Year XXX, 1988, Number 2, Page 112
HAMILTONIAN AND PROUDHONIAN FEDERALISTS: SYNERGY NOT CONFLICT*
The European Federalist movement was established, soon after the end of World War Two, because its founders were united in their determination to replace the system of absolute state sovereignty, which had brought so much suffering and destruction to Europe, by a European federation. But behind that common aim lay a variety of approaches, which were to crystallise into the two main schools of thought that became known as the hamiltonian and the proudhonian. Relations between them have not always been easy; and it may be useful to consider, after forty years’ experience, whether the differences could lead to synergy or whether they must be the cause of conflict.
The hamiltonians concentrated their action on the endeavour to secure a federal constitution for Europe. Altiero Spinelli was the leading exponent of the hamiltonian school, and the European Parliament’s Draft Treaty establishing the European Union was the culmination of his life’s work. The Draft Treaty diverged, to be sure, from the hamiltonian ideal. Defence was, in the light of the bitter lesson learned by federalists when the project for a European Defence Community failed in 1954, to remain for the time being subject to intergovernmental co-operation; and the legislature was, following the example of the Federal Republic, to take the form of a Bundesrat rather than a Senate. But the hamiltonians see the European Union as a great step towards their goal.
Following Spinelli, the hamiltonian school has been particularly strong in Italy. It was also strong in the British federalist movement, whose literature of the late 1930s served as an inspiration for Spinelli’s ideas. In Germany and the Netherlands, hamiltonians have likewise predominated. There were at times sharp conflicts between these federalist movements and Spinelli over tactics, and in particular over the usefulness of developing the Community in order to take steps towards federation. But the Union of European Federalists has been united about the aim of a European federal constitution.
The inspiration for the proudhonian school has come from France, starting with the works of P.-J. Proudhon and in particular his Du principe fédératif. Its leader in the postwar period has been Alexandre Marc (whose eightieth birthday was the occasion of the reflections on which this article is based). This school views federalism as the “conception politique qui permet de concilier les libertés particulières et les nécessités d’une organisation collective”. This concept is to be applied not only to political institutions but more generally to the organisation of the economy and society; and with respect to political institutions, the uniting of nation-states into a federation is seen as but one example of securing an appropriate distribution of power among different levels of government, from the commune at the base right up to an eventual world federal government. The whole scheme is based on a personalist philosophy, developed mainly in Paris in the 1930s, which rejects both individualism and collectivism. The term integral federalism, and more recently global federalism, has often been applied to this school, underlining the all-embracing extent of its scope. But here the adjective proudhonian, marking a neat contrast with hamiltonian, is employed.
The two leaders have each expressed their annoyance with the other school. Thus Spinelli wrote that, in his political action, he had had “no few difficulties with the followers of integral federalism of proudhonian or catholic inspiration”. Marc, for his part, has written of “le rôle paralysant, voire négatif, pour ne pas dire néfaste, joué par les adeptes du fédéralisme hamiltonien,… du ‘politique d’abord’’’.
Differences of temperament are to be expected between those who concentrate on a political campaign to achieve a constitutional structure, and those who are more interested in a wide-ranging approach to federalism based on a comprehensive philosophy. But has the controversy between the two schools reflected mainly differences of temperament, and hence of priorities, or is there a more fundamental incompatibility? Could a better understanding of both lead to synergy between them? This article seeks to throw light on these questions by considering the relevance of proudhonian ideas to those who seek to achieve a European federal constitution, under four main headings: infranational federalism, or autonomy for regions and communes; the distribution of economic powers; world federation; and proudhonian federalism as a whole.
European federation and infranational federation.
The fear of jacobin centralisation is one cause of resistance to the idea of a European constitution.
The entrenchment of local, regional and member-states’ autonomies is the most convincing antidote to this fear. Many of those who live in centralised, unitary states, such as France or the United Kingdom, have particular difficulty in understanding this federal principle. They focus on the sovereignty of the nation-state, or, in the British case, often on the sovereignty of the nation-state’s parliament. But as Jean Buchmann has explained, whereas sovereignty conceived as the summa potestas is indivisible, the puissance étatique is divisible and needs to be divided.
