political revue


Year XXX, 1988, Number 1, Page 50



1. Basic features of the problem.
As is well known, industrial revolutions have brought about many changes in modern society. The impact of these changes, which are occurring at an increasingly faster pace, and which have no historical precedent, is both positive and negative. Although there is social and material progress, there are also new types of alienation and disorder, which affect different social groups and different regions within the states to a varying degree. The opposition between centre and periphery can be seen on an international scale, if we look at the unequal relationship between countries and groups of countries, which many have tried to compare to the class struggle. The aims of this struggle are mainly economic, but the political system allows clearer identification of the agents and gives them a minimum framework.
Alienation, exploitation, domination and co-operation or the lack of it between countries all contribute to the reinforcement of the power of states, whether in the case of a great power reinforcing its state apparatus to safeguard or to extend its economic dominion, or — at the other extreme — a small country trying at whatever cost to get a minimum of tools to ensure its own position.
We may note that where different levels of government exist, both in the Third World countries, or in the so-called capitalist or Communist countries (i.e. countries with ideologies which are often diametrically opposed), it is always the central government which manages to gain some advantage from the growth of public powers. In brief, there are few options concerning the future evolution of the federal states in this context. Either we accept the tendency towards centralization, thus risking falling into new forms of totalitarianism and concentration of power in the hands of a few men, or we stop this tendency, and the whole system ends up being paralysed by confusion and anarchy.
In fact extreme situations like those described are scarcely imaginable in the industrialized countries of the West. Even where the centralization of political power is very strong, the complex nature of problems and the consequent specialization of functions fragment decision-making powers to a certain extent. But to what extent? This is one of the things we need to investigate. If we wish to speak of the dynamics of centralization within a state, we must study its relations, not only with neighbouring states, but also with the whole international political and economic system.
We have stressed the limitations of decision-making power within a state, but the margin of manoeuvre, even that of the great powers, is reduced still further by the international political and economic system. To take a concrete example, multinational companies act within a space transcending the territorial boundaries between individual states and, obviously, those between the regions of the individual states. The penetrating power of these private enterprises is worth analysing, because it poses a problem which requires systematic decisions to be made. In fact, the central government of a given state, in its relationships with these powerful enterprises, must sometimes resist, sometimes yield, and sometimes collaborate, and often all at the same time, to different degrees depending on circumstances and power relationships. Now, the least we can say is that, in this clash or co-operation (whether free or forced), the government in question will need all its resources and will thus be little inclined to divide its powers with low or medium levels of government, above all when there is the risk that these may overturn or at least block the political procedures it intends to use with multinational companies. And, to complicate matters, multinational companies can at times try to divide the different government departments and the different levels of government (as in the case of the game of undercutting each other that regions and provinces play in an attempt to get foreign investments).
Put in this context, the territorial and political frontiers between states and between their constituent parts, seem rather aleatory. In the case of weak states, foreign economic penetration is such that these frontiers have no significance. On the other hand, in some cases and to varying extents, this penetration fluctuates. And it is in this case that the existence of some state structure or other becomes important to develop a country or a region. Between total power and no power at all there is a vast intermediate area.
In a similar context, state power, if its area for manoeuvre is used well, remains, in the absence of anything better, a vital element. But what will be the role of the semi-states, as a certain number of provinces etc. can be considered, in relationship to the central government and foreign economic agents?
2. Political centralization, the counterpart of capitalism?
In an article which has become famous, “The Obsolescence of Federalism”,[1] Laski seems to be affected by the results of the New Deal in the United States, at a time when centralization is proceeding at an unprecedented pace in peacetime. Laski, a theorist of the Labour movement, is at the same time quite worried by the development of multinational enterprises, funded mainly by American capital. For him, what was happening at the time (during the great crash) in a country like the United States was a forerunner of what would happen to federalism in the other industrialized countries of the world. Confronted by the tendency towards political centralization (the central government of the United States) and economic concentration (private enterprises), he drew certain conclusions along the lines that many federal states could follow to justify the growth of their powers and their functions.[2] In fact, these states would have an increasingly unequal struggle with national private enterprises and with those controlled from abroad. Limiting himself to the American case, Laski maintains that administrative decentralization is a good thing, but he insists on the great need to concentrate political power to the benefit of the central government. The weakening of the latter by the division of powers (the horizontal division) and by means of federalism (the vertical division) no longer corresponds to the needs of industrialized society.
