen balances of power based on cooperation, are consolidated. We witness a flourishing of the network of agencies, associations and non governmental organisations, whose aim is to promote and safeguard the basic human rights, and to promote cooperation for the development of populations existing in conditions of severe, sometimes inhumane disadvantage. The *law of the market* prevails. Stories of slaves in the world, women and children in particular, abound. Differences in population and poverty rates generate

and sustain the phenomenon of migration. Globally, the uneven distribution of the resources men need, and of the right to exploit the same, is quite simply intolerable: whether considering the situation *within* or looking at the differences *between* the world's societies, what emerges is that the rich continue to grow richer and the poor poorer. Considering that no one chose to be born and live in one part of the world rather than in another, we can now appreciate the injustice of the world in its most radical sense. And at the same time we can acknowledge that we are today able to say, with the undeserved wisdom of hindsight, that Kant was right, the Kant of the late eighteenth century, who shed light on federalism and cosmopolitan law through his assertion that the violation of a right in any part of the world amounts to a violation of that right in all the other parts of the world.

I have put together this list of impressionistic assertions in the hope of conveying something of the state of uncertainty that generates the demand for theory: I stress that this is a demand both for theory that explains and embraces, making connections between familiar and less familiar aspects of the landscape that has changed, and for theory that guides us in our judgement of what is just and what is unjust, pointing us in the direction that will enable us to go on working out the conditions in which, in these times of globalisation, there might emerge political possibilities for justice without frontiers. As I have said, globalisation upsets both our well ordered ideas on what politics is and what politics ought to be. But we must seek to consider more analytically this whole complex issue.

5. One way of crystallising our ideas might be to get into focus some of the ways in which our geographically altered landscape has affected that familiar sphere that we have identified as the sphere of democratic conflict — the sphere in which, for a long time, our different political loyalties and beliefs have been put to the test. The idea is this: removing ourselves from the situation in which we currently find ourselves, that in which I am writing and you are reading what I write, let us seek to identify and define the link between globalisation and democracy. Or, put another way, let us try to identify the salient transformations that the constitutional democracies have undergone within the geographical setting as altered by globalisation. *De nobis*, it is now easy to see, *fabula narratur*.

The first aspect that I wish to get into focus is the growing *weakness* of politics or, and this amounts to the same thing, the diminishing capacity of politics to govern society and, in particular, *social powers*. The

weakness of politics is the weakness of the policies of *national* governments and parliaments. The external constraints now placed on public choice (the latter being something on which the distribution of the costs and benefits of social cooperation ought to depend) are increasing, as I mentioned in one of the impressionistic assertions in my above list. We might cite the case, familiar to us in our part of the world, of the European Union, to which I referred earlier: it is clear that the Union, a post-national reality, places constraints on the policies of the national governments. This is not to say of course that there do not persist, within these existing and increasing constraints, residual degrees of freedom of public choice that are reflected in different interpretations of the long-term interests of the national political community. It is just that the democratic sphere within which different interpretations are possible is essentially narrow and that the power to govern society is simply the power to do *fewer* things: in other words, a policy of factors is still possible, but only within narrow confines.

From the perspective of the logic of democratic choice, this also means that he who wishes to govern a national society can obtain the power to do this only by promising the people policies that are distinct from and alternative to those of the others involved in the democratic contest; however, when subsequently exercising his power of government, he will find himself answerable both to his constituency and to powers above the level of the state that are not bound in the same way by the logic of democratic choice. But let us consider now the effect of social forces and external constraints of a different and more threatening kind: an effect that, more directly linked to globalisation, we can broadly attribute to the anonymous power of companies and agencies operating on the global markets. In absolute accordance with our commitment to democracy, we must draw attention first to the democratic deficit presented by the European Union, and second, to the predatory and despotic character of social forces that, while they affect the lives of people, are subject to no restrictions, have no responsibilities or answerability and distort systematically, all over the world, the familiar framework that is the democratic exercising of authority. In the first case, the *extension* of a theory of justice, while difficult, would appear natural. In the second, we find ourselves on distinctly more uncertain ground, where exploration of the sphere of political possibilities is far more dangerous.

6. The second and third aspects that I would now like to bring into focus are just corollaries of the first (i.e., the increase in the external

constraints that impede democratic choice and the relative weakness of political power vis-à-vis other social powers). The second aspect concerns the transformation of the fundamental institutions of the democratic orders that are also the political orders that exemplify the exercising of the sovereignty of the people. While the power of government grows progressively weaker, the power of third-party institutions, which are gaining authority but which do not answer to the people, is increasing: from the power of courts and judges, to that of control and guarantee bodies and authorities in a range of arenas and social spheres. This second aspect refers to the *internal*, not *external*, impediments to the supremacy of choice and democratic debate: collective questions, where social powers and rights of citizenship compete with one another, are being systematically removed from the sphere of rightful democratic debate and entrusted to the judiciary or brought under the arbitration of outside authorities.

The third aspect regards the changing nature of the collective actors who, within the national sphere, represent, interpret and safeguard the interests of sections of the population. And this brings us on to the transformation of political parties, those enduring organisations of collective action that have marked and characterised, where we are at least, our familiar landscape characterised by pluralistic political loyalties and allegiances and by democratic conflict. It can be argued that, above all in the early phases of democratic pluralism, the functions carried out by agencies, such as modern mass parties, which have a broad social basis, numbered three: the first was to select the people of government, the second to form distinct political programmes, and the third, to promote social integration and the generation of wealth, in terms of a sense of collective identity or belonging, for broad sections of populations enclosed, territorially, within the confines of a given political community. While the first of these functions, the selecting of the people of government, has clearly endured, the second, the formation of distinct political programmes, has been considerably weakened, although not — as some maintain — cancelled out by the growing pressure of the external constraints, and the third, the generation of a sense of identity, is clearly compromised by the erosion of allegiances associated with political ideology and by the considerable individualisation and fragmentation of society generally.

As a result, where we are, politics is starting to look like the business of solely of parties, parties that are becoming nothing other than organisations competing for the power of government. The weakness of the

power of government is thus transferred to the political agencies that, in order to acquire that power in the national sphere, compete, enter into conflict and inevitably collude with one another. Thus, while on the one hand, the social powers that do, increasingly, affect and determine the quality of life, and sometimes even the life and death, of people all over the world, operate (free from constraints and subject to no boundaries) as shady, remote and anonymous forces, the party political system operating within the national sphere is seen as, and before sections of the population presented as, a system of actors who, through their obsession with their own visibility on the public stage, are apparently able to compensate for their limited powers and growing weakness. While our democratic decision-makers are engaged in endless talk shows, the real and serious decisions are being taken elsewhere, in places that are impenetrable and remote. And all this results in a loss of faith in politics and in collective action, apathy, insecurity, and disappointment in and cynicism towards the political community.

7. In order to get the fourth aspect into focus, let us consider more closely the nature of the various attitudes through which this loss of faith in politics is expressed: we know that they are attitudes that, in the last years of the twentieth century, took root in broad sections of the populations in the democracies of the wealthy world. These attitudes, which we can group under the umbrella term anti-politics, are *also* founded on the demand for a form of politics that is exercised, has effects on, and is judged within social and territorial ambits other than the ambit of the state, the ambit par excellence of democratic politics, where the latter, together with its movements and its institutions, was formed and became established. The point is that the state is, because of its size, being put under increasing pressure as a result of globalisation. After all — and this is certainly true in our part of the world — we are talking about territorial *states* that, through a long, tortuous and at times dramatic process, became *democratic*.

Now, as people are wont to say, the state seems to have become too large to do *some* things and too small to do *other* things. What emerges is an altered scheme of the places, methods and levels of government of distinct communities. The idea has been advanced of a possible three-way division of ambits and levels that might make it possible to break down both the demand for government and for citizenship. The "great city of mankind" seems to require institutions, conventions and methods of government that can respond on a *global level* (and no longer a *local*

one) to the global force of the unrestricted social powers to which I have referred. The state seems to require forms of regional federation over and above its porous boundaries (something new but akin to the process and projects of the European Union), and within its confines, decentralised forms of government answerable to the relevant peoples.

In order to assess and define the features of this altered landscape (the result of the emergence of new forms of politics and of distinct areas where there is an increasing call for government of a society that, in these times of globalisation, is changing), I feel that it is more useful intellectually to consider the virtues of processes by which institutions and practices emerge, rather than to focus on exercises in political constructivism. We can, however, conclude this examination of the four aspects that link globalisation and democracy by considering a hypothesis recently advanced by Alessandro Pizzorno. It can be maintained that the values that pluralistic and representative democracy represented during the era, now behind us, of the national sphere, appear in today's altered framework to be realisable above all in the context of engagements in collective causes or collective ends that are, however, *outside the sphere of the state*: these are either local-populist causes (which, if they prevail, are potentially anti-democratic) or universalistic-planetary causes. In the first case, we see the effect of globalisation on collective identities that are, in a manner of speaking, threatened; in the second, the effect of globalisation on collective movements in which legislative efforts are supported, above all, by the idea of potential inclusion in a universal citizenship, and thus focus on the formation of a new form of collective identity, yet to be created, and of more inclusive circle of mutual acknowledgement. (Choices dictated by each of these two effects seem, in today's precarious and unstable equilibrium, to provide the motivation for the collective protest of the galaxy of peoples who flocked to Seattle). Choices governed by the latter—by allegiance to universalistic causes — constitute, in Pizzorno's view, a sign that people who share the sense of injustice over the many forms of oppression that affect the lives of *others* all over the world, act as though obeying a virtual normative system for mankind, a system that is yet to be created, rather as though *anticipating* the positive future value of some of its terms and already actively conforming to the same.

In precisely this sense, the prolegomena to a theory of justice without frontiers are linked to the *anticipation* of such possible future values. This, and nothing else, leads one to adopt the perspective of a reasonable utopia: a perspective that throws into relief the tension between reality and values that guides us as we seek to define principles of action that are governed by, in the words of Albertini, "what should ideally happen." This perspective is consistent with an enduring faith in the universalistic values that the democracy we have inherited has, at least to an extent, expressed. The same democracy that, as we move forward, we must be able to respect, in forms and ways wrought by change, and in the context of the "construction sites" (where work is continually in progress) of what we call history: a history that, as Jean-Pierre Vernant has remarked, exists precisely because things are never the same as they have been or as they were expected to be.

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* In the next seven paragraphs, I re-explore the arguments set out in the introduction to *La bellezza e gli oppressi. Dieci lezioni sull'idea di giustizia*, Milan, Feltrinelli, 2002.

The Role of Federalists

FRANCESCO ROSSOLILLO

Introduction.

Though Albertini made major contributions to every aspect of the theory of federalism, perhaps the most important concerns the role of the MFE in the process of European unification. This was a subject dear to Albertini's heart; like his other interests, it is one that combines a theoretical with a practical side, since it is pursued with a view to action and is the action itself. How could a matter as crucial as the historical purpose of the Movement and the moral and political profile of its activists therefore fail to engage Albertini so intensely.

The Process and the Role of Federalists.

The process of European unification was and continues to be an event of incalculable historic consequence: not even its ultimate failure would change that undeniable fact.

It has tilted the world balance, at least partly; it has given Europe's economic development an irresistible boost, altering the economic structure of the Old Continent — at least of the Western part of it; it has influenced the behavior of European political forces and modified power plays within states; it has forever changed the mindset of European citizens; it has triggered an extraordinary development: the creation of a single European currency.

In light of a unification process that has stirred such massive forces and marshalled such imposing interests, one might realistically wonder if a movement made up in Italy and Europe of only a few thousand members and several hundred activists, could have played — or continue to play — a compelling enough role as to justify the commitment of its supporters.

The Issue of Freedom in History.

The issue is that of freedom in history. One has to bear in mind that history is made up of many strands: above and beyond certain obvious historic and social influences, the freedom of the individual or small groups of individuals matters far more in the history of culture than elsewhere, particularly in political history and in the history of the institutions. But the latter is precisely what we are talking about. *Under normal conditions*, individuals or small groups cannot influence the course of events in political history or the history of the institutions.

Individuals and small groups belong to a power structure that influences every public aspect of their life. They are inevitably at the mercy of overwhelmingly powerful impersonal forces, and are incapable of diverting the course of events. Even the world's great leaders do not make history: it is history that makes them. Thus the institutions tend to be self-perpetuating, because they hold the reins of power, whilst those who are subject to them lack the wherewithal for creating an alternative power.

The Crisis.

Yet history is studded with all manner of radical institutional transformations: the question that has puzzled many, including Albertini, is how they could have come about; what triggered the reversal despite the fact that everything weighed so heavily in favor of maintaining the established order.

Albertini's explanation was that major transformations always come about because the evolution of the mode of production make institutions formed to manage social relations existing at an earlier stage become outdated and unable to do their job effectively.

When this happens, the institutions lose their decision-making capability, because their size and/or structure are no longer effectively tailored to the nature of the issues they are called upon to deal with. Their power is no longer supported by the citizens' consensus. The irresistible impersonal forces of history paralyze one another and for this reason cease to act. Burkhardt views such periods as times when the established world order collapses and power disintegrates and diffuses. At such times, the deterministic approach of normal periods no longer works, and a window of freedom opens (and often rapidly closes again) in the history of this or that region of the world.

Were it not for crises, balances of power would never change. But

crises are not enough. The powers that be cannot resolve crises by establishing a more advanced order, since they were designed to govern a particular type of balance. In the case of European integration, for instance, the established institutions are supposed to govern the existing states, not to overthrow them. Furthermore, short of war, the old institutions have long handled integration's emerging contradictions not with innovative responses, but by patching them up just well enough to ward off the risk of total collapse, albeit at the expense of re-establishing the old balance at a lower and lower level.

This pattern has also prevailed in the process of European unification: here we see a gulf between the continental dimension of the issues at hand and the national dimension — though partly masked by a European façade — of the institutions. But throughout the process, emergencies have always been tackled with solutions which, however tenuous and inadequate, have nonetheless enabled the states to preserve their feeble sovereignty. This brings another important piece into the puzzle.

The Vanguard.

The vanguard is the missing element: the spearheading preparation undertaken by a revolutionary minority whose mission is to deal exclusively with the issue that led to the crisis; in our case the issue of the political unification of Europe, not the management of national power. Such a group aims to suggest the right solution at the right time. When the power structure begins to topple, this minority may become decisive, because amid the ensuing confusion, its catchwords — once disregarded — may gain popularity, however weak its proponents, becoming a catalyst for creating new alliances, and hence to found new regimes and even new peoples. Therefore, it is in times of acute crisis — not in times of normality — that truth becomes power.

The Vanguard During Periods of Normality.

The fact remains, however, that if a revolutionary vanguard is to intervene effectively in times of crisis, it must already exist in times of normality, i.e. periods when the crisis can be defined as *historical* but not yet *acute*. The impersonal forces of history have not yet paralyzed one another so as to open windows of objective freedom, but these are phases of preparation. In them the institutions reflect the old order: though starting to bend under the weight of their own inadequacy, they are still

bearing up and looking stable, thus leaving revolutionary minorities no apparent breathing space. However, revolutionary minorities can arise and survive because despite the pressures of the impersonal forces of history, like the mode of production, the balance of power and the established order, freedom cannot be suppressed as a *subjective decision*. There is always a chance that a few free men will come together and form groups driven exclusively by their awareness of the significance of the historical juncture and by their determination to change the course of events, in spite of their isolation, lack of financial resources and power.

Autonomy.

The gamble of Albertini's life was that of bringing together a group of free men willing to defy the natural tendency to accept the status quo and adapt to it to achieve personal and professional success, and instead fight for the federal unification of Europe. The fundamental feature of this group had to be *autonomy*. When emphasizing this aspect, Albertini often quoted Machiavelli's *The Prince* — Chapter 6, in which Machiavelli states that it is decisive whether innovators "stand for themselves or rely on others; that is, whether to fulfill the task at hand they must pray or can force. In the first case they are bound to fail and fulfill nothing; but when they rely on themselves and can force, then they will seldom be endangered." So for Machiavelli, the problem facing revolutionaries is "to stand for themselves" and not have to depend on anyone, even if personal interests, the institutions and the dominant ideologies all tug towards choosing the easy way and taking sides along the dividing lines created by the existing order.

For Albertini, there had to be political, organizational and financial autonomy. For him, political autonomy meant never toeing the party line and adopting the outlook of the European people as regards the historical juncture, i.e. the outlook of a still non-existent ideal entity, as opposed to that of a national people.

Organizational autonomy, in Albertini's view, is based on the part-time militant who lives *for* politics but not *on* politics; who has an occupation that provides a livelihood and does not rely on federalism to survive. By adopting this approach during the political and moral formation of the Movement, it was possible to avert the risk that the movement be taken over by full-time officers, forced to yield to the pressures of the powers that be by the need to pursue their career, taking over the MFE and swamping it in red tape, ultimately causing its

paralysis.

Lastly, the purpose of financial autonomy was to ensure that the Movement would not have to depend on external funding sources, which might have influenced its action and stance, or corrupted its active members. For Albertini, the only way to achieve financial autonomy was by self-financing, i.e. having activists cover the cost of keeping the Movement alive out of their own pocket, though envisaging ad hoc funding for special projects.

Albertini never pretended it would be easy to keep the flame of freedom burning during historical periods in which the crisis is simmering but not acute. He realized that having to struggle against everything and everyone to survive sapped the lifeblood of the Movement. But he also realized that the very causes of its vulnerability were also its strengths. It would undoubtedly be difficult to find a group of free men, unite them in a shared cause and if possible enlarge the group under the constant threat of conflict with personal interest, conformism, and the tendency to care more for the present than the future. But freedom itself, as long as it lasts, would also ensure the Movement's ability to resist the pressures of power, ideology and money.

Transfer of Sovereignty and Small Steps.

In conclusion, the arguments set out above lead to three corollaries relative to the strategy and profile of the MFE. The first is that the political unification of Europe, arising as it will out of an acute crisis, will not be a gradual process, but a traumatic event of limited duration.

Obviously the event will need to be prepared — Albertini himself sketched out a theory of "constitutional gradualism," and insisted on setting out several important milestones, such as the direct election of the European Parliament and the introduction of a single European currency. However, the transfer of sovereignty still constitutes a revolutionary leap. This conclusion is inextricably intertwined with the revolutionary nature of the Movement itself: any reformist illusions based, as they must be, on a radically false analysis of the process, would be fatal. The notion of Europe becoming politically unified through a gradual series of small, smooth and peaceful steps, is simply not consistent with the theory of federalism, nor with the experience of history. This notion is merely an excuse for *not* unifying Europe, and tricking European citizens into believing progress is being made without laying the existence of national states on the line.

