political revue

Year XXXIV, 1992, Number 2 - Page 97



The Security Policy of the European Union
1. After signing the treaty of European Union at Maastricht, European integration has moved into the sphere of security policy, which includes defence. Of course this is only the case if we take for granted that the competent bodies of the member states will ratify the treaty. I would like to help clarify the general guidelines that should govern the application of this policy applied and the reform of the clearly inadequate institutional framework envisaged for its enactment in the new treaty.
Firstly we need to define what we generally mean by an effective security policy nowadays, and its relationship to defence. To this end we must briefly examine the evolution of the significance given to security policy. “Security policy” emerged in Western Bloc countries towards the end of the sixties and became increasingly rooted in political and diplomatic jargon through the seventies and eighties. The term meant that military defence, however important, was not the only instrument to which the external security of western democracies should be entrusted. On the contrary, non-military aspects of security gained importance with respect to purely military ones.
One of these non-military means of ensuring external security was the policy of East-West detente. A general war between these two blocs would have entailed the collective suicide of the warring parties, given the capabilities of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore the balance of terror had to be mitigated by policies such as the limitation and control of weapons, common crisis management, and scientific and economic cooperation. The objective of these policies was to lessen mutual fears and hence to modify the behaviour of the opposing blocs, so as to make wars less likely. Following this development, it was realised that weapons were not the only factors which threatened security. Other potential dangers were the demographic explosion with its associated migratory phenomena, the ecological crisis, energy and raw material shortages and the incapacity of entire regional political systems to provide stable rule. Consequently, together with non-military aspects of security policy, increasing importance was given to North-South divergence and the ever greater instability that derived from it. At the same time emphasis was placed on global ecological policy as being a vital part of an effective security policy. As a result the terms “comprehensive security” or “global security” are becoming increasingly used to stress the fact that military defence is only one aspect, and not even the most important one, of security policy.
In light of this, I believe that if we want to bring this semantic evolution to a conclusion which includes the radical changes brought about in the international system by the end of East-West conflict and which is logically rigorous, an effective security policy should be regarded nowadays as none other than a policy of gradual but genuine unification of mankind. Such a policy would combine both foreign and defence policies, both of which are gradually becoming involved in world domestic relations and their policing, as well as with the gradual progress to world unification. To clarify this assumption I shall seek to highlight that world unification, apart from being the only way to guarantee security in all its aspects, is not a utopia despite the great obstacles it faces and its long term perspective, and that after overcoming the East-West conflict the first concrete, albeit limited, results in the process of world unification have already been achieved.
2. If it is clear that today an effective security policy must give top priority not to resisting external pressures or aggression, but to avoiding war at all costs (given its frightful destruction), the only effective way to achieve this, as Kant pointed out two centuries ago, is to eliminate war (hence, the arms race) as a means of solving international conflicts. Therefore world anarchy, which is the real cause of war, must be overcome. In other words we must create international conditions that are similar to those found within nations. National sovereignty must be subjected to a world federal authority. This body must be able to stop any country from arming itself with the aim of imposing its will on other states. It must, therefore, safeguard the independence and the legitimate interests of every state, thereby rendering self-defence both impossible and unnecessary.
Policies aimed at decreasing international conflicts and tensions, at arms limitation and at greater international economic co-operation, and so on, must become part of a general aim to create an international government This can only be achieved by an effective, if gradual, limitation of national sovereignty. If we do not make progress towards this objective, these minor aims are destined to produce structurally precarious results or even to be counterproductive. International conflict, like domestic conflict, cannot be eliminated, given the pluralism that characterises human society. Consequently, without progress towards a system capable of eliminating the violent resolution of international conflict (as in the case inside countries), we will forever swing between low and high intensity conflicts. This will encourage both renewed arms races and a tendency towards military pressure and aggression. On the other hand by co-operation, especially in the fields of science and technology, we risk strengthening the military capabilities of potential adversaries, hence resulting in increasingly precarious national security.
