Year LXIV, 2022, Single Issue
The EU’s race against time and Italy’s responsibilities
July 20, 2022, the day on which Italy’s Draghi-led government collapsed, could well go down as one of those key dates remembered for marking a drastic change in the course of a political process. The Italian government crisis is not just a national issue, but one that will also have repercussions on the European Union and on Western democracies as a whole.
Italy is an important country in the European framework, and therefore also on the international stage, as the country’s experience under Draghi has clearly shown. Thanks to the rush of responsibility felt by the various political forces in Italy that agreed to support the national unity agreement proposed by the President of the Republic — the far left and Fratelli d’Italia were the only ones that refused —, and also to Draghi’s authoritativeness and expertise, Italy has not only achieved very important results on the domestic front (examples include its vaccination campaign and approach to the pandemic, its economic recovery — the country’s growth is among the highest in Europe and internationally —, the social support policies introduced, the start of energy diversification, and the work done to realise the National Recovery and Resilience Plan), but also played a leading role in Europe and internationally. Draghi was the USA’s main interlocutor in Europe on the issue of the policy of support for Ukraine, and accordingly was a key supporter of Ukraine’s successful bid to become an EU candidate member state. Within the EU, Draghi, together with Macron, led the alignment of countries committed to building a strong and cohesive Europe endowed with its own strategic independence, working to this end on a series of proposals in a range of crucial areas (from energy to defence and reform of European public finance), and supporting efforts to bring about Treaty reform (from the Conference on the Future of Europe to the European Parliament’s call for a Convention pursuant to Article 48 TEU with the objective, repeatedly stated, of modifying, in a federal sense, the European political-institutional system).
The bringing down of the Draghi government has therefore plunged Italy into choppy and uncertain waters, but, more important still, it has deprived Europe of a source of decisive leadership, halting the process of EU strengthening that is so crucial to success in the clash (now heightened and made dramatically inevitable by Putin’s aggression against Ukraine) between liberal democracies and autocracies.
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Russia’s war against Ukraine, by deteriorating relations between the West and the world’s autocracies to a point where they cannot be remedied through dialogue, has raised many question marks over the future of Europe, which has been forced to acknowledge its vulnerability and lack of adequate means of defence. Had it not been for the Ukrainians bravely and resolutely resisting Russia’s aggression themselves, bolstered by external support from NATO, guaranteed in particular by America’s committed stance, there is no doubt that several EU member states under direct threat from Moscow would also have been dragged into the conflict.
In this framework, as in the past, the Europeans find themselves dependent for their security on the USA. This time, however, this external source of support is itself influenced by an internal political situation whose evolution is difficult to predict, and, moreover, this time war is actually unfolding in Europe. What is more, Europe’s failure to build a political as well as a military union clearly exposes Europe as the “soft underbelly” of the Western front that American analysts and politicians have often claimed it to be.
The fact that the Europeans depend on their enemy to meet their vital energy needs, and through this dependence are actually funding their adversary handsomely, only goes to confirm all that has been said above. What is more, within the EU states, some sections of public opinion and of the ruling class actually sympathise with and actively support the enemy (by contrast, in Russia and China, such divisions do not exist, as any democratic opposition is promptly and easily silenced). A further consideration concerns the economic consequences of the war, which have rocked economies that had only just started picking up after the hits taken during the pandemic. In this regard, although the Europeans have a strong and influential currency, the absence of the necessary concomitant fiscal and economic instruments nevertheless leaves the euro exposed to the dangers associated with the fragility of some of its member states, namely, their excessive debt, since there are no adequate structural support instruments available to address their weaknesses; meanwhile, rising inflation is making it more difficult to exploit the European Central Bank’s monetary policy lever, which in the past has proved decisive in saving the euro. Finally, even when they are required to be united and act as one, the European countries, in the framework of the EU, have to reckon with a decision-making structure that reflects their fragmentation and the absence of democratic and legitimate common sovereignty. As a result, all too often, their basis of reasoning is the sum of many weak national visions, rather than a strong vision developed by a great continental power. And in any case, they also lack the resources and adequate tools that would enable them to act.
Without detracting from the value of all has been built in over seventy years of integration, what this snapshot shows is that the EU has too long wallowed in the false belief that the Single Market is the appropriate political response to the challenges of our time, and that it, combined with sound and scrupulous management of national finances and sound national governance, is enough to guarantee peace, ensure the success of our economic and social systems, and allow our democracies to thrive. The reality is that it has allowed threats, which we are completely ill-prepared to tackle, to expand dramatically around us. In this regard, one need only consider the indications contained in NATO’s Strategic Concept compared with the EU’s Strategic Compass. Both documents analyse in very similar terms the threats we face and the attacks we are at (high) risk of suffering, yet while one is able (thanks to the part played by the USA) to propose concrete solutions based on technological and military might, the other is like a construction site waiting to be built on, except that, for the moment, the tools needed to get the work started are missing. Real power in one case versus mere words in the other.
