Year L, 2008, Number 3, Page 203
THE FUTURE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION
This article speculates on the future of the nation-state system in the era of globalisation. It uses the business management technique of scenario planning. Four alternative scenarios are outlined: the steady state, the world state, “Earth Inc.” and the wild state.
Four Worldviews on Globalisation
What will be the next stage of the nation-state system? As with all work in scenario planning, the purpose, here, is to encourage thinking “outside the square” rather than to advocate a particular point of view. The task is not to pick a winning forecast — the future will determine that. Instead, it is to create a set of worldviews which in broad terms cover all the eventualities that could emerge. It is in the nature of worldviews that a piece of information can be used in two or more of them: being viewed from more than one perspective, a given piece of information can be used in more than one worldview.
The following four worldviews are drawn from the intersection of two axes. In analysing the driving forces of change, I have opted to set the “strength or weakness of the nation-state” on one axis and the “strength or weakness of international social cohesion” (that is, the level of international co-operation) on the other axis. This gives four quadrants which become four worldviews:
1. Strong nation-state / weak international social cohesion (national governments remain in control of their destiny and are unwilling to work together on common problems): the “steady state”. This worldview is based on the idea that the current global order (with all its problems) is the best that can be devised.
2. Strong nation-state / strong international social cohesion (national governments, while they remain in control of their destiny, are willing to work together on common problems and this collaboration evolves gradually into some form of global governance): the “world state”. This worldview is based on the absence of purely national solutions to transnational problems, which means that governments have to work together through some form of global governance to solve common problems.
3. Weak nation-state / strong international social cohesion (national governments lose control over their countries and transnational corporations fill the vacuum): “Earth Inc.” With the decline of the nation-state, the only organisations capable of driving the pace of change are transnational corporations, which knit the world together into one market as they fill the governmental vacuum.
4. Weak nation-state / weak international social cohesion (national governments lose control over their countries and since there is no organisation to fill the vacuum this results in increasing chaos): the “wild state”. This is the “nightmare” scenario, in which nation-states fall apart and there are increasing numbers of “failed states”, mass movements of peoples and environmental and health problems.
1. The “Steady State”.
This scenario argues that despite all the talk of global change etc., the basic nation-state structure will remain. It may have its problems but it is the best of the options.
National sovereignty is here to stay. Governments are not willing to surrender national sovereignty. There has been little progress in establishing non-partisan standards of behaviour between governments. Governments view all forms of international co-operation from the perspective of how they can maximise their own gain.
This may be regrettable but that is a fact of political life. All politics is local — and foreigners do not vote in national elections. For example, all Western countries are now troubled by the risk of mass movements of peoples into their own territories. Some are more troubled than others, but the concern is a shared one. As long as some countries continue to be extremely wealthy and others are extremely poor, national boundaries will have to remain in place to restrict the movement of peoples. Given the nature of the international economic system, it is unlikely that this gap between rich and poor will disappear for many decades to come (if ever) — and so national border protection will remain very important.
This concern with national sovereignty is not simply a Western one. Developing countries also have a strong determination to hold on to their national sovereignty. They fought hard for their independence from their colonial masters and now they are troubled by threats of tribalism, fragmentation, and the erosion of national unity by cultural diversity and foreign influences. These countries are not going to surrender their national sovereignty for fear of being swamped by a fresh form of imperialism. They may have problems — but at least they are their own problems.
Reluctance to Change.
There is a reluctance to change to some form of global governance. This is evident, at all levels, in societies in which people are free to express their opinions. First, there is no public groundswell in favour of global governance. Most people do not see themselves as “world citizens”. When they are drawn together by massive international events, they still retain their sense of national loyalty. This does not necessarily mean that they are violent towards other people; simply that they have a sense of their own national pride and a feeling of being distinct from others. Meanwhile, very few mainstream non-governmental organisations have global governance as a key campaign issue. They recognise that global governance is too big a project, and so they prefer to stick to their own core business (the environment, nuclear disarmament, the status of women in developing countries, etc.).
Talk of “global governance” or “world government” only scares most people. They already find it difficult to influence politicians at national level, and fear that they would stand very little chance of doing so at international level. Besides, people are having more and more opportunities to vote, but enjoying it less. Voter turnout in most Western countries is now at a low level. Even the Eastern European countries, which have had only a decade or so of free elections, are already experiencing low voter turnouts. There is a widespread cynicism of politicians. Whoever you vote for, a politician always wins.