According to Laski and many like him, who are anxious to “save democracy”, if we want to oppose monopoly capitalism and the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few, homogenous, efficient groups, it is necessary to strive for parallel centralization of political power, in the hands of democratically elected representatives. The national government would no longer have to worry about the limits other political bodies might place on it, which might paralyse it. On the contrary, it will play a role which intermediate governments cannot play with any success.
According to those who promote this thesis,[3] political centralization would allow for minimum national standards of health, education, social security, working, environmental, and union conditions, progressive income tax, transport, energy, public works, etc. If these tasks are left to government at a lower level, there is the risk they will not co-operate, that they will compete and play against each other to attract foreign investment, or other short-term advantages. They would thus become easy prey for large international enterprises, who already control most of them. Further, these governments do not have the right people or material resources to face the tasks listed above, or to engage in any real economic planning. Thus it is clear that the governments of the member states are an obstacle towards social progress, rationalization, and effectiveness, all things which characterize a modern, democratic society. It must be added that, when Laski and his followers published these ideas, the situation, especially in parts of the southern United States, was not in the least favourable to decentralization.
From a more general point of view, the central government would ideally be a valid alternative, at least in certain ways, to capitalism in the phase we could define “contracting capitalism”, as opposed to the “savage capitalism” of the last century. According to this interpretation of the facts, present day capitalism needs a framework which would allow the free circulation of goods and people, and, as Laski stated in another paper, intermediate governments are an obstacle to this. Capitalism needs a uniform legislative framework, and a credible, rapid and effective partner who speaks in the name of all the citizens of the country. This type of new, evolved capitalism “can no longer allow itself the luxury of federalism”. It is, however, necessary to oppose a form of politics which allows capitalism to dominate public powers. The new model proposed is useful to citizens, economic enterprises and democracy alike, but its nature is such to automatically bring about the decline of the member states as entities with autonomy.
Rather strangely, however, Laski disapproves the concept of sovereignty for the federal state,[4] as for the unitary state, because such a concept does not allow the conduct and the objectives of the state in its internal/external relations to be described, and instead he puts forward the idea of association as the essential basis of the modern state, because, he argues, the authority of the state does not in the end have any guarantee beyond the “will” of its members.
Let us end by observing that this scheme is not devoid of logic if we accept its premises. On condition, however, that the central government is sufficiently independent from the economic agents in question. And this is simply not the case, particularly in the United States, where, as everyone knows, the central government is greatly influenced by representatives of the most important economic groups. This interference is justified, on the other hand, because there must be osmosis between the public and the private sectors, if we want to achieve our objectives of rationality, effectiveness and economic profitableness.[5] This is part of the logic of a system which seeks to put pressure on strategic positions. If political power is centralized in the hands of a national government, all efforts will be directed towards the latter. And instead of becoming a judge or an independent partner, it risks becoming manipulated to a greater or lesser extent. But this is another problem which must not be treated simplistically, because, in one federal capital, there is a plethora of agencies and commissions, which are dependent both on Congress and the Executive which certainly complicate the interplay of interests.
At this point in our discussion, let us state the fact that, whatever the result of the ties between public power and private enterprise, the central institutions have become the main meeting point between these agents. This situation has incalculable consequences for the international system and power relations within the states, if we consider the joint power of public and private agents in America. Furthermore, the American federal state is now considered, if not a model to be imitated, at least a prototype for federalism in the post-industrial society (for better or for worse).
3. Central governments and the international system.
In an essay entitled National Autonomy and Economic Development, the American sociologist Peter Evans[6] indirectly faces the problem which interests us here, studying the impact of investment on mining and manufacturing industries, as well as the strategies of multinational enterprises as regards imports. This study refers to a certain number of relatively weak countries characterized by close relations with American multinationals. The first conclusion reached will surprise few. The essay states that the less a country is developed, the more its industry is dependent on foreign enterprises, if people, goods and money are allowed to circulate freely.
In this case, small and medium-sized enterprises are rarely able to compete with the large ones. Their immediate, short-term interest causes them to seek forms of co-operation with large enterprises. But this cooperation comes at the price of a subordinate relationship, mostly dependent on decisions taken in a different country. Because the management and the main shareholders are foreign, their sensitivity to the problems of the country in which they have economic interest is fairly tenuous. However, as the writer stresses, if a relationship of this type involved public enterprise, the countries in question would be called colonies.[7] Since the economic agents are private, the loss of national sovereignty is not always so visible. But the capacity of the nation-state, as a collective, to take decisions on its own political and economic future tends to diminish.