Visibility, Mass Movement and the Mole.

The second corollary concerns the visibility of the Movement, and its ability to become a mass organisation. Albertini often brought up the subject of Hegel's "mole": unseen, it tunnels under the edifice of power, until eventually the foundations give way and the edifice collapses under its own weight. Before reaching crisis point, the action of the Movement is preparatory and does not have an immediate effect on the power structure or the institutional order, though it gnaws away at their foundations, and is therefore condemned to a state of relative invisibility. The Movement's fate is therefore to be an organization for the few, and this is understandably hard to deal with. Toiling underground is a hard, thankless job, with little in the way of material rewards. Many are tempted to seek the light by accepting compromises with the powers that be, in exchange for fleeting inconsequential spoils. But by behaving like this they are negating the original inspiration that stands as the Movement's *raison d'être*, and jeopardizing its very survival. We are often asked to encourage mass mobilization, as if we were a power-based organization, but we are not, at least not in the traditional sense of the term. And until the crisis comes to a head, all we can hope for are symbolic mobilizations, testifying to our presence. If and when the masses do mobilize for a unified federal Europe, Europe will become one and the Movement will have fulfilled its political function, though not yet its ideal mission.

Truth is Power.

The third corollary concerns the very nature of the Federalist political action. Albertini believed that if truth is destined to be our main source of power, then the search for truth must form an essential part of our action. Power coincides with truth only in the last instance, therefore conflict between them can never be entirely quashed, even in the most noble of all revolutionary undertakings.

Just as revolutionary movements must make allowances for the limitations, frailties and shortcomings of human nature. But a revolutionary movement will succeed if it remembers that the truth is its main weapon, that the victory of the revolution is the victory of truth – however partial and imperfect, and that the foundations of revolutionary action lie in an understanding of our time and its contradictions.

A European Economic Constitution

TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA

Introduction.

I would like to begin by thanking the organisers of this meeting for inviting me to speak. However, I would like to start by saying that it should be my brother Antonio standing before you now to deliver a speech in memory of Mario Albertini. For it was his acquaintance with Albertini over many years that instilled in me and in my family an interest in, and commitment to the European cause, explaining my presence here today.

The sense of me being the speaker here today is to testify just how strong and far-reaching Albertini's influence has been, an influence that has affected many distant people, well beyond the circle of those directly involved in the political advocacy of the European Federalist Movement or its intellectual work. Many people, like myself, feel that the course of their active life and their careers in European affairs would not have been the same without this important influence.

The extent of his influence can be illustrated by a personal recollection of a discussion of the idea of relaunching monetary union as a priority for the pro-European agenda in the late 1970s. I remember debating this issue with Alfonso Jozzo and Alberto Majocchi who came to see me in the research department at the Bank of Italy, suggesting that an initiative should be taken in the monetary field to relaunch the process of European integration. They spoke on behalf of Albertini. My initial reaction was something like, "forget it; we have already tried fixed rate exchange systems, which don't work, and I cannot see how the currency can possibly act as a starting point for reviving European integration". At this point Roy Jenkins, then President of the European Commission, was still to make his famous Florence speech, which called for a fresh attempt to start economic and monetary union.

The idea, inspired by Albertini, and which I discussed that day with my two visitors, appeared outmoded, was discredited among experts and was regarded as doomed to failure. However, experts, admittedly myself included, were characteristically presumptuous by insisting it could not take off. Indeed, within less than a year the whole picture changed. Following a political rather than an economic logic, and demonstrating a prophetic ability, Albertini had gone beyond the narrow logic of the experts in this highly technical sphere of currency and exchange, with a much clearer view.

On a personal level, this event marked the start of a merging of pro-European convictions nurtured within me since adolescence with my professional activity in the monetary field. As a Commission official less than two years later, I was to find myself involved in the launch of the European Monetary System, and in close to a quarter of a century since then, my work has revolved around the process that has culminated in the European currency.

The relaunch of monetary union also served as a lesson. If there were really such things as definitive lessons in humility (and there are not, since the adjective "definitive" does not sit well with the expression "lesson in humility") then this would certainly have been one. Showing that politics — and I mean politics in the high sense of the word — is more far-sighted than technical expertise, these events taught me not to trust my own specialisation too much. Indeed, had the politicians not been more prescient than the technicians, we would not have monetary union today; just as if Adenauer had listened to his minister of finance Erhardt, we would never have had the Treaty of Rome.

Indirectly, the fundamental thoughts and concepts that originate from the European Federalist Movement and Albertini continue to be the conceptual instruments I use in approaching European questions, just as my "handbook for action" draws on Jean Monnet's memoirs, and to an extent on the memoirs of Altiero Spinelli. It is interesting to note that my source of reflection is the writings of Albertini, which are theoretical and certainly not autobiographical in nature, whereas my guide for action comes from memoirs, in this case of Spinelli and Monnet.

Discussing the Endpoint.

For a long time Europe proceeded "with its face masked". I remember Jacques Delors using this image (*l'Europe avance le visage masqué*) in the conversations accompanying work leading to the famous Delors Report on Economic and Monetary Union: "Here, we can no longer hide.

If we create a single currency there is only one way of doing it, and that is to create a new currency with its own Central Bank." But why this reference to a masked face? It is because the real achievements with regard to Europe have almost always been the result of a playing down of their importance, of that clever dissembling that constitutes one of the fundamental instruments of politics. The simple explanation for this is that leaving aside public opinion (which is no small thing), Europe's opponents were, and still are, stronger than its supporters; hence the need to play down advances in European integration.

In Rome, in October 1990, I witnessed in person a classic example of this when the Italian Presidency (the Prime Minister at the time was Giulio Andreotti) managed to get the entire substance of the Delors Report built into the Conclusions of the European Council. The morning of the day on which the Conclusions were due to be approved by the heads of state or government, in a meeting of the Italian delegation, Andreotti reopened a question that had seemed firmly closed. There was a passage that used the term "common currency." Discussions had gone on for weeks over whether to use the term "common currency" or "single currency," and though we had done our utmost to ensure that the latter was used, it had been impossible to convince the other countries. Andreotti said, "What does common currency mean? Let's put single currency — you say you've already tried, but not managed to? That doesn't matter, I'll have a word with Kohl about it," and shortly afterwards he did just that. Later, in the formal meeting, he read out the Conclusions, sentence by sentence, summarising the consensus of his colleagues. When he got to the word "single," one attentive prime minister remarked, "Why 'single', hadn't we opted for 'common'?" Andreotti said nothing; he just made a small gesture, spreading his hands and tightening his lips as if to say: "What does it matter? Let's not waste time here discussing minor details." The text was approved.

Advancing with a masked face or, in other words, proceeding with relatively modest projects of apparently limited importance(like managing together the coal and steel industries), but which are nevertheless a great design, is part of a European line that we might term Monnettian-Functionalist. It is a much different line from that adopted by Spinelli, Albertini and the European Federalist Movement, which constantly advocates the great design. In fact, these two lines of thought often clashed, not fully understanding each other, a misunderstanding that can still be seen today. Let us not forget that many federalists actually opposed the Treaty of Rome, another lesson in humility because political

idealists too can become trapped by their own method or approach.

However, now we have entered a phase in which it is no longer possible to advance with a masked face. Perhaps we entered it with the arrival of the euro or perhaps when the Convention on the future of the European Union began its work. In my view, it was the speech given by German foreign minister Fischer at the Humboldt University that marked the really important change, because in his speech Fischer raised the question of the point of destination. This was a real novelty, since proceeding step by step without specifying a final goal had been a typical characteristic of the functionalist method employed until then. There had been a tendency to say, "Let's do this, because it is useful, because it has ingredients that will improve the system, and let's not worry about where, ultimately, we are heading." Fischer committed the "crime", scandalous in a foreign minister (but not in a federalist) of saying, "Here we need to talk about the point of destination, the end of the road."

It is hardly surprising that, by committing this scandalous deed, Fischer inflamed the whole debate, and rendered it in some regards more difficult and more confusing. The tendency to conceal intentions, which so often accompanies action on important issues, spread to all aspects of the debate, distorting the terminology to such an extent that it is no longer clear exactly what is meant by expressions such as "state," "federation," and "federation of nation-states." As a result, except where very concrete terms are used, the vocabulary of this debate confuses rather than clarifies the issues.

The first word that needs to be clarified, one that is now used with considerable ease in reference to European questions, is "constitution." It is perhaps true that the people who used it first and now use it most frequently are those who actually want to see less, or only a bare minimum, of European integration. Curiously, while the term "constitution" like "subsidiarity" is given minimalist connotations, the term "federation" that really does signify a minimum level of government, is regarded as synonymous with the idea of a centralised and Jacobinic state, which is the complete opposite of its true meaning.

It is probable that the Convention, chaired by Giscard d'Estaing, is working towards a constitution and it is from this perspective that I set forth my observations. One way or another, Europe's future order will be decided over the coming twelve months. Should the Convention fail in the task that has been assigned to it, I personally do not see how the process of integration that has now been advancing for 50 years can avoid being thrown into crisis. The Convention may indeed fail, but it is also

perfectly possible that its work will underpin the Union's ultimate transformation into a federation.

Five Wishes for the Convention.

Today, monetary policy, which is the domain of my profession, is no longer a part of Europe's "work in progress." Instead, it is a part of Europe that has already been constructed. As a result, I observe the work of the Convention from a distance, which differs from the last twenty years, during which I witnessed first-hand many of the steps to construct a united Europe. As a removed observer, I have several wishes or hopes in relation to the work of the Convention, which I will now briefly explain, before returning to the theme of the economic constitution.

My first wish is to see the Convention concentrating on what is important, leaving aside all questions that, while important in the day-to-day business of government, are not crucial to the task of giving birth to a European constitution. In other words, I want the Convention to deal with fundamental questions of an institutional and constitutional nature, important questions that reflect the extraordinary nature of its composition and mandate. Let me give two examples. It is often said, in reference to the Convention and to European issues, that the Convention ought to adjust the voting modalities of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, or modify the Growth and Stability Pact. Personally, I would urge the Convention not to deal with such matters, but to concentrate instead on those questions that are normally dealt with in a constitution. Of course, we do not know how the Convention will proceed, and it may not actually get down to the business of writing a constitution. In fact, there is certainly a risk that the Convention may "fly at low altitude" so to speak, never raising from the level of ordinary legislative questions to the level of constitutional law. Deciding on the appropriate level for action is in fact one of the fundamental tests faced by nearly all decision-making bodies. Often, the quality of decision-making is not so much a question of making good decisions on a particular issue as a question of choosing the right issues on which to deliberate and decide.

Second, I hope that the Convention builds on what already exists, and does not seek to invent a Europe that is entirely different from the one we have today, built over half a century; in other words, I do not want the Convention to start building Europe from scratch. Those who have been concerned with European questions for any length of time see it as essential to preserve what is in Euro-speak termed the *acquis*, that is to say the progress already made. To others, however, the value of the *acquis* is far from obvious. There are indeed newcomers taking up positions in national governments or European institutions who feel a legitimate impulse to rethink Europe anew and without preconceptions, an impulse often accompanied by a certain intolerance of the complexity and slowness of the European machine. Sometimes the absence of preconceived opinion is accompanied by the absence of basic information. Indeed, even the hundred members of the Convention probably include many individuals who, due to their age, geographical origins, or political background, actually know very little about Europe.

Third, I wish the Convention to propose a unitary institutional structure for the European Union, the unitary structure that Europe used to have until Maastricht, where unfortunately it was destroyed. The Maastricht Treaty accomplished the most positive achievement of introducing the single currency, but it also committed the misdeed of creating a three-pillar structure that is both contradictory and dangerous. Contradictory, because whilst economic and monetary union (the first pillar) was built on the basis of a combination of supranational and intergovernmental elements, the foundation of the second and third pillars was entirely intergovernmental. Dangerous, because the strong pillar may not prove able to transmit its strength to the weaker ones; indeed, it is quite possible that the opposite could occur. Although it is no easy task to develop a unitary structure, it is imperative that efforts are made now.

Fourth, I hope that the Convention will scrap the national veto. The difference between union and division is the capacity to remain united even in disagreement. The whole difference between creating a united Europe and remaining trapped in the empty rhetoric of pro-Europeanism boils down to precisely this. It is no coincidence that this is an issue on which de Gaulle stalled or that the United Kingdom feels unable to accept the abolition of its veto right. The difference between the state of being united and not being united, between the existence and the absence of a Union, lies in the ability to accept some form of majority-based decision-making principle. Indeed, only acceptance of such a principle substantiates a readiness to accept unitary decisions, even when the latter are not the decisions that one would have preferred to see taken. It is this acceptance that constitutes, in my view, the very essence of a Union.

My fifth wish (and perhaps, if the Convention successfully meets the challenge it faces, the secret of success will lie in its achievement) is to see the Convention generating a spirit of assembly, rather than remaining bogged down in the mentality of intergovernmental negotiations. The

members of the Convention need to feel bound solely by the Laeken declaration and they need to be answerable to no one; it is crucial that they do not allow themselves to be conditioned by national, party, or institutional considerations. Be they parliamentarians or government representatives, members of the opposition or of the majority, I hope that the members of the Convention will prove able to behave like free individuals reasoning solely on the basis of their own judgement, and to propose something valid for Europe. The few early indications suggest that they may. But a spirit of assembly needs to be kindled, this is a crucial condition. Indeed, the Philadelphia Convention's transition to Constituent Assembly of the United States of America, like the transformation of the French Estates General into *Etats Generaux*, coincided with the early stirrings of just such a spirit: and this spirit is stirred when a group of people, entrusted with a political task, becomes merely an assembly of people, rather than an assembly of representatives of states.

Four Propositions on the Economic Constitution.

Let me turn now to the question of Europe's economic "constitution," a question that in my view illustrates the importance of the first of my five wishes; to see the Convention concentrating on the right issues. If it does so, the Convention will conclude that, for the most part, Europe already has an economic constitution, and therefore economic questions are not the ones on which it should be most focused. However, another view is often expressed, even by authoritative sources, which argues that having achieved monetary governance at European level we now need economic governance. In other words, there may be a tendency to make the economy a priority, stemming from a belief that this is the terrain on which Europe should continue to be built. I would now like to expand on four points in this respect.

Firstly, Europe already has an economic constitution. Indeed, as far as the economy is concerned, including the currency, the European constitution-making process is virtually complete. I think that it is legitimate, in terms of substance, to use the term constitution. In the economic field there is a set of European rules and regulations that are stronger than national laws and powers. The latter are subject to European rules, not only those written in the Treaty, but also those contained within the Union's directives and other sources of legislation. This is particularly true in the case of Italy. It is a known fact that many ill-defined points in the economic part of our Constitution were left deliberately unspeci-

fied by the constituent assembly, in order to leave them open to different, even diametrically opposite, interpretations and thus compatible with different economic systems, from a market economy to a Soviet-type system of economic planning. The European constitution has served to resolve or clarify these ambiguities and uncertainties. Today, a combined reading of the Italian and the European constitutions reveals an economically unequivocal structure.

Let us look at how the European economic constitution is constructed. The task of any constitution is to institute and regulate public powers. Basically, the European economic constitution can be thought of as a matrix within which four major policy areas are combined with four different levels of government. The constitution assigns competence for each of these areas (monetary, budgetary, labour and market policy) to one or more levels of government. These levels of government are European, national and sub-national (in most countries the latter is broken down into regional and municipal, though the Treaty does not make this distinction).

Monetary governance is a European function. Budgetary policy is subject to a European rule (set out in the Treaty itself and in the Stability and Growth Pact), but remains otherwise a national function. Indeed, if we look at total public spending in Europe (meaning European, national, regional and municipal), we find that over 95 per cent is national. Labour and employment policy is not, or is only marginally, an area that comes within Europe's sphere of competence. In this field, responsibility is mainly national and even delegated to the various social interests, though some changes would not be incompatible with the European constitution. Finally, market policy is a prevalently European task. Europe guarantees the single market but, provided this is respected, leaves the states free to do practically anything they please (only, they cannot take action that would harm other countries).

What I have briefly described here represents a constitution, not only because of the legal and institutional strength of the framework it establishes, but also because of its completeness. Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the European Community did not have a coherent economic policy structure. Competence for monetary governance was attributed, as Luigi Einaudi remarked as far back as 1944, to the "wrong" level of government. It can be said that the single currency came about when it was recognised that the distribution of the other economic policy functions within the matrix was incompatible with the conservation of national power in monetary matters. The Maastricht Treaty indeed

removed a fundamental contradiction that had emerged in the Community system at the start of the Seventies. It did so by introducing a more radical solution than that which had been implicitly in the minds of the authors of the Treaty of Rome, for whom a fixed exchange rate system served as background to, and as support for, a common market.

The road from Rome to Maastricht, viewed from a monetary perspective, appears as a road from the dollar to the euro. In the 1950s, all the currencies were tied to the dollar and as a result Washington decided Europe's monetary policy. With Maastricht, Europe acquired a currency and a central bank of its own. In between, Europe went through a long period — about 25 years — during which the de facto common currency was the German mark.

In more general terms, the same road traces the transition from a constitution based on an international model of economic, trade and monetary relations to a national, or domestic-type, constitution. The Union gradually equipped itself with regulations, laws, institutions, and finally a monetary system, of the kind typically associated with the domestic economy of a sovereign country. These observations lead me to affirm that, as far as the economy is concerned, the European constituent process can be regarded as virtually complete.

My second assertion is that Europe's economic constitution is original. If we were to compare this European Union matrix with the structures in place in the United States of America or in Germany prior to the euro, or to the structures of other federal systems such as Canada and Australia, we would not find the same dispersion of functions among various levels of government. In contrast to Europe, where there is such big dispersion, other federations have strongly centralised economic policy tasks.

