


THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

Hamilton, The Federalist




YEAR XLV, 2003, NUMBER 2

THE FEDERALIST

a political review

Editor: Francesco Rossolillo

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by Mario Albertini together with a group of members of the Movimento Federalista Europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.



The Federalist is published under the auspices of the Fondazione Europea Luciano Bolis by Edif Onlus, via A.Volta 5, 27100 Pavia, Italy. Three issues a year. Subscription rates: Europe 35 € or 35 \$; other countries (by air mail) 50 € or 50 \$. A three-year subscription (100 €, 100 \$ or 125 €, 125 \$ respectively) is also possible. All payments should be made by cheque directly to Edif.

YEAR XLV, 2003, NUMBER 2

CONTENTS

For a Federal Pact Among Europe’s Founder Member States p. 3

MARIO ALBERTINI, *The Course of History* » 78

NOTES

The “Benevolent Empire” and Europe (Corrado Magherini) » 103

Only the Truth is Revolutionary (Nicoletta Mosconi) » 111

THE FEDERALISM IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT

Charles Lemonnier (Franco Spoltore) » 114

For a Federal Pact Among Europe’s Founder Member States

The Impotence of Europe and the Need for a European Foreign and Defence Policy.

The European Union today finds itself in a situation of impasse on many fronts — political and economic. But the occupation of Iraq, by British and American troops, coming in the wake of events in the Balkans, has made it patently and dramatically clear that the unity of the continent is much more than just a question of safeguarding the wellbeing of the Europeans, and closing the technological gap that separates Europe from the United States. It is, as former German chancellor Kohl never tired of repeating in the final years of his mandate, a question of peace or war. Europe has shown itself to be quite incapable of assuming any role on the international stage. Its peoples wanted peace, but its governments have proved incapable of making their wishes count. Some governments, to avoid incurring the displeasure of the imperial power, were even willing to challenge the wave of public opinion at home. Others opposed the American position, but as a result of their impotence, were able to achieve nothing more than ensure that the preventive attack mounted by the United States and Great Britain went ahead without the approval of the Security Council.

Dating back at least to the end of the Second World War, America’s hegemony over Europe is by no means a recent reality. During the Cold War, this American domination was, to an extent, masked by the common endeavour to contain the Soviet power and by the considerable convergence of European with American interests. With the end of the Cold War, however, this convergence of interests ceased to exist and the United States found itself faced with a new task: that of guaranteeing some form of world order, however precarious, by bringing the entire world under its hegemonic influence. In this setting, the European states’ vassal-like dependence has become dramatically evident; at the same time, within the most sensitive section of public opinion, an acute

awareness has developed that Europe's incapacity to act is a consequence of its division. As a result demand has grown for a Europe that *speaks with a single voice*.

The Convention.

Many felt that this demand might be met by the European Convention, whose work has recently drawn to a close, but they were wrong. The Convention has, as expected, only delivered what the Laeken European Council asked it to deliver: a very modest dressing up of the previous treaties. Of the institutional innovations it has proposed — all, moreover, of very limited scope — the ones that appear to have something to do with foreign policy (although not defence, an area covered by the entirely anodyne measures contained in article I-40) are the regulations relating to the President of the European Council of Ministers (who cannot be a head of government in office, must devote himself entirely to his role, and will remain in office for a maximum of two two-and-a-half-year terms), and to the creation of the so-called Union Foreign Minister, who, elected by the governments, will also fulfil the role of vice-president of the Commission and incorporate the prerogatives of the High Representative for CFSP and of the EU commissioner responsible for external relations).

Clearly, in the presence of twenty-five member states whose sovereignty remains intact and who thus have both an independent foreign policy and the instruments needed to implement such a policy, these personages can have little more than a symbolic role. Obligated to interpret and represent the divergent orientations of twenty-five sovereign states, they will be bound to find themselves impotent and quite unable to act. One need only ask oneself what an EU president or foreign minister might have been able to do in the face of the contrasting positions on the war in Iraq assumed by the UK and France.

The Majority Rule.

Many feel that the work of the Convention might have been viewed in an entirely different light had it proposed (and had the Intergovernmental Conference accepted) the application of majority voting in the areas of foreign policy and defence (as well as in that of fiscal policy). This view, too, is clearly flawed. In truth, Europe's capacity to act on foreign policy and defence matters is not a question of rules, but of *power*. Certainly, decisions relating to foreign policy and defence do indeed have

to be *taken* (albeit in most cases by a government and not, except in exceptional cases, by a legislative body). But having been taken, they then have to be *implemented*. The taking and the implementing of decisions are two stages that, in the government of a state, go hand in hand, as the political majority in a state naturally has at its disposal the instruments of power needed to enact the decisions that are reached. The same cannot be said of a confederation of sovereign states, like the current European Union, where the power to implement decisions is wielded not by the Union institutions that actually take the decisions, but by the governments of the Union's member states, which reserve the right to act on them or not to act on them, in accordance with the line that their pursuit of their own interests prompts them to follow. Certainly, when the majority rule was, from 1781 to 1787, effectively applied in the thirteen ex-English colonies in North America — under the *Articles of Confederation*, whose total failure highlighted the need to unite the thirteen ex-colonies in a *more perfect union* — the states that, in each instance, found themselves in the minority, above all over decisions relating to the furnishing of military contingents for the Confederate army and the payment of their financial contributions, refused systematically to act on the decisions passed by the Congress.

It must be appreciated that the refusal of one or more states to act on a decision is, in a confederation, a disintegrating force that undermines the very existence of the union. It follows that the cohesion of the union, however weak, depends exclusively on the *consensus* of the member states, and thus on the observance, legal or effective, of the unanimity rule. Neither should it be forgotten that the governments of a confederation's member states are answerable to *their own* electorate and that, should the organs of the confederation make highly unwelcome decisions, it would be the governments of the member states that would feel the full force of popular discontent and of the protests that would be mounted by the citizens and by the different factions into which the latter are organised. In extreme cases, such a development could even jeopardise the public order that the governments themselves, and certainly not the confederation, are required to guarantee.

Today's European Union is far more solid and well organised than the union of the thirteen ex-English colonies of 1781-1787. But this simply means that, within the EU, majority voting is not even adopted in the most important areas. And on the occasions when, in relation to non crucial matters, it is adopted, it is hardly ever applied in practice. What takes place instead is a general bartering and reaching of compromises that

ensures that any sacrifice a government might make in one area is balanced out by its procurement of an advantage in some another area. Thus it is that practically all decisions reached are unanimous ones.

The Need for a European State.

It is clear therefore that the whole decision-making process conditions both the way in which decisions are taken and their very content. Decisions reached by a union of sovereign states are compromises based on the interests of all the governments. And the greater in number and the more diverse the states taking part in the decision-making process are, the lower the profile and the smaller the impact their ultimate compromise will have. No confederation can have an effective foreign policy, and clearly a confederation embracing as many as twenty-five states, with, in some cases, diametrically opposed geopolitical positions, cannot hope to have even the semblance of one. It must therefore be realised that if Europe is to make its voice heard in the world and to give expression to its people's will for peace, what is needed is not a President of the Council with an extended mandate, a European "Foreign Minister," or the introduction of the majority rule in the areas of foreign policy and defence (or even in the more technical sphere of fiscal policy). It is, rather, a question of *sovereignty*, that is to say the creation of an out-and-out *federal state* — decentralised certainly, being federal, but within which the capacity to make decisions is not divorced from the power to implement them. And the term state implies a monopoly on physical force, in other words, the disarmament of the member states and the exclusive control, by a European government, of a single European army. Certainly, it implies much more than the creation of a so-called "rapid reaction force" made up of 60,000 men, with a commander answerable to, and required to act upon the instructions of twenty-five heads of state and of government. It can be remarked, in passing, that were an out-and-out federal state to be formed, the question of whether or not it would be opportune to preserve institutional ties between Europe and the United States of America would be irrelevant. A European federal state would be able, independently, to provide for its own defence. It would certainly draw up agreements and enter into alliances, but the policies it would follow would be determined, in each instance, by the nature of the interests at stake, and would not necessarily always coincide with those of the United States.

The Federal Core.

A European state cannot be founded within the framework of the current institutions, which is not to say that this framework might not be re-introduced after its foundation. Indeed, even to think of founding a European state on the basis of the consensus of the governments of twenty-five different countries, in most of which public opinion is openly hostile to any move towards political union of any kind, and which differ from one another vastly in terms of their level of integration and their foreign policy and defence traditions, would be pure folly. The founding of a European federal state can come about only upon the initiative of a group of countries that are highly homogeneous, closely interdependent economically and socially, and in which the European ideal is strongly rooted in public opinion. These requisites can be met only by Europe's founder nations — the six countries that formed the first European Community. In spite of the ambiguous signals being given out by the Italian government, this grouping has already emerged, albeit in an embryonic form, on a number of occasions. What must be patently clear, however, is that the initiative required of these countries must be more than a general mounting of pressure, or the proposing of a design to be negotiated with the Union's other member states. Instead, it must involve the creation of a *federal core* that, without further negotiation and once its Constitution has been definitively approved, will be open to any other members of the Union that wish to sign up to it.

It must be reiterated that this step must be taken *outside* the sphere of the EU institutions. To imagine that a federal core might be established within it, through the instrument of enhanced (now "structured") cooperation, would be to attempt, hypocritically, to neutralise the initiative — to set it on a different, dead-end track. Structured cooperation is nothing more than an updated version of the old *Europe à la carte* idea. The mechanism behind it is the formation of different groups of states according to the objectives being pursued; besides, this form of cooperation has to be authorised by *all* the EU member states. Were this procedure to be followed, the birth of the federal core would depend on the consensus even of those countries opposed to the idea, and it would be an entity compatible with the institutional structure and the laws of the union. This is clearly impossible. The birth of a federal core must inevitably be the expression of the strong and unanimous political will of the countries wishing to be part of it, and must inevitably involve a breakaway action — the kind of split that led to Germany's reunification.

In the latter instance, all that the other member states could do was witness the emergence of the new reality and, when the dust had settled, adapt the Community rules to it.

The Objections.

The federal core design is usually met with two main objections. The first is that it is divisive, as it excludes from the outset the majority of the EU member states. Nothing could be further from the truth. The idea of the federal core was born precisely of the realisation that political union is, in the presence of a line-up of twenty-five states, an impossible objective. The idea of asking the British or Spanish government, or the governments of the eastern European states, to join Europe's founder nations in this groundbreaking initiative and to unite under a binding federal agreement, is quite simply ludicrous. But many of these countries, and in the mid-term all of them, would be unable to resist the pull of a federal state that already existed. It must therefore be appreciated that the federal core would serve as a driving force of unity and that it is the *only* instrument with the capacity to give meaning and a political outlet to European enlargement, and to prevent the EU from becoming totally ungovernable, with rules that are impossible to apply, and destined, following its transformation into a free trade area, ultimately to disintegrate. The federal core would thus be a decisive factor in the promotion of that unity of Europe as a whole that the current EU is completely unable to guarantee.

The second objection is that the strong political will needed to establish a federal core does not, as yet, exist in any of Europe's six original member states. This is true, and it is a truth rendered all the more stark by the fact that the government of one of them is led by a person like Berlusconi and has a cabinet comprising three Northern League members. But while the will to form a federal core is yet to be formed, it is certainly realistic to imagine that it *can* be formed, given the right conditions. The creation of these conditions will, in turn, depend on the framework within which the problem of reforming the Community institutions is broached, because it is only in the framework of a small and cohesive group of countries that the crises, increasingly frequent and increasingly severe, that are besetting Europe might be allowed — as to an extent they already are doing — to give rise to uniform and prompt reactions on the part of public opinion. This is why the group of founder member states is the only one within which it currently makes sense, and

indeed is possible, to battle for the founding of a European federal state.

The Difficulty of the Choice and the Alternative.

The fact remains that it is an extremely difficult battle. The idea of national sovereignty took root in Europe over many centuries. It conditions the behaviour of governments, political parties, the media and public opinion. But the problem is now a desperately urgent one. And it is important to realise that failure to solve it will result in the transformation of Europe into a group of states entirely subservient to the hegemonic power, condemned to a future of impotence and impoverishment and, in the final analysis, condemned to exit definitively the historical stage. This is the fate that has unfailingly befallen those world regions that have not been able, quickly enough, to adapt the dimensions of the state to changing circumstances: we might cite, as examples, Greece at the time of the Macedonian and subsequently Roman conquests, and Renaissance Italy. Unless it proves able to change course drastically, Europe is heading towards its own "South Americanisation." It needs to decide whether it intends to resign itself to its decline, opting for the easy course, that of inertia and subordination, or to fight it, choosing the more arduous course of political unification.

The Federal Pact.

The story of European unification is a story of corruption of words. In recent times particularly, the attempt to delude public opinion into seeing a process that is running out of steam as a process that is, on the contrary, advancing and moving towards progressive goals, has resulted in a twisting and minimisation of the significance of terms such as "federation" and "constitution." It is thus important to stress that a federation is a state, which enjoys the prerogative of sovereignty and thus has a monopoly on physical strength, and that there is no such thing as a constitution that is not the constitution of a state. But it is equally important to guard against corruption of the very word "state," which would lose all its essential connotations were credence to be given to the falsehood that "state" corresponds to the extension of the majority principle to the areas of foreign policy and defence (as well as fiscal policy).

Similarly, it is important to clarify that the union of a number of nation-states in a single European federal state, quite apart from the

problems relating to the size of the framework within which this is achieved, can never come about as a result of decisions reached by an assembly. The protagonists in the creation of a federal state can only be those agents that are invested with the highest political responsibility, in other words the governments. These are the subjects that exercise real power, and that are thus in a position to transfer real power to another entity, even though it must be granted that such an initiative could come about only in exceptional circumstances, with the backing of a strong wave of public feeling — since constituent power rests ultimately with the people — and in a climate of openness and political debate involving the entire political class. A quite different matter will be the drawing up of its constitution, in other words the formulation of the rules that will govern the life of this new entity, once it has been created: the *pactum unionis* is not the same as the *pactum constitutionis*. And this is reflected in the sequence of events that, in the wake of the Second World War and in a non federal setting, characterised the rebuilding of the republican states of France and Italy, where the republican government was *first* formed, and *subsequently* given a constitution.