As regards the development of the Southern hemisphere, which is rightly considered to be an essential part of an effective security policy, the convergence between security policy and world unification is equally valid in this context. Since an effective policy that aims at the elimination of the North-South divide requires the mobilisation of enormous resources which only the end of the arms race and the co-ordinated and decisive efforts of advanced countries can make possible, this challenge can only be tackled effectively by the creation of a system of world government, which, apart from making weapons progressively irrelevant, would also ensure solidarity between rich and poor countries (just as national governments ensure solidarity between rich and poor regions that fall under their sovereignty).
This is also true for ecological issues. An increasing number of decisions taken by single nations can lead to catastrophe on a continental or global level, or to endangering the very survival of mankind. This challenge to security can only be met effectively by establishing strict international rule, imposing new patterns of development and consumption and along with the sacrifices that this will entail. Only by subordinating national sovereignty to a world authority can this be achieved.
Even if it makes sense to say that nowadays an effective security policy requires a policy of world unification, we need to ask whether such a policy is realistic. The basis for answering yes to this question is the reality that world union is not only necessary to govern global economic interdependence effectively, but is also vital for the survival of mankind itself. There is no need to prove that weapons of mass destruction and ecological issues represent mortal threats for mankind. It should also be clear to everyone that the North-South divide is a serious challenge, due to the demographic explosion and its associated migratory and ecological problems. Structural international instability leads to arms proliferation and aids the growth of ideological and religious fanaticism, not to mention international terrorism. What lies before us is the risk of a catastrophic conflict between the rich and poor peoples of the world.
Mankind has essentially become a single community with a shared destiny. Hence the alternative “Unite or perish”[1] (which after 1945 has represented the basic historical spur to the process of European unification) now relates to the world as a whole. Mankind should not be politically unified simply because it is the most rational way to arrive at a better governed world, but because it is also the only way to guarantee mankind’s future and hence a future for each individual. Consequently the policy of world unification has a solid foundation in raison d’état, in other words in the structural tendency of states to give first priority to the pursuit of their own security. In our present historical context, the search for national security produces a structural tendency to shift from an emphasis on national defence towards greater agreement between all states, because this is the only valid alternative to increasingly acute insecurity. A security policy which is not clearly placed in the perspective of world unification betrays its prime objective; in other words it becomes a policy for insecurity.
3. The fact that the alternative “Unite or perish” now relates to mankind as a whole is clearly shown by the concrete influence of this maxim on the evolution of the world system. In fact, this alternative played a vital role in overcoming East-West conflict, which was the fundamental obstacle, in my opinion, to the launching of world unification (just as the French-German confrontation blocked European Unification). Gorbachev’s policy of overcoming East-West conflict (although he certainly did not anticipate the collapse of communism and the USSR itself) was clearly based on an awareness of the immediate need to overcome the limitations of the communist system and the USSR’s backwardness, by moving towards political and economic pluralism. But his policy was also based on the awareness that ever closer co-operation with the West was absolutely necessary to effectively dealing with the problems of global interdependence and the very survival of mankind. While this policy was certainly tied to subjective factors (stemming from Gorbachev’s judgements and his idea of reality), his success against conservative opposition is indicative of the existence of an objective situation in which weapons of total war can no longer be used to secure the survival of a despotic empire, because of the ensuing collective suicide. World co-operation was the only option available.
If the alternative “Unite or perish” has been a very important factor in overcoming East-West conflict, then this process has made possible the first concrete, even if limited, steps towards world unification. These took the form of arms limitation treaties, the development of the CSCE and the strengthening of the role of the UN.
The arms limitation treaties, beginning with that on the elimination of short to medium range missiles signed in Washington in 1987, should be placed in the context of a policy for world unification for the following reasons:
a) a significant reduction of weapons through the dismantling of fully operational systems was achieved;
b) the principle of “on the spot” inspections was introduced, making a vitally important breach in the wall of absolute national sovereignty;
c) these treaties were placed in the context of the broader development of confidence building measures, that aimed to eliminate errors of judgement in evaluating the behaviour of other nations regarding military security and to make surprise attacks practically impossible.