In particular, we do not find other federations where monetary and budgetary power is held at two different levels. On budgetary matters, Europe has no power other than to issue rules, like those contained in Article 104 of the Treaty and in the Stability Pact, rules that forbid the states from straying outside fiscal and financial orthodoxy. Europe's budgetary rules do not allow member countries to violate budgetary discipline, but they leave all other faculties intact: the states are free to adopt large or very small budgets, to decide how public money should be spent, and to decide the structure of their own fiscal systems. We might say that, as regards budgetary policy, the Rome-Maastricht constitution merely prevents states from adopting unbalanced macroeconomic policies, while taking away from them none of their other fundamental choices in this area. Neither does it prevent them from adopting policies that may even be damaging to them, for example policies that impede rather than encourage growth.

This constitution is therefore original, which is in my view significant and valuable; it might be said that it distributes the functions of economic governance in what is potentially a very effective manner. For example, it leaves plenty of scope for competition between policies and between national systems, allowing the best to be rewarded, encouraging experimentation, and preparing the way for useful forms of emulation. From an economic point of view, it is not necessarily a good thing to concentrate the major items of income and spending in the budget of the central government. One of the qualities of Europe's economic constitution is that it complies with the principle of subsidiarity.

My third point: The fact that the process resulting in Europe's economic constitution is substantially complete does not mean that economic union is already a reality. Neither does it exclude the need for important structural work in order to create a European economic policy and European public powers. It certainly does not mean that economic and monetary union has already borne all its fruits.

A good constitution is only the start, or the basis, for effective action in the sphere of economic policy. Once adopted, a constitution has to be implemented; we have to learn to live and work with it, to appreciate and exploit its potential. The writing of Europe's economic constitution ended in 1992, it was ratified a year later and it has been in force since 1994. Since then, a great deal has been done. The single currency, which was written in the Treaty, has been created, in spite of the fact that in the 1990s (well after the Treaty fixed a date for its introduction) doubt was cast on the project a number of times. The implementation of a constitution is neither automatic nor immediate.

Even the Italian Constitution was created little by little, and some of its provisions either took many years to be implemented or still remain to be implemented. To cite an example, the Constitutional Court, which can hardly be regarded as insignificant within the Italian constitutional system, took until the mid-fifties to be created.

I have argued that the process that has led to Europe's economic constitution is substantially complete, not that it is one hundred per cent complete, because in truth there remain important fields, such as taxation, in which the unanimity rule is still an obstacle to decision making. Furthermore, Europe's economic constitution could certainly be refined. But if one is thinking about the Convention, and about what should concern it most, then I think that the Convention would be failing in its

mission if it were to seek, first and foremost, further improvements to the economic part.

There can be no doubt that it would be a good thing, for the Union, to have more room for manoeuvre in the area of budgetary policy. But it is also my belief that this can only come as a natural consequence of political union. No country has ever adopted a large budget just in an effort to obtain more instruments for economic policy. Historically, the size of budgets grew because the functions attributed to the Union grew. The Union is certainly not going to increase its capacity in the area of fiscal policy — something that I would like it to do — through discussion of economic policy. If there is a need for European public goods, these must be produced because of their intrinsic usefulness. If there are more goods recognised as European public goods, European public spending will as a result increase; and increased European public spending will result in a budget big enough, from a macroeconomic point of view, to affect the European economy, at which point we will have a European fiscal policy.

It could take a long time for the fruits — hopefully healthy ones — of Europe's existing economic constitution to ripen. However, the experience of recent years does permit, in my view, a measure of optimism. The single currency was created in spite of the fact that there were times when all the central banks, all the governments, and all the finance ministers were saying that it could wait. At one point, there was only one person in Europe, the German Chancellor Kohl, who insisted that the launch date could not be put back; the extraordinary resoluteness of a single individual proved to be all that was needed in order to resist the temptation to prevaricate.

Similarly, we are now seeing a coming to fruition of other consequences of the European economic constitution. The so-called Barcelona process (previously called the Lisbon process) through which the European Council seeks to strengthen European co-operation in the field of economic policies, is a consequence of monetary union. The Union proceeds through loose forms of co-operation that, to individuals with a federalist background, can seem unsatisfactory. Minorities are never bound by any decision taken. Yet, in my view this is, for the fields in which it is applied, the appropriate system. A meeting of the Union's finance ministers, where the majority decides to increase the budget, obliging the one of their number who is against the move to go along with the decision, is a most unlikely and undesirable scenario. The same is true of binding decisions in the field of labour policy. The process we see unfolding today in the economic field is one of organised emulation, a

multiplication, by force of example, of the best results achieved. Its strength is not to be underestimated. Similarly, in the Italian setting, the conference of regional administrations, a consultative-type decision-making body, plays a very important role, even though it is still hard for the majority of the regions to impose its will on the minority.

There is a fourth point that I would like, briefly, to illustrate: the economic constitution is a fundamental component of political union. Without doubt, the latter is grossly incomplete, but a start has been made. We often hear it said: We have created economic and monetary union, now it is time for political union. In some ways this is true, but it is also true that, for at least two reasons, economic union can actually be seen as inherent in political union.

First, because of its content: in all the state systems familiar to us, the economic questions that currently fall within the sphere of competence of the European Union are very much bound up with the political process, are indeed political questions. So, does this not make the European Union (which has been attributed these competences) political?

Second, because the European institutions to which these tasks are assigned are eminently political institutions. Is the European Parliament, an institution elected directly by the people, not political? Is the Commission not a government formed — despite the lack of acknowledgement by some — as the result of a procedure that is practically identical to the one used to form any government within a democratic parliamentary system: election, assignment of a task, a vote of confidence, possibly a vote of no-confidence?

Conclusion.

I wish to close by returning to the second of the five wishes that I expressed earlier in reference to the Convention: the wish to see it building on what already exists. I believe that the process of European integration faces two great dangers, or risks, today.

The first is the risk of ignoring what has already been built; the second is the risk of believing that the building work is already complete. Too often Europe is discussed as if we were only at the beginning of the whole story; also, too often it is treated as a finished entity, to which nothing else needs to be added and from which, indeed, elements ought to be taken away. Let us not forget that the word constitution was injected into the debate by those who wanted to take something away from Europe, not by those who wanted to add to Europe. The design for a European constitu-

tion developed months ago by *The Economist* provides a startling demonstration of the second of the two dangers I have indicated.

If these are indeed the two risks faced by Europe, it is important to appreciate that the direction taken by the Convention must be one that will lead to the completion of a political union that, to a considerable degree, has already been built, and whose economic component is already practically complete.

Federalism
from Community to the World

LUCIO LEVI

Spinelli's Inheritance.

In attempting to describe the intellectual figure of Mario Albertini as a theorist of federalism, it is necessary to make a comparison with Altiero Spinelli, who is a decidedly better known character. Although very few people are familiar with Spinelli's works, it is baffling to see that history has mysteriously ranked him among the most important figures of the last century. As the main author of *The Manifesto of Ventotene* and founder of the European Federalist Movement, he is numbered among the founding fathers of the united Europe.

Spinelli's greatest achievement was to have taken federalism into the field of action. For Spinelli, federalism was a political priority. For him it was not simply an adjunct to liberalism, as it was for his teachers — Lord Lothian, Lionel Robbins, and Luigi Einaudi — or to socialism, as it was for Barbara Wootton. Spinelli regarded federalism as a real political alternative to Europe's organization into sovereign states. In fact he saw it as an alternative to the state, and not just to government or regime.

Spinelli championed the autonomy of federalism more than any federalist before him. In particular in the field of political action, Spinelli's work has been truly innovative. He developed a theory of democratic action to unify a group of states. Like the cosmic-historical individual described by Hegel, Spinelli was man of action: throughout his life his sole purpose was to seek the universal goal of the unification of Europe. "The concept is very much one of philosophy. Historical-universal men are not obliged to know it because they are men of action. On the contrary, they know and love their work because it corresponds to their epoch."[1] These words of Hegel are extraordinarily apt for describing the work of Spinelli.

He modelled his course of action on that of the ancient thinkers, which was guided by the pursuit of wisdom. *How I Tried to Become Wise* is the title of his unfinished collection of memoirs. Like the ancient philoso-

phers, who "modestly called themselves *philosophoi*," he regarded wisdom as something with which one could "only befriend and never presume to own."[2] From Taoism to Stoicism and Epicureanism, the ideal of wisdom represents the traditional response to the problem of establishing an active approach — to life rather than history — based on moral principles.

Spinelli's interpretation of this ancient vision was that, "Wisdom does not exist. There are... infinite wisdoms related to the infinite variety of psychological materials of which we are made."[3] In other words, there are as many truths as there are men. According to Spinelli, there is no such thing as a sense of history that connects the history of the past to that of the future within a single scheme. Spinelli set himself the task of founding a new state — the European Federation — to be created from nothing, just as the European Federalist Movement was created from nothing. In the conclusion to the first part of his memoirs, Spinelli says in reference to this event, "It was up to me to create from nothing a new and different movement for a new and different battle."[4]

Before the Enlightenment (and the revolutions it inspired) — that is, before the masses erupted onto the stage of history — a collective action to change the structure of the state and improve conditions of political coexistence was inconceivable. As a result, an active approach to life founded on moral principles (that is, wisdom) was strictly a matter for the individual. With Spinelli, an entirely new political leader in step with the era of democratic revolution in which we live made his appearance in history. He conceived and initiated a democratic action for the unification of a group of states — a goal traditionally pursued by means of war.

Although he occasionally felt the need to further the theory of federalism,[5] this was a task that went beyond the individual, albeit an individual with an exceptional talent. Having decided to concentrate his energy on the movement for European Federation, Spinelli behaved as if the theory of federalism could be found ready-made in the classic works of federalist thought.

The Methodological Foundations of Albertini's Political Theory: Social Sciences and the Philosophy of History.

Albertini picked up where Spinelli left off. Spinelli was his Pietro Giordani, about which Leopardi said, "Inveni hominem" (I have found the man). Spinelli said of Albertini, "It is just as well that in the European Federalist Movement there is a Saint-Just type."[6] Although he made

important contributions to the theory of federalist action (a theme that I will not be dealing with here), Albertini primarily elaborated on the autonomy of federalism on the theoretical level. And it is in this area that he surpasses his master. The theoretical insights that we owe to him occupy two distinct fields of knowledge: the social sciences and the philosophy of history.

He was an unparalleled practitioner of that lofty bent that is theory. He was possessed by this demon, which burned within him like a devouring flame. What made him exceptional was his craving, which he carried all his life, to put theory at the service of political action. From this perspective, he was a modern man. He conceived science in operational terms. He had the modern view of science that dates from Francis Bacon. It is no longer the abstract *theoria* of Aristotle. Science is the power to use technology to control reality — not just nature, but also society. Knowledge has an eminently practical purpose: to use the words of Brecht's Galileo, "The intent of science is to ease the toil of human existence."[7]

From another perspective, Albertini thoroughly eschews the naive idealism that ignores the role of the mighty impersonal forces — that is, the structure of the means of production and political power — in history. Albertini developed his theories in close alignment with the historical and social sciences. Through analysing political, economic, and social structures, these sciences provide a vision of the range of objective conditions within which our behaviour is rooted and that are independent of our desires, no matter how noble they may be. Although they are yet to produce a satisfactory systemization, the historical and social sciences allow us to gain at least some insight into the objective tendencies of history. On the basis of this knowledge it is possible to distinguish between what, in history, can be attributed to the objective course of events and what can be attributed to free will — that is, to political planning. These sciences therefore help identify the in sphere that history belongs respectively to necessity and to freedom. Thus they play an indispensable role in political action. Knowledge of social reality represents the foundation stone of a policy guideline that is neither sterile nor faint-hearted.

The central hypothesis on which Albertini based his theoretical writings is that *only if one recognizes the place occupied by necessity in history and knows the laws that govern the operation of society is it possible to identify the cracks that are open to human intervention for change.* The connecting thread running through all his work is also common to all revolutionary thought: the gaining of knowledge of social

reality so as to act upon this reality — that is, to change it — with some possibility of success. The strength of Albertini's thinking was to show that the revolutionary strategy demands scientific analysis of the social reality and that today the federalist (supranational) point of view represents the best perspective from which to provide this analysis.

His attitude to science was the same as Marx's in *Theses on Feuerbach*. In the second thesis we find, "The question whether human thinking can pretend to objective truth is not a theoretical but a *practical* question. Man must prove the truth, that is the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely *scholastic* question."[8] In other words, the test of the truth of thought lies in its capacity to change reality. For Albertini, theoretical research is an expression of a practical need.

The task of his theoretical writings was precisely to demonstrate the superiority of federalist thought because of its capacity to transform the world, as opposed to academic thought, which limits itself to contemplating reality, leaving the task and responsibility of changing it to others. Very few people, and sometimes only one, invent new ideas. And this rule holds true for every aspect of human culture: from religion to science, from philosophy to politics, from art to literature. The founders of new movements are the people who perceive before others things that everyone feels but in an unclear way. They put forward an appeal to break the old ways of thinking through which experience is selected and interpreted and the institutions on which the old order is founded. The thing that distinguishes the true from the false prophet, the discoverer of new scientific laws from the charlatan, and the revolutionary from the dreamer is the success of their work — that is, the capacity of their new ideas to respond to the problems of their age. In other words, it is society that determines the validity of new ideas and institutions on the basis that they respond to widely felt needs. "In the final analysis," says Albertini, "who decides the truth or otherwise of a theory is society."[9] In other words, society defines the meaning and value of the yardsticks of knowledge and action.

This view of the relationship between knowledge and society is completely compatible with the choice of method on which the social sciences base themselves — that is, the logical heterogeneity between assertions of fact and value judgements, between *being* and *should be*. Albertini is fully aware of the confines within which scientific knowledge has validity: the field of empirically verifiable facts. The basis of sci-

entific knowledge lies in the empirical ascertainment of constant relationships between phenomena. Sentient experience is therefore the criterion that allows the verification or falsification of theoretical assertions.

While science offers access to a precise and controlled knowledge of an individual part of reality, there still exist fundamental aspects of reality that are beyond the grasp of scientific knowledge. Albertini comments in this regard, "We derive our principles of conduct from that which cannot be established scientifically." There are two possible attitudes to this. If one regards values as purely subjective choices, one abandons "morality ... to individual judgement" and regards "the boundary between the scientific and the non-scientific purely from one side, with the resulting danger of extrapolating its results and falling into scientism." If, on the other hand, one adopts the perspective of the philosophy of history, "One can see the dividing line from both sides... and need not leave to individual judgement that which, although not scientifically knowable and empirically verifiable, can nevertheless be examined by pure reason."[10]

By adopting this stance, Albertini distances himself considerably from Max Weber's definition of the world of values, although still remaining in his debt as regards the fundamental orientation of his methodology of the historical and social sciences.

What Albertini questions is the assertion that values are merely choices "subjective in origin,"[11] and consequently he confines value choices to the sphere of the irrational. According to this view, value choices are all equally legitimate and arbitrary. This is what Weber defines the polytheism of values. Of course Weber does not disregard the dual "relation to values" that conditions all scientific research — the choice of the subject and the direction of research — and he does confront values head on with a technical critique that leads to determining the adequacy of the means to an end. He observes that when faced with a virtually infinite quantity of empirical data, an historical or sociological inquiry is impossible without privileging certain aspects of experience and relations between phenomena, thus making a choice based on certain specific interests or values. In other words, he acknowledges that it is impossible to eliminate the value dimension from scientific research, because values lead knowledge. Yet the inevitable relation to value of scientific research does not question the possibility of reaching "objective" results, viewed as such even by those who started out with different and opposite assumptions and interests.

Though he acknowledged that our better understanding of society

owes much to last century's developments in the historical and social sciences, Albertini distances himself from those who conceive of science as the only legitimate form of thought. In light of the triumph of sociology, economics, political science, psychology and anthropology, the only yardstick for measuring the validity of thought seems to be that which takes as its model the method of natural science.

The fact is the science is merely one aspect of thought, and there are other fundamental aspects of existence that fall outside the reach of scientific knowledge. Man's eternal questions about his nature and fate — who are we? where do we come from? where are we going? — cannot find their answers within the framework of science. Problems such as the principles of morality, political ideas, the meaning of history, the inevitability of death, all need to be approached from a different dimension of thought, from philosophy primarily, and must be submitted to other criteria of control. The problems of philosophy and more specifically the whole area of value choices, are a dimension of research which cannot be probed by scientific methods. There is no doubt that the criteria of control upon which philosophy is based (logical consistency) never lead to genuine certainty, but according to Albertini this does not mean that mankind "treads a path of complete obscurity. Men strive towards well defined goals, even if they do not have the certainty they will reach them, and the illustration of these goals, the philosophy of history, is the only means of comprehending the meaning of their journey, and — for that matter — of describing real facts, if one limits the description to their progress without anticipating the achievement of the goal."[12]

Unlike Spinelli, Albertini believes that history has a sense. He postulates the existence of a common language shared by all men, which permits ongoing communication and dialogue between the living, the dead and posterity. The institution of a new political order is not, as it is for Spinelli, something created out of nothing by a solitary actor. It is a collective effort of many men participating in a common undertaking: to improve the conditions of human kind.

Political Debate: the Only Pathway to Truth.

For Albertini political debate was crucial, because he regarded thought as a collective construction. He believed that dialogue was the most effective method for gradually approaching truth through the constant questioning of every aspect of a problem, and the continuous testing of hypotheses against facts as they are perceived by individual experience and elaborated by individual thought. The application of this method does not bring about any hierarchy in school between teachers and students, nor in politics between the leaders and the led; the search for truth is shared by all and even the very young can make a significant contribution. In accordance with his dialectical conception of history, Albertini rejects theories that view the real world as a closed system capable of yielding a final answer to the problems of life. "If you ask them [to written words] a question, they preserve a solemn silence ...; if you want to know anything and put a question ... [they] give one unvarying answer," says a passage in Plato's *Phaedrus*,[13] in which Socrates emphasizes the inadequacy of the written word. Albertini, in tune with this point of view, conceives thought to be an "unended quest", to use the title of Karl Popper's autobiography. Of course he felt that for every problem that the Federalist Movement faced there could be only one truth. But this was an asymptotic idea that could be approached but never actually possessed.

I was always impressed by the way Albertini jotted down notes while listening to other speakers in a debate; at the end he would tuck the notes away in his pocket. This behaviour clearly shows that he was eager to learn something from the debate, which he considered to be the path to truth. This is particularly true when the issue is the building of the groundwork for a new political culture such as federalism. It is a task that requires a long term approach, demanding the efforts of a whole generation of scholars.