The initial core of a European state must therefore be born of a *federal pact* that, entered into by the governments of the founding nations, transfers their sovereignty to the new state. It will create a provisional government, which will control the European army and subsequently convene a Constituent Assembly.

The Terms of the Federal Pact.

Clearly it is neither appropriate nor possible, here, to give anything more than a brief indication of the content of the federal pact, whose completion, refinement and correction clearly falls to individuals who possess the necessary technical expertise. An initial drafting is, however, necessary in order to highlight the nature of the problems that will be encountered; in other words, in order to clarify what the creation of a federal state really means and to prevent the ambiguity of expressions like “federation of nation-states” from being exploited. It also allows us to see, in a harsh light, just how difficult an objective this is. The design will in fact be judged, by many, as a dream or as a purely theoretical exercise. The fact remains that, if the Europeans really do want to achieve European political unity — the objective that has guided the whole course of European integration — then *these*, and not others, are the problems that they must tackle and solve, because there is no other way to re-launch

the process and prevent Europe from falling into a rapid and inexorable decline. To argue, on the other hand, that the federal core design is purely utopian, and that public opinion in Europe’s founder member states, as well as the politicians that represent it, is not and is not in the foreseeable future likely to be able to give expression to the energy and the will needed to realise it, is tantamount to resigning oneself right now to a sorry end to the adventure of European unification and consequently to a crisis of the democratic institutions and to the degeneration of civil cohabitation in the continent. Europe is drawing closer and closer to a radical crisis, and radical crises demand radical answers. History, to be sure, is one long alternation of periods of slow evolution with periods of rapid and profound change. In the latter, it becomes possible to achieve things that, in normal periods, seemed utopian. We are thus faced with a difficult battle, but it is the only one that, today, it is worth fighting.

Here, then, are the fundamental points that the federal pact should contain:

1. The governments of the founder countries agree to unite their states in a federal pact, thereby creating a federal state that will be called “The United States of Europe.”

2. The United States of Europe will be ruled by a provisional government made up of the heads of state and of government of the signatory nations.

3. The provisional government of the United States of Europe will comprise a president, a vice-president and four ministers who will be responsible, respectively, for foreign affairs, defence, the economy and finance, and relations with both the EU and the states that subscribed to the pact.

4. Foreign affairs and defence will be the exclusive responsibility of the provisional government of the United States of Europe, which will have full powers in these spheres; the economy and finance will be managed concurrently and in collaboration with the relevant national and European institutions; relations with the European Union and with the member states will be managed in ways dictated by the nature of the problems to be solved.

5. The pact will name the president of the provisional government of the United States of Europe and assign the vice-presidency and ministries to the other government members.

6. The provisional government of the United States of Europe, by a process of co-optation and in the shortest time possible, will increase its number to twelve, appointing to each of the ministers, as well as to the

president and vice-president, an undersecretary, to be chosen in each of the member countries, preferably from the ranks of the opposition. Each of these must be assigned to a ministry other than that run by the head of his/her respective national government.

7. The selection of the successors to the heads of state or of government who have become members of the provisional government of the United States of Europe will be subject to the procedures in force in each individual country.

8. The national armies, navies and air forces, as well as the gendarmeries, will form a single European army whose supreme commander will be the President of the provisional government of the United States of Europe. The European army will come under the command of a European General Staff, which will be made up of the Chiefs of the General Staff and of other high-ranking officials from each of the countries that have entered into the pact. The Chief of the General Staff will be answerable to the defence ministry of the provisional government of the United States of Europe and will be appointed in the pact.

9. The foreign and defence ministries of the countries that have entered into the pact will automatically be abolished and their budgets will be pooled in the budget of the provisional government of the United States of Europe.

10. The diplomatic and consular staff of the states that have entered into the pact will, in the shortest time possible, be amalgamated. Until this occurs, each embassy and consulate will cease to represent a single member state, and instead represent the United States of Europe.

11. The economy and finance minister can issue public loans, in accordance with procedures defined by the provisional government upon the proposal of the same economy and finance minister.

12. Until the first general election is held — and this will be held upon completion of the work of the Constituent Assembly mentioned in the next paragraph — parliamentary control of the activities of the provisional government of the United States of Europe will be exercised, in an consultative capacity, by the MEPs belonging to the states that have entered into the federal pact.

13. Within two months of the completion of the process of ratifying the federal pact, the provisional government of the United States of Europe will call the election, through a uniform electoral system, of a Constituent Assembly, whose mandate will be to draw up the constitution of the United States of Europe. The latter must take the form of a federal state, founded on the principle of subsidiarity, in which the European

institutions will have responsibility, at least, for foreign policy and defence, for the general guidelines of economic policy and the policy of infrastructures, and for policies on scientific research and technological development; the head of government or the government in its entirety must be democratically answerable before the electorate or before the parliament (or a branch of the parliament) and must, accordingly, be elected by the citizens or by the parliament; legislative power will be entrusted to a two-chamber parliament in which one chamber will represent, proportionally, the citizens and the other will represent the states; the highest expression of judicial power will be the Court of Justice, which will be responsible for interpreting the constitution, declaring void any legal provisions that are in conflict with it; the Constitution must be open to amendment through a procedure that does not require the unanimous consensus of the member states; the right of secession will be excluded; the European institutions will be equipped with a power to levy taxes that is exercised independently or in concert with that of the member states, the regional and local authorities; the constitution will contain a provisional regulation that will allow any EU member state that has not entered into the federal pact to become a member state of the United States of Europe, accepting the constitution and the obligations it imposes. The constitution drawn up by the Constituent Assembly will be put to a public referendum.

14. The United States of Europe will continue to be part of the European Union and of the European Monetary Union, providing the relevant EU institutions agree. The United States of Europe minister responsible for relations with the EU will, without delay, begin negotiating with the EU authorities the conditions that will allow this participation to continue.

15. The pact will be submitted for ratification to the states whose representatives have signed it, in accordance with the procedures provided for by the constitutions of each of them, and it will come into force in the countries that ratify it on condition that these countries represent at least five-sixths of the states that signed the pact and three-quarters of the overall population of the latter.

Publius

The Course of History *

MARIO ALBERTINI

1. *The Course of History and the Concept of Common Understanding.*

The course of history is a problem, and in the first place an idea, that has no clear "statute" in modern culture. But its lack of a definite cultural framework (in terms of historical theories, etc.) is contrasted by its clear position in the realm of common understanding. The "course of history" is, from this latter perspective, a widely-used concept: it is found in the language of journalists, of historians, and of the man in the street. In short, it is a concept that, despite lacking a clear foundation in the scientific, cultural and sociological spheres, is nevertheless widely employed. It must also be remarked that behind this verbal expression lies a whole series of extremely important facts and opinions relating to the laws of social development. It is perhaps worth analysing briefly, from the perspective of common understanding, the meaning both of this idea and of the reality onto which it seeks to shed light.

An irresistible force seems to characterise all great historical events (I refer not to the minor ones, but to those that define an era, and give meaning to the evolution of mankind). Whether we consider the fight of the middle classes against the aristocracy, or the struggle for democracy and the creation of national parliaments so that the power of the people

* The manuscript of this text was found in Mario Albertini's personal archive. It is a re-working, never published, of a meeting led by the author during a federalist training course, held in Pavia in 1964, the typewritten transcript of which was circulated among militant federalists. The questions dealt with were subsequently probed more deeply in the context of University lessons, but as a result of his many commitments as a director of the European Federalist Movement and of the European Union of Federalists, Mario Albertini was never able to develop the issues in writing.

Despite the form of this text, highly succinct, and in parts schematic, we feel that it will be of considerable interest to anyone considering the question of how to define the cardinal criteria that might allow history to be interpreted in a way that will enable us to rise to the challenges of our times.

might be set in opposition to that of the king, whether we cite the formation of the working class and its acquisition of self-awareness, its organisation and its fight to win economic, social and political rights, or today, the liberation of the Third World, that is to say the struggle of those countries that have been excluded from the "course of history" and exploited by colonial powers, the manifestation of an irresistible force emerges as a constant feature. The particular characteristic of this force is that it cannot be linked to any precise or identifiable will. While its manifestation is marked by the start of political struggles to impose liberalism, democracy, or socialism, it is not heralded by any decision on the part of a government, party, leader, or any other group of men. There is something of an incommensurability between the triggering of these great historical currents and the decisions of men.

The character of these historical events, that is to say their lack of dependence on any conscious human will, can be defined better if one considers their so-called precursors. Indeed, precursors can be found for all the major currents of history. The emergence of the working class and its struggle for emancipation can, for example, be said to have had its precursors. And in this search for precursors, this attempt to identify the thought and deeds of those men whose orientations are, in retrospect, truly reflected in the subsequent evolution of events, one can go back as far in time as one wishes. The proletarian struggle, for example, can be traced back to the utopian socialists, and even as far back as the Christian revolution. However far back in history one chooses to go, it is always possible to find, in the thought and deeds of men, positions that can be seen as heralding the start of a new historical period.

What never emerges, however, is a direct relationship with the events in question. These precursors are simply men who saw the need for some transformation, political, social, etc. And as long as the thought of a man, or of individual men is their sole manifestation, these orientations can never constitute the setting in motion of a historical event. This explains the fact that these great historical events have never been accompanied by the existence of anything that might conceivably be termed will. One needs to look, then, for something that belongs more to the sphere of determinism. In fact, whenever the thread of history is broken, and a collective experience draws in all those men who have the ability to recognise this fact, and to find solutions to the problem they face, no evidence of truly voluntary decisions can, initially, be found. Indeed, no central committee of any party has ever made the decision: the revolution is to start tomorrow.

Even the major revolutions, like the American Revolution, the French Revolution and the Soviet Revolution (and this also applies to Lenin, who to a considerable extent was the conscience of the Russian Revolution) exploited seeds of action that had already been spontaneously sown in society before events assumed a definite form. There is, in all these historical events — and this also extends to refusal of and opposition to them — something fatal, something not desired and not understood, no conscious action. When men try to prevent an inevitable historical transformation, it is blindness that moves them. A contemporary example of this is the South African government, which opposes the emancipation of the blacks, and seeks to preserve apartheid. There are even theologians (the Church in South Africa is known to be particularly guilty of this) who quote the Holy Scriptures in order to justify racial discrimination. Businessmen and the country's ruling class in general — and let it not be forgotten that this is a solid country that has evolved through history — also oppose black freedom. And yet to anyone who has no direct involvement, it is clear that they have lost their senses, that they will never be able to prevent emancipation even if they spend ten or twenty years resisting it. It is clear that they have failed to understand the reality of the situation and that they are setting themselves in opposition to something that cannot but triumph. South Africa might hold out for a while, but that is all. If, in order to ensure that there is no ambiguity, one wanted to use an expression of common usage, one might say that those opposed to emancipation are swimming against the tide.

In short, we have, on the one hand, historical movements that are not, apparently, triggered by any conscious will, and on the other, those that oppose them, but that have no hope of halting the march of history, or of channelling it in another direction. These great historical events, characterised by their element of fatality, involve not only the institutionalised dimensions of society (its political, legal institutions, and so on), but also the sphere of customs and the life of ideas. In universities, too, as in all other seats, permanent and otherwise, of cultural organisation and expression, it is possible to witness the sudden onrush of unexpected change. One might, seeking a term of comparison, think of the development of modern science. In Galileo's era, for example, the men of science were nearly all Aristotelian. They had a metaphysical conception of science — which did not permit the formation of controllable relations between observations and conceptual schemes — and opposed the birth of modern science. Galileo was practically a lone voice. But in this case, too, there was some force that could not be resisted, something that had

to evolve and that did indeed evolve, entirely beyond all human imagining.

We now know that the evolution of modern science has been vast, and that everyone has been caught up in it, including the religious world, fearful of and for a long time opposed to this form of thought (today we have come as far as Theillard de Chardin, whose thought will perhaps ultimately be accepted by the Church, even though he has taken a large step forward in his attempt to extend application of the results of scientific research to the fields of ontology and cosmology).

Here again, it must be acknowledged that historical experiences can develop beyond the will both of those who implement them and those who oppose them, in such a way that they almost appear to be directions that are imposed on man; and it must also be noted that instances of this kind involve countless aspects of human behaviour.

This idea of common understanding constitutes — albeit not always sufficiently clearly — the starting point for all those who have sought and who seek to identify the significance of this irresistible force that characterises historical trends. Even without espousing the historical philosophy of Hegel (or even that, less well known, of Kant), one must nevertheless admit that this irresistible force idea shows some similarities with the dialectical concept of history. In fact, these irresistible forces, which push in predetermined directions derive from the opposition, on the part of new energies, to old relations, old institutions and old privileges, forces in short that resist the crystallisation of social, legal or political relations. Events of this kind thus have a certain dialectical character, because within them historical action always implies a negation of the past, or at least of certain aspects or institutions of the past.