In effect a transition was achieved from arms control policy, aimed at maintaining a balance of power, to a policy of common security. According to the latter policy, military security is no longer essentially based on deterrence, but on lessening the chances of war and on controlled disarmament. If this policy continues to evolve it is destined to lead to a security system that makes war structurally impossible by its own intrinsic logic; that is to a federal world system.
As regards the CSCE, this is undergoing a phase of great institutional development that will involve the establishment of a parliamentary assembly in the near future, albeit one that is indirectly elected and only consultative. This organisation could effectively furnish the means for deepening integration between North America, the European Union (which is expanding to all Western and Central-Eastern European countries) and the CIS, while it is not at all unrealistic to think of its enlargement to cover other democracies in the world (Japan in particular). To achieve this end, the merging of European and Atlantic organisations such as the Council of Europe and NATO with others such as the G7 and the OECD would need to be carried out. The CSCE could, in this way, become a type of world council of the democracies and admit democratic countries from the Southern hemisphere.
Obviously these developments are strictly dependent on the economic and democratic progress in the ex-communist countries. The end of Soviet Communism has eliminated an ideological and power conflict that made integration between east and west impossible. The disintegration of the Soviet bloc and the USSR has also opened up the possibility of the rebirth of nationalisms, which, if not stopped in time, could lead to a general “Balkanization” that compromises integration in the CSCE and the European Union itself (also because of migration in Biblical proportions).
As regards the UN in the wake of the end of East-West conflict, it has been able to take on an unprecedentedly active and effective role when facing crisis situations. This emerged, above all, during the Gulf War. When dealing with the Kurdish issue, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries (one of the cornerstones of absolute sovereignty) was set aside for the first time. Consequently a decisive strengthening of the structures and the capacity for intervention of the UN has become a concrete possibility. This new capability can now be applied to solving problems related to international economic and ecological interdependence and to the North/South divide. It can also be used to prevent violations of the international order and of fundamental human rights. In particular, the prospect of placing a strong permanent international police force at the disposal of a revised Security Council (as regards its structure and decision making procedures) is becoming more realistic.
The strengthening of the UN is obviously a crucial issue as regards the prospects for world union, which can only come about by the transformation of this organisation into a genuine system of democratic and federal world government. This new organisation, by disarming individual nations, would be capable of eliminating at the root the violence which characterises international society. I want to emphasise here that only a federal system is capable of reconciling unity with the maximum autonomy of its component parts (from regional groupings, nations and regions down to local government bodies) and so avoiding the dangers associated with centralisation. By centralisation I mean excessive bureaucracy that inevitably undermines liberal democracy.
However, it is evident that the transformation of the UN into a democratic and federal world government cannot be other than an extremely complicated and long term procedure. It can only be achieved after the consolidation of democracy on a global scale and by the organisation of the world into a system of vast federal regions. These regions will then become the pillars of an efficient federal world system.
Regarding the first point I want to emphasise that a true federation can only be established between democratic nations, and not between totalitarian or authoritarian states which are based on unchecked power and which, therefore, cannot structurally accept limitations either to their external sovereignty (unless they are imposed by force), or to their internal sovereignty (since, to survive, a totalitarian or authoritarian regime needs to be as isolated as possible from external influences which run counter to its principles and practice). Regarding the second point, I want to stress that only if the pillars of the world federation are large regional federations, will it be possible to achieve an effective balance in world political structures and avoid both the danger of hegemony and the oppression of small states.
In view of the extremely complex and long term problems involved in world unification outlined above, a more rapid and deeper integration at the level of the CSCE (hopefully including other democracies) can be justified. This does not go against the advancement of world union but should instead be considered its vanguard (in the same way that the integration of the original six European nations within the European Community led to its further enlargement). Indeed, through increasing integration and the demilitarisation of their relationships, the strong areas of the world (generally in the North) can develop the economic resources necessary to help the economic and social growth of the Southern hemisphere (and thereby the development of democracy[2] and regional integrations). Furthermore, they will be able to face the problem of the transformation of the UN into a world government in a more united and effective manner.