2. The “World State”.
This scenario argues that this is the first time in history that people have been confronted with the need to organise and manage the world as a totality. From the time of World War I onwards, world history could be described as a single, protracted experiment in global governance. Underlying all the conflicts and upheavals, there has been a basic question: how is humanity to govern itself? The problems are a long way from being solved, but all we can do is continue the quest. The world is now too interdependent — each of its parts affects the others — to try to operate on a piece-by-piece basis. A nuclear disaster (such as Chernobyl in April 1986), for example, has implications for other countries not just at the time, but for years to come.
Therefore, there is a need for some form of world government. The tendency among NGO advocates now is to talk more of “governance” on the basis that this definition is perceived, by the general public, as less threatening than the term “world government”. Also, since the future global government, in its definitive form, will probably have little in common with the current “national governments”, the term “world government”, with its connotations of “national government”, is misleading.
Different Routes to World Unity.
Just how the world might evolve to a different form of governance is not yet clear. There are three ways of trying to get countries united:
The federalist approach: the deliberate decision by national governments to transfer certain powers (such as maintaining armed forces) to a world government while retaining other powers (such as establishing laws concerning ownership of property) for themselves.
The functionalist approach: the creation of more global agencies (such as the World Health Organisation) to handle particular functions (such as health) so that experts can co-operate in a less politically-charged environment; in this way, the globe would eventually be covered by a network of such agencies.
The populist approach: the creation of a grass-roots people’s movement to establish a democratic world government directly responsible to the people of the world, and in the meantime to generate ideas for world government and a groundswell in favour of it.
Here we come to a chicken and egg dilemma. We cannot discuss world government because we have no world community to support it. Indeed, discussion of world government (because of its evil “Big Brother” overtones) may even delay the development of a world community and thus the movement towards a world government. On the other hand, a more cautious approach could over-emphasise the state of perfection which the world community must achieve before world government can be considered. The way to promote a world community is to have a world government. But since private citizens cannot establish a world government, the next best thing, in order to promote a world community, is to talk about global governance. World discussion of world government may have some chance of uniting the world. In other words, consideration of what is necessary to unite the world and the discussion of a common problem of overwhelming importance could lead to a growing sense of community among all peoples.
An important reason for talking about world government is to clarify what it should consist of. Should a global government focus on limited measures designed to maintain what is called security, or is security itself dependent on the pursuit of broader purposes? Should a world state be federal or unitary, or should it, perhaps, contain the best features of each? What should be the relationship between the world government and the citizens of extant states? What taxing powers should the world state have, and what order of military forces, if any? This list of questions could go on indefinitely, and there are countless possible answers to each of them. Consequently many global governance activists prefer to campaign using all three of the above approaches simultaneously. For example, they deal with the need for governments to work together at the political (federal) level and on common problems (functional approach), and also with the importance of involving people in the campaign for world government.
The Long View.
It is necessary to view the quest for global governance as a very long-term project, in which there has been some progress. What may seem impossible at one point may become possible later on. In short, progress can be made — it may just take time. Human affairs are not static. It is possible to improve human behaviour: duelling, for example, is now rare, whereas in Europe and the US it was once a normal way of settling disputes. Similarly, war is not necessarily the norm in human affairs; some societies have no tradition of it. Warfare is a learned behaviour; people have to be trained for it. As the UNESCO Seville Statement has argued, it is not inherited from our animal ancestors; it is not genetically programmed into human nature; life does not necessarily reward the struggle of the most violent (but rather the more co-operative); humans do not have a “violent brain”, and war is not caused by “instinct” or any single motivation.
There has been some progress in reducing the use of war as an instrument of national policy. Warfare between countries is now very rare. France and Germany, for example, have now gone for over half a century without a war and it seems highly unlikely that these two traditional enemies will ever go to war with each other again. This does not mean that they have become permanent friends — only that they have developed less violent ways of settling disputes (such as through the European Union and the International Court of Justice).