One could pursue this analysis much further, taking it, for example, into the sphere of language, but I believe that, through this notion of common understanding, the relevant concepts have already been made sufficiently clear. I would only like to draw attention once again to the fact that ideas that belong to the realm of common understanding are the prerogative of all those who reflect on any experience. The philosopher, the jurist, and the political theorist all try to view social realities in a theoretical dimension, so as to be able to control them and to gain a clear and precise understanding of them. The impression is therefore sometimes created that they are beyond the reach of common understanding, but this is not the case. A concept of common understanding is, in fact, a reality that men become aware of through common language, and the latter is something that belongs to everyone. Without ideas of common

understanding, that are imposed on all men and that underlie all analysis, theory or knowledge, there would no longer be philosophers, jurists or political theorists. For this reason, if one wishes to examine the question of the great historical currents, and in so doing take a first step towards understanding our moment in history, so as to exploit it and to act, it is useful, and methodologically correct, to start from the concept of common understanding, as this is the basis of our relationship with reality. And the name that is given to this reality, this complex set of facts, is the “course of history.”

2. *Determinism and Freedom.*

At the stage we have now reached, common understanding — that is, the acquisition of an awareness of reality, but not a level of cultural sophistication great enough to allow it to be attributed a clear, coherent meaning — is no longer enough. If we try to say what, in concrete terms, the course of history is, we come up against different problems and different opinions. The first thing that can be noted is that men use this concept in a contradictory way. In fact, in spite of its widely accepted meaning, many people who regularly employ it in specific circumstances draw in general, as regards their worldview, on concepts of history and of society that actually contradict it.

The first and most important contradiction is that between determinism and freedom. If these irresistible forces do exist, if the only possibility left open to man is, indeed, the possibility to develop that which exists irrespective of his decisions, and which he must accept if he is not to remain at a complete standstill, condemning himself to a state of sterility, then it is clear that history’s decisive element — the element that determines its significance — lies outside the realm both of human conscience and even of human consciousness. An awareness of the meaning of history might, from time to time, be acquired, but only when this meaning has taken shape and not while the seed is still germinating.

For as long as this contradiction persists — on the one hand we accept determinism (because it is impossible not to accept it), but on the other we demand freedom, and autonomy of human consciousness and human will — we find ourselves losing sight of the real nature of things, stumbling into a form of abstract rationalism, and arriving at an arbitrary, and in fact very widespread, understanding of history. According to this understanding, man as an individual is free and master of his own destiny. But this free man, who makes his own choices, who plans his own destiny,

who is his own project, in actual fact amounts to nothing, because history in any case follows its own direction and places him, in an entirely different perspective. Together, these free men find themselves obtaining results that appear, in relation to the choices they have made, quite casual. In truth, man is free and does plan his own existence, but this existence is bound up with that of every other man, and a result is imposed that is outside the realm of any possible consciousness, will or decision. If then, we limit ourselves to acknowledging historical determinism on the one hand, while on the other simply demanding freedom of conscience, then irrationalism is the inevitable outcome.

To overcome this contradiction, we need to try to create a vision, a theory that can be used to highlight the relations that exist between the freedom of individuals (which is a real experience, and must therefore have a basis), and the course of history, which is also a real experience that cannot be overlooked each time efforts are made to understand the evolution of human events.

3. *Historical Materialism.*

To move our analysis of this problem forwards a step, and to overcome the irrationalism that results if we stop at mere affirmation of the two terms of this contradiction, it is perhaps useful to try to know better, and to theorise, the nature of this irresistible force. The free “pole” of human nature is by no means obscure; on the contrary, it has a glorious history, which coincides to a great extent with the history of the Christian religion and of western philosophy. The other pole, on the other hand, that of determinism, which everyone ends up by acknowledging in some way or another, is comparatively obscure; and it is precisely this obscurity that harbours one of the causes of the irrationalism, of the sensation that history is the theatre of chance, that it is not possible to understand the world in which we live. However, while it is true that the idea of this irresistible force has not yet been satisfactorily theorised, it is my belief that the philosophy of Marx, in this regard, provides us with a valuable insight, which constitutes, perhaps, the beginning of sociology, that is to say, the start of a scientific approach to the study of social phenomena.

I believe that Marx perceived the more general character of this irresistible force of history, and that historical materialism constitutes an initial sketching out of a “course of history” theory. It is, of course, difficult to identify in historical materialism the start of a scientific analysis and, consequently, of a realistic awareness of the course of

history, because Marx — as indeed is often the case in the initial stages of mankind's great discoveries — failed to formulate his sociological discovery in a sufficiently clear and unequivocal manner. This more general character of the irresistible force of history would appear to be represented by the evolution of production, of the mode of production. It must be underlined that this idea is often confused with other ideas, whose character is not so general. This is understandable if one bears in mind that Marxism is known more through the theology of Stalin and of Lenin than through a critical reading of the writings of Marx himself. Thus exploited by a political power, Marxism has to be viewed more as a collection of forces than as a theory.

This is the first problem. But the real difficulty derives from Marx's actual texts. Marx presented this factor, the mode of production and its evolution, on the one hand as something that could not be distinguished from the economy in general (Marx is commonly thought of as the scholar responsible for developing the idea of the evolution of production relations as the law of historical evolution, developing it however in such a way as to make *production relations* and *economics* — often taken by Marx and by his interpreters as synonyms — coincide), and on the other, as something always interpretable in terms of a class struggle. The error that Marx committed was immediately to identify, on a theoretical level, mode of production with class conflict. It is also because of this that the idea of class confrontation took on the fixed form of a conflict between two antagonistic classes. Marx has thus been interpreted as follows: production is the law of history, production is the economy, the economy is conflict between two antagonistic classes.

But this observation should not prompt us to “throw away the baby together with the dirty water,” the dirty water being Marx's clearly erroneous identification referred to above. Indeed, care must be taken, when throwing it away, not to discard Marx's real discovery as well. Having isolated the valid element, that is to say the evolution of the mode of production, we can consider it separately, and see whether it really does correspond to the general framework of historical evolution. Naturally, it is not a question, here, of reconstructing the story of this evolution, merely of keeping it in mind. If we proceed in this manner, we can in fact see that it is the mode of production that determines men's relationships with nature, and with one another, in other words the social interdependence of individuals, without them being able, in any real sense, to oppose this state of affairs. If we think for example of man's hunting and fishing stage, the way men act in order to survive can be seen as determining the

mode of their interdependence. When the first European colonists reached North America, they found men, native Indians, who, on the whole, were still in the hunting and fishing stage. Several hundreds of thousands of individuals required the whole of the north American territory just to feed themselves. Clearly, if hunting is the mode of subsistence practised, then each individual must have at his disposal sufficient land to sustain the number of animals he himself needs.

On the other hand, the degree of material evolution of production determines not only the size of the population, but also, as already pointed out, men's relations with other men. Indeed, if hunting is your means of survival, then human organisation inevitably stops at the level of the clan, the social arrangement that characterises groups of hunters. No other relationship is admissible precisely because it is impossible to organise human groups beyond the dimensions needed to carry out the operations involved, in this case, in hunting; and this highlights with precision the correlation that exists between the interdependence of the acts necessary for survival and the degree of evolution of the mode of production.

The mode of production determines, then, both the type of interdependence among men, social roles, and the size of the groups that can be formed and live autonomously. In the case of hunting, few social roles are needed, but if Fiat or Renault, for example, constitutes your means of production, then you need a chairman and managers, as well as white- and blue-collar workers. This distribution of roles in society is fixed: no one can do anything about it, no one wanted it, and no one can oppose it. It has to be borne in mind, moreover, that the group itself constitutes a means of production. In the context of modern industry, if one wants to build automobiles, then one must have not only engineers to design the vehicles, technicians and factory workers, but also the whole political-bureaucratic structure needed in order to guarantee a market; and this means that it is also necessary to make provision for (to produce) the appropriate human grouping. Together, Fiat's tens and tens of thousands of men also constitute a means of production, as indeed do the ideas according to which it is thought that some individual has to be in command. The very idea that there have to be managers and technicians and so on, right down to the worker carrying out the most basic task necessary within the whole production apparatus, is itself, as Marx says, a means of production. It is a social product that can be likened, in the final analysis, to the technical design of a physical instrument. It, too, is a means of production, because at the current stage of historical evolution, no production would be possible if we lacked the concept of the boss, of

the worker, etc. We will subsequently see how even legal principles, moral principles, and so on, must also be considered, in view of their origin and their social function, as means of production.

4. *Historical Materialism and the Human Condition.*

Now, therefore, we must take a look at the relations between this irreducible crux of history (the mode of production), which, as we have seen, determines human groupings, roles, etc., and the other manifestations of life (*other* in the sense that, at the current stage in mankind's cultural development, they are not perceived as parts or aspects of the mode of production). We might begin by looking at a first series of interdependences. If one considers a human grouping, one can note that its characteristics are determined by the needs of production. If, for example, the mode of production is primitive farming, then the social organisation — the general means of production — will be a large family group living in a village. On the other hand, the mode of production that determines the social group constitutes, at the same time, the basis of the economy as well (in this case a sort of primitive, domestic economy), which must thus be regarded, in comparison with production relations, as a subsequent, and less general feature. It is clear, furthermore, that the mode of production also provides the basis of law, insofar as it also determines the social roles, and the social rules that correspond to those roles — rules that must be applied coercively, because without respect for the rules, and the exercising of the roles, the whole social machinery of production would seize up.

The mode of production is not only the foundation of the economy and of law, it is also the basis of the state. In fact, the state cannot be much smaller, or much larger, than production relations allow. All the transformations in the form and dimensions of the state, or pre-state (from the clan, to the city-state, the regional state, the great modern monarchies, the nation-state, and even as far as the most advanced form of state, the great continental federations) can be linked to the fact that production has developed in a way that increases continually the extent of man's interdependence. If the mode of production is industrial, then there also has to be an outlet for industrial production, that is to say the guarantee of a market, which cannot be the national market and has now assumed, or is tending to assume, greater dimensions.

The mode of production also determines customs and habits. Obviously, if I am a lawyer I will have certain habits, and if I am a labourer I

will have others. Habits and customs are bound up with social roles, and social roles are determined by production relations. Taking this observation as a starting point, one can go on to examine a second series of interdependences, which bring out even more strongly the depth of Marx's concept of history, providing, as we have said, that this is used in a critical way, and extricated from all that which does not correspond to reality.

As we have seen, the mode of production determines the overall make-up of society. When hunting was the only option, all men were predators; today, with the existence of agricultural, industrial, commercial and service activities, each man is rendered, by the mode of production, part of a given sector. The labourer, and we refer here to a time when labourers really did form a distinct part of society, constitutes a good example. At that time, if a man was a labourer, he was necessarily a labourer: he was a labourer simply because his father had been one. The barrier was absolute: no labourer could send his son to school and have him educated to university level with a view to making an engineer of him; equally, the son of a doctor, or of a member of the middle-classes in general, would in turn become a member of the same social class (instances of individual decline apart).

It must be borne in mind that this situation is changing. The scientific mode of production, still embryonic, will turn labourers into technicians, rather in the way that the industrial mode of production turned most farm-hands into factory workers. But the fact remains — and this is repeatedly underlined — that social roles are determined. Each man finds himself in the company of other men who do his same (or a similar) job; throughout his working life, every man therefore has, every day, one experience and not other experiences. His culture is thus the culture of his job, that is to say the culture of the men who do the same job as he does, who inhabit the same environment. Even his language, the words he uses (his cultural background), and thus his way of acquiring experiences — his knowledge of life and of the world is dependent upon the language he possesses and uses — are decided by his work, by the role that the mode of production has assigned him.

If society has made a man a labourer, then his labour will be the basis of his culture. As a result, his language, his worldview, his habits and so on will be perhaps not rigidly determined, but certainly greatly conditioned by this particular line of work, this type of lifestyle, this role (group of roles) that he has not chosen, but been assigned. Obviously, such conditioning does not apply solely to labourers, but to everyone, and one

must ask oneself, in each case, what the relationship might be between type of work and level of evolution of thought (cultural heritage). Generally speaking, men are deeply acquainted only with what they themselves do. It thus follows that their understanding of all that which lies outside the framework of their own work — and in particular that which goes beyond the level of social conditioning and touches the sphere of freedom (the great ideas of religion, culture and science, moral principles, works of art) — cannot be any greater than their own language skills and capacity for thought (which is to say the language skills and capacity for thought generated by their direct experience, or work) allow. It follows, too, that the mode in which one assimilates experiences that are outside one's own sphere of activity inevitably implies a process of distortion of reality caused by a divorcing of the object of thought from the effective capacity for thought. And this brings us back once more to the basis of this whole discourse, the mode of production. The evolution of the mode of production assigns men to given spheres of experience; it does not give them access to all experience.

For the sake of clarity, it is worth giving an example. If one considers the way in which the Christian religion still manifests itself in certain parts of southern Italy (left on the fringe of the Industrial Revolution), it can be remarked that the population is very Catholic and apparently very religious, but almost to the point of superstition. The miracle of Saint Gennaro is a case in point. The clergy, or much of the clergy at least, must know that the miracle of Saint Gennaro is a superstition, but they find themselves in a very difficult position. The sudden abolition of traditions that have been reduced to superstitions could trigger a crisis of religious conscience, which is in many respects a socially and historically determined conscience, not a pure expression of freedom of thought (thought that, in a collective sense, is certainly not capable of reaching the sublime level of that of a great saint or philosopher). As long as an area continues to remain industrially underdeveloped, particularly if it is an area characterised by strong traditions and social decay, poverty will prevail, as will the need to live on dreams, because real life offers nothing, as this kind of religiousness (the awaiting of the miracle of Saint Gennaro) indeed shows.

5. *Politics.*

At this point, it has to be said that if, on the one hand, we have the mode of production, which assigns social roles and does not yet allow all people

to acquire an open, free, scientific mentality, or to elevate religion to the level of spirituality and morality, on the other there is another factor relating to human action and the course of history that Marx failed to consider. One of the things that has long caused me, personally, to hesitate before Marxism, and has for many years prevented me from using some of its concepts, is the realisation that economies are very often determined by politics. This is a commonly understood idea. For example, the autarchic economies and the corporative system that Italy has known, or the state capitalism that appeared in Russia, were not effects of a tendency that would inevitably have emerged in the economy itself; on the contrary, they resulted from the fact that the state, politics, decided to mould the economy in this particular way. It is impossible to accept the idea of the evolution of the mode of production as the most general characteristic of the course of history without first clarifying the concept of politics, and of the sphere of political autonomy.

