Federalist Action

Year LXVI, 2024, Single Issue 1, Page101

TIME TO CREATE THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE
For Peace, Democracy and Freedom, in Europe and the World*

The forthcoming XXXII congress of the Movimento Federalista Europeo (UEF-Italy, MFE), brought forward initially with the aim of re-aligning our internal schedule with the tradition of holding MFE congresses in the springtime, will take place up at a particularly significant political juncture, coinciding as it does with the first months of the new Trump presidency, and the changes this is bringing.

The first forceful manifestations of the MAGA project, namely Trump’s declarations on presenting his presidency, combined with the ‘protagonism’ of Elon Musk in Europe, are evidence of the extraordinary speed with which the new American administration intends to try and bend the world to its will: its complete abandonment of traditional US foreign policy, adopted since the end of WWII, will see the United States assuming a new, much more aggressive international stance with imperialist overtones. For Europe, which built its strategic alliance with the USA on the basis of the latter’s international choices following the Second World War, all this is a living nightmare. Now, with the Americans completely rethinking this partnership and intent on domination, the main concern of the European countries, given that they have never sought to become autonomous, is how, in this new setting, they might in any case manage to remain under the protective umbrella of the United States, without which they are totally defenceless.

Parallel to these developments, populist, nationalist and illiberal forces are gaining traction in EU member states, raising concerns about the stability of democracy and its ties with the European project. Products both of the polarisation that is growing and deepening within Western societies, further undermining their cohesion, and of the intrusive interference, increasingly penetrating and effective, by democracy’s various enemies, they are forces that Trump’s victory makes even more dangerous, as well as more powerful, and that aim to undermine the rule of law and weaken the European Union from within — forces against which the EU is unable to intervene, given the excessive power, in Europe, wielded by the member states and the few exclusive competences, and lack of autonomous powers, in the hands of the Commission and the European Parliament. What is more, they are forces that, even though the political coalition supporting the European Commission remains democratic and pro-European, are growing in strength within the European institutions, too.

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In autumn 2023, when we were preparing for our previous congress, we said, during the presentation of the Positions, that ‘a year and a half after the return of war to Europe, [and] in a dramatic and highly uncertain international scenario..., the European Union is called upon to face new challenges, which make its political-institutional choices over the next two-three years crucially important. Federalism and confederalism (maintenance of the existing equilibria) are the two alternatives on the table, and this time it will be a decisive match for the fate of our continent and the world.’ In the course of the past year and a half, we have seen several positive developments: a bold move by the last European Parliament (initiation of a process of Treaty reform), support for this direction by some factions within the present EP, and verbal backing from the European Commission. Against that, however, there has been total closure on the part of the national governments (and thus the European Council), who are the ‘masters of the Treaties’ and therefore the ultimate decision-makers on the steps to be taken for the future of the European Union.

Therefore, as we had feared, despite the explosion into European discourse of the Letta, Draghi and Niinistö reports, the outcome has been paralysis, which both nationalism and extremism have managed to exploit. The combination of Europe’s technological lag and industrial underdevelopment, its dependence on external security providers (for armaments, logistics and technology), its energy and critical raw material challenges, and the lack of a common foreign policy that enables the EU to project its voice (rather than those of its individual member states) on the global political stage — not to mention the social crisis stemming from these issues — is creating a perfect storm for Europe. This situation has brutally exposed the weaknesses and contradictions within its political and institutional system, further exacerbated by the return of Trump.

The current system was created to function and prosper in an international environment that was open, structured and relatively stable—particularly in terms of security, as well as energy and critical raw material supplies. It fostered an economic model based on factors and conditions that, today, are no longer relevant, such as reliance on exports, minimal public investment, limited focus on innovation, low wages, unquestioning faith in international value chains, and so on.

In the midst of this storm, the Europeans lack the political means to act; indeed, being a ‘community of destiny’, they have no central authority to coordinate a unified response. Power remains squarely in the hands of the national governments, which, due to their own shortcomings, can only offer reactions driven by impotence — prompting the EU to mirror this inaction. This is evident in the weakness that European institutions are showing towards Trump (notwithstanding the talk of an attack on an EU member state, i.e., a direct threat to Europe’s territorial integrity); it is also shown by the Italian government’s eagerness to be the first to pay feudal allegiance to the new master, and by the admission of impotence by the European Commission (including the EU’s new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas) in the face of the possibility that Italy (‘a sovereign state that makes its choices sovereignly’) might now outsource its national security to Elon Musk, a move that could also pose a European security problem if Italy were to participate in common security projects.

The truth is that without a sudden surge of self-respect, and without a project that offers a new example and contrasting vision of sovereignty (meaning European sovereignty) as a counterpoint to the triumphalism of empires and nationalism, then our fate is sealed. This is why the most important thing right now is to keep the battle for a federal Europe alive.

Over the past year and a half, the MFE and the UEF, together with the Spinelli Group, have strongly supported the European Parliament’s de facto constituent effort, which is currently the only viable option on the table and, in itself, a bold attempt at democracy and federalism. That this project has found more enemies than friends, even in the federalist camp, has helped the national governments to avoid paying for their lack of initiative, but above all it has weakened the credibility of democracy, since too few have come out in defence of the promise made to the citizens, and demanded that the national institutions honour their commitments. Now that unfolding events are showing us — if they even needed to — that this struggle was the only one it was right to engage in over these past two years, and that it is around the value and intrinsic meaning of this choice that it might prove possible to gather the forces that will not resign themselves to the triumph of autocracies and the new ‘reactionary international’, then what is our next move? What do federalists want to do, and what can they do? These are the questions that our XXXII Congress, in two months’ time, will be called upon to answer.

We are entering a new phase, which is being shaped by America’s new imperialism. In the coming years, the federal perspective will remain in play only if it can be kept alive, primarily, if we can manage to keep it alive, explaining and demonstrating that it is the necessary condition for saving Europe (and all that ‘Europe’ means and entails). In this phase, we will likely have a less central role and will face difficulties in persuading political forces to see reason. In Italy, we will be opposed by a government firmly entrenched in its position. Our strength will depend on our seriousness, coherence and clarity — essentially, on our political and cultural proficiency. This is the challenge that our leaderships, meaning both the outgoing one and the new one about to assume its responsibilities for the next two years, wish to present to the Movement. It is also the reason why these ideas have been formulated for analysis and discussion. We do not claim that this set of Positions is complete — it certainly leaves out many crucial current issues, for example, there is no in-depth analysis of the migration problem, which is merely mentioned, or of the war in the Middle East — but they try to identify some political priorities in relation to which, as a federalist organisation active in Italy and Europe, it is important we try to play a role.
 