Albertini had such deep faith in the political debate that he advocated a reform of the statute of the European Federalist Movement, institutionalizing a "Debates Office" in order to promote a free exchange of the views of all members, and the broadest possible participation in elaborating the political line. Special attention is given to the need to focus the debate on so-called "theoretical emergencies," i.e. issues that are important but do not require immediate decisions. The purpose of a debate on these issues is to bring out a common perspective, supplying the information and clarifications necessary to pave the way for largely shared political choices.

Towards a New Paradigm of Politics.

Albertini enshrined in his writings many fundamental aspects pertaining to the new theory of politics: the theory of the national state, the theory of federalism, the theory of the European unification, a definition

of the federalist strategy. However, a large proportion of his thoughts never materialized in written form. These aspects primarily concern more abstract theories which he discussed during university lectures or talks within the Federalist movement. Snippets of his general theory of politics are scattered here and there in the pages of his books, but they were never organized systematically in essays providing a comprehensive overview. The aims of Albertini's theoretical research were to devise a new paradigm of politics. This was an unfinished endeavour, at least in respect of a formal elaboration, though in those of his works that have been published there are important indications that define the contours of the theory.

In any case, there is no doubt that the elaboration of a new paradigm of politics constitutes a necessary objective for a revolutionary movement that proposed to set out the foundations of an action-oriented philosophy. Lenin, it must be remembered, stated that: "without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement."[14]

Federalism's striving for autonomy makes it a viable alternative to the other forms of contemporary political thought, primarily nationalism, but also liberalism, democracy and socialism. The struggle for national power has caused these ideologies to sacrifice their original universalistic inspirations to national egoism. Albertini's working plan was to attempt to elaborate a theoretical model for political analysis out of a series of theoretical contributions from different disciplines: historical materialism, the theory of *raison d'état* and the theory of ideology.

Historical Materialism: an Ideal Type Upon which to Base the Architecture of the Social Sciences.

To start with, Albertini uses historical materialism as a scientific theory in which evolution of the mode of production represents the overriding factor determining, in the final instance the course of history and social change. The assumption on which he bases this conception of society and history is the empirical observation that the first condition of human history consists of concrete individuals producing the means of their subsistence. The cornerstone and organizing principle of society as a whole is the mode of production.

Albertini submitted to a critical revision historical materialism, which he considered as the most general ideal type supplying the fundamental building block upon which to base the architecture of the social sciences. Here is how he explains his viewpoint: "If one does not confuse the

concept of social production with other less general concepts of class or economics in the specific sense, or consider the evolution of the means of production as the necessary and sufficient cause, but rather as merely the necessary cause of historical change, ... one cannot but admit that: a) the mode of production is truly the most general historical phenomenon; and b) the dimension and nature of all other social phenomena must necessarily correspond to it (i.e. social phenomena in the broadest sense: economic, juridical, political, cultural etc.)."[15]

Albertini rejects economic determinism, the so-called vulgar Marxism. In accordance with this explanation, the type of determination exercised by the mode of production is viewed in strictly mechanical terms and proceeds only in one direction. Specifically, the mode of production is seen as the sole factor influencing the nature of political, juridical, cultural, religious and other phenomena. It has been underscored in this respect that historical materialism may be employed as an explanatory scheme compatible with the mutual influence of political, juridical, cultural and religious factors on material production. To cite just one example, Max Weber in his works on the sociology of religion, highlights how the ethics of religions has influenced the evolution of economic systems. Historical materialism can be regarded as a "canon of historical interpretation," in the words so aptly crafted by Benedetto Croce,[16] and not as the only yardstick for a comprehensive and exhaustive explanation of the course of history.

Concerning the crucial issue of the state and relations between the mode of production and the state, Albertini distances himself from the Marxist conception of the state as "the organized power of one class for the oppression of another." "The state depends on society," he remarks, "but this dependence is not automatic: the state is not an instrument in the hands of the privileged classes. The state has an autonomous cause, the possible mediation of interests. All interests share in this mediation, though some are stronger than others. But it is the weakest that most need the state to assert themselves. The state cannot eliminate the domination that exists within society. But this does not mean that the state is nothing but a pure and simple consequence of social domination. Domination is social. Now, if historical factors weaken the state, social domination becomes stronger. The fact is that: one, the state is not just the result of the domination of social conflict; it is also the result of the domination of universal vital primary needs, and two, that the state constitutes a hindrance to, not an aggravation of the social domination which arises objectively from material relations of force."

Albertini defines as vulgar Marxism the assumption that: "the economy controls, or can control, politics. In general, as the history of our century clearly demonstrates, it is politics that controls the economy and not vice versa, though politics and consequently also the economy, are in the last instance controlled by the mode of production, which cannot be reduced to economics, i.e. production and exchange."[17]

The state and the world system of states constitute the juridical and political framework in which the process of production unfolds. For Marx and Engels they have a superstructural, but by no means irrelevant role, in determining the course of history. Without the state, in other words, without public order, and a defence system against other states and without a minimum level of international order, the production process would not be able to function. Relations between historical-social processes and political structures are, to use the imagery of Trotsky, "like those that exist between steam and a cylinder and piston. Yet motion relies on steam, not on the cylinder or piston."[18]

The structures of power thus possess a "relative autonomy," in that they obey the specific laws of politics, which only "in the last instance" are obliged to bow to the demands of the economy. So that while negligible changes in the mode of production have no repercussions on the superstructure, all the great milestones in the evolution of the mode of production have upset the superstructure and forced it to adapt to the demands of social production. Relations between the economic structure and the political superstructure are, as Engels wrote: "a reciprocal action between two unequal forces', in which the role of the superstructure may be either to favour the development of productive forces (when there is "correspondence" between productive forces, productive relations and the political superstructure) or hinder them (when there is not that "correspondence."[19]

This theory allows Albertini to formulate an overall analysis and assessment of contemporary society, and identifies the basic tendency driving history in our time, as "the tendency towards the unification of the human kind." This is an irreversible tendency, which Albertini describes as follows: "In the early stages of the industrial revolution, the growth of the interdependence of human action developed primarily in depth, within states. Then through the liberal and democratic struggle of the bourgeoisie against the aristocracy and the socialist struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, this phase first intensified then overcame the division of evolved societies into rival classes. However, because of this integration, there has also been a simultaneous division of

human beings into separate groups comprised of bureaucratic states, and idealized in an ideological representation, as something like kinship: 'nations'. The spreading interdependence of human action will smash the division of the human race into nations." He concludes by stating: "We have already embarked on the historical process that will disarm nations, uniting them in a world Federation."[20]

A Reformulation of the Theory of Raison d'Etat.

Albertini's use of historical materialism enables him to identify the basic tendency of contemporary history. But the adoption of this theoretical assumption is not *per se* sufficient to provide a framework for federalist action. Revolutionary action is a political action tending primarily to transform the structures of power. Hence the importance of political analysis.

The second theoretical assumption formulated by Albertini consists in the recovery and reinterpretation of the theory of *raison d'état*. He views this theory as a fundamental key — the most suitable of several — for approaching a concrete analysis of politics. It rests on the postulate that in political life, the prevalent behaviours are those which reinforce security and the power of the state.

There is an internal component of *raison d'état* which embodies the need of the state to assert its sovereignty with respect to other centres of power within its territory — in other words, to attribute to government the monopoly of force and to the state control over civil society. And there is also an external component of *raison d'état*, which stems from the distribution of power among a plurality of sovereign states in conflict amongst themselves. With the consolidation of the modern state and its sovereignty, the external component has become the most significant and prominent manifestation of the *raison d'état*. Because the world is divided into sovereign states which do not recognize any higher power, force dominates international relations and security is at the top of governments" agendas. "What results," writes Albertini, "is a situation of universal insecurity and a constant state of tension and military preparedness — a situation rightly described by federalists as 'international anarchy'— and the authoritarian degeneration of states. Economic disarray is another consequence."[21]

To guarantee security, governments are willing to sacrifice all other values of political coexistence and to use any means — they will even breach juridical and moral norms if necessary. *Raison d'état* is thus a

blind and irresistible driving force that does not tolerate limitations and imposes itself on all statesmen irregardless of the principles that inspire their political action. This is not the free choice of a value, such as war rather than peace, or authoritarianism rather than freedom. It is an acknowledgement of the need to adapt the structure and policy of the state to the domestic and international conditions for its survival.

The dominant culture deems the theory of *raison d'état* to be obsolete. On the one hand, it is conceived as indissolubly linked to an historic era, the era of the formation of the modern state, and to the absolutist structure of the latter. On the other hand, it is felt that *raison d'état* was defeated by the humanization of political power brought about by the liberal, democratic and socialist transformation of the state.

Nonetheless, when the circumstances of political life make it necessary to resort to force, *raison d'état* — though rejected in theory — is welcomed in practice. With its need to survive in a hostile environment, the behaviour of politicians tends constantly to break all links with the universal principles enshrined in state Constitutions (and the general rules adopted by its institutions). The compromise imposed by the *raison d'état* between values and facts, goes so far as to justify the degeneration of liberal states into fascism and communist states into Stalinism. This refusal of *raison d'état* in principle, alongside its acceptance in practice is a contradiction in traditional political thought that proves how solid are the foundations of political analysis based on the notion of *raison d'état*. But it also proves that the mainstream politics fails to understand a fundamental — indeed essential — aspect of political life. Of course the latter operates on the basis of its own laws, even when these are not recognized by politicians.

In Albertini's view, federalism alone properly interprets the theory of *raison d'état* with accuracy. He states that: "only the goal of peace, which requires that the politics of all states — not just one's own — be controlled in the general interest, renders international politics something that depends on human will. In all other cases, when there is a determination to directly control only the politics of one's own state, international politics will above all depend on which turn the clash between states takes, i.e. on a factor transcending the will of every state... Only the theory of a supernational government, and the consequent understanding that it is possible to control relations and stop contentions between states, depicts international relations as a process crafted by man and subject to the man's decisions, hence also an activity whose cause is well known and perfectly explainable."[22]

The theory of *raison d'état* does not therefore offer itself as the eternal law of politics, but rather as the theory of politics of a specific historical phase, that of international anarchy. It "must be viewed as something that emerges with a certain type of political organization (the system of sovereign and exclusive states, the armed defence of national independence, the need for nations to maximize their might, the subordination of all nations to the hierarchy of relations of force and of all values to that of national defence), and falls with another type of organization (world federation, the independence of nations ensured by law, the equality of nations as a consequence of the elimination of armed defence and hence also of the hierarchy established by relations of force)." The novelty of federalism consists in having established "the boundaries within which the concept [of *raison d'état*] can and must be applied."[23]

According to Friedrich Meinecke, the theory of *raison d'état* is "the science that provides the key to interpreting history."[24] However, by suggesting that relations of force between states — viewed as the determining factor for understanding and explaining the course of history — become the focus of all historical analyses, this theory leads to unilateral interpretations. In reality, it singles out only one of the laws commanding the historical process. Its field of application must be limited to the relatively autonomous sphere of politics. Viewed within these limits, the theory of *raison d'état* is a scheme of analysis capable of making an irreplaceable contribution to the understanding of history. If the viewpoint adopted is that of *raison d'état*, then the state can be regarded not as an isolated entity, but as a subsystem of the system of states. Accordingly, the form of the state and its policies are not portrayed as the product solely of domestic policy, but also of relations between the state and other states. "Modern historical science," writes Meinecke, "has so far made more extensive use of the doctrine of *raison d'état*, than political science, which in many respects is still influenced by the consequences of the old method aiming at the absolute, the search for the best state... rather than the concrete one."[25]

Despite the enormous development of empirical research in the field of politics, this remark still remains largely true. Political science is still very far from the formulation of a general theory. Albertini often stated that "a babel of languages spreads through the social sciences," and recommended giving "a negative replay to the question of the existence of a science of politics ..., that has not yet achieved results that are at least equal to those achieved by Adam Smith in his understanding of economic facts."[26] This observation is confirmed by the fact that political investi-

gation, especially when it probes political classes, pressure groups, elections and so on, remains heavily influenced by the categories of the national culture, which reflect the limitations of the traditional ideologies (liberalism, democracy and socialism).

Escaping this approach, that focuses research on to an individual isolated state, are the complex relations between domestic politics and international politics, between the state and the system of states. Insofar as scientific investigation attributes the study of international relations to internationalistic disciplines and separates the study of internal politics from international politics, it runs the risk of turning into a hindrance to the progress of knowledge. So it remains utterly true that serious historiography, especially as inspired by Leopold von Ranke, has been more capable than political science to identify the influence that relations of force between states exercise on domestic policy and on the very constitution of states. Thus, historiography has provided the impetus to "have a theory of politics in its unity," through research that analyzes the links existing between internal and international politics, and places the study of the state within the framework "of the world balance of power."[27]

To define the theoretical approach of *raison d'état* as the principle of "the primacy of foreign policy" implies opting for a vision of the political process that is just as unilateral and distorted as the one that stems from theories based on the decisive nature of "internal factors": the so-called principle of the "primacy of domestic policy." The proper context for studying all political actions is that of the system of states, which today has acquired the form of a world system of states, and the course of international politics is determined as much by political struggle within the states, as by the structure of the system of states. The contribution that all states make towards steering international politics is proportional to the power they hold and their ranking in the system of states. However, the adoption of *raison d'état* as an analytical method neglects the criterion offered by the materialistic conception of history, which highlights the influence of the social structure on the political superstructure and explains the different forms of the state on the basis of evolutions in the modes of production. The mistake made by the school of historiography inspired by Ranke is the opposite to that made by Marxism, which neglects the role of *raison d'état* and unilaterally emphasizes the effect that the development of the means of production has had on history.

These two models are generally regarded as incompatible, much like the political and cultural movements that generated them. However, it takes little to prove that, when taken separately, neither model can

adequately account for a vast field of variability, whilst jointly they are able to describe correlations that would otherwise be inexplicable. For instance, historical materialism explains the relationship between industrialization and the birth of modern bureaucratic states of national dimensions. However, the distinction between the rigid and centralized structure of the states of continental Europe and the flexible and decentralized structure of Great Britain is not just due to differences in the structure of their productive systems. The only thing that can explain this distinction is a political factor: the different role played by the continental powers with respect to the insular power in the system of states, stemming from the fact that the former were more exposed than the latter to the risk of aggression. The fact is that the different structure of those states cannot be explained by a difference in the structure of the productive system. It is completely incorrect to consider states, whatever form they may assume in any given era, as the sole product of economic and social development. For example, Great Britain and France are both unitary states, but their reaction to the issues raised by the advent of the industrial society was different and they forged quite different constitutional structures. It can therefore be stated that their institutions reflect the problems of the same era, but arise out of different political circumstances.

These remarks suggest an interesting working hypothesis based on the complementary nature of the models of historical materialism and *raison d'état*, viewed as parts of a unified theory of the historical-political process. In essence, Albertini's theoretical hypothesis is the following: historical materialism should be conceived as a general model explaining the link existing between a certain stage of the evolution of the mode of production and the dimension and form of states and the system of states, while the field of variability that historical materialism does not define is covered by the theory of *raison d'état*, viewed as the theory based on the principle of the relative autonomy of political power with respect to the evolution of the mode of production. If adequately explored, the theory according to which these two approaches are complementary seems to take us closer than each of the social sciences to understanding and predicting the course of history.

The Theory of Ideology.

The third theory formulated by Albertini is that of ideology, conceived as the form assumed by thought in the political sphere. The

development of ideologies was accompanied by the conviction that history can be object of rational comprehension. But this was only a partially founded conviction, since besides technical capacities of controlling social reality, ideologies contained elements of self-mystification. The word ideology itself has two different meanings. Albertini's observation is the following: "Though it may be inevitable in everyday language (after Marx) to equate the term 'ideology' with political and social self-mystification, it is not possible to reduce 'ideologies' (in the plural, hence liberalism and so on) to a mere 'ideology' (in the singular, hence self-mystification). It makes no sense to put liberalism, socialism and so on in the same basket as self-mystification. The great ideologies of the past, up to Marxism, largely constitute our political-cultural heritage and the tools we employ for analyzing historical and social matters, though it is plain that this is a non-critical learning — wisdom is the only yardstick — and that for this reason, it is within these ideologies that ideology manifests itself as self-mystification." Based on this premise, the systematic link between the two notions of ideology can be defined in the following terms: "As a mental process, self-mystification depends... on the confusion between value judgements and statements of fact. Consequently, if the values are highlighted and set apart, any facts disguised as values will collapse, and only values disguised as facts will be retrieved. This proves that self-mystification does not emerge, or can be suppressed, if values as such are elaborated or re-elaborated as such, in other words as the model for a desirable situation, without mistaking the elaboration of the model or goal for an understanding of the means of achieving it."[28]

Thus ideologies are formulas for analyzing society and history in order to control them and bring about their change. Ideologies define a political design which highlights the relevance of an historical period through the primacy of its corresponding institutions and values.

According to Albertini, ideology is the form assumed by active political thought: a conceptual system that permits the convergence of thought crucial to the cohesion of a political grouping and the consistency of its principles of action. Its active nature distinguishes it from philosophical and religious thought, i.e. it is action-oriented.

When Albertini tackled the problem of defining the notion of federalism, he came up against the shortcomings of current definitions which limited themselves to the institutional aspect, and he felt the need to develop a more comprehensive theory that would distinguish the value aspect from the structural and historical-social aspect. Albertini con-

tended that such an analytical approach was applicable to all ideologies.[29] The value aspect defines the goal pursued by the ideology. The structural aspect explores the way power must be organized to achieve the goal. The historical-social aspect defines the historical context within which it is possible to realize a value through the appropriate power structure.

Federalism as an Ideology.

Viewed from this standpoint, federalism becomes a far vaster subject than that covered by the theory of federal institutions. Yet even today, in the wake of *The Federalist*, many scholars continue to cultivate a narrow approach. In his book on federalism, Albertini remarks that the institutions are conditioned by society, which represents the infrastructure of the institutions, and the latter, in turn, constitute governmental tools for generating political decisions and thus pursuing specific values. Therefore, any comprehensive definition of federalism demands that alongside the institutional aspect, should also consider the historical-social aspect and the value aspect. If all three elements are taken into account, federalism becomes an ideology that has a structure (the federal state), value (peace) and an historical and social aspect (the overcoming of society's division into classes and nations). The value aspect of federalism is peace. Federalism is to peace what liberalism is to freedom, democracy to equality and socialism to social justice.