4. On the basis of the above considerations, it is clear that the policy for world union is no longer simply a vital need but is already underway, even if it is in its infancy. However, this certainly does not imply that we are dealing with a linear and predictable process. As outlined above, this policy has a solid basis in the convergence of raisons d’état on a planetary scale; that is, in the incapacity of all states in the world to deal effectively with the fundamental problems of our times except within a prospect of supra-national unification.
Moreover, the effectiveness of this objective convergence of national interests depends on the subjective ability of statesmen and public opinion to perceive clearly and in a timely manner the true interests of their countries. As an example of the difficulty of such perception, I will use here the example of the US, the only superpower left after the collapse of the USSR. The consolidation in this country of an adequate awareness of the alternative “Unite or perish” is being hindered by the widespread illusion (in the interests of the military-industrial complex) that America can effectively face international problems by assuming the role of the world’s sole policeman. There exists the inability to understand that such a role, besides not making the world a safer place, is incompatible with economic and civil progress and, ultimately, with the very safeguarding of democracy in the US.
In practice, the historical crisis of the sovereign state is being partially observed in the US by their insular traditions and by the fact that they are the greatest world power. We can trace a certain analogy here to the British attitude towards European integration which has up to now trailed behind that of the six founding members of the Community. Insular traditions and the relatively slower decline of British power have meant the persistence of illusions regarding their international capacity for action which is based more on a special relationship with the US than on European integration.
The difficulty in developing an awareness of the convergence of raisons d’état seems even more evident if we consider that this awareness can only effectively condition the behaviour of states where the experience of statehood is at its most advanced level. Full awareness of this situation can only be obtained in democratic nations. In these countries, the great universal ideologies based on freedom, equality and social justice have become a structural component of statehood, favouring the awareness that mankind has a single destiny. Furthermore, in these countries the principle of limiting government powers makes the limitation of national sovereignty acceptable.
These conditions do not exist in authoritarian or totalitarian countries where power is structurally based on aggressive ideologies and/or is oriented towards isolation from external influences; nor in countries dominated by religious fundamentalism for which security problems “in this world” tend to be marginalised in favour of a fanatic emphasis on certain religious principles; nor in situations where nationalistic or tribal rivalries destroy existing states and give birth to politically unstable countries; nor in conditions of extreme poverty which feed dictatorships, religious or ideological fundamentalism, nationalism and international terrorism.
Apart from difficulties deriving from a lack of awareness of the convergence of raisons d’état, we need to appreciate that an effective limitation of national sovereignty goes against the interests of those who hold political power or who gain advantage from absolute state sovereignty. The experience of European integration has clearly highlighted that national governments are both instruments for, and obstacles to, supra-national union. While on the one hand they are forced to move towards union because of the “Unite or perish” alternative, on the other they balk at limiting their power and hinder the efficiency of supranational institutions. They are decisively supported in this by influential sectors in the diplomatic world and in the high echelons of civil and military bureaucracies that fear a lowering of their status. In addition, certain socio-economic groups gain advantage from the protectionist policies of individual states.
Finally we must take the time factor into account There exist many mortal challenges for mankind. Apart from weapons of mass destruction, the North-South divide or the ecological question, we need to consider the instability of the ex-Soviet bloc which is also aggravating the problem of NBC weapons proliferation. All these problems, which are pushing us in the direction of world union, may also cause undreamt-of catastrophes before world institutions efficient enough to stop them can be created.
Up to now the difficulties and risks associated with possible setbacks to the struggle for world union (which in this case may involve mankind’s self-annihilation) have been emphasised. Yet, if certainty of victory was the precondition for every political battle, there would be no progress in history. As one of the founding fathers of Europe, Jean Monnet, said, we must always try what at first seems impossible to make possible what is necessary.
5. From the above it is clear that the final aim of world unification must be at the base of an efficient security policy for the European Union. Despite the difficulty of this task, there is no real alternative. The great importance of this contribution needs to be clarified.
The first point is the function of role model which the European Union can perform. Clearly, this is on condition that not only the commitments of Maastricht are observed, but also that a rapid and complete transformation of Community institutions into federal forms is achieved. Given that world unification can only be brought about by the construction of large regional federations, which are needed to provide the pillars of the federal world structure, then it is reasonable to expect that the successful federalisation of a centrally important region such as Europe will be of great relevance for world integration. Indeed, despite its incomplete nature, European integration has already helped other regional integration processes and has also contributed significantly to the end of East-West hostility.