Finally, there is the lesson learned from the protracted unification of Italy (1815-70), which can be summed up in two key statements from the then prime minister, Massimo D’Azeglio. In 1861, D’Azeglio remarked “Italy is made, now we must make Italians”. Thus, we first create institutions and they then change public attitudes. He also warned, “To make an Italy out of Italians, one must not be in a hurry”. The same could be said about Earthlings.
3. “Earth Inc.”
This scenario argues that the erosion of the nation-state will continue and that transnational corporations, as they fill the global governance vacuum, are destined to have an ever greater say in how the world is run. National governments will not necessarily disappear (any more than the rise of national governments necessarily caused all forms of local government to disappear). But national governments will need to get used to the fact that the nation-state system is over and that corporations are the major players in world affairs.
Money is the Measure of All Things.
Money is now the measure of all things. The publication, in 1776, of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations can be taken as the starting point of this new era, which saw the rise of modern capitalism and in which the market, rather than government involvement or religious dictates, has increasingly set the pace for economic activities. Smith placed emphasis on individuals being left free to pursue their own interests. Self-interest guides people, as though by the influence of an “invisible hand”, to use their intellect in a way that maximises productive effort and thus the public good. Private vice becomes a public virtue. Therefore, a free market — not government — is the best allocator of resources, and the best promoter of the public good. Government should be as small as possible, with limited responsibilities. Thus, individuals should be left to maximise their own income and determine how it is to be spent. This is now the world’s most popular economic philosophy.
Meanwhile, with money as the measure of all things, national identity ceases to be such a major issue — except where it can be commodified, as in the case of corporations that derive benefits from their sponsorship of local or national sporting teams. People are principally consumers or aspiring consumers, rather than citizens. Politics and patriotism are not as pleasurable as the latest fashion in clothes, music or technology. That is their choice. They have the freedom to choose.
The Erosion of National Government Power.
Western governments have, for some years, been reducing their role in the economic life of their countries — and the vacuum has been filled by transnational corporations. The 20th century saw the rise and fall of government. When it began, there was limited government involvement in the economy. Then the Great Depression of the 1930s, followed by World War II, resulted in far greater government intervention in the economy, as part of the “Keynesian revolution”.
The process of withdrawing from the Keynesian revolution began in the late 1970s. Robert Skidelsky’s three-volume biography of John Maynard Keynes charts the rise of Keynesian economics before noting, at the end of the third volume, the beginning of the retreat from Keynesian thinking. In 1976, the British Labour prime minister, James Callaghan, announced the end of the era: “The option of spending our way out of recession no longer exists”. The process was greatly accelerated by the Conservative leader Margaret Thatcher, who was first elected in 1979, and it has been continued by all her successors. As if to emphasise the irrelevance of party labels, these policies were introduced mainly by Conservative governments in the US (Reagan) and UK (Thatcher), and by Labour governments in Australia and New Zealand.
Transnational corporations have eroded the notion of a national economy; there is now only a global one. Kenichi Ohmae, a Japanese business consultant, coined a new term: the interlinked economy (ILE) of the Triad (US, Europe and Japan), which was followed by the expression “Asian tigers” (referring to countries such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore). The emergence of the ILE has created much confusion, particularly for those who are used to dealing with economic policies based on conventional economic statistics that compare one country with another. Their theories do not work any more. For example, if a government tightens the money supply by increasing interest rates, loans may come in from abroad (i.e. cheaper funds from elsewhere in the ILE), making the country’s monetary policy almost meaningless. For all practical purposes, the ILE has made obsolete the traditional instruments of central bankers — interest rate and money supply.
These trends help to explain the low voter turnout in Western elections: voters see elections as increasingly irrelevant. A political party may come to office, but not necessarily to power. Power is held elsewhere.
Corporations Rule the World.
There is much agreement between writers of different viewpoints about the growing power of transnational corporations. Instead, there is disagreement over whether this trend should be welcomed. David Korten, whose best-selling book When Corporations Rule the World inspired the subtitle of this section, sees corporations as a sinister force, eroding local cultures, encouraging materialism, and looking after only those who have money. Another long-term critic of corporate power is Richard Barnet of the Washington DC Institute of Policy Studies, who is worried about the power of corporations to influence government decision-making for their own benefit rather than in the interests of the citizens.