Some hamiltonian federalists have shown impatience about the fears of the Länder of the German Federal Republic that the Single European Act may infringe their competences. But if the constitution of the Federal Republic gives competences to the Länder on the grounds that the matters in question are more suitably managed at that level than at the level of the Federal Republic, it must at least be legitimate to doubt whether these competences should be taken over by a yet higher and more remote level such as that of the European Community. To belittle the doubts of the Länder about accepting such a loss of autonomy is hardly the best way to mobilise public support for transferring from the member states to the Community these competences that really do have a predominantly continental dimension.
The European Parliament’s Draft Treaty for European Union, which designed the institutional reforms that Europeans so much need, unfortunately went much farther in the wrong direction, giving the Union “concurrent competence in the field of social, health, consumer protection, regional, environmental, education and research, cultural and information policies” (Article 55), and thus raising the possibility of Union legislation across virtually the whole field of social policy. There are certainly some aspects of social policy, such as social security or the mutual recognition of educational qualifications, where a legislative role for the Union can be justified. The principle of subsidiarity was affirmed in the Draft Treaty, in order to discourage excessive centralisation. But it may be doubted whether this would be a sufficient safeguard. There is a strong case for emending the Draft Treaty in order to limit the role of the Union in this field; and this should help to attract the support of people who have a reasonable concern about local autonomy.
Marc has claimed, on the other hand, that proudhonian federalists have worked successfully to prevent regional autonomists from becoming separatists, and has suggested that if hamiltonians had understood the importance of ethnic and regional movements, the “poussée fédéraliste, en Europe, eût été multipliée par dix ou par cent”. While even a sympathetic hamiltonian may regard Marc’s quantitative estimate as somewhat exaggerated, and while the spinellist cause has in fact received powerful support from the Conseil des Communes et Régions d’Europe, it is to be regretted that so many autonomists have remained indifferent or even hostile to the struggle for a European constitution.
There were some promising beginnings. In 1943 in the Valli Valdesi, for example, Gustavo Malan recalls going to see Mario Rollier, one of the founders of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, to discuss the idea of an autonomous status for these Alpine valleys after the war. Rollier, after a moment’s reflection, agreed with the proposal provided that it was placed within the framework of a European federation. Not long after, in December 1943, representatives of the Valli Valdesi, including Malan and Rollier, met representatives of the Val d’Aosta, including the resistance hero Emilio Chanoux, at Chivasso, and expressed their demand for local autonomy within a European and federalist context in a document that became known as the Chivasso declaration, which gave rise to a significant literature. The political resolution adopted by the founding Congress of the UEF at Montreux in 1947 called for “a pyramid of solidarities from bottom to top” and called for federalists to work “simultaneously… on all planes: inside each country, between neighbouring peoples, between nations of the same continent, between regional federations”. But the principal drafter of that resolution was Marc; and for the subsequent decade and a half, local autonomy was given less emphasis in the resolutions of the UEF. The Charte Fédéraliste, adopted at the federalist Congress of 1964, again in Montreux, brought the hamiltonian and proudhonian streams together again, at least as far as doctrine was concerned. But during the following two decades the hamiltonians still did not take the infranational aspect of federalism really seriously. It is only in the last few years that hamiltonians in Pavia have begun earnestly to develop their doctrine in this direction.
To take the confluence of hamiltonian and proudhonian traditions beyond the realm of doctrine and into that of political action will not be easy. Yet recent evidence shows the importance of doing so, at least as far as the local and regional autonomist aspect of the proudhonian tradition is concerned. For the reactions of the German Länder to the Single European Act have demonstrated that those who value regional autonomy can see even small steps towards European integration as a danger to their cause: and how much more could they see European Union or Federation as their enemy if the protection of local and regional autonomies is not seen as a basic principle of the unification plans. Given that principle, however, the eagerness of many local and regional authorities for direct links with the Community, by-passing the often heavy hands of the governments of their member-states, indicates the potential support for a link between local autonomy and European federation.
European federation and the distribution of economic power.
Can political democracy coexist with an economy in which autocracy is the predominant form of organisation? A conventional marxism, assuming that political institutions are a superstructure determined solely by the character of the economic base, would assert that it cannot. But, having performed the service of drawing attention to the influence of economic structures on political forms, Marx led his followers to pervert that insight into a crude and simplistic dogma. Even in the Soviet Union, recent works have accepted that dialectical materialism can be more subtle: that one form of economic structure can coexist for a long time with a political form that does not appear to be determined by it; and that a range of political forms, not just one specific model, may correspond adequately with a given economic structure. Common sense can only applaud the rejection of a marxist one-way street, down which a rigidly defined economic structure determines a rigidly defined political model. But common sense may equally approve the proudhonian vision of a relationship between the economic and political forms.