With respect to this last point, the Western liberal-democratic system could not have shown itself to be decisively superior to Soviet communism without the creation of the EC. Despite the EC’s limitations, it has led to a lasting pacification of Western Europe as well as to great economic development which has consolidated the liberal democratic governments, that have gradually absorbed the totalitarianism of both left and right. This has convincingly shown up the inconsistency of Soviet communist ideology, according to which the liberal democracies and the market economy were bound to create incurable internal and international contradictions.[3] In this way, Western Europe progressively became a point of reference and a magnet for anyone in Eastern-Central Europe and the USSR who had access to non-manipulated information about the real state of affairs outside the Soviet bloc. All this decisively contributed to sap the legitimacy from the communist leadership, which was against any real change in the Soviet system.
Apart from being a model, the concrete political initiatives that the European Union can carry out are also decisively important.
Among the areas in which European politics could make a decisive contribution to world unification is the extension of the European Union to Central-Eastern Europe. It is evident that this is the principal means by which to achieve the economic and democratic rebirth of that region. Here the positive experience of EC enlargement to southern Europe could be repeated on a larger scale. In this way a very important part of the “Balkanization” process, which has followed the fall of communism, could be reversed. It is also clear that the European Union must quickly complete its transformation to federalism so as to be able to manage this expansion efficiently, without compromising its own capacity for integration. Only in this way would it also allow the countries of Central-Eastern Europe to enjoy the full benefits of being part of an integrated union.
At this point, it is necessary to stress that if we want to achieve an authentic federal Europe, the crucial problem of the elimination of national armies must be faced. In brief, we must, as gradually as is needed, arrive at a situation where each member state retains at its disposal only the internal police forces that are needed to maintain public order (which, except in cases of exceptional crises, must remain a national responsibility). Hence, member states would be materially incapable of applying military pressure on each other or of resisting direct federal authority for applying federal laws or enforcing democratic order. Although such crises may appear a remote possibility in the present Community of twelve, the situation might be quite different in Central-Eastern Europe with their fragile democracies and ethnic-territorial conflicts. Therefore an early revision of the decisions taken at Maastricht should take into account this problem, which, if the enlargement of the community were not on the agenda, would not appear so urgent. Thus an authentic common policy of internal security must be hammered out, and based on institutional instruments considerably more efficient than those conceived of at Maastricht.
A second important area of European policy for world unification concerns the CIS. I believe that in order to stabilise this area and therefore avoid a disintegrative process that could lead to civil war with the use of NBC weapons, we should aim for the federal consolidation of the CIS. This would be preferable to including the ex-Soviet republics in the European Union (with the exception of the Baltic Republics). In effect a federation from “the Atlantic to the Pacific” is not realistic in the current state of affairs. On the other hand a vast confederal community, with certain federal points of reference, would be more realistic. Its basic pillars would be North America, the European Union, the CIS and Japan.
The principal means by which the consolidation of the CIS can be helped along is clearly a policy similar to the Marshall Plan. This would provide the massive economic aid necessary for the recovery of the region, on condition that disarmament and non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction was continued, conflicting nationalisms are pacified, and, thus, a policy of integration rather than disintegration is carried out in the area. In this case the European Union is called upon to perform a cardinal role due to its geographic proximity, the danger of migration and so on, and also because the completion of economic and monetary union will make the EC area the strongest and most dynamic in the world. For these reasons, thought must be given to a form of association between the European Union and the CIS.