Other writers, on the other hand, have claimed that the process is, overall, a good thing. A rising tide lifts all boats. Kenichi Ohmae sees the world as borderless — national boundaries are simply “cartographic illusions” —, with many opportunities for people who wish to take them up. Meanwhile, journalist Thomas Friedman of The New York Times has written about a world caught between all the burgeoning global markets, financial institutions and computer technologies through which people pursue higher living standards (represented by the efficient manufacture of the Lexus automobile), and the individual’s traditional roots, identities and home, symbolised by the “olive tree”. Friedman looks to an era in which the world can be made safe for corporations and consumers and the flourishing of democracy. He is confident that the “olive tree” interests can be preserved in an era of rapid modernisation.
The modern capitalist economy creates more opportunities for more people than any other economic system. This system feeds upon itself so that wealth creates more wealth. Supply creates its own demand, as consumers are introduced to goods and services they previously could not conceive of, but now cannot live without. This wealth trickles down to other areas, where economic growth can then begin. Unlike our ancestors, we expect things to change and we expect a better standard of living (the “revolution of rising expectations”). With this mindset now taking hold in countries outside the Western world, we can expect the 21st century to be the century that will record greatest economic growth for the greatest number of people. And this will be achieved via transnational corporations rather than relying on the dictates of government departments.
Not only is globalisation good for people, it also reduces the risk of international conflict. Why fight against people who could be your customers? International conflicts are now very rare among free-trade countries. More colourfully, countries that have McDonald’s fast food outlets do not fight each other: “the golden arches theory of conflict prevention”. There is nothing special about fast food as such. But its sale within a country indicates that the government of that country is a believer in free trade and that its citizens are too busy enjoying their life to maintain old feuds. Thus, “Earth Inc.” both rests on increasing global social cohesion and contributes to it. It creates a virtuous spiral.
4. The “Wild State”.
The previous scenarios are all too optimistic. They focus too much on order, rather than disorder. There are many sources of disorder in the world. In the wild-state scenario, which is based on both the continued erosion of the nation-state and the decline of international social cohesion, each nation-state will have to do the best that it can with what it has, because it will not be able to rely on much assistance from anyone else.
Money Comes First.
Transnational corporations are not a force for good. They are motivated only by money. They are out to make money for their owners/stockholders. They are not out to improve the world. They are not really accountable to any one (not even their own stockholders, many of which are pension funds concerned only about the rate of return, not about how it is acquired). Corporations have no allegiances and no loyalties. Thus, they can move production and service centres from one country to another looking for the best rate of return. They can also trigger bidding wars in which governments compete to get the corporation to chose their country as its base, and thus set one government off against another. In this way, they obtain special “export zones”, exemptions from labour and environmental regulations and favourable tax treatment. Meanwhile, China is undergoing the largest industrial revolution in world history. Its low-paid workers are producing cheap goods that are flooding foreign markets, undercutting the cost of goods made in developed countries.
Because corporations are mobile, they have created a race to the bottom. Manufacturers search the world — the single, borderless economy — for greater returns on investment, moving their assembly lines to low-wage countries. The globalisation of industrial production is resulting in excess supplies of goods and labour, which in turn exert downward pressure on prices and wages.
Corporations also move in search of low-tax regimes and, as a result of this, governments lack the funds for the supply of services. Individuals protest over taxation (the “tax-payers’ revolt”), but corporations, too, are reluctant to pay taxes. All this extra money in the hands of individuals and corporations has helped to finance a vast consumer expansion over the past three decades or so, but it means that there are shortages in essential services and infrastructures.
“The Coming Anarchy”.
This phrase is from an article written, in 1994, by Robert Kaplan, who had visited some failing nation-states such as Sierra Leone. Kaplan talks about a “withering away of central government, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war”. The nation-state system does not necessarily cope with problems well. Those of us who live in developed Western countries should not assume that what we see here is what is to be seen in the rest of the world. A world made in the image of McDonald’s and Coke is not necessarily a world made safe for democracy and the protection of human rights. We should not assume that the consumption of Western goods leads inevitably to the rise of democracy.
While much favourable publicity is given to the newly industrialised countries (NICs), especially in East Asia, most developing countries have not met the targets laid down in the UN Development Decades, which began over four decades ago. Indeed, in some African countries people were economically better off under their European colonial rulers. This is a situation that will deter transnational corporations from risking their investments and their foreign-recruited staff in these countries. Thus, some of the current poor countries will sink into even greater poverty and obscurity.