Gorbachev’s difficulties in promoting his ideas for economic decentralisation within the Soviet party apparatus and bureaucracy demonstrate the close connexion between economic and political centralisation. In the 1930s, Marc and his friends were rejecting American capitalism and Soviet socialism “equally”. Both were seen, whether under the influence of Ford or of stakhanovism, to reduce the worker to the role of an instrument or a tool. In 1977, Marc was still defining capitalism as a system within which “la propriété, ou la possession, ou la gestion du capital… détermine une centralisation abusive des pouvoirs, tendant à la limite vers leur concentration maximale et incline vers leur monopolisation”. Yet Ford’s assembly line typified a phase of industrial development in a capitalism which has shown a large capacity for evolution, no less in the United States than elsewhere. For all its abuses, the economic forms and the distribution of power within American capitalism are pluralist, giving much greater diversity in the influence of the economy on politics and in the development of economic forms than is to be found in the Soviet Union.
With automation through microelectronics and information technology, the employment of large masses of people on the assembly line may soon be a thing of the past, and the tendency towards an abusive concentration of power may be counterbalanced by an opposite tendency towards decentralisation and demassification. Here again, Italian hamiltonians have been adapting proudhonian ideas for the development of their doctrine. The argument is that the new technologies, requiring co-operation among groups of skilled people rather than iron discipline over workers treated as robots, are friendly to more co-operative forms of organisation in the enterprise; and this is seen as a part of a general trend towards federal democracy. It would be dangerous to take a deterministic view of this process; the new technologies have a centralising potential as well. Big Brother could find ways to use them; and it will be harder for the Soviet Union than for the pluralist West to avoid this danger. But Marc has spent much of his life elaborating a theory which is precisely designed to deal with a process that has both centralising and decentralising elements. Economic development based on technologies that require both local autogestion and a European or worldwide dimension is a federalising development in this very sense; and, without succumbing to any facile determinism, it is reasonable to conclude that this offers federalists an opportunity to harness economic and social forces to the construction of a federal polity.
One of the motives for combining nation-states into a federation is to create an economic space big enough for the specialisation and scale required for the development of modern technology and hence for economic health and strength. This has been understood by the more progressive leaders of European industries, who have supported steps in a federal direction, such as the establishment of a customs union by the EEC Treaty and, now, the completion of the internal market. Such support can be important for the hamiltonian project of the European constitution. But many at the grass roots are indifferent to this, or even hostile, because they feel that the economic forces which shape their lives are slipping farther and farther away from their own sphere of influence. This can be the reaction not only of the workers in the factory and of the local leaders of local organisations, but also of young technologists and managers who see in the new technologies a chance to be creative individuals rather than cogs in a great hierarchical machine. Such people have a legitimate desire for autonomy. Hamiltonians may with equal justice consider that the European constitution is the first priority, offering a framework within which such problems as autonomy for small production units can be readily solved. But hamiltonians may also find that the support of those with an interest in the large market is not enough, and that the bureaucratic and nationalist resistances to the European constitution will not be overcome unless it attracts also those whose main interest is in the autonomy of small units, in the economy as well as in the structure of government. If it is true that the new technologies have both centralising and decentralising elements, it may follow that a great political reform such as the establishment of a European federation should, in order to have the most chance of success, recognise both poles of the antinomy. In juridical terms, this could be done by federal (meanwhile, Community or Union) laws that facilitate not only economic integration, but also decentralisation, participation, and co-operative forms of organisation in enterprises. In terms of political action, it points towards an effort by hamiltonians to forge an alliance not only with those whose main interest lies in the big market but also with autonomist economic forces, which may become an equally powerful part of the wave of the future, particularly in the growing sector of production based on the new technologies.
While the progress of science and technology has been breaking down the frontiers within Western Europe, it is also a force for integration of the wider world economy. Here, however, the political resistance is greater, sharpened as it is by divergences among cultures, economic levels, and economic, social and political systems. Yet a world federation is becoming ever more necessary, not only in order to manage the integrating world economy but also to secure the survival of life on this planet. Scholars who have studied the conditions that favour the creation of federations often include among them a similarity of economic and political systems. Thus a form of economic organisation that responds to the needs of the new technologies is important not only for the Europeans themselves in their internal affairs, but also for creating the conditions which will favour the development of a federal system for the world as a whole. The new technologies will be applied throughout the world. We Europeans will help the rest of the world as well as ourselves if we show how the conventional forms of economic organisation, rooted in nineteenth century European conditions and ideologies, can be reformed to suit the circumstances of the world in the twenty-first century; and we will at the same time help to pave the way towards world federation.
