# THE FEDERALIST

a political review

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent uncon-nected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

Hamilton, The Federalist

THE FEDERALIST

a political review

Editor: Giovanni Vigo

The Federalist was founded in 1959 by Mario Albertini together with a group of members of the Movimento Federalista Europeo and is now published in English and Italian. The review is based on the principles of federalism, on the rejection of any exclusive concept of the nation and on the hypothesis that the supranational era of the history of mankind has begun. The primary value *The Federalist* aims to serve is peace.

CONTENTS

The Legacy of Mario Albertini

Fifteen years after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union is plagued by uncertainties and contradictions. The text signed in the Dutch city a decade and a half ago not only made provision for the creation of the single currency, but also pointed out the need for a common foreign and security policy and for the creation of European citizenship as the final seal on the process of unification that had restored peace and prosperity to the western part of the continent. To give the citizens of the fifteen countries a concrete sign of the progress achieved, the heads of state and of government decided to rechristen the European Community the "European Union", a more solemn name with echoes of the federation created in North America more than two centuries earlier.

As we all know, of the programme outlined in Maastricht only the single currency, which came into circulation on January 1, 2002, has survived. The matter of a common foreign and security policy and the plan for European citizenship seem to have been forgotten. It cannot be denied that the euro was a major triumph for the Europeans, but on its own it is not enough to avert the threat of disintegration which hangs so heavily over today's increasingly divided and impotent European Union. It really needed the other parts of the Treaty, too, to be promptly realised, so as to transform the Union into a federal state capable of taking, completely autonomously, the decisions relating to its own defence, foreign policy, security and economic and monetary policy. Instead, the governments moved in the opposite direction, starting work on increasingly muddled agreements and ultimately entrusting the "Convention on the Future of Europe" with the task of drawing up an umpteenth treaty that, in spite of being named, deceptively, the "Treaty adopting a Constitution for Europe", has failed to give rise to the fundamental charter that should be the basis of the life of any state.

Even the European leaders most inclined to get the process of European unification re-started continue to be trapped by this manifestly inadequate Treaty; they may talk of the need for alternative routes in order to overcome the bedlam of twenty-seven countries that speak very different languages, but they are incapable of putting concrete proposals

and projects on the table.

It is in difficult times such as these that the ideas of those men and women who have devoted their entire lives to the battle for European federation regain all their force and relevance. In 2006, we commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the death of Altiero Spinelli by gathering together, for our readers, some of his key writings, which marked the start of what he himself called the "European adventure." Now, it is the turn of Mario Albertini as, ten years after his death, we have decided to recall the man and his work in a text that pieces together the significance of his political militancy and theoretical reflections, and in an essay in which he himself illustrates the historical and cultural roots of European federalism.

Federalism, according to Albertini, is the only model through which we can gain an understanding of the concept of the supranational phase of history. But to become a driving force in the current historical phase, and to establish itself as a principle of action, it will have to become real: embodied in an event that brings out its full significance. This event can only be the creation of a European federation, since this will negate, in fact, Europe's division into sovereign states; furthermore, it will be history's first negation of the great nations that have encouraged the political division of mankind — an ill-fated culture that has lent justification and legitimacy to the duty to kill. Moreover, only the European federal state can reverse Europe's current slide into ruin, and preserve the cultural and political heritage that has been built through the iron will of those for whom the battle for European unity and for the affirmation of federalism has been a *raison d'être*.

The Federalist

Mario Albertini, Theorist and Militant*

NICOLETTA MOSCONI

Such is the breadth of the topics covered in the writings of Mario Albertini — these range from deeply pondered treatises to roughly outlined ideas, from theoretical works to "militant" papers, and also include his correspondence and his many newspaper and journal articles — that it is impossible, in a brief introduction, to do justice to the contribution he made to political culture, and in particular to federalist thought and the federalist struggle.[1] This contribution also includes his teaching, at the University of Pavia, on the topics of ideology, politics, the raison d'état, and (in his original interpretation of the texts of Marx) the materialistic conception of history. These topics were also progressively developed in the context of the "cadre schools" for young federalists to whom, as we shall see, Albertini wanted to make it clear that one had to be equipped with the necessary theoretical instruments in order to be able to engage, completely consciously, in the struggle for the European federation.[2]

It is also worth underlining another aspect — less tangible, but nevertheless real and not without its consequences — of his enormous cultural and political vitality: his great belief in dialogue, which he saw as fundamental to the advancing of knowledge, and which turned each meeting or conversation with him into a moment of reflection, characterised by exchange and by the utmost respect for his interlocutor, regardless of whether the latter was an eminent politician or a young federalist.

In fact, Albertini would often quote from Plato's *Fedro* on the subject of the limitations of the written as opposed to the spoken word, before concluding that the only truly productive form of communication — that which generates ideas — is oral communication, precisely because it is the medium of dialogue. He recognised, of course, that written language serves a regulating function, once certain points have been established.

But, for Albertini, underlining the value of the spoken word meant pointing out the need for language to enter a process in which every affirmation can be considered from the many angles that are opened up by the asking and answering of questions: in short, by dialogue. And this becomes particularly crucial when, in an era of transition like the one we are living through, there is a need to tune into, and interpret, an evolving reality, so as to be able to plot paths and develop designs to be followed.

Albertini, in several autobiographical accounts, some published and some not, of his intellectual development and his pre-federalist political activity, described the moral and intellectual journey that had led him to federalism: "Since I belonged to a generation that had grown up under a dictatorship, and knew no life other than one characterised by enforced and stagnant uniformity, my political inclinations grew out of a simple love of freedom. In a situation of oppression, this sentiment could not produce solid ideas, or rather, could manifest itself tangibly only as a state of mind of absolute opposition that set good (freedom) against bad (fascism), and left no scope for mediation between the two.... I joined the Liberal Party in the belief that I was following a religion of freedom.... It was there that my abstract battle unfolded, but as my experience continued to belie my ideas ... I found myself needing to reflect upon the whole question of politics."[3]

This reflection was, at first, a reaction to Benedetto Croce (his "first master"[4]) who recommended rejecting ratification of the peace treaty in the name of Italian honour: "The ideal of Italy and its national dignity is dead; we view it as respectable in an old man who shared that ideal during his lifetime; however it is a dead letter, entirely devoid of historical relevance, when recalled now, to fight today's battle."[5] But it was to take a long odyssey of reading and reflection (Machiavelli, Meinecke, Dehio, Ranke, Schumpeter, Robbins, Bobbio etc.) before Albertini, as a result of his contact with Spinelli in 1953, chose to focus on the European sphere.[6]

In actual fact, Albertini had begun to approach the European question as early as the years immediately following the end of the Second World War, but at that time he still regarded Europe, within the ambit of his engagement in national politics, as a cultural issue.[7] It was to be some time before he came to see that the Italian setting was no longer adequate for the pursuit of democratic objectives and did not allow one to pursue progressive policies: "My feelings towards political issues changed. I began to reconsider the great problems of southern Italy, of national unity and of democracy in Italy, and to see my old values — the values that had driven me when I believed I was concerning myself with mankind, as well

as more general values — in much more relative terms. Why on earth, when making my moral choices, should I see southern Italians as my priority when there were two billion people in the world worse off than them?... The bond I felt with my country was based on nothing more than the simple fact that it was where I happened to have been born, any other meaning it had for me had to be attributed to it by reason and by political opinion... Thus, I rebelled not only against nationalism ... but also against the concept of national loyalty."[8]

This revelation, this new capacity to "weigh up the world" from a different perspective, had consequences both cultural and intellectual: "... other cultural revisions followed. I had learned to criticise ideology, thus I was able, on reading Mannheim, to understand his arguments on a level even deeper than that on which he himself had understood them, and I believed myself to be working, culturally, within the scope of politics as an empirical science; it is in this sense that I am assembling all these different elements, of Marx, of the rule of law, of Ranke, of the political class, through the thought and illuminating maxims of Hamilton ("the best security for the fidelity of mankind is to make their interests coincide with their duty"), which reveal the full meaning of founding institutions and of using them correctly."[9]

It became crucial, for Albertini, to analyse in depth the different categories of politics in order to "define" a new choice, a break with the obsolete reality that the parties were slaves to ("the parties tend to mistake reality for the current political equilibrium, since that is what they are busy manipulating and, ultimately, seeking to conserve"[10]) and the intellectuals struggled to recognise. As Albertini's "dispute" with Norberto Bobbio showed, in periods of historical change, it is the figure and the role of the intellectual that need to be reconsidered. Whereas Bobbio saw the intellectual as someone who "neither withdraws, nor waits, but endeavours to be present wherever positive values are present," in Albertini's view the intellectual should not limit himself to affirming the positive aspects of the various sides. If he does, he simply "goes with the general political flow and thus becomes parasitical, living off the politics of the day and depriving society's general equilibrium, as well as its present and, in particular, its future political equilibrium, of the active influence of truths spoken by intellectuals, both on political matters, where they represent the most accurate possible understanding of the situation, and on the need to review the existing models of political action, and establish new ones."[11]

These are the considerations on which, throughout his life, Albertini

based his thought and his action, endeavouring to examine our times "with the mindset of an active man, a man concerned with the future, and with the present only in terms of its bearing on the future." "The present — the historical situation in progress — should not be considered separately, as something to be accepted, but rather as something that must be integrated into plans that are underpinned by a definite will... Thus, in one way, it may be seen as a means by which to achieve the precise ends of a struggle, and in another as a meaningful situation, whose meaning lies precisely in the fact that it harbours the seeds of its own evolution into a new situation, one capable of improving the destiny of mankind. The future, in turn, does not take on the form of a simple description ..., but rather that of definite new principles of action and of the consequences that derive from these."[12]

This tending of thought and action towards the future culminated in Albertini's realisation that we are living in a historical phase that constitutes a radical turning point, a phase in which "we have to get rid of some of the old in order to make room for the new,"[13] and to allow the process of mankind's emancipation to advance. "In times such as these, history, with its relentless evolutionary complexity, will reach an extremely simple point: a point at which there is room only for the old or only for the new, and thus at which something has to be rejected absolutely. This was true of liberalism vis-à-vis absolutism, of democracy vis-à-vis class-based political privilege..., of socialism vis-à-vis class-based economic privilege... and it seems that it is about to be true of federalism vis-à-vis the nations' monopoly on political and economic power, in which the brute force of the armed forces is used in order to preserve the hierarchy among nations, a hierarchy that has become incompatible, on account of the growing interdependence between national and international processes, with the spread of freedom, justice and equality."[14]

That which Albertini called the *theoretical line* is based on precisely this: the establishing of a specific relationship between a political ideology and the point reached by the historical process.

"An ideology has... a general relationship with history when it has already won its battle to exist and no longer corresponds to a turning point in history, but is rather an acquired and stable factor in the historical process. Once in this situation, the ideologies set *the present* in relation to *the past* (the turning point that brought their affirmation), theorise (in thought) the established factors in the life of the society..., and mobilise energies around already recognised values."[15]

But the relentless evolution of history allows men to go on concentrating on the front of established values only until a point is reached at which real progress of any kind has become impossible: at this point, only by rethinking the future will it again become possible to exercise political responsibility and provide men with a rational basis for their moral choices. Having reached this crossroads, or conflict between values that reciprocally preclude each other, they have to ask themselves "what must be destroyed and what created.... In this situation, the ideologies become the thought that sets the present in relation to the future, turning into 'active political thought' because they mobilise energies with a view to removing the obstacle that has been identified."[16]

Nature and Criticism of the Nation-state.

The crisis of the traditional ideologies, which was felt particularly keenly in Europe in the wake of the Second World War and has become increasingly apparent over the years, is an alarm bell telling us how difficult it now is for the political forces that relate to them to gather consensus for their programmes, to recruit new energies, but above all to offer adequate responses to the problems and needs that are emerging in society. In attempting to get to the root of this crisis, one should be questioning not the inherent value of the political ideologies, or the capability of the politicians, so much as the political framework within which the latter are forced to act: the national framework.

Questioning the national framework is now a historical necessity: due to the increased interdependence of human relations the dimensions of the classic nation-states are now inadequate. But recognition of this fact amounts to nothing more than a barren observation unless it is also understood that nationhood is not a natural state, but rather a situation produced by men, and which men can also modify.

It is only starting from this realisation, in other words by translating a simple observation into a frame of mind, that we can start to contemplate, as feasible, the battle for the European federation, a battle founded on recognition and declaration of the illegitimacy of the nation-state and on rejection of the concept of national loyalty. It is not easy to make this psychological conversion, because it means opposing a myth that is deeply rooted in modern history, the idea of nation. It means exploring the peculiar character of the nation so as to debunk it and expose its ideological connection with the nation-state.

This is what Albertini did in *Lo Stato nazionale* (1958), a work in

which, starting from the consideration that there existed, as yet, no serious cultural examination of it, he pointed out the need to analyse "national behaviour" as the everyday political behaviour to which, for better or worse, the majority of political choices and conducts can be attributed. "The political disasters of our century have led to a heated debate in Europe, in which the evils and mistakes it has seen have, in turn and by the different parties, been blamed on liberal policy or socialist policy, or, equally, on communist, fascist, Christian-social, or nationalist policy. They have almost never been attributed to 'national behaviour'. And yet simple consideration of the concept of raison d'état, in other words of the fact that the character of political power depends on the way in which it is won and maintained, should be enough to show that these behaviours, liberal, communist, fascist, and so on, all adapted to the framework of national political power, and that their prevalence, or otherwise, depended on whether or not they had achieved national objectives and rendered the nation's organisation stable and secure."[17]

In short, we find ourselves faced with what Albertini called the "paradox of nationalism". Nationalism "implies a doctrine of the nation, and certain human behaviours, but its principles, which in our times are the only ones that legitimatise the duty to die and to kill, and in whose name, in our century too, the violent deaths of many millions of people have been justified, have never been seriously defined, and currently do not allow us to identify precisely the groups of individuals implicated, to understand properly what it is that compels individuals when they feel and act in a 'national' manner, or to provide any useful justification for the value of the 'nation' which has, nevertheless, reached the top of the scale of human values. Millions and millions of men have died bloody deaths with the words France, Germany, or Italy, etc., on, or placed on, their lips. These words do not merely correspond to the commands of a political power, they always carry more meaning than that, yet we do not really know what this meaning is. We still do not know why it is that men are condemned by these words to make an act of supreme devotion and total sacrifice coincide with the equally complete negation of the most important of human values; in other words, we do not know why these words turn the readiness to sacrifice one's own life, to die, into a value precisely when this readiness is also a readiness to kill, to negate the value of the life of others."[18]

Having dealt with the topic at length from the historical, sociological and linguistic perspectives, Albertini was induced to define the nation as the ideology of a certain type of state, namely the bureaucratic, central-

ised state that came into being with the French Revolution, and national behaviour as an ideological, mystified behaviour. "Important conclusions can be reached if we accept that the typical character of the 'nation' is not the language, nor the possession of a territory, nor tradition, nor *race*, by virtue of the fact that these elements are too vague (tradition), or retrospective (possession of the territory), or incomprehensible (*race*), or not always present (language) where there are people who feel they belong to a nation; and if we also admit that the 'nation' in the specific sense is an ideological fact.

To begin with, a criterion can be established to judge the degree of nationalism. The national feeling... is the ideological reflection of the citizen's ties with his nation-state. Consequently, the national feeling becomes stronger and more exclusive as these ties increase in extension (number of citizens actually involved) and depth (number of human activities linked to the state).... If state powers end up by covering the most important aspects of social life, and also concern the school system, culture, religion and so on, nationalism, through the very extension of its scale of values to all these activities, ends up by becoming exclusive, levelling, totalitarian and really turns the national group into a Horde."[19]

It is thus arbitrary and incorrect to draw a distinction between "national sentiment, meaning good-natured, unarmed patriotism, and nationalism, meaning nothing more than a blind thirst for power and domination,"[20] maintaining that nationalism is the negation of national sentiment. In truth "nationalism springs from the nations themselves. When a nation exists, and it does so not just as an intention or a hope, it exists as a state. Its conduct — that is to say, the behaviour of the politicians that govern it — is thus subject to the law of the raison d'état, which excludes mystical international brotherhoods, establishes the harsh reality of relations of force between states, and thus implies a continuous effort to increase its own power and to reduce the power of others."[21] In short, the paramount need for the security of the state "turns hypothetical national sentiment, understood as the simple love of one's own nation in a world made up of friendly nations, into nationalism."[22]

If all this is true, and if the historical process is indeed showing us a way forward based on the growing interdependence that extends beyond the confines of the nation-states, then it will be up to those who have managed to free themselves from the mystified idea of the nation to reject the existing national communities and to replace them with pluralist, or federal, communities, as it is only in these that the convergence of state with nation, and the consequences of this, can be overcome.

Federalism.

Despite the fact that there now exist many federations, "federalism, as an idea, is more known than understood"[23] due to the fact that its realisation preceded its formulation. "The Constitution of the USA was not created as a design for a new type of state, but only as a compromise between two apparently irreconcilable political factions: one that wanted to leave sovereignty entirely in the hands of each of the thirteen American states ... and the other that wanted to transfer it completely to the Union, to prevent this from disintegrating."[24] Only Hamilton understood, at the time of its founding, that the new American federal state embodied a new means of democratic government, a means with the capacity to extend its sphere of action from one to many states.

In actual fact, Europe is the region where, as from the time of the French Revolution and the emergence of nationalism, the foundations were laid that allowed federalist thought to acquire its theoretical autonomy. Recourse to the ideal values of federalism, in the form of ideas of unity and brotherhood among peoples, in fact served to provide a response, albeit on a purely utopian level, to the contradiction that exists between, on the one hand, the universality of the values of Christianity, liberalism, democracy and socialism and, on the other, loyalty to the nation, which instead divides peoples and sets them against one another. And it is through reflection upon the criteria of federalism that one can gain an understanding both of the historical crisis of the European states between the two World Wars, and of their political crisis after the Second World War.

The great theoretical contribution that Albertini made to the definition of federalism was, first of all, to clear away the ambiguities of the partial theories — one of these identified federalism with the theory of the federal state (this idea was initially even shared by Albertini himself) and another, developed by Alexandre Marc, provided a "metahistorical global vision of society" based on the thought of Proudhon[25]— that, not having established a link with reality, appear somewhat arbitrary. Progressively, he developed his conception of federalism, ultimately defining it as the theoretical-practical awareness underlying an independent social behaviour.

This particular framing of federalism, that is, this definition of federalism as founded on human behaviours — and it is to be noted that the other great ideologies, namely liberalism, democracy and socialism, can also be framed in this way — , makes it possible to escape the realm of vagueness and to apply the theory that has been developed as a criterion of knowledge and action.

To this end, Albertini developed a scheme of reasoning based on a tripartition: "To define a... social behaviour it is necessary to divide it, from the analytical point of view... into three aspects: *value*, i.e. the goal to which it is directed, which explains the manifestation of man's passions and ideals; *structure*, i.e. the particular form which the behaviour takes on in order to realise its aims; and a *socio-historical aspect*, i.e. the complex of historical and social conditions in which this behaviour can spread and consolidate."[26]

The essential reference for defining the *value aspect* of federalism, i.e. peace, is Immanuel Kant. Kant's analysis of the terms "peace" and "war", together with his introduction of the concept of "truce", makes it possible to overcome the serious mystification, fixed in the minds of men, that leads them to equate peace with the absence of war. In fact, that which is often defined a situation of peace, is in fact one of truce, in which the states continue to base their conduct on violence, accumulating weapons to guarantee their own security and instilling in the citizens the idea that they must always be prepared to kill, or be killed, for the good of their country. The states do this because there lack, in international relations, the legal mechanisms and powers that, in all political communities, are used to settle disputes between individuals amicably; in other words, there lacks the prerequisite — the presence of the state, the federal state — that would allow this false peace (truce) to be transmuted into true peace. Only the uniting of mankind in a global federation can guarantee Kant's "perpetual peace."