In addition, there is the problem of the growing number of “failed states”. Somalia has gone for about two decades without a government; Afghanistan acquired a government only through international intervention in late 2001 (and it is not clear how long that will last). In these countries the pattern is more one of warlords and bandits controlling fiefdoms. The world is slipping back into a pre-Westphalian era. The nation-state system is less than 500 years old. There is no law of the universe to say that it should always exist. The 21st century may well see its slide into chaos.
Increased Reluctance to Intervene.
Reduced international cohesion means that countries are reluctant to intervene in the affairs of other countries. This can be seen in three ways: the UN’s failure to mount operations, the lack of political will among governments to get involved, and the lack of public support in developed countries for such operations.
The UN was designed to fight Hitler: a major threat to international peace and security who was opposed by many other countries. It was not designed to rush from one domestic trouble spot to another. It cannot cope with all the conflicts now under way, let alone those that are likely to occur in the future. For example, General Sir Michael Rose, one of the British Army officers most experienced in low-intensity warfare, has written an account of the chaos within the UN operation in Bosnia in the mid-1990s. Even the UN force’s title was misleading: “UNPROFOR: UN Protection Force”. It created public expectations far beyond the practical capabilities of any peacekeeping mission. This is just symptomatic of the UN’s inability to keep up with the changing nature of warfare (not that any government is doing particularly well, either). The UN operations in the Balkans, which continue, have not increased the appetite of Western governments to get involved in peacekeeping missions. If anything, they have reduced that appetite because so little of a long-range nature seems to have been achieved. As British writer William Shawcross argued in his review of the operations throughout the 1990s, there is no clear formula for determining when the UN will intervene in a crisis or how.
The basic question is this: if a country collapses and the UN sends in a peacekeeping force and humanitarian personnel, will it, through them, be able to rebuild a system of governance? That system would be based on the nation-state which (particularly in Africa) has at most only shallow roots. Thus, even if the UN conducted a perfect military and civilian operation (and it has never done so yet), it could not impose a stable nation-state system on a country that had few traditions of a previous one. It will be interesting to see how the government in Afghanistan created in December 2001 proceeds. The omens are not good. And perhaps Africa will be the world’s first “failed continent”. The international community’s failure in Rwanda is symptomatic of its overall neglect of Africa in the face of the continent’s apparently insurmountable problems.
Finally, there is the role of public opinion in developed countries. Perhaps the notion of the “global village” (as coined by Marshall McLuhan over three decades ago) was flawed. He was correct that the current communications revolution, which was then getting under way, would enable people to learn more about the rest of the world so that it would feel as though we were all living in one large village. But the blizzard of information — particularly bad news — is so overwhelming that it actually stops people from wanting to help their “neighbours”. Assuming the world to be heading for more problems (such as global economic downturn), Western populations will argue that “charity begins at home”. They will not want their money spent overseas when there are so many issues at home (such as unemployment, crime and family breakdown) to deal with. They will not be sympathetic to their governments taking in more asylum seekers as people flee their own countries in search of a better life.
To conclude, the future of our planet will unfold, in terms of the future of the nation-state, along one of these four worldviews. The challenge is to stimulate more debate on the “big picture” of global governance.
Keith Suter’s paper “The future of the nation-state in the era of globalisation” is a description, as far as possible objective and rigorous, of four possible scenarios which might develop in the near future as a result of the algebraic sum of the relative strengths of the two opposing forces at work throughout the world in the present situation of transition: the persistence of the division of human beings in sovereign nation-states on the one hand, and the drive towards interdependence of human relationships on the other. The issues he raises lie at the heart of the federalist debate and we expect the readers of our review will find his treatment of them stimulating.
But although such an assessment is a necessary preliminary step for action, it raises several problems for those who have chosen political action as a means of contributing to the global establishment of the values of peace, democracy, freedom and social justice (and probably for every human being, given that even rejection of political action is, in fact, a political choice, i.e. acceptance of being an object rather than an actor — however minor — in mankind’s evolution).
From this perspective, the first problem is one of choice: the four worldviews Suter offers us are not equivalent as far as these values are concerned. And it is not difficult to guess that most would choose the “World state” scenario. However, liking one scenario more than the others does not make it more real.