When, for example, we study countries like Canada or Switzerland, we can see that the amount of dependence on these foreign economic agents is certainly variable and not at first sight comparable to less developed countries. But this does not remove the problem, which could be stated in the following terms. The evaluation of the role of national autonomy in seeking its own economic progress depends, here as well, on the value we give to the impact of foreign investments, for example in mining industries, in transformation industries or in any other part of the tertiary sector. If we maintain that these investments are beneficial for the country (and obviously this depends on the criteria we use), we will tend to consider every obstacle to the circulation of foreign capital irrational. The chauvinistic nationalists who want to erect barriers to foreign investment, and thus risk slowing down the economic development of the country, are thus condemned in the name of economic liberalism and free exchange. If, on the other hand, we maintain that the multinationals are mainly enterprises which only care about their own profit, we will adopt a different attitude, especially if we prove that this subordination has more or less long-term adverse effects.
At an international level the worsening of the disparity between countries must be stressed, as well as regional disparity within the countries. We will study both of these tendencies, and will refer to precise data, for example to find out to what extent foreign investment contributes to the technological development of a country. We will try to calculate this in terms of the number and quality of posts created, its effects on other sectors of production, etc.
To sum up, the nature and the level of dependence and effects may vary considerably from country to country, depending on the economic and political infrastructure of the latter. In short, there are a vast number of intermediate approaches between the two extreme ones, which makes things difficult for those who want to use the existing margins for manoeuvre. But what are the tools which will allow the “national community” to exploit it? Here we must face a situation which seems paradoxical at first sight: in some countries in which there is a large amount of foreign capital, the weak class of local entrepreneurs, who are looking for more protection, pushes those in power to develop more socialist forms of economic organization, even if the latter would have preferred private enterprise. In poorer countries there does not seem to be any alternative to the state. The state is the only tool which the people should, in theory, be able to control and use to ensure their own development and their own protection, even though the state very often becomes controlled by an elite, which becomes increasingly more removed from the mass of the citizens. And more seriously, and particularly in less developed countries, this elite is too bound up by the economic interests which dominate its infrastructure.
To conclude, whatever new model is used to solve this crucial problem, the people who most care about safeguarding a minimum of autonomy in these countries are induced to think that a national, democratic state is the main, if not the only, ace they have. Not because the state is a direct producer of goods, but because it should permit a better use of material and human resources. In poor countries or ones in crisis (such as the industrialized states during the thirties), economic mobilization is even spoken of, and almost “full powers” are conferred on the central government.
This situation — some will argue — applies mostly to undeveloped countries or those in the throes of a great crisis. In reality, in industrialized countries (and in those which still claim to be inspired by classical liberalism) the needs are increasingly complex and the intervention of the state shows no signs of diminishing. On the contrary, the number of the state’s tasks is growing, mostly because of the international division of labour. Even when it is considered desirable that the central government should intervene as little as possible, it is induced to do a lot of coordinating and arbitrating in cases of internal conflict, which are often caused by the intersecting of national and regional interests within the international economic system.
In the world of business, at least among people with democratic leanings, the argument is often used that the extension of international economic relations contributes, in time, to the democratization of the decision-making process within the countries involved in the exchanges. The force of progress in a world which is increasingly becoming more interdependent would contribute to a “multinationalization” of activities which had been regional or national for a long time.[8] We will limit ourselves to stating that this undeniable transformation, which in many countries has been both sudden and far-reaching, has radically changed the nature of their decision-making process. In fact, while in the last century, at least until the Second Industrial Revolution, most routine decisions were taken locally, today almost every aspect of the citizens’ activity depends on decisions taken outside the state, over which it has little influence. Within this framework, it is not surprising that the central government, for example that of the federal state, seeks to guarantee at least some articulation between the external and the internal, regional or local forces. The former, if they are not controlled, may submerge the national community, and the latter are increasingly anaemic and internally divided.
In the US, readjustment of the focus of the main political activities and the consequent shift in power has all been in favour of the central government. Little more than a century ago the following functions were under the control of states and local governments: education, health, private ownership, production and distribution of goods, credit, transport, public services, civil rights, the administration of justice, etc. At the beginning of this century, the central government controlled only a third of general public spending, while the rest was controlled by other levels of government. Since then the pattern has reversed. This will be discussed in a later part of this study. We have mentioned these indicators here because they show at least how even one of the most liberal and most decentralized states did not escape the process of centralization and nationalization[9] which is denounced today by those who support the “multinationalization of the economy”. In fact no other country today has such a concentration of material and human resources within what is called the “executive”, as in the times of Montesquieu and Jefferson.