If the state, which guarantees the overcoming of anarchic relations between members of the international community, is the basis of peace, this means that the theories which argue that peace is a consequence of the affirmation of the values of freedom, or democracy, are wrong, even though these theories do contain elements of truth: "If the realisation of peace requires a legal order, a state encompassing the whole human race, only when freedom, democracy and social justice are assured will that law, and the state which enforces it, be stable and uncontested. These are not sufficient conditions for peace, but they are certainly necessary."[27]

The meaning of peace cannot be understood fully unless it is considered in relation not only to the great values of social and political life, but also to the human condition in general. Only once the supremacy of war has been abolished does the emergence of moral and rational behaviours in human conduct become feasible: "Bearing in mind the relationship that Kant

established between federalism, peace, and autonomy of reason and will, one can reasonably envisage, in the context of a global expansion of federalism, a change in the human condition capable of promoting the generalised social behaviours that are needed for the universal realisation of the human city, in which relations will be built on solidarity, not on power"[28], on the "ethic of conviction" rather than on the "ethic of responsibility." Put another way, "in the ambit of groups in which the other person is someone we know, or who falls directly within our range of action," all people will be ends and no one will be means, and the sense of community will become "a normal part of the human spirit."[29]

This forecast is different from the prediction that the increase in extension of human interdependence will make it possible to overcome mankind's division into nations, a prediction based on historical materialism used as a sociological-type analytical approach. To envisage a future in which the sense of community becomes a part of the human spirit means considering it in the light of the philosophy of history, which we cannot do without. "It is true, wrote Albertini, that though this philosophy one does not arrive at absolute certainties. But, as far as we know, it is only in conditions of risk and uncertainty that men prove able to act. This is not to say, however, that they advance in utter darkness. They advance towards clearly defined aims, even though they cannot be certain of reaching them, and the illustration of these aims, the philosophy of history, is the only means by which we can grasp the significance of their progress..."[30]

The *structure aspect* of federalism, the federal state, finds concrete expression in a historical reality, i.e. in the various federations founded over the course of recent centuries. But, above all, it is by reflecting on the birth of the American federation, and in particular on Hamilton's lucid analyses in *The Federalist*, that we can begin to define a complete theory of the federal state. A federal state is born upon the voluntary creation of a union that exercises sovereignty over an area encompassing a number of states, but that still conserves a number of decision-making centres. As such, the federation is the right instrument through which to extend the sphere of statehood even until, in theory, it embraces the whole of mankind, replacing hierarchical and violent relations among states with democratic and peaceful ones.

In a federation, democracy does not only extend its sphere; it also achieves its full realisation. Whereas in unitary states the division of powers, cited as one of the fundamental characteristics of democracy, tends to remain a purely formal division, and — as the experience of the

European states has shown — the executive power is easily able to override the will of the parliament and the judiciary, in a federation, it acquires its full effectiveness, becoming a territorially-based division in practice.[31]

Looking beyond the dual loyalty that is a typical characteristic of existing federations (in the United States of America, for example, an individual is as much a citizen of the US as he is of his own state), Albertini saw, in the singularity of the European situation — Europe constitutes a complex territorial system on account of its many local and regional traditions — the possibility of establishing a new model of federal state and of democratic life. With the creation of a number of independent and coordinated levels of government, from the district and the city up to the European federation (ultimately, even, from the district to the world), the foundations would be laid for the taking of truly democratic decisions, which must necessarily be based on a real understanding of the problems to be dealt with, starting precisely at the level closest to the citizens, that of their own community, the level at which a coincidence of the general will with government (self government) becomes feasible.[32]

A federal-type state community (thus we come to the *historical-social aspect*) "can arise and endure only in a society that is, in a territorial sense, highly complex, and in which the presence of two, or even more, poles of common political behaviours produces — in the heart of every citizen — a balanced division of loyalty between the union and the states."[33] This means that the citizens must feel a strong sense of belonging to the state community from which they originate, so strong that they are unwilling to give it up it completely, but also, at the same time, a bond with the citizens of the other states (based on a sense of their sharing a common destiny) that makes them willing to forgo exclusive citizenship of their own state in order to be able to part of a broader community.

There are, nevertheless, obstacles to the development and continuation of this dual allegiance, and analysis of these throws light on the very problems, relating to the historical-social framework, that make the federation conceivable. One of these obstacles is the struggle between opposing classes; the class struggle, by replacing territorial division (and thus the loyalties that are created on the basis of this) with social division, generates hostility between members of the same community, as well as a sense of loyalty to one's own social class that extends transversely beyond the confines of the single states. As a result, the states lose the social foundations on which their power rests, and are weakened in

relation to the central power.

But it is the internal repercussions of international relations that constitute the real obstacle to the creation and maintenance of a territorially-based bipolar society. The ever-present threat of war and the need to have a strong military machine, which is inevitably subordinate to the federal government, on the one hand produces centralisation and, on the other, upsets the citizens' balance of loyalties (their loyalty to the central power increasing at the expense of their loyalty to the unarmed member states).

This explains the progressive decline of American federalism after the United States' became involved in world politics and is a demonstration of the fact that it is only through its global affirmation that federalism will be able to reach its complete and definitive form.

If federalism, defined in this way, allows us to imagine the future of mankind as a future of peace and solidarity, at the same time its categories make it possible, in the context of the transition from a world of division and war to one of unity and peace, to overturn the prevailing view of international politics. This is a conservative view, based on the idea that the nation-states are a permanent fact of history. From this perspective, international politics can be thought of only in terms of *raison d'état*, "that is, in terms of the convergence in an equilibrium of various *raisons d'état*. This implies regarding this equilibrium as possible, gaining the support needed in order to identify it and bring it about, and existing efficaciously within it. Or, put another way, it means imagining an absurdity, seeing an illusion, a Baconian idol. Those who think in this way... are no longer directing the political process, because they do not understand it; rather, they are allowing themselves to be caught up in a chaotic and irrational flow."[34]

It is impossible to establish "rational" relations between sovereign states, even though, in clearly-defined geographical areas and in certain historical phases, there have been long periods characterised by a reasonable degree of equilibrium. In the experience of the European system of states, for example, application of the balance of power principle, while unable to prevent war, did allow "a positive evolution of the political reality in which an element of rationality could be introduced (i.e. the traditional ministers of the *raison d'état* advanced a chapter in the history of reason)."[35] "The *raison d'état*, Albertini explains, when this is distinct from the blind thirst for power, certainly constituted an application of reason to the sphere of politics, in the sense that it identified an area of [human] knowledge — that of the relations of force between states... — and took clinical appraisal of these relations as the supreme criterion

for political conduct, thereby and within certain limits controlling, in one way, precisely the blind thirst for power, and in another, liberty, or casual conduct."[36] But the presence of reason, which can mitigate conflicts, is a very different thing from its affirmation, which will be possible only when the *raison d'état* no longer conditions international relations, that is, when these relations, based on the presence of a world federal power, will be of a purely legal nature.

The Historical Significance of the Process of European Unification.

Federalism will be able to become a proper "political culture" only when it is no longer just a theory, or a reflection on a turning point in history, but also "a historically realised, empirical fact, which can be a point of reference for everyone.... Political culture is, in fact, related to the criteria of behaviour that accompany the major events in history. These criteria become models of behaviour that set themselves up in comparison, and even in conflict, with the usual social criteria of behaviour... and they thus come to be taken as ideal and moral principles of historical importance, and as stages in the growth of freedom and in the emancipation of mankind, etc."[37]

It is true that what happened in North America after the War of Independence resulted in the "invention" and concrete realisation of federalism as a system that allows the democratic unification of a number of states. However, the significance of this invention remained limited, since it was concerned exclusively with the need for good government and with the destiny of the American people.[38] In other words, the birth of the American federation did not, in itself, give rise to a new political culture. Whereas, in the course of the past two centuries, men and peoples the world over have been mobilised in the name of the great liberal-democratic and socialist revolutions, the same cannot be said of the American Revolution, since this was not perceived as the overcoming of a stage in the evolution of history. "The American federation came into being in what was still a side road of history, sheltered from the great conflicts between states and classes. And it negated... thirteen small states that had no state or national history."[39]

In truth, until we witness the birth of a federal state in an area covered by a group of established nation-states, there will be no overcoming the prevalence of the traditional approach to, and outlook, on political life, whose normal development is understood to be an evolution of the states or of relations between the states, but not a process leading to the merging

of a number of states. The replacement of the legal systems of established nation-states with a pluralistic system, the federal system — this would amount to an interruption of the juridical status quo, and thus a "revolution" — entails a redistribution of power. And it is precisely this new distribution of power that allows the emergence of new criteria of social behaviour that, having entered the historical picture, influence its evolution.

The European federation, if it comes into being, will represent the negation of the great historical nations. "These great historical nations have turned the concept of the nation as the organic division of mankind into a typical idea; they are the secular, historically concrete expression of the culture of the political division of mankind. Their negation will thus be the negation of this culture...

National culture... is the culture that, by mystifying liberalism, democracy and socialism, has, in fact, legitimatised the duty to kill. The culture of the negation of the political division of mankind is the historical negation of this duty; it constitutes the affirmation, in the sphere of thought, of the political, not just spiritual, right not to kill, and is thus the historical framework of the struggle to affirm it in practice — beyond the European federation — through world federation.

This interpretation of the historical-cultural significance of the European federation... may seem ... over-ambitious and too arbitrary. But man, in the making of his history, which evolves and is not simply a pattern of repetition, is right to be ambitious, given the enormity of the gap that separates what is from what should be. Anyway, there is something non-arbitrary in this interpretation: the fact that it is not a solitary excogitation, but reflects, rather, the growing significance of the reasons for the federalists' struggle.[40]

Reflection on the ultimate historical significance of the problem of European unity thus assumes enormous theoretical and practical importance: theoretical because it is a reflection on the ultimate ends of a process of historical significance; practical because it concerns the human action that influences, or that is necessary to influence, this process, which still being open and uncertain, bears witness to the difficulties encountered by attempts to introduce "new orders."

The Strategy of the Struggle for European Unification.

"Everything spontaneously done for the good of European unity is useful and, in the most diverse ways, everyone can make a contribution,

both within the sphere of what they themselves do, or within any other field of social activity... but the crucial question is that of the strategy to adopt."[41] If, in fact, the *theoretical line* can be defined as using the categories of federalism to identify the historical phase we are living though, and thus the direction in which history is moving, if the *political line* means pointing out the obstacles behind which there pile up problems, needs and demands to which the normal political instruments and a given institutional system are unable to respond adequately, then the *strategic line* identifies the means with which to take on the national power that must be overcome in the creation of the new supranational power, and the manner in which this must be done.

In this regard, several preliminary considerations are called for, the first of which, of a very general nature, concerns the relationship between, on the one hand, the possibility of developing a strategy and, on the other, the existing social order: in Europe "it will, in fact, be possible to destroy the closed and centralised institutions, and to found ones based on openness and federalism... only if the conduct of the Europeans really is, to some extent, in the most important sectors of social life, assuming these traits."[42] In other words, it is a question of taking into consideration, in the context of the question of strategy, what Albertini defined the historical-social basis of federalism, not to draw precise strategic indications from it so much as to establish the feasibility of a strategy, given that "no human behaviour which gives rise to a particular organisation of political relations can manifest itself without a basis in society and in a particular historical phase which allows it to spread and consolidate."[43]

The second consideration is that it is impossible to conduct a political battle without understanding the nature of it, and in particular the nature of its objective. In the case of European unity, this means deciding whether it is a revolutionary or a normal objective, so as to define the operation that needs to be conducted, the means that need to be used, and the role of the protagonists. The nature of the decision to found the European federation is such that it cannot be considered a normal political decision: "it represents the most serious decision that can be taken in the realm of political activity, since it implies the foundation of a new state in a new geographical area, in other words a decision which will determine the destiny of the inhabitants of numerous countries for many generations to come."[44] It is a radical choice, in which sovereignty is at stake and which throws into question the political formula, or structure, that governs the struggle for power.[45] In short, the nature of the decision, and thus of the battle, is revolutionary, and this cannot fail to have repercussions on the

strategy.

This revolutionary nature of the battle — and here we come to a third consideration — implies the exclusion, from the strategic debate, of the question of Europe's political content, i.e. of whether to choose a Europe that is liberal, socialist, etc. Fighting for European unity means fighting for the creation of a state (or rather, for certain institutions, not for one political current or another) that, by definition, must allow all the political currents complete freedom of action without identifying with any of them: in other words, it must be, quite simply, democratic. "The fact that the federation, being a state, must be open to all the political currents is not to say, however, that it does not exclude certain political and social outcomes, or that it does not favour others. It is a fact that the solutions to the biggest political and social problems depend not only on the type of government but also, and above all, on the type of state, even though this is not usually realised because the question of changing the form and dimensions of the state arises very exceptionally and only in the context of major historical change."[46] These considerations have important strategic implications also in relation to the forces to be mobilised: a constituent endeavour must involve the entire population and all the political forces (without distinction between right and left), and the only division that must emerge is that which separates the *national* from the *supranational field of interest*.

A fourth preliminary consideration concerns the meaning of the terms *unity* and *division* in a process of unification of states, because only if this is clear is it possible to identify the final objective to be pursued and thus to develop a strategy, whose success or failure will subsequently be measured. "For this purpose, it is enough remember a truth as simple as it is generally ignored: with regard to the essential thing, that is, the supreme decision-making power, there is division up to confederal level. Up to this level, the states conserve absolute sovereignty, that is, they do not acknowledge a superior political decision-making centre, and therefore they divide the peoples that are part of the confederation. Institutionally, there is unity only upon reaching federal level, where decisions valid for everyone can be taken autonomously. In all other situations, that is to say in all those associations of states in which the association itself is not the holder of power, there is division. The difference between unity and division, therefore, does not lie in the absence or presence of an association of some kind, but in the federal or non federal nature of the association. States, being unable to exist in isolation, nearly always present phenomena of association, but these phenomena do not prevent deep

divisions and major differences from arising," except in cases in which sovereignty is transferred from the states to a federation.[47] It is only by confronting the question of sovereignty that the strategy underpinning the struggle for European unification really can target unity.

The fifth consideration dispenses with the functionalist view according to which the decision to found the European federation will be the spontaneous culmination of progressive advances in the process of integration.[48] On the contrary, there is nothing spontaneous at all about this final step, which must instead stem from the precise, political will to create a new power, distinct from the national powers. From this perspective, "the decision to found the European federation... entails the transfer... of foreign and military policy, and of part of economic and social policy, from the national states to a federal state." And "this decision cannot be gradual.... In order to transfer these matters, it is necessary also to transfer the 'sovereignty' at issue...; but the 'sovereignty'... cannot be gradually transferred but only handed over in a specific moment."[49]

The final consideration concerns the conditions that make it possible to think of deciding to found the European federation. It is clear that had it not been for the historical crisis of the European nation-states (the eclipsing of their sovereignty), which began with the First World War and came to its head with the dramatic collapse of the European system of states in the wake of the Second World War, we would have seen "no attempts to achieve European unity after World War One, nor the process of integration that began in the wake of the Second World War."[50] However, while the presence of a historical crisis is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient for carrying the process of unification through to its completion. As long as the existing power situation makes it possible to manage (albeit in a provisional and inadequate manner) the common problems in an area of interdependence, then there will prevail what Albertini termed the "convergence of the *raisons d'état*," which produces collaboration, but preserves the status quo. Only a severe crisis of national power, in other words, an incapacity on the part of the nation to respond to the citizens' problems of wellbeing and security, has the potential, dramatically, to undermine a now inadequate power framework. If such a crisis is neither in progress, nor perceptible to public opinion or the government, because the instruments of collaboration that have been activated are, temporarily, continuing to work, then the relinquishing of national power, of sovereignty, will not be on the agenda.

All this has clear strategic implications, if it is considered that "the strategic opportunity is ascertained, not chosen,"[51] and that outside a

viable political context, it is impossible to mobilise and deploy the forces needed to fight and to throw down the final challenge.

Starting from these premises, the aim of the federalists' strategy is to force the national powers to take the decisive step of renouncing their absolute sovereignty in those fields (foreign and military policy, and economic and fiscal policy) that are central to statehood.

The European Federalist Movement (Movimento Federalista Europeo, MFE) has tried out basically two strategic approaches designed to exploit the possibilities presented by the phases in the process of European unification. In the papers presented at the XIV national congress of the MFE, held in Rome in 1989, Albertini analysed these through a few reflections on Altiero Spinelli and Jean Monnet. Considering the situation in which Europe found itself immediately after the Second World War, Albertini pointed out two ways in which the power vacuum created at that time might have been filled: "by a federal-type European government, or by a process leading towards this federal outcome as a concrete means of bringing about convergence of the states' policies.... The first of these solutions, which is the one Altiero Spinelli fought for, places federation at the start, in the sense that it sees the federation as the objective of an immediate constitutional-type battle, and not as the outcome of a gradual process of building Europe.... The second solution... is the one pursued by Jean Monnet. If we want terms to define these approaches, we can talk of the weak federalism of Monnet, as opposed to the strong federalism of Spinelli. These definitions may be justified by the observation that Monnet's strategy, given that it places the federal power at the end of a gradual process, and does not envisage a European government as the driving force of this process, can be conducted only through an intergovernmental mechanism (like that which Monnet in fact created, the European Community)....

The advantage of Monnet's strategy is that it is capable of engaging the active forces of the nations without first having to pose the constitutional question. The result is full exploitation of the states' normal European policy, meaning the policy they pursue when the European objectives on the agenda do not demand a transfer of the states' sovereign powers.... The disadvantage of this strategy lies in the fact... that it is a strategy that keeps the issue of European unity alive, but not one that can carry it through to its completion. Effectively, it amounts to nothing... when the European objectives are such that they demand the transfer of sovereign powers to Europe.

One need only consider this analysis in reverse in order to see the advantages and the disadvantages of Spinelli's strategy. The advantages derive from the fact that the presence of the federal power from the outset means that it is European democracy that has determined the manner, form and time frame of European unification. Its disadvantage lies in the extreme difficulty of calling a constituent assembly at the start of the process, with the parties still so closely bound to national powers. However, it is necessary to bear in mind a decisive point. When European objectives cannot be pursued without a transfer of sovereign powers, which is the same as saying in those situations in which the battle for Europe can actually be won, the only valid strategy is Spinelli's."[52] In Spinelli's strategy the strategic objective and the political objective (the European federation) are the same; in Monnet's approach, the strategic objective is an expedient adopted with a view to achieving the political objective.

The constituent strategy, which sets the federation as the direct objective, on the basis of the consideration that power cannot pass by degrees from the nations to Europe, aims to achieve recognition of the European people's constituent power through their demand for a constituent assembly. This strategy characterised the federalists' battles from the end of the '40s through to around the middle of the '60s, battles that initially sought to exploit the climate of the post-war period, or rather the extreme weakness of the European states, and that later, as the federalists grew progressively more radical in their contestation of the nation-states, which they defined "illegitimate", became reactions to the stinging defeat of the European Defence Community (EDC) project and to the subsequent policy of the governments, which endorsed the functionalist theory. The success of this policy, measured in terms of the economic growth that followed the creation of the Common Market and allowed the states to regain, apparently at least, a certain degree of stability, led Albertini to rethink the question of strategy. The resulting change of direction, which characterised the last years of the transition period of the Common Market (the late '60s) and went on to accompany the long process that has culminated in the creation of the single currency, was called *constitutional gradualism*.

The new strategy drew inspiration from a passage of Jean Monnet's *Memorandum* of 28 April, 1950 in which he explained the nature of the strategic design of the ECSC. Having first observed that nothing but blind alleys were being met across the full spectrum of the political front, he continued: "There is only one way out of such a situation: a concrete and resolute action on a limited but decisive point, that will bring about a

fundamental change in relation to that point and help to modify the very terms of the problems as a whole."