And this is what Marx failed to do. His view was actually the opposite: according to Marx, politics is nothing other than a determined consequence of the economy (and this calls into question the ambiguous formulation of historical materialism).

Very briefly, I believe that politics can be said to be an activity in which the action of men is channelled, within certain limits, in pre-established, that is forced, directions. When one wants to pursue a political objective, such as the European federation, before one can present it as an accomplishment that will be useful to all men, one must first be quite clear exactly what the European federation is. In fact, men can accept it as a political objective only if they know what it is, and how it will benefit them in the political, social field, and so on. This established, were politics not a channelled activity, with its particular determinations, we could, for example, already go ahead and found the European federation. Today, almost 80 per cent of the population of the Six is in favour of effective European unity, and yet this unity is not being created, or at least is not being created yet.

Politics can thus be seen, first of all, from this perspective: it is not enough to agree upon an objective, it is also necessary to find the way of gaining the power needed to decide its realisation. In the example we have given above, the situation is the following: if we want to build the European federation, then we must have, first of all, a theory of the federation and of its advantages; second, we must discover how to win the power necessary to decide the foundation of the European federation. Every political objective, prior to its realisation, has to go through this

process of discovering the nature of the power needed for its accomplishment; and analysis of this power raises problems quite different from those raised by analysis of the objective: it raises problems that are associated specifically with politics.

We need to consider power. Power is a determinate thing: the power to do this, or the other. If there is something I want to do, I must first of all identify the institutionalised power that has the capacity to decide the realisation of this particular thing; I must thus follow certain directions that are imposed by the nature of power. But power does not determine only the conduct of men; it also determines results. If we want to found the European federation, we do not have to win power at national level; by winning power in Italy, for example, we will not have won the power to decide the founding of the European federation. We would need, at least, to have the power in France, Germany, Belgium, etc. all together.

Power is thus a forced channelling of behaviours, and as such the factor that determines political life. At the root of this political determination lies the fact that politics is a double-faceted activity: in politics, the power to do something and effectively doing something split and give rise to two different activities. If you want to wage a war, or implement an economic plan, then you must, first of all, secure a majority or a dictatorship, the power, in other words, to decide to wage this war or to apply this economic plan; during the actual waging of the war, or development of the economic plan, it is the military, the economists and the administrators who will actually act. In short, if you want to attain a social objective that can be realised through politics, then there are two problems that have to be faced: the first is effectively understanding the objective, and the second is effectively understanding how to win the power needed to decide its realisation.

This brief outline serves as an introduction to the concept of *raison d'état*. As we have seen, political ends bring to the fore a (relative) autonomy of power (which manifests itself in the political activities of the citizens — for example in their role as electors who vote — and in politics, understood as the profession of the political class). This is why it is the way in which a state's power is acquired, maintained and strengthened that constitutes its law, the process by which the state is endowed with its political characteristics. And what applies to the power of the state applies to all powers. Thus, we can generalise the concept of *raison d'état* and talk of the “reason of power.” Wherever there exists an institutionalised power, there also exists a law by which power is won, maintained and strengthened. In the case of a state, this law is the *raison d'état*, in that of

a political party, it becomes the “reason of party” and in the case of different, lesser power situations, it will be the law (or “reason”) of this or the other given form of power.

At this point, we can try to introduce some order into our reasoning. First of all, we considered the mode of production (forces, relations, instruments, and so on) and now we have looked at the *raison d'état*, or of power. If, as we have done here, we distinguish between the mode of production (a historical whole in evolution) and the economy (just one aspect of production relations), then we can affirm the existence of a relationship of the following kind: politics in general holds sway over the economy, but politics, as a circumscribed sphere of possibility, is determined by the mode of production. Politics may oppose, temporarily, the direction followed by the evolution of the forces of production, but in the long term, given that the mode of production determines the type of human grouping, the composition of social roles, the development of ideas, etc., this attempt to resist the course of history cannot succeed. The fact nevertheless remains that politics can, within certain limits, determine the economy. As we have said, the economy is just one aspect of the mode of production. The mode of production far outweighs the economy (the law of the market, of supply and demand, planning, etc.) because it involves all the means (practical, technical, scientific, legal, ideological, etc.) needed in order to produce and reproduce social life. This concept of *production* is much broader than that of economic science.

6. Ideology.

At this point, the following consideration needs to be made: if we want knowledge of the course of history (i.e., the knowledge that is possible at the current stage in mankind's cultural development), then we must have recourse, in one respect, to the idea of the mode of production (“social reason”) and, in another, to the idea of *raison d'état* (“political reason”). The problem we come up against is that of the awareness men have of the course of history, and it is thus very important to know how, within man's inner self, ideas are related to the course of history. In this regard, our earlier remarks, recalling the thought of Marx, might be useful: social roles (the role of the master, that of the slave, and all other roles) are determined by the mode of production. But it is also useful to recall that Aristotle, in reference to this social division, said that slavery is natural. This proposition does not derive from a theoretical understanding of the question; in theory there is no such thing as natural slavery. But in spite

of this, Aristotle was able to affirm that certain men were naturally slaves because he accepted other men's representation of the social situation in which they found themselves: a situation that obliged certain men to be masters and certain men to be slaves.

This is, clearly, a false representation — if we consider Man in the universal sense, we find neither the master, nor the slave. But the fact is that society, by determining men's social roles, also determines the ideas that justify social roles. If a man is a master, he must have a worldview that justifies this privilege; in the same way, if a man is a slave, he must inevitably remain a prisoner of a conception of reality that justifies slavery. Were it otherwise, both would go mad. The social role generates the worldview, or at least certain aspects of the worldview. Thus, in our example, it might be said that the mode of production of the city-states of classical antiquity imposed this profound social division and split men into two categories, of which one, the category of free men, could exist only thanks to the fact that there also existed a very large number of slaves.

Christianity, with its idea that all men are made in God's likeness, opposed this worldview. These two ideas, one rooted in liberty, and the other stemming from the conditioning to which man, as a social being, was submitted, co-existed right up until the evolution of the mode of production began to eliminate slavery. It was only from this time on that the idea of liberty and equality among men managed to establish itself also on the social level of widespread thought. Marx termed this type of mental representation, which is not an understanding of the facts as they stand, but a distortion of the facts that justifies the social roles, *ideology*. It is, in short, a type of consciousness, or false consciousness: ideological consciousness. All this comes down to a mode of mental functioning. The specific character of the representation that is formed in this context — a context of pressure exerted by social roles on the psychological state of individuals — is the transformation into universal of the merely historical and accidental. What ensues is a splitting in two of consciousness (taken singly, one by one, events are seen as they are, but taken as a whole they become something that does not exist: slavery becomes natural, while the slave, each individual slave, remains a miserable, defeated creature). What also ensues is self-mystification, a sort of unconscious self-deception, a psychological state that renders difficult (if not impossible) the normal practice of re-examining what one thinks and of discovering one's error.

Another source of ideological thought, which Marx failed to see as a

result of his view of politics as a simple consequence of the economy, is power. As we have said, power gathers men together in organisations of power: the state, the parties, etc. In each distribution of power, there are those who command and those who are commanded, as well, therefore, as all the representations of power that can be employed in the attempt to conserve power. If I command, I must justify, on the basis of the well-being of others, my power to command. I certainly cannot justify it before the people, or ultimately before myself, on the sole basis of my personal wellbeing. As a result the idea must inevitably grow within me that it is right that I should have power. Power is thus justified and guaranteed by a distortion of reality.

No power can be guaranteed without a representation that identifies power with justice, with the sense of history, etc. This applies not only to those who command, but also to those who are commanded. Every effective form of obedience requires a representation that justifies it. Perhaps an example will clarify these ideas. Times of war are, by definition, associated with the terrible power to have people killed, and to have people risk their own lives, but for this power really to manifest itself within all men, a representation is needed that justifies this terrible power to have people killed and to have people risk their own lives. There needs, then, to be the idea that the group to which one belongs, and its leader, are — even in the face of the Christian religion, which teaches that all men are made in God's likeness — infinitely more real and more valuable than Man as such — than each individual man. Indeed, one can ask a man to kill only if those who give the orders, and those who carry them out, believe that the nation (to limit ourselves to recent history) is more important an entity than the individuals of which it is comprised. If they did not, the power to send men to war would not manifest itself.

We have thus outlined, albeit briefly, the theory that the consciousness of men contains not only representations deriving, ultimately, from the spirit of science (which sets out to present reality as it is), but also ideas that derive from social roles and positions of power. These ideas do not have a theoretical function, but a practical one: that of justifying, and thus supporting, etc., these social roles and positions of power. We are indebted to Marx, once again, for this conceptual clarification, which is necessary in order to understand historical events, or rather to discover — going beyond the way in which men have, in the course of history, represented role and power conflicts — the real truth of events and of their unfolding. This is the reason why the course of history can — not only through its effective trend, but also through the idea which men form of

it — lead us back once again to the material basis of production and to the power situation. This common interpretation of historical materialism and of the *raison d'état*, necessarily brief, certainly does not allow us to arrive at a scientific idea of the course of history. I do believe, however, that it allows us to glimpse the first rational schemes of a sociological — to use one of the many meanings of the term — nature, schemes through which the possibility is starting to emerge of our being able to control our knowledge of the course of history, and thus of being able to exploit it in order to base our political action on a more solid foundation.

I wish to end this section with two observations that limit the sense of the course of history concept and serve as a further clarification of the field of experience to which it can be applied. First of all, I think that this concept (using it more specifically as a means of historical investigation) can be used to describe the “how,” but not the “why” of history. Second, I feel that it is applicable to large numbers (society, men as bound by social ties), but not to small numbers, or to individuals as such. The “why” of history belongs to another sphere. In the final instance, it has to do with freedom. And when freedom is drawn into the argument as a historical factor, one immediately thinks of religion, of metaphysics, of science, of the mysterious world of autonomous knowledge and will, which cannot be known through scientific laws, precisely because it is free. But what must not be forgotten is the fact that the way in which freedom (innovation) is transformed into a social reality, and produces institutions, rules, and so on, can be known in an empirical (increasingly scientific) manner, and that a scientific theory of the social process can be based only on an adequate concept of the course of history.

7. *The Present Stage in the Course of History.*

Through criteria of historical materialism, *raison d'état* and ideology, the idea of the course of history as the manifestation of an irresistible force passes from an obscure state, as a contradictory idea, to the state of an idea whose outline is — despite the fact that it has not yet been deliberately theorised, nor is yet sufficiently clear — nevertheless beginning to emerge. We can thus try to employ it in order to examine the stage now reached by the course of history, endeavouring, in order not to remain trapped by the mystifications of modern reality, to look beyond ideology.

Clearly, if we are to avoid mistaking for independent some variable that is actually dependent, we must first consider, ahead of everything else, the whole picture. It is, then, precisely the method of historical

materialism to which we must turn, since it allows us to identify, in each situation examined, the underlying facts of a more general nature. On this basis, and considering the course of history in terms of the evolution of production relations, we might remark that it is above all in Europe that it has expressed itself in its most advanced form; and that the salient feature of the point reached by the historical process in Europe (and virtually everywhere else) is the vast extension, crossing the boundaries between states, of the interdependence of human action in the field of material production, and thus also in social, political, economic and cultural life.

We could stop at this simple assertion, merely pointing out, in order to make its meaning quite clear, that to refer to production relations is also to refer to the state, and that it is within the context defined by the term state that it is possible to perceive the historically vital combination of the forces of the mode of production with those of the *raison d'état*. But perhaps, in this sense, it is worth taking a look at Europe's recent history. We can begin by remarking how, in many fundamental sectors of today's economy, great concentrations of production are needed; and the fact that this tendency emerged at the start of the century above all in North America. The reason for this, i.e., the huge increase in quantities produced per hour of labour, rendered possible by the development of technology and by the organisation of labour that accompanied it, is well known. Unlike the past, it had become necessary, in order to produce profitably, to create huge manufacturing complexes. And these vast production units, like the increasing quantities they produced, needed to have large markets at their disposal.

At the start of the century, the course of history brought the United States of America and the more advanced states of western Europe face to face with the following alternatives: to create a large continental-size economy, or to regress. A single example is all that is need to illustrate what happened: in 1919, Ford was able to decide that he was going to produce and sell around a million automobiles a year. It was as though the whip had been cracked: indeed, around this formidable pole of economic growth (automobile manufacturing), countless other production transformations came about in other sectors, all characterised by the introduction of the assembly line, or at least by a more efficient division and organisation of labour. In Italy, in the same period, Fiat (and these considerations also apply to the other western European states) could produce only around thirteen thousand automobiles. It certainly cannot be said that Agnelli was less intelligent than Ford, or that Italian

technicians and workers were less intelligent than their counterparts in America (in actual fact, in this regard, North America, with its huge mass of immigrants from the less developed areas of Europe, was at a disadvantage rather than an advantage).

The reason why Ford succeeded where Agnelli failed is quite simple. Ford was operating in North America, in other words in a setting in which the federal institutions had made it possible to unify a continent and create a large domestic market. He was thus able to plan the production of a million cars a year, whereas Agnelli, in the narrow Italian market, could not set his sights on producing any more than several thousand. In Italy, the historical challenge could not be taken up. It was the political institutions (that is, the nation-states characterised by their small markets and by their precariousness and lack of openness to international trade) that resisted, in Italy and in Europe, the course of history; and this fact explains not only developments on the economic front, but also, at least to an extent, the diabolical events that, through Fascism and Nazism, subsequently manifested themselves in Europe. Only a terrible concentration of power could oppose the march of history, which was pushing Europeans in the direction of unity. Both the start of the process of Europe's political unification, with Briand and Stresemann, and the failure of this first attempt can be placed in this context. Reference to these events of our century might serve to clarify the meaning of the idea that I set out earlier: that of the extension, crossing state boundaries, of the interdependence of human action in the field of material production, and thus also in political, cultural life, etc.