Up to now we have considered the centralization of power within the states in a vertical perspective, which shows us how the government of a unitary state or a federal state has to come to grips with external forces. Now we must investigate at what point theories like those of the separation of the three powers (or horizontal dimension) are under pressure in all the states. Everywhere we can see that the two powers “legislative and judicial” have been weakened to the advantage of the executive or the government,[10] in the restricted sense of the term. There is also a vast literature on this theme. In the United States it is being said that the power of the President is being extended, if not quite becoming imperialistic. In France the transformation of the political institutions of 1958 has only officially consecrated a change[11] visible in all industrialized countries.
We must confirm that the evolution of the international system has contributed to reinforcing the powers of the executive to the loss of the two other “classic” powers, increasing the level of centralization, not only compared to other levels of government, but also compared to the judiciary and the legislature. Studies on the Presidency of the United States show us, in fact, how this institution has been able to increase its power, basing itself on its control of foreign policy and defence. The more the United States, despite a certain tendency to isolation, becomes involved in the international system, the more the Presidency reinforces its position of influence and prestige. It is thus not surprising that the Presidency, and above all the bureaucratic apparatus which surrounds it, are under the cross-fire of the “inferior” levels of government and the other two “branches of government” mostly when the system is badly abused.
Limiting their examination to specific aspects of the external factors mentioned above, such as that of growing interdependence, many authors foresee the end of the national state, the multiplication and the subdivision of responsibilities, fragmenting loyalties, etc. James Rosenau speaks of horizontal and vertical, internal and external communities overlapping each other so that the loyalty of the individuals increasingly transcends the limits of the states in which they live.[12]
4. The closing of space, nationalism and political centralism.
We may thus stress the phenomenon of interdependence and changes which the classic nation-state has undergone, because of two changes which we will deal with in a later study, the emergence of certain regions and the decline of the efficiency of central governments in the management of the powers they have been reserving for themselves. From this point of view the nation-state as an agent is subjected to pressure which comes from the intraterritorial basis, and becomes increasingly closely involved with other states.
However, it can never be stressed too much how varied different states’ defences are. And if it is true that in the present international situation the decision-making power of many governments is becoming weaker when compared with external factors, this is certainly not happening in all countries. In precisely the case of those governments which feel most threatened (and feeling obviously involves a prise de conscience) the most outspoken form of nationalism emerges, usually accompanied by a strong wish to consolidate their own powers, especially in its relationships with foreign political and economic agents. Gilpin says that economic nationalism is thus a response to the economic forces of the market, which create an international division of labour between the large industrial and technological centres and the periphery, made up of industries with a small technological content or which only produce raw materials.[13]
This type of economic nationalism is partly the consequence and reflection of a precise political will. Its origins lie in certain states in the “periphery” which want to benefit from industrial development as well, converting at least some of their raw materials on the spot. Their objective is to diminish the country’s dependence on transnational forces, which can only be achieved by creating one or more autonomous industrial centres. Let us stress again that it is easy to classify this behaviour as backward in the name of the laws of the market and of internationalism, while in many cases it is a defence reaction on the part of a community which feels its existence as a distinct entity threatened.
To convince ourselves that this attitude has real foundations, it is worthwhile analysing the conditions in which the integration of large economic bodies happens. Who integrates? How are the fruits of integration divided up? The disparity between countries is diminishing, etc.? François Perroux, in a study which remains a classic on the subject, has shown how inharmonious growth can be when economic agents are too unequal, above all when no real mechanisms of correction or redistribution exist. These inharmonious effects become evident in the various regions (some may become emarginated, others become centres of development), at the level of activities (unused or overused industrial capacity), at the level of social groups (privileged or unprivileged labour depending on industry), etc. Neither price nor market control the best allocation of resources from a national point of view. And no nation accepts the diktat of the price and the market, not even the United States, if we consider, for example, its relationships with the EEC.