In this respect, Albertini shares Kant's political, juridical and philosophical-historical standpoint, which has been put at the top of the political agenda by the crisis of the national state and the expansion — across borders — of the interdependence of human action, of which European unification is the most highly developed embodiment. These phenomena should be regarded as the premises for perpetual peace through the construction of a world federation. Denying the nation, with European federation, means denying "the culture that fosters the political division of the human kind" and at the same time, affirming "within nations" a "truly human... multinational model,... the political culture of the unity of the human kind."[30] World wars and the nuclear weaponry would seem to suggest that Kant was correct when he predicted that it is only by experiencing the destructiveness of war that states would relinquish their "savage freedom" and bow to a common law.

The structural aspect of federalism lies in the federal state, which promotes the overcoming of the closed and centralized structures of the national state with the formation, downstream, of genuine regional and

local autonomies, and the realization, upstream, of effective forms of political and social solidarity, above and beyond national states.

The historical and social aspect of federalism consists in overcoming the division of the human kind into rival classes and nations: only thus can the pluralism develop that is typical of a federal society, and is expressed by the principle of unity in diversity. In federal societies, there is a level playing field in which loyalty towards the overall society actually coexists with loyalty towards smaller local communities – regions, provinces, cities, neighbourhoods and so on. But this social balance has developed only partially in past federal societies, because on the one hand class struggle has made the sense of belonging to a class prevail over all other forms of social solidarity and prevented strong bonds of solidarity from taking root in regional and local communities, and on the other, the struggle between states at the international level has strengthened the central authority at the expense of local powers.

The notion of federalism as an ideology does not just highlight the limitations of the reductionist approach, which defines federalism as merely a constitutional technique (K.C. Wheare). Albertini's critique is addressed also to such visions as the integral federalism of Alexandre Marc or Denis de Rougemont and that of Daniel Elazar, which define federalism as unity in diversity. Albertini calls this a generic and historically indeterminate concept, which traces the roots of federalism back to the dim and distant past, when the first forms of association emerged between tribes, and detects traces of it in all eras, from the leagues between the free cities of ancient Greece, to the Roman Empire, the city-republics of medieval Italy and Germany, the Holy Roman Empire and so on. The concept elaborated by Albertini, instead, has major consequences on the periodization of federalism. In his view, representative democracy constitutes an essential requirement for federal institutions. The outcome of this assumption is that the United States of America represent the archetypal federation. Hence it is not possible to class as federal any of the earlier political formations listed above: though they feature an institutional framework based on the decentralization of power, nonetheless they did not have a democratic structure. At most they can be classified as the precursors of federalism.

Crisis of the National State and European Unification.

In keeping with the above definition, Albertini divided the development of federalist thought into three phases. The first phase, going from

the French Revolution to the first world war, is characterized by the emergence, still only in principle, of the community and cosmopolitan component of federalism, opposed to the authoritarian and warlike aspects of the national state. The second phase is the period between the two world wars, when the criteria of federalism were resorted to to interpret the crisis of the national state and the European states system. The first phase began after the second world war and is still ongoing: in this phase the conceptual schemes and political and institutional tools of federalism are necessary for resolving the crisis of Europe.

It is easier to understand the significance of federalism if one starts looking at it from the point of view of what it negates, rather than what it affirms. In point of fact, the positive determinations of federalist theory have gradually become clear through the experience of refusing both the division of the mankind into sovereign states and the centralization of political power. Since these phenomena have appeared most distinctly in the Europe of nations, federalism has primarily cast itself as the *negation of the national state*.

The first task of Albertini's research programme was to elaborate a theory of the nation.[31] His aim was to tear apart the nation-centric paradigm of politics, which is the embodiment of an archaic culture unable to deal with the major issues of the contemporary world. The method used by Albertini was to define the nation on the basis of the empirical observation of human behaviour. The national behaviour is a behaviour of loyalty; its objective landmark is the state, which is regarded not as such, but rather as an illusory entity linked to cultural, aesthetic, sporting experiences whose specific nature is not national. Albertini wonders why an Italian, admiring the Gulf of Naples, claims that: "Italy is beautiful." At the heart of this statement lies a political phenomenon. When people attend national schools, celebrate national holidays, pay national taxes, and are conscripted into the national armed forces to be trained to kill and be killed for the nation, they express these behaviours in terms of loyalty to a mythical entity, the nation, an idealized representation of the bureaucratic and centralized states. Such an idealization of reality is the mental reflection of relations of power between individual and the national state. Albertini stretched the notion of ideology, which Marx had restricted to class positions, to include relations of power within the state. On this basis it is possible to demystify the idea of nation, which started out originally as a revolutionary idea and today has become an element of conservatism. Insofar as it depicts the political division between nations as something right and natural, even sacred, it opposes

the basic trend of contemporary history towards the internationalization of the production process, which demands that the state should organize itself on a vast political space along multinational and federal lines.

Federalism's negation of the national state appeared as far back as the French Revolution, when nationalism was also in its infancy, but initially and for quite some time emphasis was placed on principles and values. At that time, the conditions had not yet arisen for federalism to represent a viable political alternative to the organization of Europe into national states, and foster political action. However, the roots of federalism's opposition to the system of national states were deep. It is unreasonable to regard the liberal, democratic and socialist values that in the 19th century brought about new models of political coexistence, but were only partially and precariously realized within national states, as limited only to the national arena. On the other hand, the extension of those values to Europe as a whole, as a pathway to universal application, is impossible without employing federal institutions. The situation changed with the coming of the industrial society — specifically the second phase of the industrialization process that "increases the intensity and frequency of relations between the individuals of different state, expanding the sphere of international politics."[32] A new phenomenon now begins to emerge: *the crisis of the national state*,[33] the concept on which the theoretical autonomy of contemporary federalism is founded. This concept matches what liberal thought calls the crisis of the *ancien régime*, and socialism and communism call the crisis of capitalism; and through it, the basic contradiction of an entire era can be detected, and a global historical assessment formulated. It is the concept that both Trotsky and Einaudi employed to explain the first world war. German imperialism is seen as the negative expression of Europe's need for unity. The alternative to a Europe unified by violence is represented for both by the United States of Europe. But only after the second world war did the issue of European unity acquire a political nature. The process of European integration represents the historical issue that lies at the heart of Albertini's theoretical elaboration. He devised an impressive amount of analytical categories which, together, constitute the complex conceptual framework needed to master the process both theoretically and practically. There is too little space here to illustrate the many relevant aspects, so I will simply provide the main features of Albertini's interpretation.

In the period following the second world war, the national states were "no longer able on their own to fulfil the two fundamental tasks of any state: economic development and the defence of their citizens." Hence

the crisis of consensus towards national institutions. National governments were consequently "permanently faced with the choice of 'divided we fall, united we stand'... Their very *raisons d'état* gives them no other option than to resolve their problems jointly."[34]

In 1968 Albertini reached the conclusion the European integration had become "irreversible." His argument goes like this: "Integration in the ambit of 'the Six' is merely the most advanced stage of a much vaster process of integration of human activity at the world level whose character seems to be that of the beginning of a new historical cycle, that is, of an irresistible historical force. Naturally, an evolution of this kind is not immune to crises or even periods of stagnation or regression, crises or periods that could even, hypothetically, affect the Common Market. But it does exclude, in principle, the possibility of a lasting return to a closed domestic market forms." He concludes that the irreversibility of the process depends "on the evolution of the mode of production, i.e. on a primary historical factor."[35]

Albertini dedicated much of his intellectual energy to studying European unification, which he viewed as the foremost expression of the supranational course of history. Federalism is the formula that enables this process to be understood and controlled. Federalism today has a role comparable to what liberalism, democracy and socialism were in the past: through the development and dissemination of the culture of peace, federalism propounds a society capable of resolving the critical issues of our time; it reopens the possibility of thinking of the future, which was overshadowed in traditional ideologies because of the exhaustion of their revolutionary thrust.

However, to rise to this challenge, federalism must renew itself, elaborate new categories of analysis, and invent new institutional formulas. It asserts that it is "a new world, that mankind will learn to understand as it is built."[36] European Federation represents thus the crucial event of our time, the first real federal unification ever achieved, insofar as it will unite historically consolidated nations. It will represent a milestone in our history, the beginning of the unification of the human kind. In contrast, the significance of all the Federations that have existed until now was that of having created a new state in a world divided into states, in which the political division of mankind seemed to be an insurmountable condition.

European Federation will arise "from the negation of the political division of the human kind." According to Albertini, "This is, historically, the most important thing. National culture, conceived as the theory of the political division of the human kind, is one which by mystifying

liberalism, democracy and socialism — soviet or otherwise — legitimated the duty to kill. A duty negated by a culture that historically negates the political division of the human kind. It is a vindication in the sphere of thought of the political — not just the spiritual — right not to kill, and hence the historical framework for the struggle to affirm this right in practice, above and beyond European Federation, with the world federation."[37]

Federalism and Other Ideologies.

As we have seen, the goal of peace defines federalism as an independent ideology. The approach to the issue of peace and war defines the main difference separating federalism from other ideologies.

When the theorists of liberalism, democracy and socialism looked at the future of international relations, they imagined that people, unshackled from the domination of the monarchy, the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie and capitalism and as such, masters of their fate, would no longer resort to war. In short, it can be stated that liberalism, democracy and socialism share a common view of international politics, a view defined as internationalism: they interpret international politics using the same categories with which they explain domestic politics; they attribute international tensions and wars exclusively to the nature of the internal structures of states; and they consider peace as the automatic and necessary consequence of the transformation of the internal structures of states. Thus, internationalism is a political conception which in theory does not attribute any autonomy to the international political system with respect to the internal structure of individual states, or to foreign policy with respect to domestic policy; and in practice prioritizes the spread of freedom and equality within the individual states, at the expense of achieving peace and international order.

As Kant put it, peace becomes possible only if the states that join the world Federation have a republican constitution, in which each citizen accepts limitations to the exercise of their freedom, by obeying a common set of laws which everyone else is also willing to respect, having together contributed to drafting it.[38] In other words, freedom and equality are not vehicles of peace but merely "premises for peace."[39] The fulfilment of these principles allows for the achievement of a form of civil coexistence, featuring peaceable relations between individual, i.e. social pace. And social peace must be regarded as a requirement for international peace. On the other hand, the decision to join the Federation must be a free

choice: this is the difference between Federation and Empire.

Conversely, federalism considers international anarchy as a hindrance to consolidating freedom, democracy and social justice within states, and sees peace — the creation of an international juridical order — as the condition for defeating the warlike and authoritarian tendencies always simmering under the surface of the state. This viewpoint is a radical reversal of the prevalent thinking among followers of liberalism, democracy and socialism, who still today place the reform of the state above the achievement of international order, and delude themselves that peace will automatically flow from the dissemination of liberal, democratic and socialist principles within the individual states. So a clear-cut but generally unrecognized criterion is identified, which explains not only the reason why the dissemination of liberal, democratic and socialist principles has failed to usher in an era of peace, but also why these principles have taken such an incomplete and precarious foothold in a world of clashing sovereign states.

In conclusion, to quote Albertini's formula, "whilst the *historical affirmation* of each of these ideologies is one of the premises to peace, peace (as world government) in its turn is the necessary premise for *their complete realisation*, and this immediately shows that it is not possible to construct peace by merely strengthening these ideologies."[40]

Accordingly, federalism does not compete with the other ideologies, but complements them. This means that federalism "does not represent an alternative ideology to liberalism, democracy and socialism which, having promoted and organized the liberation of the middle class, the lower middle class and the working class, over the course of history became rivals — each of them excluding the others — thus obstructing the realization of their respective values of freedom and equality, which as such are complementary and not alternative. As a result, federalism does not need to smother liberalism, democracy and socialism in order to grow; on the contrary, federalism can thrive only by cooperating to complete the achievement of freedom and equality through peace, for which only federalism can provide the appropriate moral, institutional and historical settin."[41]

Normative Models and the Philosophy of History.

The study of federalism points out that this concept includes a value aspect, a normative dimension, which is typical of all crucial concepts in the vocabulary of politics, starting from the term "politics" and including

words like state, power, consent, legitimacy, freedom, democracy, peace and so on, which define contemporary facts and values. Politics, states, powers, consent, legitimacy, freedom and democracy have been something limited, provisional, contingent and — ultimately — contradictory. Just one example is sufficient to clarify this twofold aspect of the categories of politics. As Machiavelli noted, politics belongs to two different worlds: "You must know... that there are two methods of fighting: the one by laws the other by force: the first method is that of men, the second of beast."[42] Politics is an activity through which conflicts can be resolved by legal means or by violent means. Generally speaking, it can be stated that the former tend to prevail within states, whilst the latter prevail in relations between states, since states do not recognize a higher power governing their relations.

While it may be true that throughout the course of history, these two aspects of politics have always coexisted, it is equally true that they constitute a tear in the fabric of political coexistence, and a contradiction in the meanings of political life. An empirical analysis of politics will always be a partial one, suggesting the idea of a goal as yet unachieved: that of politics set free of violence.

When Albertini originally embarked on his meditation on politics, elaborating his own set of categories within the framework of political science,[43] he soon realized that the descriptive or empirical approach would never lead to a thorough analysis of the problems of politics. "Politics is not really itself," observed Albertini, "if it accepts the concurrent existence alongside the sphere of truly legal relations of a sphere of relations of force and oppression... This idea... of politics, though a constant throughout history, and an aspect typical... of politics in its evolutionary process, has not yet become one of the elements contributing to a positive understanding of social reality. This idea is still restricted to the fields of utopia and ideology... The positive study of facts, on the other hand, is in turn also restricted to so-called 'realism'... which, in truth, is by no means realistic, but rather reductive, since it does not consider ideals to be real."[44]

In Albertini's view, the study of authors like Kant, as regards peace, and Proudhon, as regards ownership, makes it possible to overcome the theoretical limits of a separate examination of the twin aspects of politics. "Starting from a primary observable fact, the empirical characteristics" of strength relations, which arise respectively in ownership or in international relations, "and a primary fact that can be theorized, the revolutionary transformation of human behaviour, Proudhon was able to demon-

strate that... the economy becomes itself, in other words, can only be truly founded on labour, only if it arises from the foundations of the law, as opposed to a wild clash of interests, clearing the field of the overwhelming of the weak on the part of the strong,"[45] and Kant was able to demonstrate that politics becomes itself if it abolishes violence from international relations, so that "every nation, even the smallest, can expect to have security and rights not by virtue of its own might or its own declarations regarding what is right but from this great federation of peoples (*foedus amphictyonum*), alone, a united might and from decisions made by the united will with laws."[46]

In conclusion, both Proudhon and Kant believed that strength relations were a form of social pathology, while the normative models they elaborated represented "as a whole, the model for social physiology."[47]

The elaboration of normative models meets the need to give moral values a rational basis. The features of these models must not be drawn from experience, but elaborated autonomously by reason. Kant stated in this regard: "Those who want to draw from experience the concepts of virtue... would make of virtue a vain and equivocal name, variable according to the times and circumstances, and untenable as a rule."[48]

Philosophy employs concepts *a priori*: this is probably the main reason for the discredit that has been cast upon the philosophy of history in contemporary culture.[49] However, the fact that the ultimate goal of history is defined *a priori* and thus represents a predetermined objective, does not constitute a drawback for Kant. On the one hand, reason obliges the human kind to strive to spread peace, and indicates the world Federation as the only model of political organization in which all men can be free and equal, and on the other, this goal can only be reached — or at least approached — if men themselves foster progress in that direction.

The rationale on which Kant founds his own progressive philosophy of history is that there is an "innate duty" in each man, which obliges him "so to affect posterity that it will become continually better." And he adds this thought: "History may well give rise to so many doubts... as to whether we may hope anything better for the human race, yet this uncertainty can detract neither from the maxim that from a practical point of view it is attainable, nor from the presupposition of its necessity."[50]

Albertini's mindset as far as politics is concerned, is that of a scientist, but a very special sort of scientist, with an active attitude towards politics. Though politics is an expression of "the attempt to submit the future to the plans of reason. This also implies that reason may have a role in history

(i.e. that history has a sense); it also implies a definite choice in favour of progress, instead of wondering abstractly if it is possible or impossible, thus avoiding the catastrophic error of applying reason to everything except that which decides everything: the course of history."[51]

In point of fact, normative models represent the essential terms of comparison for formulating an opinion not only of the constitutions, but also of the legislations that states adopt; to measure not only the proximity of the historical forms of political organization to the ideal form of a political order, but also the function of each political action with respect to a given goal. Above all normative models are necessary for determining if an action is compatible or not with that goal, and if it steers progress in that direction. Without making constant reference to the goal, progress cannot be measured. Normative models are thus like the North Star for sailors on the night sea. Metaphors aside, they are a reference point that sheds light on history as it unfolds. Consequently, their role is all the more important in relation to the problems of political action. In a nutshell, they are a necessary dimension for political action: by its very nature, political action is projected into the future, and thus requires yardstick against which to establish the meaning and direction of political choices. Politicians who propose to improve the conditions of political coexistence must understand the solution to the problems posed by history, and therefore the tools for subjecting social processes to human planning. This cannot take place without a model, without setting proposed solutions with the framework of a long-term plan for society's transformation.

Albertini dedicated a large part of his theoretical enquiry on a discussion of normative models, particularly those for peace and community. His elaboration of them has contributed to defining the general features of the federalist plan.

The Theory of Peace.

On the basis of Kant's theory that peace is the ultimate goal of the course of history, Albertini forges his own view of peace as a normative model. Peace, for Albertini, is a value that will give the world a rational order and history its meaning. Kant defines the concept of peace in entirely new terms, that have little in common with the interpretation of the term still being used today, where peace corresponds to an absence of hostilities, or a truce, a suspension of hostilities between two wars (i.e. negative peace). "The state of peace among men living in close proxim-

ity," wrote Kant, "is not the natural state," but rather something that "must ... be *established*" through the creation of a legal system and guaranteed by a power superior to the states (positive peace).[52] By defining peace as a political organization that makes war impossible, Kant accurately identifies the discriminating factor that separates peace from war and places truce (the situation in which, though hostilities have ceased, the threat still remains that they may erupt again) on the side of war.