It is clear that this extension will become even stronger with the mode of production that is already in gestation, i.e., the scientific-technical (post-industrial) mode of production.

8. *The Crisis of Traditional Ideologies.*

From this perspective, we can try to arrive at an initial evaluation of the great political-social theories of yesterday (liberalism, democracy and socialism, including communism), and to set out the problem of the theory needed in order to understand what is happening today. If we compare, in the light of what has been said, the history of yesterday with that of today, the difference can be seen to lie in the fact that in the stages prior to the industrial revolution, the growth of the interdependence of human action manifested itself more in depth, within the individual states (whose dimensions, if measured on the basis of the degree of evolution

of communications and of production, were already enormous) than in breadth (i.e., in extension to the world market).

This is a recurring feature in the entire history of the industrialisation of the nation-states, be it the industrialisation of Great Britain, France, Germany or Italy, etc. In this framework, the course of history, through the liberal, democratic and then the socialist struggle, intensified and then overcame the division into classes of the more developed societies. It went like this: to begin with, industrial production established, as two antagonistic elements, who was the master, or boss, and who the worker; subsequently, however, the very evolution of this mode of production gave the proletariat the economic, social and political arms it needed for its emancipation. The proletariat initially developed its capacity for self-organisation and struggle on a social (trade union) level, and later on a political level (through the socialist and Marxist parties). This process advanced at the same rate as the growth in production levels and in the dimensions of production units. Whereas once a boss could create an efficient production unit with just a handful of workers, now the number of workers per enterprise was starting to grow, as was the number of enterprises per unit of territory, resulting in a gathering and concentration of workers. This was the point at which the latter gained an awareness of their situation, of their strength, and could start to organise themselves. Marx's great discovery was precisely this: the idea of organising something — the proletariat — that already existed. It was a question of giving this force a consciousness.

Having said that, it is necessary to examine the class struggle from a very specific perspective: that of concrete ways of life, of the human condition, of man's existential state. On this level, the Industrial Revolution made the differences between the classes more serious. Precisely because it brought men together in the same workplace, it threw very sharply into relief the abyssal lifestyle differences that separated them: although bosses on the one hand, and workers on the other, found themselves side by side in factories, they were radically different from one another. A growing awareness of this difference generated in the workers the idea of the need to fight for their emancipation and kept them fixed in this viewpoint. This, in turn, led to their power, on a political and trade union level, increasing until a point was reached at which society might be considered to be no longer divided into antagonistic classes. It is true that in the eyes of most people, this going beyond the division of society into classes has never, in truth, come about. But what is in question is the term "class." Here, the term is used, as in Marx's time, to

indicate a radical difference in living conditions. If, on the contrary, the term is used to indicate differences in role, and the fact that these differences continue to generate morally unacceptable inequalities, then these inequalities clearly cannot be said to have been overcome. But if we think of what class meant in the last century (and in Italy at the start of this one), that is, an abyssal difference between two strata of the population, one enjoying the full range of possibilities, material and spiritual, that life offers, and the other having only that of surviving physically in precarious conditions, with virtually no schooling, cultural opportunity, etc., then we have to conclude that all this is part of the past, and that the class struggle is dying out and evolving — with all the difficulties that derive from the fact that the present is still viewed through the theories of the past — into a new struggle. Now, the struggle is for the abolition of privileges of role and for the full freedom not only of the classes, but also that of the individual (and these two freedoms do not coincide: emancipation of the classes has not resolved the problem of the self-government of the people or that of political participation).

Having clarified these points, we can now tackle the problem of the crisis of the ideologies. It is best to start with nationalism, which brings in not only the ideologies of the parties, but also the ideology of the state, i.e., the idea of nation. In this regard, it is worth recalling that prior to the unification and integration of the classes (in particular of the middle classes) the states of Europe existed as aristocratic, dynastic, monarchical powers, not as nations. Men — Europeans — were classed as subjects of the king of France, or of Spain, for example, but not in such a way as to suggest that the division into states depended on radical differences in their very nature. There is no doubt that, in France, or in Spain, etc., a good subject considered himself first and foremost a Christian, second a man of his particular land (meaning region or city), and only after this, a Frenchman or a Spaniard, that is to say, a subject. Subsequently, with the evolution of the forces of production, the middle class struggle with the aristocracy, and then that of the proletariat with the middle classes, there also evolved an increasingly close integration of all the classes (and thus of all individuals) within the framework of the old states, or of those built according to the same model (integration in depth, which reached its peak in Europe with the nationalisation of socialism and the end of the II International). It was only from then on (because of the need to explain and justify these compact, exclusive and apparently insuperable state units) that the idea of seeing oneself, for blood reasons, as French, Italian, German, etc. first began to emerge. Basically, if one probes deeply the

idea of nation, one will always come face to face with the idea of race. Now, in these post-war times, to avoid using this word that, with the events of Europe's recent past, has taken on such hateful connotations, there is a tendency to use weaker words, such as "stock" for example, a softer word for race. But however we put it, the idea of nation is always based on the idea of a blood tie, or of a sort of natural kinship, or of some other thing, some mythical image that is used in an attempt to explain and justify something very real: the state (nation-state) as a highly integrated, very closed, and exclusive group.

Clearly, it is false to think that today's nations are built on some blood tie. If, for example, we think of France in 1820, we are led to consider the French nation as a single entity. Everyone thinks the French nation is eternal, and there are French historians who have identified its origins in geography, in the "mystical Hexagon." Nevertheless, in 1820, Augustin Thierry and other French historians still thought, on the basis of previous theories, that there existed two different nations on French territory: the Franks and the Gauls (Thierry: "we are two nations on the same territory"), and that the French Revolution was the revenge of the vanquished people (Guizot: "For 13 centuries, France has contained two peoples, a victorious people and a vanquished people"). This way of thinking, not surprising to the French in the period of the Restoration, has, albeit in different forms, resurfaced in our century. Today, with the nation-state in crisis, it emerges that behind France's apparent homogeneity, there are in fact Bretons, Basques, Occitans, etc. and it must be readily admitted that these peoples have a language, and thus a nationality, that is different from their French one. This phenomenon can be witnessed all over Europe. Italy is characterised by a regionalist tendency, and by regional demands even of a nationalistic nature. West Germany has a federal state in which the autonomy enjoyed by the *Länders* mirrors effectively the pluralism of customs there: Bavarians and Berliners, for example, do not share the same customs, nor therefore, at least in some respects, the same nationality. These observations confirm what we have already pointed out. France, Italy, and the others, are not "nations" in the sense of national groups, coinciding for natural reasons with an exclusive (single-nation) state. The fusion of nation with state is not in any way a landing place of history. It is only the conception (ideological) of the European states that grew up when their dimensions were found to coincide with those of power and of economic development. This way of thinking is now in crisis, because this coincidence no longer exists. Power now has continental dimensions, and economic development dimensions that reflect,

independently, all the different levels: regional, national, continental, global. The nation-state has thus lost its *raison d'être*. Only in this framework, and on the basis of the extension of the interdependence of human action across state boundaries, is national feeling destined to regain its freedom, its old regional and local expressions, its cultural value; only in this framework will it be possible once more to conceive of mankind both in his unity and in his different parts, none of which must have been exclusive or advantaged in relation to the others.

But it is not only the concept of nation as the ideology of the state that is in crisis. So, too, is the concept of ideology, and the traditional ideologies (liberalism, democracy, socialism). To tackle this complex problem, it is worth going back to the course of history idea. This idea helps in a way that is essential to knowledge and to action, because it allows us to view the great principles of historical action (the ideologies) in relation to whatever element of necessity is contained within the evolution of history. It is true that to oppose the course of history means not to advance, to remain immobile, to run the risk of creating uncontrollable, catastrophic vortices. And it is also a fact (reflected in the crisis of the ideologies) that the entire political front (liberalism, democracy, socialism, nationalism) is currently at a standstill, precisely because it is seeking in vain to swim against the tide of history, a reality that becomes immediately evident when one thinks that the objective of this front is the renewal of the nation-state, that is the (impossible) renewal of the form of state that ought instead to be destroyed in order to liberate the international, regional and individual forces that it is currently trapping or suffocating.

From the perspective of the course of history (with its social reason and its political reason) the great milestones that have marked out the course of mankind are clear to see. Clearly distinguishable, too, is the era in which the nations and the antagonistic classes were formed; the triggering of the class struggles, that of the middle classes against the aristocracy and that of the proletariat against the middle classes; and finally, in the wake of these historical turning points, the latest turning point, that of the extension of human interdependence across national boundaries. Each of these turning points has been characterised by the affirmation of a value and of a new ideology. Let us take as an example liberalism, which allows us to clarify this point well. In question is the middle classes' battle against absolutism. It was a battle waged in the name of liberalism, which must thus be understood, first of all, as the ideology that reflects that particular stage of history.

In short, we might say the following. In one respect, liberalism, in seeking to affirm the value of political and economic freedom, has managed to render absolute the terms of the struggle against absolutism (also rendering capitalism, in the sense of *laissez-faire*, absolute); in another respect, it has understood, albeit from this perspective, the real terms of the struggle taking place (that is, of the historical turning point); in yet another respect, it has discovered, through almost scientific means, some of the structural aspects of the more developed societies. The conceptual schemes used to describe these structures are: the rule of law, the function of the opposition, the government that is formed by the electors and, thanks to parliament, subject to the scrutiny of the electors, the market theory, etc. They are concepts that, with the passage of time, have not lost their validity. Applicable, too, to democracy and socialism, they have a virtually scientific nature and constitute an important part of the wealth of knowledge that is available to all those who want to understand historical, political and social reality.

The same criterion of analysis can, then, be applied also to democracy, socialism, and to the consequent transformations of the state and of society. But what must be borne in mind here is that the great turning points in history are reflected in human consciousness through an ideology, that is through a view of action (values, facts, structures) that, in one way, identifies the new aspects of history and promotes them, and in another tends to render absolute, universal and eternal the historical phase that it is interpreting. This makes it impossible, from the outset, to recognise the point at which a historical transformation is complete, and at which new divisions emerge to take the place of those created by struggles that are now at an end. We have currently reached one such point in time; and, as regards democracy and socialism, this is the current situation.

While democracy and socialism — like liberalism — reflect certain structural aspects of society, they no longer reflect the divisions that manifest themselves when, at history's great turning points, it is the past and the future that are at stake. A close look at the facts is enough to remove all doubt in this regard. Indeed, to separate the working class from the rest of society (which is what happened when it was a question of breaking the middle classes' monopoly on political and economic power) would now have no more point than mobilising the higher *bourgeoisie* (as in the case of liberalism), or the petty *bourgeoisie* (as in the case of democracy). Traditional ideologies are useful when it comes to securing votes and positions of power, but not when it is a question of tracing the

dividing line between the past that is hanging over into the present, and the future. The old reactionary citadels that made freedom of the classes impossible have long since fallen.

The crisis of political action is due precisely to the fact that most men — including those involved in the media — still view the current phase in the course of history in terms of liberalism, democracy and socialism, in other words using the theories that served to interpret the phases that are now behind us. Clearly, it is only through liberal, democratic and socialist culture that the liberal, democratic and socialist aspects of our societies can be understood. But it is important that understanding the structural aspects of society is not confused with the march of history, because it is the latter that lies beneath the problems that must now be solved. And it is with a view to these problems, to the world's new problems, that we should now be organising our forces.

Notes

THE “BENEVOLENT EMPIRE” AND EUROPE

After the Second World War and at least up until the Kennedy years, the United States stood as the main inspiration for European unification and one of its staunchest supporters: quite the opposite of the old notion of “divide and rule.” But things have changed. The American government is far more favourable to enlarging the European Union (including Turkey) and Nato (perhaps also including Russia) than to deepening the former and rebalancing the latter. Rather than a politically integrated Europe, America would rather see a group of sovereign states, possibly cooperating with one another but not sharing commitments that could take precedence over those established individually with the United States. For American political circles, Europe is no longer the place where history is written.

The issue of American hegemony over the entire world came to a head first with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and then with the events of September 11. Terms such as “unilateralism” and “the benevolent Empire,” originally used only by a small group of neo-conservatives regarded up till then as brilliant but unrealistic, turned into buzzwords in mainstream American politics.

The prevailing idea is that since there is no way to withdraw from nor adapt to a world regarded as hostile, menacing, or at the very least unpredictable, the best option is to control and dominate it. The unavoidable corollary to this hegemonic theory is that it is necessary to prevent countries of any significance from advancing, as such countries might eventually become competitors and challenge the American order. Paul Wolfowitz, the current Deputy Secretary of Defense, embraced this political line in an official 1992 document entitled *Defense Planning Guidance*, but then left out all reference to this notion in the final version. However, in 2002, it was once again one of the central themes of the

White House's national security guidelines.

This approach is criticized extensively even within the United States. Except for government circles, there is widespread belief that the "arrogance of force" generates nothing but resentment and anger throughout the world, which sheer frustration will aggravate; moreover, America's abandonment of the enlightened policy of the post-war years will drive people against liberal democracy, the market economy, and globalization; American imperialism will become its own worst enemy. This belligerent attitude, together with a state of permanent war, will not be without consequences for American society, and its institutions, values and freedoms.

As to the mudslinging match waged against Europe by America's neoconservatives, the Europeans themselves should be emphasizing that, at the level of public opinion, the vision and values on either side of the Atlantic are more convergent than divergent, that European anti-Americanism is far less virulent than elsewhere in the world, and that Western Europe could be America's staunchest and most dependable allies, should Washington dust off the *equal partnership policy* supported by John F. Kennedy in the early 1960s.