European and world federation.
“…we no more want a hermetically sealed Europe than a divided Europe. Our motto is and remains: One Europe in One World”. These final words of the political resolution approved by the first UEF Congress forty years ago are very typical of Marc’s eloquence and generosity of spirit. But they also reflected a general awareness among European federalists at that time that, in the nuclear age which Hiroshima and Nagasaki had just introduced, only a world federation could offer a full safeguard against nuclear catastrophe. When the Movement for World Federal Government held its own founding Congress, also at Montreux and immediately before the Congress of the UEF, one-third of the members elected to its Council and two-thirds of its Executive Committee were among those elected to the Central Committee of the UEF. But the European hamiltonians and the world federalists drifted apart and it is only recently that the connexion between European and world federation has begun to be appreciated again.
The hamiltonians of Pavia have, once more, had the intellectual energy to incorporate this connexion in their theoretical work. Politically, their idea has been to harness the energies of the peace movements to the concept that offers a solid institutional structure for the securing of permanent peace. From Britain, where the Federal Union organisation long propagated the causes of both European and world federation, Christopher Layton has recently shown how the European Community could contribute to the construction of a world order. From the perspective of European federalists, the political logic of this thinking is that it is becoming increasingly clear to many people that the aims of peace and prosperity, which have provided much of the driving force for movement towards European federation, cannot be realised without progress towards a federal order in the world as well as in Europe. The idealism which motivated so many people to work for European federation after World War Two is not likely to revive now, therefore, unless the European Community / Union / Federation is seen as playing an important part in the promotion of world peace and prosperity: hence, in the building of a world federation.
There is also a structural link between the processes of creating a European and a world federation. Domination of world politics by two rival superpowers is an unpromising basis for movement towards a federal world. The two rivals are almost bound to concentrate on their mutual rivalry and on the balance of power that conditions it, rather than on transcending their struggle through replacing the strategic balance and the rule of force by civilian politics and the rule of law. Nor is the possibility of their mutual agreement so reassuring for the rest of the world. “It is undesirable”, as Wheare put it in his classic work on federal government, “that one or two units should be so powerful that they can overrule the others and bend the will of the federal government to themselves”. Such a prospect is likely to deter other peoples from pressing for a closer union in which two superpowers seem likely to predominate.
The European Community, with its population greater than that of the United States or the Soviet Union and with its high level of economic development, is best placed to move the international system beyond its present phase of duopoly, provided that it consolidates its political strength by reforming the Community into a Union, and the Union into a Federation. The Europeans would then be able to influence an increasingly polycentric world, whose centres of power would include not only the United States and the Soviet Union but also states such as Brazil, China, India and Japan, as well as Western Europe, in the direction of a federal system in which there would be the prospect of a wide distribution of power across the different continents.
European federation and proudhonian federalism as a whole.
Two of the strongest forces in the world economy and polity today are the advance of the new technologies and the desire for democratic liberties. No political system can succeed unless it is designed to accomodate these two forces: unless, to use Marc’s words, it reconciles “les necessités d’une organisation collective” with “les libertés particulières”. This is why the essential political tasks of our time are to replace absolute nation-state sovereignty by political federalism, and the maldistribution of economic power by economic federalism.
Such federalism has to be applied at numerous levels. There is the need for autonomy for local and regional governments within the nation-states as well as the federating of nation-states at sub-continental, continental and eventually world level. There is the need for autonomy of small production units, whether independently or within large firms with federal or co-operative structures, as well as the creation of multinational enterprises of continental or world-wide dimensions. For the purpose of political action within this vast framework of proudhonian federalism, it is necessary to set priorities. It is normal that different people will have different preferences. My own priorities are to create a European federation and to work towards a world federal system, in order to safeguard peace as well as to enhance welfare through the common management of the increasingly interdependent economy.
Instead of seeking to maximise synergy from the different elements of global federalism, however, federalists with one priority have too often wasted energy fighting against federalists with another priority. Since respect for diversity is a basic principle of federalism, and since ends are influenced by means, such exclusive attitudes are an unpromising starting point for the application of federalist principles. Internecine conflicts between different groups of federalists are moreover a gratuitous impediment to the federalist endeavour, which faces quite enough resistance from anti-federalist forces. Ferdinand Kinsky has drawn attention to the rapprochement between hamiltonians and proudhonians in recent years, and to the widespread acceptance among all federalist tendencies of the urgent need for a federal constitution for Europe. I have tried, in the preceding pages, to demonstrate some reasons why the struggle for a European constitution and other elements of global federalism should be seen as complementary.