The International Picture

The current international framework presents two antithetical and conflicting aspects: on the one hand, we have increasingly pressing global and transnational challenges (issues related to the climate, health, migration and the development of digital technologies and nuclear proliferation, for example) and an unprecedented depth of human interconnection; on the other, we are having to reckon with extreme political fragmentation, driven in part by a lack of leaders with a clear vision and set of values that might help to channel the demands of the different states towards common objectives. It is a world characterised by US military superiority and an emerging economic duopoly between the US and China, with the latter (despite its internal difficulties and contradictions) now catching up with the world’s leading economy. But it is also a world defined by shifting political alliances: indeed, even though the axis between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea (which stands in opposition to the US-led ‘Western’ one) appears to be strengthening, and in many cases attracting new allies, many states are, somewhat ambiguously, playing on both fronts. The richest and most powerful states of the so-called Global South, meaning the BRICS countries, both the original line-up and the new one (i.e., minus China and Russia), are working to increase their political and economic power and political sphere of influence, while the more marginal and poorer states are generally remaining out of the picture, or finding themselves excluded. What is more, all the above countries are tending to act on the basis of specific national interests, with the result that their alliance is one built on converging interests and common ‘enemies’, rather than on a shared vision that they wish to assert in the world; one need only think of the radically different models, in terms of regime, economic system and reference values, embodied by the four above-mentioned countries, which are spearheading the opposition to the ‘West’.

In this scenario, the climate emergency is an especially dramatic factor due to its devastating consequences and impact on vast regions. Alongside the instability caused by wars and unrest, it is driving mass migrations of biblical proportions. The migration crisis has thus become the latest global emergency. And with states (including European ones) and international institutions unprepared and often powerless, it is fostering attitudes of exclusion and racism among large segments of the public, which, in turn, are fuelling anti-democratic forces.

Finally, among the great unknowns to be reckoned with, we must also mention the increasing weight and role of the digital tech giants, particularly (but not only) in the development of artificial intelligence and the exploitation of space. The tech giants’ links with political power (both now and in the future) and the influence that they exert or may be able to exert in the near future, the issues they raise regarding the relationship between democracy and the concentration of private wealth, and the distortions they portend are grave issues threatening the future of our political and social systems.
 

1. The Decline of Democracy.

The decline of democracy in the world is becoming an increasingly widespread trend, and we are not referring only to democracy understood as a regime of government in countries that have recently seen attempts to establish it, or shown the potential to embrace it or at least to move in that direction. By decline of democracy, we also mean the weakening of consolidated liberal democracies and the growth of illiberal, populist, extremist forces united by nationalism. The phenomenon is evident in Europe, but with the election of Trump it has been resoundingly confirmed in the United States. Of course, this does not spell automatic victory for the various autocratic forms, as shown by the fact that, in some places, precisely those where democracy has been most at risk, protests, demonstrations and popular initiatives have been mounted to underline the need for a political system based on the rule of law and thus on freedom of the press, freedom of the judiciary and respect for human rights. In this context, we should mention, for example, the demonstrations in Georgia and Slovakia in late 2024 and early 2025.

It nevertheless remains true that we are witnessing a general weakening of democratic regimes, the causes of which are multiple, many linked to the specificities of individual countries. Everywhere, certainly, a considerable part in this has been played by the irruption of new technologies and social media onto the political and social scene, and thus by the interference of enemy actors, which work by manipulating public opinion and financing anti-system forces, an approach in which Russia, driven by the Gerasimov doctrine which theorises the implosion, from within, of Western liberal-democratic systems, excels. This decline can therefore also be seen as one of the effects of the new forms of hybrid warfare — involving infiltrations by foreign agents, sabotage attempts, hacking, and so on — in which we are already deeply immersed, even in Europe.

But the very fact that this democratic retreat has been able to occur is also the result of a more general malaise afflicting democracy, which has deep roots and is not just dependent on current circumstances. Certainly, the political and evaluation errors that characterised American and European politics following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the model of globalisation pursued (which, while lifting very large sections of the population out of poverty, especially in Asia, has also impoverished many areas of the West and marginalised whole territories, industries and categories of workers), have weakened the social fabric of democracies and played a part in undermining trust in democratic politics and its institutions. In Europe, all this has been compounded by the national governments’ inadequacy in the face of the complex challenges of our time, an inadequacy that, although partly addressed by the process of European unification, stems from the size of the European states and the paltry resources available to them, and thus has very long roots. Overall, however, there is also the fact that democratic politics struggles to formulate and communicate a compelling vision that can resonate with citizens, promote shared goals, and cultivate a strong sense of community and collective responsibility. In an interview given to Le Grand Continent on 16 November, 2020, Emmanuel Macron, acknowledging the end of the era of international politics based on US leadership of the democratic world, reflected on this very point; he spoke of the current limits of the American doctrine and model, which are spent as a driving force and inadequate for the problems and challenges of the 21^st century, linked to climate and digital transitions, strong cultural and social changes, and the need for new international partnerships. At the same time, Macron called on Europe to become sovereign in order to be able to make a political, cultural and value-based contribution capable of strengthening democracy and enhancing its value in the eyes of citizens, and to fill the voids left by democratic states that are too weak, or lack the capacity, to make citizens feel protected by and part of a common mission.

The level of integration achieved by the European Union, insufficient to position it as a model or leading force in revitalizing the concept and role of the democratic state and democracy as a whole, has thus been a crucial factor in the decline of democracy. This, coupled with the fact that democratic forces (with a few exceptions) have failed to fully adopt and develop a federal vision for Europe, has led to their inability to enrich and renew their understanding of the democratic state in response to the significant changes unfolding in the global context. For us as federalists, this is an important point that we have addressed on many occasions (one, in particular, being the Debate Office meeting held by the MFE in Florence on 17-18 October 2020 on the subject of Federalism and the Concepts of Political Power, Might, Statehood and Sovereignty), underlining how the future European federation would play a crucial role in strengthening the idea and practice of democracy and the very concept of the democratic state: both because it would provide an example, i.e., a more evolved and advanced model based on a broadening and strengthening of the orbit of democracy and solidarity in order to unite peoples in a community of destiny, and because it would be a democratic political actor and bearer of a vision of a new world order based on the quest to achieve a convergence of the interests of all countries in the face of common challenges.