What kind of world is the United States trying to create anyway? Are the American people aware that their government has led our planet to a crossroads? Where the choice is between a unilateral hegemony, with America facing emerging threats alone, or a multilateral world system in which the United States surrenders some of its power in exchange for more support, and shoulders its remaining responsibilities in a manner more befitting to its own interests, those of its allies and the world as a whole.

After spending more than twenty years over-optimistically preaching the benefits of globalization, and predicting the triumph of the market economy and democracy, why has the United States now swung over to a pessimistic outlook — and September 11 cannot be the only reason — claiming that the country's immediate interests take absolute precedence, with defense having a higher priority than the fate of mankind as a whole? The prevailing view of globalization today is one of gloom and doom; it is that of a mortal struggle, touching every continent, between "Good", represented by the United States, and "Evil," represented by an entity, undefined and indefinable, whose face changes with the changing circumstances.

Is a world such as this really inevitable? More importantly, is there a force somewhere, even one still in the bud, with the strength to change the

course of human fate? What role might the Old Continent play, in finding a way out of this impasse?

* * *

The advocates of globalization see frontiers eclipsed by the rise of modern manufacturing systems and the new information and communication technologies. In such a world, inward-looking states lack the wherewithal to support national identity and are condemned to decline amid social discontent. Their role is merely to minimize the social impact of such discontent and ward off the threat of external attacks or civil war. Academics have described this, without a shred of irony, as the theory of the "evaporation of the state."

Globalization has been defined as the epochal transition from a world dominated by states to a world dominated by markets; it has been seen as a return to the era prior to the first world war, a time when markets were expanding, production was flourishing and bourses were becoming all-pervasive. Globalization is based on a handful of basic principles: free trade, the free movement of capital, non-intervention of the state in the economy. The advocates of globalization preach that it is the path towards wellbeing, cooperation between nations and world peace. With the triumph of the laissez faire attitudes of the 19th century, a globalized market will foster the organization of international production and maximize global wealth. The American political and economic system, therefore, is the perfect example, and the United States, the only real super power left, will guide the rest of the world. American leadership and the reformed Bretton Woods system will bring about cooperation between economic powers, and guarantee the functioning of the global economy.

The first objection that can be raised is from the perspective of economic theory. With respect to the initial teachings of Adam Smith, economic studies have explored the notion of the "imperfections of the market," demonstrating how the postulates of perfect competition and perfect information are seldom proven in the real world. Moreover, already in the 1930s Lionel Robbins explained that every economic activity implies some sort of plan ("the choice is not between a plan or the absence of a plan, but between different types of plans"), that the "invisible hand" is in reality the work of the legislator, and that there is no market without the state. The anarchic egotism of the "animal spirits" cannot determine the common good. Moreover, the American leadership's sustainability is based on the central theoretical core of interna-

tional political economics, the “theory of hegemonic stability.”

Charles P. Kindleberger looks toward the *Pax Britannica* of the 19th century and the *Pax Americana* of the 20th century to support his argument that the international economy cannot function correctly unless there are common ground rules for all the actors, enforced by a hegemonic power (a “stabilizer”). The role of the stabilizer is to supply the system with certain essential public assets such as: monetary stability, control of the economic cycle, military security, compatibility between the development and the protection of the environment.

Let us now see if there are still sufficient grounds in the 20th century for attributing this role to the United States.

Since the mid-1980s, the United States has been the most indebted country on earth. With the advent of the Reagan Administration, the theory of *supply-side economics* came to the fore, which was based on reducing the role of the federal government, slashing taxes and social welfare spending, and placing total trust in the market economy. For some five years, simultaneous hikes in defense spending generated a period of remarkable economic growth, which ended with the stock market crash of 1987. All that remains is the legacy of the twin deficits: a ballooning federal budget shortfall and widening trade gap. A situation which has left the American and world economy distorted to this day. During the 1990s rising American productivity levels gave rise to a period of significant economic growth with the stock market skyrocketing to unprecedented levels. In reality, Americans have been living beyond their means for decades. Personal savings rates have hit rock bottom while spending levels have been boosted by foreign borrowings, a buoyant stock market — at least up till 2000 — and, until last year, a strong dollar, which reduced the cost of imports, since the rest of the world has been experiencing a lengthy period of sluggish growth, if not recession (everyone but China, that is).

The tax hikes introduced by the Clinton administration cut the federal deficit and handed over to the Bush administration a budget surplus — that has now become a sizable deficit. The forecast for 2003 alone is for a deficit of 304 billion dollars, without counting the amount set aside for the war in Iraq.

At the end of 2002, the net financial debt of the United States towards the rest of the world amounted to approximately 2,200 billion dollars, up 130 per cent over 1998; the trade deficit in 2002 billowed to 435 billion dollars (over 1.2 billion a day, or some 5 per cent of the GDP). The relative decline of the American economy, the fluctuating value of the dollar, the

fact that America’s massive foreign debt will have to be narrowed and living standards scaled down, low savings rates, the crisis tearing apart the education and health system, the need to adapt to a rapidly evolving world economy, characterized by strenuous competition, regional accords and the instability of the international financial system: all these factors lead to the conclusion that the economic and financial crisis that the world has known for the last three years is not likely to be cyclic.

Furthermore, the “theory of hegemonic stability” mentioned above is based on the existence of a single “stabilizer,” which means regarding the existence of two monetary poles alongside the dollar (the euro and the yen) as a threat to world stability. Alternatively, there is no way USA could be attributed the role of the stabilizer of the early 21st century. So having ruled out the possibility of a hegemonic leader, it is obvious that none is necessary, and therefore “post-hegemonic cooperation” becomes a distinct possibility (R. O. Keohane), based on international institutions with enough power to regulate the globalization process in the presence of a multipolar international system.

As to the functioning of the global economy over the past several decades, suffice it to mention the criticism levelled by many academics.

Effects on poverty: the flexibility of the labour market has significantly reduced wages and weakened all forms of employment protection. Trade deregulation combined with high interest rates (for those countries obliged to apply the “recipe” of the International Monetary Fund) have destroyed jobs and increased unemployment. Stock market deregulation without effective regulation has caused economic instability and higher interest rates. More privatization without a corresponding increase in competition or at least the close monitoring of monopolies, has led to higher prices for consumers. Budget austerity (higher taxes, lower spending on welfare and education), has increased unemployment and sparked social cohesion. Altogether, these measures have in many countries obliterated the very layer of society that is indispensable for healthy economic growth — the middle class — and contributed to enriching an elite minority.

International Monetary Fund policies: The IMF’s initial mandate was to strengthen world stability and supply or locate financial resources for countries threatened by recession. Though never having officially amended its mandate, the IMF seems now to be at the service of world finance, rather than the world economy. Its intellectually inconsistent and contradictory behavior makes sense only if one assumes that its mission is to serve the interests of the international financial community.

Consequences of the so-called "Washington consensus" (an agreement dating to the 1980s between the IMF, the World Bank and the American Treasury, on policy towards developing countries): globalization, as it has so far unfolded, has failed to produce the results it promised — results which it can and must deliver. The result of "consensus politics" has all too often been that of benefiting a small minority at the expense of the majority. Commercial interests have prevailed over the environment, human rights, social justice and democracy in the name of a simplistic model of the market economy which should rightly be defined as "market fanaticism."

The IMF's decision-making procedures: the decisions of the IMF are based on a queer blend of ideology and bad economics, poorly disguising private interests. The Fund applies standard decisions that fail to take into account the real interests of the inhabitants of the countries they are applied to. No feasibility studies are carried out, nor are there debates and in-depth analyses on the effects of other possible solutions. Decisions are taken behind closed doors, and discussion in any form is discouraged. Countries on the receiving end of IMF decisions are prevented from raising objections. Democracy is nowhere to be seen.

* * *

From this albeit brief and partial description of our globalized world, there is no doubt at that the main problem lies in the democratic deficit: that is, in the lack of procedures and powers rooted in the democratic method in places and at levels where the main problems of our age could be effectively tackled and solved; while democratically elected legislative bodies, and thus the ability of the people to influence the decisions of the executive, exist only in (some, not all) national states overwhelmed by the scale of today's many massive problems.

Even in the European Union, which many regard as enjoying a high level of democracy, the Council of Ministers — the Union's foremost decision making body — features an odd mixture of legislative and executive powers which should have been banned since the French Revolution. The European Parliament, the only democratically elected body, does not represent the legislative, whilst the Commission, which must seek the confidence of Parliament, is not a real government.

No public organization is directly accountable to the citizen — neither the United Nations, nor the International Court of Justice, World Health Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade

Organization, etc. The decision-making rule common to all these institutions is "one state, one vote," while instead the rule of democracy is "one man, one vote." Therefore, in a world divided into sovereign states, it is the sovereignty of the state — subject to the rule of force — that prevails over democracy.

We have seen how the United States cannot assume a hegemonic role and protect world order alone. The recent emphasis on military issues is a direct consequence of the relative economic decline of the United States. In any case, the best of all worlds is one not dominated by a single great power, but rather one based on a multilateral system in which great regional areas coexist peacefully. A world where economic and financial globalization is not left to the rule of the most powerful, but regulated by forms of global governance arising from a lengthy and undoubtedly conflict-ridden process, which nevertheless will be all the more effective as regional groupings decide to travel the federal and democratic route.

* * *

Let us now go back to the role that Europe might potentially play.

If we believe that the ultimate goal of history is the gradual achievement of peace through the political unification of the human race. If we also believe, with Kant, Hamilton and Albertini, that politics is based on relations of power, and that the logic of power is to preserve and strengthen itself at the expense of others. If we believe that peace and the common good of a plurality of states cannot be attained through international cooperation but only through international democracy, by creating a supranational state: Kant stated that there can be law only where the state exists, while where the state does not exist, the rule of force prevails. If we believe in all of this, then the logical conclusion is that the only way to nurture the seeds of federalism and initiate the process of world unification, is by creating a European federal state, with competences in the areas of economic and monetary policy, internal security, defense and foreign policy. This is also an indispensable stepping stone towards restoring relations of *equal partnership* with the United States of America, which will also allow American politics to turn its back on the degeneration caused by its current hegemonic leadership.

The significance of founding a federal European state — i.e. the affirmation of law and the democratic method beyond national borders — will be that of sparking the federalist phase of universal history. After the consolidation of the European Federation, federalism will thus be more

active than it is today, and federalists will realize that the new state, being the first fundamental step towards the creation of a world Federation, constitutes only a temporary entity which, in time, will be eclipsed by the spread of interdependence.

With the federal European state, the culture of disavowing the political division of mankind will assert itself: for the first time in human history, the conditions will exist to put into practise the right not to kill. The process will go beyond European Federation, and lead eventually to world federation and the emancipation of men and women everywhere.

Besides being a crucial step towards world federation, European federation will represent an example to the rest of the world of successfully overcoming conflict, fostering wellbeing, embracing the democratic model, safeguarding cultural, linguistic and religious minorities, and seeking *sustainable development*.

It will drive the development of economically disadvantaged nations, even following its dependence on international trade.

Rooted firmly in cultural, linguistic and religious pluralism, it will not allow the myth of the "European nation" to emerge, and its legitimacy will be based exclusively on "constitutional patriotism" (J. Habermas). It will, moreover, ensure more solid foundations for the functioning and action of the UN and all the international public institutions, enhancing and reforming world governance, albeit with the limitations posed by the slow and difficult passage from a unipolar to a multipolar world balance.

Moreover, the federal European state will enshrine a political scenario that will give European citizens the freedom to choose between an economic and social model based on a trimmed down version of the Welfare State and a less interfering role for government (i.e. the essentially Darwinian, British-American model) and a system of social security and mixed economy based on solidarity (the European or Rhineland model).

The failure of European unification would mean a return to anarchy in the "new Middle Ages" with the United States, for a certain period, playing the part of the declining Empire, in a world where mankind has the technological capability of destroying itself.

Corrado Magherini

ONLY THE TRUTH IS REVOLUTIONARY

A concept that we have often used to interpret the process of unification currently taking place in Europe is that of the *convergence of the European states' "raisons d'état."* This concept, if understood correctly, helps to explain the specific behaviour of a group of states that are drawing together through the establishment of closer and closer ties; it also constitutes the objective basis underlying the possibility of struggling for the ultimate completion of the unitary process. Nevertheless, this concept needs to be considered in context, and within its own particular phase — that of a drawing closer to the federal objective.

By using the expression "convergence of the *raisons d'état*" to define the post-World War II situation of Europe's states, we are underlining the difference between this setting and another, the latter being one in which a more general and generic *convergence of interests* manifests itself, giving rise to treaties and agreements among states that serve in the management of their interdependence and, within this interdependence, in the defence of their specific interests. The difference lies in the fact that in the first setting, "convergence" concerns the very survival of the states, which are "forced" to collaborate increasingly closely in order to guarantee their citizens' security on an economic and military level, and thus "forced" to view their own future in unitary terms. Only this type of convergence renders the battle for federal unification feasible, a battle that could not realistically be undertaken were the states still able adequately to fulfil the fundamental tasks that fall to them.

It would be wrong, however, to assume that this type of convergence triggers an irresistible process that will lead inevitably to federal union. On the contrary, federal union is an objective that implies the need not only to build, but also to "destroy." The collaboration phase involves, and is indeed based on, a gradual creation of ties and institutions. The "destruction" phase is that which is entered when it is decided to surpass the old power framework — the nation — and to replace it with a supra-national one.

And this phase is far more difficult, because it presupposes the co-existence of objective elements, for example an impasse that mere surface adjustments can do nothing to overcome, and subjective elements, such as an awareness of the gravity of the situation, and a willingness to overcome it through a refusal to defend established positions and interests.