It is from this affirmation that Albertini developed the idea of the need for the pursuit of gradual strategic ends as a subtle way of driving politicians onto a "downward slope" from the nations to Europe. This could be done by identifying a "slippery point," or problem, ... that could potentially render "thinkable the decision to transfer power: basically problems in the areas of "purse" and "sword."[53] *The downward slope* concept, Albertini explained, is "a paradigm that is applied to many historical events, in their individual uniqueness, but also to many of the happenings of normal life: the paradigm... of the false step. If I take a false step, the consequences will be automatic; they will follow whether or not I want them to. It is something that can happen to anyone, that is often seen on a historical level, and that does not depend on any form of general determinism. The idea of the false step just means that some consequences, which constitute a result, are already inevitable at a point when one was not actually thinking of, definitely did not want, or did not yet want, that result."[54]

When this mechanism is triggered, the action of the national leaders tends to go beyond confederal limits and to become, consciously or otherwise, European action. "It is a recurring situation that emerges when national solutions are found to be impossible. In these circumstances, national leaders act as European leaders.... It is a widely known fact, but it is one that cannot be understood fully until it is admitted that what is activated in these cases is true *occasional European leadership*. This leadership emerges, naturally, in a context defined not by the institutions but by an objective situation (widespread fears, great problems, strength in unity, weakness in division), and it exerts a force of traction on the political class as a whole (which is thus allowed to pursue a European action without having to abandon the field of national politics)."[55]

According to this definition, occasional European leadership may be considered the answer to the question of whether or not *the power to build Europe* actually exists. If we consider this power in a static sense, then we can affirm that it does not exist, given that, in a process of unification of states, the latter have and retain their sovereignty until such time as the process of unification has been completed. And for this to happen, a very difficult decision needs to be taken simultaneously by all those involved. Occasional leadership, however, can allow the power to build Europe, potentially at least, to start to manifest itself, if an endeavour initiated by one or more governments proves able to win the consensus of the others.

The concept of occasional leadership is thus the dynamic element that could, in a rather crystallised power situation (that of divided sovereign states), trigger a process that might lead the holders of the old powers to decide to create a new, supranational power. And when such a decision is taken, all those unitary solutions compatible with the maintenance of sovereignty disappear from view and it becomes possible for the full force of the constituent will to manifest itself.[56]

Identifying the role of the governments and the mechanism that can activate their will to make the federal leap forward does not mean that this role is actually being fulfilled, or that the objective need for unification is sufficient to ensure that it will be fulfilled. Drawing a parallel with Italian unification, Albertini wrote: "This was a problem at once simple and terribly difficult.... Simple, because it was perfectly easy to see that the regional states divided Italy, and that Italy could be united only by an Italian state. Terribly difficult, because it was terribly difficult for the ruling class to understand a policy — that of Italian unification — that was going to threaten, reduce or even destroy their own positions of power. The moderates — after vacillating for some considerable time — pursued this policy. But they were undoubtedly spurred on by the whip of Mazzini, by the action of a small revolutionary class that exploited moral and cultural forces rather than any power situation. We see something similar to this in the case of European unification: it is slowed down by the fact that the problem lies precisely where the driving force should be, with the politicians. This problem will be overcome only if the federalists prove able to crack... the federalist whip."[57]

Strategically, the federalists have two fundamental tasks: the first is to take the *initiative*, vis-à-vis the governments and political forces, in order either to point out intermediate strategic objectives arising from objective situations, or to pursue the objective of the European state when the manifest precariousness of the power situation, which could culminate in a severe crisis, makes it both feasible and possible that the holders of national power will finally display the highest level of historical and political responsibility. The other task is to act as guides, in other words, to gather the citizens, defined by Albertini as the "European people in the making," around the strategic or around the political objective so that they can voice their consensus for unification.[58] In every strategic phase, therefore, it is a question of setting up an efficient and autonomous action that gets men acting in an effective and productive way.

To this end, it is necessary to activate, in a political sense, the following categories: *organised Europeanism* (the Movements), *or-*

ganisable Europeanism, i.e., "the impact the eclipse of the national sovereignties has had on the most aware citizens", and *diffuse Europeanism*, "the impact that de facto European unity has had on individual citizens," so as to create a "balance between the confederal policy of the governments and the federal objective of the organised Europeans, between the myths of integration and the United States of Europe idea, and between nationalist distortion... of reality and awareness of the federalism-nationalism contraposition."[59]

If, indeed, the new European state will come about only if the governments relinquish their sovereignty irrevocably through a pact of union, then this step must be promoted and sanctioned through the exercising of the will of the sovereign people, that is, through an end to exclusive consensus for the national powers and an expression of consensus for the birth of the new European power.

Focusing on the people does not mean attributing the people with the capacity and role of an organised political movement, fully aware of the nature of the political struggle needed to reach the federal objective, and completely unconditioned by the national power framework. Instead, it means being aware that the transfer of sovereignty is not a purely institutional matter and that the life and significance of this institutional construct must "stem from an act of will, whose subject is the people and whose content is based on a *different way of living together*."[60] Those who write off the European federation an unrealisable project, because there exists no European people, no European demos, as the precondition for the birth of the European state, fail to appreciate that "a new people is born at the moment in which it becomes aware of the need for the birth of a new state and that a new state is born out of this awareness."[61] The concept of the European people in the making (a consequence of the long process of integration), which will become the "European people" proper upon the creation of the European state, allows us to envisage that, should circumstances allow it, there could emerge the common will to create the European state: "European people and a European state will therefore come about at the same time."[62]

The Organisation and the Militants.

The effective action of a political movement depends absolutely on the identification of an adequate strategy; it is equally important that the individuals who carry out this strategy, and indeed their whole organisation, are up to scratch. For this reason, the organisation and training of

militants were among Albertini's most pressing concerns from the very start of his federalist militancy.[63]

However, it was not until after the collapse of the EDC that he began to channel most of his energies in this direction. Prior to this setback, the MFE was entirely different compared to what it was progressively to become in the period following it. It had tens of thousands of members, most of whom belonged to national political parties. The movement was the reflection of the enormous pro-European feeling (encouraged by American support for the idea of a United States of Europe) that dominated the political class in the post-war period and allowed the MFE to become a point of reference for the parties and a "prompter" heeded by the leaders.

After this stage and, as we shall see, the setting out of a new strategy (the European People's Congress), it was necessary to rethink the organisation. The radical opposition to the nation-state that accompanied this new strategy necessarily put a distance between the MFE and the vast majority of the notables and of the political class, for whom Europeanism was strictly conditioned by the national power framework. As a result the movement needed to be rebuilt, so to speak, on different foundations, through the recruitment of new, highly motivated forces and the creation of militants who think and act autonomously.[64]

"Building Europe is difficult.... To engage in the attempt is to set oneself, bravely and modestly, at the crossroads of all the political and economic crises that the past forty years of Europe's political and economic life have brought. Europe is an alternative to the ideological crisis of communism, to the passivity of socialism, and to the stagnation of national political life. Militants are those who have this calling and who realise the noble nature of their task, which must make them, pioneers of a small organisation, feel that they are the alternative to everything else that currently occupies the stage. Because either this is how it is for them, or, as federalists, they are worthless." And, as such, federalists must be capable of making their presence felt in their own environment, of "winning small, but effective, slices of power," thereby making "the birth of an organisation coincide with the birth of genuine positions of leadership at local level."[65] Several years later Albertini reiterated and expanded on these ideas, stating that "we cannot start again under a leader who points out the way and leaves followers to travel it. This is the kind of leader that is needed only when power is within reach, certainly not when it is still remote, when it is still a question of creating a force, and when it is *companions, not followers*, that we need. To create a force,

moral and intellectual energies need to be unleashed. It takes people with autonomy, people who can do things by themselves, who can do new things... the leadership we need has to be sought in the collective experience of all these independent contributions."[66]

The basis for the creation of these independent militants was identified as the capacity to rid one's subconscious of the national sentiment, of the national point of view fed by the continuous inputs from the existing social-political order: "Militants are formed in the course of the struggle, not in study groups. However, one is not born a militant, and one does not become a good militant without acquiring a clearly defined political character," and this can be done through study and debate. "It might seem strange that to succeed in any political enterprise, it is necessary to build the struggle upon a foundation of serious study, with rules and structures that bear a closer resemblance to those of schools of philosophy than political associations. Yet, in all revolutionary enterprises something of this nature has always existed, because the hardest challenge for the revolutionary is precisely that of making the best use of rationality to direct the struggle towards a new objective in a world in which habit, conventional wisdom and clichés steer men towards old objectives."[67] Hence, the federalist vanguard becomes "the theoretical and practical consciousness of the European nature of the fundamental political alternative. As a specifically theoretical awareness, it is founded on the theory of federalism and on the demystification of the nation.... As a specifically practical awareness, the federalist vanguard signifies *opposition to the community*, which is different from the typical opposition to governments or regimes since, instead of refuting a particular government or regime, the federalist vanguard rejects the national community as an exclusive political community. Only at this point does the decision in favour of a European federation abandon the vagueness of good intentions to become a definite will, a real and effective political attitude, that is, a daily relationship with the power structure."[68]

The intellectual autonomy of the individual, and the autonomy of the organisation, can nevertheless be guaranteed only through a definite breaking away from the logic of the system. "The revolutionary... cannot and must not have a role in the system. Staying within the system means accepting its logic, not questioning its basis, carrying out more or less correctly the tasks linked to one's role, and seeking the consensus of those who have an elevated position in politics or society, in short, telling them what they want to hear... renouncing one's prerogative to speak the truth."[69] "A position is secure when interests coincide with duty (Hamil-

ton).... Those with pre-established positions that depend on the existing political and economic balance... have interests that are in conflict with their duty"[70]: great enterprises can be based only on "exclusive devotion."[71]

And finally, to complete the picture, we cannot ignore the material aspect that can condition the autonomy of an organisation: its relationship with money, one of the instruments most capable of corrupting individuals and groups. Militants must be self-financing if they are to respect an unassailable principle of true independence, which must, by definition, be moral, intellectual, political and financial.

Obviously, not all the members of an organisation can be militants in the strict sense of the word; having said that, the MFE will be able to tackle the task of founding a new state only if there is, within its ranks, a well prepared group, a hard core devoted exclusively to the cause. It cannot be ignored that the governments and the citizens will also take the field, but both of these groups are conditioned by the national framework and therefore it is up to the militant to work constantly and, with determination, to display the "skills of the pilot," in other words, to point out, at every junction reached, the right road to take.

The Strategic Stages in the Struggle for European Unification.

1. The Pact for Federal Union and the EDC.

In 1949 the Union of European Federalists (UEF) agreed to the MFE's proposal to mount a campaign for a Pact for Federal Union, which the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe was meant to draw up and put to the member states for ratification. In Italy, in particular, this campaign involved Italy's top politicians and led to the signing of its "Petition for a Pact for Federal Union" at the Teatro Sistina in Rome by the prime minister, Alcide De Gasperi, and the foreign minister, Carlo Sforza, in the presence of the President of Italy, Luigi Einaudi. The backdrop to this campaign was the decay and power crisis of Europe's nation-states, whose weakness was seen to be exploitable in the bid to get them to put their centuries of conflict and destruction behind them and unite in a federation. The fact that the federal pact never came into being only exacerbated Europe's post-war problems, the greatest of which was that of German sovereignty, and in particular, of the German army. The EDC project was the governments' answer to this problem, and the battle for a European political community the federalist reaction.

The fact that the federalists had to rely on the foreign policy of the nation-states constituted, in Albertini's words, the "paradox of the EDC": "in the EDC project, traditional policy and federalist policy coincided. The diplomats were faced with a tough problem. Federalism offered the solution. The solution was federalist, whereas the means of its implementation was the nation-state."[72]

In truth, Albertini wrote, "if one were to look, behind the European façade, for the true reasons for the political actions in support of the EDC that were mounted in the various countries, one would see that in France they were a means of preventing German rearmament, in Germany a means of recovering the only form of sovereignty that was, at that time, possible, and in Italy a means of protecting the centre government."[73] The federalists, aware of this, and critical of the EDC as an institution, nevertheless supported it as a "policy", since it was, basically, a constituent policy: "it would have given us, as was indeed recognised by the 58 French socialists opposed to the project, a six-member European state.... There can be no going back... when the national army has been dismantled.... All the democratic forces would have been obliged to adopt a stance vis-à-vis a situation whose only possible outcome was federalist."[74]

But the battle was lost, and the collapse of the EDC made it necessary to reconsider the alliance between traditional and federalist policy. This alliance was based on a real situation, the crisis of the sovereign state, and it had induced the most enlightened of the holders of national power to press ahead, almost up to the point of relinquishing sovereignty. The failure of the operation, which had represented one of Europe's occasional opportunities, brought national politics once more to the fore: the opponent, the nation-state, was once more in the driving seat.

This meant that it was necessary to find a new strategy and to strengthen the MFE: while the political situation temporarily left the federalists out of the game, the contradictions inherent in national life remained, and if the federalist analysis of the situation were correct, they would be destined, fatally, to re-emerge.

2. The European People's Congress.

With the ratification of the WEU and the restoration of Germany's sovereignty, it was clear that the rebuilding of Europe was proceeding along national lines, and was based on the preservation of the absolute sovereignty of the states: the federalists thus set themselves the task of creating the conditions that would *force* the national governments to

relinquish their sovereignty, their intention being to fire popular demand for a constituent assembly, the convening of which could come about only upon the creation of a *supranational political force* that was firmly in favour of such a step and that was strong enough to impose it on the national governments. This political force, which would serve to increase European popular will until victory was achieved, and agreement to the constituent assembly wrung out of the governments, was to be the European People's Congress (EPC).[75] "This is not a maximalist programme," wrote Albertini in an article on the significance of the Paris congress, in January 1955, of the European Union of Federalists, which launched the idea of the EPC. "It is a question of shifting the struggle to terrain where it can be won. Schuman himself, whose courageous address opened the meeting, said that European action must focus not on the national parliaments, but on the two spheres of opinion — public and government. National situations become crystallised in national parliaments, and even more so in national governments. But it is from national governments that public opinion must secure the first step, because national governments are the ones with the power of initiative."[76]

"The vote for the EPC — Albertini wrote, to illustrate the meaning and the ends of the campaign — "does not create a parliamentary power, but counts more as a sort of protest, a claim to the European voting right.... The general political meaning of this long-term work plan is essentially as follows: it tends towards the hegemony on diffuse Europeanism. Today, Europeanism is a zero force politically... But this situation can be overturned with the primary elections.... In the same way in which someone who has liberal, socialist, trade union reactions immediately reports them to a given party or trade union, thus tomorrow someone who has European reactions will report them to the European People's Congress and no longer to the 'Europeanists' of the national parties. When this is done, Europeanism will be a political force. It will then be a matter of using this force appropriately and decisively when power crisis situations arise. In such situations choices become strong the masses awaken from their usual slumber and acquire the power of choice. Then the EPC will be able to stage the decisive battle."[77]

It was inevitable that these radical positions should be adopted. Having come to the end of a political cycle in which Europe's weakness had been severe, and with the tragic consequences of Europe's division still fresh in the memory, it was hard to imagine that the governments might, in the short term, have pursued the objective of the federation, which implied the destruction, at their own hands, of their positions of power: the federalists had to set out on the road of *autonomy*, the

formation of cadres, the gathering of consensus, developing a policy of *regime and community opposition.*[78]

On the European front, when the governments, through the creation of the Common Market, started to move in the direction of simple economic integration, the federalists responded by denouncing the prevailing functionalist illusion, vigorously contesting the European communities and the futile hope that they might spontaneously evolve in the direction of federalism. "Evolution," wrote Albertini, "means passing (gradually) from status X to status Y. Well, one cannot talk... of a (gradual) transfer of the power of these pseudo-communities from a national (confederal) status to a European (federal) status for the simple reason that these pseudo-communities do not have any power, and as a result cannot go from having one form of power to having another; and neither is it possible to talk in indirect terms: since they are subordinate to and not wielders of power, they are not in a position to transfer it from a national to a European level. Whatever form they take, these pseudo-communities remain within the confines of the national sphere. In relation to the European sphere, they are, one might say, asymptotic: they can be thought to draw ever closer to it, they cannot be considered able to reach it.... Those who wish federation to be achieved cannot, therefore, be in favour of the pseudo-communities. So what must their attitude be? Indifferent, hostile? I would say that it must be hostile. Allow me to illustrate just one point: to unite Europe there needs to be a transfer of sovereignty from the state to the federation, and this can occur only if a sufficient number of individuals, firmly aligned in the European camp, turn against the national powers in order (to a great extent) to destroy them, while at the same time founding, in the same European camp, a political (constituent) power. We are talking about an extremely difficult revolutionary struggle... demanding exceptional force of reason."[79]

This political-strategic analysis, which went entirely against the prevailing trend presented the federalists with a number of problems: on the one hand there was the need to give consciousness to and organise the widespread Europeanism, in other words, the pro-European feelings of the citizens, and, on the other, the need to denounce the Europeanist policy pursued by the governments, a policy that, in reality, postponed the federal objective, and was feeding the widespread Europeanism that federalists themselves needed to be exploiting, and which ought to have been the framework of action of the EPC.

But, difficult as it was, this was an attitude that had to be adopted, and it was not without its repercussions, producing splits and divisions within

the federalist movements. The campaign for the EPC was not initially well received by the UEF (which at the time was an "international" of independent national movements) and its supporters tried to conduct it independently of the existing organisations, setting up the EPC as an autonomous organisation. But the attempt to get the elections of its delegates conducted over a sufficiently wide area of western Europe failed and the EPC "started to drift like a ship without a compass" — public elections were successfully organised only in those areas in which there were strong and resolute groups, basically only in northern Italy and Lyon — until, finally, it entered its death throes.

The crisis of the EPC, which turned into the crisis of the movement, marked the start, in 1960, of a troubled period that culminated, on the one hand, in Albertini assuming a position of opposition to Spinelli and also in his taking over of the leadership of the MFE, and, on the other, in terms of action, in the launch of the campaign for the Voluntary Census of the European Federal People.

"It was a very tough and arduous undertaking," Albertini wrote. "It was a matter of re-examining everything that had been thought and done from 1955 to 1960, and of starting again, tackling, intellectually, a much vaster field, while the force of federalism was dwindling to such a point that the scope for action was becoming infinitesimal. Having abandoned the comfortable position of (cultural) deputy to Spinelli, I had to confront him head on and openly, and hold my ground against practically everyone, while I was being accused of giving way, of Gaullism, of sabotaging federalist autonomy. Beginning with two or three young friends, bit by bit I wove the threads together, without wavering on the key elements: a vision of the course of history, a vision of the political process and of our place in it, regime and community opposition, and finally, as this gradually took shape and became possible once again, the concrete determination to tackle the problems that the MFE is called upon to solve [namely] the restarting of action in the European framework (real action, not the dream of action like the visionary plans for a great revival of the EPC, which do not allow us to achieve anything, since, here and now, they are not possible and they do not spur the federalist front into action), and political debate on fundamental questions: the place of the federalists in the course of history and in the political process.