This is one of the fundamental reasons why the political battle to complete the European unification project, giving rise to a federal Union, is, in the current phase, the only way to save democracy, by taking it to an international level and relaunching it to counter the appeal of autocracies, and the values and models that they are offering today’s disoriented public opinion. Therefore, the current European structure, as well as condemning us to impotence and vassalage, has to be recognised as enormously damaging to democracy as such; and from this perspective, it is shocking that the European Union and national governments’ burial of the greatest exercise in democratic participation ever organised by the EU — the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) —, and thus of the proposal and request from the European Parliament to reform the Treaties on the basis of what emerged in the course of it, is not being decried as scandalous. Because it is an affront, both to citizens and to civic participation, which damages the credibility of the EU institutions, whose negligence and contempt are increasing the citizens’ feelings of alienation from the political process.
 

2. The Current Piecemeal World War III and Its Effects on Globalisation.

Pope Francis’s remark that we have entered ‘a third world war fought piecemeal’ highlights the fact that, amidst the political fragmentation of our modern, interconnected world where there are no political peacekeepers, we are witnessing a proliferation of wars and crisis hotspots as various actors vie for political, economic and military dominance. This trend, which shows no signs of easing in the short to medium term, since no positive change seems imminent and the situation could even worsen, is contributing to the ongoing uncertainty surrounding economic prospects and future security.

On a security level, certainly, Europe’s situation is dramatic. On February 24, 2022, war returned to our continent, yet public opinion in our countries seems unwilling to acknowledge this, and struggles to understand that Ukraine is fighting not only for its own freedom and its own future, but also for the freedom and future of Europe as a whole. It is impossible to say how Trump’s return will impact the outcome of this tragedy; it is pointless to make predictions, because the various scenarios are still open. For now, despite everything, Ukraine continues to resist, while Russia, despite receiving support from its autocratic allies, is facing an economic crisis that is becoming increasingly evident; meanwhile, the Russian army’s advances are slow and, at present, incompatible with full occupation of the territories that represent Putin’s core objective. Providing the US and the EU keep the (sadly, too often rather meagre) commitments that they have made, and with a further tightening of sanctions, Russia might find itself having to negotiate a truce (which is not the same as peace) from a position of weakness, which might even please the new US administration; but nothing can be said for sure, since too much is in the hands of the new master of US politics. Instead, what we certainly can say is that the Europeans find themselves, once again, in a state of impotence, and this time it is a very dangerous state to be in, since the enemy is at our door. Among the many interventions that we could have cited here, we here mention, because it is very recent and was published in a newspaper aimed at the general public, the Corriere della Sera interview (17 January) with the new Chair of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, in which he urges the European states (which, as he himself recalls, are sovereign, and will set the time frames and methods on the basis of their own political agendas) to spend more and, more important still, to spend better (‘We defend our industrial sovereignty tooth and nail, which is wrong’; ‘The EU member states in NATO have 172 different weapons systems, compared with the Americans’ 35’). To preserve peace, the admiral warns, the Europeans must understand that they are in danger and invest in their deterrent capacity against Putin, an enemy who tests our ability to react on a daily basis. We will return to the question of European defence later on in these Positions.

As a result of current international tensions — and the direct experience of the vulnerability that comes from dependence on external sources for critical raw materials, energy, or the production of strategic manufactured goods —, a redefinition of the economic and commercial relationships that characterised the first phase of globalisation is now under way. But since globalisation continues to progress, driven by the technological evolution of communications and transportation, this is a highly risky process. Autarchic measures are likely to impoverish those who pursue them and will also create opportunities for imperial powers with no interest in politically regulating the phenomenon. In this context, the European Union is particularly vulnerable, both because it is resource poor and because its economy is export oriented, with production deeply integrated into global value chains. As a result, it cannot afford to adopt autarchic policies. However, with shifts in international relations rendering some of the founding principles of its model obsolete, the EU is now paying the price for its political weakness. We are not referring only to Europe’s problematic dependence on the US for security, or to the impact on prices of its having been forced to significantly reduce its supplies of Russian gas; in general, we are pointing out that Europe is suffering for its considerable dependence on external partners for critical raw materials, technology and the production of strategic goods, and is paying the price for adopting an export-driven production model in the face of profoundly changing global markets. Even though the signs of changing international relations have been there for years, the EU has not managed to modify its system in a way that is even minimally sufficient to address them, and, rather as we have seen on the security front, as regards its technology and production, and also the general competitiveness of its system, it has entered a phase of clear decline that is destined to worsen in the context of growing political uncertainty and instability, unless it can initiate a profound reform of its political-institutional structure, and set about modifying its Treaties.

In particular, the ‘de-risking’ the EU must undertake in the current context is both a complex and a delicate process that requires it to reshape its economic relations, primarily with China, in order to reduce dependencies. This means carefully balancing defensive and offensive measures to recalibrate relations without causing them to break down. It will also involve a significant diversification of supply sources and, simultaneously, the establishment of new partnerships, especially with countries in the Global South; it will also mean increasing internal production on the basis of a common strategy, through an industrial policy supported by huge investments, some of which must inevitably be public. As pointed out by Nathalie Tocci in La grande incertezza, Europe, to achieve all this, will ‘have to have broad shoulders politically, financially and institutionally’; but instead, faced with the need for considerable public spending capacity, it ‘is struggling [...since] the community budget is woefully inadequate’; moreover, attempting to compensate for this deficiency by facilitating possible recourse to national government subsidies only increases the internal disparities within the EU.

Faced with the current worsening instability and risks at international level, it is therefore clear that the European states must accept the need to scale down their obsolete sovereignty in areas where it does not correspond to any capacity for autonomous action, in order to build, instead, an effective shared sovereignty at European level, making the EU a body capable of exercising democratic political authority, both internally and externally. This would give the Europeans the tools they require to effectively address the need to reverse their decline, recover their lost competitiveness, act authoritatively on the international stage, and build a truly autonomous defence capacity. If they do not, that is, if they fail to become a federal Union, the price to be paid, not only by European citizens, but also by those of EU candidate countries and the entire world, will be very high.