Any such thinking must benefit from the life’s work of Alexandre Marc. From the application of federalism in the most diverse fields of politics, economics and society, to the psychological, philosophical and religious basis for a just relationship between the person and society, Marc has for well over half a century never ceased to think, rethink, write, rewrite and above all to teach, to “atteindre les hommes, un à un, et les former”. The antinomial pole of his combative instinct has been his cordial, magnanimous urge to see all these diverse elements as a whole and to understand their complementarity. The corpus of his work challenges us all to adopt a broad and generous intellectual framework within which to relate the political strategies of the various tendencies among the federalists. We owe it to him to respond by thinking and acting in complementary ways to achieve our various federalist ends.
[*] We are publishing this essay by John Pinder because it deals with a major issue, the various developments of federalism in the various attempts to make it the rule of a new political behaviour. We may observe, however, that he analyzes the theoretical and strategic trends of a “school” of which he thinks the editorial board of this review belongs to. So we should make it clear that we do not consider our identity properly defined by the label “Hamiltonian federalism”. We refer to Hamilton (together with Jay and Madison) because their thinking reflects the invention of federal institutions which occurred — de facto and not intentionally — in the Philadelphia Convention in a very clear way. For this reason Hamilton marks a watershed in the history of federalism, which came to be defined only then. Otherwise, our references are obviously to the entire history of political thinking, our standpoint being one that uses historical materialism and, primarily, Kant’s writings on politics and the philosophy of history (and it goes without saying that we also studied Proudhon’s thinking). We wish to further underline that the conception of federalism which we have pursued in our review since 1959 has assumed various expressions, despite the constant reference to the Ventotene Manifesto (for a brief outline see the essay by Lucio Levi “Recent Developments in Federalist Theory” published in the second issue of The Federalist in 1987).
We are in any case in complete agreement with Pinder regarding the need to face up to the problems of mutual awareness and knowledge of the various theoretical formulations of federalism which tries to become a political force, even though it is still not possible to find all the literature and all the sources necessary to achieve this end.
 See Altiero Spinelli, Come ho tentato di diventare saggio. Io, Ulisse, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1984, pp. 307-308.
 Reprinted in the series Oeuvres complètes de P.-J. Proudhon, “Du princip fédératif et oeuvres diverses sur les problèmes politiques européens”, Paris, Librairie Marcel Rivière, 1959.
 The original paper has been prepared for publication in César E. Diaz-Carrera (eds.), El federalismo global, Madrid, 1987. The editors are grateful to Professor Diaz for permission to publish this text in The Federalist.
 Robert Aron et Alexandre Marc, Principes du fédéralisme, Paris, Le Portulan, 1948, p. 19.
 Ferdinand Kinsky, “Fédéralisme et personnalisme”, in Repères pour un fédéralisme révolutionnaire. L’Europe en formation, 190-192, Jan.-March 1976.
 Altiero Spinelli, Come ho tentato di diventare saggio: la goccia e la roccia, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1987, p. 63.
 Alexandre Marc, “Taisez-vous, bavards!”, in Repères…, Op. cit., p. 10.
 Jean Buchmann, “Du fédéralisme comme technique générale du pouvoir”, in Henri Rieben (ed.), Le fédéralisme et Alexandre Marc, Lausanne, Centre de Recherches Européennes, 1974, p. 116.
 See John Pinder, “Economic and Social Powers of the European Union and the Member States: Subordinate or Coordinate Relationship?”, in Ronald Bieber, Jean-Paul Jacqué, Joseph H.H. Weiler (eds.), An Ever Closer Union, Brussels, Commission of the EC for the European University Institute, 1985.
 Alexandre Marc, “Taisez-vous, bavards!”, in Repères…, Op. cit., p. 18.
 The monthly journal of the Associazione Italiana del CCRE, Comuni d’Europa, repeatedly expresses the particularly strong support from local and regional governments in Italy.
 Personal communication from Gustavo Malan.