Europe's current situation, and the new global framework character-

ised by the United States' dangerous hegemonic role, contain elements that are generating grave concern and rendering the future uncertain. Europe's now imminent enlargement is seriously jeopardising, now and for an indefinite future time, the possibility of creating a state entity in Europe, and even that of managing in an orderly fashion collaboration among the states. At the same time, America's hegemony, no longer geared towards the containment of a common enemy, has become oppressive and, since the USA's revival of the *divide et impera* policy, been fomenting division and conflict among the European states.

The European states, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War — when it was actually the United States, beginning with the aid offered under the Marshall Plan, that was pushing them in the direction of unification — failed to seize the opportunity offered them by the vast, victorious power. Having wasted this opportunity, and subsequently squandered that of the European Defence Community (EDC), too, western Europe allowed itself to slide into a state of vassal-like dependence on the United States.

But while, in the past, America's predomination served to guarantee, for a long time, a framework of relative stability in Europe — a setting in which Europe, in stages, achieved what has been termed its *de facto* unity — today the effects of US hegemony are proving so dangerous that there can no longer be any real justification for the apparent determination, on the part of the national governments and political forces, to maintain the status quo.

One is prompted to ask oneself, to use the words of Altiero Spinelli, how “the proud European states” could possibly have been so ready, and can still be so “ready to throw away their independence when it is a question of entering a state of vassal-like dependence, yet guard it so jealously when it is a question of joining together in a federation of equals” (see “Pax americana e Federazione europea”, 1949, in *Europa Terza forza*, Bologna, Il Mulino 2000, p. 166). This state of dependence of the European states can, ultimately, be equated with their collaboration: indeed, on the one hand, they collaborate and by so doing retain a level of power that has now become quite inadequate for solving the problems they face; on the other, they accept protection as a guarantee of their citizens' security and wellbeing, and by so doing merely keep up the appearance of being sovereign powers, when in reality they have lost their sovereignty.

What we are faced with here, apart from a conscious determination to defend established interests and powers, is an irrational element, a myth

that has, for centuries, lain at the root of European political life: the myth of the sovereign nation-state. And it is only those who have fully espoused the federalist objective (in opposition to the established political community), that is to say those who have taken on the priority task of overcoming the nation-state, who can (or should be able to) resist irrational conditioning, and thus see and indicate how this surpassing of the nation-state can be achieved.

It is certainly true that, in the midst of the political struggle, when one is looking for allies and support on which to count as one seeks to rock the foundations of the nation-state, the temptation to lower one's guard and to allow oneself to be carried along by the dominant current is certainly great: rational asceticism is not easy to practise because “it leaves lonely and out in the cold those who denounce foolishness for what it is. It is to this fear of isolation that we can attribute the shortage of people willing, in this highly passionate political, social and economic field, to practise asceticism of reason” (A. Spinelli, “Lettera ad Alberto Mortara”, August 5th, 1944, in *Machiavelli nel secolo XX*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993, p. 408). But the true revolutionary is sustained by the awareness that radical positions are the only ones that have the potential, sooner or later, when their obviousness is united with the force of circumstance, to impose themselves as the answers to the problems that power faces.

This is why a lack of clear-headedness when faced with the difficult task of speaking the truth becomes, upon reaching the moment of truth — the moment at which there is no alternative to the radical choice: the renunciation of national sovereignty — an unforgivable betrayal. “To win, we must, to quote Machiavelli, be prepared to fight as partisans, and not be cautious in what we do, prudent in what we think, and unsure in what we say” (A. Spinelli, *Discorsi al Parlamento europeo*, Introduzione, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1987, p. 10).

Nicoletta Mosconi

Federalism in the History of Thought

CHARLES LEMONNIER

In the wake of the Napoleonic wars and the Congress of Vienna, a number of peace societies, leagues and unions were founded that fought long and at times very hard to prevent new wars from breaking out between the nations of Europe. Their activities flourished right up until the eve of the first world war and paved the way for countless international institutions and organizations, like the Hague Tribunal and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, that have survived to the present day. In the 19th century, the popularity and reach of the peace movement were such as to have spawned campaigns that just a few years before the outbreak of the Great War mobilized millions of people.¹

But no amount of opposition could prevent the situation from collapsing into war, and in 1935, Lord Lothian clearly explained the reasons: "The anarchy of state sovereignties is the cause of war," warned Lord Lothian. "Until the peace movement realize this central fact and base their long-distance policy upon it, it will stand in the ranks of those who follow Sisyphus. Every time it succeeds, by immense and consecrated effort, in rolling the stone of national sovereignty near to the top of the hill of international co-operation, it will find that stone slipping out of its control and rushing down to overwhelm its leaders and their followers behind them."²

Lord Lothian's solution lay in the gradual creation of a world federal state. Such an awareness was undoubtedly lost to most members of the peace movement of the 19th century, but by no means to all. It is a little known yet historically documented fact that during the 19th century the federalist concept actually had a concrete, albeit limited, opportunity to anticipate the birth of a federalist Movement capable of fighting for peace and the United States of Europe. Evidence of this can be found in the struggle of Charles Lemonnier³ between 1860 and 1891, the year of his death. Though hard to define as the same type of genuine federalist

activism we know today, his struggle is nevertheless part of the history of what would eventually become 20th century European federalism.

What was the scenario that gave rise to Lemonnier's vision? To answer this question it is necessary to dwell briefly on the historical situation that developed after the final defeat of Napoleonic France and the convocation of the Congress of Vienna, events that provided the framework for the birth of the peace Movement and the 19th century plans for reorganizing Europe. The terrible wars that Europe endured for over 20 years had deeply scarred the lives and consciences of the Europeans, leading an increasing number of individuals to strive to prevent other conflicts. Many influential figures ventured into the political arena as a belated but lasting reaction of the French Revolution, deeply changing the way politicians and ordinary citizens viewed power.

The history books emphasize above all the restorative forces that materialized following the fall of Napoleon, but in reality after the Congress of Vienna, Europe's political powers realized that there was a need to give their choices at least the appearance of legitimacy. The decision of the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, Great Britain and Russia to restore the dynasties removed by the Revolution and the Napoleonic campaigns had to allow for the fact that public opinion could no longer be ignored — it was necessary to give at least the impression that the voice of ordinary people were being listened to.⁴

The Congress of Vienna attempted to set up a system of semi-permanent congresses — Vienna was followed by another four events up till 1822 — whose objective was to redesign constitutions, borders and spheres of influence. Given the number of delegates and the institutional aims it set itself, several American scholars have defined this system as the first European Constitutional Convention.⁵

The fact remains that personalities such as Metternich and Talleyrand realized, or perhaps simply feared, that in the wake of the French Revolution no sovereign power could exist and act without listening to the opinion of its citizens. In fact, Talleyrand recognized in Vienna that "the spirit of the present Age in great civilized states demands that supreme authority shall not be exercised except with the concurrence of representatives chosen by the people subject to it."⁶

This was hardly mere propaganda, but rather genuine concern: evidence in the fact that the Congress of Vienna first obliged the restored King of France to receive a mandate from the French Senate to reacquire the crown, then demanded that the smaller German states accept the federal parliament in Frankfurt. Against such a backdrop it is not hard to

understand how an intellectual of alternating fortunes such as Saint-Simon might conceivably address a memorandum directly to the Congress of Vienna concerning the reorganization of Europe⁷ wherein the author suggests instituting a European parliament comprised of representatives of the various European peoples capable of controlling a true European government.

Saint-Simon acknowledged that it was impossible to set up such a parliament in the short term, starting from such different levels of parliamentarianism in the various countries, and therefore advised beginning with a core European parliament formed by France and Great Britain, the two nations which had the longest experience of a parliamentary system.

This, therefore, was the atmosphere against which the aforementioned leagues, unions and societies for peace burgeoned and started to organize their activities through local, national and latterly international Congresses, that were staged at regular intervals from 1816 until the eve of the Great War, when the Peace Congress that was due to meet in Vienna in September 1914 had to be cancelled.

In the space of a few short years, peace ceased to be simply the subject of discussions and struggles of a moral and religious nature. Peace became a bone of contention between two opposing political approaches: one merely internationalist, arguing for the nations of Europe to set up an international tribunal and demanding arbitration as a means for resolving conflicts, and the other in favour of creating a European federation.

Initially the latter objective was supported mainly by the American members of the peace movement; in 1844 they recommended putting together a continental campaign for the creation of a European Congress. At the time, European pacifists were largely in favor of striving for an international tribunal. Later the peace movement in Europe split into two camps: on the one hand, the unreservedly internationalist *International and Permanent Peace League* guided by Passy, and on the other the *International League for Peace and Freedom* steered by Lemonnier, based on Kant's perpetual peace project, the Saint-Simon initiative and the American federal model. It was Lemonnier's league that organized what many re-named "the great assize of European democracy," in Geneva in 1867.⁸

As the texts proposed here suggest, Lemonnier was well aware of the problems associated with fostering a political peace movement capable of distancing itself from Passy's movement, which was driven by vaguely moralistic, religious and anti-militaristic attitudes. Lemonnier did not

believe that creating an international tribunal would succeed in solving the problem of war, as Passy's movement claimed. But on his own Lemonnier could do little. On his side, Lemonnier had his pro-Saint-Simon friends and, after 1858, also Evariste Mangin, director of the *Phare de la Loire*, whom Lemonnier credits with inventing the mechanism for calling what would eventually become a sort of Congress of delegates of the European people, as we shall see later.

Following the failure of the system inaugurated in Vienna of "roving Congresses" designed to govern the new Europe with at least a minimal degree of consensus, the great powers implemented policies that gradually narrowed freedom of expression in order to maintain the ever precarious European order, clamping down on liberal-democratic and national movements. Thus it was that after the events of 1848, it became very difficult to foster political activities. The situation was not too different in France in 1867, when the risk of a Franco-Prussian conflict to solve the Luxembourg question raised deep concerns among public opinion. The crisis was averted with the recognition of Luxembourg's neutrality, but in the wake of this narrowly avoided threat, the issue of peace was once again in the spotlight. This was the atmosphere behind the idea of organizing an international peace Congress in Geneva in September of that year.

The Manifesto that appeared in June 1867, calling the Congress, read: "The Geneva congress proposes to determine the political and economic conditions for achieving peace between peoples, and in particular for founding the United States of Europe. The congress aspires to be the assize of European democracy, in the name of the ideals of the French Revolution and the awakening of consciences." Mangin's approach toward publicizing and emphasizing the democratic nature of such a Congress in an environment of limited individual freedoms was simple and respected the laws of the time: under French law, groups of no more than 20 people could lawfully meet together, and accordingly Mangin advised Lemonnier to call for groups of 20 people to meet in every large city and elect a delegate; articles and appeals would later appear in the press asking for the opinion of the delegate's fellow citizens and their approval to represent them at the European Congress.

Mangin hoped that this approach would lead to implementing Saint-Simon's plans for a European parliament. The 1867 peace congress was scheduled to take place almost concurrently with the First International. It was hoped that delegates would participate in both assemblies. But Karl Marx opposed this idea and explicitly encouraged the delegates attending

the First International to desert the peace Congress. Nevertheless the Congress was a great success, attracting over 6000 participants including Giuseppe Garibaldi, Victor Hugo, Mikhail Bakunin and Amand Goegg, the German democratic former minister of Baden, who would eventually support Lemonnier in the publication of the bilingual monthly *Les Etats-Unis d'Europe* — *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa* (The United States of Europe).

The hopes and plans for the Geneva Congress were hard hit by the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, a war that fuelled the peace movement guided by Passy which favoured international arbitration. In an effort to reorganize his own movement, in 1872 Lemonnier wrote a pamphlet on the United States of Europe, and in 1878 he spoke out at the peace Congress organized in Paris by Passy who had tried to marginalize the 1867 movements; Lemonnier again criticized the international arbitration proposal and advised against involving Tsarist Russia in such a system. He restated the objective of federation, starting from the United States, France, Italy and Great Britain. His project involved asking these countries to stipulate an initial thirty-year cooperation treaty preparatory to the institution of a federal pact.⁹

However, history was about to take another turn, narrowing the gap that had separated the nationalistic aspirations and claims of the worker's movement. In the space of just a few years, the United States — regarded as the reference point for building international institutions capable of guaranteeing and promoting peace — built the foundations of its rise to world power status. Goegg, co-editor of *The United States of Europe*, had some time earlier decided to promote commitment to the German social-democratic movement. Throughout the Eighties, Passy's popularity continued to increase: he was elected twice to the Chamber of Deputies, while Lemonnier's popularity waned. At the universal peace Congress of 1889 Lemonnier, now an old man, finally admitted that the common denominator for all pacifists was the battle for international arbitration.

Ten years after, the peace movement had committed itself so strongly to supporting this battle, and the issue of arbitration had become so popular, that hundreds of thousands of signatures were gathered throughout Europe in support of the initiative of Tsar Nicholas II, who advised calling an international conference to institute an international tribunal (eventually staged in 1899 with the creation of the permanent Court of the Hague). Fifteen years later, to use Lord Lothian's imagery, the stone of national sovereignty would crush these fragile constructions and what remained of the peace movement.

NOTE

¹ See: Sandi Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991.

² Lord Lothian, *Pacifism is not enough nor Patriotism either* (London, 1935) in *Pacifism is not enough*, John Pinder and Andrea Bosco eds., London 1990.