In fact, the political immobility of today’s EU threatens to undermine, first and foremost, the enlargement process. However, the argument for expanding membership is no longer driven by the need to enlarge the market; instead, it now rests on geopolitical and security considerations. As a result, enlargement is increasingly viewed as a means of defining the boundaries of the ‘European system’ in opposition to currently hostile countries. But it is a process that is difficult to reconcile with the slow pace of a Union that is constantly hampered by crossed vetoes and protracted procedures, and that lends little political support to the forces within prospective member states that are striving to keep their candidacy on track. While Russia exercises a very strong, and fraudulent, influence in these countries, often shifting the balance of power in its own favour, the EU fails to act as a shield and lend concrete support to those who look to it, and feel part of the European family. This is not to suggest that the EU should overlook the necessary steps these states must take to reform their political and institutional systems, thereby strengthening their democracy and commitment to the rule of law, nor the regulatory adjustments required for them to join the Single Market. However, it is evident that a genuinely political Europe would make enlargement a top priority, and would be equipped with the tools to involve these states in various forms of collaboration and participation, effectively binding them to the EU and supporting pro-European movements. This is indeed precisely why the European Political Community was initially viewed by some as a pre-integration platform; however, due to Europe’s stagnation, it quickly evolved into an ineffective international forum. Ultimately, we cannot ignore the fact that the current EU risks disappointing the hopes of citizens who aspire to fully integrate into Europe as a political community.

The political weakness of the European Union on the international stage has serious repercussions, as Europe’s absence has a significant impact in many key areas. More broadly, the inability of one of the world’s wealthiest and most developed regions to assume any kind of global leadership role creates a power vacuum. In contrast, a politically strong Europe could play a crucial role in upholding the principle of international law, addressing issues ranging from state territorial integrity to humanitarian concerns; it could create real partnerships with the most fragile countries of the world’s South, to support their energy transition and address the climate emergency for example; it could contribute effectively to the reform of multilateral institutions, to make the distribution of power in the world more equitable, and thus open up channels for fruitful relations also with many of the major countries of the Global South. Not to mention the fact that it could contribute to the development of regional integration processes in different areas of the world, and at global level influence the possibility of strengthening cooperation to address common challenges; in fact, the idea of pooling sovereignty on certain key issues, essential for addressing the climate emergency, would no longer be a utopia as it is today, but a feasible project to pursue.

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In conclusion, democracy per se, the states and the democratic forces, indeed the whole world, all desperately need a federal Europe. The continued failure to move in that direction is a grave fault on the part of the European states, and federalists must never tire of repeating, explaining and demonstrating this fact.
 

Europe Faced with Trump

As mentioned in the introduction, Trump’s return to the White House marks the start of a new era in American politics, both internally and externally. While internally, as pointed out by Sergio Fabbrini, writing in Il Sole 24 ore on Sunday 19 January, American democracy is facing serious risks, and it remains to be seen whether internal powers of opposition will be sufficient to stop the drift that the new administration will seek to impose, at international level, there can be no doubt that we are witnessing the end of an era of American politics rooted in democratic internationalism and a belief in the need to uphold the liberal order, and the opening of a new phase. The most accurate interpretation of the new direction appears to be the one immediately offered by Le Grand Continent, which attributes an imperialistic mindset to Trump’s statements and policies. This mindset is shared by Russia and China, and now Trump is adopting their perspective in order to reshape, first and foremost, ‘the West’, in a way that transforms America’s allies into vassals, assessed on the basis of the level of loyalty they show. It seems undeniable that this is Trump’s way of thinking. Faced with his resolve to, among other things, strip away many of the ‘frills’ of democracy and openly prioritise profit, deregulation and American nationalism (which is evolving into domination), Europe finds itself in a particularly challenging position. Trump aims to further weaken the European Union, which he despises for its political weakness and sees as hostile on a commercial level (given its trade surplus with the USA and its regulatory framework). He would therefore prefer to engage with individual states on a bilateral basis, an approach that many governments, most notably the Italian one, have unfortunately embraced. Furthermore, there are uncertainties created by Trump’s alliance with Elon Musk and by the immediate submission of the other tech giants to the new direction.

The European Union is well aware of its weaknesses; this applies to both the institutions and the member states. As regards the former, the Parliament did propose a way, through reform of the Treaties, to equip it with the tools necessary to overcome these weaknesses, and the European Commission ordered two reports, one on competitiveness and the other on security, drawn up by Mario Draghi and Sauli Niinistö, respectively. The aim was to present the governments with incontrovertible data on Europe’s shortcomings and vulnerabilities, while at the same time highlighting the fundamental cause of this situation, namely the EU’s financial, economic and political fragmentation and the lack of decision-making power and governance at European level. The governments themselves acknowledge the accuracy of the analyses presented in the two reports; they are fully aware of the state of their national systems and of the inconsistency or weakness of responses that are not coordinated at the European level. However, by failing to recognize the need to establish shared sovereignty and capacity for collective governance, they undermine their ability to create the conditions necessary for an effective common European strategy. Although they pay lip service to the Commission’s agenda, proposed on the basis of the aforementioned reports, they are unable to put it into practice. Even the suggestions contained in a third one, on the Single Market, which Enrico Letta was commissioned to prepare, remain for now disregarded, despite being implementable under the current Treaties, and despite having been accepted in the conclusions of the European Council (about a year ago) where Letta presented them; even the Capital Markets Union and completion of the single market in the fields of energy, industry (including defence), research and innovation are opposed by the governments, which see these areas as too close to the heart of sovereignty, and as such ones for the states alone to deal with. In so doing, they demonstrate that the touchstone of national sovereignty prevents them from reasoning in terms of the general interest and building greater integration. By not accepting the transition to a federal political union, the states remain, once again, incapable of making the progress at European level that everyone is calling for. As a result, the Europeans, too divided, remain weak, powerless and unable to determine their own destiny, and thus vulnerable to manipulation by external actors ready to exploit their weakness.
  