Nonetheless, the dogma in which the dominant political thought is still rooted, is that our nation constitutes the centre of the political universe. The state-centric paradigm considers politics from the standpoint of the national interest and its pursuit, not from the standpoint of the common good of mankind. In an anarchic world, dominated by conflict between a plurality of national interests, there is no space for a universal interest — only the hegemony of the strongest. Therefore, the state-centric culture belongs to the world of war, insofar as war is the means that states resort to to resolve conflicts that cannot be resolved by diplomacy. So long as the world is divided by deep conflicts between rival groups (nations and classes) the line along which the historical process develops will be guided by the relations of force between these groups — i.e. something that no one ever wanted. The course of history continues to be a natural process beyond the control of human will and reason. This means that the elimination of war has never been one of the aims of the political struggle.

On the one hand, observes Albertini, "the world of states ... is based on war: *it is the world of war.*" On the other, "within each state politics is precisely the activity by which conflicts are peacefully resolved." Moreover, "history present a constant tendency towards an extension of the size of states, i.e. the transformation of previous war zones into zones of internal peace." Albertini interprets the deepest meaning of politics as "a gradual process of elimination of wars; and thus war is interpreted as the expression of the imperfection of politics, and peace as the expression of perfection of politics."[53]

This line of reasoning could also be extended to the notion of state. If the ultimate goal of the state, according to Hobbes, is peace,[54] then the state will correspond to this idea only if it eliminates all relations of force from political life. And with a world Federation this becomes a possibility, as it represents the fulfilment of the notion of state.

On various occasions Albertini analyzed the consequences of a world Federation, pointing for instance at the relationship between world government and control of the historic process. "... with the idea of world

government," he writes, "we acquire the possibility of conceiving not only the idea of an incontrolled historical process, but also that of a controlled historical process. In the latter case the historical process takes the form of a set of co-ordinated political decisions, within which the *general will*, which now takes shape also at the world level, will no longer be subordinate to *necessity* (taken as the international clash of national wills). Political will thus passes from the sphere of heteronomy to that of autonomy. And this entails at the same time the passage from history characterised by determinism to history guided by freedom."[55] In other words, with a world government, world politics cease to be the outcome of an anarchic clash between states, and can become the object of free and democratic choices. It is no longer necessity that determines political ends, but reason.

The Community.

Albertini contends that federalism creates the conditions necessary for a society set free from poverty and violence, in which mankind can create communities everywhere based on solidarity. "The roots of our values and relationships," he writes "lie in one respect in the state, which uses the monopoly of physical force to keep the peace, and in another respect (and this is the hidden face that Hobbes failed to emphasize) in human solidarity, which arises spontaneously without being imposed by any form of authority. Spontaneous social relations occur at the personal, neighbourhood and community level. This, the greatest fortune of human life, is nipped in the bud, in the absence of autonomy."[56]

Albertini observes the contemporary world and notes that: "the primary cause of our society's evils... is the defective distribution of power."[57] Indeed, only one level of government, the national level, holds truly independent power, and all other powers are subordinate to it. The UN is subordinate to its member states, the European Union, despite the maturity of its unification process, is still subordinate to national governments, regional and local communities are similarly subordinate to national governments. The reason for this state of affairs lies in the division of the world into clashing sovereign states, a situation that feeds the demand for security, social cohesion and the centralization of power generated by antagonism among the states.

Clearly, the old institutions that are our legacy are insufficient for tackling the world's great problems: peace, poverty, the environment, control over globalization and so on. These problems can only be

resolved at the international level. On the other hand, the centralization that is typical of the national state is another serious drawback of democratic institutions, preventing them from dealing with issues that could be solved more effectively and democratically at regional and local level. The state is too small to face major issues, but equally too large to deal with smaller issues.

For politics to regain the power to determine the fate of the human community, the obstacle that needs to be overthrown is the absolute sovereignty of the state. Federalism is the political formula that enables the distribution of political power to be reorganized, granting autonomy to all levels of government, from the local community to the United Nations. Ultimately, it can be said that statehood will be fully realized when it acquires the tools to govern the world within the framework of a world Federation. Universal peace, and with it the expulsion of violence from human history, represents the prerequisite for a sea change in the human condition. With peace as the backdrop, individual liberty can thrive as never before in history, and political coexistence can arise out of solidarity at the grassroots level.

The community constitutes the cornerstone of the federalist concept of politics. It must be viewed as the fundamental building block of a society in which all men and women live in peace, because peace is guaranteed by a worldwide federal system, and *raison d'état* has accomplished its purpose as the driving force of history. On this subject, Albertini writes: "Framed exclusively by law, people's behaviour would at last be dictated by the specifically human part of their nature, by the autonomy of reason and the moral law. People would no longer consider each other as a means, but only as an end. It goes without saying that in groups where the other is an acquaintance or someone who belongs to one's sphere of action, this relationship not only implies that others are never viewed as means to a personal end, as necessarily occurs in a regime of private ownership of the means of production, but it also implies that the good of others is felt as one's own. In other words, it implies the community, which is in fact the group in which everyone is an end and no one is a means in the concrete practice of life, in existential terms. A sense of community would thus become a normal part of the human soul, and this might conceivably pave the way for a real alternative to the private ownership of the means of production and the transformation of cities into communities."[58]

In his analysis, Albertini goes beyond identifying the centralization of the national state as the cause of the destruction of the kind of spontaneous

solidarity that characterized day to day neighbourly relations in past eras. He factors in another element, the industrial mode of production. "Industrialism," he writes "destroyed the brand of spontaneous solidarity that manifested itself at the neighbourhood level and rose to become a cultural conscience — everyman's personal and social identity — with the parish, just as the city identified with its bishopric."[59]

Albertini's analysis of the prospects opened up by post-industrial society adds new elements to the notion of community. The problem today is how to "give the city back to the people — human beings everywhere — with planned control of development,... the scientific organization of the territory... and the elimination of suburbs (i.e. geographical discrimination) and their replacement with veritable urban districts... The city can no longer be viewed as a physical place but as a global function, as a collection of city services distributed and available throughout the territory. The feeling of belonging to a city should therefore be shared by all those who use a network of services including manufacturing, green areas, communications systems, cultural centres etc. . Hence the city should be seen as a collection of urban districts in a framework that makes no distinction between city and country."[60]

The analysis ends with Albertini pondering schools, which he regards as society's self-education tool. Albertini recommends opening up the school to society: "An open school is not a school set apart from life... If it is to be the cultural hub of the neighbourhood and the city, then it must also be everyone's library, sports centre, sight and sound museum, debating hall and venue for exploring issues relevant to the neighbourhood and the city — a veritable urban laboratory. It is only through such a school and such relations between city and school that the motivation will be found to bring about a revival of solidarity, activity and work offered up freely for humane aims."[61]

Conclusions.

Man supplies responses to the problems raised by reality. Therefore, as Marx put it, "Mankind always sets itself only such problems as it can solve."[62]

Faced with the historical crisis of national states, federalism represents a political thought through which it is possible to understand and control contemporary history. Albertini was aware that knowledge is a powerful revolutionary force and considered federalist theory as the instrument of a political battle, whose aim he defined as "uniting Europe to unite the world."[63]

NOTES

[1] G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, Leipzig, F. Meiner, 1917, vol. I, p. 76.

[2] A. Spinelli, *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999, p. XII.

[3] *Ibid.* p. XIII.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 343.

[5] We know from his *European Diary* that in 1961 he planned a book, which never saw the light of day, entitled *L'Utopia democratica* (*The Democratic Utopia*). His aim was as follows: "The new world development of our age, envisaged by the communists only, is that humanity now has a sole political destiny that is applicable to all, and that this can be nothing other than freedom for all — that is, democracy. I must think about this deeply and, should I decide to do so, leave federalist activism definitively (to one) aside and write this book. Perhaps this is the way to give federalism that political and social scope that, since the beginning, everyone has asked me for and until now I have been unable to adequately provide." (A. Spinelli, *Diario Europeo. 1948–1969*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1989, p. 411).

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 301.

[7] B. Brecht, *Leben des Galilei*, Berlin, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1963, p. 125.

[8] K. Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*, in *Karl Marx. Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, ed. by T. Bottomore and M. Rubel, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1970, p. 82.

[9] M. Albertini, *Una rivoluzione pacifica*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999, p. 467.

[10] M. Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999, pp. 111-112.

[11] M. Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Glincoe, IL, The Free Press, 1949, p. 52.

[12] M. Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo, cit.*, p. 112.

[13] Plato, *Phaedrus*, in *Dialogues of Plato*, ed. by B. Jowett, Oxford, Clarendon, 1892, vol. I, p. 485.

[14] V.I. Lenin, *What is to be done?*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 25.

[15] M. Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo, cit.*, pp. 109-110.

[16] B. Croce, *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx*, Translation Publishers, 1981.

[17] M. Albertini, "Lettre ouverte à la JEF de Gênes", 14 September 1971, in *Le Fédéraliste*, XIV, 1972, n. 1-2, pp. 72-73.

[18] L. Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution.*

[19] *Engels an Conrad Schmidt*, 27 October 1890, K. Marx-F. Engels, *Ausgewälte Schriften*, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1974, p. 461.

[20] M. Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo, cit.*, p. 110.

[21] M. Albertini, *Il federalismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993, p.145.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 220-221.

[24] F. Meinecke, *Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neuren Geschichte*, München-Berlin, Oldenbourg, 1924, p. 23.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[26] M. Albertini, "War Culture and Peace Culture", in *The Federalist*, XXVI, 1984, no. 1, pp. 19-20.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[28] M. Albertini, *Il federalismo, cit.*, p. 92.

[29] *Ibid.* p. 91.

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 288-289.

[31] M. Albertini, *Lo Stato nazionale*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997. For comments on the question of nationhood in the evolution of Albertini's thought, see L. Levi, "The theory of Nation", in *The Federalist*, XL, 1998, n. 2.

[32] M. Albertini, *Il federalismo, cit.*, p. 147.

[33] M. Albertini, *Ibid.*, part IV.

[34] M. Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo, cit.*, p. 237.

[35] M. Albertini, "The Power Aspect of European Planning", in *The Federalist*, XLI, 1999, no. 2, p. 127.

[36] M. Albertini, "War Culture and Peace Culture", in *The Federalist, cit.*, p. 18.

[37] M. Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo, cit.*, p. 135.

[38] I. Kant, "To Perpetual Peace", in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, ed. by T. Humphrey, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1988, pp. 112-114.

[39] M. Albertini, *Il federalismo, cit.*, p. 41.

[40] M. Albertini, "War Culture and Peace Culture" in *The Federalist, cit.*, p. 28.

[41] M. Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo, cit.*, pp. 181-182.

[42] N. Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses*, New York, Modern Library, 1950, p. 64.

[43] See the item "Politica" on the *Grande dizionario enciclopedico*, Turin, UTET, 1960, vol. X, pp. 203-208.

[44] M. Albertini, *Proudhon*, Florence, Vallecchi, 1974, pp. 105-106.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

[46] I. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Intent", in *Perpetual Peace, cit.*, pp. 34-35.

[47] M. Albertini, *Proudhon, cit.*, p. 107.

[48] I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Berlin, Otto Hendel Verlag, 1899, p. 319.

[49] On this subject, M.R. Cohen observes: "Perhaps the most important obstacle to the development of the philosophies of history today is the prevailing fear of the *a priori*." He adds that "this is amazing, if we reflect" that "the philosophy of history ... surely is the focal point of all applications of philosophy to life" (*The Meaning of Human History*, La Salle, IL, Open Court, 1961, pp. 3-4).

[50] I. Kant, "On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But is of no Practical Use", in *Perpetual Peace, cit.* p. 86.

[51] M. Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo, cit.*, p. 144.

[52] I. Kant, *To Perpetual Peace, cit.*, p. 111.

[53] M. Albertini, "War Culture and Peace Culture" in *The Federalist, cit.*, p. 26.

[54] T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1904, p. 123.

[55] M. Albertini, "War Culture and Peace Culture" in *The Federalist, cit.*, p. 23.

[56] Movimento Federalista Europeo, *Unione Europea subito, Atti del XII Congresso*, Pavia, EDIF, 1984, p. 18.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[58] M. Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo, cit.*, pp. 110-111.

[59] M. Albertini, "Discorso ai giovani federalisti", in *Il Federalista*, XX, 1978, n. 2-3, p. 61.

[60] *Ibid.*

[61] *Ibid.*

[62] K. Marx, "Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", in *Karl Marx, cit.*, p. 68.

[63] M. Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo cit.*, p. 177.

Federalism and *Raison d'État*

SERGIO PISTONE

One of the fundamental aspects of the theory of federalism developed by Mario Albertini is its proximity to the theory of *raison d'état*. Inspired by Immanuel Kant and Alexander Hamilton, this connection is also very much alive in the founder of the European Federalist Movement, Altiero Spinelli; however, it is Albertini who provides the most compelling conceptual insights.[1]

It should be stressed that the theory of federalism is not totally identical to the theory of *raison d'état*: rather, the two converge in their understanding of politics, and diverge in respect of their evaluations of it. Specifically, *federalists apply an understanding of the laws of politics based on the teachings of the theory of raison d'état to serve peace rather than the power of their state,* as is generally the case among those who espouse Realpolitik. On the other hand, this complex relationship constitutes the primary distinction between the stance of federalists and that of internationalists and pacifists: though sharing a common value system (with peace the foremost value), there is less agreement on the means for achieving peace. Moreover, the realist's clear vision of the laws controlling the acquisition and maintenance of power constitutes the *conditio sine qua non* for the federalist's definition of a valid strategy for the concrete political struggle to attain peace.

In order to clarify these statements, it is necessary to review the fundamental teachings of the theory of *raison d'état*, which envision two main assumptions: the primacy of the state over society and the state sovereignty-international anarchy dichotomy.[2]

The Primacy of State over Society.

The basic assumption behind the paradigm of raison d'état goes along with the view that the state is the irreplaceable tool that makes possible peaceable coexistence amongst peoples within complex societies, in other words societies founded on the division of labour and a

mercantile economy — which paved the way for the industrial revolution — whose roots date back to the European Middle Ages. Such societies are highly dynamic but structurally conflictual, and conflict can only be managed peacefully by means of a specific control mechanism. This entails the division of society into a small minority, that holds power and enforces the rules that are indispensable for peaceable coexistence, and a huge majority which is subordinate to this power. For it is the monopoly of force which — beyond the formal attributes of indivisibility, originality etc., constituting the material basis of the state's sovereignty — allows the governing minority to enforce a universally valid and effective legal system and prevent society from self-destroying. Therefore this implies a class of people — the "political class" — whose specific job is to seek power. Often there is an underlying personal craving for power: however, there is also a corresponding social need since power is indispensable for society to reproduce itself.

The creation of a monopoly of force in the hands of a central authority, generally a monarch, required centuries of determined struggle, because it meant disarming the nobility and the Communes, and uprooting feudal anarchy. During this phase, the modern state strived — and in some ways is still striving — long and hard, to civilize the population it governed, the basic tenets of the process being the moral advancement that comes from accepting (and thus progressively internalizing) the relinquishment of the use of individual violence to safeguard personal interests, and the economic and social progress made possible by the certainty of law. This then was the backdrop against which the State underwent deep transformations driven by the emancipating ideologies rooted in the Enlightenment, which are liberalism, democracy and socialism. In actual fact, these transformations ushered in several additional factors that were crucial for the peace-making function of the state.

The state's monopoly over legitimate force, i.e. the disarming of the individuals and groups making up society, is regarded as the first principle of statehood, a condition without which there would be a return to a war of all against all — a situation today described as "Yugoslavization", or "tribalization." This first element is supported by a second, represented by the rule of law: a set of checks and balances such as bills of rights, the primacy of law, division of powers, judicial independence, and so on, which are an integral part of liberal thought; mechanisms that serve to prevent the monopoly of force from becoming pure abuse of power — dictatorship — and being legitimated, thus paving the way for individuals to take up arms, and ultimately civil war from

breaking out. Historically the third element is the participation of all citizens, men and women, in the making of laws and the control of government, a principle enshrined in particular in democracy, which then gradually developed as the industrial revolution made all social classes aware of their interests and rights. Without this element, those segments of society who have no influence over political decision-making are inevitably tempted to disregard the law. The fourth element brings the welfare state into the picture. Enshrined in socialism, its main focus is social justice. The perception that the welfare state's overriding function is to keep the peace is based on an awareness that the market economy is partly the driving force behind human emancipation and thus the development of a modern, pluralistic and open society, and partly a ceaseless source of inequality, imbalance and marginalization. Such phenomena need to be effectively curbed by means of control and solidarity mechanisms enforced by public authority, otherwise the state is perceived as a power pursuing the interests of only one part of society instead of the general interest, thus strengthening the urge to resort to violence.

International Anarchy.

The basic assumption in respect of which the state is the irreplaceable tool for achieving peaceable coexistence amongst the members of society, then leads logically to the second fundamental teaching of the paradigm of *raison d'état. Which is that it is in the dichotomy of state sovereignty-international anarchy that the structural difference lies between relations within the state and relations with other states.*

So while the modern state may be characterized by a progressive tendency towards an advance of civilization within its borders, international relations between states in the framework of the modern European system of states which later ushered in the world system of states. Whereas it is the central authority that disarms the individuals and groups that form the fabric of society, compelling them to resort to law instead of violence to settle their disputes, in relations between states not only is the use of weapons universal, but there is also a relentless race towards ever more powerful and efficient weapons. All states resort to the threat and use of force to safeguard their interests, with the smallest relying on stronger allies if need be. Insofar as the state not only obliges but also teaches its subjects to forgo violence in reciprocal relations, it also obliges and teaches a growing number of its subjects to take up arms and use force in international relations, and consequently, to mistrust populations who

live over the border and to hate them in the event of armed conflict. Then when the state moves towards liberalism, democracy and socialism, the principles and rights that this development brings onto the scene are systematically set aside at times of actual or impending war, if not quashed altogether. Suffice it to mention secret diplomacy, state secrets, censorship, the strengthening of the central authority at the expense of local autonomies, which are all patent infringements of the most important democratic principles, but are nonetheless routinely resorted to by democratic states. The very principles of economic efficiency are disavowed when the state is called upon to flex its muscles in a trial of strength with other states. Take, for instance, state aid to manufacturing sectors that are inefficient but still regarded as strategically important.