Spinelli had no answer to this need for new awareness and new action. This is why he sought support externally, in the USA and in the national left wing parties. But by so doing he sacrificed federalist

autonomy, went off course, deviating in the national direction, and lost his some of his following."[80]

Albertini faced a dilemma that was moral as well as political: "It is only recently that I have started to see clearly, through to its ultimate political consequences, the fact that Spinelli cannot lead this phase of the federalist struggle.... It is a very serious situation, serious because it is difficult to contemplate on a human level: he is, after all, the founder; and serious from a political perspective, too, because he is, in any case, a major player on the stage and fighting or diminishing him would damage federalism. It is a real quandary: if we leave him to go on leading the struggle, he will take it off course, yet if we take away his supremacy, we have no one with the authority to replace him."[81]

But just a year later, the die was cast: "... basically, it all depends on whether or not it is true that Spinelli's policy will lead to the dissolution of the MFE. This has been my personal view for some considerable time now, and I have made no secret of the fact.... It is true that I could... be mistaken, and before deciding to take action I thought about it endlessly. But things continued to go from bad to worse, until finally I felt that not intervening would have been blameful. After all, we have no means of gauging our actions other than our own consciences. And the fact that we could be wrong does not relieve us of our responsibility to make a choice: we are making choices all the time, and action, just as much as failure to act, constitutes a choice." Spinelli's leadership "is a problem that cannot be resolved through sentiment alone: respect, gratitude, friendship. This would be to treat a value judgment as an established fact, whereas establishing the facts is precisely what we have to do, in order to be able to appreciate their political consequences. Who is Spinelli? He is a man with enormous intuition when it comes to fully, or almost fully developed political situations, but totally without interest in those that still manifest themselves in a purely embryonic form. He is a man very skilled at manipulating the existing equilibria, but entirely the wrong person to pave the way for future ones. It was, for Spinelli, somehow destiny that, in the period between 1948 and 1954, there prevailed a situation that could, potentially, have allowed the federal unification of Europe (through correct understanding and manipulation of the existing equilibrium, and provided that some politician outside the normal arena should prove able to take the right initiative at the right time). Spinelli was this man and was thus responsible for placing federalism, for the first time in European history, on the political stage... and by so doing he left his mark in post-war history."

But the political cycle that began in 1954 is, as far as the European question is concerned, the complete opposite of the cycle that came to its close the same year. The policies of the parties and governments can no longer be expected to coincide in a virtual manner with the objective of the federal unification of Europe. It is thus no longer a question of intervening in the current equilibrium from the outside, with a federalist initiative. Instead, it is a question of getting to grips with the embryonic political aspects of the situation, with the aim of bringing about the birth of a new force, and of using this force to modify the equilibrium so as to obtain that which can no longer be obtained in the context of the normal equilibrium. In the new political cycle that had begun, Spinelli's life started to become difficult. His personality no longer coincided with his task. He could point out the new direction to follow, but he was unable to follow it himself, because it was not his path. He remained immobile, and each time he tried to move, to act, he found himself deviating in a national direction.... And ever since then we have remained on the threshold. And it has to be understood that is where we will remain, for ever, unless we can find the courage to surpass him.... Federalism in the current cycle must do things that Spinelli cannot do, that there would be no point asking him to do. Precisely because, as a man, he is complete — he has earned his place among those who have genuinely contributed something to history —, Spinelli is the man for some things, but not for all things. And on a human level — life is by no means perfect — I believe that there is only one way in which we can be true to him: and that is by opposing him."[82]

"Surpassing" Spinelli meant "finding some firm ground, some basis offering real organisational possibilities. In particular: a) a view of how the world is moving (the world, note, not governments, which are effects rather than causes), b) an action that can represent the starting point from which to move from the present, from all that is national, towards Europe, and which must be a starting point everywhere, even in cities where the federalists do not yet have a foothold."[83]

This action will be the Voluntary Census of the European Federal People, a systematic gathering of signatures, whose purpose is to "monitor" the European citizens in favour of European unity until such time as they are in the majority.

3. The Voluntary Census of the European Federal People.

The differences with Spinelli came to light at the meetings of the

supranational MFE[84] and of the permanent committee of the EPC, held in Paris on 30 September and 1 October, 1961 as preparation for the Lyon congress (9-11 February, 1962), and their political-organisational repercussions came, in March 1962, with the official establishment, in Milan, of the *Autonomia federalista* current. As Spinelli progressively withdrew from the picture[85], this current, led by Albertini, embarked on a period of intense activity: the first meeting at European level was held in Basel on 29 April, 1962, and at the second (on 30 September) the new framework action (in the form of the Census) was approved. In the October, this action was proposed to the central committee of the supranational MFE, in opposition to the plan to revive the EPC action.

This crisis period and the shifting to a new perspective on strategy and action are analysed by Albertini in a series of writings gathered together in an essay entitled *La crisi di orientamento politico del federalismo europeo*. "Neither the European People's Congress, he writes, nor the unified supranational Movimento Federalista Europeo have produced the desired fruits. I begin with a few remarks on the EPC. This could have been thought of: a) *as a means of establishing contact between federalists, understood as a new, European political class, and their cities* (this is how I always interpreted it...), and b) *as a formula capable of arousing political energies*. Experience has shown us that the EPC is the first of these things, not the second.... It is easy, moreover, to explain why: a) the EPC makes provision for the election of plebiscitary delegates, not delegates selected by assemblies on the basis of their political positions; b) as a result, it does not select responsible leaders, but amasses delegates-cum-spectators, who may approve of this personality or the other, but who fail to appreciate that the reports and proposals which they hear (but do not listen to) constitute political directions whose choice, which depends on each and every one of them, effectively imposes a political line on the organisation; c) this is why the EPC fails both as policy-making organ and as an organ for driving recruitment efforts and for selecting men....

Now a few considerations on the MFE. It has failed to become European.... If we compare it with the past, we can say that things have been got rid of (the old "sovereign" national organisations), but not, as yet, that they have effectively been replaced with things European. The national commissions tend to keep political initiative within the national sphere.... In the light of these premises, it is possible to get to the heart of the problem. We are faced with the most difficult political objective: the foundation of a new state in a new area. Having failed to seize the opportunity offered by post-war Germany, we will now need to employ the most difficult of means: a political movement that will have to be founded from scratch. If we prove unable to rise to these great challenges, our adoption of political stances will amount to nothing more than talk... The problem we face is not one of conserving, or of organising, that which exists; instead we face the problem of making superior political behaviours — superior morally and culturally — coincide with the struggle for Europe."[86]

All this implied a need to focus massively on the cultural front: "Our cultural efforts are of the utmost importance. We need a doctrine that will enable us to show what our enemy is, and why it must be defeated. A permanent doctrine. In the absence of a doctrine, coups de main, policies like those of the Carbonari, and short-term enterprises are all possible, but the same cannot be said of long-term endeavours that must rest on the engagement, for a very long time, of many men, in the absence of funds to pay or recompense them and without any prospect of imminent success.... As long as people think that evil equates with capitalism, with communist totalitarianism, with the anti-Christ, then the natural reactions — the acceptable watchwords — will be those of the socialists, the democrats, the Christians... We need a satisfactory theory of the nation-state, something solid on which to base our claim that it is illegitimate, and our rejection of loyalty to it.... It will be impossible to abandon the nation-states regime in favour of the federal one without an absolute negation of nationalism (= the nation-state) in all the spheres in which its influence has spread.... We need to set up a regime opposition and a regime opposition can be based only on absolute negation (which by its nature, by the very fact that it negates a power situation that has produced a culture, must inevitably have a cultural character) of the existing regime. We really do have to show that the nation is an idol. It is not enough just to say this. We have to say it in such a way that the best, and then all the rest, become convinced that it is an idol, and that it must not be served. Until we reach this point, our opposition is in vain, we "do not act on our own", our force is nil."[87]

This great endeavour, to found and disseminate federalist political culture — its aim was to highlight "the exhaustion of the traditional political ideologies" and to indicate federalism as "the true answer if we are to reach the ethical and political values that the new global and European situation causes to be born in the consciousness of men"[88] — provided the crucial support for a framework action, an action able to create a European framework of political struggle based on the federa-

tion/nation-states alternative.

"In the current situation — Albertini wrote, officially presenting the campaign for the Voluntary Census of the European Federal People — the European citizens, while able, through the parties, to contribute to the formation of the respective national policies, are not in a position either to declare themselves in favour of Europe, or to adopt stances on issues that concern Europe. We therefore need to make it possible both for all Europeans to support Europe, and for this support to be harnessed through a means of action that is within everyone's reach, and as such able to be developed everywhere. We must also give the Europeans, who have shown this support, the opportunity to express, from time to time, their positions on Europe's political, social and economic problems."[89] The theory was that this would result in the Europeans acting above national level, "that they would, as they became organised, become progressively more open a) to the idea that they are the European federal people, and b) to the idea that, as members of this people, they have the democratic right to decide what form European unity should take (through the exercising of their constituent power)."[90]

This campaign had to aim to achieve numerous expressions of support, indeed it had to win a level of support great enough to turn it into a public phenomenon, or rather to create "a widespread European frame of mind that would stop the population from continuing to regard the governments and national parties as the sole protagonists of European unification."[91] Ultimately, this process was intended to lead to "a global shift of public opinion", such as to "force the governments to face the need to convene a constituent assembly", with provision being made even for non-violent acts of civil disobedience.[92]

While the *Autonomia federalista* current was proceeding along these lines, deciding, after several postponements, that the action should begin on 1 November 1963 in France, Italy and Germany, strenuous efforts were being made to convince the MFE to sanction the Census as an official action. "The MFE, wrote Albertini, is now conducting the policy of the Front, that is to say, it is trying to assume the leadership of Europe's democratic forces. The minority... for its part, is trying to do the same with the Census.... The Front, in its present form, cannot evolve, therefore it is not the correct solution, but its efforts were in the right direction."[93] On this basis Albertini looked for an agreement and came up with the following proposal: "The Census can organise the population. The Front can speak to the population. If the population is to be organised, it must be given the opportunity to express itself. In the absence of the vote,

which is a population's normal means of expression, the only thing that can be done at European level is to conduct a sort of census. On the other hand, in order to preserve this link with the population and channel it politically, we have to group together the nuclei in favour of Europe, as gradually they emerge — hence the need for a flexible form of aggregation — and, together with them, adopt political stances. This is the Front... if the MFE acknowledges... the complementarity between the Front and the Census, introducing appropriate guarantees which will have to be worked out, [*Autonomia federalista*] will have no alternative but to disband."[94]

The operation was carried out successfully: in the course of the central committee meeting of 31 May 1965, the Census was approved as an official action of the MFE and the *Autonomia federalista* current was dissolved.

4. The Direct Election of the European Parliament.

The attempt to mobilise the citizens through the EPC and the Census collided with the growing success of the Common Market. "The MFE knew that economic integration alone would not automatically lead Europe to political unification. It also knew that economic union could not be fully realised without political union, given that its evolution, at a certain point, would inevitably have raised economic policy problems that are practically impossible to resolve in the absence of a European power. And it endeavoured by every means to make these patent truths understood. But it was neither heard nor heeded: the constant march of the Common Market gave most the impression that it was now advancing steadily in the direction of Europe. For the MFE it was a question of biding its time."[95]

In other words, the MFE had to identify an adequate basis, linked to some aspect of the political situation, from which to re-launch the action of the federalists. What they saw on the horizon was the imminent end of the transition period of the Common Market, and this was something that could be exploited strategically. When this point came, the states would find themselves at a crossroads: a) to go on enjoying the advantages of economic integration would mean facing up to the problem of economic and monetary union, b) to overcome the discrepancy (which the governments, first and foremost, were experiencing on a daily basis) between the size of the problems and that of the decision-making centres would mean tackling the problem of the institutions and their democratic control. For

the federalists, these two fronts, together, would become the platform from which to re-launch Europe through the change in strategy that, as we have seen, was defined *constitutional gradualism*.

Taking as his starting point the consideration that Europe was now an economic reality, with a complex administration, Albertini drew attention to the fact that, alongside this new and powerful European reality there was a European Parliament still devoid of a constituency: "In asking for it to be elected, we are demanding something that everyone but the enemies of Europe welcome. Now we must exploit this sentiment... [The] parties, despite recognising the principle of European democracy, do nothing to turn it into a reality. But they will have to shake off this inertia should the MFE, through a patient and resolute campaign, force them to come up with a response. Of course it is not just a question of demanding the direct election of the European Parliament, but rather of embarking on a slow and difficult process that will eventually lead to this goal.... In practice, it means singling out individual objectives that are within reach along the pathway towards electing a European parliament, so as to bring about concrete decisions and not just Sunday sermons. The crucial point, now, is the fact that de Gaulle can block European elections, but cannot prevent other countries from electing their members of the European Parliament by universal suffrage.... This has to be the starting point...."[96]

Thus the concrete proposal was to start, in Italy, a campaign for the unilateral direct election of Italy's representatives in the European Parliament, gradually drawing into the Italian campaign the leaders of the French opposition to de Gaulle and leading figures in other countries, too, so as to create a sort of chain reaction. Should unilateral elections not be obtained, the contingency plan was to mobilise "a force great enough to demand, through a congress elected directly by the people in primary elections held on the same day in a sufficient number of European cities, European democracy."[97] This would have meant exploiting all the actions of the MFE, from the Front to the Census, and the Border Action, and so on, and have necessitated the direct mobilisation of public opinion and the gathering together of a group of key figures from the worlds of politics, culture and the trade unions.

With regard to the significance of and the potential offered by the direct election of the European Parliament, Albertini wrote: "All the great political and economic problems should now be referred necessarily to European level, but... they still allow Europe to be seen in the evasive terms typical of the national perspective (in terms of collaboration, of confederation, of a community not destined to undergo a federal transfor-

mation). The question of European elections, on the other hand, has to be considered from the perspective of transferring power to Europe, as this is exactly what direct European elections imply. One need only consider the fact that the first European elections will inevitably see the parties aligning themselves at European level and fighting to win European consensus.... Once the political struggle has been shifted from the national frameworks to the European setting, the main obstacles that separate us from European democracy will have been overcome. All the other objectives, including the Constitution and the constituent assembly will merely become aspects of what, in military strategy, is called building on success."[98]

It was to be more than a decade before the first European elections were held, and while this milestone may not have triggered the process of transferring power from the nations to Europe, it did allow the federalists to keep the European question alive. They did this by denouncing the contradiction between the European vote and the absence of a European state. It also allowed them to involve the Parliament itself in some of the stages of their political struggles, through to Altiero Spinelli's Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, which, within and with the help of the European Parliament, managed to advance further the process of unification, raising in clear terms the problem of the transfer of certain key powers from the nations to Europe.

5. The Currency.

In the early 1970s, the world was faced with a severe political and economic crisis linked to increasing turmoil in the monetary sphere and the raw materials sector, which, in turn, was attributable to the weakening of America's position of leadership. It thus appeared more urgent than ever to inject some energy into the process of European unification, so that Europe might be able to enter the equation, or at least begin a tangible process that would make it possible to anticipate a change in the global power situation, moving it in the direction of "egalitarian multipolarism."

While the battle to obtain European elections was still being waged, the federalists opened up another strategic front, identifying currency as a "slippery point" on the "downward slope" leading from the nations to Europe, in other words, as a factor that made a decision to transfer power to European level appear feasible. On the basis of this new principle of gradual exploitation of the governments' European policy — at the summit meeting in The Hague in 1969, the governments had recognised the

need for monetary union — the MFE moved closer to their objective of demanding a single currency.

It was a matter of acting in order to turn a concrete problem, caused by increasingly close economic integration and by an ever more chaotic international situation, into a political problem, of linking the currency question with the question of sovereignty, and thus of the state.

"It is commonly admitted — Albertini wrote — that monetary problems should also be tackled from a political perspective. But it is not common for consideration to be given to the basic political questions that underlie them... Obviously, this affects the results of the analyses that are conducted. Positive conclusions cannot be reached when one sees that there is a need for greater understanding of a problem, yet fails to address this need; in this way, the reflection is kept firmly within the state that Hegel defines 'bad infinity'. And at the root of the 'bad infinity' [in this case]... is the absence of a complete and adequate theory of the political aspects (power aspects) of currency."[99]

Starting from the analyses of Lionel Robbins, who highlights these very aspects, Albertini pursued his line of reasoning, ultimately showing that the expression "European monetary unification" refers to a clear question that begs but one answer, not a number of solutions (in truth, all but one illusory). The economic objective is to transform a group of national currencies, whose influence at international level is both subordinate and limited, into a "national" (European) currency that covers the whole of the area in question. It is thus a question of having recourse to a political instrument: public will, constitutionally defined, over this same area. This is the same as saying that European monetary unification cannot be planned without also planning the creation of a European federal state."[100]

In short, the currency question was, indeed, one of those "slippery points" that, activating the national leaders in the framework of normal political action (which, being such, does not extend to consideration of the possibility of creating European sovereignty), opened the way, once the objective was on the table, for the emergence of an occasional European leadership that could pull the national leaderships in that very direction.

Having obtained, in December 1975, approval for the first direct election of the European Parliament, the federalists turned their attention to the single currency which, on the basis of the above considerations, had assumed strategic importance. It was a lengthy battle. First, the federalists lent their support to the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS), which they saw as an intermediate stage, capable of containing the currency drift caused by the widespread problem of exchange rate fluctuations. Then, once this objective had been reached, they fought for the transformation of the EMS into an out-and-out monetary union.[101]

Then, during the Rome European Council in October 1990, decisions on economic and monetary union were finally taken which seemed to suggest that a true European currency would be born through the drawing up and ratification of a treaty containing the programme for its realisation.[102] While drawing attention to the risks linked to the long time frame envisaged by the governments, Albertini underlined the importance of ratifying a treaty that contained a clear programme and fixed deadlines: "What is in question here is the force (political, economic and social) that has thus far underpinned the Community's progress: the shaping of expectations. It is by this means that the process of unification has so far been able to advance. European energies... can enter the field when the Community, stating clearly where it is going, the intermediate objectives, the dates etc., sets out programmes that look credible and that mobilise a number of forces — forces that increase as these programmes, drawing closer to the final objective, gain even more credibility, and even prevail over opposing or passive forces. Of course, the more important the objective is, the greater will be the forces that enter the field."[103]

On the basis of these considerations, and of the fact that the Single Market was due to come into effect from 1 January 1993, the MFE asked the governments to bring forward the creation of the European currency so as to avoid the risk that the whole project might sink, were there to be a change in the general climate that had given rise to the political will to create it. It was, that is, a question: 1) of speeding up the attaining of the strategic objective (the currency) so as to be able to move on to the building-on-success stage in order to create new institutional equilibria, and 2) "of rendering steeper and steeper the slippery slope on which the governments found themselves, requesting incessantly that the European Parliament be granted, irrevocably, a constituent mandate, at least in relation to the creation of the democratic and institutional structure through which to manage the competences already transferred — or in the process of being transferred — to Europe,"[104] thereby opening up the way for completion of the constitutional endeavour.

Contrary to the federalists' requests, the currency was not created by the end of 1994, and neither, once the objective was finally reached with the birth of the euro, did the single currency, as had been hoped, prove able to activate — on the basis of the contradiction between the presence

of a single currency covering an area embracing many states and the absence of a democratic government of that same area, capable of fully exploiting the currency's potential — an effective constituent process for the founding of a European federal state.

This is nothing more than a further confirmation of the difficulties inherent in the European endeavour and of how the latter is strongly conditioned by the inertia of the national powers, which are at once instrumental in the advancing of integration and obstacles to the completion of the process wherever sovereignty is at stake.

European Federation and World Federation.

The federalists' political commitment to the creation of the European federation acquires its full significance only when seen from the perspective of the federal unification, ultimately, of the whole world. This is the difference between federalists and Europeanists. This reference to global federation is an essential element of the federalists' theoretical line and is always at the basis of the analyses that define their political thinking.

Starting from an examination of the international situation in the 1980s, Albertini placed particular emphasis on the need for "thought and will" to be projected even beyond the strategic battle for the European federation. Looking to a far distant future, he outlined a global framework tending towards the overcoming of division through pro-unification endeavours and organisations in many parts of the world, and also (with all its limitations and potential) through the United Nations Organisation.

Underlining the fact that the increasingly rapid growth of independence is pushing in the direction of collaboration between all countries "for a balanced development of the world market and a settlement of international problems by negotiation," he concluded that "this common search for political, economic and social progress [would be] conceivable only if the beginning of the progress towards a world government, and the emergence of this new point of reference for public opinion and culture… [were to give rise to] the prospect of a united world in the world balance of expectations."[105]

In concrete terms, these reflections led the MFE to re-establish contact and collaboration with the world federalists, to join the World Federalist Movement, and to decide, in 1984, to publish the political review *Il Federalista* in English (as well as in Italian and French).