1. The Europeans’ Loss of Competitiveness and Consequent Decline.

As we explained in our Quaderno federalista (Federalist Paper) focusing on the Draghi report on European competitiveness (https://federalists.eu/federalist-library/what-the-eu-needs-to-halt-its-decline-and-regain-control-of-its-destiny-the-draghi-report-on-european-competitiveness), Draghi’s document analyses the weaknesses of the entire European system and addresses the need for a new common industrial strategy and the need to adapt EU governance. In recent years, Europe has indeed lost considerable ground to its main competitors (China and the US), especially in advanced tech sectors where its failure to keep pace with innovation has seriously harmed productivity, which in Europe has remained too low. Europe also struggles for other reasons: its dependence on external partners in many strategic sectors (in addition to the technology sector, we may cite, in particular, that of security and the supply of essential raw materials and energy); its excessively low rate of investments and poor efficiency in procuring the resources necessary for growth; and the fragmentation of its capital market and banking system. In short, the EU is increasingly lagging behind, a situation that is leading to: progressive impoverishment of our societies and of large sections of the European population; greater inequalities and a consequent loss of social cohesion; a growing difficulty in maintaining the levels of welfare that Europe had previously achieved; and a weakening of the democratic fabric within the member states. And all this, combined with our strategic dependence and inability to guarantee our own security, is also threatening our freedom.

Fundamentally, the malfunctioning of the system, which the Draghi report demonstrates factually through numerous concrete examples, is linked to the financial, economic and, ultimately, political fragmentation of the European Union. Always, and across all areas, the cause of the EU’s failure to develop its still-enormous potential lies in the persistence of a system fragmented into national political and regulatory frameworks, and in the member states’ inability to take the decisive steps towards the indispensable greater integration that would give rise to a truly unitary framework.

This fragmentation prevents the EU from developing an effective common strategy. Draghi’s report points out that effective ‘industrial policies today — as seen in the US and China — comprise multi-policy strategies, combining fiscal policies to incentivise domestic production, trade policies to penalise anti-competitive behaviour abroad and foreign economic policies to secure supply chains…However, owing to its complex governance structure and slow and disaggregated policymaking process, the EU is less able to produce such a response.’ The member states, it goes on to explain, each act with a view to protecting their own national interests, rather than prioritising mutual coordination; and this lack of coordination also applies to financial instruments.

Basically, Draghi’s report confirms that the EU’s real problem, therefore, is to achieve a real awareness of the transformations that are taking place in the world and the consequent need to change its economic and governance model. A single market in which policies, including industrial policy, remain national is no longer sufficient; today, we need to act together in a whole series of areas that currently remain the prerogative of the member states (whereas the national perspective and national instruments are completely powerless and inadequate). For this reason, the EU must become a true political union and equip itself with appropriate governance tools, suited to the new challenges. The EU could still recover the ground it has lost, and does indeed potentially have what it takes to become a virtuous model for the rest of the world; but, as Draghi has already said on other occasions, the EU needs to embrace ‘pragmatic federalism’ and ‘become a state’. As the report says, ‘In many areas, the EU can achieve a lot by taking a large number of smaller steps, but doing so in a coordinated way that aligns all policies behind the common goal. In other areas, a small number of larger steps are needed — delegating tasks to the EU level that can only be performed there.’
 

2. The Security Issue.

The conditions in which we find ourselves today are profoundly different from those in which the EU has previously, even recently, developed strategies and projects with the idea of building a common defence. Today we are no longer faced with a scenario in which the EU can, as its primary objective, engage in missions abroad, particularly ones in support of NATO or international organisations, mainly for the purposes of peace keeping or monitoring/maintaining truce situations. Instead, the priority now is to defend our own territory against external aggressions, and to be capable of withstanding natural or health crises vast enough to undermine the stability of a member state or of the EU as a whole. And even these latter eventualities, in the framework of the hybrid warfare we are now fully caught up in, risk giving ‘unfriendly’ external agents opportunities to mount some form of intrusion and/or aggression. Security today affects all areas of political, economic and civil life and all public and private actors, including (indeed, especially) citizens. Niinistö’s insights in this regard are illuminating, and take on even greater significance in the light of how Trump’s presidency has started.

Niinistö’s report focuses on ‘preparing Europe for a more dangerous world’ and it starts from the awareness that ‘security is the foundation on which everything is built’. ‘At the start of this decade,’ Niinistö writes in his introduction, ‘Europe has woken up to a new reality. The COVID-19 pandemic was a crisis of a nature and magnitude for which all Member States and the EU as a whole were insufficiently prepared. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine showed that it takes two to maintain peace, but only one to start a war. Russia’s invasion also underlined Putin’s long-held perception that the West and Western people are weak. Moreover, the increasing damage caused by extreme weather events is forcing Europeans to ask not only how climate change will affect future generations, but also what we need to prepare for today…Lenin instructed the Bolsheviks during the Russian civil war to “probe with bayonets: If you find mush you continue. If you find steel you stop.” A hundred years on, today’s opportunistic actors use the same method. They target us by looking for weaknesses in our protection, take advantage of our political divisions, any lack of social cohesion and harmful economic dependencies, trying to weaponise anything they can against us. In being well prepared, a fundamental requirement is not to be an easy target.’

‘We need preparedness and strength not to wage war, but to maintain peace. The risk of Russian aggression beyond Ukraine cannot be excluded. Preparing for this risk is not escalatory in any way, but rather intends to discourage Russia or any other actor from targeting the Union and its Member States. Improving the defence capabilities of EU Member States is necessary to ensure that they are able to support one another in line with their obligations under the EU treaty and contribute to a strengthened deterrence.’

Preserving our security in this scenario demands a change of mindset within the EU, which must occur across the entire spectrum of its activities. The first thing is to manage to build trust between all public authorities — member states, European institutions and internal levels of government and administration — and between them and the private sector and civil society. ‘Ultimately, preparedness begins and ends with the trust of citizens that the political community they live in is worth protecting and defending.’ Furthermore, the ‘fact that all Member States find themselves in the same boat sailing in choppy waters applies to our security as much as to our economy’, Niinistö goes on. ‘The fundamental need to improve our competitiveness was recently highlighted in the report by Special Adviser Mario Draghi. The link between competitiveness and security works both ways, and is of particular importance taking into account that the EU’s share of the world economy and its population are shrinking. Only a Europe that is competitive economically is able to keep itself secure and influence global developments, rather than merely adapting to them, and to provide the best environment for businesses to grow and succeed.’ Another important aspect is the link between industrial strategy and foreign and security policy: ‘To maximise industrial capacity and R&D output, the EU needs to strengthen links between the defence industry and other strategic industrial sectors, not only in aerospace, but also in shipbuilding, for example (where major external dependencies have emerged, with China dominating the global market). As we further strengthen these industrial ecosystems, ensuring the security of production, supply and information on technology, etc., should be systematically addressed. The overall requirements of reducing supply chain vulnerabilities and dependencies, enhancing security of supply and diversifying the supplies of raw materials, while building strategic stockpiles, apply a fortiori to the armed forces.’