 See O.C. (Osvaldo Coisson), “Nota bibliografica”, in “Chivasso -19 dicembre 1943: La Dichiarazione dei rappresentanti delle popolazioni alpine”, Novel Temp, No. 23, Sampeyre, Piedmont, Sept.-Dec. 1983, pp. 5-11, in which are also printed the Declaration and an article by Gustavo Malan entitled “Quarant’anni dopo”. See also Emilio Chanoux, “Federalismo e autonomie”, Quaderni dell’Italia Libera, 26, undated (1944); L.R. (Giorgio Peyronel), “Federalismo, autonomie locali, autogoverno” L’Unità Europea, No. 4, Milan, May-June 1944, p. 3, and “Federalismo e autonomie”, L’Unità Europea, No. 5, July-Aug. 1944, pp. 2-3; Giorgio Peyronel, “La Dichiarazione dei rappresentanti delle popolazioni al Convegno di Chivasso il 19 dicembre 1943”, in Il movimento di liberazione in Italia, No. 2, Milan, Sept. 1949, pp. 16-26. The paper by Chanoux and the second of Peyronel’s articles in L’Unità Europea are cited, in English, in Walter Lipgens, Documents on the History of European Integration, Vol. 1: Continental Plans for European Union 1939-1945, Berlin and New York, de Gruyter, 1985, pp. 534-6.
 General Political Resolution, UEF Congress at Montreux, 27-31 August 1947, reproduced in Jean-Pierre Gouzy, Les pionniers de l’Europe Communautaire, Lausanne, Centre de Recherches Européennes, 1968, pp. 156-8, and in part in Aron and Marc, op. cit., pp. 144-5. The passages cited above are reproduced in English in Lipgens, A History of European Integration 1945-1947, pp. 575, 590; the whole text of the resolution is reproduced in Andrew and Frances Boyd, Western Union, London, Hutchinson, undated (1948 or 1949), pp. 141-8.
 See Gouzy, ibid., p. 150. The “Charte Fédéraliste” was printed in the collection Réalités du present, textes et documents, Paris, Presses d’Europe, 1963.
 See, for example, Francesco Rossolillo, Città, territorio, istituzioni nella società post-industriale, Naples, Guida editori, 1983, and various articles in recent numbers of The Federalist.
 See Erno Loone, Sovremennaya Philosophiya Istorii, Tallin, 1980.
 Robert Aron, “Précurseur: Arnaud Dandieu (1897-1933)”, in Rieben, Op. cit., pp. 44-5.
 Alexandre Marc, “Monnaie et socialisme”, in Les cahiers du fédéralisme, supplément au numéro 212 de L’Europe en formation, Dec. 1977, p. 43.
 See Lucio Levi and Sergio Pistone, “L’alternativa federalista alla crisi dello Stato nazionale e della società industriale”, in Il Federalista, XXIII (1981), pp. 80-102, reworked and amplified in Lucio Levi, Crisi della Comunità europea e riforma delle istituzioni, Milan, Franco Angeli Editore, 1983; and Francesco Rossolillo, “Federalism in a Post-Industrial Society”, in The Federalist, XXVI (1984), pp. 120-133.
 See, for example, Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, 1965; K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, London, Oxford University Press, 1946.
 General Political Resolution, UEF Congress, 21-31 August 1947, reproduced in Gouzy, Op. cit. and Lipgens, Op. cit.
 See Lipgens, Op. cit., p. 588.
 See Mario Albertini, Lo Stato nazionale, Naples, Guida editori, 1980, p. 158, and various articles and editorials in The Federalist, for example “Towards a World Government”, in the first number of the review to appear in the three languages in July 1984.
 Christopher Layton, One Europe: One World, Special Supplement No. 4 to the Journal of World Trade Law, Geneva, in association with the Federal Trust, London, 1986; republished as Europe and the Global Crisis: A First Exploration of Europe’s Potential Contribution to World Order, London, Federal Trust and International Institute for Environment and Development, 1986.
 Wheare, Op. cit., p. 52 (of second edition, 1951).
 Ferdinand Kinsky, “Où en est la stratégie fédéraliste?”, L’Europe en formation, 258, Nov.-Dec. 1984, p. 37.
 See, for example, Denis de Rougemont, “Alexandre Marc et l’invention du personnalisme”, in Rieben, op. cit., and Ferdinand Kinsky, “Fédéralisme et personnalisme”, Op. cit.
 Jean-Pierre Gouzy, “L’apport d’Alexandre Marc à la pensée et l’action fédéralistes”, in Rieben, ibid., p. 6.