Year LXVII, 2025, Single Issue, Page 52
EUROPEAN REARMAMENT, STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
AND THE MISLEADING COMPARISON TO 1914
In contemporary debate on the question of European rearmament, comparisons are frequently drawn with the arms race that preceded the First World War. This historical reference is often employed as a rhetorical device to denounce what is perceived as Europe’s present bellicose drift and to support the argument that increasing military spending would inevitably lead to a spiral of escalation similar to the one that led to the collapse of the European order in 1914. However, a closer analysis shows that this comparison is largely inappropriate and risks obscuring, rather than clarifying, the nature of the strategic problem now facing Europe. The historical, political and geopolitical situation of early-twentieth-century Europe was profoundly different from that of Europe today, as were the drivers, objectives and implications of European rearmament.
The period leading up to 1914 saw the main European powers directly engaged in a relatively symmetrical strategic competition with one another. Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Russia saw themselves as actors of comparable political, military and imperial might, operating within an international framework devoid of supranational institutions capable of managing crises. Rearmament during this period, rather than serving a primarily defensive or stabilising function, was an integral part of the pursuit of prestige, influence and, ultimately, continental and global hegemony. The naval race between Germany and the United Kingdom, the rise of military conscription, and the development of offensive military doctrines all followed a logic of outpacing the adversary rather than maintaining a balance. The rigid, automatic alliances then in place meant that every local crisis could escalate into a general war, while the political culture of the time regarded armed conflict as not only possible, but sometimes even inevitable or useful as a tool for redefining the balance of power. In this setting, the stockpiling of weapons structurally increased the likelihood of war by reducing the scope for mediation and making the use of force an increasingly practicable option.
Contemporary Europe finds itself in a radically different situation. The European Union is neither a traditional military power nor a fully sovereign strategic actor. Rather, it is an incomplete political construction, characterised by an extraordinary degree of economic and regulatory integration, yet exhibiting persistent weakness in the fields of defence and security. For over seventy years, the continent’s security has in fact been guaranteed by the NATO umbrella and, ultimately, by the United States. This delegation of strategic responsibility allowed the European states to pour their resources and political capital primarily into reconstruction, economic integration and the development of the welfare state—a choice that, in that historical context, was both rational and consistent with the bipolar nature of the Cold War. However, it created a long-term structural dependence that is now becoming increasingly problematic.
Today’s evolving international landscape has laid this weakness bare. The return of conventional warfare to continental Europe, competition among major powers, Russia’s growing assertiveness, and the emergence of a more unstable international order have called into question the fundamental assumption underpinning European security: the certainty of America’s commitment to it. The progressive disengagement of the United States—or at least the growing uncertainty over continued American support—has exposed the problem of Europe’s lack of autonomous means of guaranteeing its own security. In this context, the debate over European rearmament clearly stems not from sudden militaristic fervour, but from recognition of the strategic void that has formed over time.
European rearmament today, then, is not driven by a logic of symmetrical competition or the pursuit of military supremacy; Europe is neither attempting to ‘outpace’ other powers nor to establish itself as a global hegemon. On the contrary, following decades of underinvestment and fragmentation, it finds itself in a condition of relative inferiority. Essentially, increases in Europe’s defence spending and the strengthening of its military capabilities aim to close a gap and reach a minimum threshold of strategic credibility, without which the Union can neither effectively defend its territory nor participate in international relations as an autonomous actor. In this sense, it is misleading to use the term ‘arms race’: these moves are not about competing with equal powers; rather, they are efforts to recover capabilities that have been lost or were never fully developed.
One aspect often overlooked in public debate is the relationship between military capabilities and the pursuit of peace. The pacifist argument tends, among other things, to consider any strengthening of military capabilities as intrinsically destabilising, based on the assumption that peace derives from renunciation of force. Yet the history of international relations shows that lasting peace arises not from unilateral weakness, but from balance and deterrence. The détente between the opposing blocs during the Cold War, together with the main arms control agreements, was possible precisely because the two sides recognised each other as capable and credible actors. In the absence of a solid power base, diplomacy is weakened and reduced to mere declarations of intent.
Accordingly, European strategic autonomy does not contradict Europe’s commitment to peace, but instead constitutes a necessary condition for it, since a structurally weak Europe is an element not of stability but of vulnerability. Furthermore, dependence on external actors reduces the room for political decision-making and increases the risk of being dragged into dynamics determined externally. Paradoxically, Europe’s lack of autonomous military capabilities may well leave it more exposed to conflicts, not less. The real choice, therefore, is not between rearmament and pacifism, but between, on the one hand, a coordinated and integrated strengthening of defence capabilities and, on the other, their fragmentation along national lines, which multiplies inefficiencies and rivalries without actually enhancing security.
This brings us to the central roles of France and Germany. Historically, the main advances in the process of European integration have arisen in response to systemic crises and been driven by joint initiatives from these two countries. Even today, only Paris and Berlin possess sufficient political, economic and military weight to trigger—particularly in the event of a major external shock—a qualitative leap forward. France embodies a tradition of strategic autonomy and a culture of power that naturally incline it to support a strengthening of Europe’s military capabilities. Germany, while more hesitant strategically, represents the economic and industrial pillar without which any common defence project would lack substance. Credible European rearmament, if accompanied by industrial integration, a unified command and joint political decision-making, could serve as a driver of a deeper federal transformation of the Union.
Comparing the present situation to 1914, if done carefully, may have limited value as a warning against the risks of uncontrolled escalation. However, if this comparison is taken as the main interpretive lens, it becomes misleading. Contemporary Europe is not on the brink of a war driven by excessive power; the risk it faces stems rather from the opposite: strategic irrelevance and vulnerability resulting from prolonged weakness. European rearmament today does not signal a return to the past, but an attempt—belated yet necessary—to adapt to a changed international order. Unless it possesses at least minimal strategic autonomy, Europe can neither defend peace nor contribute meaningfully to its construction. In this sense, the strengthening of its defence capabilities, if undertaken as a means of deterrence, integration and shared responsibility, constitutes not a negation of peace, but rather a potential precondition for its preservation.
Giovanni Salpietro