It must be equally stressed out that an indispensable condition for a quick stabilization of the CIS is the consolidation of the CSCE and the involvement of Japan. The economic reason for this is that the financial intervention needed is more than the European Union alone can afford and requires the participation of North America and Japan. The political motive is that Russia’s partners will only be persuaded to overcome their fears of Russian hegemony (which are slowing the consolidation of the CIS) if they have the support and guarantee that the CIS will be integrated into an increasingly efficient CSCE.[4]
A third area in which the European Union can contribute greatly to world unification is the reform of the UN and specifically that of the Security Council. While the method adopted to make it more effective should be the introduction of the principle of majority voting among the permanent members, the guiding principle to make it more representative should be its regionalisation. This means that the permanent seats should be allocated to states of continental dimensions or regional groups, rather than to the victorious powers of the Second World War. It is these groupings which should make up the pillars of a future world federal system.
In effect, the representatives of the US, Russia (or the CIS as soon as it is consolidated) and China should be joined by the representatives of India, Japan and other regional organisations (e.g. Organization of African Unity, the Organization of American States, the Arab League and other potential large regional organisations including, of course, the European Union). The European Union can start this process off by substituting the representatives of France and Great Britain with its own, and thus avoid the allocation of a permanent seat to Germany (which would be highly counter-productive both for European unity and strengthening of the Security Council).
6. After this brief look at the contribution of the European Union to world unification we should now consider the specifically military aspect of a European Union security policy that is primarily aimed at world unification. Here we can take our cue from certain general views of military problems within the present international system. The fact that world unification is on the agenda does not mean that the time is ripe to create a democratic world system of government in which international conflicts become totally domestic affairs, handled by the police and by political/administrative means. In light of this the European Union must have at its disposal military forces for its external security in order to be capable of participating autonomously in implementing world decisions, and thus to contribute actively in the process of world unification. These forces must be under the control of a European government, hence both eliminating national armies for the reasons given above and also fitting in with the principle of subsidiarity (i.e. greater efficiency, savings, etc.). This would entail the complete federalization of the defence policy of the European Union. In addition to this clarification, we should understand that the alternative “Unite or perish” has already produced such transformations in the international system that the military problems of today’s international situation fall between policing problems and defence problems as traditionally conceived.
In this context the main point to remember is the end of the East-West divide. This has led to the practical disappearance of the risk of a general war between nuclear super-powers. It has also allowed the development of controlled disarmament and integration between East and West to such a point that the possibility of military confrontation between the countries involved is becoming more and more irrelevant. Military problems in the Northern hemisphere have become essentially linked to the inter-ethnic conflicts in the ex-communist countries. That is, conflicts which should become gradually de-militarized by means of the extension of the European Union to East-Central Europe and the revitalisation and consolidation of the CIS within the CSCE. Clearly a prerequisite of the above is that these processes are carried out with all due haste.
Undoubtedly the situation as regards the Southern hemisphere is a lot more complex. This is because the problems that are to be faced (democratic social-economic development and regional integration) in order to enable this area to play an active part in world unification are both considerably more difficult and require a lot more time than the problems regarding the East. Therefore there will continue to be acute instability in the South, which is destined to produce endemic internal and international crises. This situation requires a very long term policy that seriously confronts the social-economic and political roots of instability. This should, according to the logic of the Marshall Plan, result in the subordination of development aid to disarmament, regional integration and guarantees for basic human rights. Furthermore attempts should be made to try and block the international arms trade and NBC proliferation. In the context of this policy a determined military policy aimed at preventing and punishing the violation of international order will also be needed for a long time to come. However serious the military problems emerging in the North-South relationship may seem, we are nevertheless dealing also in this case with problems that are qualitatively different from those during the East-West conflict. This is due to the imbalance of forces between the Northern countries and the South.
If this is the type of military problem that characterizes the present international system, it should be evident that an effective world police force, responsible to the UN, must be gradually built up. This is the cheapest and only effective way to involve those countries called on to take the lead in the process of world unification. On this very complex subject, I will only give two brief outlines dealing with local crisis and nuclear proliferation.
Concerning the first point, it seems obvious that, if the Security Council in times of need had at its automatic disposal a worthwhile military force, consisting of contingents supplied by the permanent members of the Security Council in proportion to their economic weight, then this force would become increasingly efficient in preventing adventurism (like that of Saddam Hussein), and for any other intervention which may still be required in the future.