Several years later, the Gorbaciov era seemed to open up the way for a movement towards "the prospect of a united world." Albertini believed in the possibilities created by the new relations between the superpowers, while nevertheless remaining realistically cautious over this still very uncertain seed of hope. The overturning, theorised by Gorbaciov, of the principle that had always underlain the politics of all the states — "pursuing the increase in one's own power and the decrease in the power of others" — on the basis of the idea of reciprocal security — "to think about others' security when providing for one's own" — did indeed harbour enormous potential, making an entirely new course in international relations appear feasible. Despite being conscious of this project's inherent limitation, a limitation which the two superpowers were not yet capable of overcoming — "namely the problem of maintaining a national defence as the supreme bulwark of their absolute and exclusive sovereignty"[106] — the federalists' task was to keep to the fore, and to strengthen, the expectations generated by this "New Era," lending their support to every proposal, coming from a major world leader, that tended towards the ultimate objective of global government.

The global political scenario based on the new relations between the USA and the USSR was soon shaken to its core by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which took away the force of traction that could, on the basis of the new principles of collaboration, have been exerted by the bipolar leadership. It was a reality that had to be taken on board in the awareness that the disappearance of this opening in no way detracted from the enormous importance of the battle for the European federation, which was, and still is, the only strategic front sufficiently developed to influence, in the short term, the global power order (helping to modify its relations of force), and to open up the way for the affirmation of federalism.

If the objective of the federalists' struggle is that of gradually entrusting world government to a growing number of peoples and men and, ultimately, to all men, the European federal state can trigger this process, and in the current historical phase, as Mario Albertini taught us, it is the compulsory point of reference for making the federalist revolution part of reality.

NOTES

[1] We here outline broadly the most important theoretical and strategic questions that Albertini dealt with, and the stages in the main political battles for European unity, which always saw him in the front line. This is done, as far as possible, using Albertini's own words, a choice dictated by the belief that it is only by approaching directly texts taken from his writings over the years that the reader can fully appreciate their significance and force.

[2] Unfortunately, apart from politics and the idea of the course of history (on which Albertini wrote two brief but enlightening essays included in: Mario Albertini, *tutti gli scritti* (currently in publication), these topics were never developed in writing and it is therefore impossible to give an account of the depth of his thought, which it would certainly be worth piecing together elsewhere, starting with the recordings of his university lectures and seminars.

I must only add, in this note, that in the '80s and '90s Albertini himself declared his writings on politics unsatisfactory, this being a topic that, together with the materialistic conception of history, and the topics of ideology and the *raison d'état*, he intended build into a general theory, that is to say into a perfectly complete "standard for interpreting history and political action." Albertini thought about this project on a number of occasions, and tried to get it under way, but was ultimately prevented from doing so by his daily commitment to the struggle for European federation.

[3] Mario Albertini, "Conclusioni d'una esperienza politica", in *La Provincia pavese*, 1 November 1946.

[4] It was with a thesis on Croce, supervised by Giulio Preti, that Albertini graduated in 1951. For all the unpublished texts cited in this Introduction the reader is invited to refer to this and to the subsequent volumes, where they are published in chronological order.

[5] Mario Albertini, "L'amore dell'Italia nell'Europa", in *Lo Stato moderno*, IV (20 September - 5 October 1947), n. 18-19.

[6] In a letter to Ugoberto Alfassio Grimaldi dated 19 December, 1953 Albertini defines himself: "formally and in my daily action, an angry and active federalist."

[7] It might be said that, in this phase, there prevailed in him the Don Quixote that is in every man who considers his position in relation to the world. "If one is not a Don Quixote — he wrote in a letter to Andrea Chiti-Batelli dated 4 August, 1964 — one cannot become a Lenin. We are all Don Quixotes inside. But it is alright to be a Don Quixote as long as one remains restless, as long as one is not complacent. Don Quixote is a stage in the search for realisable ideas and for the effective means of achieving them, the stage in which one is still ignorant both of the ends and of the means, but does not give in; it is from this that the restlessness derives."

[8] Mario Albertini, *Perché sono europeo*, undated typescript, probably from 1958.

[9] *Ibidem.*

[10] Mario Albertini, "L'invito al dialogo di Norberto Bobbio", in *Il Mercurio*, II (8 October, 1955), n. 71.

[11] *Ibidem.*

[12] Mario Albertini, "I principi d'azione del Manifesto di Ventotene", Introduction to: Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi, *Il Manifesto di Ventotene*, Naples, Guida, 1982, p. 6. Republished in Mario Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999.

[13] Mario Albertini, *Il federalismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993, p. 280, note 5 (a new edition of *Il federalismo e lo Stato federale. Antologia e definizione*, Milan, Giuffrè, 1963).

[14] *Ibidem.*

[15] *Ibidem.*

[16] *Ibidem.*

[17] Mario Albertini, *Lo Stato nazionale*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997, pp. 16-17 (the original edition was published in 1958).

[18] *Ibidem*, pp. 40-41.

[19] Mario Albertini, "La nazione, il feticcio ideologico del nostro tempo", in *Il Federalista*, II (1960), n. 3, pp. 173-175. Republished ("The Nation, Ideological Fetish of our Time") in the section "Thirty Years Ago" in *The Federalist*, XXXII (1990), n. 1, and in: Mario Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo, cit.*

[20] Mario Albertini, "Il Risorgimento e l'unità europea", in *Lo Stato nazionale, cit.*, p. 190 (first published in 1961).

[21] *Ibidem*, p. 189.

[22] *Ibidem.*

[23] Mario Albertini, Introduction to Immanuel Kant, *La pace, la ragione e la storia*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1985, p. 7.

[24] *Ibidem*, p. 8.

[25] Mario Albertini, *Il federalismo* (1993), *cit.*, p. 9. In a review of Alexandre Marc's book, *Dialectique du déchaînement. Fondements philosophiques du fédéralisme* — in *Le Fédéraliste*, V (1963), n. 3 — Albertini writes: "I have the impression that I am following the same route that Marc travelled, yet whereas I am taking upward path that leads from things to ideas, he travelled it by the downward path, from ideas to things.... I often see my ideas set out before me as though they were the mirror image of his. There may be a basis of truth to this fancy. Marc was European and a federalist at a time when the face of Europe was still disfigured by nationalism, which had reached its peak; when the dominance of modern life's most centralised power seemed to have definitively reduced federalism to an insubstantial shadow. In truth, it was fascism that was an insubstantial shadow. It was nothing other than a crazy attempt to block the path of federalism, which was advancing. But who could see that then? And — it has to be to said — how many can see it now? The ability to think in these terms, way back then, and to glimpse fair weather among the lighting and storms, demanded very strong ideals; it demanded the capacity to process experience only at the level of thought. Only in the mind's eye was it possible to set one's sights on federalism, the opposite of fascism. If this analysis is true, Marc started from the only point he could start from: a global reflection of a metaphysical nature."

[26] Mario Albertini, "Federalism", in *The Federalist*, XIII (2000), n. 2, p. 87. The original, unpublished version is dated 1962.

[27] *Ibidem*, p. 95.

[28] Mario Albertini, *Il federalismo* (1993), *cit.*, p. 282, note 6. Albertini's particular sensitivity to the problems of urban communities and of the need to manage the territory at the level of the local community, is shown by his work for the association Italia Nostra. He was president of the Pavia section of this association from 1965 to 1971 and its national vice-president from December 1972. It is also worth recalling the important essay "La crisi dell'ordine urbano e il pensiero di Jane Jacobs" (Pavia, Il Federalista, 1984), which was republished ("The Crisis of the Urban Order and the Thought of Jane Jacobs") in *The Federalist*, XLVII (2005), n. 3.

[29] Mario Albertini, "L''utopie' de Olivetti", in *Le Fédéraliste*, VII (1965), n. 2., republished in: Mario Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo, cit.*, p. 111.

[30] *Ibidem*, p. 112.

[31] "In a federal state the division between federal government and federal states corresponds to a division in the political class, in the electoral apparatus and in the social interests... in the groups into which these interests are organised. This gives rise to a balance of powers which is much steadier and better-anchored in society, which allows the co-existence of freedom and of the unitary executive" (Mario Albertini, "Federalism", 1962,

cit., p. 103). This balance of powers is most clearly illustrated in the role that, in a federation, is assigned to the judicial power (the weakest of the three powers): the judicial power effectively holds the balance, given that every judicial decision, on matters of a constitutional nature, can be supported either by the federal government, or by one or more of the federated states.

Naturally, as we shall see, this is true up to the point allowed by the international situation, whereas it will be entirely true in a future world federation.

[32] With regard to the formation of the general will, Albertini prefigured the relationship between the various levels of government in a model, barely outlined, of an electoral system: "...the formation of the public will should come about through a 'cascading' proportional electoral system, in other words through a series of elections that are properly coordinated from local level to intermediate level, and finally to general level, in such a way that all groups of men might gain an awareness of their problems as they give shape to their will, before going on, through increasingly widespread elections, to insert this new awareness and this will into the general consciousness and general will.... What we need to see is local elections that are accompanied by discussion of local problems, municipal elections where the problems of the city are discussed, but on the basis of an understanding of those at more local level, and so on until all the levels are covered." Mario Albertini, "Discorso ai giovani federalisti", in *Il Federalista*, XX (1978), n. 2, p. 59.

[33] Mario Albertini, Introduction to Immanuel Kant, *La pace, la ragione e la storia, cit.*, p. 12.

[34] Mario Albertini, "Le ragioni del federalismo europeo" (1954), in *Il Federalista*, XXIII (1981), n. 2, pp. 121-122.

[35] *Ibidem*, p. 122.

[36] Mario Albertini, *Il federalismo* (1993), *cit.*, p. 294, note 6.

[37] *Ibidem*, pp. 285-286.

[38] "Between 1787 and 1788, the Americans were forced to decide their own fate, because history had presented them with an absolute choice. They faced an enemy that, being an invisible enemy (disintegration of the Union), was far more insidious than the English. What was at stake was not that which we normally call politics, but rather the very possibility of determining, through the creation of vital institutions, a people's fundamental political model, which determines whether that which usually goes by the name of politics, i.e. the rotation, through the years, of governments and oppositions, should be conducted in a progressive manner, and thus a manner that will extend the horizons of men's lives, or in a stagnant manner, which produces only a degenerate, lower form of life" (Mario Albertini, "La federazione", in *La politica e altri saggi*, Milan, Giuffrè, 1963, pp. 51-52. Republished in: Mario Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo, cit.*).

[39] Mario Albertini, "Le radici storiche e culturali del federalismo europeo", in: Mario Albertini, Andrea Chiti-Batelli, Giuseppe Petrilli, "Storia del federalismo europeo", Turin, ERI, 1973, p. 79. Republished in: Mario Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo, cit.* The English version, "The Cultural and Historical Roots of European Federalism" is published in this issue. (*The Federalist*, XLIX (2007), n. 2).

[40] *Ibidem*.

[41] Mario Albertini, "La strategia della lotta per l'Europa", in *Giornale del Censimento*, II (1966), n. 1-2. Republished in: Mario Albertini, *Una rivoluzione pacifica. Dalle nazioni all'Europa*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999. Also republished ("The Strategy of the Struggle for Europe") in the section "Thirty Years Ago" in *The Federalist* XXXVIII (1996), n. 1. Albertini often underlined the crucial importance of strategy in any political battle, and above all in a battle where the aim is to change the existing order. On many occasions he highlighted the inconsistency and weakness of demands, proclamations and solemn declarations of principle that throw the spotlight on an objective but fail to address the question of the means necessary to achieve it. With regard to the battle for the European federation, simply presenting the possible advantages if its creation, Albertini wrote, is not enough "to transform an idea into an idea-force.... Just saying something is good will never be enough to get men to do it. We have to tackle a quite different challenge. We have to analyse the movement of the real forces in the field, and see whether it is possible to engage part of these forces in a European struggle. The problem is more than just an analysis of the objectives." (Letter to Andrea Chiti-Batelli dated 30 November, 1961).

[42] Mario Albertini, "A proposito del federalismo integrale di Proudhon", in *L'integrazione europea e altri saggi*, Pavia, Il Federalista, 1965, p. 134, note 2. In the same note, Albertini examines the connection between politics and social change: "Society changes when the behaviour of all its members changes. And this is a [general] change in behaviour to which each individual contributes a new element. But each individual reflects, in the particularity of his action, the particularity of everyone else's actions, too. Politics, as well, is a link in this chain. Indeed, while we know that politics is the action of the few over the many, it is also true that these few, more than any other, conform to the expectations of the many over whom they exert their action, focusing on their weaknesses if they are demagogues, and their virtues if they are true statesmen. In fact, it is common wisdom, confirmed by all those who have experience of politics, that the power one wins is commensurate with the degree to which one bends one's behaviour to the needs and aspirations of others", that is, of society. Of course, this last affirmation, with regard to the struggle to create a new power structure in Europe, is necessary but not sufficient: the task of the revolutionary politician is to plant new seeds, and thus to use his understanding of the real situation as a starting point for overcoming it.

[43] Mario Albertini, "Federalism" (1962), *cit.*, p. 107.

[44] Mario Albertini, "The Strategy of the Struggle for Europe", *cit.*, p. 53.

[45] Francesco Rossolillo, "Note sulla coscienza rivoluzionaria", in *Il Politico*, 1970, n. 2, p. 323.

[46] Mario Albertini, "Quale Europa", in *Giornale del Censimento*, I (December 1965), n. 5.

[47] Mario Albertini, "La crisi di orientamento politico del federalismo europeo", in *Il Federalista*, III (1961), n. 4, p. 227. Republished in: Mario Albertini, *Una rivoluzione pacifica, cit.*

[48] Albertini deals with the "evolutionary" concept of the process of European unification — this is distinct from the strategy of constitutional gradualism which, as we shall see, was to be developed in the second half of the 1960s — in several writings dated 1961. Having excluded that the Communities (which he defines pseudo-communities) can evolve into organs of the federal government, he goes on to separate the strategic from the historical level: "Naturally, this applies only as long as we are talking about voluntary action. In a broader framework, where involuntary factors come into play (historical determinations), the pseudo-communities, like any confederal structures, serve as the sign that the whole process, political, economic-institutional, etc., is tending to extend beyond the confines of the states, and in this sense we can see them as stages in a process that is leading from the national to the European dimension. But in this context, the picture is dialectical, and the evolution unfolds as both conflict between and resolution of different positions, the confederal and the federal" (see "Una lettera di Merlini a proposito di 'Quattro banalità...' ", in *Il Federalista*, III, 1961, n. 3, p. 192, note 3). The single European governments, on account of what Albertini calls the "de facto eclipse of the national sovereignties," are no longer equipped to make the fundamental political choices relating to the destiny of their citizens, and this gives rise to a de facto European unity, not irreversible, that manifests itself

in its juridical superstructures: the European Communities. But it would be a grave mistake to allow oneself to be conditioned by the myth of European integration, "a false impression of movement that conceals immobility," which mistakes "the effect — the confederal policy of the governments — for the cause, and the cause — de facto European unity — for the effect" (See "Rapporto presentato al IX Congresso Mfe", in *Informations de Le Fédéraliste*, italian edition, January 1962, and in *Le Fédéraliste*, IV, 1962, n. 1, p. 61).

[49] Mario Albertini, "The Strategy of the Struggle for Europe", *cit.*, p. 60.

[50] Mario Albertini, "Il significato politico del disegno di legge", Supplement to n. 2 of *Le Fédéraliste*, XI (1969), p. 119. Republished in Mario Albertini, *Una rivoluzione pacifica, cit.*

[51] Mario Albertini, "L'aspetto strategico della nostra lotta", in *L'Unità europea*, March 1991. Republished in: Mario Albertini, *Una rivoluzione pacifica, cit.*

[52] In MFE, *Atti del XIV Congresso, Rome, 2-5 March 1989*, pp. 17-18.

[53] Mario Albertini, "L'organizzazione e il nuovo modo di fare politica", in *Una rivoluzione pacifica, cit.*, p. 464.

[54] Mario Albertini, "Una discussione sulla possibilità di fondare la Federazione europea", in *Giornale del Censimento*, II (September-October, 1966), n. 9-10. In this same text, Albertini draws a distinction between the concept of the downward slope and that of the inevitability of European integration, which can only be deemed a historical trend if one believes: "a) that the mode of production is the primary historical phenomenon, which determines the dimensions and character of the other social factors, b) that the mode of production is acquiring dimensions much broader than those of the traditional nations, and imposing itself in all areas of social life." But recognising this is not the same as "assigning a historical time frame or a historical means to the unfolding of the trend," and does not help one to judge certain situations with a view to strategy."

[55] Mario Albertini, "La Comunità europea, evoluzione federale o involuzione diplomatica?", in *Il Federalista*, XXI (1979), n. 3, p. 173. Republished in: Mario Albertini, *Una rivoluzione pacifica, cit.*

[56] The concept of occasional leadership in the final stage in the process of unification, the stage in which the decision is taken to create the European state, is in fact applied, theoretically and practically, in the intermediate phases of the process as well, in which the strategic objective, according to the theory of constitutional gradualism, was only a stage. In this regard, particular insight is provided by the text of Francesco Rossolillo's Report on the Spinelli plan for Community reform, presented to the first Commission of the UEF Congress held in Milan in December 1982, in which, among other things, the Council of Ministers is indicated as the obstacle that has to be circumvented "without, however, avoiding the absolutely necessary stage of gaining the support of the governments of the member states.... The conviction that the Draft Treaty would never be accepted by the Council does not mean that governments of the member states must be assumed to be intrinsically opposed to institutional reform. On the contrary, one can believe that, in the right circumstances, and subjected to the right kind of pressure, they could even support the Draft Treaty. What is utopian, on the other hand, is to imagine that they might offer this support contemporaneously, unanimously and by secret ballot (a method that would relieve them of their responsibility). Thus, while it is unthinkable that the Council might agree to approve the Draft Treaty in the form in which the Parliament will draw it up, it is perfectly conceivable that a government will be prepared to be the first to take the step of adopting it [occasional leadership]. With this step taken, it would be easier to take the second, and the third, and so on...." Thus "the federalists would be faced with clearly identified and responsible interlocutors, on whom to apply pressure, something that would not happen if the project were placed in the hands of the Council, an elusive interlocutor, in whose ambit

it is all too easy to offload the responsibility for failures onto the other partners" (Francesco Rossolillo, "La strategia della lotta per la riforma istituzionale della Comunità" in *Il Federalista*, XXIV (1982), n. 3, pp. 212-213). Doubts over the efficiency of occasional European leadership remain: the governments, pushed by an objective situation and by the initiative of the federalists in the direction of relinquishing sovereignty, when faced with this step, the true solution, do not inevitably take the decision to create the new European power. In this situation it is essential that the federalists remain absolutely clear-sighted, denouncing and rejecting compromise solutions, retain their full autonomy, breaking away from those (politicians and the governments) with whom they had joined forces in the pursuit of the strategic objective, and start over again, preparing a new initiative.

[57] Mario Albertini, "L'Europe des Etats, l'Europe du Marché Commun et l'Europe du peuple fédéral européen", in *Le Fédéraliste*, IV (1962), n. 2, p. 193.

[58] Mario Albertini, Letter to Altiero Spinelli, 25 August, 1956.

[59] Mario Albertini, "Rapporto presentato al IX Congresso Mfe", in *Informations de Le Fédéraliste*, italian edition, January 1962, and in *Le Fédéraliste*, IV (1962), n. 1, p. 63.

[60] Francesco Rossolillo, "Notes on Sovereignty", in *The Federalist*, XLIII (2001), n. 3, p. 166.

[61] *Ibidem*, note 13, pp. 190-191. Naturally, these affirmations do not exclude the fact that the birth of a new state has power implications.

[62] *Ibidem*, p. 166.

[63] In a letter to Spinelli dated 6 September, 1953 he writes: "If I may be allowed to make a personal remark, in relation to a set idea of mine, I think I can say that, unfortunately, the modern framework of political action does not guarantee the success of correct political lines, according to an orthodox but abstract concept of democracy, but only of those that combine logical functionality with far-reaching organisational energy."