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From this description of the EU’s situation, it is very clear to see why toppling those who were spearheading change in Europe could turn out to have been an ill-judged, indeed fatal, move. The creation of a federal political union in Europe is a reform crucially needed in order to strengthen the EU’s international standing, as well as its ability to act authoritatively, both internally and externally, and to offer citizens and public opinion (often disheartened and disappointed by the weaknesses of national institutions and national policies) a farsighted and profound project through which to re-establish democratic politics and models. In the context of the struggle between alternative systems, the fact that autocracy seems to be effective enough to have no trouble challenging the complexity and inclusiveness of democratic decision-making mechanisms obviously makes it crucial to strengthen the democratic system; and, given the evident structural weakness of national systems, it is clear, too, that democracy can only be revitalised through its full realisation at European level. There are, however, numerous obstacles to the evolution of the European institutional system that is necessary in order to achieve this, such as the inertia of Germany (a key European country that has long supported the existing system based on a large EU single market and is now struggling to change its economic and political outlook), the resistance of the so-called frugal EU countries and the northern European member states, and the desire, in Eastern Europe, to see a political weakening of the EU in favour of a return to a regime based on full sovereignty. The Franco-Italian alignment was the indispensable driving force for building the new Europe, and it has been stopped in its tracks. Considering that the war against Ukraine has exacerbated the threat to our democratic systems, making time a decisive factor, this abrupt halt is particularly perilous.
A further question mark is whether Italy can ever recover the role it was playing under Mario Draghi’s premiership. This can happen, only if, on 25 September, there emerges a prevailing desire for continuity of the outgoing government’s policies and experience, thereby opening the way for a new comprehensive national agreement and government of national unity. In theory, anything is possible, which means that, however unlikely, there is also a chance that, whoever wins, a sense of responsibility towards the national interest might nevertheless prevail together with an attachment to democratic values and freedoms that would be lost outside the European framework.
A miraculous return of Italy to the field might also be favoured by the now widely accepted realisation that Italy is not a country that can be governed “against” Europe, but only by working in synergy with its European partners and with the EU, and by respecting shared commitments; equally well established is the knowledge that if the choices and behaviours adopted at national level are irresponsible ones liable to deprive Italy of European protections, then the country faces only one possible destiny: irreversible crisis and bankruptcy. Even were the next government merely to support a weakening of the EU, thus changing the framework of our European alliances, this would not only seriously endanger the cohesion and stability of the EU itself, but also increase the likelihood of a return to the paralysis and rigid budgetary control powers that are so damaging to the stability of Italy’s entire economic-production system. Italy, therefore, has an important part of Europe’s destiny in its hands, and also desperately needs a strong and cohesive Europe. Whoever is chosen to govern after 25 September cannot ignore this reality.
And yet, judging by the behaviour of the political forces that brought down Draghi in the Italian Senate on July 20, there appears to be no limit to the irresponsibility of a political class that has largely lost its sense of duty and its awareness of its task. The factions that have continued to believe in Draghi, and shown that they understand the country’s true needs, as well as the necessity to put these needs before partisan interests, are currently in the minority and seem unable to formulate an electoral strategy up to the challenges of the present historical moment, not least due to the inconsistencies of a very poor electoral law. The others, new and old opponents of the national unity government, are basically divided between: the 5 Star Movement (M5S), which has for months promoted anti-NATO positions with regard to Italy’s support for Ukraine, and is now seeking to return to its populist roots to avoid being swept off the political landscape; Salvini's League, which, like the M5S, has challenged Draghi on Ukraine and on key reforms linked to the National Recovery and Resilience Plan; Forza Italia, which repeatedly reiterates its attachment to the European EPP family, while at the same time, under Berlusconi’s leadership, maintaining an ambiguous position towards Putin and continuing to climb on its old populist hobbyhorses; and finally, Fratelli d’Italia (FdI). This party, characterised by traditionally and consistently anti-European and sovereignist positions and open support for illiberal movements in Europe, has grown in strength during its opposition to the previous government and to its reforms and pro-European choices. Now, however, smelling a likely electoral victory with all the attendant responsibilities of government, it seems to have rediscovered Europeanism and respect for the constitutional system (albeit maintaining its presidentialist convictions) and understood the need to pick up the agenda of the previous government; it has also sought to establish its credentials with the American administration by confirming that its future government will have an Atlanticist orientation.
Is this volte-face by the party tipped to win the elections and lead the next government just a tactical move to avoid a perfect storm the moment it takes power? Or does it indicate, already, the beginning of a dawning realisation that Draghi was right about everything, and therefore that opposing him, while electorally advantageous, was politically wrong? Can a future FdI-led government overcome the contradictions that have made its birth such a strong possibility? Or, alternatively, can the elections in Italy be won, by a margin great enough to immediately restore Italy’s credibility, by a political alignment naturally in favour of pressing ahead with the agenda of the previous government? It would be good if all this could be properly debated, to make Italy’s citizens aware of what is really at stake on 25 September.
Pavia, 7 August 2022
The Federalist