Niinistö identified two ‘particularly evident’ gaps needing to be addressed as priorities: first, there is the fact that we ‘do not have a clear plan on what the EU will do in the event of armed aggression against a Member State’, and in his view the ‘threat of war posed by Russia to European security [should force] us to address this as a centrepiece of our preparedness, without undermining the work to prepare for other major threats…connected to disruptions to the global economy, disasters driven by climate change, or another pandemic’); and second there is the lack of a ‘comprehensive capacity to bring all necessary EU resources together in a coordinated manner…to prepare for — and if needed, act — in response to major cross-sectoral and cross-border shocks and crises.’

Starting from this framework, analysed in the Niinistö Report, there also clearly arises the question of building a European defence. First of all, defence is part of the general security system of any political community, and in Europe’s case it should be founded on a widely supported and deeply felt sense of European citizenship, and, in turn, on federal institutions that reflect this shared commitment. Only in the presence of a clear supranational internal policy (based on correct use of the concept of subsidiarity) is it possible to pool sensitive information and share the work of security services, the coordination of civil protection, and so on.  European citizenship can only be fully realised in the presence of a federal institutional system, which provides a democratic framework at European level. This system in turn fosters a sense of civic belonging to a supranational community that individuals can truly identify with as their own.

As for building a common defence, this will require, primarily, the development of a common industrial and technological capacity, and of coordination and interoperability of the national armed forces. This, of course, as also pointed out by Admiral Cavo Dragone in the interview mentioned earlier, would require alignment of armaments, something that is currently lacking due to the fragmentation among the countries in this area. Listed in Niinistö’s report are the many initiatives already launched by the EU in the field of defence. ‘After the wave of EU defence initiatives in 2016–2020, including the launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund, new steps were taken in the wake of the Russian aggression against Ukraine through the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence (March 2022) and the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis (May 2022). Building on the initial success of the European Defence Fund, new innovative funding instruments were developed for joint procurement (EDIRPA) and industrial ramp-up (ASAP). Moreover, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) of March 2024 has put forward concrete proposals to increase the EU’s defence readiness. It was backed up by the proposed European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP) Regulation that is currently under discussion in the Council and the European Parliament. Yet, according to the latest available figures, Member States are still far from achieving the benchmark they set for themselves over 15 years ago in the EDA — as replicated as a commitment in PESCO — to invest 35% together on European collaborative projects.’ ‘Europe’s endemic fragmentation along national supply and demand lines in the defence sector has weakened the competitiveness of the European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB). Apart from a predominantly national focus, with over 80% of national defence investment spent in respective national industries, Member States also often procure from outside the EU — notably in the US (especially in the air domain) and more recently in South Korea.’

Therefore, the real crux of the matter is, once again, political, and depends on whether the states are willing to address this issue not with the defence of national interests and sovereignty in mind, but thinking in collective terms and knowing that they must move towards the birth of a truly common foreign policy, to be implemented (also operationally) by the European Commission, which in parallel must be equipped with the competences, resources and powers to act as a true government, under the parliamentary control of the European Parliament and the Council.
 

3. Faced With the Return of Vast Empires, Europe Must Become a State.

Given the need for renewed competitiveness, and the pressing security (and defence) issue, the time has come for the EU, and Europeans generally, to urgently implement a radical change of their political paradigm and create a new institutional structure that, to be able to address certain crucial areas in particular, can only be federal. As Mario Draghi has put it, Europe has to become a state; this is truer than ever today, given that it is now not only China and Russia that harbour imperialistic ambitions, but Trump’s America too, and the ongoing rise of nationalism is threatening to overwhelm the EU, and disrupt the entire world order.

As we have seen, overcoming Europe’s impotence and implementing effective policies in strategic sectors (security, foreign and trade policy, technological innovation) requires a political capacity that today’s fragmented Europe lacks the capacity to muster. The need to create a capacity for government action directly at European level, thereby overcoming the current system based on coordination between states, is crucial in two essential areas in particular: defence and the EU budget.

The Niinistö Report has already made it clear that defence, more so than ever in the current political framework, lies at the heart of sovereignty and must be an integral part of government actions across all areas of political life. In underlining that the EU must get used to acting as a unitary entity in the face of external threats, it has shown that there are some issues in the process of Europe’s defence building that cannot be resolved without resolving the issues of sovereignty, legitimacy and democratic control.

1. Accepting the need to act as a truly united community in the event of an attack on any member state, and identifying potential enemies (or at any rate threats to European security), are currently difficult and controversial tasks for the European states. And differences of opinion in this area are unlikely to be overcome, and a strong degree of cohesion established, without first moving from an intergovernmental system to a federal one, that is, without the Commission acquiring competences and autonomy of governance with respect to the states (within a federal system that effectively adopts bicameralism) and using these powers and legitimacy to act on behalf of the Europeans.
2. Similarly, there is the problem of how a common vision can be built, the general interest identified, and a shared strategy developed in the absence of institutions of governance and democratic control representing the citizens of the entire community. Here again, as shown by the fragmentation of the current EU, coordination of national governments will not allow a European point of view to emerge; what is needed is a federal system.
3. The same applies, even more so, to the matter of who should decide. Defence is a field in which rapid decisions are needed, and so, for this reason too, there needs to be a political representative with the power to decide in real time (something that would be impossible with the current intergovernmental decision-making mechanisms, even were the power of veto to be abolished); but, above all, it is a field in which the decision-making power must have not only the authority to act but also, indeed primarily, democratic legitimacy throughout the Union, given that it intervenes directly in the lives of citizens and territories and makes life and death choices that impact human lives.

As Panebianco explained in a recent editorial in Corriere della Sera (16 January), focusing in particular on the question of the decision-maker on defence, European defence building requires far more than just agreeing to implement certain industrial policies or take certain technical steps: the issue is political, as there exist no automatic mechanisms through which the issue of sovereignty might be overcome by inertia.