Hence, the modern nation-state has become a kind of compromise between market influence and internal political needs. Central governments thus try to facilitate the creation of economic structures and to pursue policies that will probably guarantee national production which is advantageous for the country, taking into account external bonds and the internal pressures exerted by social groups and, more and more frequently, by regions. The more economic integration is accepted because its results are judged equitable by the parties concerned, the less it needs the intervention of a public power, whether in the international framework or within a state. All in all, however, the reply to the question “who will integrate?” is “the state” or a similar organization.
Using the concept of economic integration in Perroux’s sense,[14] in respect of the large economic bodies, we come to the conclusion that it is above all necessary to guarantee the integration and internal solidity of different countries, in conditions which are increasingly difficult, because of the imbalances which exist between them in the present system. National integration will then be “the result of contradictory actions: the disintegrating actions of sub-systems (industries, regions, social groups) implied in every growth, and the integrating actions decided by the public powers to maintain national cohesion. National integration comes from a collective project.” The author adds later: “We must not forget that free exchange between countries with very different levels of industrial development favours the strongest, and, if it is not accompanied by compensatory policies, it discriminates against the weakest or disintegrates and weakens the most favoured among them”.[15]
If the states that are thus threatened are grouped in a body like the Common Market, we can hope that “the community spirit” will one day be sufficiently developed to establish mechanisms which would permit the “compensatory” policies, of which Perroux speaks, to be drawn up, policies which require that we go at least partly against free exchange. Such measures are, however, not possible without strengthening central institutions. On the other hand, a state abandoned to itself, faced by the same threat tends to rely on the strengthening of the state apparatus. This translates into “nationalist” and nationalizing measures, and accentuates still more the centralizing of power vis-à-vis the regions which constitute the country.
5. Internal Reactions.
We have shown above how unequal relationships between states can be, given the huge differences that separate them in terms of political and economic power. If we look now at a lower level of power, inside the countries in question, we see that there are different amounts of unbalancing features which, every proportion guarded, produce the same effects. In several Western federal states (including Canada), which belong to the group of developed countries, economic disparities between the regions can be observed: we are speaking of relationships between the centre and the periphery, of the central regions, of the moving of the axis of economic development in favour of one or two new centres. Some authors go as far as to talk of internal colonialism.[16]
It is, however, necessary to observe that internal reactions against the central government are not necessarily a characteristic of the poorer regions. The case of Biafra in the federal state of Nigeria, of the Ukraine in the USSR, of Slovenia and Croatia in Yugoslavia, seem to indicate the contrary. It is necessary to try to shed more light on the forces which sustain the movements which oppose the centralizing of power, whether in general or in particular in certain federal states. This movement can go as far as to demand the separation or at least the radical restructuring of the state in the framework of which they feel threatened.
It is certain that almost everywhere we can see reactions to political centralization. These reactions take on different aspects, like the regionalist movements in France, Belgium, Great Britain and Spain. In Africa they are often wrongly classified as tribal movements aiming to correct the arbitrary nature of colonial boundaries. Elsewhere it is the ethnic minorities that rebel. This opposition can fight against particular aspects of centralization, like, for example, growing bureaucracy, perhaps allying itself with a revolt of “citizens who pay taxes”, as in the United States.
Everywhere we see reactions that, if they were synchronized and “orchestrated”, could constitute a strong force against central governments. An International of this kind can obviously not be founded, given the variety of demands formulated, which certainly have as their common enemy a “central government” — but a central government which is not a world-wide one.
In this way the international system puts a considerable brake on these movements, as far as they contest it, by, for example, striving to create new states from states recognized for a long time. Except at the time of decolonialization, the international system seems to be reluctant to go in this direction, even when certain large powers consider it in their interest to redraw the world map. Public international law consecrates this status quo, only recognizing one government as being legitimately capable of speaking in the name of every member state of the international community. Even in highly decentralized federal states the “intermediate governments” must take the “federal umbrella” into account in one way or another.
Returning to the international economic system, we have seen above how states make an effort to reinforce their apparatus and thus the powers of the central government, with the aim of protecting themselves better. The same argument could be used by the intermediate governments facing a dual threat, the threat from outside and the threat incarnated in a central government which does not meet their needs, or does not answer them sufficiently. These governments, provincial or otherwise, could be induced to move towards a greater centralization, thus openly going against the national government. For as long as this duel does not affect the international order, as the great powers mentioned above understand it, it will be considered an internal question and, in the last instance, again within the powers of the national government. Following this reasoning to its logical conclusion, the latter is always the victor from the legal point of view.