In focussing their attention on this character of international relations, the theorists of *raison d'état* have based their entire rationale upon the concept of international anarchy. They argue that international anarchy is the structural situation responsible for the qualitative difference between the internal evolution of the state and the evolution of its international relations. In essence, international anarchy means the absence of government, i.e. of a supreme authority capable of imposing a valid and effective legal system. Such an authority became enshrined in internal relations when the central authority of the state began monopolizing power, but the same did not occur in international relations because of the large number of sovereign states, or rather of completely autonomous monopolies on power. Consequently, the society of states lacks the *conditio sine qua non* for effectively imposing the rules needed to ensure the peaceable coexistence of states, and the peaceful — legal — settlement of international disputes. A trial of strength between the parties is the only way to solve them, and all international law can do is to sanction such an outcome. War is invariably on the agenda and is always lurking in the background, even in peace time, because even in peace time states realize that war is a permanent possibility, and prepare for this eventuality.

In a situation like this, each state must practise a form of "power politics", which does not strictly speaking mean an overly aggressive or violent foreign policy, but rather one that lives in permanent readiness to deal with trials of strength, from the mere threat to the actual use of force, and that consequently keeps on hand, and in extreme cases even, uses force, in the shape of armaments, alliances, and the rapid filling of power vacuums — sometimes even trickery and fraud. In the framework of anarchy that structurally characterizes the international scenario, the prime concern of those who rule over states is to ensure external security, in other words, to effectively defend the state's interests in trials of strength involving other states, and withstand attempts by the latter to impose their will. And when the state's security is threatened, what gets sacrificed to an extent commensurate to the menace, is the legal, ethical, political (in terms of the dominant political doctrines) and economic principles that are generally upheld when external security of the state is not menaced. The primacy of security is what explains the different evolution — within the European system of states — of island states, of which the paradigmatic example is Great Britain, versus continental states, of which the paradigmatic example is Prussia-Germany. In the case of island states, a favourable strategic position (i.e. no land boundaries to defend), has led to the successful development of more liberal and decentralized institutions; in the case of continental states, a security position that is structurally more vulnerable and precarious due to the need to defend land boundaries, which are easier to cross, has countered the expansion of liberal politics and favoured authoritarianism and centralization.

The concept of international anarchy reveals the structural absence of a valid and effective legal system and hence the supremacy of the rule of force in international relations. This explains how it is that within the State there is, in the absence of deep institutional crisis or even civil war, a certain degree of certainty and predictability in inter-human relations which, albeit within the limitations posed by the existence of an unavoidable sphere of lawless relations, is nonetheless qualitatively different to the structural fickleness of international relations. But this explanation, however, falls short of defining the international arena as chaotic, and dominated by ceaseless, irrational and unpredictable bickering between states, nor does it mean that the situation is totally devoid of order. In fact, right from the very start the theoreticians of *raison d'état* sensed the existence in the international arena of other structural elements, above and beyond the more general element of international anarchy, which curb the chaos in international relations and render its concrete developments somewhat more predictable. In an effort to clarify these additional elements and thus more easily predict the pattern of international relations, the advocates of *raison d'état* hammered out the notion of the *system of states*, whose salient features I will now illustrate.

The notion arises from the observation that relations of force between states have led to the formation of an iron-clad hierarchy, with the *major powers* at the top of the pile, i.e. the states with enough muscle and

interests to protect themselves on their own, and the *mid-sized* and *small powers* at the bottom, i.e. those that must seek the protection of one of the great powers or the promise of their neutrality. This situation automatically implies that the fundamental decisions that shape the evolution of the international system are taken by the great powers, representing a minority among the world's sovereign states. This group essentially *governs the world*: it sets the formal and informal rules by which international relations must be played. Clearly, this is not a legitimate government founded on the monopoly of force, much less a democratic form of government, therefore it is qualitatively different to the government within the framework of a sovereign state. In the European system of states, there were never more than six great powers at any given time: in this multipolar system, some saw their status slide, others disappeared altogether, only to be replaced by 'new entries'. Conversely, the world system that emerged after the two wars was dominated until the end of the East-West conflict by two superpowers: the United States and the USSR, in a bipolar system. Today the situation is unsettled and very probably transient: there are monopolar aspects (i.e. the supremacy of the US) alongside tendencies towards multipolarism (the rise of China, India and the European Union — in addition to the fact that the Russian federation still harbours a massive nuclear weapons stockpile and possesses great and as yet unfulfilled economic potential.

The existence of the great powers constitutes a structural cornerstone in the framework of international anarchy, and brings an albeit general element of order into international relations, in particular between large and small states. *Balance* is another essential element, and it can be seen governing relations among the great powers; it also adds an element of order. By stating that balance has been underpinning relations between the great powers, what is really being said is that there is an enduring condition of relatively equal force among the great powers dominating the European and world system (as well as among the city-states of ancient Greece and 15th century Italy). Such a situation prevented any one state from rising above the others, and therefore implied the automatic quelling of any hegemonic ambitions through the formation of a coalition of several great powers against the strongest state and its allies, or simply through the opposition of one power against the other in the case of a bipolar system. However, though the mechanism of balance was clearly not enough to repress international anarchy, with its violent and belligerent manifestations, it was able to curb them. Widespread wars have broken out only when the scales have been tipped by a major power

unleashing its hegemonic impulses, whilst when balance reigns there have been long periods in which wars were absent or limited. It has been thanks to balance in the European and world system that the great powers have been able to preserve their independence, and that a pluralistic system of sovereign states has thrived, even going so far as to allow mid-sized and small powers to enjoy a limited degree of autonomy.

Any discussion of balance between the powers cannot overlook the views of realists about the sea change brought about by the discovery of atomic and nuclear weapons. The quantum leap that these weapons of mass destruction, including an increasingly lethal array of chemical and bacteriological weapons, have determined in international anarchy's relentless pursuit of ever more efficient armaments, has led to a radically new form of balance. What has developed is a system of deterrence, known also as the *balance of terror*: a situation in which all-out war between the great powers would be a collective suicide, leading to such total destruction as to wipe the human race from the face of the earth. But while the rational inconceivability of all-out war has not eliminated relations of force between the states or war on a limited or local scale, it has shifted the accent of national security from defence to weapons control and the prevention of war. Essentially, relations between the great powers now feature a new factor: solidarity for the sake of common survival.

Scientific progress has brought about another history-making consequence: environmental interdependence. This means a situation where a growing number of decisions that are within the realm of each state's sovereignty, including the decision to wage war, can lead to catastrophes of continental and global proportions, and ultimately jeopardize the survival of life on the planet earth. The situation also demands solidarity for survival, which translates into the need for growing international cooperation and increasingly stringent regional and global accords to counter threats against all of humanity.

Besides the interdependence of states associated with the challenge to our common survival, contemporary realism also takes into account the influence on international relations of *growing economic interdependence*, associated first with the industrial revolution and then the technical-scientific revolution. In every state, the expansion of prosperity has gone hand in hand with the opening up of markets, and insofar as the rational inconceivability of all-out war is concerned, this has powerfully stimulated international economic cooperation.

Among the factors curbing the violence associated with international

anarchy, it is worth noting that unlike states with authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, states with liberal democratic regimes, featuring an effective separation and a substantial decentralization of powers — or even a federal structure — are more unlikely to adopt a belligerent foreign policy, since the balance between the powers of the state hinders rapid decision-making and intervention at the international level. This by no means implies the existence of an automatic nexus between democracy within states and the overcoming of relations of force between states.

All the factors illustrated above tend to preserve the pluralistic nature of the international system, and to some extent discourage trials of strength; as such they have given rise to several significant phenomena typical of international relations, which need now to be pondered.

It must first be noted that the hierarchy between states and the balance among the major world powers constitute two fundamental structural elements in the framework of international anarchy, determining its transformation from a loose grouping of states into a system of states, or rather, an arrangement — as the word "system" suggests — featuring a certain order, and therefore generating relatively comprehensible and predictable concrete developments. Historically, the balance between the major powers, in particular, constitutes the factual condition that led the world' states to recognize one another reciprocally and formally as sovereign states. In modern Europe, this permitted the rise and gradual spread of international law, along with its relative effectiveness despite the fact that it did not derive from a sovereign power. According to the paradigm of *raison d'état*, in point of fact, the rules of international law that states effectively abide by derive their factual authority not so much from the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*, which is essentially a value judgement, as from the fact that given a balanced scenario, where it is factually impossible to eliminate the sovereignty of other states, the main actors in the international system have had to recognize the need to coexist, for better or worse. Though not relinquishing power politics or war as a last resort, they have settled for regulating their anarchical coexistence by forging a special sort of law, one that justifies the routine use of violence and is subordinate to relations of strength and hierarchies between states. In short, though no sovereign power enforces compliance with international law, there is nonetheless a situation of power, albeit as unstable as the balance between the sovereign states, which largely amounts to the same thing. As to the forms of interdependence mentioned earlier, which developed within the system of states, these lie at the basis of international organizations like the United Nations; their development

in the postwar period has been far more dramatic that at any other time. Expanding international interdependence — of which economic globalization represents the latest development — has indeed imposed increasing cooperation between states, and accordingly international law has acquired unprecedented quantitative and qualitative importance for managing major issues that cannot be settled by isolated actions on the part of individual states. The role of non-governmental actors in international relations has also become more relevant; these include multinationals and non governmental humanitarian and environmental organizations.

Many experts in international relations observe these phenomena and argue that the fundamental concepts of state sovereignty and international anarchy are increasingly unable to describe contemporary reality, since state sovereignty has become largely eroded and with it the very foundations of the qualitative distinction between international and internal relations. Advocates of the paradigm of *raison d'état* dispute that international organizations are dominated factually (and formally in the case of the UN Security Council) by the superpowers, adding that the role of the multinationals, though important, is still ultimately dictated by the power of the state they belong to, while the function of the NGOs, in the framework of inter-state cooperation, does not challenge the rules of the game put in place by the great powers. Thus the states remain the leading actors in international relations, which are governed by force, unlike internal relations; all states in fact maintain larger armed forces than their internal security would warrant. If the state sovereignty-international anarchy dichotomy still stands, then one must ask how it is possible to reconcile the anarchic structure of inter-state society with the survival and progress of mankind. Does history's agenda now call for the creation of an effective and democratic world government, and how can this be achieved? This question raises the issue of the federalist paradigm and how it encompasses and overrides the paradigm of *raison d'état*.

Perpetual Peace and the World Federal State.

We stated at the outset that the distinction between federalist theory and theory of *raison d'état* lies not in the cognitive aspect, about which there is substantial convergence, but rather in the evaluative one. The value guiding theorists of *raison d'état* is security, and thus the power of their state, since they cannot conceive of eliminating international anarchy. In short, they view the plurality of absolute sovereign states not as a stepping stone in history's development, but as the journey's end.

This reflects an ideological prejudice of a nationalistic nature which holds, through different arguments according to the various trends forming the tradition of *raison d'état*, that the principal driver of progress lies in the plurality of sovereign states and hence in their contentious relations. Conversely, the value guiding federalists is peace and thus the conviction that at this historical juncture of our advanced industrial revolution, commitment towards human progress is indissolubly linked with concrete commitment towards non-violent international relations. Fuelling this belief are the enlightened thoughts on peace contained in the political-legal writings of Kant and in his philosophy of history, which need to be briefly alluded to here.[3]

First of all, Kant explains clearly what peace is, based on a realistic vision of international relations. Peace must not be mistaken for the mere absence of war. Such periods are simply phases of truce between wars because, as long as anarchical relations exist between states, and no higher authority exists to force them into lawful relations, war will always be the typical tool for settling international disputes on issues regarded as vital. War is therefore always present even when it is not being actively waged, because states use truce to prepare themselves not just militarily but also economically, socially, politically and morally for war. *International anarchy cannot coexist with peace, which transforms relations of force between states into legal relations proper, making war structurally impossible by the expansion of statehood on a universal scale.*

Secondly, Kant forges a vital link between the overcoming of international anarchy — the realization of perpetual peace — and the constitution of a republican system within the state. By this Kant meant what we today would call a liberal-democratic regime, and he believed that it represented a fundamental milestone in the development of the human race. On the other hand, he went along with the teachings of the theorists of *raison d'état*, who maintained that the existence of power relations between states makes external security a priority. This favours authoritarian tendencies and structures in the internal life of the state since these are better able to preserve and consolidate the power needed to survive amid international anarchy. Kant therefore realized that at times of crisis, liberal and democratic principles would be systematically laid aside in favour of *raison d'état*, i.e. the principle that security is the state's uppermost priority.[4] It should be noted that this consideration applies equally to socialism, which at the time of Kant had not yet emerged as one of the modern world's major ideologies: like liberalism and democracy, socialism has always viewed the *raison d'état* as a definite hindrance to

the fulfillment of its demand for social justice, and hence to implement for the whole population the principles of liberalism and democracy. Kant had a realistic view of the despotic implications of power politics; he contended that international anarchy would need to be overcome to permit the full expansion of republicanism.

It goes without saying that the concept of perpetual peace elaborated by Kant at the end of the 18th century cannot be regarded as mere utopianism: Kant was acutely aware that it will take a very long time for mankind to mature sufficiently to realize perpetual peace. However, there is a real chance that it will materialize. On the one hand, history has witnessed the overcoming of anarchy in relations between individuals through the creation of a state capable of imposing respect of the law from within. Therefore it cannot be ruled out *a priori* that with further progress, international anarchy might also be overcome. On the other hand, displaying an extraordinary capacity to foresee the huge challenges of the 20th century that would eventually usher in supranational integration, Kant argues that such progress will be driven by the combined strength of two powerful historical forces. One is the development of trade, which will make mankind increasingly interdependent and thus multiply the opportunities for conflict, but also create a strong need for tools to peaceably resolve conflicts, which means enlarging statehood. The other factor has been identified as the growing destructiveness of war due to scientific and technological advancement, which will call for a determined effort to overcome the phenomenon of war to escape the fate of collective self-destruction.[5]

It has to be stressed that Kant's enlightened thoughts on the need for supranational democratic unification were not matched by a clear vision of the institutional system required to achieve this goal. Though making reference to federation, the German philosopher had no first hand knowledge of a federal state, the first example of which came about with the drafting at the Philadelphia Convention of the Constitution of the United States of America in 1787, and whose theory had been elaborated in particular by Alexander Hamilton.[6] According to this theory, the federal state — which attributes to central government only the tasks deemed as essential for maintaining political and economic unity (foreign policy, defense, currency and, in general, the economic decisions needed to preserve the unity of the market) and leaves the federal states the utmost autonomy — is the only institutional system that allows democratic participation to be organized on a continental and possibly even global scale; in other words, the only system that can unite democracies without

the drawbacks of a centralized state. *So the federal state is the constitutional structure that can realize peace based on democratic government, by subordinating all of the world's states to an authority capable of replacing relations of force with relations based on the law.*

Having reviewed Kant's thoughts on perpetual peace, we can now say that one of the most qualifying aspects of the MFE's federalist theory is its ability to follow through and render his thoughts relevant to today's world. *Albertini picks up where Spinelli left off, demonstrating with unparalleled and uncompromising clarity that peace has become the supreme goal of the political struggle in the era of the 'second' industrial revolution and of the transition towards the scientific revolution, and that federalism is the institutional tool for attaining this goal. In particular, Albertini convincingly argues that the European Federation must be regarded as the first and most significant milestone on the path towards world federation.*[7] To grasp the significance and clarity of this theory of federalism, which brings together the realism of the theory of *raison d'état* with the pacifism of Kant, I draw the reader's attention to a specific point that is of central relevance to the matter at hand: federalism's critical stance on internationalism and the capacity to transcend it.

Federalism's Critique of Internationalism.

Internationalism began to be espoused at the end of the 18th century — around the time of the French Revolution — by the prevailing ideologies that initiated processes of deep change in the structure of the modern state. Liberalism, democracy and socialism (including both varieties, social-democracy and communism) can all trace their philosophical origins directly or indirectly back to the emancipating and universalistic thrust of enlightenment.

There are two main aspects to the internationalistic component of these ideologies: the first is cosmopolitanism, according to which it is impossible to consider the values of liberty, equality and social justice as principles valid for only one country and its domestic domain. Since these values are intrinsically universal, their realization at the national level can only be regarded as a necessary step towards their extension across Europe and the world. The second element is the theory of the primacy of internal politics, as referred to international relations and the causes of war, and thus also the means for realizing peace. According to this notion, war essentially depends on certain structures typical of states, therefore when such structures are overcome, the elimination of war and the

development of a system of enduringly peaceful relations between states must necessarily follow.

Liberalism, democracy and socialism take a radically different view of the domestic structures they regard as the basis of political power, and the structures that can override it. In essence: according to liberal beliefs the fundamental cause of war lies in aristocratic-absolutist politics and mercantile-protectionist economics; consequently, the emergence of representative governments elected only by the well-to-do, along with the division of powers and the growth of international trade should quell the belligerent tendencies of states. Democracy sees the cause of wars in the authoritarian character of governments and hence views peace as the automatic result of establishing popular sovereignty. Socialism, lastly, regards modern capitalism's exploitation of workers as the ultimate cause of imperialism and war, pointing to the struggle for social justice as the key to dissolving antagonism between the classes and at the same time ensuring peace; for social democrats, social justice brings the welfare state into the liberal democratic picture, while for communists it means completely abolishing private property of the means of production and subsistence to the people, and introducing the dictatorship of the proletariat. But apart from these differences, the internationalistic approach shares the conviction that a world made up of liberal, and respectively, democratic, socialist and communist states, would be steered by liberal and, respectively, democratic, socialist and communist ideas and therefore this would stamp out phenomena associated with power politics and caused by the as yet incomplete or non universal fulfillment of the principles of internal organization of the state as affirmed by those ideologies.

Federalism is a far cry from this approach, which essentially sees foreign policy as a function of domestic policy.[8] In terms of values, federalists are cosmopolitan for two reasons: because they believe in the universality of democracy, which, to be effective, must blend with liberalism and social justice; and because their guiding value is universal peace. It is, indeed, federalism's ability to fully appreciate the teachings of political realism that distances it from internationalism, in terms of the former's identification of the institutional tools necessary for achieving peace, and of the concrete political action — the strategy, in fact — with which to strive for it.