Indeed, we must never forget that the single currency, too, was conceived by federalists as a step (possible within the framework of the development of the European market) intended to force the states to build a political union (‘European vote, European currency, European government’ was the MFE’s mantra of the time). As we know, this is not how things worked out, even though the euro was a decisive achievement for the nascent European Union, which cemented the Union in the turbulent times following the fall of the Soviet bloc and helped the EU to manage the challenges of globalisation. The key distinction between a common defence and a single currency is that the latter, despite its significant flaws, has functioned even without a state. Currency, to an extent a technical matter, is fundamentally tied to the European Central Bank (ECB), which operates independently of politics in the sense that it does not answer to citizens or require democratic legitimacy. As a federal institution, the ECB was able to be established and manage the currency even while other areas crucial to sovereignty remained under national control.

The other crucial issue is the EU budget. The Letta, Draghi and Niinistö reports clearly indicate the need for huge investments in the ongoing transitions, in the creation of European public goods (including defence), in support for industrial growth, etc.. A significant part of these funds will come from private capital (which the EU needs to become capable of raising, by creating a European capital market, and of attracting, by displaying dynamism), but public funding will also play an important role. The European budget (quite apart from the fact that it could be rationalised and oriented towards new choices) is negligible in size and rigid in its financing mechanisms. This is because it is largely funded by contributions from the states, which, to an extent, negotiate on the basis of how much of their contribution they will get back in the form of European funding. As such, it is completely inadequate, and is one of the fundamental reasons for the non-functioning of the EU (in this regard, it is worth consulting Giulia Rossolillo’s very useful 2021 paper on this very topic: https://www.mfe.it/port/documenti/schede/cofoe/201028_finanziamento_ue.pdf ). Budget reform is therefore an essential step and a conditio sine qua non. In many ways, it is also one of the prerequisites for borrowing at European level. Although NextGenerationEU has set a precedent, it is not sustainable to rely on this approach systematically without a European-level fiscal capacity to cover the interest, a system that would allow the debt to be treated as a loan to the states (even if repayment is planned over an extended period). Providing the EU with an independent fiscal capacity is essential for achieving the political and institutional reforms necessary for Europe. This is key to freeing the EU from the intergovernmental system (which means, among other things, eliminating the veto power and the consensus-based decision-making process) and enabling it to operate as a political entity. Additionally, it would lay the groundwork — by giving the Parliament both the authority to levy taxes and the power to propose legislation — for establishing a genuine democracy at European level, which is also a core element of the ‘safer together’ narrative in the Niinistö report.
 

4. What Steps Could Be Taken Today Towards Transforming Europe Into a State?

Europe today is divided: the number of states governed by nationalist forces or coalitions in which these forces have a decisive influence is increasing, worrying elections are looming in Germany where AfD is making frightening gains, while France, where Rassemblement National receives a very high share of the vote, is on the brink of chaos. Donald Trump’s arrival will only worsen this division, because, as demonstrated by the behaviour of the Italian government, there will be a scramble to win the favour of the new ‘emperor’, who is already attempting to employ a divide-and-conquer strategy.

In this critical situation, which sees Europeans vulnerable and completely exposed, the first act of resistance will be managing to preserve unity on key questions, and not letting Trump tear the EU apart on trade issues or issues crucial to security and the green transition. Clearly, and inevitably (given the Europeans’ need for US military protection), Europe under these conditions will face significant blackmail and will be forced to comply with numerous US demands, particularly until such time as it chooses to speed up the achievement of its goals in areas like technological innovation, industry and so on. Likewise, Europe’s ability to maintain its stance on Ukraine, in terms of both military and financial support, will be critical, as will fulfilling its commitment to granting Ukraine EU membership; at the same time, it will be vital to stay true to the commitments on enlargement, prioritising candidate countries that uphold democratic regimes. As federalists, we must remain vigilant on these issues, actively promoting them by bringing them into political debate. Likewise, we must be prepared to criticise when governments take steps in the opposite direction (as we did with a press release on January 10 in which we denounced the Italian government’s decisions on security and sensitive communications (https://www.mfe.it/port/index.php/interventi/trump-musk-litalia-e-leuropa).

There are additional steps that today’s EU could take, within the current framework and without amending the Treaties, particularly towards establishing a European capital market. It could also initiate or discuss several measures outlined in the Letta and Draghi reports to complete the single market and begin formulating an industrial strategy. Should any such steps be taken, we should undoubtedly support them, as they are inherently positive and demonstrate Europe’s vitality. In this case, our contribution would be crucial in clarifying their significance within the political debate and in properly framing them as part of the process to strengthen the EU and part of the broader federalist narrative.

On the defence front, too, there will be an effort to move towards shared financing for certain strategic industries and productions, in order to tackle the challenges of common supplies and interoperability. In this case, it is likely that the necessary steps will demand a vanguard approach, possibly using the ‘Schengen model’ as proposed by Marco Buti and Francesco Nicoli in Il Sole 24 Ore on January 12. This would involve acting outside the framework of Treaties and the EU itself initially, with the possibility of negotiating inclusion of the measures taken at a later stage. Although such an initiative might not lead to the formation of a political core (the countries involved would primarily be those of eastern Europe, most threatened by Putin’s Russia and certainly not inclined to take the lead in a process of political unification), it would still serve as a means to break down the 27-member EU framework, and represent a manifestation of collective European will, which would be valuable in itself.

Such manifestations aside, there would seem to be little more that the states can do at the present time. A first decisive event, on which much depends, will be the German elections, whose outcome will tell us what kind of government might be possible in Germany.

For its part, the European Commission, while continuing to work on effectively advancing its agenda, could — if it wanted to, thus honouring von der Leyen’s commitment to the EP — remind the governments of the need to review certain Treaty rules, particularly on the right of veto (to facilitate decision-making in specific areas) and the budget (to enable European-level borrowing, support crucial investments, and provide the necessary tools to coordinate an effective strategy). It could do this in collaboration with the European Parliament (where, in the meantime, the Spinelli Group continues to keep the fight alive, as demonstrated by its latest initiative on January 21 in Strasbourg), urging the governments to engage in discussions about the EU’s future in a Convention. In practical terms, we know that everything is ready, and the request is already with the European Council. A move by the Commission could also prompt some states (assuming Germany has a government open to this approach) to take the lead in driving forward greater integration.

All the above scenarios are possible, provided a European will, however fragile, is maintained in France, Germany, and any other countries that have not yet succumbed to nationalism; and the initiatives feasible within the current framework, i.e., without causing disruptions, are primarily steps that can ensure the continued existence of a European will. These initiatives will only be truly effective if, in the meantime, at least some key actors come to realise that the transition to a federal Europe is the only path that will secure our continent and our freedom, and if the necessary reforms are clearly defined. This type of political work will be crucial, and it is precisely what we federalists must drive forward.
 