[64] In October 1955, Albertini became head of the Central Cadres Commission, which was dissolved in May 1956 through lack of funds. However, Albertini's intense activity on this front continued through conferences and training schools held in various sections of the MFE, particularly in northern Italy.

[65] Mario Albertini, Letter to Gianmario Rossi, 30 August, 1956.

[66] Mario Albertini, Letter to Altiero Spinelli, 7 February, 1957, and Letter to Altiero Spinelli, 21 September, 1961.

[67] Mario Albertini, "Esame tecnico della lotta per l'Europa", in *Il Federalista*, I (1959), n. 2, pp. 95 and 100. Republished in Mario Albertini, *Una rivoluzione pacifica, cit.*

[68] Mario Albertini, "The Strategy of the Struggle for Europe", *cit.*

[69] Francesco Rossolillo, "The Revolutionary", in *The Federalist*, XLVII (2005), n. 1, pp. 15-16.

[70] Mario Albertini, Letter to Altiero Spinelli, 7 February, 1957.

[71] Mario Albertini, Letter to Bernard Lesfargues, 18 April, 1964.

[72] Mario Albertini, "L'Europa dopo Londra", article submitted to the journal *Occidente* on 22 November, 1954, not published.

[73] Mario Albertini, *Lo Stato-nazione contro la democrazia*, report presented at a training course for militants (Stresa, 15-22 July, 1956).

[74] Mario Albertini, *Relazione al convegno di Brescia* (24 October 1954).

[75] The mechanism of the EPC consisted of the organisation of primary elections through open-air polling stations to choose the representatives of the European people who would meet, as a permanent congress, in order to demand a European constituent assembly. The definitive decision on the campaign was taken at the central committee meeting of the UEF on 12 May, 1955.

[76] Mario Albertini, "Significato del V Congresso internazionale dell'Unione europea

dei federalisti", in *La Provincia pavese*, 16 March 1955. On the basis of these considerations, the federalists prepared the instruments for the confrontation with the national powers, having a draft, (the federal pact) drawn up (by an ad hoc commission elected by the EPC in Turin in December 1958) for the creation of the United States of Europe and for the convening of a European constituent assembly.

[77] Mario Albertini, *Esame tecnico della lotta per l'Europa, cit.*, pp. 109-111.

[78] Mario Albertini, "Le IXe Congres du M.F.E.", (Lione, 9-11 febbraio 1962), *in Le Fédéraliste*, IV (1962), n. 1, p. 30, note 1.

[79] Mario Albertini, "Una lettera di Merlini a proposito di 'Quattro banalità...'", *cit.*, pp. 191-192.

[80] Mario Albertini, Letter to Andrea Chiti-Batelli, 29 October, 1962. Spinelli proposed that the federalists should align with "the forces of democratic progress" and stand in the national political elections in three cities.

[81] Mario Albertini, Letter to Sante Granelli, 23 February, 1961.

[82] Mario Albertini, Letter to Gianni Merlini, 24 March, 1962. That the decision to fight Spinelli was the fruit of a lucid, albeit morally difficult, analysis of the situation, and not born of personal opposition, is demonstrated by the fact that, when Spinelli, in 1958, suggested that Albertini should succeed him as secretary of the MFE, Albertini replied that his (Spinelli's) day was not yet over: "Since I know your work, he wrote to him in a letter dated 4 August 1958, being asked by you to continue it is something that affects me deeply... But, today, you are the only one who can carry it on; I can and must, at your side, understand it and make my contribution to it as your subordinate, precisely so as to be able to continue it myself when the time comes in which I must do so." Moreover, when Spinelli once more became a point of reference for the federalist struggle, with the Draft Treaty that he managed to get adopted by the European Parliament in 1984, Albertini was the first to support the operation and to re-establish relations with him, just as, on Spinelli's death he gave a profile of the man, defining him ("hero of reason") in terms that can leave one in no doubt as to the enormous respect he had for him, over and above their temporary political differences.

[83] Mario Albertini, Letter to Andrea Chiti-Batelli, 5 January, 1962, in which, among other things, the "Spinelli question" is dealt with more extensively.

[84] In 1956 the German and Dutch federalists broke away from the Union of European Federalists and formed, together with the La Fédération movement, a group called Action européenne fédéraliste (AEF). In 1959, the Italian and French federalists, with small groups from other countries, formed the supranational MFE. The national movements disappeared, Europe was divided into regions, under single MFE membership, and the national commissions were set up. This split was mended in 1972 when the UEF reformed.

[85] At the central committee meeting in Paris in June 1962, Spinelli announced that as from the following September he would no longer be able to contribute regularly to the action of the MFE, resigning from the Bureau exécutif; on 9 September the same year he resigned as secretary of the Italian commission.

[86] Mario Albertini, "La crisi di orientamento", *cit.*, pp. 233-236.

[87] *Ibidem*, p. 237, note 6.

[88] Mario Albertini, "L'azione-quadro per il federalismo europeo", in *Informations de Le Fédéraliste*, italian edition, July 1962. Also, part of "La politique de la minorité du Mfe", in *Le Fédéraliste*, IV, 1962, n. 3.

[89] Mario Albertini, "Presentazione ufficiale della campagna", in *Autonomie fédéraliste. Informations*, italian edition, October 1963, and also in *Le Fédéraliste*, V (1963), n. 2.

[90] Mario Albertini, *Rapporti del Censimento con le organizzazioni nazionali*, undated typescript, known to be from 1963.

[91] Mario Albertini, Letter to Andrea Chiti-Batelli, 4 August, 1964.

[92] Mario Albertini, Letter to Dietrich Gruber, 20 April, 1964.

[93] Mario Albertini, Letter to Jean-Pierre Gouzy, 26 November, 1964. The aim of this policy, proposed in the Rifflet motion to the Montreux congress in April 1964, was to set up federalist initiative committees with a view to forming a European democratic front for a European federation, made up of all the forces for democratic renewal.

[94] Mario Albertini, Letter to Hirsch, Marc, Desboeuf, Orban, Serafini, Rifflet, Giarini, Moriquand, Gouzy, Rossolillo, Gruber, Kinsky, Pariso, 20 April, 1965.

[95] Mario Albertini, "Un piano d'azione a medio termine", in *Federalismo europeo*, I (September-October 1967), n. 7-8. Republished in Mario Albertini, *Una rivoluzione pacifica, cit.*

[96] Mario Albertini, "Un piano d'azione a medio termine", *cit.*

[97] *Ibidem.*

[98] *Ibidem.*

[99] And he continues thus: "The fact is that where economists and experts in monetary phenomena see a means (the currency) and view human behaviours as a function of the economic characteristics — existing or which may be planned — of that means, political scholars ought to see a complex human relationship, a whole set of reciprocal and complementary behaviours in which the power element always manifests itself.... Ultimately, this means that there is a need for a set of crucial, logical concepts capable of highlighting... the power aspects of currency.... The governments of the Community have officially decided to create monetary union in the course of the next ten years. We must therefore solve the political aspects of the question, obscure as they are." (Mario Albertini, "Il problema monetario e il problema politico europeo", in *Studi in onore di Carlo Emilio Ferri*, Milan, 1973. Republished in Mario Albertini, *Una rivoluzione pacifica, cit.*, pp. 173-174).

[100] *Ibidem*, p. 182.

[101] Running parallel with the battle for a European currency, the federalists prepared an action aiming to bring about political union through a referendum in Italy calling for a European government and the granting of a constituent mandate to the European Parliament. The referendum, obtained thanks to a law of popular initiative, was held in June 1989, together with the European elections, and gathered overwhelming support (88.1 per cent of those who voted were in favour of granting the European Parliament a constituent mandate).

[102] Mario Albertini, "Moneta europea e unione politica", in *L'Unità europea*, December 1990. Republished in Mario Albertini, *Una rivoluzione pacifica, cit.*

[103] Mario Albertini, "L'ago della bilancia è la moneta", in *L'Unità europea*, September 1990. Republished in Mario Albertini, *Una rivoluzione pacifica, cit.*

[104] Mario Albertini, "L'aspetto strategico della nostra lotta", *cit.* One of the points of reference for the proposal to institute an economic and monetary government was Spinelli's Draft Treaty adopted by the European Parliament in 1984.

[105] Mario Albertini, "Towards a World Government", in *The Federalist*, XXVI (1984), n. 1, p. 6. Republished in Mario Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo, cit.*

[106] Mario Albertini, "The Problem of Security in the Nuclear Age", in *The Federalist*, XXX (1988), n. 1, p. 4. Republished in Mario Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo, cit.*

The Cultural and Historical Roots of European Federalism*

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The Theory of Federalism.

It is not easy to formulate a precise, that is to say scientific, definition of federalism. After all, notwithstanding the growing tendency to approach political and social thought in a scientific manner, we do not even possess such definitions for far more deeply studied and widely debated phenomena, such as liberalism, socialism, and so on. As for federalism, it is unclear, at the current stage of political culture, whether it can even be considered an idea on a par with liberalism and socialism, etc., or whether it is instead, a less important, less significant idea.

In this situation, I feel that we can get close to a sufficiently realistic idea of federalism simply by dismissing, for the reasons we shall see, the idea that it is merely the theory of the federal state, and by extending our investigation so that we might think of it, hypothetically at least, as an independent social behaviour, with its own characteristics (in terms of its value, structure and social-historical context).

Perhaps this is also the way in which the ideas of liberalism, socialism, etc., can (as far as possible) be clarified. But this is a methodological question that, while worth bearing in mind, cannot be dealt with here. In this exposition, which concerns European federalism specifically, and above all the history of European federalism, I will not be dealing with this question, nor attempting to put together an exhaustive account of the most important facts (theoretical or practical) related to federalism[1]. I will only say that, in my view, federalism has peace as its value aspect, the federation or the federal state[2] as its structural aspect, and a particular moment, or phase, in the course of history as its social-historical aspect.

Peace, of course, should not be confused — even though unfortunately it often is, in spite of Kant's rigorous clarification of the concept (including an illustration of its relationship with freedom and justice) —

* From Mario Albertini, Andrea Chiti-Batelli, Giuseppe Petrilli, *Storia del federalismo europeo*, Turin, ERI, 1973.

with the simple absence of war in progress. Situations in which war is simply absent may more accurately be defined "truces" given that they are based on relations of force between armed states, i.e., states that are organised for war (with all the moral, cultural, political, economic and social implications of this), and for which war, entered into, threatened or simply imagined as one state's means of weighing up its capacities vis-à-vis those of the others, is the fundamental criterion in international decision making, be it a case of sacrificing one's own interests in order to avoid war, or accepting the risk of war in order to safeguard them.

Neither should peace be confused with the pacifism of states (UN), parties (internationalism), or individual consciences (religious, moral or psychological ideas). Peace is the organisation of power that transforms the relations of force between states into proper legal relations. As such, it demands that the sphere of democratic government be enlarged from a single state to many states; and, as far as the relations between peace, freedom and justice are concerned, recognition of the right of everyone to contribute to the taking of all the political and social decisions that concern them directly; in other words, it demands the creation of spheres of local democratic government at every level at which there is concrete expression of human relations.

From this clear idea of peace derives the federalist idea of the distribution of political power and, to this end, the need to identify the historical-social conditions in which peace can be established and maintained within a section of mankind, or indeed within the whole of mankind. It is a question of historical moments: the particular situation of the thirteen former colonies at the time of the Philadelphia Convention, that of the European states in the current process of integration, and so on. And, looking ahead, it concerns a future historical phase, that of the overcoming of conflicts between classes and nations, and of the formation of a global society thanks to the material development of production and the forging of objective bonds between all men.

What I have said thus far shows that if one attempts to reduce the whole of federalism to the mere concept of the federal state one will be left without an adequate understanding even of that. In fact, we actually know very little about a state if we understand its machinery, but not the type of society in which it can function and endure. It follows that to claim that federalism is the theory of the federal state does not get round the question of the federal society, in other words, the question related to the federalist way of thinking and acting (we understand a society when we understand the behaviour that constitutes that society).

On the other hand, we are faced, in this regard, with an absolute certainty: federalist behaviour is a concrete and common-sense reality, not an imaginary product of fanciful thought. First of all, the societies where federal states exist must possess some federal character, which means that we have to presume that in federal states there exists a specific federalist behaviour. Second, we must consider the fact that we also find federalist behaviour outside the existing federal states, in Europe to be precise. Throughout the nineteenth century and right up to the Second World War, the only federalists to be found in Europe were isolated individuals. If one ignored what was happening within the existing federal states, one could thus presume that the federalists were just a small, scattered group of utopians, that their thought was nothing more than pie in the sky, and that the prospect of a genuine federalist behaviour, concrete and socially significant, existed only in their imaginations. Yet, over the past thirty years or so, things have changed. These isolated individuals and small gatherings have grown into proper federalist movements, evidence that there now exists a socially significant number of people who are adopting federalism — in the same way as others adopt liberalism, socialism, etc. — as their concrete stance vis-à-vis power, society and the historical process. We thus need to clarify the exact nature both of this stance and of the federalist behaviour that manifests itself in existing federal states.

As I have said, these considerations allow us to outline hypothetically the ambit of federalism. They have highlighted the existence of three categories into which facts can be divided, categories relating, respectively, to the actual working of the federal constitutional model of state, to the federalist behaviour of people who live in federal states, and, finally, to the federalist behaviour of people who do not live in federal states. It is reasonable to suppose that these facts have something in common, and equally reasonable to suppose that this common element encapsulates the meaning of federalism. If this is true, then these facts are the ones that identify the field that we must explore in order to arrive at a satisfactory definition of federalism, and a deeper understanding of the federal state.

The Federal State.

In discussions on European integration, one often hears it said, even by leading Europeanists, that the difference between a confederation and a federation is of little importance, or that the federation is the last step in a process that begins with a system of nation-states endowed with absolute sovereignty and progresses towards the federal level gradually, passing through goodness knows how many increasing levels of "supranationality."

Opinions of this kind, which ignore the fact that a federation is a state whereas a confederation is not, and fail to understand that a group of nation-states remains essentially a group of nation-states right up to the point at which it is replaced by a federal state, are able to emerge only because "ideas are malleable." But since "reality is hard and difficult," the only ideas of any value — the only ones that men can use in order to function — are those that really get to grips with "reality", however hard and difficult it may be.

This means that anyone concerned with European integration, if he or she wants to avoid talking nonsense and acting blindly, must take reality into account, by which I mean, specifically, the circumstance that explains the emergence of federalism as a new factor in the history of mankind. One need only name this circumstance — the Philadelphia Convention — to see immediately that there is an abyssal difference between a federation and a confederation, and that the birth of the federation was the birth of a new type of state.

The Philadelphia Convention, in creating history's first federal constitution, constructed the model of the political mechanism that Kant expected to produce peace among states and the universal establishment of law. Hamilton, together with Jay and Madison, writing *The Federalist* during the fight for ratification of the federal Constitution, in order to highlight the advantages of the latter over the confederal formula, developed (without intentionally setting out to do so) the first principles of this political mechanism, the mechanism of the federal state. To set his thought in its correct theoretical framework, it must be realised that these papers were, formally, just political propaganda, albeit of the highest level, and it is also, indeed, above all, necessary to consider that the historical situation that gave rise to this propaganda was the drawing up, by an assembly, of the text of a constitution.

The Constitution of the United States of America is recognised to be the fruit of compromise — compromise in the strictest sense of the word, given that the most important points in it were reached simply as settlements between the different opinions of the opposing parties, and certainly not as the single parts of a coherent structure. Yet, despite this, these settlements in fact proved to be the fundamental parts of the federal mechanism, and the foundations of a solid construct. This remarkable

outcome is easily explained. America's political class emerged from the War of Independence split into two currents, one basically unitary and the other basically pluralist, and both had a basis, respectively the Union and the states, that could not be eliminated in the short term. Compromise was clearly the only possible way out of their confrontation, and it could be reached in only one way: by conserving the Union through the creation of a truly independent pan-American government, in other words a government that would act at the level of the citizens, not the states, but at the same time would safeguard the states' independence, and thus pluralism. The difficulty, then, lay in finding a formula for a central government that, despite intervening directly at the level of the citizens of the member states, would not destroy the states' independence. Basically, a federation was the solution arrived at because a federation was the only solution that could be arrived at.

But the federal formula, which is the main thread running through this interpretation of these events, was not in fact known to those who actually lived through them, and the evolution of the situation was in reality far more complex. At the time, the federal formula was not just unknown; it was also quite unthinkable, given that, in traditional political thought, a government's independence was bound up with the absolute and indivisible sovereignty of the state. This bond made it impossible to attribute independence both to the central government and to the governments of the states and, in the minds of these men, presented them with a choice (which did not correspond to reality and would indeed have been impossible) between indivisible unity and pluralism, since the organisation of pluralism within unity, which is what the situation demanded, was at the time beyond the capacity of human action. The unitary current thus proposed ways of organising central government that excluded all independence of the states and thus, ultimately, pluralism, while the action of the pluralist current went no further than pure and simple defence of the confederal league, which guaranteed the states their independence, together with the maintenance of their absolute sovereignty, at the cost of paralysis of the Union and a slow but fatal crumbling of unity.

Naturally, these projects remained on the drawing board, leaving the problem without a solution and the differences unresolved. This state of affairs persisted for some time, until, on the initiative of the unitary current, the two sides clashed in an arena that put the problem firmly on the table, precluded any avoiding of it, and made it necessary to make a choice: this arena was the convention held to revise the federal system of government, commonly known as the Philadelphia Convention. At this

point, both sides started trying to impose their will, but quickly seeing that they would not succeed, stopped trying half way. As luck would have it, they stopped at exactly the right point. The real trial of strength came over the question of the composition of the legislative assembly, in which the question of sovereignty was at stake. The defenders of the Union wanted proportional representation, while the defenders of the states insisted on equal representation for every state. In the end, the first criterion was adopted for the House of Representatives, and the second for the Senate, thereby sacrificing the sovereignty of the states in the lower chamber, and that of the Union in the upper chamber. Following this trial of strength, the Constitution was rapidly completed, but — and this is the crucial point — we use word "Constitution" with the benefit of hindsight. The Philadelphia delegates had no way of knowing that it really was a constitution, a functional mechanism. What they did know for certain was that they had reached a compromise, and reached it contrary to their own particular concept of state (to understand clearly what had happened, they would have needed to be presented with a new theory of state, and with the force of evidence). There thus followed a period of time during which, in the minds of men, a veil separated reality from its representation.

This, then, was the early attitude of men to history's first federation. I have recalled this aspect of the history of the birth of the United States of America in order to highlight the circumstances in which Hamilton managed to develop the first principles of the federal state theory. The truth is that Hamilton was able to see through the veil that separated consciousness from reality; *The Federalist* itself is proof that he understood, even before the Constitution was operational, how it would work. It is true that there were ambiguities in his understanding, that the full depth of his intuition emerged only in the context of the tension of the struggle for ratification and when he had the text of the Constitution as a set point of reference, and, finally, that in other circumstances his views changed, even leading him to judge the federal Constitution in negative terms. But this certainly does not detract from him. Foreseeing does not carry the same certainty as actually seeing, nor does it give us the same clear outlines. Hamilton fought ceaselessly for the consolidation of American unity, first trying to found a pan-American government, and then trying to strengthen it. The ambiguities in his understanding are entirely justifiable. Moreover, the fact that there were ambiguities in Hamilton's understanding is irrelevant to our purposes here; what is important is to highlight them, pointing out the federalist character of some of his ideas that, while he formulated them in general terms, are in

fact applicable only in the federalist context to which he was actually, and implicitly, referring.