Federalists realize that power politics and the anarchical structure of the society of states are inextricably intertwined, and as such they acknowledge the fundamental autonomy of foreign policy with respect to

domestic policy. Therefore, it is their view that the priority of external security represents an insurmountable hindrance to the full attainment of democracy. Hence, the conviction that peace requires far more than struggles inspired by internationalist ideologies that aim primarily to bring about domestic change, while on the international front they are represented organizationally and institutionally at the level of civil society by international associations, and at the level of inter-governmental relations, from the League of Nations to the United Nations. International anarchy must, instead, be quashed by federal ties that eliminate the absolute sovereignty of the state.

The superiority of the federal over the internationalist approach is not only a question of faith: history since the French Revolution also proves it. In fact, as regimes have come and gone, either naturally or following revolutions, the European (and thus the world) system of states has taken many different turns both internally and internationally, but one thing has remained unchanged: the tendency of the political classes to consider external security a priority above and beyond all else, and to behave according to the dictates of *raison d'état*, irregardless of the ideological affinities shared by different states. This general consideration needs to be qualified with regards to contemporary democratic internationalism. But first several points have to be clarified. To start with, while democracy in the past has clashed, sometimes quite aggressively, with liberalism and social democracy, today there is a common tendency in the industrialized world to believe that the democratic system must necessarily incorporate liberal principles (as a guarantee against majority rule) and the welfare state (as a condition for all citizens to be truly free and equal). The basis of this convergence — which admits differing opinions and hence tolerates clashes between progressives and conservatives who nevertheless do not dispute the democratic system as their common home — lies in economic and social progress, which may have failed to overcome conflicts between the different segments of society, but has certainly resolved the existential conflict between opposing classes. Secondly, democratic internationalism today enjoys a dominant position worldwide: following the collapse of soviet communism there is no significant internationalistic alternative to democracy. Thirdly, democratic internationalism is the only true dialogue partner of federalism, which has traditionally opposed totalitarian leanings both towards the right and the left.

Having cleared up these points, it needs to be emphasized that federalism's critical view of democratic internationalism does not imply

a belief that the success of the democratic regime is irrelevant with respect to the issue of overcoming international anarchy. Quite the opposite: the inescapable condition for effective federal relations between states is — as mentioned earlier — their democratic nature, both because the federal state is a constitutional system capable of extending democratic government over an ever increasing area and ultimately the entire world, and also because an authoritarian or totalitarian power that will not accept limits internally, cannot accept them externally either, unless imposed by force. But in this case we would have an empire and not a federation.

So while democracy is the prerequisite for realizing peace, the fact remains that it does not automatically lead to this goal: per se, democracy does not imply the overcoming of international anarchy. It should be noted that this statement is not convincingly refuted by theorists of democratic internationalism, who state that throughout history most wars are between non-democratic states or waged by the latter against democratic states, particularly in the period after 1945, when, it is argued, a sort of "perpetual peace" came into being among democracies.[9] There are several weaknesses in these claims, which obviously deny the inseparable link between peace and the overcoming of the absolute sovereignty of the state: they overlook the existence of nuclear weapons, which make war between the great powers an inconceivable eventuality; the hegemonic power of the United States over other democracies since 1945; the fact that within the framework of American hegemony, Western Europe has embarked on a profound process of supranational integration (which we will explore later), characterized by the seeds of federalism and a level of interdependence such as to render a war between member-states impossible.

In reality, the failure to admit that democracy alone is not enough to obtain peace — solid federal relations are needed if it is to be perpetual — means that democratic internationalism remains a prisoner of nationalism, and accordingly, believes the plurality of sovereign states to be immovable.

Overcoming Internationalism in Practice.

Let us now examine how else federalism differs from internationalism, i.e. in the strategy for achieving peace. *Internationalism seeks to pursue international co-operation as opposed to abolishing the absolute sovereignty of individual states, and as such views the mere existence of national democratic governments as the fundamental tool for construct-*

ing peace. In brief, as national democracy develops and thrives, so does democracy at the international level. Conversely, *federalism pursues supranational statehood, and as such views national democratic governments as a contradiction to the goal of peace. Such governments are both a means and a hindrance to the achievement of supranational federalism first in Europe and then in the world.* Let us first examine this statement by Spinelli[10] which Albertini clarifies with great rigour by shedding creative light on the teachings of political realism.

If the peaceful federal unification of states requires Kantian republicanism, then it transpires that unification must be based on the free decisions of democratic national governments. Unification imposed with force by a hegemonic power cannot be peaceful, and must perforce lead to despotism. However, there is another reason why democratic national governments are indispensable actors in the process of European unification: they are structurally forced by history since the second world war, to implement a policy of European unification, insofar as the collapse of Europe's national states implies a crucial choice: "unite or perish."

If the foregoing argument implies that democratic governments are to be regarded as tools, they are also partly a hindrance to the creation of a European Federation, which is the only means for making European unification an irreversible process. Creating a European Federation does not just mean delegating powers to supranational organs while leaving the ultimate decision-making in the hands of national governments. It means transferring sovereignty permanently to a supranational state which will give national states a wide margin of autonomy, but will deprive them of absolute sovereignty. The structural opposition of national governments to this prospect is rooted in the law of the preservation of power. As the theory of *raison d'état* puts it, ever since Machiavelli, the holders and wielders of political power have had an inexorable tendency to preserve and strengthen it. What is at stake is not just a personal craving for power, though this may definitely be a factor, but rather the fact that political power — in the last analysis, the monopoly of legitimate force — is the necessary condition for the survival and evolution of society. Consequently, the law of the preservation of power also applies to democratic states which are always liable to slip into anarchy if the political power weakens, and is a major obstacle to the transfer of sovereignty even when the alternative is "unite or perish." The structurally contradictory attitude of democratic governments towards supranational unification means that in the absence of a factor external to the logic of their behaviour, the only type of unification

they will admit is one that does not involve the irrevocable transfer of sovereignty. Such a factor is represented by the intervention of a political actor capable of democratically forcing national governments, by leveraging the objective contradictions they harbour as a result of the historical crisis afflicting national states.

Let us first consider the objective premise for the transition to supranational federalism: the state of crisis that national states have reached, to the point where the only politically viable alternative is "unite or perish." The cause of this situation lies in the collapse of the European system of states; the cold war combined with the pressures exerted by the hegemonic power of the United States over Western Europe paved the way for the process of integration with the community method. It is here that the formidable inertial force of the preservation of power manifests itself in the endless postponement of the federal solution — despite the Schuman Declaration. But this tendency is undermined primarily by two major contradictions generated by the transition from mere international co-operation to supranational integration.

The first is the precarious and inefficient nature of functionalistic unification. Though containing the seeds of federalism, community functionalistic institutions are characterized by the unanimous decisions of governments on fundamental issues. Therefore they are structurally weak and have proven to be unable to act effectively when serious problems arise. Hence the slow decision-making, continuous postponements, and precariousness of the European integration process, and the resulting frustration though this in turn can lead to an even stronger determination to support federalism. On top of the lack of efficiency, there is also a lack of democracy. On the one hand, functionalistic integration within the European community produces an albeit less than perfect supranational decision-making mechanism, along with a deeply rooted interdependence that, together, progressively deplete the decision-making capability of national democratic systems. But on the other, no fully developed supranational democratic system is in place, since at that level intergovernmental and technocratic procedures still very much prevail. The paradox, i.e. when there is a decision-making capability there is no fully democratic system in place, and when such a system is in place at the national level, no strategically important decisions are made any more — is destined to create growing discomfort among the advocates of democracy, be they parties or individual citizens. Such discomfort may erupt into a crisis ringing the death knell for democracy, but it may just as easily support the idea of supranational democracy.

Compellingly, the political relevance of the "unite or perish" alternative has put national governments on a slippery slope, which does not invariably lead to a happy outcome — the alternative for sovereign national states could be a breakdown into micro-nations — but also concretely smoothes the way to abolish the system of sovereign states in Europe. For this to happen, a situation amenable to positive revolutionary change must go hand in hand with the intervention of a revolutionary actor capable of making the most of the possibilities that the situation offers. This actor is a movement for European Federation independent of national governments and political parties but with the ability to exert enough democratic pressure as to persuade them to act in ways that "go against the grain."[11]

The teachings of political realism concerning the drivers of revolutionary change go back several centuries to the famous passage — mentioned repeatedly by Spinelli and Albertini — in Machiavelli's *The Prince* on innovators who introduce a new order of things, who must use force to achieve what they want, rather than merely pray for it. Because it is inspired by this tradition, *the main thrust of the federalist argument on strategy states that the movement for European federation must be autonomous if it is to successfully pursue and achieve its objec-tive.* The three fundamental principles driving federalist autonomy, as theorized above all by Mario Albertini and implemented by the MFE under his guidance, lie at the political, organizational and financial level.

The first principle, *political autonomy*, is embodied in the formation of a movement, as opposed to a party. The purpose of the movement is to bring together the supporters of European federation — naturally within a supranational organization — irregardless of their ideologies (obviously excluding the advocates of totalitarianism) or social layer. Of course the struggle to conquer national power, which would become the fundamental aim of the movement for European federation if it set itself up as a party, would inevitably undermine the battle to transfer a substantial portion of this power to supranational institutions. Hence the refusal on the part of the core group of militants guiding and managing the MFE to identify with any national party. It has thus been possible, at crucial times, to establish invaluable relations of cooperation and tactical alliance with democratic parties, some of whose members have joined the movement, and at the same time safeguard federalist independence.

The principle of *organizational autonomy* concerns the training and selection of militants, where it is essential to steer clear of a burdensome and costly administrative apparatus that would inevitably exert an influ-

ence the movement, since it would depend essentially on external financial support for its survival. Hence the decision that all federalist militants must be part-time militants, with an occupation providing sufficient income to guarantee their economic independence but at the same time enough time to dedicate to their federalist pursuits. Thanks to this arrangement, the organization is low-cost, and therefore immune from any attempt on the part of political or economic forces to apply pressure or blackmail.

The third principle, lastly, is *financial autonomy*, attained specifically through the institution of self-financing. In concrete terms, this means that militants recruited by the Italian federalist organization have always realized that their work for federalism would never generate profits, but rather would cost them money. This approach has become the financial basis of the MFE, but it has not banned external funding — such support has been used primarily to finance specific projects, while the permanent structure of the organization has always relied on its "own resources." This has constituted an additional safeguard against yielding to any form of outside influence.

But beyond its political, organizational and financial autonomy, the MFE rests on the most important foundation of all: *cultural autonomy.* Only the strongest cultural motivation, along with an equally firm moral conviction, and the knowledge that federalism truly has something new to say in terms of values and an understanding of the current historical juncture with respect to prevailing political thought, can forgo the motivations of power and money and fuel the often challenging and demanding long-term commitment in a group of militants large enough to build an autonomous federalist force with the strength to make a difference.

Cultural autonomy, for federalists, is grounded in the demystification of nationalism — a highly complex operation.[12] It is not just a matter of rejecting nationalism as a value choice incompatible with peace and cosmopolitanism, based on belief in the superiority of one's own national identity over all others, thus justifying their oppression, and even going so far as practicing genocide. The demystification of nationalism also means an awareness that the dominant ideologies derived from Enlightenment (liberalism, democracy and socialism) are incapable of overcoming national sovereign states. These ideologies are universalistic and as such favourable in principle to supranational unification, but at the same time they mythicize national states, which they view as 'natural' institutions because they are based on pre-existing nations. They cannot see that

it is states that create nations and not vice versa, nor do they consequently understand with any degree of clarity that national states are institutions that were historically determined and thus can be historically overcome. This self-mystification, which ultimately stems from a tendency to preserve power, structurally drives national democratic governments and parties to regard supranational unification as a form of close cooperation between states, rather than as an irrevocable hand-over of national sovereignty to federal institutions.

Assuming that the demystification of nationalism constitutes the basic foundation of federalist autonomy, then it must follow on the practical level that there is an urgent need for militant federalists to systematically denounce the limits of internationalism. They must also denounce functionalistic theories emphasizing the automatic nature of European integration without fully appreciating how strongly national powers can resist as they have not totally shaken off the grip of nationalist ideology, that disguises the true nature of political power. In other words, this also applies to pacifism, which sorely underestimates the issue of statehood in general, and is vulnerable to being instrumentalized by the tendency of absolute sovereignty to preserve itself. Of course internationalists, functionalists and pacifists converge in terms of shared values, and hence organized federalism also strives to involve them in the struggle to reach the goals of federalism. But to succeed, federalist activists must come to grips with the fact that these efforts are nowhere near enough to achieve the goal of peace: and it is in the very nature of federalism to overcome them. Otherwise, dialogue with internationalists, functionalists and pacifists might lead to a loss of identity and thus of autonomy for federalism.

So far we have considered the link between the need for federalism's autonomy and the acknowledgement that democratic national governments are both a means and a hindrance to federal unification. This fundamental independent variable in federalism's approach to strategy leads to a consequence of decisive relevance to the process for building European unity: to realize federal institutions, without which integration is inevitably precarious and reversible, the constituent assembly method must prevail over the diplomatic method of intergovernmental conferences.

The method of a European Constituent Assembly, whose paradigmatic model is the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 which drafted history's first federal constitution, essentially signifies three things: attribution of the task of defining European institutions to a parliamentary

body which, unlike diplomatic conferences, deliberates in open sessions monitored by public opinion; decisions taken by majority vote rather than on the basis of the principle of unanimity (which constitutes the first rule of diplomatic conferences); ratification by majority vote of the project approved by the Constituent Assembly, and enforcement of the project only among the ratifying countries. The decision to adopt this approach stems not only from the principles of democracy but also from considerations dictated by political realism: essentially, when deliberations are reached unanimously and secretly by national governments and diplomacies, the tendency towards upholding absolute sovereignty is inexorably destined to outweigh the need for effective unification. Conversely, with the constituent democratic method, the approach favouring federal institutions would be incomparably stronger, because it would amplify the pro-European attitude already widespread among public opinion, especially in countries where the crisis of the national state is felt more acutely, and even among democratic parties with internationalistic leanings.

For these reasons, the strategic aim of the federalist struggle has always been to compel governments to implement a democratic constituent process. The pursuit of this objective has not, however, weakened commitment towards achieving intermediate goals such as the creation of a European army, directly elected European Parliament, and European currency. But these goals served the purpose of bringing up some of the fundamental aspects of sovereignty, thus making the start of a democratic constituent process possible. In short, this is and has been a form of *constitutional gradualism,*[13] which has little or nothing to do with supporting functionalistic or sectarian battles; federalist support for functionalistic gradualism would, conversely, end up blunting the strength of federalism and weakening its ability to exploit the contradictions of functionalistic integration.

The shortcomings in terms of efficiency and democracy that structurally characterize European integration, as mentioned above, place national governments on a slide, and their exploitation is precisely what needs to be leveraged in order to force the implementation of a democratic constituent process. If this operation is to be carried out effectively, the existence of an independent federalist force is not enough: it must also be employed effectively. In such a context, the capacity to mobilize public opinion and therefore, to impose the priority of the alternative between those who are for the European Federation and those who espouse national sovereignty when disputes lead to acute crises and tensions rise

in the national arena. *This is a necessary part of the federalist strategy, and if it is lacking or inadequate, federalist autonomy becomes an end in itself: sectarianism.*

To conclude, if one of the main features of the MFE's concept of federalism is a balanced blend of idealism and realism, much of the credit is due to Albertini. Furthermore, this concept has fostered a militant commitment that is unparalleled in Europe (and the rest of the world, for that matter); upon it rests the enduring and unchallenged leadership role of the MFE in the federalist struggle conducted by movements for European unity.

NOTES

[1] I discuss the broader issue of relations between the federalist doctrine of the MFE and the doctrine of *raison d'état* in "*Raison d'État*, peace and the federalist strategy", in *The Federalist*, XLIII (2001), no. 1, to which I also refer for the bibliographic references. It must be stressed that this article refers, unless otherwise specified, to the contribution of Albertini.

[2] Cf. in particular: Mario Albertini, *La politica e altri saggi*, Milan, Giuffré, 1963; Id., *Il federalismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993; Sergio Pistone, *F. Meinecke e la crisi dello Stato nazionale tedesco*, Turin, Giappichelli, 1969; Id. (editor), *Politica di potenza e imperialismo. L'analisi dell'imperialismo alla luce della dottrina della ragion di Stato*, Milan, F. Angeli, 1973; Id., *L. Dehio*, Naples, Guida, 1977; Id., "Imperialismo", "Ragion di Stato", "Relazioni internazionali", in *Dizionario di politica*, directed by N. Bobbio, N. Matteucci, G. Pasquino, Turin, UTET, 1990.

[3] Cf. Immanuel Kant, *La pace, la ragione e la storia*, edited by M. Albertini, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1985.

[4] In this regard, recall the clarification offered by Seeley (*Introduction to political science*, London, Macmillan, 1902) who stated: "the domestic freedom of a state is inversely proportional to the pressures exerted on its borders."

[5] It needs to be stressed here that Kant was by no means a naive pacifist, and as such he regarded war as a determining factor in historical progress, driving governments to improve the living conditions of their subjects in order to strengthen their consensus for the power politics of the state. Kant also foresaw that increasingly effective armaments would eventually cause the purely destructive aspects of war to prevail, generating a crucial need to overcome them.

[6] Cf. Lucio Levi, "La federazione: costituzionalismo e democrazia oltre i confini nazionali", introductory essay to the last edition by A. Hamilton, J. Madison, J. Jay, *Il Federalista*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997.

[7] Cf. Mario Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo*, edited by Nicoletta Mosconi, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999.

[8] Cf. Lucio Levi, *L'internazionalisme ne suffit pas. Internationalisme marxiste et fédéralisme*, Lione, Fédérop, 1984; Id., "Che cos'è l'internazionalismo", in *Il Federalista*,

XXXIII (1991), no. 3; "Internazionalismo", in *Enciclopedia delle Scienze Sociali*, Rome, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1996.

[9] Cf., for a realistic interpretation of this current of thought, Angelo Panebianco, *Guerrieri democratici. La democrazia e la politica di potenza*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997.

[10] Cf. Altiero Spinelli, *Una strategia per gli Stati Uniti d'Europa*, edited by Sergio Pistone, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1989.

[11] Cf. Mario Albertini, *Una rivoluzione pacifica. Dalle nazioni all'Europa*, edited by Nicoletta Mosconi, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999.

[12] Cf. Mario Albertini, *Lo Stato nazionale*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1996.

[13] Cf. Mario Albertini, *Una rivoluzione pacifica, cit.*

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