The Role of Federalists in Italy, Europe and the World

The MFE was founded, and has continued its struggle, in the knowledge that the European process is highly complex, and that the nation states (at once a tool and an obstacle, as Spinelli put it) tend to safeguard their own power and exclude federalism (i.e., the goal of creating a federation and a European power) from the process. For this reason, understanding the distinct roles that the various actors involved must play is crucial; it is essential in general, but also particularly important for us to define our specific role, which is inherently that of a vanguard. Keeping the federal option alive is our responsibility — a task that the other actors are structurally unable to fulfil, and one they can take on only as a result of pressure applied by us.

Today, compared with the past, there are two new developments: a) the European Parliament (or, more specifically, a federalist vanguard within it) now supports our federalist cause, and there is also growing receptiveness to our ideas (albeit often constrained by the conservatism of the bureaucratic apparatus) at the highest levels of the European Commission; b) the process has entered its final stage, the one in which Europe’s transformation into a political Union is on the table, and therefore federalism has moved back to centre stage as a reference model. This second element (the fact we have reached the final stage in the process) does not mean that European governments and institutions will no longer implement intergovernmental and/or community policies or initiatives. It means that the issues facing Europe are all linked to the absence of federal institutions, because a common budget, foreign policy, and defence are all urgently needed now, and demand the transition to a federal structure. As shown by the reports we have here discussed at length, it is now very clear how these political tools should be developed. And this leads us on to a further important point regarding our role: for the reasons given, the role of federalists in this phase is not to explain the characteristics that a European defence must have, or to support or oppose specific policies. In fact, the characteristics of a future European defence are already clearly outlined in all the reports referenced. However, it is no coincidence that there is no explicit mention of the political steps needed to actually achieve this goal. It therefore falls to us to enter the political debate with the aim of guiding and steering it, so that the political heart of the challenge facing Europe can finally be grasped. This is where our role becomes essential.

We have repeatedly discussed and emphasised the reforms required to enable the federal transition, and they are clearly outlined in our Federalist Papers  (collected at: https://www.mfe.it/port/index.php/partecipa/campagna-per-la-convenzione-europea/memorandum-quaderni-della-campagna). These ideas are not the domain of federalists alone; in fact, they were central to a genuine and participatory debate during the Conference on the Future of Europe and to the work carried out by AFCO, which subsequently developed proposals for Treaty reforms; yet, even though certain observers who clearly share our analysis and proposals are often featured in the most prominent newspapers and media, we are often the only ones introducing these ideas into political debate, particularly at grassroots level.
   

1. Our Action

As always, our efforts are and must remain organised at all levels. At the European level, where the UEF has gained strength through years of dedicated work and where the MFE holds a leadership role, our focus is currently on the European institutions. We aim to ensure that the European Parliament continues the work initiated in the previous legislature and to press the Commission to address the need for key Treaty reforms. From the grassroots level, we must work in synergy on this political effort, bringing this perspective into the political debate.

At national level, here in Italy we are dealing with an increasingly nationalist government that would like to see Europe restricted to the single market and single currency — both critical for our economic and financial system — and kept a space where member states can engage and coordinate ‘sovereignly’. While this vision limits our ability to push the government toward federalist initiatives, it does not stop us from attempting to exploit divisions within the ruling majority, creating opportunities for discussions on key issues and exposing the contradictions, particularly with regard to Italy and its ‘national interests’, inherent in pursuing a weak Europe.

It is crucial to work on uniting the opposition to the government around the European issue, while also identifying specific initiatives. At the national level, it remains strategic to foster dialogue and build alliances with social forces and various civil society organisations.

At local (also regional) level, the role of ‘political agitation’, as theorised for our local sections since the 1960s, remains essential. Between the end of November and Christmas, we discussed and examined tools and proposals for action in the regions. We encourage you to refer to that discussion and the materials produced, all of which can be found starting from the homepage of the MFE website — www.mfe.it. Of course, developments will need to be assessed as they unfold; however, the core of our message is to tackle concrete issues, starting with those raised by economic and social emergencies, as well as major international situations, highlighting how all strategic areas, from security to technology, not only require a European dimension, but also need political leadership within Europe. To achieve this, we must emphasise the need for Treaty reform and explain what this means in practice. Our local sections can work to build networks, share appeals and engage with parliament and the government, or they can opt for public meetings. The main thing is to make sure the federalist voice is heard in towns and cities.

Finally, there is the global level, which is federalism’s natural horizon and point of reference. The international institutions have never, at any time since the immediate post WWII period, been as fragile as they are today, as a result of the current political climate and the position of the American power, which was their original architect. Tensions between ‘empires’ and the prospect of a more aggressive return to spheres of influence currently make the possibility of a political initiative aimed at initiating a global integration process seem more remote than ever. The missing elements are a subject to serve as the protagonist of such an initiative and the glue provided by a model and a common vision. Supplying these is something that should fall to Europe, but it is unrealistic to imagine that today’s much weaker and increasingly less influential EU is up to the task. For this reason, on a political level, it is now truer than ever that the European federation needs to be the first step not only to world unification but also to unity of the entire human race. We have seen what it could do, and how it could change the picture. Until such time as the EU is able to express a unified political will, it is our responsibility as federalists, alongside the European cause, to continue advancing efforts within our organisations (as the UEF and WFM joint working group aims to do). This includes raising awareness, participating in the defence of international law, and, above all, guiding the mobilisation of organisations advocating for global governance, the respect of legal principles, and international institutions. Additionally, we must help others understand the significance of the struggle taking place in Europe and use it as a platform to strengthen regional integration processes and movements across different continents.

***

In conclusion, we would like to emphasise that, at this difficult time, we must have the clarity to fight the right battle. The Manifesto was born during the Resistance, and we have never wavered in upholding its message, which is now more relevant than ever.

Pavia-Florence, 22 January 2025

Stefano Castagnoli
Luisa Trumellini

[*] These are the Pre-Congress Positions drawn up by the president, Stefano Castagnoli, and general secretary, Luisa Trumellini, ahead of the 32^nd Meeting of the Movimento federalista europeo (MFE), which will take place in Lecce from 28 to 30 March, 2025.