Hamilton described, with enormous clarity and insight, the nature and consequences of the extension of the sphere of representative government from the area of just one state to that of many states. It also emerges in his writings that, in the federal system, the judicial power really can be endowed with the capacity to subordinate all the other powers to constitutional law, and moreover that it is possible, by combining the roles of head of state and head of government in a single individual, to give the executive power the strength it must have if it is to govern well, while also guarding against the risk of tyranny or Caesarism. But he failed to clarify the link between these improvements to the executive and judicial powers (essential to the establishment of the rule of law and the consolidation of democracy) and the division of power that is produced in the federal framework, in which the central government is checked by the governments of the member states, and in which the judicial power, depending on whose interests the judicial decision converges with, has the support either of the federal government or of the governments of the states (in unitary states, on the other hand, the judicial power lacks the strength to withstand the excessive power of the legislative assembly and the executive, which are more often combined than distinct). He also failed to clarify the fact that it is only at this level of refinement of the executive and, above all, the judicial power that the constitutional state, the community in which all powers really are made to bend to constitutional law, emerges as a typical form, and not just as an accident of history.

With integrations of this kind, Hamilton's thought can be regarded as the first formulation of the federal state theory. What his thought does not contain, however, is a systematic analysis of the relations between the new American Constitution and American society of the time. And this analysis is indispensable if one wants to arrive at a complete theory of federalism. The federal state theory describes an organisation, not the human setting in which that organisation can be born and endure; it identifies the political framework for a given behaviour, not its social basis and historical context (which must be established together since social phenomena have a historical character). As a result, it does not enable us to understand every aspect of federalism and its historical unfolding, or even to set Hamilton in the history of federalist thought or to place the American federation in the course of history. We therefore need to look again at the birth of the United States of America to see whether this re-examination enables us to highlight, after the structural

and value aspects, also the social-historical aspect of federalism.

Before the War of Independence, the colonies lying along North America's east coast had achieved a sufficient level of development, both in a material sense and in the sense of the evolution of ideas, to allow the formation of a representative government. These were thirteen societies that belonged to the British imperial system. Above them, as their only social and political point of reference, stood the great British community. It was only when their fight for English freedoms turned into out-and-out war with the mother country that the colonies began to see themselves as sharing a deep bond and to form a new and independent society: American society. The war destroyed all their affection for the British Crown, and created, in its stead, a new allegiance — to the American Union. At the end of the war, the colonies no longer belonged to the British; they were American.

However, it was only as former colonies that they enjoyed an organisation based on independent governments and solid institutions. What they had on an American level was only a de facto unity with the confederal superstructure. Hence, this new pro-American sentiment was, initially, merely the manifestation of a spontaneous converging of the colonial people's inclinations and behaviour. Of course, this sentiment was also deeply rooted in the geographical and historical context. But it has to be remembered that, at this stage, production and trade relations in North America had not yet generated a close and stable interdependence of the behaviour of the various colonial people, which means that it was the war, bringing a proliferation and intensification of inter-American relations, that was responsible for turning the embryonic American unity into proper, de facto unity. Being so immature, this unity would not have lasted long without a political stabiliser, without a government; nevertheless, it did enjoy, for a time, a form of autonomy of its own. Precisely because it stemmed from a de facto situation, and was not based on membership of a single state, this American unity must be considered, for analytical purposes at least, as a raw, social factor, rather than as a specific, political factor, even though here, as in many other cases, the distinction between the social and the political is rather blurred.

This de facto unity, sufficient to sustain the new pro-American sentiment, was insufficient, on the other hand, to attenuate dramatically, or even to destroy, the thirteen local patriotisms that state autonomy, historical traditions and even the colonies' very nature as "nations" in the etymological sense (nations as the territorial dimensions of individuals' birth, life and death) combined very effectively to defend. Thus, the new

American sentiment was added to, but did not replace, the old local patriotisms, and the combination of these equally strong sentiments led to the birth of a generalised social behaviour that was characterised by true bipolarity, by a division of loyalties between the Union and the states — a social behaviour that united all the colonies into a single, vast society but at the same time divided them into smaller societies, distinct from the former and from each other, each with its own clearly established territorial boundaries within the boundaries of the larger, common society. This behaviour can be defined federal. It is this that constitutes what, in turn, we can term federal society (or, in the political context, federal people), that is, a community with independent, territorially-based social differences. Or, more precisely, a community with territorially-based social groups that are strong enough to sustain independent governments and to overcome all other social differences, but not strong enough to produce separate societies, precisely because they are comprised of men who, at the same time, remain loyal to a wider society. In this form, this phenomenon was, and still is, new. It is true that it is a general tendency of humans to belong to a number of different social circles, but it is also true that this tendency is incapable of producing true bipolarity, either in unitary republics, where state centralisation and the national ideal are such that national sentiment prevails, to the detriment of all other group sentiments, or in feudally-organised imperial societies, where it is stifled by the fact that the members of these societies are subjects, in other words, individuals who cannot freely express their social sentiments.

These observations show clearly the close relations between the new social behaviour that emerged in North America and the novel aspect of the federal Constitution, namely, the division of sovereignty. It is now clear that the situation in Philadelphia stemmed from the fundamental nature of American society, even though, in taking the form of a confrontation rather than bipolarity, it did have a political explanation: the impossibility of dividing sovereignty. It is also clear that the need for a compromise, like the fact that one could be reached only in federal terms, highlights not only the process of the creation of the federal institutions, but also, and in particular, their relations with a society able to function only with institutions of this kind, a society too unitary for a simple system of sovereign states existing in equilibrium with one another, and too diversified, and at the same time too inclined to enlarge its borders, for the closed and compact unitary form of state. It is also clear, finally, that federalism has specific social significance. What we must now do is

clarify the nature of this social significance, that is to say, evaluate the basis of the federal society that emerged in exceptional circumstances at the end of the eighteenth century in North America and, more generally, define the historical framework of federalist social behaviour.

Incompatible both with the unitary republic and with the feudally-organised empire, this behaviour can manifest itself only in areas that embrace many states and that have achieved the conditions (material and in terms of the evolution of ideas) necessary for political freedom, as well as a certain degree of unity. But even this is not enough. For this behaviour to be sustained, there has to be an end to, or at least an attenuation of, both the class struggle and the military power. The class struggle destroys any solidarity between proletarians and the middle classes that might unite social groups at territorial level, and subordinates these groups to the general division of society into antagonistic social classes. In addition, a military power encourages a concentration of power in the central government, destroys the political balance between the centre and the periphery and therefore makes bipolarity impossible in the social domain. In fact, during the period in which federalism in North America enjoyed is fullest expression, the region's island status (which Hamilton described so well) effectively ensured that American society remained protected even without the formation of a proper military power. Furthermore, because this period coincided with an exceptionally favourable situation in terms of the availability of work, the class struggle was prevented from developing in American society, and the path to the development of socialism effectively barred.

Nevertheless, in all situations (real or envisaged) like that of America, that is to say, characterised simply by a reduction of the class struggle and of the military power, or by a reduction of the consequences of these phenomena, federalism can still only emerge in a partial and precarious manner. Partial because there exist two poles of federalist social behaviour, one that tends to develop too much, and the other that tends to develop too little. The pole constituted by territorially-based social groups develops too little because, as long as class differences persist, these groups cannot in any sense become free communities or, as a result, foster the community spirit to its natural outcome. The pole constituted by society as a whole, on the other hand, develops too much, because the existence of military power in other parts of the world also has repercussions on the individuals who belong to less-armed societies, and encourages them to develop a sense of loyalty to their wider society that is reminiscent of the nationalistic sense of loyalty that develops in armed

societies. The precariousness, in turn, derives from the fact that in an armed world no society can, for long, escape the logic of power and of the *raison d'état*. In this kind of world, it is only in certain exceptional natural or historical circumstances that particularly fortunate societies manage, for a short time, to remain substantially unarmed and thus able to sustain the balance between the federal government and the member states.

In short, as long as the historical situation offers nothing more than an attenuation of the class struggle and of the level of military power, or of the consequences of these phenomena, federalism will be able to manifest itself, in an unstable and imperfect manner, only in certain privileged sectors of the world population. This is the same as saying that it can manifest itself fully and stably only in a clearly defined historical framework: that in which class differences and military power are no more, in other words, when a stage has been reached in the development of material production, and consequently of human interdependence, in which society's division into classes will already have been overcome, and in which it will at last be possible to overcome mankind's division into nations. All this shows that the two poles of federalist social behaviour are, in their deepest essence, community and cosmopolitanism.

To conclude these reflections, I would like to remark that the Philadelphia Convention, together with the American Constitution and its first major commentary, *The Federalist*, if considered as a whole — and, in truth, they form a whole —, allow us to view the problems of the institutions and of the course of history from a new perspective. On this basis, federalism makes it possible to widen the horizons, which liberalism, democracy and socialism have continued to narrow, of political and social interpretation and assessment. Obviously, we are not questioning the value of these milestones in political thought, but rather considering the fact, clear for all to see, of the growing gap that is separating the real situation from the universal thought of the classical authors (up to Marx), a gap that is probably becoming unbridgeable as we move further and further away from the historical situations in which the great traditional ideologies, faced with all that they were seeking to demolish, achieved their fullest expression.

In any case, I feel there can be no doubt that federalism should be taken into proper consideration by all those who can see the need for new forms of participation in political and social life (new institutions and new decision-making mechanisms) yet fail to call into question the nation-state, whose indivisible sovereignty prevents the creation of true regional and local autonomies and whose exclusive sovereignty, a result of the

fusion of nation with state, prevents the formation of genuine political and social solidarity above the level of the nation-states.

The Birth of European Federalism.

Let us now try to conduct a similar analysis of the idea of the European federation, of militant federalism, in order, in the same way, to bring out its peculiar characteristics. Like all political realities, European federalism has historical roots. To highlight these immediately, we can start by remarking on the curious fact of the coincidence of the concrete establishment (through the French Revolution) of the modern principle of the nation with the birth of ideas (not facts) of a federalist, albeit vaguely federalist, nature. And I think the reason for this coincidence, which the dominant culture has failed to highlight, is this: the nation-state constituted a new principle of social, political and economic organisation. It was, too, the formula that allowed democracy to be introduced into the old framework of the absolute state. But as such, and precisely because it brought the interests of all the citizens into the sphere of the politics of government, it undermined the functioning of the old international mechanism, which was based on the dynastic idea of state, on the aristocracy as a European social phenomenon, and on authoritarian, but limited, power — all factors that allowed the maintenance of a certain international equilibrium, precisely because the states' own demands were limited.

The introduction of the new nation-state formula thus created the need to re-build, in new terms, international coexistence. It is the evolution of this need that explains, starting with Saint-Simon (that is to say, with the publication, in 1814, of his essay on the reorganisation of European society, which indeed considers the end of the politics of balance), the change that came about in pacifist literature. Abstract projects started to be replaced by an attempt, albeit embryonic, to resolve a new contradiction in the historical process: the nation-state formula affirmed the rights of men and of citizens within the ambit of the old states, but entirely negated them, negating even the right to live and not to kill, at international level.

This solution to this contradiction lies in popular control of international relations, which is possible only through federalism, since federalism gives the people, through the vote, direct control over the single states and also over an organised group of states.

Seen in this way, the course of federalist affirmations in Europe is no

longer a story purely of ideas (as it has wrongly been regarded), but instead a story of men, of the endeavour, difficult and uncertain like all human endeavours, but for this reason realistic, to solve a problem presented by the development of history and not simply an insubstantial product of the perfectionism of some enlightened mind.

Basically, the history of European federalism is merely the history of the emerging contradiction between the affirmation of democracy in the national sphere and its negation in the international sphere. This means that European federalism has been an aspect of European history from the French Revolution onwards — an aspect (albeit still unclear, like all the historical trends yet to come to full fruition) more extensive than one might think, in which, alongside an evolution of the thought begun with the philosophy of Kant, there is slowly unfolding that element of universality that is common to all great revolutionary movements. And it calls into question liberalism, with regard to the rights of the citizen, democracy, with regard to the rights of the people, and socialism, with regard to the socioeconomic rights of the people.

These three great ideologies, which have progressively filled the nation-state with its democratic and social content, in fact display, from their very beginnings, a federalist component, even though awareness of this is undermined by the tendency to confuse, on theoretical level, federalism with internationalism, which is, in fact, the opposite of federalism, since it entrusts leaders rather than the people with the task of solving international problems.

This theoretical confusion, which can be explained by the absence, up until the Second World War, of the objective conditions for the realisation of federalism, nevertheless carries the risk of a surrendering to nationalism, a risk proven to be real each time the nation has prevailed over freedom, democracy and socialism on the scale of values actually pursued. The manifestations of this tendency to surrender are striking, from the statalism of the liberals, to the naïve nationalism of the democrats, and the "national ways" pointed out by socialism. In this context, the collapse of the Second International prior to the First World War, like the construction of socialism in a single country, take on the character of a historical turning point, definitively sealing that supremacy of the nation brutally sustained by the racists and accepted by all the states on a formal level as the principle of the absolute sovereignty of the nation and of the non-interference in the affairs of other states. But, in essence, the struggles for freedom, democracy and socialism concern all men and not just one's fellow countrymen. This is the reason why their federalist

component, in spite of all the surrenders to nationalism, cannot be eliminated.

This is not the place to analyse the history of European federalism as an aspect of European history. Nevertheless, we can recall the thought of Proudhon in order to show how such a historical reconstruction could shed light on a hidden facet of European history after the French Revolution. Proudhon does not offer only "integral federalism" (economic, social, political), a concept that embodies a fundamental criterion for socialism if its end (human freedom) is not to be sacrificed to its means (the transformation of property). He also advances a criticism of the nation-state and of international relations that goes so far as to demystify the idea of nation. Thanks to his great farsightedness, Proudhon was able to see the tragic limitations of a national democracy uncorrected by democracy at local and at European level. With his penetrating vision, he saw, behind the façade of the modern nations, their true reality as political myths produced by the centralised state, by the "single and indivisible republic."

In a passage that is unfortunately too often forgotten, Proudhon actually wrote that the French nation (France being the "nation" *par excellence*) does not exist, and that France is an artificial, political, collection of fifteen nationalities. Until a few years ago, this affirmation might have sounded like a *boutade*. But the truth of it is now clear to see: the historical crisis of the nation-state has led to a re-emergence in France of the different nationalities (Breton, Basque, Occitan), a phenomenon that has exposed the essential artificiality of political life confined within a centralised and exclusive state, of the separation of the interests of workers in different European countries, and of the very concept of the nation (shown to be an ideological façade), and even forced De Gaulle to address the Bretons in Breton.

European federalism, if one considers not only what it has meant in the past, but also what it means now and what it can mean in the future, is seen to be linked to the history of Europe at every stage in its evolution. European federalism faces an important task. As a new form of modern state, federalism is, as we have seen, an American reality. But the United States of America, in order to come into being, did not have to overcome historically established nations and thus did not have to solve the series of problems that the Europeans now face. Unification, in Europe, will demand a profound revolution. In Europe, the problem is that of going beyond the historical nations, the nations *par excellence*: France, Germany, Italy, Spain (one day, once democracy is restored to it), and so on.

On a cultural level, overcoming the historically established nations should equate to overcoming a historical phase and, for this very reason, creating a new development model for the countries of the third World and, in general, for the whole of mankind, which is rapidly approaching the point at which he will have to choose between unity (which the UN prefigures but does not realise) and environmental disaster.

But before dealing with this broad historical significance, it is worth analysing briefly the social and political significance of the European federation, considering its objective aspects. It is never made clear that the passage from the nation-state to the European state implies a material and historical transformation of great importance, a real grassroots social change. There is a tendency to consider the word "social" as synonymous with "class" and "class struggle." But the reality is far more complex, because to confuse these terms is to forget the huge social importance of the fact of the nation.

The nation-state is the political community that attempts, and in part manages, to render homogeneous all the communities that exist within it. Basically, its tendentiously totalitarian nature is already evident in the fact that this type of state is able to survive only if it succeeds in establishing a single language and uniform customs throughout its sphere of action (even though, as far as the latter are concerned, it is a semblance of unification more than real unification that it has actually managed to impose). This artificial social basis is what makes a man born in Turin feel like a man born in Palermo and different, in his human origins, from any man born in any other state (even though, in reality, and leaving aside the common origins of all men, the difference between a man from Turin and a man from Palermo is greater than that, say, between someone from Turin and someone from Lyons).

A European state could not, on the contrary, be founded on this social basis, and neither could the formation of this social basis be induced by and helped along by a European state. Although Italian and French were, starting in Florence and Paris respectively, turned into national languages, no development of this kind could ever occur on a European level. There is no centre of power that has the capacity to impose a single language in Europe, the capacity to make the French stop speaking French and the Italians stop speaking Italian. Even more so, there is no centre of power with the capacity to create in Europe the illusion of, or even a degree of, uniformity of customs. This is a situation that can be illustrated neatly in a formula that federalists never tire of repeating: what will be possible in Europe is the formation of a people of nations, not a

national people. This formation of a people of nations is not something that belongs to a far-off and indefinite time. The Treaties of Rome make provision for European general elections, a goal supported by an array of forces that has every bit as much chance of success as the forces that oppose it. And it goes without saying that the first European elections will be the first expression of a new popular political entity: the European people. But this will be a pluralist not a monolithic people, and it will be, as history decrees, the people of the European nations.

This is a concrete, social aspect that cannot fail to be taken into consideration when one talks of European unity. The second concrete aspect that must be considered is of a political-institutional nature. First of all, it needs to be said that the accusations of "institutionalism" levelled at federalists are quite meaningless. It is obvious that institutions cannot exist without an underlying social basis and also that institutions cannot be fought for without the belief that there exist the necessary social foundations on which to build them and make them work. The supreme duty of politics is, often, to destroy institutions that are stifling new social developments and to create new institutions in response to new developments. It also needs to be pointed out that those who refuse European institutionalism are, in fact, and even without realising it, accepting national institutionalism, regarding as "organic" a process — that of the nation — which in reality demands a preliminary institutional condition: an organised national framework for the expression of historical forces.

That said, a quick pointer on this question is provided by Anglo-Saxon culture, in comparison with which the culture of continental Europe is found to have a gap. In Anglo-Saxon culture, a clear distinction is drawn between the unitary (national) principle and the federal (pluralist) principle. In the nation-state, sovereign representation is unitary. The idea of the republic being "one and indivisible" is the natural consequence of this. But this republic reduces the division of powers, the thing that should constitute the political guarantee of freedom, to a mere outward appearance. And, with truly diabolical results, it entrusts schools even, and culture, to the centre of power that "wields the sword", that is the army.

This kind of state is bound — aspirations in any other direction are insignificant, vain — to use schools, culture, to turn citizens into good soldiers. And it does precisely this. The history of the nation, which hounds us throughout our education from primary school to university, lays bare, starting with the edifying tales aimed at youngsters, the submission of historical-social culture to the practical, authoritarian and

bellicose needs of the state. It is this same culture that we see emerging in state-related areas of social behaviour — national elections, national military service — and in political rituals.

It is this culture again that emerges in the arbitrary application of universal facts — historical facts and current facts of political and social importance — to national frameworks, in a way that is all the more insidious because this manipulation, not being openly uplifting, quells fears of having served power rather than truth. This culture, which depends on the state, makes the nation-state the lord of all individual consciences.

The federal state, on the other hands, represents a splitting of the sovereign function, of sovereignty. Politics is not restricted to a single framework and political battles are not fought for a single power, which, through its prefects, controls all lower powers. Instead it operates in the federal framework and in the framework of the member states. The difference is fundamental. This territorial, as opposed to exclusively functional, division of power is supported by a solid social basis. And this territorial distribution of power, in its most typical form, cannot survive without the primacy of the Constitution.

Its unity is based, in fact, on a rule — that of the distribution of power among all the member states and the federal government; in the unitary state, on the other hand, unity lies in a centre of power to which everything is subordinate, and which is judge and party at the same time. It is not mere chance that the birth of the theory of the judicial review — and not just the Constitutional Court, a late fruit of the decline of the nation-state — coincided with that of history's first federal state, the American federation. Neither is it mere chance that the American federation, embryo and remains of the first federal pact, has no education minister, no interior minister and no prefects.