Therefore one must ask oneself: are these scenarios equally likely? From a historical perspective, the effects of the scientific mode of production are driving the world irreversibly towards increasing interdependence of human activities and are bound to create, in the long run, the conditions for a world government (the “World state” scenario). Moreover, in the last decades of the last century and at the beginning of the present one, we have been living in a situation very close to Suter’s “Earth Inc.” scenario. But the present financial and economic crisis, which has dramatically swept the world, offers a clear measure both of the amplitude of the process of growing human interdependence and of the need for global rules to provide a framework within which the world market (and transnational corporations) can properly function. Although the reactions to the crisis have so far been at the level of the single states, a very strong inclination towards international co-operation, in order contain the damage, is emerging both among governments and in public opinion. Undoubtedly, the measures so far proposed do not go beyond intergovernmental co-operation and therefore do not erode state sovereignty, yet the idea of the need for some kind of world government is making headway in public opinion and this is reflected in the mass media (the most recent example is probably the article by Gideon Rachman “And Now for a World Government” which appeared in the Financial Times on December, 8, 2008). Nevertheless, as Suter points out, this trend comes up against the political heritage of the old mode of production — state sovereignty — and the process of overcoming this will be a long one.
In the meantime, dramatic threats to the very survival of mankind, deriving from the same scientific and technological progress that is driving the trend towards human interdependence, do hang over our planet: the enormous power of weapons of mass destruction, the widening gap in terms of wealth between the North and the South of the world (whose existence is exacerbated by the worldwide telecommunications network), and the pollution of the Earth’s atmosphere and waters, with the resulting climate changes. Such threats can no longer be the concern of only part of the human race, given that there exist no “happy” islands that are safe from them, nor any possibility of creating such havens (even though some politicians are deceiving themselves otherwise). Growing awareness of these dangers is an additional force pushing towards world government and increasing the need for political action in order to create, at the only level at which this can be effective, i.e. at world level, the conditions for controlling them.
On the other hand, the evolution of the world situation in the short and medium term is much more uncertain, because the process of human emancipation does not proceed along straight lines, but can undergo sudden interruptions, deviations or even lengthy regressions as a result of chance and human will.
For those who have chosen to act politically with the aim of asserting the values of peace, democracy, freedom and social justice, the existence of this deep trend towards human interdependence provides the ideal historical conditions for their struggle; furthermore, the fact that the obstacles in their path can be identified makes it possible to draw up an overall strategy for furthering pursuit of the above goals. From this perspective, European unification can undoubtedly be seen as the most advanced experiment in the attempt to overcome national sovereignties and to establish supranational democracy. Probably it is at European level that the final set in the match between the persistence of absolute national sovereignty and the establishment of supranational democracy (in other words, the establishment of a federal state) will be played out. The present European Union still lies (just) within the “Steady State” or the “Earth Inc.” scenarios and the overall socio-political conditions present in its 27 members are not ripe for the final leap forwards to a federal organisation. Yet it is possible that the drive towards supranational government may continue in a smaller vanguard of states (possibly those that began the integration process more than fifty years ago) through the creation of an initial federal core which would undoubtedly exert a strong force of attraction over neighbouring countries and would constitute an extraordinary example for the whole world. Were this experiment to succeed, Suter’s “World state” scenario would become a much closer prospect.
 David Adams (ed.), The Seville Statement on Violence: Preparing the Ground for the Constructing of Peace, Paris, UNESCO, 1989.
 Quoted in: Andrina Stiles, The Unification of Italy, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 2001, p. 91.
 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, London, Penguin, 1983 (1776).
 Quoted in: Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Britain, London, Macmillan, 2000, p. 508.
 Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World, London, Collins, 1990, p. xi.
 David Korten, When Corporations Rule the World, London, Earthscan, 1996.
 For example, Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh, Global Dreams, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994.
 Kenichi Ohmae, The Invisible Continent, London, Nicholas Brealey, 2001.
 Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New York, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999, p. 26-28.
 See: Paul Zane Pilzer, Unlimited Wealth, New York, Crown, 1994.
 Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy”, The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, p. 46.
 Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace, London, Harvill, 1998.
 William Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2000.
 See: Keith Suter “The Lost Continent: Has Africa Run Out of Hope?”, The Age, Melbourne, January 27 2001, p. 11.