In fact, things are much more complex, even if this interpretation has a certain validity. Law evolves, it leaves open loopholes, the states themselves change, there is no immutable international order. In the course of history, the map of the world has been continually changing on the basis of power relationships, but the need to maintain the present order comes above all from the need for the governments to protect themselves from the external and internal troubles that affect them more directly.
If we add these considerations which concern the international system to the other elements analysed above, we will see that the regions, the provinces and other political entities, find themselves in a difficult situation when they really try to struggle to defend their political autonomy. The latter can, however, be legitimate and possible, even if it would lead to the creation of a new sovereign state. This depends on certain variables of both internal and external order, which we cannot examine here. These variables depend on the power of the community in question, on its social and political cohesion, on the intensity of its motivation, on its capacity to find support in the other parts of the country and abroad, etc. What we must stress here is the essential importance of a peaceful arrangement which would not excessively affect the other regions of the country in transformation and, hence, the international system itself.
As far as the central government of the federal state goes, as long as there are no attempts on its powers, it can stress co-operation, administrative decentralization and other more or less effective solutions. If however it feels its essential powers are threatened, it will be forced to use coercion in a crescendo of preventive, repressive measures. And these, in their turn, may lead to a direct clash, or to the explosion of the country, and would involve the international system in a very different way and in conditions very often less favourable to all the parties, whether more or less interested.
It is obvious that modern federal states (the matter in question in this study) will try to avoid conflict which could degenerate in such a disastrous way. However, if the needs of a community are pressed to a marked degree, they would be forced, sooner or later, to make important changes in their structure. And, unless governments proceed as in the case of the Ukrainian and Biafran attempts, it is not possible to avoid discussing the problem of the division of powers. But how far can the federal state, as it has been conceived of up to now, go along this road?
Edmond Orban

[1] See Harold Laski in New Republic, May 1939.
[2] See in particular the New Democratic Party in Canada and the Social Democrats of the German Federal Republic.
[3] Harold Laski, A Grammar of Politics, London 1930. See also William Ebenstein, Today’s Isms, Communism, Fascism, Capitalism, Socialism, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1973, chap. 3.
[4] See in particular, The Foundation of Sovereignty and Other Essays, New Haven, 1921, and Jacques Maritain, “The Concept of Sovereignty”, in American Political Science Review, June 1950, pp. 343-357.
[5] There is a lot of literature on this subject in the US. See for example our La Présidence moderne aux Etats-Unis, personnalité et institutionnalisation, chap. 1, “Quelques variables et constantes dans le choix des conseillers présidentiels”, Montreal, Presses de l’Université du Québec, 1974.
[6] Peter Evans, National Autonomy and Economic Development. Critical Perspectives on Multinational Corporations in Poor Countries.
[7] With regard to this, we could quote a huge literature devoted to neo-colonialism, to relationships between the centre and the periphery, imperialism, etc. (see in particular Harry Magdoff, Paul Baran, Gunder Frank, etc.) which also applies to relations with the Third World.
[8] H. Kaiser, “Transnational Relations and the Democratic Process”, in International Organization, vol. XXV. no. 3, 1971, p. 370.
[9] By nationalization we do not mean collectivization of the means of production, a situation which in the US is just about non-existent.
[10] When we speak of the central government in the most general sense of the term, we include legislative, judicial and executive institutions.
[11] The famous speech by Charles de Gaulle at Bayeux (1945) expresses in the most rigorous way the need to strengthen the executive. This preoccupation is reflected in the Constitution of the V Republic, 1958.
[12] James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, London, Frances Pinter, 1980.
[13] R. Gilpin, “Integration and Disintegration on the North American Continent”, in International Organization, vol. XXVlll, no. 4, 1974, p. 265.
[14] François Perroux, L’Europe sans visages, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1958, in particular the VI chapter, “Intégration économique, qui intègre? Au benefice de qui s’opère l’intégration?”.
[15] François Perroux, op. cit., pp. 633 and 646.
[16] For a discussion of these theories and an empirical analysis see, above all, Michael Hechter, International Colonialism, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977. One of the founders of RIN (Rassemblement pour l’indépendance nationale) described the Quebec situation as a colony within Canada. See his work: André D’Allemagne, Le colonialisme au Québec, Montreal, Les Editions RB, 1966. Pierre Vallières, speaking of the francophone citizens of Canada, in Nègres blancs d’Amérique, considers them from this point of view also, but his analytical framework is Marxist.




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