Concerning the second point, the Security Council could possibly face the problem of nuclear proliferation as follows. The permanent members of the Security Council come to an agreement which would place their nuclear capabilities under the control of a world security authority. Its role would be to dissuade other countries from using or threatening to use weapons of mass destruction. In effect we would pass from super-power deterrence to world authority deterrence directed against any country that was not willing to participate seriously in world unification. In this way we would see a return to the implementation of the Baruch Plan of 1946, which indeed foresaw United Nations’ control of nuclear power, and which failed because of the Cold War.
On the basis of the above exposition, it should be recognized that the military aspect of an effective security policy of the European Union must essentially coincide with a European contribution to a world police force.
The conventional aspect of this contribution would be as follows:
a) a European army considerably smaller than the present sum total of existing national armies would be sufficient.[5] This would lead to the abolition of compulsory military service and the introduction of compulsory civic service. In certain sectors this civic service may need to be paramilitary in order to avoid the situation that tasks which involve military force are carried out exclusively by professionals;
b) such a European army should be integrated into a NATO that has been transformed into the military arm of the CSCE and is no longer subordinate to American political-military hegemony;
c) the role of the European army as an integral part of the world police force should be signified in some symbolic way. For example by a title such as “European Contingents of World Security and Peace Forces”, and by the adoption of an oath of allegiance to a European constitution which explicitly aims at world unification;
d) over and above any symbolic content, the European army should have an unequivocable constitutional commitment to a policy of world unification. The European constitution should state that a European army is not only at the disposal of the UN for the development of a world police force, but also that it can only intervene outside European Union territory on the basis of UN decisions, or CSCE decisions agreed upon by the UN. This would ensure that neutral countries would no longer have valid reasons to oppose participation in a fully unified federal Europe and involvement with the military aspects of its security.
The nuclear aspect of a European contribution to the development of a world police force involves the nuclear forces of France and Great Britain. Here it is clear that the European Union must not only persuade France and Great Britain to participate actively in nuclear disarmament (and more generally NBC disarmament), but also to place the remainder of their forces under UN control. In this way the European Union would decisively contribute to the system of UN deterrence, referred to above, and could also avoid becoming a nuclear power itself, while simultaneously overcoming the strong military imbalance between its members that exists due to the possession and non-possession of a nuclear capability (which is one of the obstacles to the completion of European unification). It remains clear, however, that the European Union will only be able to implement this policy effectively by making the fastest possible progress towards the federalisation of its foreign and security policies.

[1] The slogan “Europe must unite or perish” was launched by Aristide Briand when he presented his proposal for European unification, in 1929.
[2] Regarding this, I want to underline the fact that the overcoming of East-West conflict has not only meant the beginning of democracy in the East, but also a significant strengthening of moves towards democracy in the Southern hemisphere. This also because it has automatically weakened communist totalitarian tendencies in this part of the world, and consequently ended the American tendency to support the worst forms of dictatorship of so long as they were anti-communist.
[3] The end of East-West conflict meant the defeat of Soviet style economic planning as a valid alternative to the market economy. However, this should not lead us to believe that the economic system of the Western democracies does not need to be radically changed in favour of guaranteeing greater social justice, greater solidarity between rich and poor peoples and the safeguarding of the environment.
[4] To appreciate what chances the European Union has of strengthening the CSCE, after equipping itself with stronger institutional instruments for the implementation of a common foreign policy and common security policy, one must keep in mind that the European Community, despite having very weak tools at its disposal to engender co-operation in foreign policy, has already played a very important role in the negotiations that gave birth to the CSCE. One of the few instances in which the EC has spoken with a single effective voice in the context of European political co-operation was its request to insert the “third basket”, regarding human rights, into the Final Helsinki Act. Today we know that this aspect of the CSCE, desired by the EC above all other options, had great importance in the process that led to the disintegration of the Soviet bloc because it created important openings for dissident groups inside communist countries and allowed information channels regarding human rights violations to be set up.
[5] The reduced size of a European army conceived as an integral part of the development of a world police force would have two advantages. Apart from the large savings involved, it would also be a solid guarantee against the danger of centralising tendencies causing the collapse of a federal Europe.

Share with