Year LXVII, 2025, Single Issue, Page 7
Unite or Perish
Since the inauguration of the new US administration, Europe and its citizens have been faced with the harsh reality that not only Russia but also the United States increasingly regard the European Union as an enemy to be sidelined—a weak and internally divided organisation with limited political influence that seeks to obstruct Russia’s expansionist ambitions towards Ukraine and Eastern Europe, while simultaneously seeking to impose its own regulations and standards on American companies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. At the same time, it represents a model of openness and resistance to the forces of nationalism, and thus stands in stark contrast to the cultural vision embraced by both the White House and the Kremlin.
Although a paradoxical convergence of the stances of the USA and Russia on both the invasion of Ukraine and the role of Europe had been apparent since the very start of Trump’s second term, the American administration’s proposed 28-point plan to end the conflict, unveiled at the end of November, constituted a further escalation of this trend. In fact, the plan fully aligns with the demands of the aggressor, Russia, while severely penalising the victim of the aggression, Ukraine. The document explicitly accuses Ukraine of Nazism, while also calling for it to abandon its NATO membership aspirations, reduce its armed forces to just 600,000 troops, and cede additional territory beyond the areas already occupied by Russia. Above all, under the terms of the plan, the fate of the Ukrainian people would be decided by the United States and Russia, with the Europeans excluded from any role in the negotiations and merely required to assume obligations and financial commitments.
Even though more developed documents are now under negotiation, and the EU and its member states, together with Ukraine, have managed to prevent the plan from being finalised, the fact remains that the USA—on whose support Kyiv depends in order to continue holding out against Russia’s aggression—has shifted from an ally to a power primarily interested in pursuing convergence with Putin.
Further confirmation of this shift in relations is provided by the United States National Security Strategy, presented by Trump at the beginning of December. It openly accuses the Europeans of: treating Russia as an existential threat; harbouring unrealistic expectations of the peace process, thereby impeding its progress; eroding their own identity and civilisation through excessively permissive immigration policies; undermining the fundamental principles of democracy; and suffocating opposition forces—by which it means nationalist parties such as the AfD in Germany and the Front National in France, which the White House regards as sources of ‘great optimism’.
If we also consider that European states are subject to daily Russian drone incursions and cyberattacks, not to mention Russia’s ongoing campaign of disinformation and its financial support for Europe’s strongly nationalist parties, it becomes clear that the continent, under attack on all fronts, has effectively already been drawn into the ongoing conflict and must now find the strength to respond.
Against this backdrop, the European Council meeting of 18–19 December 2025 represented an important opportunity for the European member states to send Russia and the United States a strong signal through decisions on two crucial issues: aid for Ukraine in the wake of the Trump administration’s declarations of disengagement, and the Mercosur agreement, which—in today’s climate of great power competition and rising US tariffs—would guarantee the Europeans preferential access to a major market. On both, however, the European Council settled for solutions that, while positive in some respects, did not amount to strong political responses. The picture of the EU that thus emerged was that of an organisation composed of numerous small states, each driven by its own national interest and consequently willing to opt for the easiest course of action.
Indeed, on the trade policy question concerning the possibility of opening up to the Mercosur market, which would mean significant economic gains for the Europeans, it was French concerns—stemming from the French government’s weakness in the face of its farmers’ protests—together with similar reservations from Italy, that ultimately prevailed, resulting in a one-month postponement of the decision.
On the political issue relating to the war in Ukraine, the limits of a Union that remains hostage to its member states emerged more clearly than ever. The Commission’s proposal, supported by Germany and the Nordic states, to use the frozen Russian assets currently held on the Euroclear platform to issue a loan to Ukraine—repayable should Moscow pay the war reparations it owes, but otherwise automatically convertible into compensation for war damages—met with opposition from Belgium, concerned that it might ultimately be held solely responsible for the platform, which is headquartered on its territory, as well as from France and Italy, fearful of possible retaliatory measures against their companies. It was furthermore rejected by Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, whose pro-Russian governments oppose solutions that would put pressure on the Kremlin. It should at this point be noted that use of the frozen Russian assets was also addressed in Trump’s 28-point peace plan, which envisaged investing EUR 100 billion of these funds in US-led reconstruction of Ukraine, with the United States set to receive 50 per cent of the resulting profits and the remaining frozen funds to be channelled into a joint United States–Russia investment vehicle. It is therefore clear that it was in the United States’ interest for the European Council’s proposal on use of the assets to fail. Likewise, the fact that the project was fiercely denounced in Russian propaganda confirms that it would have created serious difficulties for Putin. Even the Italian government’s cool stance on the proposed use of the assets was likely driven by a desire not to irritate Trump, with whom it believes it enjoys a special relationship.