This is the social basis, institutional character and legal distribution of power that Europe could have. It constitutes a reasonable forecast of a realisable situation, even though, admittedly, it still would not constitute a perfectly federal solution. It is a forecast, not a dream, because this is a situation that would stem not from individual will, but from the objective impossibility of forming a centralised and unitary European nation-state.

Federalism As the Overcoming of the Division of Mankind.

The conclusion we reached in the previous section is not a sufficient basis for an analysis of militant federalism. Federalists assume responsi-

bility for Europe's imperfection, to which I alluded earlier, and for the fact that this imperfection corresponds, in truth, to a failure to negate completely the authoritarian and bellicose values of the nation-state. This is why their argument extends, and in a very precise manner, beyond the confines of Europe. This is why, when horizons are narrowed by the requirements of political struggle and there emerges the need to look far ahead, we say that there is still a need to conduct politics in order to pave the way for the day in which men will no longer be forced to engage in politics. We are fighting for the European federation only because our revolutionary conscience does not allow us to run away from reality.

In this regard, there are two things that I would like to underline. The first is that nobody will oblige federalists — even should the Europe they are fighting for become, with their contribution, a reality — to support a future European government. Even at the risk of attracting derision, as has occurred in the past, the most responsible among us have always maintained that the place of federalists, in Europe, will always be among the ranks of the opposition. Europe will allow this because Europe will have an opposition. What is peculiar is the failure of the Continent's left-wing parties to see this; and this leaves them envisaging a European state that will be more compact, more totalitarian, than the nation-state. What the left-wing parties in Europe's nation-states should actually be thinking about is how much more effective a European opposition is likely to be compared with the national oppositions.

But I want to explain the paradox of our participation in the building of a state that we already know we will have to criticise. There is nothing absurd about this. It is the paradox that accompanies every advance made along the road of revolution. The revolution is global and universal. This is why every advance made towards it immediately becomes meaningless to those fighting for it, unless they are able to accept that their destiny is to continue to be in the ranks of the opposition even after fulfilling their task. This truth is revealed in its positive form by those who are prepared to renounce power in order to remain in the ranks of the opposition, whereas its negative expression takes the form of a loss, a reversal, of the true historical perspective in the hearts of those decide, after accepting responsibility for a revolutionary transformation, also to accept the responsibility for managing power.

This paradox will become clearer, I hope, as I move on to my second point. Important stages in revolutionary progress have always had two meanings: one that is practical, immediate, verifiable in the new institutions and in new political and social behaviour, and one that is theoretical

and can be seen only on a cultural level (culture being taken to mean that which drives, deep down, the formation of human thought). The end result of the French Revolution, if viewed in the light not of life prior to it, but of the fierce revolutionary ideals that inspired it, was rather unexceptional: the state that, despite recognising the barriers it brought down and the historical forces it freed, we today condemn as "Jacobinic-Napoleonic."

In any case, the "Jacobinic-Napoleonic" state did not destroy the global significance of the French Revolution, which led to the affirmation, within the culture of mankind, of the democratic principle. Despite its imperfect realisation, despite all the defeats democracy has suffered, this principle became strongly rooted in the hearts of men, where it has remained firm. Fascism, which openly repudiated it, has been swept from the scene. One-party socialist states, which repudiate it in practice, are unable to negate it in theory and in the rituals of political life.

Similar observations can be made about the Soviet Revolution. So great is the distance that separates the revolutionary aspirations from the resulting Soviet state that the obvious conclusion now is that what was realised in the Soviet Union was not communism, but a rigid form of state capitalism. However, the expression "state capitalism" highlights an empirical aspect of the Soviet situation that reduces its historical significance. We know that communism has not become a reality. But we should also be aware of the fact that, in the wake of the Soviet Revolution, private ownership of the social means of production has, in a cultural sense, lost its legitimacy. True social ownership of the means of production is still a long way off, as is, moreover, genuine democracy. But, in the same way as absolutism died in the hearts of men, in my view for good, so the principle of the legitimacy of private ownership of the social means of production is now dying out in the hearts of men.

Reality can adapt to the democracy, imperfect, guided and manipulated, of the West; and the management, guided and manipulated, of collective production in the East. Culture cannot. And it is culture that separates that which is and that which should be, and that thus motivates life's deepest currents.

In the light of these observations, I do not feel that we can evaluate the future European state without considering, alongside that which it will negate in practice, that which it will negate in theory, thereby highlighting not only what it will practically and immediately affirm, but also what it will affirm in the sphere of culture.

In practice, the European state will negate — with consequences that

have already been discussed — the Continent's division into nation-states. In theory it will negate the nations, or rather, the fusion of nation with state — the enslavement of the nation (which stands for culture and universality) to the closed, unitary state (which, per se, is synonymous with power and particularism). It was for precisely this reason that, in his 1954 Christmas message, Pope Pius XII defined, correctly in my modest opinion, this type of state as one of the most diabolical creations in the history of mankind. And it is significant that this criticism, which recurs in the most coherent expressions of liberalism, democracy and socialism, should also have been advanced in the framework of religion, where the criterion of transcendence makes it possible to distinguish more clearly between that which is always open, which renews life, and that which is forever closed, which subdues and extinguishes life.

What is the significance of this theoretical negation? For historical reasons, this is not a question that can be answered on the basis of consideration of the American federation. The American federation came into being in what was still a side road of history, sheltered from the great conflicts between states and classes. And it negated — this is the real point — thirteen small states that had no state or national history.

The European federation, on the other hand, will, from the outset, have to negate, in the dialectical sense of the word, France, Germany and Italy: the great historical nations. These great historical nations have turned the concept of the nation as the organic division of mankind into a typical idea; they are the secular, historically concrete expression of the culture of the political division of mankind. Their negation will thus be the negation of this culture.

It is true that the European federation will be a state among states. It will create a dual loyalty in the citizens, introducing European elections alongside national ones. It is possible to imagine that, putting an end to obligatory military service, it will also put an end to the "citizen equals soldier" equation. But, as a power among powers, it will have to defend its autonomy with military means too. In practice, it will remain on the terrain of the political division of mankind, even though examination of its *raison d'état*, something worthy of a separate discussion, suggests that it will be less brutal and, in social terms, less constricted than the Soviet Union or the United States of America.

In theory, however, the terrain of the European state will be the terrain of the negation of the political division of mankind. This is, historically, the most important thing. National culture, like the theory of the political division of mankind, is the culture that, by mystifying liberalism, democ-

racy and socialism, has, in fact, legitimatised the duty to kill. The culture of the negation of the political division of mankind is the historical negation of this duty; it constitutes the affirmation, in the sphere of thought, of the political, not just spiritual, right not to kill, and is thus the historical framework of the struggle to affirm it in practice — beyond the European federation — through world federation.

This analysis may seem abstract and meaningless. But is it possible to exclude, from the horizon of thought, the dawn and the dusk, the first, tentative light in which things are born and the semi-darkness in which they perish? There is a fixed point of reference in all these considerations and it is this: a negation has the same value as that which it negates. And the nation legitimatised, in theory, the duty to kill, because it was unable to eliminate it in practice. To negate the nation, through the European federation, to do away with the fatal association of nation with state and nation with culture, and to overcome historically the nation as the ultimate point of reference in all human action in the political and social sphere, is to negate the basis of the legitimisation of the duty to kill, and to remove the darkness surrounding the idea of national culture, which has prevented men from seeing that neither liberalism, democracy nor socialism can be realised without the affirmation of the supreme right not to kill.

This interpretation of the historical-cultural significance of the European federation, like any attempt to understand the meaning of contemporary history that sets out to be more than just a cursory analysis of the present in the light of the past, may seem not only abstract and meaningless, but also over-ambitious and too arbitrary.

But man, in the making of his history, which evolves and is not simply a pattern of repetition, is right to be ambitious, given the enormity of the gap that separates what is from what should be. Anyway, there is something non-arbitrary in this interpretation: the fact that it is not a solitary excogitation, but reflects, rather, the growing significance of the reasons for the federalists' struggle.

For thirty years now, this struggle has left the federalists isolated from most of the other forces in the field. As a result, the federalists view the question of European unity in totally different terms from everyone else. Thus, as things currently stand, what I have said up to now is meaningful only within the context of the federalist struggle; it will become meaningful for everyone only upon the advent of the European federation, and only providing the European federation, in its two dimensions — as a practical and theoretical fact — does indeed present the practical and

cultural aspects that today constitute the motivations and expectations underpinning the federalists' battle. But some things already have a universal meaning, even though they still need to break free from the obstinate tendency to approach the new with old ideas.

First of all, there is the simple, basic fact of European unity as an aspiration and as a real historical process. Millions of people, including great statesmen, scholars and politicians, believe that European unity is necessary. But on realising that European unity is necessary, and that only a federation can guarantee this unity, it is an illusion to believe, as many do, that one has reached a conclusion. What one has reached is only the starting point of a new experience that makes every apparently certain thing appear problematical and throws into question, together with the nation-state (which is to say " Italian-ness" for the Italians, and the same for the other nationalities), the whole of the past and the present. The proof of this lies in the fact that those who refuse to embark on this experience preach fine words, but do not accomplish fine actions.

Second, there is the crisis of the ideologies and, because of this, the loss of historical identity. There are events of the past and present that cannot be explained in the framework of prevailing social and political thought. The federalists are beginning to perceive a new thread running through the history of Europe, which, in spite of so-called European revisions, continues to be, for everyone else, the history of Italy, of France, and so on. This guiding thread may prove correct or incorrect. But the fact is that the European system of states has died, and its place has been taken by the world system of states. And it is true that we still have to sort out the knots that the French Revolution created and the Soviet Revolution failed to unravel. Those who believed in individual freedom, in rule by the people, and in the collective ownership of the means of production have been forced, in the very framework of recognition of individual freedom, of rule by the people, and of the collective ownership of the means of production, to face up to man's incapacity to be free, to exercise self-government and to control production collectively. And it is not enough to say that no value is acquired indefinitely. It is always necessary to appreciate the historical conditions in which values are fought for.

At this point, an observation is called for. Liberalism, democracy and socialism, which as concepts lie beyond the *raison d'état*, in reality still find themselves struggling against — and more often than not losing — the *raison d'état* in the ambit of *the raison d'état* by which the world continues to be governed.

So why not revisit the thought of those who predicted this development, or who have criticised it in the course of its unfolding? The question here is not just the history of militant federalism: it is the history of everyone; it is the federalist core present in the ideologies that, in turn, have represented dominant thought and the dominant course of action. Reason shows, as I have said, that liberal, socialist and democratic thought could not have been developed and proposed as anything other than solutions valid for all men, as opposed to only the citizens of one country or another.

This internationalist core, tendentiously federalist, of the ideologies that moved the historical process of the last century is far stronger than it is usually thought to be, if it is indeed true that Lenin, in 1915, felt the need to adopt a stance on the "United States of Europe watchword." The force of this watchword was still such as to constitute an obstacle to the affirmation of his political line, and Lenin, writing on the subject, neither wished, nor perhaps was able, to deny the positive significance of the United States of Europe, limiting himself instead to an affirmation of the need for a prelude, i.e., a socialist revolution in Europe, something he considered to be imminent, thus putting off the battle for a United States of Europe to some, foreseeable, near future time.

The federalists must at least be credited with having assessed these events, reread the authors that had predicted or criticised them, and taken account, in their attempt to understand the historical situation in which we find ourselves acting, of what is due to the *rasion d'état* and what, instead, can be attributed to the germ of federalism present in the great ideologies. This allowed them, as I have said, to highlight the contemporaneousness of the affirmation of the nation-state in reality and the affirmation of the United States of Europe as an ideal, and, in their efforts to explain it, to perceive the nature of the fine European thread running from the cosmopolitan component of the French Revolution to the current process of European integration.

Within the framework I have just outlined of what the European federation has come to mean to the federalists, I would like to return to the most solid aspect of this story, in order to link it to the two World Wars and to the current situation. I have said that the new nation-state formula was incompatible with the old European system of absolute, albeit limited, states.

This incompatibility was particularly clear in the sphere of international politics, and can be attributed to the fact that the aristocracy constituted a Europe-wide community that had a suprastate sense of

European solidarity. Until the French Revolution, political personality was based ultimately and fundamentally not on attachment to the state, or to nationhood, but on an attachment to Christianity, or according to the secular version, "Europe's Republic of scholars." Metternich thought in this way and truly believed in the existence of an order — even a legal order, European law — at suprastate level.

This incompatibility could also be seen clearly in the internal conditioning of international politics, both because popular culture (nationality) was not yet crucial to the state, and because the merging of the economic interests of all parties with the motivations behind the states' policies (which accompanied the Industrial Revolution and the full realisation of the modern bureaucratic state) had still to occur.

The fusion of state and nation put an end to these limitations, which had excluded many civil and material values from the sphere of action of the state. Relations between states became very difficult. Europe experienced a division the like of which it had never known before. This aspect of the last stage in the life of the European system of states should, in my view, be borne in mind more, and studied in depth. One thing, however, is certain: the affirmation of the national principle in Italy and in Germany, marking the definitive end of the international politics of enlightened sovereigns, resulted in the First World War, and explains the new, generalised, and total nature of that war. Moreover, the spread, as a result of the First World War, of the national principle throughout Europe led to the Second World War, that is, to the end of Europe, whose chances of once again playing an active historical role now depend on its capacity to resolve, through its unification, the international problem generated by the creation of the nation-state.

Power, that is to say effective decision-making power at international level, has emigrated from Europe to North America, to the territory previously covered by the Czarist empire and which now makes up the Soviet Union, and to China. This is not a circumstance that we can already slot into the theory of historical cycles, citing it as an example of the exhaustion of old historical-social forces and the advent of new ones. Instead, what we are witnessing — and the game is not yet over, since Europe can still be unified — is the historical end of a political formula, the nation-state formula, and the irreversible historical affirmation of new, vaster, more complex forms of state based on implicitly or explicitly multinational foundations (China, like Europe, is a civilisation, not a nation, and the United States can, as we have said, be likened to a successful "European" federation, while the Soviet Union is a multina-

tional state) and, beneath the veil of ideology, on a federal or almost imperial structure.

One can accept or deny the reality of this situation. The militant federalists embarked on their experience because they came face to face with this situation and refused to accept it. Whatever the current of their thought, liberal, democratic, socialist or Christian-social, one thing was clear to them: the nation-states divide Europe, and this division spells its historical death. It could be that all their ideas, which, hampered by the obvious limitations that derive from speaking also on behalf of others, I have tried to summarise here, are entirely wrong. But what is certainly not wrong is that division is fatal for the Europeans; what is not wrong is that in the face of all the problems created by division, the duty to fight for unity constitutes the only fixed point of reference. And duty alone is reason enough to continue, even when everything appears difficult and uncertain.

The federalists can question everything again. However, they cannot question what was written, expressed with lapidary concision, by this century's most prominent Italian: "In the life of nations, the mistake of not seizing the moment is usually irreparable. The need to unify Europe is evident. The existing states are dust devoid of substance. None of them is able to bear the cost of its autonomous defence. It is only through union that they can endure. This is not a problem of choice between independence and union, but of choice between existing in unity and disappearing. Italians paid for the hesitation of and discord among the Italian states at the end of the fifteenth century with three centuries of lost independence; then the time for deciding lasted, perhaps, just a few months. Now, the time will be ripe for European union only as long as western Europe continues to share the same ideals of freedom. Can we really be sure that factors working against the ideals of freedom will not, unexpectedly, gain sufficient strength to prevent union, consigning some countries to the sphere of North America and others to that of Russia? An Italian territory will still exist, but not an Italian nation; the latter is destined to go on living as a spiritual and moral unit only providing we are able to forgo this absurd military and economic independence."

These words are taken from a note written by Luigi Einaudi on March 1st 1954, when he was President of the Republic of Italy, a position that did not prevent him from seeing the republic for what it really was.

All historical situations are set in time and have a duration. Einaudi, by relating Europe to time, also placed Europe in relation to the sphere of human action, and gave a physiognomy to the Europe that is before us.

It is not enough to fight for European unity, we have to make sure that we do not waste time, because time is of the essence; we cannot afford to miss our historical opportunity. Fifty years later, discussing the March on Rome, Amendola used similar terms, talking of the "political value of passing time." In the period that followed the First World War, the parties that gave voice to the great ideologies had lost, together with their sense of history, their sense of the political value of time, and fascism prevailed as a result of this. The way in which they have approached European politics in the period since the end of the Second World War shows that they have still not regained it.

This is the unshakeable element that distinguishes the federalists from the parties. The federalists were, and continue to be, a small vanguard that stand apart from the majority of the forces in the field because they are not willing to waste time. The federalists have tried, in the way in which they are structured and in their policy, to offer an *ante litteram* living example of European unity, because life is lived in the framework of time, and only life can overcome death. In their struggles against all that divides Europe, they have progressively formed, in their thought, an outline of what Europe could be. This outline presents all the uncertainty of a prediction. But the reality against which the federalists fight is not uncertain. The federalists have been, are, and always will be the enemies of the nation-state, of the national division of political and social forces.

NOTES

[1] See Mario Albertini, *Il federalismo*, Bologna, 1993 (1st edition, Milan, 1963).

[2] Historically, a "federation" is an association of states (a whole) endowed with its own power, an association that, on account of this power, which distinguishes it from a confederation, has also been called "federal state".

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

NICOLETTA MOSCONI, Movimento Federalista Europeo.

Some articles from recent number

2003

Editorials
The Road to Peace.
For a Federal Pact Among Europe's Founder Member States.
The Return of Protectionism and Europe's Responsibility.

Essays
Daniela Preda, The Debate over European Constituent Assembly: A Story of Draft, Desires and Disappointments.
Giovanni Vigo, The Battle for Europe. The Example and Ideas of Mario Albertini.

Notes
What Core?
The "Benevolent Empire" and Europe.
Constituent Strategy and Constitutional Gradualism.
China Successes and the Illusion of Europe.
Islam and the Idea of Nation.

Federalism in the History of Thought
Charles Lemonnier.

2004

Editorials
The Decline of Europe.
Iraq and the Responsibility of Europe towards the Midddle East.
Beyond the Secular State.

Essays
Jean-Pierre Gouzy, The Saga of the European Federalists during and after the Second World War.
Alberto Majocchi, Economic Policy in the European Constitution.

Luisa Trumellini, Putin's Russia.

Notes
Federalist's Strategy and Campaign towards the European Constitution.
For an Alternative Strategy: A Federal Core in a European Concentric
   Circles.
The War on Terror and the Future of the United States.

Federalism in the History of Thought
European Resistance for European Unity.

2005

Editorials
Francesco Rossolillo.
France and Netherland's Rejection of this Europe.
The Problem of Europe Defence and the Federal Core.

Essays
Francesco Rossolillo, The Revolutionary.
Ugo Draetta, After the Constitutional Treaty. The Question of a Political
   Europe.
GuidoMontani, The Role of the European Budget in European Economic
   Policy.

Notes
The European Economy and the Challenge from Asia.
The Crisis of United Nations.
The Messina Conference and the Advance of European Unification.

Thirty Years Ago
Francesco Rossolillo, The Role of the Institution in the Struggle for
   Europe.

Federalism in the History of Thought.
Altiero Spinelli

2006

Editorials
The Energy Problem and Economic Nationalism.
The Legacy of Altiero Spinelli.
How to Respond to the Crisis of the European Union.

Essays
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, The Europe of Melancholy.
Sante Granelli, The Crisis of the Middle East and the Responsibilities of
   Europe.
Altiero Spinelli, The Manifesto of the European Federalists.
Giulia Rossolillo, Federal Core and European Union.

Notes
China, Mercosur and an Absentee: Europe.
Becoming Flexible to Keep it Together: The Logic and the Pitfalls behind
   the Concept of Differentiated Integration.

Thirty Years Ago
Mario Albertini, European Election, European Government and a Euro-
   pean State.