³ Charles Lemonnier (1808?-1891). As a young philosophy teacher unwilling to abide by the rules of the Sorèze College, particularly the obligation to introduce students to Catholicism, he left teaching at the age of 21. In 1829 he became a fervent follower of Saint-Simon's doctrine of historical progress and the emancipation of the human race, turning to agitation in Montpellier, Paris and Toulouse. With his wife Elisa, who was involved in the movement for the recognition of women's rights, he also contributed financially for some time to Saint-Simon's cause, up until 1831-32, when the Saint-Simonian movements were disbanded. He began practising maritime law in 1834 in Bordeaux, where he also wrote a book on maritime insurance. In 1845 he returned to Paris to take up an administrative post with the *Chemins de Fer du Nord*. In 1854 he founded the *Revue religieuse et philosophique*, which was immediately banned by the emperor. In 1859 he published the works of Saint-Simon. Starting in 1867 his involvement centered primarily on the organization and activities of the League for peace and freedom, mentioned extensively in the introduction; he attended all of the League's congresses up to 1889 in his capacity as vice chairman and editor of the Franco-German monthly *Les Etats-Unis d'Europe* - *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa*.

⁴ Philip Bobbit, *The Shield of Achilles*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2002.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 542.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 554.

⁷ Saint-Simon, "De la réorganisation de la société Européenne", in *L'Europe de Saint-Simon*, by Charles-Olivier Carbonelle, Toulouse, Privat, 2001.

⁸ Sandi Cooper, op. cit., p. 36.

⁹ Sandi Cooper, op. cit., p. 50.

* * *

THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE*

Introduction.

Everything that there was to say against war has, rightly enough, already been said. Yet war is still waged. Anathemas pronounced against war have vanished like smoke. People have proven themselves to be as

* Charles Lemonnier, *Les Etats Unis d'Europe*, Librairie de la Bibliothèque Démocratique, Paris, 1872.

bloodthirsty as kings, and madder than kings, because it is the blood of the people that is shed when there is war.

It is no longer a case of putting war on trial. War is still in our midst: who will destroy it? Philosophy, economics, morals — none has anything more to say.

As for religion, it has often been the cause of wars. Religion can at the same time bless and condemn, forgive and blame, excommunicate or sanctify all the flags faithful to its creed.

As we write, the world is still reeling from the consequences of the war between France and Germany. Both countries, on which the peace and freedom of Europe depend, are stained by the blood of their sons, and still, one craves for revenge while the other takes pride in its shameful victory.

Alsace and Lorraine, stormed, plundered, enslaved yet never subdued; France, which paid its contribution in blood for twenty years of Caesarism, a ravaged Germany that sacrificed herself for the Kaiser who dishonors her; force prevails over law and rises up to judge; selfish Europe fills herself with soldiers; work, science, vested interests, all are at the service of destruction: this is the spectacle of Europe.

Five, soon six, million men at arms; five, six billion francs a year spent on war, without counting the war damages Germany claimed from France: this is the result of Europe's armed peace.

[...]

Will things always be like this? Will this utopia of peace — real peace, not armed peace which is nothing other than a truce, but real lasting peace — which is a reality on the other side of the Ocean, will it ever be achieved on this continent?

Are we condemned to pursue that which is right without ever reaching it? To see truth without being able to practice it? To bathe in blood without ever breaking free of this slavery? Are we beasts or men? Though we see that which is right, will we never have the will to attain it, nor the strength to submit to it? Why is the example offered by the peoples of Switzerland and America in vain for us? What has been done so far to establish peace in Europe? Why have all efforts to achieve it failed? What is being done today? What can we hope for? But above all, what can we do — what must we do to ensure that peace is no longer merely a dream? These are the questions we must try to answer.

[...]

[Editor's note: At this point in his pamphlet, Lemonnier presents several projects for peace, formulated in the past by Henry IV, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Kant and Saint Simon. He then describes the structure and organization of Peace Societies in the United Kingdom and America, the nature of the *Ligue internationale et permanente de la Paix* and lastly, the *Ligue internationale de la paix*, of which he presents the political guidelines. We resume his original text at this point.]

[...]

Since its birth, the *Ligue internationale de la paix* has distinguished itself from all other international societies for peace by its clear affirmation of a political program...

It is not our intention to trace the history [of its first Congress, *Editor's note*]¹, nor that of its successive congresses. Suffice it to briefly mention the principal resolutions approved on that occasion, which state:

Whereas

the great states of Europe have proven themselves incapable of maintaining peace and ensuring the development of all the moral and material energies of modern society;

whereas

the existence and growth of standing armies are the sign of the existence of a state of latent war incompatible with the maintenance of the freedom and wellbeing of every social class, primarily the working class;

the Congress, desiring to found peace upon democracy and freedom, hereby

decides

to establish a *Ligue internationale de la paix*, a true cosmopolitan federation;

that it will be the duty of each member of this League to work to inform and form public opinion as to the true nature of government, the executor of the general will, and as to the means for extirpating the ignorance and prejudices that are at the basis of war;

and decides moreover

to institute a standing central committee and to found a French-German newspaper: the United States of Europe.

[...]

Thereafter the third Congress (Lausanne, 1869), under the presidency of Victor Hugo, sought above all to define the basis of a federal organization for Europe. It is worth mentioning the motion voted on this issue as it clearly specifies the aim of the League:

whereas

the fundamental and permanent cause of the state of war in which Europe finds itself is the absence of any form of international judicial institution;

that the primary condition allowing an international tribunal to replace with its judicial decisions the solutions that war and diplomacy impose with force and subterfuge, consists in the fact that such a tribunal should be freely and directly elected and instituted thanks to the will of the people and that it should act on the basis of international laws freely voted by those same peoples;

whereas

irregardless of this tribunal's moral authority, in order for its decisions to be effective, the execution of said decisions must be sanctioned by a coercive force;

whereas

said force cannot exist legitimately unless it is constituted, regulated and governed by the direct will of the people;

whereas

together these three institutions (an international law, a tribunal enforcing the law, and a power ensuring the execution of the decisions of the tribunal) constitute a government;

the Congress hereby decides:

that the only means of establishing peace in Europe is through the creation of a federation of peoples under the name of the United States of Europe;

that the government of this union shall be republican and federal, that is, it must reside in the principle of the sovereignty of the people, and respect the autonomy and independence of each member of the confederation;

that the constitution of this government shall be amendable...

that no people shall become a member of the European Confederation without having won: universal suffrage, the right to decide on taxes, the right to declare peace and war, the right to conclude or ratify political alliances and commercial treaties, the right to amend its constitution.

[...]

The United States of Europe.

This slogan, which is still a prophesy, has become a program and a formula, and entered the language of politics on a day of struggle.² On 17 July 1851, on the occasion of discussions in the French Legislative Assembly on an insidious proposal to review the constitution, Victor Hugo took the floor... the great poet, induced by the nature of the discussion and by the animosity of his adversaries to reflect on the future, exclaimed: "Yes! The French people have carved out of indestructible stone and placed in the midst of the old monarchic continent the first brick of this immense construction that one day will be named the United States of Europe."

In three words, Victor Hugo had summarized Kant!

[...]

[Editor's note: before reaching his conclusions, Lemonnier describes the nature of the United States of America, the federal model to which Europeans must aspire.]

[...]

Conclusions.

The reader may be wondering how far away we are from achieving this wonderful utopia?

We will ardently reply that we are as far away as we want to be. It is up to each and every one of us to transform this utopia into reality. Let us not simply imagine that it is up to our neighbor to act, let us try to understand what has to be done, and let us do it.

If we have explained ourselves clearly up to now, the reader will have realized that the principle on which the creation of the United States of Europe is founded, that is the creation on the juridical level of a federation of peoples, is the very principle of republic, which is none other than the principle of morality.

Therefore neither we, nor our homes, nor our schools, can ever teach our children well without implicitly indicating to them the goal of the United States of Europe. We cannot be fair towards our workers, towards our employers, towards our masters, towards our servants, without bringing into being the United States of Europe.

The United States of Europe are in the middle of the road traced by the revolution, not the French, but the European Revolution of 1789 and 1791. Everything that is done for liberty, equality and brotherhood, or for the emancipation of women and children, is done for the United States of Europe...

To found [the United States of Europe] it is not necessary to destroy nations, or weaken patriotism. On the contrary, the very concept of a federation contains and supposes a plurality of nations, a distinction between states, a diversity: therefore the fatherland, but also the village!

Now we may consider how to build the United States of Europe, day after day, before our very eyes, and with our own hands. For each of us, it is a question of being aware or not of what we are doing.

If we live in a nation without universal suffrage, let us work to achieve it. If we belong to a people who has already won this right, let us exercise it actively and wisely, helping our compatriots to understand it and use it, endeavoring to elect honest representatives, and let us be aware of what we must ask and demand of them.

Federation cannot be established unless among peoples with a very advanced political organization. Now, among the peoples of Europe, only one people, the Swiss, have so far achieved this level of development. But it is obvious that the only policy that a Republic can pursue is the policy of federation. Therefore, as soon as Europe has two Republics

that are strong enough to offer each other sufficient guarantees, their union will form the first concrete foundations for the United States of Europe.

The main difficulty in creating a European federal government is that we are unaccustomed to conceiving of governments in any other form than that inspired by the dynastic principle. Dynasties are by their nature jealous, selfish, suspicious, hostile amongst themselves. The need to dominate peoples and to deceive them, as La Boétie said, may lead dynasties to form only false alliances. But for Republics, the opposite is true, because for them the founding principle is association. Imagine a Republic formed by two European peoples, a little like what is already happening in Switzerland and the United States, and what could happen tomorrow to France. What could be more natural and simple than an alliance uniting the two nations under the common law of a federation that they themselves forged?

We can already imagine the precise moment in which the United States of Europe comes into being: it will be the moment when two or three great European nations will have acquired, by virtue of having attained a sufficient degree of development, that level of social and political awareness that allows a people, that has at last come of age, to take awareness of itself and give itself the form of a Republic.

The modern notion of Republic is that of a government founded on the autonomy of the individual, hence the creation and affirmation of the Republic cannot occur but peacefully and by the free consensus of a majority of citizens.

The Republic contradicts the principle on which it is founded and disintegrates, the instance that it tries to base itself on deceit or force.

Therefore to teach the importance of the Republic is to teach peace, to invoke peace is to invoke the Republic. It would not be pointless, but it would take too long and be too difficult, to indicate the degree of progress attained so far by each of us along this pathway towards the goal we have set ourselves for the advancement of all peoples.

Thus it would be puerile to expect to indicate the exact hour in which we will see peace truly establish itself in Europe through the realization of the great idea we have attempted to sketch out. We must know how to wait, working all the while, and work, without tiring. Every day we will glimpse a little more of the horizon.

History teaches us that after every war there has always been a powerful desire for peace. The consequence is obvious and raises new hopes. If no war has ever appeared more horrible, cruel, bloody and

inhuman than that which we have experienced during this last sad and terrible year, then perhaps we may legitimately believe that we are readier now than ever before to establish a real and lasting peace, founded on liberty and justice, which will forever place force at the service of the law.

(Prefaced and edited by Franco Spoltore)

NOTES

¹ The Congress opened in Geneva on 9 September 1867, under the Chairmanship of Giuseppe Garibaldi (*editor's note*).

² Mazzini had already seen and affirmed the idea of European Federation, but had not yet defined it.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

MARIO ALBERTINI, Founder of the review *The Federalist*. He died in 1997.

CORRADO MAGHERINI, Member of the Central Committee of the Movimento Federalista Europeo.

NICOLETTA MOSCONI, Member of the Central Committee of the Movimento Federalista Europeo.

FRANCO SPOLTRE, Member of the Central Committee of the Movimento Federalista Europeo.

Some articles from recent numbers:

1999

Editorials

The Decisive Battle.

Europe and the War in Kosovo.

How Europe Can Help the United States.

Essays

Francesco Rossolillo, European Federation and World Federation.

Lucio Levi, The Unification of the World as a Project and as a Process.

The Role of Europe.

Notes

The Scientific Revolution and the Internet.

Reflections on Totalitarianism.

Europe, Turkey and the Kurds.

Germany and the "Past that Will not Go Away".

The USA and the New International Anarchy.

Discussions

On the Subject of World Citizenship.

Thirty Years Ago

Mario Albertini, The Power Aspect of European Planning.

Federalism in the History of Thought

Giuseppe Mazzini.

2000

Editorials

Europe and the World Trade.

A Call for the Creation of a Federal Core.

American Economic Power and the Division of Europe.

Essays

Antonio Mosconi, The Euro and the Dollar: Towards a World Monetary System.

Franco Spoltore, The Debate between American Federalists and Antifederalists from 1787 to 1800 and Its Current Situation.

Notes

Europe and the New Lomé Convention.

Global Interdependence and the Crisis of Statehood.

Discussions

Does Interdependence Equal Unification?

The Crisis of the States as a Criterion in Historical and Political Analysis.

Thirty Years Ago

Francesco Rossolillo, Why Build Europe?

Federalism in the History of Thought

Ortega Y Gasset.

2001

Editorials

Europe after Nice.

Law and Politics.

Europe and Islamic World.

Essays

Sergio Pistone, Raison d'Etat, Peace and Federalist Strategy.

Alfonso Sabatino, Reform of the Common Agricultural policy and European Constitution.

Francesco Rossolillo, Notes on Sovereignty.

Notes

Dollarisation" in Latin America and Mercosur Crisis.

The Scientific Revolution and Genetically-Modified Organisms.

The Limits and Dilemmas of Pacifism.

Discussions

On the Topicality of World Federalism.
Europe Needs a New “Schuman Initiative”.

Thirty Years Ago

Mario Albertini. Monetary Union and Europe’s Political Alternative.

Federalism in the History of Thought

James Madison

2002

Editorials

The Tragedy of the Middle East
Culture and Power
Mario Albertini

Essays

Ugo Draetta, Europe in 2002
John Pinder, Mario Albertini in the History of Federal Thought
Salvatore Veca, The Ethical Foundations of Politics
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, A European Economic Constitution

Notes

World Order and Climate Change
The New American Policy for Defence and Security
Building Europe or Writing a "Constitution"?

Viewpoints

Sovereignty, Self-government and Global government. A World
Federalist Perspective

Federalism in the History of Thought

Alexander Hamilton