The compromise solution ultimately adopted was to authorise a EUR 90 billion loan to Ukraine, funded through the issuance of new EU budget-backed bonds. To secure the abstention of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic—necessary because decisions on EU debt require unanimity—these countries were granted ‘opt-outs’ that exempt them from contributing to the repayment of the debt in question. The European Council, in its conclusions, justifies this measure on the basis of Article 20 TEU on enhanced cooperation, even though the conditions for such cooperation were not actually met in this case. Meanwhile, the Russian assets remain frozen for potential use in the future.
The final outcome, while providing a lifeline for Ukraine and containing positive elements insofar as it overcame resistance to the issuance of new debt, ultimately worked in favour of both Putin and Trump. Indeed, the new loan will, in practice, be paid by European taxpayers rather than by Russia, while the aforementioned pro-Russia EU governments succeeded both in preventing a course of action strongly opposed by Putin and in avoiding all repercussions of the decision to raise additional debt.
Even though the European Council’s two decisions safeguard both the possibility of concluding the Mercosur agreement in 2026 and Europe’s continued support for Ukraine (whose defence resources would otherwise have been exhausted by the end of March), its meeting was nevertheless a missed opportunity. A positive decision on the Mercosur question would have underlined the EU’s capacity to counter the United States’ protectionist drift, while strengthening its reputation as a reliable trading partner. Moreover, the use of Russian assets to support Ukraine’s resistance would have guaranteed Kyiv the resources needed to confront an already weakened Russia, thereby helping to induce the latter to accept a ‘just’ peace, while at the same time demonstrating the Europeans’ determination to react with unity and resolve to the attacks mounted by Trump and Putin on our model of integration and democracy, and setting Europe on the path to political unification.
Europe has long clung to the illusion that it can prosper in a world of open markets and international cooperation without needing to create a federal union. This belief has not only led to serious delays in key sectors such as defence, technological innovation and the digital sphere, but also left the European member states—now abruptly awakened to a global order defined by competition between major powers and a return to the use of force as an instrument of international relations—paralysed by fear and unable to respond decisively to external provocations.
This inability stems less from the unanimity rule than from the intergovernmental method—a rigid decision-making process that prevents the emergence of a European general interest and allows the member states to exert decisive influence over the functioning of the Union, thereby rendering it effectively dependent on them. First of all, when issues of fundamental importance to the future of the Union are decided by the governments of the member states—regardless of whether those decisions are taken unanimously or by qualified majority—the outcome necessarily reflects a compromise among competing national interests rather than a solution that serves the interest of Europe’s citizens as a whole. Indeed, every national government is accountable to its own electorate and by definition constrained by considerations linked to its electoral cycle and short-term interests. The unfolding of the European Council meeting in December reflects this reality, in which the importance of opening up to the Mercosur market and protecting Ukraine (whose defeat would cost Europeans far more dearly, both politically and economically, than the use of frozen Russian assets) was ultimately outweighed by the interests of individual states, driven by domestic political considerations and by their ties to the United States or Russia. A forum of national governments cannot, by definition, fulfil the role that would be performed by a democratically legitimised European government, which, being accountable not to individual national electorates and parliaments but to the citizens of Europe as a whole, would be in a position to take decisions in their common interest.
The European Union’s dependence on its member states becomes particularly problematic in relation to the issue of the EU budget, and thus the Union’s capacity to provide aid to Ukraine and to issue debt on a structural rather than occasional basis. Most of the European Union’s revenue in fact still derives from member state contributions, and the Union still lacks fiscal autonomy. The debt incurred by the Commission following the approval of the NextGenerationEU package, guaranteed by the EU budget (temporarily raised to 2 per cent GNI for this purpose), will require member states to increase their contributions unless new European own resources are introduced. The latter is a matter on which, at present, no agreement has been reached, as any such agreement requires unanimity both in the Council and at national level pursuant to Article 311 TFEU. A European Union endowed with a federal budget financed by fiscal resources fixed and levied directly by the Union would be able, on the one hand, to invest in the sectors (defence, digital technology and technological innovation) in which it is clearly lagging behind; on the other, like any other sovereign entity, it would be able to issue debt systematically, as its solvency would be guaranteed by the said fiscal resources, collected directly from citizens and businesses. In the absence of these conditions, debt issuance by the European Union cannot be structural—it would have to be decided on an ad hoc basis by the member states in emergency situations—and may fail to attract investors, who, aware of the Union’s structural weakness, internal divisions, and lack of a European fiscal authority to guarantee the debt, might be induced look elsewhere.
The stretching of the Union’s institutional mechanisms to their limits, and the adoption of compromise solutions such as the ‘opt-outs’ granted to Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic at the December summit, while clearly necessary in emergency situations and capable of addressing the fault lines that threaten the integration process, do not alter the fact that the European Union—or even just some of its members—must either constitute a political union, or inevitably succumb to the pressures of the member states’ divergent interests, leaving its citizens irrelevant on the global stage.
The Federalist
